MIGRATIONPOLICY PRACTICEISSN 2223-5248

Joint Managing Editors:• SolonArdittis(Eurasylum)• FrankLaczko(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Advisers:

• JoannevanSelm(Eurasylum)• KarolinePopp(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Coordinator:

• ValerieHagger(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

Editorial Assistants:• MyleneBuensuceso(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)• AnnaLynConstantino(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Committee:

• AderantiAdepoju(HumanResourcesDevelopmentCentre,Lagos,Nigeria)

• RichardAresBaumgartner(EuropeanAgencyfortheManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersoftheEuropeanUnion–FRONTEX,Warsaw)

• PeterBosch(EuropeanCommission,Brussels)

• JuanCarlosCalleros(StaffOfficeofthePresidentofMexico)

• DavidCostello(Commissioner,OfficeoftheRefugeeApplications,fromtheGovernmentofIreland)

• HowardDuncan(Metropolis,Ottawa,Canada)

• NeliEsipova(GallupWorldPoll,NewYork)

• AraceliAzuaraFerreiro(OrganizationofAmericanStates–OAS,Washington,D.C.)

• PhilippeFargues(MigrationPolicyCentre–MPC,Florence)

• LukasGehrke(InternationalCentreforMigrationPolicyDevelopment–ICMPD,Vienna)

• ShahidulHaque(MinistryofForeignAffairs,GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofBangladesh)

• MichelleLeighton(InternationalLabourOffice–ILO,Geneva)

• WilliamMcClure(AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection)

• JenniferMcDonald(Passport,ImmigrationandCitizenshipAgency,MinistryofNationalSecurity,Jamaica)

• SankarRamasamy(DepartmentofLabour,NewZealand)

• DilipRatha(WorldBank,Washington,D.C.)

• CécileRiallant(EC-UNJointMigrationandDevelopmentInitiative,Brussels)

• NandKishoreSingh(MemberoftheIndianParliament,NewDelhi)

• SimonTonelli(CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg)

• AdrianavanDooijeweert(DutchAdvisoryCommitteeonMigrationAffairs–ACVZ,TheHague)

• MaiaWelbourne(CitizenshipandImmigrationCanada–CIC,Ottawa)

Published jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum Ltd.

A Bimonthly Journal for and by Policymakers Worldwide

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EDITORIAL BOARD

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MigrantsdisembarkedfromarescuevesselintheItalianportofAugustainSicily.©IOM2015(Photo:FrancescoMalavolta)

IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank LaczkoChanging the paradigm in protracted refugee situations: Towards self-relianceT. Alexander Aleinikoff

New channels and new tools of protection: Mobility and development approachesKathleen Newland

Mobility, livelihoods and safety: A new approach to forced migrantsRoger Zetter

From refugee to migrant? Labour mobility’s protection potentialKaty Long

Migration trends across the Mediterranean: Connecting the dotsArezo Malakooti

Remittances: How reliable are the data? Sandra Paola Alvarez, Pascal Briod, Olivier Ferrari and Ulrike Rieder

Irregular migration from the Horn of Africa to Europe Nassim MajidiSnapshot of migration trends in the MediterraneanTara BrianPublicationsMPP Readers’ Survey

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Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE2IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko1

InDecember2014,the13thplenarymeetingoftheTransatlantic Council on Migration, convened bytheMigrationPolicyInstitute(MPI),examinedthe

realitiesofthecurrentglobalprotectionsystem,whichisunderincreasingstrain,andsetouttoidentifygapsandopportunities for change. The reportspreparedfor the Council2 considered how governments andstakeholderscancooperatetoaddressexistingcrises,distribute responsibilities more fairly, create moreflexiblesystemsthatrespondtochangingrealitiesandpreventnewdisplacementfrombecomingprotracted.

Migration Policy Practicewelcomes theopportunitytopublish,inshortarticleform,aselectionofsomeofthemostnoteworthypapersdiscussedatthemeetingoftheTransatlanticCouncilonMigration.

In the first of these articles, T. Alexander Aleinikoffdiscusses the difficulties in applying the relief-to-development concept in situations of long-term displacement. Host States do not tend toinclude refugees in their national developmentplans, and as a result, international assistance todisplaced communities continues to originate from“humanitarian” sources. According to Aleinikoff, inordertobetterfostertheself-sufficiencyofrefugeesand the development of host communities, a newnarrative, new interventions and new partners willbe required. However, bringing together a rangeof actors with disparate agendas and interestswill be challenging, and will require policymakers,humanitarian actors and donor agencies to thinkcreatively and search actively for opportunities tocooperate, and to bring in non-traditional partnerssuchastheprivatesectoranddiasporas.

Inthesecondarticle,KathleenNewlandexploresthemainsourcesofstrainontheexistingsystemofrefugeeprotection, and possible avenues for strengtheningthesystem.AccordingtoNewland,currentsourcesofstrain on the existing protection system include the

1 Solon Ardittis isManaging Director of Eurasylum Ltd. FrankLaczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at theInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)HeadquartersinGeneva.Theyaretheco-editorsofMigration Policy Practice.

2 See http://migrationpolicy.org/programs/transatlantic-council-migration/refitting-global-protection-system-meet-challenges-modern

territorialbasisofasylumthatrequiresrefugeestobephysicallypresentinacountrytoclaimprotection,thecomplexmixofmigrantsandrefugees,thehighcostand inadequate financing of support to prima facierefugeepopulations incountriesoffirstasylum, theprotractednatureofdisplacement,andtheenforcedimmobility of refugees and other displaced peoplein countries of transit and/or first asylum, owing tothe lack of legal options for travel. New promisingapproaches to refitting the regime include breakingdowntheconceptualandinstitutionalwallsbetweenhumanitarian and development assistance, andfacilitatingmobilityforrefugeesandotherdisplacedpeoplesothattheycansecuretheirlivelihoods,gainaccess to a broader array of rights, and contributeto development in countries and communities oftemporaryorpermanentsettlement.

In the third article, Roger Zetter suggests that theconceptof“refugee”isbothincreasinglyproblematic,when confined to its definition in international law,and inadequate in scope to capture the complex,multivariate factors – beyond persecution – thatpropel displacement in the contemporary world.According to Zetter, while the mitigation of forceddisplacementthroughlong-termdevelopment,goodgovernanceandfullrespectforhumanrightsremainsthe ultimate aim, the increasing scale of conflict-drivenandenvironment-relatedmovementcontinuesto strain the existing regime for the protection ofthe displaced, and to generate new demands forprotection. In order to refit the global protectionsystem to meet the challenges of contemporaryhumanitarian crises, there is thus a need both toreinforce–andalsototranscend–thewell-establishedlegalandnormativeframeworksofprotection,andtoreframeourunderstandingoftheconceptsofforcedmigrationandprotection.

In the fourtharticle,KatyLongconsiders theextenttowhichlabourmigrationisbeingused–orcouldbeused in the future– to strengthen the internationalrefugee protection regime and facilitate durablesolutions for refugees. Refugeesmaymigrate (aftergainingasylum)foreducation,forhealthorforfamilyreasons (includingmarriage). Thismigrationmaybeentirely voluntary,or constrainedby factors suchaspoverty or insecurity. According to Long, the mostpromisingapproachestoharnessingthedevelopmentpotential of refugees are those that concentrateon securing regularization and work authorization

Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 3

for refugees already residing in countries of firstasylum. Also promising are small-scale programmesin developed economies that look to fill particularlabour-marketshortageswhilemeetinghumanitarianand development obligations. Policymakers andinternational actorswould thus dowell to considerremoving obstacles that keep otherwise qualifiedrefugeesfromaccessingexistingmigrationchannels,andofferingnewmigrationopportunitiestospecificgroups of refugees, whether within a region (suchas through expanded regional free movementarrangements) or further afield (through temporarywork programmes in developed countries, forexample).

The second setof articles in this issueofMigration Policy Practice focuses more directly on issues ofirregularmigrationandremittances.

The first article on this theme, by ArezoMalakooti,examines the recent dynamics of migration flowsacross theMediterranean by looking at two routesin particular: Western Mediterranean and CentralMediterranean. Based on research and fieldworkcommissioned by the International Organizationfor Migration (IOM), the article informs the typicalprofiles of migrants, the push and pull factors, themaintravelroutesandtheconditionsofthejourneyof migration flows across the Mediterranean. Thearticle also discusses the key decision-makingfactors when selecting between the western andtheCentralMediterraneanroutes.Theseincludethelevelofcontrolatbordercrossingpoints,theeaseofpassagetoEurope,thepossibilityforregularizationatsomepointalongtheroute,the levelsofabuseandconditionsinthetransitcountries,therisksinvolved,thedurationofthe journey,thecostofthe journey,and the presence of networks or friends along thewayorintransitcountries.

In the second article, Sandra Paola Alvarez,Pascal Briod, Olivier Ferrari and Ulrike Riederdiscuss issues related to estimations of aggregatevolumes of remittances, bilateral remittances andremittance transfer costs. The authors suggest thatthe methodologies commonly used to estimateremittancesandremittancetransfercostsnecessarilyintroduceanumberofbiasesorsufferfromlimitationsthat confirm how problematic it is to generateaccurate“evidence”onremittances.Forpolicymakingpurposes, itmay thereforebeworthexploringwaystoimproveourunderstandingofremittancetransfercosts by facilitating new partnerships that allow forthe development of more complex methodologiesanddatasets.Betterestimationsof remittancecostsare not only likely to influence the transparency of

remittancepricesbutalsoaddress currentprioritiesrelatingtoreducingremittancetransfercosts.

In the third article, Nassim Majidi discusses IOM’sactivities to raise awareness about the risks andconsequencesofirregularmigrationfromSomaliland,whereanestimated400to700youngmigrants joinirregular flows to Libya through Ethiopia and Sudanevery month. Awareness-raising about this issuehighlights changes in asylum policies in Europe(especiallyNorwayandSweden,hometothelargestSomali communities inEurope), the limitedchancesof success, dangers and risks during the journey,and challenges faced upon arrival in Europe. TheIOM campaign aims to bring greater awareness ofthehuge risks involved in irregularmigrationwheremany fall victims to trafficking and unscrupulousmiddlemen, while others arrive in Europe only torealizethatopportunitiestherearelimited.AccordingtoMajidi, given the economic instability in Somaliaand thedecreasing likelihoodofprotectiongiven toapplicants to gain asylum in Europe, thenumberofSomali youthmigrating irregularly to Europe is onlylikely to increase. As such, awareness campaignsalone cannot lead to behavioural changes butmustbeaccompaniedbyprogrammesspecificallytargetingyouthandemployment.

In the lastarticle,TaraBrianprovidesa snapshotofcurrentmigrationtrendsintheMediterranean.Basedon IOM’s regularly updated data, the article showsthatwhilelastyearsawthearrivalinEuropeofover220,000peoplefromacrosstheMediterranean,morethan 135,000 migrants have already disembarkedin Southern Europe in the first sixmonths of 2015.In particular, the Eastern Mediterranean route hasseen an unprecedented increase in the number ofmigrantscrossingtoGreecethisyear,withanaverageof nearly 800 arrivals daily in June 2015. Althoughthis year’s arrivals to Greece match the numbersdisembarking in Italy, the increase in flows in theEastern Mediterranean does not coincide with adecrease in numbers crossing through the CentralMediterranean: flows to Italy have risen by roughly5percentwhencomparedwiththenumbersinthistime period last year. Syrians are by far the largestgroup arriving in Greece through the Aegean Sea,whileintheCentralMediterraneanEritreansarethedominantnationality.

WethankallthecontributorstothisissueofMigration Policy Practiceandinvitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinasurveywhichaimstohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimary interests inour journal.Shouldyouwishtoparticipate inthissurvey,pleaseclick here.n

Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE4

Introduction

Almost60millionpersonsaredisplacedbecauseof conflict and violence in the world today;2andthemajorityoftheworld’sforcedmigrants

– refugees and internally displaced persons – areinprotractedsituations,with littlechancethat theirdisplacementwillendanytimesoon.Takentogether,thesefactspaintadeeplydisturbingpicture.Millionsofpersonshavenotonlybornetheinjuriesandcostsof being forced from their homes, they continue tosuffer those harms, their lives essentially placed onlong-termhold.

These are unhappy facts, too, for host and donorStates.Thevastmajorityoftheworld’sforcedmigrantsreside in developing countries, which expect andrelyontheinternationalcommunitytohelpprovideassistancetothedisplaced.Thisisparticularlysoforrefugeeswho,unliketheinternallydisplacedpersons,arenotcitizensoftheStatesthathaveprovidedthemasylum.Whileemergenciesmayattracta significantamountof funding,3 support tends todiminishovertime.Long-standingsituationsareperceivedtohaveneithertheurgencynorlikelihoodofresolutionthatdrawsheighteneddonorinterest.Fundsaredisbursedyear after year with little enthusiasm, amid beliefsthatnotmuchmorecan,orshould,bedone.

It should seem curious that assistance provided torefugees severaldecadesafter theirdisplacement iscategorized as “humanitarian” by governments and

1 T.AlexanderAleinikoffservedas theUnitedNationsDeputyHighCommissionerforRefugeesfromFebruary2010throughJune 2015. This article is based on research commissionedbytheTransatlanticCouncilonMigration,aninitiativeoftheMigration Policy Institute, for its 13th plenary session, heldinDecember2014.FormoreontheTransatlanticCouncilonMigration, please visit www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/transatlantic-council-migration

2 (Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR),UNHCR Global Trends 2014: A World at War (Geneva,UNHCR,2015).Available fromwww.refworld.org/docid/558292924.html

3 UNHCR alone received nearly USD 1 billion in both 2013and2014toassistrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonsaffectedbytheconflictintheSyrianArabRepublic.

multilateralinternationalorganizations.Humanitarianreliefisusuallyassociatedwithemergencies–tents,blankets, foodandmedicalcareforthosewhohavebeenforcedfromtheirhomesafteracataclysmicevent(earthquake,tsunami,civilwar,targetedpersecutionandthreatenedgenocide).AstheUnitedNations(UN)guidancegoes,humanitarianreliefshouldgiveway–infairlyshortorder–toreconstruction;asthefloodwatersrecede,peopleshouldleavetheiremergencyshelters andbegin to rebuild their homes and theircommunities.

The relief-to-development mantra can make senseincasesofnaturaldisaster,whenatemporaryshockhas taken a community off its normal developmentcourse. But this concept is more difficult to applyin situations of long-term displacement. Refugeecampsandsettlementspersist inhostcommunities,usually as isolated, unproductive islands sustainedlargelybytheinternationalcommunity–orneglectedaltogether. Host States are not likely to includerefugeesintheirnationaldevelopmentplans,meantfor their own citizens, and are not likely to wantinternational funders to divert development dollarstonon-nationals.Asaresult,internationalassistanceto displaced communities continues to be sourcedfrom“humanitarian”basketsnomatterhowlongthedisplacement continues.Ahallmarkof such fundingis that it usually bypasses host States, althoughStaterefugeeagenciesmayreceivefinancialsupportandhost communitiesmaybenefit fromsome localservices, such as schools and water, sanitation andhealth (WASH) projects. Development funding,meanwhile, is generally bilateral and provided toStatesaccordingtotheirdevelopmentplans.

Not surprisingly, programming follows funding. Theprovisionof emergency relief comesfirst, as dollarsfromdonoremergencyfundsflowin.Butsoonafter,theOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR) and other multilateral andnon-governmental organization (NGO) actors shiftto general forms of assistance, underwritten bygrants from humanitarian funding streams. Theresult is somewhat pejoratively referred to as“care andmaintenance”, and it is now the reigningparadigm for assistance to the long-term displaced.

Changing the paradigm in protracted refugee situations: Towards self-relianceT. Alexander Aleinikoff1

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No officially sanctioned category is to be foundbetween humanitarian and development funding;hence,thestretchingoftheterm“humanitarian”tocoverassistanceinprotractedsituations.Butperhapsit istimeto recognizemore frankly the fundingandspending category assigned to most of the world’sdisplacedforwhatitis:dollarsfordependence.

Beyond “care and maintenance”

If long-term dependence is the problem, thenfostering self-reliance is a plausible solution. Thequestion is how tomake self-reliance acceptable tohostcommunitiesandinterestingtodonors.

HostStatesperceivemajordisincentivestopromotingrefugees’ self-reliance. For asylum States, refugeesare temporary residentswho should return to theirhomecountryassoonasconditionsallow.Topromotetheir self-sufficiency through economic activity andparticipationwouldbe,ineffect,topromoteapolicyof local integration–ahard sell tohost communitypopulations and national constituencies. Indeed,this is why States are reluctant to include refugeesinnationaldevelopmentplans;it ishardtoarguetocitizens that sovereign debt should be increased totake care of noncitizens. The promotion of policiesthatfosterself-reliancealsorunscountertotheclaimthatrefugeepopulationsareaburden–aclaimthatisthebasisfordemandsforgreaterfinancialsupportfromtheinternational(humanitarian)community.

The moral argument seems clear: long-termdependencyforforcedmigrants,coupledwithalackofmembershipinaState,deniesmillionsofpersonsapresentandafuture.Theinternationalcommunityshouldneithersupportnoracceptit.Butmorethanappealstohumanitarianprincipleswillbenecessarytofundamentallychangeaningrainedsetofpracticesandpolicies.

To be sure, in the midst of an emergency, forcedmigrantswill need immediate care; but the idea ofrefugeesaspersonsforwhomthenecessitiesof lifemust be provided should endwhen the emergencyends.Afterall,beforetheconflictthatpromptedtheirflight,refugeeswerelikelytobelivingtypicallivesintheir home countries – providing for their families,caring for their children and engaging with theircommunities.Giventheopportunity,thereisnoreasonthatmostcouldnotresumesuchlivesagain,albeitinanewcountryofresidence.Fromthisperspective,weshouldseerefugeesindevelopmentterms:theyarea

groupofpotentiallyproductivepersons,abletotakecareofthemselvesandcontributetotheeconomyofthe host community. Because many refugee campsandsettlementsare located in lessdevelopedareasofhostStates,thepotentialofrefugeestocontributetodevelopmenttakesonaddedvalue.

Indeed, refugees aremore than potential skilled orunskilledworkers,entrepreneursandsmall-businessoperators. Because they are, in some sense, theresponsibility of the international community, theyprovide links to international humanitarian anddevelopment funds. Refugees should thus be seentoofferdualbenefitstotheeconomicgrowthofhostStates, both through their own efforts and throughthe international funding their presence is likely toattract.

Crucialtothisshiftinperspectiveisthewillingnessofdevelopmentactors to seedisplacementas anareaofprogrammatic interest.Thisbriefexploresseveralpractical options for increasing the priority given toforced migrants by humanitarian and developmentactors, host States and donor States. It begins byproposing several programmatic interventions thatmovebeyond the standard “careandmaintenance”response, and then discusses possible tools forimplementingthem.Takentogether,thesesuggestionsraise a provocative question: if development actorscometoseedisplacementasafundingpriority(andthe fundingprovided isadditional to thatotherwiseplanned), can we imagine a world where Statescompeteforthe“privilege”ofhostingrefugees?

Programmatic interventions

Tosaythatforcedmigrantsarevaluablecontributorstoeconomicdevelopmentdoesnotmakeitreal.Thebestwaytobringthenewmodelintoexistencewouldbetoundertakeprojectsnowthatareconsistentwiththe new vision. Rather than a dramatic paradigmshift,whatisbeingsuggestedisaparadigmslide–asanewwayofdoingbusinessthatultimatelyleadstoanewwayofunderstandingthebusinesswearetryingto do. The changes to current policy and practiceneeded to set this inmotion include: (1) improvedimplementation of refugees’ existing labour-marketrights; and (2) better development of livelihoodopportunities at both individual and community orsystemlevels.

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Refugees’ rights to work, to self-employment and to pursue professions

Firstandforemost,refugeesmustbegiventherighttowork.4 This does not require a paradigm shift; itsimplyrecognizesarightalreadyincludedinthe1951Convention5 that called the international refugeeregimeintoexistence.WhilenocomprehensivestudyhasyetinvestigatedhostStates’respectfortherighttowork, a recent analysis of the situationofnearly5million refugees (representing 18different States)revealedthat45percentofthoserefugeesenjoynolegal right towork,while theremaining55percentfacesignificantdefactobarrierstoemployment.6

TheConventiondoes not stop at the right towork.It also guarantees an increasing bundle of rightsto refugees as they develop deeper connectionsto their country of residence. Refugees lawfully present within a State are entitled to “treatmentas favourable as possible and, in any event, no lessfavourable than that accorded toaliens generally inthesamecircumstances”withrespecttotherighttoself-employment.7 Refugees lawfully staying withina State are entitled to enjoy “the most favourabletreatmentaccordedtonationalsofaforeigncountryinthesamecircumstances”withrespecttotherightto engage in wage-earning employment,8 as wellas the right to practice a liberal profession.9 Evenotherwise acceptable restrictions on foreigners’employmentrightsareinapplicabletorefugeeswhohavecompletedthreeyears’residenceinthecountry,

4 This is not an issue for internally displaced persons, whowouldhavetheusualrightspertainingtocitizenship.

5 Here and throughout, the Convention being referred tois the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugeesand the subsequent 1967 Protocol; for the full text, see:UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees(Geneva,UNHCR,2010),availablefromwww.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html

6 Asylum Access, Global RefugeeWork Rights Report: TakingtheMovementfromTheorytoPractice(Oakland,California,Asylum Access, 2014), available from http://asylumaccess.org/AsylumAccess/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/FINAL_Global-Refugee-Work-Rights-Report-2014_Interactive.pdf.Identifiedbarrierstoemploymentincludeinadequateaccesstonationalrefugeestatus,xenophobia,bureaucraticbarriers,andinadequateaccesstovocationaltrainingandeducation.

7 1951Convention,Article18.

8 1951Convention,Article17(1).

9 1951Convention,Article19(1).

orarespousesorparentsofnationalsofthecountryofasylum.10

Admittedly, host States may be reluctant to grantrefugees a right to work if domestic populationsbelievethatrefugeeswillcompetewiththemforjobs.Onesolution,tobeexploredbelow,wouldbetofoldarighttoworkintobroaderdevelopmentplansforhostcommunities.

A better approach to livelihoods

UNHCR and NGO partners fund tens of millions ofdollars of livelihood development projects annually.Most projects are rather small, providing a limitednumberofrefugeeswithsomeskills,suchastailoring,soap-makingorwoodworking;supplyingafamilywithacoworchickens;ordistributingseedsandtoolsforsubsistencefarming.Usuallynosignificantanalysisisconductedofmarketsforthegoodsproducedorskillsacquiredand littlefollow-up isdonetoseewhetherthe incomes and prospects of persons passingthrough the projects havematerially improved.Norhas UNHCR generated persuasive evidence thatnumerous “microcredit” projects have moved largenumbersofrefugeestowardsself-sufficiency.11

Thefactisthatlivelihooddevelopmentisnotviewedas a core function of humanitarian organizations,particularly beyond projects for the displaced.To date, few organizations have had either theknowledgeortrainedstafftoconstructandconductrobustprogrammes(includingevaluationsofprojectbenefits), although this is changing. Humanitarianorganizations are becoming more sophisticated intheir approaches to livelihoods, as the followingexamplesdemonstrate.12

10 1951Convention,Article17(2).Notably,Article17(3)furtheremphasizes the drafters’ preoccupation with employmentrightsbyrequiringStatesto“givesympatheticconsiderationtoassimilatingthe[wage-earning]rightsofallrefugees...tothoseofnationals.”

11 Indeed,manyoftheprogrammesarejustifiedmoreintermsof psychosocial support for vulnerable refugees or givingotherwise idle young men something to occupy their timethanintermsofadvancementtowardsself-sufficiency.

12 See, for example: UNHCR, Global Strategy for Livelihoods: A UNHCR Strategy 2014–2018 (Geneva, UNHCR, 2014).Availablefromwww.unhcr.org/530f107b6.pdf

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Assistance at the individual level

UNHCR is currently piloting a multidisciplinaryapproach to poverty reduction – the “graduationmodel” – which sequences social protection,livelihood development and access to finance. Themodel supports refugees’ immediate needs whilebuilding the foundation for longer-term human-capitalinvestments.13DevelopedinruralBangladesh,the model is now being introduced into urbanenvironments inCostaRica,EcuadorandEgypt.Thegraduation model begins by targeting the stresscausedbyconditionsofextremepoverty,suchasfoodinsecurity. In the second stage,participantsdevelopfinancialdisciplinebycreatingaspecificsavingsplanand learning about financial service providers. Theythen receive training focused on asset preservationand entrepreneurial skills, as well as health andsocial issues. Finally, participants are matched withsustainable economic activities based on theirqualifications, existingmarket conditions and assets(including available microloans). The Ecuadoreanprojectiscurrentlyscreeningcandidates,andisslatedtotakeabout18monthstoreachitsfinalstage.

Itisincreasinglyrecognizedthatstrategiestosupportlivelihoods are likely to be more effective whenbeneficiaries are economically invested in projects.So, forexample, inZambia,aspartofaprogrammefostering the local integration of former Angolanrefugees,farmersareadvancedseedsandtoolsupontheconditionthattheypaybackthecostoftheinputsfromprofitsgeneratedbytheiractivity.Otheravenuesmay provide access to capital to support income-generating enterprises. Through a self-sufficiencyinitiative in Ecuador, for instance, Banco Pinchinchahasbeguntoofferrefugeesbankaccounts,microloansandfinancialcounselling.

Broader development opportunities

Far-reaching programmes can be established basedonaneconomicunderstandingoftherefugeehostingareaandbroadermarketconditions.Ratherthanjustgiving refugees seeds to grow crops for householdconsumption,larger-scaleagriculturalprojectscanbeenvisagedthatbringbenefitsbothtorefugeeandhostcommunities.Projectsofthistypehavebeeninitiatedin Ethiopia and Chad and are being considered forrefugee settlement areas in Uganda. The crops to

13 Ibid.

be planted are chosen based on an analysis of thedemandfortheminthelocalareaandbeyond.Otherkinds of agricultural programmes are possible aswell. In Burkina Faso, with the support of the IKEAFoundation,UNHCR is initiatingaprojecttoaddressa dramatic undersupply ofmilk by building skills inboth the refugee andhost communities to increasetheproductioncapacityoflocaldairies.Ifsuccessful,theprojectwillexpandavaluablesourceofnutrition,increase income levels for both refugees andhosts,andproviderefugeeswithvaluableskillsthattheycantakebacktoMaliwhenreturnbecomesfeasible.14

Alessdirectbutpotentiallymoreusefulrouteforwardistoprovideinfrastructure(roads,energy,vocationalschoolsandhospitals)uponwhicheconomicactivitycanbebased.Thethinkingisthatrefugee(andhostcommunity)enterpriseswillbestartedwhenthereisafoundationtosupportthem.Aneconomicallyvibrantareashouldthengeneratethejobsandopportunitiesthatareneededforself-sufficiency.

Instrumentalities

To move towards a new paradigm, humanitarianorganizations will need help. Donor States willneed to conceptualize aid for the displaced in abroader context; host States will have to recognizeand support programmes for the displaced that gobeyond maintaining dependency; and developmentorganizations will need to contribute programmeknowledge and new funding. All these actions arelinked:hostStatesaremorelikelytoacceptabroaderviewofprogrammingforthedisplacedifitcomeswithtangiblebenefitsforhostcommunities.DonorStateswillcometoacceptthenewparadigmifitissupportedby host States. Lastly, development agencies willcontributetothenewapproachifitisrepresentedinnationaland localdevelopmentplanning.Non-Stateactorssuchasdiasporacommunitiesandtheprivatesector can also be invited to help implement newinitiatives.

14 UNHCR,Milk Solutions for theLivelihoodsandSelf-RelianceofMalianRefugees andHost Communities in Burkina Faso:Seeds for Solutions 2014–2017 (Geneva, UNHCR, 2014).Availablefromhttp://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/milk-solutions-livelihoods-and-self-reliance-malian-refugees-and-host

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Development actors

The involvement of development actors appearsto be the greatest challenge. To date, developmentagencieshaveplayeda limited role indisplacementfor two reasons: (1) displacement has not beenaddressedbynationaland localdevelopmentplans;and(2)theseactorshavenotseenthedevelopmentneedsofthedisplacedasafundingpriority,giventhecharacterizationof thoseneedsas“humanitarian”.15The first reason would be countered by makingprogressonthesecond–thatis,itishighlylikelythatnationalandlocalplanswouldencompassareasthathost displaced people if donors indicated a stronginterestthattheydoso.

Theargumentthatdevelopmentactorsshouldmakedisplacementafocusofconcernisthreefold:

•First, it is clear – at least in some situations –that displacement has an impact on national economic growth;16 that is, the arrival of forcedmigrantsaffectsthedevelopmenttrajectoryofthehostState.Seenpositively,displacementpresentsopportunities for economic growth because ofthe talents and capacities of forced migrantscombinedwiththehostcommunity.

15 In extreme cases – such as in Lebanon and Jordan –development actors have shown interest in displacedcommunities,butthekindofparticipationobservedinthesecases (helping local communities withstand immediatecrisis) is of a different nature thanwhat is being suggestedhere.Post-emergencyandlong-termdisplacementsituationsrequiremore than a bifurcated approach, in which UNHCRanditspartnersfocusonrefugees,whiletheUnitedNationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) and development actorsfocus on host communities. Development actors must bepart of the refugee response itself; that is, the goal of thedevelopmentworkshouldincluderefugees’self-relianceandhostcommunities’growth,aswellastherehabilitationofthecommunitiesaffectedbycrisis.

16 ArecentWorldBankreportnotesthat“forceddisplacement...hasimportanteconomic,social,political,andenvironmentalimpactsontheplacesoforiginanddestination”;D.Rathaetal., “Migration and remittances: Recent developments andoutlook (Special topic: Forced migration)” (Migration and Development Brief 23,Washington,D.C.,WorldBank,October2014), available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief23.pdf. A report on Africa’sGreat Lakes region (GLR) also concludes that “[i]mpactsof displacement can be a source of fragility for the region,with displacement having the potential to negatively affectthe stability and prospects for economic development intheGLRasawhole”; see:WorldBankandUNHCR,“Forceddisplacement in the Great Lakes region” (Internal Draft,Washington,D.C.,WorldBankandUNHCR,2014),47–8.

•Second,whetherornotaneffectonhost-countryGDPcanbeshown,17refugees are highly likely to be doubly excluded from development assistance –thatis,bothfromthecountrytheyfledandfromthecountrythathasgrantedthemasylum.Ifoneofthehallmarksofpost-2015developmentthinkingis universality and inclusion, then areas hostingdisplaced populations are prime candidates forfocusandconcern.

•Third, development programming for displaced populations will improve their chances of a sustainable return to their home State whilebenefittingtheoveralldevelopmentoftheState.So, for example, one might appropriately viewdevelopmentassistancetoSomalirefugeecampsasimplicitdevelopmentassistancetoSomalia.

It may be that these three arguments – based onrecognizing impact, endingexclusionand facilitating return–areenoughtomotivatedevelopmentactorsto recognize displacement as an area for attentionand funding. And indeed there are some hopefulsigns.AWorldBank initiative inAfrica’sGreatLakesregion recommends that development actorsencourage the inclusion of displaced populationsand host communities inwider development plans,supporteducationeffortsfordisplacedchildren,anddevelopandfundapproaches“toenhancethevoiceand representation of displaced communities bystrengtheningtheircivilsocietyandcontactwithlocalauthorities.”18

But it may be that structural change withindevelopmentorganizationswouldbethesurestwaytofocusattentionondisplacement.OneexampleofsuchachangeisthecreationofanofficeinGermany’sFederal Ministry for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment dedicated to displacement. Initiatedwith EUR 170 million budget, the unit is intendedto link development plans to relief for displacedpopulations.

17 For example, a World Bank report concludes that, for theyears2012–2014,displacementcausedbytheSyrianconflictmay cut real GDP growth in Lebanon by 2.9 per cent eachyear;see:WorldBank,Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict (Washington, D.C.,WorldBank,2013),availablefromhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18292074/lebanon-economic-social-impact-assessment-syrian-conflict

18 WorldBankandUNHCR,“Forceddisplacement in theGreatLakes region”, (InternalDraft,Washington,D.C.,WorldBankandUNHCR,2014),47–8.

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To say that development planning is crucial toa new paradigm for solving situations of forcedmigrationisnottoimplysomekindofhandoverfromhumanitarian to development agencies. Rather, theneedsassessmentandplanningprocessesshouldbejointfromthestart–perhapscoordinatedbytheUNCountryTeam,withUNHCRinthelead.

The diaspora

The diaspora – defined here as co-nationals (andtheir descendants) living in a third country – is anuntapped resourcewithpotentially great interest insupporting displaced populations. If the paradigm“slide” discussed here involves replacing “care andmaintenance” with self-reliance, then diasporacommunities are likely to have means and talentsto contribute. They may also have close ties tothe country of origin and could assist in producingsustainablereturnprogrammes.Inaddition,diasporacommunitiesmayincludeinfluentialpoliticalactorsinresettlement countries that could generate supportfordonor-Statepoliciesthatfostertheself-relianceofdisplacedpopulations.

Effectivemobilizationofthediasporawillrequireneweffortsbyhumanitarianorganizations,whichtypicallylose touch with displaced populations once theyhaveachievedasolution.Therearesomepromisingsigns. The 2014 Addis Ababa Commitment towardsSomali Refugees (a product of High CommissionerAntónio Guterres’ Global Initiative on SomaliRefugees)recognizedthat“theSomalidiasporahaveanimportantroletoplay”inturningthecommitmentinto practice.19 Another example is the RefugeeCongressestablishedbytheUNHCRRegionalOfficeinWashington.TheCongressincludesresettledrefugeesfromeachoftheUSstatesandpromotesadvocacyintheUnitedStatesonbehalfoftherefugees.Itcouldalsobemobilizedtosupportpersonswhohavenotyetfoundasolutiontotheirdisplacement,byprovidingscholarships,marketingassistance, contractualworkandprofessionalopportunities.

Private investors

Onceweshiftourfocusfromcontinuedhumanitarianassistance to the self-reliance of refugees and thedevelopmentof theirhostcommunities, itbecomeslogicaltoaskwhatroleprivateinvestmentmightplay.

19 UNHCR,AddisAbabaCommitmenttowardsSomaliRefugees(Geneva, UNHCR, 2014). Available from www.unhcr.org/540dac2c6.pdf

Giventhepresenceofunderutilizedeconomicactors–thatis,ofrefugeeswhoarenotparticipatingintheeconomy either as producers or consumers – theprivatesectormayseeopportunitiesfor investingininfrastructureandstart-upbusinesses.Humanitarianagenciescoulddeveloptripartiteagreementsamonghost States, investors andmultilateral organizationsthat provide incentives to private developers whilealso securing the rights and advancement of thedisplaced.

Conclusion

The negative consequences of protracted situationsof displacement have long been understood. Theyundermine human development for the displaced,whoselivesareessentiallyputonhold.Withapparentsolutionsoutofreach,hostStatesmayfacegrowingburdensastheinternationalcommunitylosesinterestanddonorsupportdeclines.Asprotractedsituationsbecome the norm, it is clear – for bothmoral andpracticalreasons–thatthelong-termdependencyofmillionsofdisplacedpersonscannotbeanacceptableoutcomefortheinternationalhumanitariansystem.

Tobetterfostertheself-sufficiencyofrefugeesandthedevelopmentofhost communities,anewnarrative,newinterventionsandnewpartnerswillbeneeded.Recognizing thedevelopment potential of displacedpopulations for both host and origin communitiesis essential to shift the common perception ofdisplacementfromthatofaburdentoabenefit.

Bringing together such a range of actors withdisparate agendas and interestswill be challenging,anditwillrequirepolicymakers,humanitarianactorsand donor agencies to think creatively and searchactivelyforopportunitiestocooperate,andtobringinnon-traditionalpartnerssuchastheprivatesectorand diaspora. Amid the mounting pressures placedon the humanitarian system by new crises, findingsustainable solutions to long-standing refugeesituationsisacriticalpriority.n

“Recognizing the development potential of displaced

populations...is essential to shift the common perception

of displacement from that of a burden to a benefit.”

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New channels and new tools of protection: Mobility and development approachesKathleen Newland1

Introduction

The regime of international protection builtaround the 1951 Convention Relating to theStatusofRefugeesisnotworkingasenvisioned;

it is neither protecting refugees and other forciblydisplaced people adequately nor achieving durablesolutionsforthem.2ThefaultisnotintheConvention,butinthefailuretointerpretandapplyitasalivingdocument responsive to the evolving realities ofcontemporaryforcibledisplacement.

Many governments, especially those of wealthydeveloped countries, are choosing to apply theConvention narrowly, forcing huge flows of peoplein need of protection into channels that cannotaccommodate them. Displaced people encountersignificantrisksasaresult,andtheunauthorizedflowsmaygeneratetheperceptionthatmigrationisoutofcontrol. The political challenges that governmentsface when they cannot convince their electoratesthattheyareabletomanagetheirbordersjeopardizemorethanthelongevityofpolitical leadership.Suchchallengesmayalsonarrowthealreadylimitedspaceavailableforinternationalcooperationonprotection,

1 Kathleen Newland is Co-Founder and a Senior Fellow ofthe Migration Policy Institute (MPI), where she directs theMigrants, Migration, and Development Program and leadsthe Institute’s work on refugee protection. This article isbasedonresearchcommissionedbytheTransatlanticCouncilonMigration, an initiative of theMPI, for its 13th plenarysession, held in December 2014. For more information onthe Transatlantic Council on Migration, please visit www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/transatlantic-council-migration

2 This article reserves the term “refugee” for people whoconformtothedefinitionofArticle1ofthe1951ConventionRelating to the Status of Refugees, and uses “displacedpeople” for the larger category of people forced to leavetheir homes for reasons other than those described in theConventionbutwhoareinneedofsomeformofinternationalprotection. According to Article 1, “the term ‘refugee’ shallapply toanypersonwho . . .owing towell-founded fearofbeing persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,membershipofaparticularsocialgroup,orpoliticalopinionisoutsidethecountryofhisnationalityandisunableor,owingtosuchfear,isunwillingtoavailhimselfoftheprotectionofthatcountry...”((Officeofthe)UnitedNationsHighCommissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR),Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva,UNHCR,2010),availablefromwww.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html)

as governments become increasingly risk-averse intheir dealings with refugees and other displacedpersons.

ThegovernmentsofWesterndevelopedcountriesarespendinghugeamountsofmoneyonsystemsthatarenotproducingtheresults–intermsofsafety,security(both personal and national), protection of humanrights,andeconomicadvancement–desiredbytheircitizens aswell as by displaced people. States havealso failed to develop, as new situations demand,additionalplatformsfor internationalcooperationtoprotect, assist, and find solutions for the displacedwhile alsomaking it possible for them to use theirskillsandtalentsproductively.Inacontextofmultiplesimultaneous crises resulting in displacement on ascalenotseensinceWorldWarII,thelimitationsofthecurrentsystemarepromptingcallsforafundamentalrethinkingof theprotectionregime.Reformsshouldbedesignedtosupplementandreinforce,ratherthanreplace, the Convention-based refugee protectionsystem.

To strengthen the protection regime – and addressthe pressures facing communities and governmentsproviding protection – national policymakers andinternational agencies will need to undertake acomprehensive evaluation of the dynamics ofdisplacement crises, from beginning to end; simplyreactingtodisplacementonceitreachestheirbordershas proven to be insufficient. To get ahead of themomentum of crises, new approaches will need tolook beyond asylum and deploy both developmentresourcesandmobilityoptions.

The chaos and misery surrounding displacementare in no one’s interest except those who profitfromhumandespair– chiefly smugglers, traffickers,corrupt officials and exploitative employers. Thedesperatecircumstancesofthedisplacedunderminenotonlyhumansecuritybutalsotheruleoflawand

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thefundamentallegitimacyofthemodernsystemofsovereignStates.3

This article explores the main sources of strain ontheexistingsystemofprotection,andthetwomostpromising avenues for strengthening the system. Itmakesthecaseforarobust,cooperativeinternationaleffort to go beyond humanitarian assistance andincorporate new tools and new channels for theprotectionofthedisplaced.

Sources of strain on the international protection regime

Anumberofunderlyingfactorsfeedtheinadequacyofthecurrentprotectionregime:

• The territorial basis of asylum that requiresrefugeestobephysicallypresent inacountry toclaimprotection;

• The complex mix of migrants and refugees,someofwhommayhavestrongclaimstointernationalprotection,andotherswhohavenone;

• The high cost and inadequate financing of support toprimafacierefugeepopulationsincountriesoffirstasylum;

• The protracted nature of displacement for themajorityofrefugeesandformanyotherdisplacedpeople;

• The enforced immobility of refugees and otherdisplaced people in countries of transit and/orfirstasylum,owingtothelackoflegaloptionsfortravel.

These factors are discussed in more detail below;however,itisworthnotingthatonlythefirstcanbetracedtothelegalprovisionsoftheConventionitself.

The territorial basis of asylum

Theinternationalprotectionregimepredicatesasylumon access to the territoryof a Stateother than theasylum-seeker’s country of origin. Yet governments

3 TheWestphalian system gives sovereign States the right tomonopolize force within their boundaries so that they canprotect their citizens from internal and external threats;internationalprotectionprovidedbyotherStatesfillsthegapandpreservesthelegitimacyofthesystemasawhole,whenindividualStatesfailintheirobligationstoprotecttheirowncitizens.Thus,therefugeeregimeisasmuchaboutprotectingthesystemofStatesasitisaboutprotectingindividuals.

that have the means to do so invest enormousamountsofphysical,financialand,sometimes,moralcapital to prevent and deter unauthorized entries.The“non-entrée”policiesofcapableStates,coupledwithverylimitedlegalchannelsofaccessforpeoplefrom developing countries to those States, make itextremely difficult for refugees and other displacedpeople to gain access to territory where they canclaimasylum.

Legal avenues of entry are all but closed to peoplewhodonotmeettheselectioncriteria(chieflybasedondesiredskillsorclosefamilyties)oftheirintendedcountries of destination. As a result, most asylum-seekershavenooption forentry intoanother Stateother than illegal means. Recognizing this, Article31 of the Refugee Convention proscribes Statesfrom penalizing asylum-seekers for entering theirterritories without authorization, although this isqualified by the requirement that the refugeemustbe coming directly from a territory where his orher life or freedom was under threat (as specifiedby the Convention’s definition of refugees).4Manygovernments invoke this caveat to refuse asylumto refugees who have transited through anothercountry, however precarious their presence in thatcountry may have been and however compellingtheirneedforprotection.Illegalentrycarriesataint(oftenexacerbatedorevencreatedbypopulistmediaand political opportunists) that may divert policyresponsesawayfromproblem-solvingtowardssimplerefusal even to consider the protection claims ofdisplacedpeople.

Mixed flows

Much of contemporary displacement does notmap onto the persecution-based, grounds-specificdefinition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention.5Many, if not most, of the people moving in searchof protection are fleeing from a complex mix ofinterrelated factors such as generalized violence,armed conflict, individualized persecution, thecollapse of governance, widespread human rightsabuses, ethnic or sectarian tensions, and a host of

4 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva,UNHCR,2010).Availablefromwww.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html

5 R.Zetter,Protection in Crisis: Forced Migration and Protection in a Global Era (Washington,D.C.,MigrationPolicyInstitute,2015). Available from www.migrationpolicy.org/research/protection-crisis-forced-migration-and-protection-global-era

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exacerbating factors suchas food insecurity,naturaldisastersandenvironmentaldegradation.

Costly refugee-status determination systems toestablish whether displaced people conform to theConvention definition are not designed to addressthe protection needs of non-refugees: there is nowidely accepted international regime to guide thegovernance of broader flows of forcibly displacedpeople.Arrangementswithintheexistingprotectionregimedonot,inotherwords,solvetheproblemofhow tomanage large-scale forcible displacement ina cooperative framework. Some progress has beenmadeinwideningrefugee-likeprotectiontobroadergroups,forexample,tovictimsofgeneralizedviolence(by theOrganizationofAfricanUnity [OAU] refugeeconvention), to victims ofwidespread human-rightsviolations (included in the Cartagena Declaration),and to internally displaced people (via the GuidingPrinciples on Internal Displacement). Currently, theNansen Initiative, led by Switzerland and Norway,withtheparticipationofanumberofothercountries,is intheprocessofdeveloping“aprotectionagendaaddressing the needs of people displaced acrossinternationalborders inthecontextofdisastersandtheeffectsofclimatechange.”6

PartofthereasonforthereluctanceofcapableStatesto allow refugees to arrive spontaneously, withoutpriorpermission,isthedifficultyofsortingoutwhoisarefugeeandwhoisnot.Inordertoavoidreturningrefugees to danger in the process of deportingunauthorized immigrants, States must have someway of distinguishing those who have a valid claimforprotection.Butdeterminingrefugeestatuscanbedifficultandexpensive,andtheincentivesarestrongfornon-refugeestoclaimasylumbymisrepresentingthemselves. Moreover, repatriating non-refugees isanothercomplexanddifficultprocess.Governmentsface far fewer complications if refugees simply donot arrive uninvited. However, non-entrée policiestendtoshift theproblemofprovidingprotectiontopoorerandlesscapableStatesortocountriesoffirstasylum that are already bearing disproportionateburdens – with later knock-on effects like irregularonwardmovementsthataffectcountriesbeyondtheregionofcrisisaswell.Someofthepeopletravellingtowards asylum countries in the West would beconsidered prima facie refugees, without question,

6 TheNansenInitiative,“AboutUs”,accessed5December2014.Availablefromwww.nanseninitiative.org/

hadtheystayedincountriesneighbouringtheirown,buttheirrefugeestatusisquestionedwhentheyseekamoresecureplaceofrefuge.Thereareexamplesofcooperationbetweenintendeddestinationcountriesand countries of transit or first asylum intended toexpand protection capacity, such as the EuropeanUnion’s“mobilitypartnership”withMorocco.Inothercases,however,cooperationseemstobe littlemorethanafinancialarrangementtooutsourceprotectionobligations and immigration enforcement fartherfromthebordersofrichcountries.

Inadequate resources

The Government of Jordan, which has hostedsubstantial displaced populations, noted in theintroduction to its 2014 National Resilience Planthat “it is widely acknowledged across all partiesresponding to the crisis that the current levels offinancing and modus operandi of humanitarian aidare unsustainable in their present form.”7 As if toconfirmthisobservation,theWorldFoodProgramme(WFP) announced at the end of November 2014that it would be compelled to reduce its foodsupporttorefugeesfromtheSyrianArabRepublicinneighbouringcountries.Thereasonwassimple: lackoffunds.ManyexpertspredictedwidespreadhungerinSyrianrefugeecommunitiesaswintersetin,aswellasnegativerepercussionsonhostcommunitieswhererefugees have usedWFP vouchers to buy food andtherebystimulate localmarkets.Onwardmovementfrom the region could also be predicted, as Syrianrefugeestrytoreachasafecountryinwhichtheycansustainthemselves.

The cost of maintaining large numbers of refugeesover long periods of time is impossibly high, bothin human and financial terms. The overwhelmingmajority(86percent)ofrefugees live indevelopingcountries.8Internationalfundinghasnotkeptupwiththegrowingneedforhumanitarianassistanceinthese

7 GovernmentofJordan,MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperation,National Resilience Plan 2014–2016: Proposed Priority Responses to Mitigate the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan and Jordanian Host Communities (Amman,GovernmentofJordan,MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperation, 2014). Available from www.jordanembassyus.org/sites/default/files/NRP_FinalDraft_08.29.2014_MOPIC.pdf

8 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Trends 2013: War’s Human Cost (Geneva, UNHCR, 2014). Available from www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html

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countries.FundingneedsoftheOfficeoftheUnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)have grownby130per cent since2009; public andprivate contributions to its budget rose by only70 per cent in the same period.9The organization’ssupplementary appeals for ongoing humanitarianemergencies in 2014 reached 40 per cent of theirtargets,onaverage,bytheendofOctober.Theonlyappeal that came close to being fully funded (at93percent)wastheonlyoneinaEuropeancountry:for internally displaced people in Ukraine.10 Bycontrast,appealsfortheorganization’sworkinNorthWaziristan (Pakistan), Afghanistan and the CentralAfricanRepublicreached26percent,30percentand33 per cent, respectively, of their funding targets.11OtheragenciessuchastheWFParealsoexperiencingshortfalls.

Despite the inadequacy of international assistance,fewalternativesforsupportareavailabletorefugees.Inmanycountriesoffirstasylum,refugeesaredeniedpermission to work, for fear of igniting a backlashamonglocalswhomayresentcompetitionforscarcejobs, and for fear that refugeeswho are integratedintothelabourmarketmaynevergohome.Displacedpeoplewhodonothaverefugeestatusfacethesamebarrierstolabour-marketentryasrefugeesbutdonotusuallyhaveaccesstointernationalassistance.Infact,manyrefugeesanddisplacedpeopledowork,outofnecessity, in theundergroundeconomy,where theyare vulnerable to exploitation and drive down thewagerateforlocalworkers.

Theshortfallofnationaland international resourcesisamajorfactorerodingthequalityofprotectionandthreateningthestabilityoftheinternationalprotectionregime. Countries neighbouring Syria have begunto close their borders in the face of overwhelminginflows, overburdened infrastructure and seriouseconomicrepercussions.TheGovernmentofJordan,forexample,reportsthatthecrisisintheSyrianArabRepublichasdrivendownforeigndirect investment;

9 UNHCR, “Identifying needs and funding requirements”,UNHCR Global Appeal 2015 Update(Geneva,UNHCR,2014).Availablefromwww.unhcr.org/5461e5f30.html

10 WhiletheUkraineappealissmallerthanthosefortheSyrianArab Republic, Sudan, Iraq or the Central African Republic,otherappealsofsimilarsize(suchasthoseforAfghanistanorPakistan)havealsofailedtomeettheirfundingneeds.

11 UNHCR, “Identifying needs and funding requirements”,UNHCR Global Appeal 2015 Update – Identifying Needs and Funding Requirements (Geneva, UNHCR, 2014). Availablefromwww.unhcr.org/5461e5f30.html

drivenupthetradedeficit,budgetdeficitandpublicdebt; and caused a drop in GDP growth from anannual rateof6.6percent in2000–2008toaround2percentin2013.12Displacedpopulationsthathavenomeansofsupportoftenbegintoexhibitincreasedsocialpathologiessuchaschildlabour,childmarriage,prostitution,domesticviolence,informalworkunderexploitative conditions, recruitment into militantgroups and, of course, dangerous unauthorizedmigration.

Long duration

Traditionalmodelsofrefugeeprotectionwerebasedon assumptions that refugees would repatriate assoonasfightingstoppedand/orarepressiveregimewasreplacedinthecountryoforigin–andthatthetimeframe for these events would be counted inmonthsoryears,notdecades.Itdidnotanticipatetheeraof“frozenconflicts”,asymmetricwarfareandfailedStates,whichproducesituationsofdisplacementthatextendovergenerations.Today,halfof therefugeesinUNHCR’smandate,ormorethan6millionpeople,have been refugees for five years or more – oftenmany more.13 Large-scale movements of Afghanrefugeesbeganinthelate1970s,andmajoroutflowsfrom Somalia started in 1991. Some Palestinianrefugees,forwhomtheUNReliefandWorksAgencyratherthanUNHCRisresponsible,havebeenrefugeessince1948.Theproportionofrefugeesinprotractedsituations is currently diluted by the sharp rise inSyrianrefugeesthatbeganin2011andhasgatheredmomentuminsubsequentyears.Butwithnoendtothe conflict in sight, Syrianswill soon beginmovingintoaprotractedrefugeesituation,definedbyUNHCRasoneinwhich25,000peoplehavebeenrefugeesforfiveyearsormore.

Refugeecampsarebecomingpermanentsettlements,even as a growing proportion of refugees move tourban areaswhere humanitarian assistancemay be

12 GovernmentofJordan,MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperation, National Resilience Plan 2014–2016: Proposed Priority Responses to Mitigate the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan and Jordanian Host Communities (Amman,GovernmentofJordan,MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperation, 2014). Available from www.jordanembassyus.org/sites/default/files/NRP_FinalDraft_08.29.2014_MOPIC.pdf

13 A.Guterres,“Risingchallenges,strongsupport”,UNHCR Global Appeal 2014–15 (Geneva, UNHCR, 2014). Available fromwww.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=528a0a100&query=GlobalAppeal2015

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less accessible but employment opportunities arebetter. While some long-term refugees are able tointegrate in countries of first asylum and achievestability,manymore liveon themargins in insecurecircumstances. Resettlement opportunities reachlessthan1percentofrefugees,andreturnremainsadistantdreamformany. In2013,UNHCRreportedthat repatriations had sunk to the lowest level inalmost25years.14Clearly, the threeclassic “durablesolutions” (repatriation, integration in the countryoffirstasylumandresettlement)arenotworkingtoreducethenumbersoflong-termrefugees.

Protracteddisplacementplacesgreatstrainonforcedmigrants, host countries and communities, and onthe budgets and operational capacity of nationaland international institutions involved in refugeeprotection and humanitarian response. Financialpledges from donors to international organizationsand refugee-hosting countries are commonly madeonayear-to-yearbasis,makingitdifficulttoplanandimplementprogrammessuitableforlong-termneeds.Inconsequence,livesareputonindefinitehold.

Enforced immobility

Theabsenceofsatisfactorysolutionscreatespowerfulmotives for refugees and other displaced people tomoveonfromtransitcountriesandcountriesoffirstasylumwhereassistanceisinadequate,protectionisprecarious and opportunities for self-sufficiency arelimited. The quality of protection for Rohingyas inBangladesh,SyriansinLebanonandSomalisinKenya,for example, leavesmuch to be desired despite, insome cases, the best efforts of the country of firstasylum. As noted above, most attempts to reach acountrythatoffersbetterprospectstakeplaceoutsidelegalframeworks.

Onwardtravelisoftenstigmatizedas“queuejumping”,or an illegitimate attempt to achieve “migrationoutcomes” rather thanmuchmore limited,minimalprotection from return to a place of danger. Theseviewsfailtogiveappropriateweighttotheminimumstandardsfortreatmentofrefugeesthatarespecifiedin the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.ManyStatesthatarepartytotheConventiondonotaccord these rights to refugees in their territories,

14 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Trends 2013: War’s Human Cost (Geneva, UNHCR, 2014). Available from www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html

and instead, for example, restrict their movementsordenythemtherighttowork.Giventheprovisionsof the Refugee Convention, it is not unreasonableforrefugeestoexpecttobeabletoenjoytherightsStateshaveagreedtograntthem.Formanyrefugees,however,onwardmovementmaybetheonlywaytoaccessminimumstandardsoftreatment.

Protection beyond nonrefoulement

Four of the seven chapters (Chapters II–V) of theRefugee Convention (all of which are incorporatedin the Protocol) lay out the obligations that StatePartiestotheRefugeeConventionagreedintheareasof juridical status, gainful employment, welfare andadministrativematters.Thesechapterscoverspecificrights such as property rights (including intellectualproperty);accesstocourts;rightofassociation;wage-earning, self-employment and professional practice;housing;publiceducation;rationingandpublicreliefandassistance;labourlegislationandsocialsecurity;freedom of movement; and access to identity andtravel documents. Chapter I separately specifiesfreedom of religion. With respect to fundamentalrights such as freedom of religion and association,labourandsocialsecurityandelementaryeducation,theStatePartieshaveagreedtotreatlegallyresidingrefugees on terms equal to their own nationals. Inother areas, the Convention specifies treatment asfavourable as possible and at least as favourable asthataccordedtootheraliens.

Source: UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva,UNHCR,2010).Availablefrom www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html

Thereare, infact,veryfewestablishedinternationalmechanisms foronward travel forpeoplewhohavefled their countries of origin but have not foundsecureprotectionorlivelihoods.Today’sresettlementprogrammescanaccommodatelessthan1percentoftheworld’s refugees,and refugeeshaveexceptionaldifficultyaccessingotherchannelsofmobility.Manyrefugeesdonothave traveldocuments,andeven iftheydidtheywouldnotbegrantedavisafortraveltoanothercountry.Asaresult,refugeesarerarelyabletoparticipateinnormalchannelsofmobilitysuchaslabour migration, international education or familyreunification.

Immobility creates obstacles to refugees seeking ahigherqualityofprotectionandbetteroutletsfortheirtalents and energies. It also encourages the growth

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ofclandestinetravel,withitsattendantchallengestoruleoflawandgovernments’abilitytoplanmigrantadmissions in away that serves the goals of publicpolicy.

New channels, new tools

As thestrainon the internationalprotectionregimeincreases,theneedfornewtoolsandnewchannelsto improve the regime’s functioning becomesmoreapparent. Two distinct but related approachesto refitting the regime hold particular promise.One involves breaking down the conceptual andinstitutional walls between humanitarian anddevelopmentassistanceso thatbothcancontributeto more robust and sustainable protection. Theother involves facilitating mobility for refugees andotherdisplacedpeoplesothattheycansecuretheirlivelihoods,gainaccesstoabroaderarrayofrightsthanisavailableincountriesoffirstasylum,andcontributeto development in countries and communities oftemporary or permanent settlement (and to theircountriesoforiginif,intime,circumstancespermit).

Development approaches

Approachestoprotectionthatfocusondevelopmentare further along in concept and practice thanthosecentredonmobility.Bothdonorgovernmentsand governments in countries of first asylum arepartnering with international organizations andhumanitarian non-governmental organizations toprovide alternatives to the care-and-maintenancemodel once prevalent among responses to refugeeflows.Thenewapproachesemphasizethecapabilitiesof refugees toprovide for theirown livelihoods– ifthey are empowered to do so with access to land,equipment, training or capital and, importantly,legal status in the labourmarket of host countries.Host communities must be co-planners and co-beneficiaries of development-based protection, orthey may perceive refugees as rivals rather thanpartners in local development. The development ofcapacities in host communities is often the startingpoint for strengthening protection in the broadestsense,asinJordan’sNationalResiliencePlan.

Developmentagencies,however,areoftenreluctanttoengageinrefugeesituations,whichtheyconsidertoorisky,toocontroversial,andtoofarremovedfromstandardprioritiesandoperatingprocedures.Butthescale of disruption to development at the nationallevel in countries hosting large refugee populations

makes a compelling argument for these agencies’involvement. The Federal Ministry for EconomicCooperation and Development in Germany, forexample, isamongthefirsttoforwardnewthinkingabout the relationship between displacement –especiallylong-termdisplacement–anddevelopmentcooperation, as it implements programmes toimprovethewell-beingofhostcommunities,refugeesand internally displaced people. It has also pushedtheEuropeanUnion to realign its development andhumanitarianassistanceoperations.On4December2014,theEuropeanCommissionadoptedaEUR180millionaidpackage forSyriansdisplacedbythewartodealwith the longer-termdevelopmentneedsoftherefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersons,withafocusoneducation.15

Developmentapproachestotheprotectionofrefugeesanddisplacedpeoplearerapidlygainingcurrency.Buttheirimplementationwillinvolvedifficultbureaucratictransitionsinmandates,budgets,standardoperatingprocedures and partnerships. Such shifts normallyhappenatmomentsofcrisis,andsuchamomenthasarrived.

Mobility approaches

The imperative of opening up new channels forrefugees’ self-sufficiency – and breaking patternsof dependence on inadequate and unreliablehumanitarianassistanceprogrammes– is intimatelyconnectedtothedevelopmentimperativesdiscussedabove.Governmentshavebegun todiscussways toincorporatedisplacedpeopleintothelabourmarketsofcountriesoffirstasylum,withminimaldisruptionand maximum gains, but they have been muchmorereluctanttodiscuss internationalmobilityasameansofaccesstolivelihoodsandafullerenjoymentof the rights outlined in the Refugee Convention.This approach holds great promise, and deservesexplorationandexperimentation.

One set of channels for increasedmobility consistsof established programmes for labour migrants atvarious skill levels, family reunification programmesfor refugees who have relatives already settledelsewhere, and international study and trainingprogrammes.Refugeesshould,intheory,alreadyhave

15 EuropeanCommission, “EU–Syria:€180million todealwithcrisis and spill-over in Lebanon and Jordan”, 4 December2014. Available from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2364_en.htm

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access to these programmes, and some do indeedtakeadvantageofthem,oftenwithoutfirstobtainingrefugeestatus.Butmanydonot,as theyencounterobstacles to mobility (such as the lack of traveldocuments).Someoftheseobstaclesareamenabletotechnicalsolutions.Others,suchassecurityconcernsaffecting displaced populations especially from theMiddleEast,WestAsiaandtheHornofAfrica,willbemorecomplex,involvingsophisticatedbutexpeditiousscreeningprocesses,politicalriskassessmentsandsoforth.

A second set of new channels could be designedespecially for refugees and forcibly displacedpopulations, to allow those with skills in demandon the internationalmarket to take up positions inother countries. Temporary labour programmes fordisplaced persons with less formal skills could alsobe designed. Specialized education and trainingprogrammesforrefugeesandotherdisplacedpersonscould be tailored to international-market demandfor care workers, technical specialists, agriculturalworkers and so forth. Such programmes wouldneed to ensure that workers are protected againstrefoulementattheendoftheircontractperiods.Asoneexample,MicrosoftCorporationisimplementingsmallprogrammestotrainrefugeesintechnicalskillsthrough online courses (for which it provides bothhardware and software). Private-sector involvementinprovidingtoolstoimprovelivelihoodsandincreasepotentialmobilityshouldbefostered.Therearemanypossible ways to simultaneously benefit displacedpeople, countriesoffirst asylumand countrieswithlabourneeds.

Conclusion

Today’s refugee regimewas setup todealwith theaftermathofWorldWarII.Janus-faced,itlookedbacktothelegacyofwar-erapersecutionsandforwardtoa future of permanent solutions for the remainingdisplaced populations. Protection and solutions arethe twin mandates of the regime, and of UNHCR.There is no reference in theRefugeeConvention tohumanitarianassistanceforrefugees,andnoformulaforfundingit.Yet,overtime,humanitarianassistancehasbecomethedefaultresponsetorefugeecrises–withlimitationsthatarenowinescapablyclear.

RecentcrisesintheSyrianArabRepublic,Yemen,theCentral African Republic, Iraq and elsewhere havedemonstrated – perhaps more clearly than ever –the inadequacy of a reactive, territorially focused

response to forced migration and displacement.Refugees are routinely leftwithout hope of a long-termsolution,responsibilitiesforcareandintegrationare distributed unevenly, and governments are lefttrying to manage an increasingly unmanageablesystem. In addition, in an age of global mobility, ithasbecomereadilyapparentthatthefailuresoftheprotection system in one location will have directeffectsoncommunities,governmentsandindividualsfarremovedfromthesiteofacrisis.

Clearly, the tools and approaches used to addressdisplaced people need to be updated andsupplemented.Thetwoapproachesdiscussedhere–embeddingdevelopment inhumanitarian responsesand facilitating legal mobility – are particularlypromising. Any effort to provide more effectiveprotectionwill almost certainly need to incorporatebothaspartofacomprehensivestrategytoaddressdisplacementfrombeginningtoend.

Thereareseveralobstaclestoupdatingtheprotectionpolicyframework,notleastofwhichisthechallengeofpersuadingpublics to support investment innewresponses to displacement. Government and otherleaderscanhelptofurtherpublicunderstandingofthelinksbetweenprotection,developmentandmobility,and how these connections can bring about moreeffectivehumanitarianresponses.Constituenciesthatarecalledupontofundhumanitarianassistanceandprotection–and,insomecases,toprovideprotectiondirectly by welcoming displaced people into theircommunities–oftenhave legitimateconcerns; theydeservetobetakenseriously.Governmentswillneedtomakea substantial commitment to communicatetotheirelectoratestheimportanceof implementingrobust protection regimes that can contribute togreaterstabilityandprosperityforallcountries.n

“Government and other leaders can help to further

public understanding of the links between protection,

development and mobility, and how these connections

can bring about more effective humanitarian responses.”

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Introduction

For most people facing violence, severe rightsabuses or other risks, being forced to leavetheirhomeisthe“option”oflastresort.People

abandon their home environments, evacuate theirplacesofhabitualresidence,andrupturetheirsocialnetworks and economic livelihoods only with greatreluctance–andonlywhenotherstrategiestoremainhave failed. Furthermore, a combination of driversmost often lies at the core of such displacementratherthanauniquecause-effectrelationship.

Almost 60 million people worldwide are forciblydisplaced as refugees, asylum-seekers or internallydisplaced persons.2 Approximately 95 per cent ofdisplacement occurs in the global south, andmorethan50percentofthedisplacedliveinurbanareas.3Giventheglobalscaleofirregularmigration,therearelikely to bemillions more forcibly displaced peoplewho have not travelled though legal channels orregisteredtheirclaimforprotectionwithauthorities.Notalltheseunauthorizedmigrantshavebeenforcibly

1 Roger Zetter is Emeritus Professor of Refugee Studies atOxfordUniversity,whereheservedasthefourthDirectorofthe Refugee Studies Centre and the founding Editor of theJournal of Refugee Studies, published by Oxford UniversityPress. This article is based on research commissioned bythe Transatlantic Council on Migration, an initiative of theMigration Policy Institute, for its 13th plenary session, heldinDecember2014.FormoreinformationontheTransatlanticCouncil onMigration, please visitwww.migrationpolicy.org/programs/transatlantic-council-migration

2 Internallydisplacedpersonscomposemorethan65percentof the total (33.3 million individuals). See: (Office of the)United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),UNHCR Global Trends 2014: A World at War (Geneva,UNHCR,2015),availablefromwww.unhcr.org/556725e69.pdf

3 UNHCR, Mid-Year Trends 2013 (Geneva, UNHCR, 2013),availablefromwww.unhcr.org/52af08d26.html;S.Albujaetal.,Global Overview 2014: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence (Geneva, Internal Displacement MonitoringCentre,2014),availablefromwww.internal-displacement.org/publications/2014/global-overview-2014-people-internally-displaced-by-conflict-and-violence;andInternalDisplacementMonitoring Centre (IDMC) and Norwegian Refugee Council(NRC), Annual Report 2014: 2013 in Review(GenevaandOslo,IDMC and, 2014), available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/201407-global-IDMC-annual-report-en.pdf

Mobility, livelihoods and safety: A new approach to forced migrantsRoger Zetter1

displaced,ofcourse,butasubstantialandincreasingproportionhave.

Against this backdrop, the familiar label “refugee”seemsbothincreasinglyproblematic,whenconfinedtoitsdefinitionininternationallaw,andinadequateinscopetocapturethecomplex,multivariatefactors–beyondpersecution(thedistinguishingcharacteristicofrefugeestatusunderthe1951GenevaConventionRelating to the Status of Refugees) – that propeldisplacement in the contemporary world. Whilevarious terms have been used to define thesedifferentiated yet often overlapping patterns andprocesses, “forced migrants” best captures thewidercategoryofpeople forwhomthere isneitherasimpledefinitionnoranofficialdesignation,aswellas thewide-ranging dynamics that drive populationdisplacement.

The expansion of irregular migration furthercomplicates thepicture,especially in the contextofmulticausal, mixed migration flows (i.e., flows thatincludebothforcedandvoluntarymigrants)andtheoftenunpredictablescale,patternsandprocessesofthesepopulationmovements.Governmentsperceivelarge,unregulatedflows– regardlessof the reasonsthat have forced people to leave their countries oforigin – as threatening to both the sovereignty ofnational borders and the established concepts ofStatemembershipandcitizenship.

Although thedriversof forcedmigrationarevaried,somelevelofforceandcompulsionisalwayspresent.Crucially, a substantial and increasing number offorced migrants fall outside the existing protectionregimeandthe legalandnormativeframeworkthatdefines it – this is the problem at the core of thisarticle.

Together, these dynamics pose many challenges tothe concept and the practice of protection, placingthe system under strain worldwide. Accordingly,States, intergovernmentalorganizations,donorsandhumanitarian actors are evincing growing concernover the multiple challenges the humanitariancommunityfacesinensuringprotectionattheglobal,

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regional and field levels.4 The now-familiar phrases“protection gaps” and shrinking “protection space”provideashorthandreferencetothesechallenges.

Closing normative, policy and operational gaps

The present-day dynamics of displacement posemanychallenges to the conceptand thepracticeofprotection,asframedbythearchitectureofthe1951RefugeeConvention, the1967Protocol,and relatedregional instrumentsontheonehandandthe1998Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement on theother.5 Multicausal drivers of displacement andmixedmigrationflowsforcethewideningdivergenceof protection needs, norms, and capacity as moreandmoremigrantsfalloutsidetheprovisionsoftheavailable instruments. How have policymakers andhumanitarianactorsresponded?

4 See,forexample:SwissFederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs(SFDFA), Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts(Bern,SFDFA,2014),availablefromwww.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=176466; IASCPrincipals, “Theprotectionofhumanrights inhumanitariancrises”, joint background paper by theOffice of the UnitedNationsHighCommissioner forHumanRights (OHCHR)andUNHCR, (Geneva, 8 May 2013), §4, available from www.refworld.org/pdfid/537f08744.pdf. Evidence of this concernis available at: United Nations, The Report of the Secretary General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka (New York, United Nations, 2012), available fromwww.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf;IASC,Whole System Review of the Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action (Geneva, IASC, 2014); IOM Migration Crisis OperationalFramework; United Nations, “Rights up front,” May 2014;LocaltoGlobalProtection(L2GP),“Localtoglobalprotection:Promotinglocalperspectivesinhumanitariancrises”,accessed1December2014,available fromwww.local2global.info/;R.Zetter,Protecting Forced Migrants: A State of the Art Report of Concepts, Challenges, and Ways Forward (Bern,SwissFederalCommission on Migration, 2014), available from http://reliefweb.int/report/world/protecting-forced-migrants-state-art-report-concepts-challenges-and-ways-forward; UNHCR,“UNHCR annual dialogues on protection challenges, 2013:Protecting the internally displaced”, accessed 1 December2014,availablefromwww.unhcr.org/pages/5214d99c6.html;IASC, “Inter-Agency Standing Committee TransformativeAgenda”, accessed 1 December 2014, available from www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-template-default&bd=87; post-2015 Draft DevelopmentGoals; World Humanitarian Summit, “World HumanitarianSummit 2015”, accessed 1 December 2014, available fromwww.worldhumanitariansummit.org/

5 Ofcoursethekeypointhereisthatdespitethefundamentalimportance of the principle of protection and althoughinternational law makes ample reference to protection,paradoxically,internationallawdoesnotdefineprotection.

Normative responses and developments in international law and practice

Normative adaptation has been extremely modestto date.6 An increasing number of States arecodifying generic forms of “subsidiary protection”7and “complementary protection,”8 in some casescalled “humanitarian protection” and “temporaryprotected status” (TPS).9 These forms of protectionareessentiallytheresponseofcountriesintheglobalnorth to the rising demand for asylum seen in thepast two decades or so. The positive view is thatthese governments recognize that highly vulnerablepeopleneedprotectionevenwhenrefugeestatushasbeenor is likelytobedenied.Ontheotherhand, itcouldbeargued that these supplementary formsofprotection allow countries to reduce the volume ofpeople receiving refugee status and the obligationsthis imposes,asnoneof theseprovisionsaffordthesame level of protection as the 1951 Convention.For example, protected entry and humanitarianadmissions to the European Union have becomeverylimitedandintermittentinrecentyears.Whileitcouldbearguedthatsomeprotectionisbetterthannoneatall,genericformsofprotectionaffordlimitedrightsandare inmanycases temporary, leaving thebeneficiaryinanuncertainsituation.

6 The one exception to this observation is the 2009 AfricanUnion Convention for the Protection and Assistance ofInternally Displaced Persons in Africa (also known as theKampalaConvention).

7 “Subsidiaryprotection”maybegrantedwhenanapplicantdoesnotfulfiltherequirementsforbecomingarefugeebutthesituationinthecountryoforiginmakesreturnimpossible.Subsidiaryprotectionisusuallytime-limited.

8 “Complementary protection” is for those whose claim forrefugee protection under the 1951 Refugee Conventionhas failed, but who cannot be returned to their countriesof origin because of other severe threats to their rights.ComplementaryprotectionisavailableinEUMemberStates,andcountriessuchasCanada,Mexico,NewZealandandtheUnitedStates.

9 “Temporaryprotectedstatus”(TPS)wasinvoked,forexample,by the United States, for Hondurans and NicaraguansfollowinghurricaneMitchin1998,butonlyforthosealreadyoutside those countries. A number of European countriesreactivelyprovidedTPStohundredsof thousandsofmainlyBosnians fleeing civil war in the 1990s, and Switzerlandgranted TPS to thousands of Kosovo Albanians in 2000.BothFinland (in2004)andSweden (in2005)haveprovidedTPS to individuals unable to return to their countries oforigin because of an environmental disaster. (R. Mandal,Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (“Complementary Protection”), Legal and Protection PolicySeries,PPLA/2005/02(Geneva,UNHCR,June2005),availablefromwww.refworld.org/docid/435e198d4.html)

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At the international level, a recent report from theOfficeof theUnitedNationsHighCommissioner forHuman Rights (OHCHR) advocates and refines thehumanrightsobligationsandthenormsofprotectionto be provided at borders in accordance withinternationalhumanrightslaw.Butthereportisonlyadvisoryandit istoosoontogaugetheimpactthatit might have on national practice.10 A far-reachingstrategy to strengthen the normative scope ofprotectionforpeoplesusceptibletodisplacementwaspromotedunderthedoctrineoftheResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P).11Adoptedatthe2005UnitedNationsWorld Summit, the international community hasstoppedshortofgivingR2Panyteeth,however,whereitmighthavebeeninvoked,forexample,inDarfurorinSyria.12Perhaps themost radicaland far-reachingnormativedevelopmentinprotectionsincethe1967Protocolwasaccomplishedbytheratificationofthe2009AfricanUnionConventionfortheProtectionandAssistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa(theKampalaConvention).But,again,itistooearlytoassesstheConvention’simpactsonprotection.Finally,someprogressisbeingmadeinfillingthenormativeprotection gaps for people crossing borders in thecontextofclimatechange.13

Policy and operational developments

While legal norms remain underdeveloped,protection policy has advanced and diversified.Strategies for emergency humanitarian evacuation

10 OHCHR,“OHCHRRecommendedPrinciplesandGuidelines”.

11 The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect does not dealdirectly with protecting forcibly displaced people but aimsto tackle the conditions that lead to such displacement byadvocating that if a State is unwilling or unable to protectitspopulationwheregenocide,ethniccleansing,warcrimesor crimesagainsthumanityare takingplace, thencollectiveinternationalinterventionmightbeappropriate.

12 J. Genser and I. Cotler (eds.), The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time(Oxford,United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 2012), availablefrom https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-responsibility-to-protect-9780199797769?cc=us&lang=en&;A. Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction, 2nd edition (Basingstoke, United Kingdom, Palgrave-Macmillan,2013); S. Martin, “Forced migration, the refugee regimeand the responsibility to protect”, Global Responsibility to Protect, 2(2010):38–59, available from www.academia.edu/6311945/Forced_Migration_the_Refugee_Regime_and_the_Responsibility_to_Protect

13 See the Nansen Initiative, and W. Kälin and N. Schrepfer,“Protectingpeoplecrossingbordersinthecontextofclimatechange:Normativegapsandapproaches”(Geneva,DivisionofInternationalProtection,UNHCR,February2012).

andbasiccivilianprotectioninwarzoneshavebeenadoptedbysomehumanitarianorganizationssuchastheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)and the International Organization for Migration(IOM). A number ofNGOs have designedmeans toprovide external support for self-protectionwithoutdisempowering the self-protection capacities of theaffectedcommunitiesthemselves.

At the global level, theGlobal Protection Cluster ofthe Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC, of theUnited Nations and partners) is now established astheprincipal inter-agency forumforcollaboration inhumanitarian context. It has enhanced coordinationof protection overall including, importantly, settingcommon standards for protection by humanitarianactors. The 2010 UNHCR policy guidance titledRefugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action14was an important reminder,mainlyto governments in the global north. It asked thatreceivingStatessafeguardthequalityoftheirrefugeeprotection (e.g. reception conditions) and clarifiedtheallianceofgoodpractices inthisareatogeneralmigrationpoliciesdesignedtocopewiththegrowingscaleofmixedmigration.

Progress,too,hasbeenmadeondevelopingprotectiontools and instruments for the displaced in urbansettings:15 for example, the 2009 UNHCR RefugeeProtectionandSolutions inUrbanAreas,16 the2010IASCStrategyforMeetingHumanitarianChallengesinUrbanAreas17andmanyNGOinitiatives.18TheUNHCRreport focuses on developing policy and practice

14 UNHCR, Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action(Geneva,UNHCR,2007).Availablefromwww.unhcr.org/4742a30b4.html

15 R. Zetter and G. Deikun, “Meeting humanitarian challengesin urban areas”, Forced Migration Review, 34, Special Issueon Urban Displacement:5–8. Available from www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/meeting-humanitarian-challenges-in-urban-areas

16 UNHCR,UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas (Geneva,UNHCR,2009).Availablefromwww.refworld.org/docid/4ab8e7f72.html

17 Objective 4 of the Strategy is key in the present context ofpromotingprotectionofvulnerableurbanpopulationsagainstviolence and exploitation. See IASC, IASC Strategy: Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas (Geneva, IASC,2010), p. 8, available fromwww.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docID=5615&type=pdf

18 Good Practice for Urban Refugees, “Tools and guidelines”section, accessed 10 March 2015. Available from www.urbangoodpractices.org/guidelines/index/lang:eng?url=guidelines%2Findex%2Flang%3Aeng

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on matters such as reception conditions, refugeeprofiling and support for the livelihoods of urbanrefugees.Amongfivekeypriorities,theIASCstrategylists tools for assessing needs and vulnerability,and protecting vulnerable urban populations fromviolenceandsexualexploitation.Thepredicamentofthird-country nationals stranded in crisis situationsis being addressed through extensive cooperationbetweenIOMandUNHCR.19

The European Commission has been activelydeveloping protection tools and instruments,althoughtheoutcomesareflawed.Examplesincluderegional protection programmes and their morerecent manifestation in the Syrian region (RegionalDevelopmentandProtectionProgrammes);mobilitypartnerships20 between EU Member States andrefugee recipient or transit countries to enhancelegalandadministrativecapacityforprotection;andprotectionforrefugees,asylum-seekers,andirregularmigrantsencompassedbytheEuropeanCommission’sGlobalApproachtoMigrationandMobility(GAMM)21andtheCommonEuropeanAsylumSystem(CEAS).22

19 See discussion on stranded migrants in “Displacement andProtection:TheNeed forPolicyConsistency” sectionof thisreport,andIOMMigrationCrisisOperationalFramework.

20 Mobilitypartnershipsaresoftlaw-based,bilateralagreementsbetween the European Commission or individual MemberStates, andcountries thatare (1) sourcesofmigrant labourcoming into Europe or, more recently, (2) transit countriesfor forcedmigrants andmixedmigration flows destined forEurope(EuropeanCommission,2011).Mobilitypartnershipsserveasamigrationmanagementandinstitutionalcapacity-buildingtool,coveringfourdimensions:(1)legalmigrationandmobility;(2)maximizingthedevelopmentimpactofmigration;(3) irregular migration and trafficking in human beings(ofparticularrelevancetothis report);and(4) internationalprotection and asylum policy. (European Commission,“CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheCouncilandtheEuropean Parliament on Regional Protection Programmes”,EUR-Lex COM(2005) 388 final (European Commission,Brussels, 1 September 2005), available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0388)

21 European Commission, “The Global Approach to MigrationandMobility: Communication from the Commission to theEuropean Parliament, the Council, the European Economicand Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions”,EUR-LexCOM(2011)743final,SEC(2011)1353final(EuropeanCommission, Brussels, 19 November 2011). Available fromhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/pdf/1_en_act_part1_v9_com2011-743_en.pdf

22 Adoptedoverthecourseofatleast15years,thiscomprisesawiderangeofinstrumentssettingouttheminimumstandardsfor reception, processing and interpretation of protectioncriteriaforasylum-seekersintheEuropeanUnion,andseekingto ensure consistent management and handling across allMember States. See, for example: S. Peers et al. (eds.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law, 2nd edition, vol. 3 (Asylum)(Leiden,theNetherlands,BrillNijhoff,forthcoming).

AnotherexampleofnewpraxiswithinEuropeisthewhole-of-governmentapproachseen inSwitzerland.This is an interdepartmental policymaking processcoveringinternalandexternaldimensionsofmigration(in all forms). Recognizing how forceddisplacementin faraway countries eventually affects mixedmigrationflowsatSwissborders,thisapproachseeksto coordinate the Government’s development andhumanitarianpoliciesinregionsofmassdisplacementwithitspoliciesgoverningasylum-seekers’entryandprocessinginSwitzerlanditself.23

The challenge of protection: An agenda for change

Thoughthesenormativeandpolicydevelopmentsareuseful,theydonottacklethefundamentaldisjuncturebetween (1) contemporary patterns and processesofforceddisplacementontheonehandand(2)thecurrent legal andnormative frameworkdesigned toprotect the rights, dignity and safety of displacedpopulations on the other. An increasingmajority ofpeople fall outside the existing protection regime,while,toooften,thequalityanddeliveryofprotectionforthosemigrantswhofallwithinexistingnormsdonotaccordwithinternationalstandards.

Amidpowerfuldriversofdisplacementandaprotectionapparatusunderstrain, it isclearthatgovernments,intergovernmentalagenciesandhumanitarianactorsfaceanumberofprofoundchallengesthattranscendthelegalandpolicyresponsesdiscussedabove.Thesechallengescallintoquestionthesustainabilityofsomeoftheacceptedprinciplesthatcommonlygoverntheinterplaybetweenforcedmigrationandprotection.

Displacement, protection and policy coherence

Acoherentandsystematicframeworkthataddressesall forms of international migration is essential totackle thedisjuncturebetween forceddisplacementandprotection.

The availability of legal channels for internationalmigration has not kept pace with the expanding

23 Asafurtherexample,theappointmentintheUnitedKingdomofanindependentchiefinspectorofbordersandimmigrationto assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the UnitedKingdom’s border and immigration functions has helpedto safeguard protection standards from often politicallyexpedientobjectives.

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demand and global reach of this process;24 as aresult, the claim for protection is often the onlyentry route25 apart from family reunification. Thelack of opportunities for authorized26 migrationcombinedwith the inexorable riseof conflict-drivenforced displacement, and the limited scope forrefugeeresettlement,haveputgreatpressureontheprotectionregime.

Atthesametime,giventhecomplexandmulticausaldrivers, forced displacement can no longer beconceivedasadiscretemigratoryprocessdemarcatedbyrefugeestatusbutpartofaninternationalmigrationcontinuumthatalsoembracesauthorizedmigration.Accordingly, it is essential that policies addressingforced displacement (and thus protection) are setwithin a wider policy framework that (1) not onlyincludesbutalsoexpandsthescaleofmanaged(i.e.authorized)migration,(2)enhancesdevelopment-ledstrategiesincountriesoforiginandthemajorrecipientcountriesofdisplacedpeopletoprovidesustainablefutures,and(3)expandsrefugeeresettlement.27

24 Approximately 232 million people – more than 3 per centof theworld’spopulation–aremigrants livingoutsidetheircountriesoforigin.Thisisanincreaseof57millionfromthenumbers in 2000 and a 50 per cent increase from the 154million internationalmigrants in 1990. (See United NationsDepartment of Economic and Social Affairs, “Number ofinternationalmigrants rises above232million,UN reports”,11September2013,availablefromwww.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45819#.VHzU8zHF_OM)

25 Itisworthnotingthatmanycountriesnolongeraccept,ortheyresist,“external”claimsforasylumthroughtheirembassiesinanapplicant’s countryoforigin (orneighbouringcountries),and that to apply for asylum in a host country effectivelyrequiresasylum-seekersfirsttoaccessasylumStateterritory;aclaimforasylumisnotofitselfanentryroute.

26 Sometimes also termed voluntary or regular migration,authorized internationalmigration describes the process ofpeople seekingbettereconomicand socialopportunitiesaswellasdifferent lifeexperiencesand lifestyles. Internationalmigration – notably labour mobility – is a major force ineconomicandsocialdevelopmentinbothoriginandreceivingcountries,andthemagnitudeofitsincrease,notedabove,isbothaconsequenceandadriveroftheprocessesofeconomicglobalizationthathaveunfoldedinrecentdecades.

27 Refugeeresettlementrarelyexceeds10percentoftheannualglobal demand of about 800,000 applications that UNHCRreceives. Resistance to calls for the resettlement of SyrianrefugeesinEuropeancountriesissymptomaticofgovernments’reluctancetomeetdemand.Europeancountrieshadofferedjustunder32,000placesforresettlement,humanitarianandother formsofadmissionagainstasylumclaimsof justover123,000byMay2014–mainlyconcentratedinahandfulofEUMemberStates–andcomparedwiththeUNHCRrequeststo provide resettlement and other forms of admission for100,000Syriansin2015and2016.(UNHCR,Syrian Refugees in Europe: What Europe Can Do to Ensure Protection and Solidarity (Geneva, UNHCR, 2014), available from www.refworld.org/pdfid/53b69f574.pdf)

This trinityprovidesacoherentplatformforamoreorderly, transparent and humane response to theprotection needs of forcibly displaced people. Atpresent a cohesive framework is lacking at nationalandinternationallevelsdespiteeffortstodevelopone.Asdiscussedearlier,thechallengeliesinovercomingthenegativepublic andpoliticaldiscourse thatnowsurroundsimmigrationandasylum-seeking.

Conceptual challenges: Protection status, rights and needs

Not every forcibly displaced person is a refugee,but all forcibly displaced people need some formof protection. The existing legal and normativeframework of protection is no longer sufficient totackle the diverse protection challenges of forcedmigration in the contemporary world. Against thisbackdrop, momentum is gaining to reconceptualizeprotectionbeyondthestatus-baseddeterminationofarefugee,asdefinedinthe1951RefugeeConvention.

Ashasbeenargued, themultidimensional needsofforciblydisplacedpeoplemightbebetteraddressedby the concept of “displacement vulnerability” –that is, vulnerability from, during and after forceddisplacement. Two developments in particular arealongtheselines.

A number of humanitarian actors (ICRC, theInternational Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)and Oxfam, among others)28 argue that forceddisplacement creates wide-ranging risks relating tolivelihoods, socioeconomic structures and physicalsecurity. Affected individuals require protectionirrespective of their category or legal status. Theseagencies recommend a needs-based approach to

28 See, forexample: ICRC,Enhancing Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence (Geneva,ICRC,2012), available from www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0956.pdf;ICRC, Professional Standards for Protection Work [Carried Out by Humanitarian and Human Rights Actors in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence], 2ndedition (Geneva, ICRC, 2013), available from www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0999.htm; IFRC,“Migration: Ensuring Access, Dignity, Respect for Diversity,and Social Inclusion”, resolution of the 31st InternationalConference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva,2011; Oxfam, “Protection: Overview”, Our Work: ConflictandDisasterssection(Oxford,UnitedKingdom,Oxfam,n.d.),accessed 1 December 2014, available from http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/our-work/conflict-disasters/protection

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providingprotectionthatrespondstovulnerabilities29and is not based on a specific legal status. Such anapproachrequireseffectiveneeds-basedassessmenttechniques and encompasses displaced peopleregardlessofstatus.

A parallel line of argument promoted by somehumanitarianNGOsandtheIFRC30proposesarights-based approach. This assumes that the right toprotection,likemanyotherrights,isanentitlementofallhumanbeings.Itisnotcontingentonaparticularlegal(orsocialorpolitical)status.Wheregovernmentsare unable or unwilling to protect fundamentalrights, the role of humanitarian and human rightsorganizationsistoadvocateandnegotiateonbehalfofthosewhoserightsareabused.

Given the constraints of status-based protection,theneeds- or rights-based approachesmightbetteraddress the diverse needs and identities of today’sdisplaced. The two approaches should be seen ascomplementary; in essence, both are predicatedon mainstreaming protection into humanitarianassistance programmes.31 Irrespective of the basisforprotection,allevidencepoints to theneed foraframeworkthatisasinclusiveaspossible.

Displacement and protection: The need for policy consistency

Existing policy, meanwhile, must be made moreconsistent. As previously discussed, itmust addressthemodesofself-protectionalreadybeingdeployedbythedisplaced,encompassdevelopmentneedsandcountertheparticularrisksposedinurbansettings.

29 IFRC, “Migration: Ensuring Access, Dignity, Respect forDiversity, and Social Inclusion”, resolution of the 31stInternationalConferenceoftheRedCrossandRedCrescent,Geneva,2011.

30 See,forexample: IFRC,“Migration:EnsuringAccess,Dignity,Respect for Diversity, and Social Inclusion”, resolution ofthe31st InternationalConferenceof theRedCrossandRedCrescent,Geneva,2011;IFRC,World Disasters Report 2012.

31 “Protection mainstreaming is the process of incorporatingprotectionprinciplesandpromotingmeaningfulaccess,safetyanddignity inall aspects [of theprovision]ofhumanitarianaid . . . [so that the] protective impact of aid programmingis maximised.” See Global Protection Cluster, “Brief onprotectionmainstreaming,”(GlobalProtectionCluster,2014),available from www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/aors/protection_mainstreaming/brief_on_protection_mainstreaming.pdf

Since internal displacement is the principalmanifestation of forced migration today and, amidclimate change, is likely to remain so for manydecades,muchmoreinternationalsupportisneededto encourage States to adhere to the 1998GuidingPrinciplesandregionalconventionssuchasthe2009Kampala Convention embed these in their policies.Effortstothisend includeadvocacyby internationalactors such the ICRC and the InternalDisplacementMonitoring Centre, resources to support capacity-building and training of protection agencies andpersonnel, and pioneering new approaches such astheNansenInitiative.

Theproliferationofprotectionpoliciesandpractices,andthelargelyreactiveandtailorednatureofinitiatives,hasmitigatedthecoherenceofpolicyandpractice.Itcouldbeargued that theproliferationof protectionbettertailorsmechanismstoparticularsituations,andtoregionalornationalneedsandcapacities.However,ithasalso reinforcedthedisaggregatedresponse tocontemporary protection challenges and thus thefragmentationof the normativebasis of protection.Evenwhereconsistencyandconvergence is theaim(aswithEurope’sCEAS),veryunevenimplementationmeans that policy and operational divergenceremainsapersistentfeatureofcoreprotectionnormsand processes such as reception, admission, statusdetermination, temporary protection, nationalityand age verification tests, appeals, detention andremovals.32

This lack of consistent praxis is paralleled by theabsenceofacomprehensiveinstitutionalresponsetoprotection.Manyoftherelevantinitiativeshavebeendeveloped by international agencies, governments,the European Union, or humanitarian NGOs on anindividual basis to meet specific institutional goals,programmingstrategiesorpoliticalpriorities.

32 Whereas only 4 per cent of asylum applicants receivedpositivefirst-instancedecisionsinGreecein2013and18percentinFrance,inItalytheratewas60percent,inSweden53percent,andinSwitzerland40percent.SeeEurostat,Asylum Statistics(Brussels,EuropeanUnion,2014).

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Ofmoreprofoundconcernisthegrowingdichotomybetween the concepts andpracticeof protection inregionsofmassdisplacementintheglobalsouthandtheregimesnowembeddedintheglobalnorth.33HowSomaliscanexpecttohavetheirstatusdeterminedintheUnitedKingdomisnotthesameasitisinKenya,forexample–althoughbothcountriesarepartiestothe 1951 Convention, and the outcome should bethe same. Such divergence relentlessly diminishesthe global consistency of the quality of protectionfor refugees and asylum-seekers. Divergencesacrificesthequalityofprotectiontothesupremacyof containment.34Whenpractices increasingly serverestrictionist interests in the global north, then theoft-quotedmantraof“equity”inburden-sharingmustbequestioned.

From protection norms to protection management: A shift in priority

Althoughthescopeofprotectionhasbeenmodestlyextendedthroughdevelopments in“soft”law,manyrecentchangestopolicyandpracticeindicateagradualshiftinemphasisfromnorms-basedprinciplestothemanagementofprotection.Inotherwords,protectionis now dominated by various institutionalizedprocedures and regulations, as deployed by diverseinternationalagenciesandhumanitarianactors.Withthisfocusonmanagement,thenormativesupremacyofprotectionasaprincipleandafundamentalhumanrightis,arguably,beingdiminished.

Two examples, GAMM and CEAS, are to be foundin theEuropeanUnion.Pointingto theprecedenceof management mechanisms such as these is notto deny the need for improved policymaking, theadjustment of protection instruments to meetparticular circumstances and national capacities,or the coherent and consistent management of

33 Thisdichotomyismostevidentinthe“rebordering”ofEuropeand the restrictive regime of the European Union. See, forexample:A.Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Beyond Fortress Europe?(Manchester,ManchesterUniversityPress,2008);A.DeGiorgi,“Immigrationcontrol,post-Fordismandlesseligibility:Amaterialscritiqueofthecriminalizationof immigration across Europe”, Punishment & Society,12(2):147–167; J. Harding, Border Vigils: Keeping Migrants Out of the Rich World (LondonandNewYork,Verso,2012);C. Levy, “Refugees, Europe, camps/state of exception: ‘Intothezone’,theEuropeanUnionandextraterritorialprocessingof migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers (theories andpractice)”,RefugeeSurveyQuarterly,29(1):92–119.

34 Seeearlierdiscussiononthedisplacementcontinuum.

protection policies. However, it is essential tosafeguard the international legal and normativeprinciplesonwhichprotectionisbasedandtoensurethattheseprinciplesdonotrecedeinthefaceofamoremanagedprovisionofprotection.

The politicization of protection

Finally, these challenges point to where theprotectionsystemisundergreateststrain:thehighlypoliticized context within which protection is nowplaced.Thisisnottodenytherealitythatthe1951Conventionandthe1967Protocolwereconstructedwithinapoliticalcontext,northatrefugeeprotectionhasalwaysservednationalandinternationalpoliticalinterests to a greater or lesser degree. However,what is different now is that under the pressureof globalized mobility and the multicausal andcomplexdriversof forceddisplacement,protectionhas, in effect, been co-opted and instrumentalizedas never before to serve national interests and apolitical discourse that reinforces the securitizationof migration and asylum at the expense of thefundamental rights and protection of all migrants,especiallythosewhohavebeenforciblydisplaced.35That protection now lies at the nexus of humanrights, legal and normative precepts, and politicsis potentially the most disturbing evidence of thefragmentationoftoday’ssystem.

Conclusion

Whilethemitigationofforceddisplacementthroughlong-term development, good governance and fullrespectforhumanrightsremainstheultimateaim,theincreasing scale of conflict-driven and environment-related movement continues to strain the existingregime for the protection of the displaced, and togeneratenewdemandsforprotection.

35 ThehighlypoliticizedpublicdiscourseonmigrationandasyluminEuropewasdramaticallyevidentinnationalelectionsandelectionstotheEuropeanParliamentin2014,andthe2014Swiss referendum on immigration quotas for the EuropeanUnion.Meanwhile,xenophobiahasbeenrisingacrossEurope.SeeR.Zetter,“Creatingidentities,diminishingprotectionandthesecuritisationofasyluminEurope”inS.Kneeboneetal.(eds.),Refugee Protection and the Role of Law (LondonandNewYork,Routledge/Taylor&FrancisGroup,2014).

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To refit the global protection system to meet thechallenges of contemporary humanitarian crises,there isaneed toboth reinforceand transcend thewell-established legal and normative frameworks ofprotection, and reframe our understanding of theconceptsofforcedmigrationandprotection.

Betterprotectingforcedmigrantscannotstandaloneas an aspiration, essential though this is. Solutionstothecrisisofprotectionandforcedmigrationcanonlybeaddressedwithinawiderandmorecoherentpolicy framework. This should expand the globalscale of regular, managed migration; build on andpromote longer-term, development-led strategiesin countries of origin and the major destinationcountries; and substantially expand the scope andscaleofrefugeeresettlement.n

“Solutions to the crisis of protection and forced

migration can only be addressed within a wider and

more coherent policy framework.”

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From refugee to migrant? Labour mobility’s protection potentialKaty Long1

Introduction

Refugeeprotection–bothasyluminthecountryof first refugee and resettlement to a thirdcountry–isahumanitarianendeavour,distinct

fromeconomicorlabourmigration.Arefugeeisnot“just”amigrant. It is,however, increasinglyevidentthat continuedmovement andmigration often playanimportantroleinshapingrefugees’livesaftertheirinitialflight, evenwithout the formal legal channelstodoso.

Inthepastdecadetherehasbeengrowinginternationalrecognition thatmany refugees and asylum-seekersopttomoveonfromthecountriesinwhichtheyfirstsought asylum. The economic restrictions faced inmanycountries–suchasprohibitionsontherighttoworkandlimitationsonmovementawayfromcamps–leadmanyindividualswhoseasylumclaimsarevalid(andmayevenhavebeenrecognizedbythereceivingcountry)topursueirregularsecondarymigrationafterbeinggrantedrefugeestatus, insearchofeconomicand sometimes even basic physical security.2 Infact, refugee status is sometimes seen as the leastdesirableoflegalcategories,tobeavoidedbyallthosewiththepowertomakeotherchoices.3Thisisinpart

1 KatyLongisaVisitingScholaratStanfordUniversityandalsoteachesfortheSchoolofAdvancedStudyattheUniversityofLondon.Sheisaresearcherandawriterwhoseworksexploresthe causes and consequences of migration for migrants,citizens and communities. This article is based on researchcommissionedby theTransatlanticCouncilonMigration,aninitiativeoftheMigrationPolicyInstitute,forits13thplenarysession, held in December 2014. For more information onthe Transatlantic Council on Migration, please visit www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/transatlantic-council-migration

2 Irregular secondary movement is normally defined as theonwardmovementofarefugeefromacountry inwhichheorshehasbeenabletoclaimasylumtoathirdcountry.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeCanadianAssociationforRefugeeandForcedMigrationStudies(CARFMS),“Secondarymovements:Definitions”, accessed 18 November 2014, available fromhttp://rfmsot.apps01.yorku.ca/secondary-movements

3 Forinstance,duringfieldworkinterviewsinKampala,Uganda,carriedoutbytheauthorinJuly2012,fiveDarfurihumanrightslawyersseparatelyexplainedthatwhiletheyhadleftSudantoavoidpersecution,theyhadnotappliedandwouldnotapplyforasylumbecausetheydidnotwish to live restricted livesasrefugees,insteadpreferringtousetheirsavingstopayforstudentvisas.

because refugees are perceived to be more at riskfor discrimination, andbecause refugeesmay enjoyfewer rights than migrants who, for example, canidentifythemselvesasstudentsorbusinesspeople.Iftheproblemsassociatedwithirregularimmigration–suchasdangerous journeys,exploitativeemployers,lost taxation revenue, displaced local workers andincreased insecurity – are to be effectively tackled,recognizingthat“refugees”and“migrants”areoftenthesamepeople,anddevelopinglegalalternativestotheirirregularmigration,islikelytoprovevital.

The fact that continued movement is already partofexile formanyrefugees inpart reflects thestrainthat complex,open-endeddisplacement criseshaveplacedonexistingapproachestorefugeeprotection.In2014,6.3million refugees–ormorethanhalfofthoseinthecareoftheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)–hadspentmorethanfiveyearsinexile(whatUNHCRdefinesasaprotractedrefugeesituation).4

Thetraditionalthree-prongedapproachtodeliveringdurable solutions for refugees – repatriation to thecountryoforigin, local integration in thecountryoffirst asylum, or resettlement to a third country – isnotworking.5Anumberof researchershavearguedthat the international community must recognizethe role thatmigration (especially circular, seasonaland temporary migration) can play in supportingresilience under stress – and build “migration anddevelopment”intoplanningforsustainablesolutions

4 (Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees(UNHCR),UNHCR Global Trends 2013: War’s Human Cost (Geneva, UNHCR, 2014), p. 12. Available from http://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-2013-wars-human-cost

5 K. Long, Permanent Crises? Unlocking the Protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford Department ofInternational Development, University of Oxford, 2011).Available from www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2011/201110-Permanent-crises-Unlocking-the-protracted-displacement-of-refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-thematic-en.pdf

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to displacement.6 Pursuing labour mobility forrefugees may therefore make sense for economic,political and humanitarian reasons, offering thechancetoenhancerefugeeprotectionandreducethemanycostsassociatedwithlong-termrefugeecrises.

This article considers the extent to which labourmigration is being used – or could be used in thefuture – to strengthen the international refugeeprotectionregimeandfacilitatedurablesolutionsformorerefugees.Labourmigrationandlabourmobility–thatis,movingprimarilyforthepurposesofseekingemployment at the destination – are the primaryfocusofthisarticle.Whilecloselyrelated,thetermsare distinct. “Labour migration” is used to refer toorganized, structured movement for employment;itcanbetemporaryor longterm.“Labourmobility”impliesfreedomofmovement:theabilityofworkerstomoverelativelyeasilyacrossborders(perhapsinbothdirections).However, it is importanttoacknowledgethat labourmigrationandmobility arenot theonlyways that refugees can and do to improve theirsocioeconomiccircumstances.Refugeesmaymigrate(aftergainingasylum)foreducation,forhealthorforfamily reasons (including marriage). This migrationmaybeentirely voluntary,or constrainedby factorssuch as poverty or insecurity.Many of this article’sconclusions can be applied to these other forms ofmovement,too.

Uncertain labour-market access

Manycountiesdograntrecognizedrefugeesfullaccessto their labour market but prevent asylum-seekersfrom working while their case is heard, a processthatcantakeyears.Otherslodgedreservationsatthetimeofsigningthe1951Conventionthatsignificantlycurtailrefugees’rightstowork.InEgypt,forexample,bureaucratichurdlesandgovernmenthostilitymakepractical access to the labour market extremelydifficulttosecure.

6 See, for example: A.Monsutti, “Afghanmigratory strategiesand the three solutions to the refugee problem”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 27(1):58–73, available from http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org/content/27/1/58.abstract; N. Nyberg-Sørensen, N. Van Hear and P. Engberg-Pedersen, The Migration–Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options,Migration Research Series No. 8 (Geneva, InternationalOrganizationforMigration,2002),availablefromhttp://iom.ch/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/serial_publications/mrs_8.pdf

Evenwhere access to the labourmarket is granted,refugees may often encounter discrimination, andface the reality that – especially in developingcountries–unemploymentratesandpovertyamongnationalsarealsoveryhigh.7

Thiscombinationofformaldiscriminationandwiderpovertyhelpstoexplainwhymanyrefugeesareunabletofindworkincountriesoffirstasylum,andwhymanydecidetomoveirregularlyalongsideothermigrants.Anaddedcomplicationisthatveryfewrefugeesareabletouseexistinglegalmigrationschemestomoveon from their countries of first asylum even if theywouldotherwisequalify todo so, because they areunabletoprovidetherequireddocumentation.

The lack of livelihood opportunities in countriesof first asylum (due to both legal barriers andeconomic conditions) and thedifficultyof accessinglegalmigration channels to third countries togetherpreventrefugees’accesstolegalworkopportunitiesand, in many cases, prompt them to engage inirregular work or migration. Recently, policymakershavedemonstratedarenewedinterestinconsideringhowlabourmigrationmightbeusedtoaddresstheseissues.

Problems: Overcoming obstacles to access

Despite increased interest in the approach, it hasneverthelessbeenrelativelydifficulttoputlarge-scalelabourmigrationschemesforrefugeesintopractice.If mobility is to become a realistic policy responseto displacement, government and humanitarianactors will need to address several key challenges.These include addressing negative public opinion,overcomingconcernsregardingthepossibleshrinkingofhumanitarianspace,ensuringrefugees’rightsareprotected as migrants, resolving legal obstacles torefugees’ immigration, anddetermining thedivisionof institutional responsibility between differentinternationalhumanitarianandmigrationactors.

Negative public opinion is by far the most difficult obstacle to developing migration opportunities for refugees. In both developed and developing

7 Asylum Access and Refugee Work Rights Coalition, Global Refugee Work Rights Report 2014: Taking the Movement from Theory to Practice(Oakland,California,AsylumAccess,2014).Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FINAL_Global-Refugee-Work-Rights-Report-2014_Interactive.pdf

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States, animosity is particularly directed towardspoorandlow-skilledforeigners,andthepublicoftenfails to distinguish between “migrants”, “asylum-seekers” and “refugees”.8 The strong showing ofanti-immigrant parties in the May 2014 Europeanelections, for instance, was in part a reflection ofwidespreadanxietyandgeneralfearofimmigrationinmanydevelopedeconomiesfollowingthepost-2008global recession. In many African and Asian Statesthat host large numbers of refugees, meanwhile,high unemployment, local poverty and weak Stategovernanceleaverefugees–evenwhengrantedlegalstatus–vulnerabletodiscriminationandharassment;andtherearestrongincentivesforpoliticianstoadoptanti-migrantplatformsinpubliccampaigns.

Inthefaceofsuchpublichostility,seekingtopersuadepolicymakerstoactivelydevelopprogrammestoadmitmoremigrants–ortoprovidethoserefugeesalreadypresentwithauthorizationtoworkortoremaininthelongterm–islikelytoproveanuphillbattle.

Humanitarian actors may be reluctant to blur the line between “refugees” and “migrants”. A relatedobstacleislikelytobefoundinthereluctanceofmanyhumanitariannon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)tominimizea“refugee”-versus-“migrant”dichotomythathasbeenviewedasessentialtopreservingspaceforasyluminthefaceofpublicxenophobia.Thereareconcernsthatopeningupparallelmigrationchannelsalongsideresettlement,forinstance,willallowStatestosubstituteassistanceforthemostvulnerablewithopportunity for thosewith thegreatestpotential tointegrate.

Existing migrants’ rights frameworks may be insufficient to protect refugees who are able to migrate legally.Itisimportanttoensurethatrefugeeshaveaccesstolegalmigrationchannels.Unauthorizedmigrantsaremorelikelytosufferfromsocioeconomicdiscriminationandtoenjoyfewerlegalorcivicrights.Butsimplyholdinglegalstatusisnotenoughtomakemigrationa“good”solution;manylegalmigrantsalsosufferdiscriminationanddeprivation.Severalscholarshave warned against embracing migration as asolutionforrefugeeswithoutensuringthatmigrants’

8 See, for example:B.Andersonand S. Blinder, “WhoCountsas a Migrant? Definitions and Their Consequences”, 3rdrevision, Briefing series (The Migration Observatory,University of Oxford, 1 August 2014). Available fromwww.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/who-counts-migrant-definitions-and-their-consequences

rights are safeguarded.9 A cautionary tale can befound in the experience of many Somali, EthiopianandSriLankanrefugeeswhotravelledtotheMiddleEastaslabourmigrants,butbecausemigrantworkershave few rights in this region they are dependentupon (often unscrupulous) employers for continuedlegalstatus.

Migrant status is not the equivalent of citizenship;in many States, it is extremely difficult to obtainpermanent residence or to naturalize, andmigrantsare permanently barred from full participation insociety.Evenafterdecadesasresidents,theymaybeprohibitedfromowningland,fromvotingorfromfullparticipation in the labour market. Such conditionsare difficult for all migrants but are likely to createparticularhardshipforrefugees(especiallythoseforwhomrepatriationisnotanoption).

National immigration and protection practices thatcreate legal obstacles to the migration of refugeeswillneedtobereformed.Arguablyoneofthemostsignificantobstacles facedby those looking toopenmigration options to refugees is that – by outcomeif not intention – international immigration regimesmake it extremely difficult for refugees to movelegallyacrossborders.Ifrefugeeadvocateshaveofteninsistedthatrefugeesarenotmigrantsasameansofsecuring greater protection, immigration lawsmeanthatrefugeescannotbecomemigrantswithoutgivinguptheirrefugeeprotection.

Asnotedabove,manyrefugeesexperienceproblemswith documentation. The 1951 Convention traveldocuments(CTDs)thattheyareentitledtoareoftendifficult to obtain and/or use, which leads somerefugees to acquire a national passport in order tomigrate.This,however,canbeinterpretedasshowingthattheyhave“re-availedthemselvesoftheprotection

9 See, forexample:K. Long,Permanent Crises? Unlocking the Protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (Oxford,RefugeeStudiesCentre,OxfordDepartmentof International Development, University of Oxford, 2011),available from www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2011/201110-Permanent-crises-Unlocking-the-protracted-displacement-of-refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-thematic-en.pdf; N. Nyberg-Sørensen,N. Van Hear and P. Engberg-Pedersen, The Migration–Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options,MigrationResearchSeriesNo.8(Geneva,InternationalOrganizationforMigration,2002),availablefromhttp://iom.ch/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/serial_publications/mrs_8.pdf

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oftheircountryoforigin.”10Thismaybelessaconcernfor refugeesmigratingat theendofacrisis–whenrepatriationmaybeanoption,andreturnisunlikelytoleadtopersecution–butitisaseriousproblemforthoserefugeeswhoselivesorfundamentalfreedommaybeputatriskintheircountriesoforigin.

Building ethical and effective labour migration programmes for refugees will require the cooperation of multiple stakeholders.Securingsuch institutionalcooperation – balancing the different mandates,concerns and goals of diverse actors – is likely totakebothtimeandeffort. IntegratingmigrationandfreedomofmovementintounderstandingsofrefugeeprotectionwillrequireUNHCRtomaintainitsrecentlevelsof involvement indiscussinganddebatingtherelationshipbetweenrefugeesandmigration,andinfacilitatingrefugeemovementwhenconditionsallow.However,itisalsoclearthatmanyofthesafeguardsthat would need to be incorporated into migrationprogrammes for refugees, particularly regardingmigrants’ rights and conditions, are most relevantto the International Labour Organization (ILO) andthe International Organization for Migration (IOM).Some inter-agency cooperation has already beenfostered among UNHCR, IOM and ILO in this area;building furtheron theexpertiseof IOMand ILO inlabourmigration is likely to increase the chancesofsuccessfulprogrammedesignforrefugees.

Ultimately, however, the success of any labourmigration programme for refugees dependson securing buy-in from recruiting/host States.Maintainingcontrolof immigrationpolicy isseenbymost countries as integral to national sovereignty:anysuccessfullabourmigrationprogrammewillneedto persuade countries involved that the benefitsare considerable (whether measured in terms offostering national economic growth, furtheringregional cooperation, contributing to internationalburden-sharing, building peace, ormeeting existinghumanitariananddevelopmentpledges)andthatanyriskscanbeeffectivelymanaged.

Potential areas for action

Given theseobstacles,what typesof future refugeemigration programmes might be developed orsupported by international actors? Two possible

10 Article1C1,UNGeneralAssembly,ConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees.

approaches present themselves. First, actors couldfocus on ensuring nondiscrimination, or facilitatingrefugees’equalaccesstoexistingmigrationchannels.Second,theycouldconcentrateondevelopingtailoredmigrationprogrammesforspecificrefugeegroups.

Facilitating access to existing channels by removing refugee-specific barriers

Nearly all States offer some opportunities forimmigration, although these are often targetedat those who can fill labour-market shortages,particularlythehighlyskilled.Althoughsomerefugeesmaybeotherwisequalifiedtoapplyforamigrantvisaunder theseprogrammes, their refugeestatusoftenpreventsthemfrombeingabletodoso.

An approach focused on ensuring refugees’ equalaccess toexistingmigrationchannelswould removetheseobstaclesandencouragethemtotakeadvantageof immigration opportunities. Such an approachwouldaimtodevelopasetofmeasuresintendedtosimplifyaccesstoexistinglegalimmigrationchannelsforrefugees.

Such measures would probably benefit a relativelysmall number of educated or skilled refugees. Themajority of refugees would not qualify to migrateunder schemes designed to attract highly skilledprofessionals. However, there is little doubt thatsomerefugeeswouldbenefitwhilealsohelpinghostcountriesfilllabour-marketgaps.

Furthermore,securingequalaccessforrefugeesandpreventing discrimination within the immigrationsystemisarguablyanintegralcomponentofrefugeeprotection in and of itself, and one thatmay fostermore political support than would entirely newimmigration programmes. Although the public maybehostiletowardsnewimmigrationmeasures,manymay be attracted to initiatives that simply aim tosecurealreadyrecognizedrefugeesthesamerightsasotherwould-bemigrants.

Suchanapproachwouldneedtotargetthefollowingobstaclesfacedbyrefugees:

• Lack of a “country of return”.Acountryofreturnis a normal requirement under immigrationprocedures:alllabourmigrantsinitiallyholdonlya conditional (and often time-limited) right tostayinthecountryofwork,andmayberequiredto leave,orevenbedeported, if theybreak the

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conditionsoftheirvisa.Thismeansthatrefugeescannot apply for awork-related visaunless theydo sowithanationalpassport,whichcan resultinforfeitingtheprotectionsaccordedtothemasrefugees.

Tomitigate this barrier, destination States couldwaivecountry-of-returnrequirements forwould-be labour migrants who otherwise meet allimmigration criteria but are effectively barredbecause theyhold refugeestatus.Suchmigrantscouldberequiredtoundergoadditionalscreeningor interview processes. However, upon grantingaworkvisa,aStatewouldeffectivelybeagreeingto fast-track a refugee-migrant’s permanentresidency,andtostaydeportationintheeventofaviolationofthevisaconditions.

States of first asylum could also cooperate withdestinationStatestoassumearoleasalast-resortcountryofreturnforrefugee-migrants,especiallyin cases where visa infractions are relativelyminor (for example, temporary unemployment).UNHCRcouldhelptofacilitateconfidenceinsucharrangementsbyactingasatrustedintermediary,andbymeetingthefinancialcostsinvolvedinthereintegrationofreturnedrefugee-migrants.

• Limited access to travel documents, including the CTDs. ThereasonsforthefailureoftheCTDregimearethreefold.Technologicaladvances,inparticulartherequirementoftheInternationalCivilAviationAuthority that from 2015 all passports must bemachine-readable, have increased the cost andcomplexityofissuingusableCTDs.Moreseriously,there isawidespreadbelief inmanyfirst-asylumStates and among some UNHCR staff that CTDsshould be regarded as a privilege not a right.Arguablymostproblematicofall,however,isthefact that many destination States are extremelyreluctant toadmit refugees travelingonCTDsatall, fearing that itwill bedifficult toenforceanydeportationorderagainstaCTDholder.

There is widespread recognition of the need toreform and modernize the CTD system. Moreeffortsshouldbemadetoconsiderhowrefugeemovement for legitimate purposes, includingtaking up work, could be facilitated. All States,especially signatories to the 1951 Convention,should consider how they might be able toimproverecognizedrefugees’accesstoCTDsthatmeet the International Air Transport Associationstandards for international travel, and how they

coulddeviseadditionalsafeguardsthatencourageCTDs tobeacceptedasvalid international traveldocuments,especiallyforthoselookingtotakeuplegallyauthorizedworkorstudyuponarrival.

• Inability to provide a financial guarantee or proof of financial resources. Many immigrationprogrammes require would-be immigrants todemonstrate that they already have certainfinancial resources available to them, in partto guard against dependence on or recourse topublic funds.11 Inmanycases,employerscanactasguarantors.However,somerefugeeswhomightotherwisequalify foran immigrationvisacannotdemonstratesuchfinancialindependence.

States imposing financial requirements couldwaivethemforrecognizedrefugeeswhomeetallothercriteriaforamigrationvisa.Incaseswheredestination States do not waive maintenancerequirements, UNHCR, another trusted third-partyNGO,ortheprospectiveemployercouldactasguarantor.

• Lack of information on existing migration opportunities. In most protracted refugeesituations,refugeesseekingameansofmigratinglegally focus their efforts almost exclusively onaccessingresettlementandtoa lesserextent (inthe case of younger, more educated refugees)on scholarship opportunities abroad. Very fewrefugees are aware of possible legal labourmigrationopportunities.

NGOs,UNHCRanddestinationStatescouldworkto publicize existing opportunities for labourmigration. In order to improveunderstandingofrefugeeskillsets,refugeesshouldbeencouragedto provide information about their skills orqualifications, to be stored in a central dataregistry. This might, in the future, allow NGOsor destination States to proactively tailor anddistribute information about opportunities formigrationtorelevantgroupsofdisplacedpeople.UNHCRandNGOs could alsoproactively engagewithprospectiveemployers,recruitmentagenciesand destination States to raise awareness about

11 For instance, applicants to the UK high-skilled migrationprogramme must hold GBP 945 in an account for 90 daysprior to submitting an application to meet maintenancerequirements.

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thepossibilityofemployingrefugees-as-migrants.This could be an opportunity to actively fosterglobalcorporatesocial responsibilitywhilefillinglabourshortages.

These four recommendations represent aminimumsetofinitiativesthroughwhichaplatformforrefugees’migrationcouldbesecured.

For States interested in using existing migrationpathways for humanitarian outcomes, additionalinitiatives could also be developed as forms ofaffirmative action. For instance, in points-basedmigration systems (where would-be immigrantsaccumulatepointsforqualifications,languageability,financial resources and so on, and must reach apredeterminedthresholdinordertoqualifyforavisa),refugeescouldbeawardedanadditionalnumberofpointsonsubmittingproofofrefugeestatus.

Active development of refugee-migration programmes

Beyond ensuring refugees’ equal access to existingmigrationchannels, therearespecificcircumstancesin which the international community may find itusefultodirectlyengageinsupportinganddevelopingpopulation-specific migration programmes thatactively target refugeecommunities.Such initiativesare likely to be most successful when establishedalongside other efforts to foster durable post-crisissolutions, and when focused on providing refugeeswhoarealreadylivingandworkinginahostcountrywiththelegalrighttostayasmigrants.

Migrant status as part of a durable solution

Allowinglong-termrefugees,especiallyattheendofacrisis, toswitchstatusandbecome legal residentsin their countries of asylum rather than requiringtheir repatriation has several benefits. It increasesthe likelihood that refugees will be able to buildupon existing socioeconomic networks to secure asustainable livelihood; itacknowledges the fact thatespecially in protracted refugee situations, manyrefugeesmaynotrememberthe“home”towhichtheyaresupposedtoreturnandhavemuchstrongerlinkstotheirhostcommunitythantoacountryoforigin.Offering refugeesmigrant statusalso recognizes theimportantroleofmigrationinfosteringpost-conflictrecoveryanddevelopment.

Tofacilitategreateruseoflegalimmigrationstatusasadurable solution, several stepsmaybeconsideredbythefollowingkeyactors:

• International actors. UNHCR and others couldprovide an initial push by identifying refugeecrises, particularly protracted ones, where legalimmigration status could play a role in helpingto end displacement and support either localintegration or repatriation. International actorscould then work with host States to developreasonableandaccessiblecriteriaforgrantinglegalresidentstatus–withaccesstothelabourmarket–potentiallyincludingevidenceofhighschooloruniversity graduation, ongoing employment or aviablebusiness.

• Host and asylum countries. States, especiallysignatories to the 1951 Convention, that do notalready offer refugees full access to the labourmarket could consider how refugees’ access toemployment opportunities during their exilecould be expanded, perhaps incrementally,especially in protracted refugee situations. Toenable access to visas, host States could waiveprocessingandapplicationcostswherepossible.Alternatively, UNHCR could consider meetingsuch costs as part of securing a durable end torefugeedisplacement.Host States thathavenotalreadyestablishedroutesformigrantstobecomepermanent residents could also be encouragedto develop programmes throughwhich refugee-migrantsmight–overtime–becomeeligibleforpermanentresidenceandcitizenship.

• Countries of origin. In cases where migrationis being used to bring an end to refugee status(as in the EconomicCommunity ofWestAfricanStates), UNHCR and other international actorsshould take care to ensure that these refugeesare able to secure ongoing consular protectionfromtheircountriesoforigin.Countriesoforiginshould be encouraged towaive costs associatedwithobtainingpassportsandotheridentificationdocuments needed by refugee-migrants (orUNHCRcouldconsidermeetingthecosts).

Encouraging regional free movement

Encouraging trade blocs to open up labourmarketsisoftenpoliticallydifficult,buthasmanyadvantagesbeyond securing new opportunities for labourmobility. Because such agreements are reciprocal,notonlyrefugeesbutalsohostcommunitymembers

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gain new access to neighbouring States’ markets.Building strong regional trade links can help toacceleratereconstructionandcementpeace-buildingefforts.Suchinitiativesclearlyextendfarbeyondthehumanitarian and immigration spheres and requirethecooperationofabroadrangeofpolitical,economicandsecurityactors:

• International actors. During post-conflictnegotiations, international actors could seekto ensure that borders are not unnecessarilysecuritized, making it more difficult for workersto cross thanbefore conflict. Peacenegotiationscould also include plans to open borders thatwere closed as a result of conflict. In regionswhere complex displacement crises haveinvolved multiple borders, peace-building anddevelopment initiatives could stress thebenefitsthat the regional freemovementofworkerscanbringalongsideregionalfreetrade.

• Regional blocs and member States. Inareaswhereregional cooperation and trade mechanismsalreadyexist,memberStatescouldagreetowaivethecostsassociatedwithworkvisasandresidentpermits for citizens of other member States.Alternatively, authorities could simply seek tokeepcoststoaminimumandavoidmeasuresthatwoulddeliberatelydeter citizens fromexercisingtheir right to move freely. Programmes couldalso be developed in cooperation with NGOsand internationalactorstoensurethatallactorsinvolved in regulating immigration – borderguards,police,employmentbureausandsoon–areawareofregionalcitizens’rightstoworkandmovefreely.

Matching labour-market needs with development opportunities through temporary migration

There is scope for countries to develop specificmigration programmes to support either refugeeswhoarestuckinprotractedrefugeesituationsorthosereturningtocountriesjustemergingfromconflictordisaster.Suchprogrammescouldprovideaspecifiednumber of refugees with access to specific labour-marketsectorsforalimitedtimeperiod.Beneficiarieswouldgainthechancetoearn,save,andremitmoneyandtolearnnewskills,increasingthehumancapitalavailable to their communities upon their return.Suchprogrammesmightfocusonusingmigrationtoleverage development and thus enhance refugees’socioeconomic status, rather than on providing apermanentsolutiontodisplacementperse.

A major advantage of this type of temporarydevelopmentprogrammeisthatwhilethemajorityofWesternStatesheavilyrestrictlong-term,low-skilledmigration, many have seasonal labour shortages inlow-skilledsectors,especiallyagriculture,andalreadyrun seasonal recruitment programmes to fill thesegaps. Such initiatives could inparticularbenefit lesseducated, rural refugee populations who are oftenoverlooked by migration programmes. This wouldservenotonlyahumanitarianbutalsoadevelopmentfunction, especially if combined with an NGOprogrammethatofferstechnicaltrainingorlanguageclasses.

Tomake such initiatives a reality, there are severalfocusedeffortsneededfromthefollowingactors:

• International actors.UNHCR,IOM,ILOandotherinternationalactorscouldplayaroleinidentifyingpotentialseasonallabour-marketshortages,suchas in agriculture, thatwould be suitable for thetemporaryrecruitmentofrefugeelabourers.

• Recruiting States, recruitment agencies, trade unions and international actors. A broadcoalition of actors will need to work togetherwith prospective employers to ensure that anyprogrammesdevisedofferrefugeesdecentwagesand decent working conditions. Independentmonitoring and evaluation of conditions duringworkprogrammeswouldalsoberequired.

• Countries of asylum. Where repatriation is notan option, countries of asylum would need toagree to receive all refugees who participate ina temporary programme upon their return. Inorder to facilitate good relations with the hostcommunity,recruitingStatescouldalsoreserveaportionofprogrammejobsforworkersfromthehostcountry.

• Refugees. Recruiting authorities should givefull information to refugeeson thedurationandnature of the temporary migration opportunity,and refugees should be asked to provide theirinformed consent, on record, before travelling.Participating refugees should also be givenregularopportunitiestoevaluatetheprogrammeand contact authorities, including unionrepresentatives,whereappropriate.

Theextenttowhichany(orall)oftheseapproachesto refugee labour mobility is feasible depends onthe context. However, in all cases, it is clear thatsuccess depends upon building support beyond

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the humanitarian community and emphasizing themutualbenefitstobegainedbyfacilitatingrefugees’abilitytomove–benefitsthatincludefillingexistinglabour shortages, reducing aid dependency, andcontributing to long-term, post-conflict or post-disasterreconstructionefforts.

Conclusion

Inrecentyears,theinternationalcommunityhasmadeconsiderableprogressinrecognizingtheoftencomplexconnectionsbetween“migrants”and“refugees”andin seeking to harness the development potentialof migration, especially for those moving from theleastdevelopedStates.Butthepotentialofmobilityto provide socioeconomic independence or durablesolutionstorefugeesremainsmostlyuntapped,andlegalandbureaucraticobstaclescontinuetohamperaccess to existing opportunities for many refugeeswhomightotherwisequalifyaslabourmigrants.

Themostpromisingapproachesarelikelytobethosethat concentrate on securing regularization andwork authorization for already-resident refugees incountries of first asylum. Also promising are small-scale programmes in developed economies thatlook to fill particular labour-market shortageswhilemeetinghumanitariananddevelopmentobligations.Policymakersandinternationalactorswouldthusdowell to consider two steps: (1) removing obstaclesthat keep otherwise qualified refugees fromaccessingexistingmigrationchannels;and(2)offeringnew migration opportunities to specific groups ofrefugees,whetherwithin a region (such as throughexpandedregionalfreemovementarrangements)orfurtherafield(throughtemporaryworkprogrammesindevelopedcountries,forexample).

New researchwill need to identify how andwherelabour mobility schemes for refugees can be bestestablished, with special attention paid tomappingthespecificskillsetsandinterestsofvariousrefugeegroups.Meanwhile,internationalactorsmightidentifythoseStateswherepoliticalandeconomicconditions(including labour-market shortages) might fostertheshiftsinlawandpolicyneededtoaccommodaterefugees’interests.

Attention should also be paid to the humanitarianconcern that opening alternative mobility channelscoulderoderefugeeprotection.Yet,thefactremainsthat existing resettlement capacity cannot meettoday’sneedsordemand.Furthermore, focusingon

securing protection for the most vulnerable leavesmanyyoung,educatedrefugeestrappedinprotractedrefugee situations, with few options for escape butirregularmigration.

While any steps towards easing refugeemovementwould meet significant obstacles – not the leastofwhich isnegativepublicopinion– it is clear thatmobilitywillcontinuetobeafundamentalresponsetodisplacement,regardlessofwhetheritisfacilitatedbygovernmentsand internationalactorsoreffectedbyrefugeesthemselves.Withoutlegalchannelsopentothem,manyrefugeeswillchoosetotravelirregularly–withworse outcomes for both refugees and localcitizens,andseriousimplicationsforpublicconfidenceinStates’migrationandprotectionsystems.

There is enormous potential formigration policy toenhance refugee protection. This is especially clearwhenlookingattheconditionsofthoseinprotractedexile. Now, the international community must findthepoliticalwilltoturnthispotentialintoapracticalreality.n

“Without legal channels open to them, many refugees will

choose to travel irregularly – with worse outcomes for both

refugees and local citizens, and serious implications for public

confidence in States’ migration and protection systems.”

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Map 1: Movements along the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes, 2012–2014

Migration trends across the Mediterranean: Connecting the dotsArezo Malakooti1

Introduction

InNovember2014, the InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)RegionalOfficefortheMiddleEast and North Africa (MENA) commissioned

Altai Consulting to create a fresh and updatedunderstandingofthedynamicsofthemigrationflowsacrosstheMediterraneanbylookingattworoutesinparticular:theWesternMediterraneanrouteandtheCentralMediterraneanroute.

Fieldworkwas conducted between November 2014and February 2015 across seven countries in theMENA regionandEurope (Egypt, Italy, Libya,Malta,Morocco, Spain and Tunisia). Across the sample oflocations,60in-depthinterviewswereconductedwithmigrantsand73in-depthinterviewswereconductedwith key informants, resulting in a total of 133in-depthqualitativeinterviews.Thisarticlepresentsasummaryofthekeyfindingsofthestudy.2

2 Toaccessthefullreport,pleasereferto:www.altaiconsulting.com/docs/migration/Altai_Migration_trends_accross_the_Mediterranean_v3.pdf

1 ArezoMalakootiistheDirectorofMigrationResearchatAltaiConsulting.

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The Western Mediterranean route

TheWesternMediterraneanroutegenerallyreferstotheroutefrom North Africa to Spain.ItencompassesaseapassageacrosstheStraitofGibraltarfromTangiertoTarifa,alandroutethroughtheenclavesofCeutaandMelilla,andaseapassagetotheCanaryIslandsinSpain.

Figure 1: Irregular border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route, 2008–2014

6,500 6,650

5,000

8,450

6,400 6,800

4,000

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014(Sept 30)

Profiles

Unlike in Libya,mostmigrants tend to have a clearobjective to move on to Europe when they firstarriveinMoroccobutmostspendmuchmoretimeinMoroccothantheyoriginallyanticipatedbecauseofthedifficultiesincrossingoverintoSpain.

Close to 90 per cent of irregular migrants in Spainentered regularly but became irregular over time,andonly10percentcamebyboatfromsub-SaharanAfricathroughtheMediterranean.However,theflowthroughtheMediterraneantendstogarnerthemostattentionbecause it issodangerousandconsideredthemostflagrant.Themaincountriesoforigincomingthrough the Mediterranean have traditionally beenSenegal, Cameroon, Guinea and Nigeria, but since2013 there has been a shift towardsmore asylum-seekersarriving.

Push and pull factors

Thepushfactorsemergeasfarmoreinfluentialthanthepullfactorsandthemostsignificantpushfactoristheneedtofleefrominstability:eitherwarorconflict(as in the case of asylum-seekers) or economic orsocietalpressuresthatinhibitastablelife.Thestudy

also foundthata feelingof inequality isoftenmoreinfluentialthanabsoluteneedinadecisiontomigrate,which iswhymanyof themigrantson theWesternMediterraneanroutewerenottheworst-offintheirhomecountries.

Thedecisiontomigrateisoftenconsideredforsometime before migrants finally decide to leave theirhome countries. Formostmigrants, life back homewasprecariousandheldtogetherbyverythinthreadsthat could very easily come undone. When one ofthose threadsgives in,migrantsoftenfinallydecidetoleave.Forothermigrants,thetippingpointcomeswhen they observe returnees who come back in abetter situationorwhen friendswho return fromamigrationabroaddecidedtomigrateagainandoffertotakethemalong.

Main routes of travel and the conditions of the journey

There are twomain routes toMorocco: the desertroute thatmoves through Algeria (Map 2), and thecoastalroutethatmovesthroughMauritania(Map3).

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Map 2: The desert route to Morocco (Western Mediterranean route)

Map 3: The coastal route to Morocco (Western Mediterranean route)

vv

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IntermsoftheroutesfromMoroccotoSpain,thesearoutetraditionallycrossestheStraitofGibraltarfromTangiertoTarifaandthelandroutesmovefromMoroccointotheenclavesofMelillaandCeuta.Inmorerecentyears,therehavealsobeensearoutesfromMoroccointoMelillaandCeuta.

Map 4: Routes from Morocco to Spain (Western Mediterranean route)

The smuggling hotspots on theWesternMediterra-neanrouteareinAgadez(Niger)andGao(Mali).ArlitinNigerisahotspotfortraffickingandprostitution.

In terms of the dynamics of smuggling, migrantsusuallydealwithafrontman,whoisworkingforthesmugglerandisfromthesamecountryoforiginasthemigrants.Somemigrantsalsospokeofnominatingaguarantor who would pay the smuggler once theyhadsuccessfullyarrivedindestination,demonstratingthat migrants have started to address their ownvulnerabilities.

In termsof trafficking, thevastmajorityofNigerianwomenthatarriveinMoroccohavebeentraffickedforsexualexploitation,andNigeriahasalwaysrepresented

theprimarycountryoforigininthisregard.In2014,however,thenumberofCameroonianwomenbeingtraffickedtoMorocco forsexualexploitationstartedto surpass the number of Nigerian women in thesamesituation.

The Central Mediterranean route

TheCentralMediterraneanroutereferstothemixedmigratory flow coming from Northern Africa to Italy and Malta.Libyahastraditionallybeenamajortransitpointforsub-SaharanAfricanandWestAfricanmigrants along this route and the main departurepointforcrossingtheMediterranean.However,EgyptandTunisiahavealsoactedastransitanddeparturepointsattimes.

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Figure 2: Irregular border crossings on the Central Mediterranean route, 2008–2014

MigrantswhoremaininLibyaaretypicallythosethatarestillinstableemployment,protractedrefugeesandextremelyvulnerablesub-SaharanAfricanmigrantswhobecomestranded.

Main routes of travel and the conditions of the journey

Despite the Libyan crisis of 2014, the main routesinto Libya remained active, demonstrating that themigratory routes into the country, and the transitroutes through the country, are well established.TheseroutesaredisplayedinMap5.

Recent trends

TheLibyancrisisof2014createdanumberofchangesto theenvironment formigrants in the country, theprotectionspace forasylum-seekersand,ultimately,thecharacteristicsoftheflowsenteringanddepartingLibya.

The levels of arbitrary arrest and detainment,harassment, ill treatment and labour exploitationexperienced by migrants and asylum-seekers wereheightenedinthecurrentcrisis.Inaddition,rumourslinking Syrians to particular militia groups and thescapegoating of Syrians and Palestinians made theclimate difficult for these groups, too, who hadpreviously been better received than sub-SaharanAfricansinthecountry.

Asaresult,migrantsandasylum-seekersreportahugemigratorypressuretoleavethecountryinthecurrentcontext,withlittlewayofdoingsootherthanleavingvia theMediterranean: Tunisia effectively closed itsborderstonon-LibyanmigrantstryingtoexitLibyaviaTunisia;andEgyptalsosteppedupcontrolsalongitsborder,with Libyamaking it close to impossible formigrantsandasylum-seekerstofindtheirwayhome(ortoathirdcountry)viatheseborders.TravellingtothesouthofthecountrytoleaveLibyaviaitssouthernborders is also too risky formigrants as they faceanumber of checkpoints along the way, manned bybothStateandnon-Stateactors.

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Map 5: Routes to North Africa (Central Mediterranean route)

Libya remains the main departure point forboats crossing the Mediterranean on the CentralMediterraneanroute,with83percentofallarrivalsin Italy in 2014 having departed the Libyan coast.However, as can be seen in Figure 3, departures

fromEgyptalso increased in2014.Towardstheendof2014,therewasalsoanincreaseinthenumberofboatsthatarrivedinItalyfromTurkey.

Figure 3: Irregular arrivals on the Italian coast by country of departure, 2012–2014

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ThemaindeparturepointsfromtheNorthAfricancoastaredisplayedinMap6.

Map 6: Departure points from the North African coast (Central Mediterranean route)

Migrant smuggling and trafficking

The large increase in flows through the CentralMediterranean,thechangeinthecompositionofthemigrants that comprise this flow (in particular, theintroduction of a populationwith greater economicmeans, as in the caseof Syrians) and theeffectsofMare Nostrum led to some deliberate changes tothe dynamics of smuggling in this region in 2014.Oneofthemostpronouncedwasagreaterfocusonthemarketingof smuggling services, particularly onsocialmedia,andthetargetingofdifferentgroupsofmigrants throughdifferentpackagesof services.Forexample, Syrianswereoffered “safer” journeys at ahigherprice.2104alsowitnessedan increase inthepurchase of journeys from country of origin all thewaytoEurope.

There are also impressions that smugglers tookadvantageofMareNostrumbyusingvesselsthatwerenotseaworthy,ontheassumptionthattheywouldbe

picked up by the Italian navy soon after departure,whichmade the journeysacross theMediterraneanmoredangerous.

The multiplicity of groups involved in smugglingin Libya today also led to some changes. Whilepreviouslyitwaspossibletopricethevariousroutesinstandardways,todaythepriceofaparticularrouteorsegmentofthejourneydependsonthenationalityof themigrantpaying for it, the levelof service themigrantiswillingtopayfor,andthesmugglingringamigrantcomesintocontactwithinLibya.

In terms of trafficking of migrants, the number ofdetectionsofwomenwhoarrived in Italy for sexualexploitation increased by 300 per cent in 2014.Nigerianwomen continued tomark the increase inthe arrival of traffickedwomen on Italian shores in2014,buttherewasalsoanincreaseinthenumberoftraffickedCameroonianwomen.

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Push and pull factors

Figure 4: Irregular arrivals on Italian shores, 2002–2014

As shown in Figure 4, in 2014, Italy experienceda dramatic increase in boat arrivals across theMediterraneanwith170,000arrivalsintotal,whichisthreetimesthe last recordof2011(thetimeof theArabspring).

WhilesomearguethatMareNostrumactedasapullfactor,therealityisthatanumberofpushfactorsledtoanincreaseinthenumberofpeopleonthemovetowardstheNorthAfricancoast,particularlyintermsofconflictinEurope’simmediateneighbourhood(forexample: the presence of ISIS in Iraq; the continualwar in theSyrianArabRepublic, theCentralAfricanRepublic and South Sudan; and the worseningrepression in Eritrea). Moreover, since the end ofMareNostrum,thenumberofmigrantsonboatsthatdeparted the Libyan coast has increased,with over33,000arrivalshavingbeenreportedinItalybyMay2015, compared with just over 26,000 in the sameperiodin2014.

Thecrisis inLibyaalsocreatedamigratorypressureformigrants already in the countrywho needed toescape theheightened levelsofarbitraryarrestanddetainment, harassment and ill treatment. It alsocreated a perception of the doors to Europe being“open,”whichwasexploitedbysmugglersandledtoanincreaseinopportunisticflows.

Cross-cutting issues and cross analysis

Syrian refugees and Mediterranean routes

In 2013, therewere flows of Syrians arriving by airinto Algeria, Egypt and Libya, all of which did notrequire visas for Syrians at the time. From Algeria,SyriansmovedbylandtoMoroccotocrossoverintoSpain,ortoLibyabylandthroughTunisia.FromEgypt,Syrians eithermade direct sea crossings to Italy, ormore commonly moved to Libya by land to boardboats to Europe. By July 2013, visa requirementswere instituted in Egypt, and by December 2014in Algeria, which curtailed the airflows into thesecountries.Attackson theTripoliairport in July2014andthesubsequentclosureoftheairportalsoendedairflows into Libya in 2014. However, airflows intoLibyaresumedin2015,particularlyforSyriansflyingintoLibyafromJordan,withonwardboatjourneytoEurope organized in advance. Sudan still welcomesSyrianswithouttheneedforavisa.SyriansthatfollowthisroutenormallyflyintoKhartoumandthenmoveinto Libya by land fromwhere they board boats toEurope.ThesedynamicsareshowninMap7.

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Map 7: Syrian refugees and Mediterranean routes

Towardstheendof2014,thenumberofSyriansthatarrived in Italy on boats that had departed Turkeyincreased. In 2015, the flows of Syrians arriving onboats in Greece, along the Eastern Mediterraneanroute,alsoexperiencedalargeincrease.

Decision-making factors when selecting between the routes

Typically, the considerations that factor into thedecision between the two Mediterranean routesstudied are: how heavily border crossing pointsare controlled; the ease of passage to Europe; thepossibility for regularization at some point alongthe route; the levelsofabuseandconditions in thetransit countries; the risks involved; thedurationofthejourney;thecostofthejourney;andthepresenceof networks or friends along the way or in transitcountries.

While theCentralMediterranean routepresents farmoredangerousjourneys,thechanceofsuccessalongthisrouteintermsofreachingEuropeisfargreater.Thatis,ifamigrantoranasylum-seekerisabletoreachtheLibyancoast,itisalmostguaranteedthattheywill

beabletoboardaboattoEurope,whereascrossingfrom Morocco into Spain has become increasinglymore difficult in previous years. This may help toexplainwhymigrantson theCentralMediterraneanroutewerefoundtobefarmoredesperatewith farlesstolosewhencomparedwithmigrantswhochosetofollowtheWesternMediterraneanroute.n

“In 2015, the flows of Syrians arriving on boats

in Greece, along the eastern Mediterranean route, also

experienced a large increase.”

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Introduction

Migrant remittances are commonlyunderstoodasprivatemonetaryorin-kind,cross-border and internal transfers that

“migrants”2send,individuallyorcollectively,topeoplewithwhomtheymaintaincloselinks(IOM,2013:405).Inthispaper,wereferexclusivelytoformallyrecordedcross-borderfinancialremittances.

Usually depicted as a tool for financing“development”,3 these types of financial transfer(especially to developing countries) have receivedutmost attention in themigrationanddevelopmentdiscourse,policyandpracticesinceestimatesonthevolumeofremittanceshavebecomewidelyavailable.

Inparallel,theinternationalcommunityhasdevotedgreat attention to evidence-based policymaking,which has resulted in the examination of existingdata,datacollectionmethodologiesanddatasources,including those related to remittances.As such,notonly the impactof remittancesondevelopmentbutalsotheexistingtechniquestomeasureremittancesand toestimate remittance transfer costsareundergreaterscrutiny.

In this paper, we briefly discuss issues related toestimations of aggregate volumes of remittances,bilateral remittances and remittance transfer costs.

1 SandraPaolaAlvarezisMigrationandDevelopmentSpecialistat the International Organization for Migration (IOM)HeadquartersinGeneva;PascalBriodisCo-FounderandHeadofProductatTawiPay,a comparisonwebsite for remittanceservices;OlivierFerrariisMigrationandDevelopmentOfficerat IOM Headquarters; Ulrike Rieder is Treasury ProjectCoordinatoratIOMHeadquarters.

2 Space limitations preclude a detailed discussion about thedefinition of “migrant”. Suffice it to note that there is nouniversallyagreeddefinitionandthatinternationalmigrationstatistics are collected from different sources (censuses,population registers, surveys, administrative data) that relyondifferentdefinitions(whichmayvaryaccordingtoplaceofbirth,nationality, citizenship, lengthorpurposeof stay,andotherparameters)andsamplingtechniques.

3 For example, by the European Commission, in discussionsabout the post-2015 development agenda or G8 and G20discussionsondevelopmentfinancing.

Remittances: How reliable are the data?Sandra Paola Alvarez, Pascal Briod, Olivier Ferrari and Ulrike Rieder1

Wesuggestthatthemethodologiescommonlyusedtoestimateremittancesandremittancetransfercostsnecessarily introduce a number of biases or sufferfromlimitationsthatconfirmhowproblematicitistogenerateaccurate“evidence”onremittances.

Estimating aggregate volumes of remittances

Remittances,asdefinedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),represent“householdincomefromforeigneconomies arising mainly from the temporary orpermanentmovementofpeopletothoseeconomies”(IMF,2009a:272).Notwithstandingthefunctionalityofthisdefinition,measuring techniques conventionallyused to estimate remittances can hardly ensure aperfectmatchbetweensuchdefinitionandthedatacollectedbycentralbanks,moneytransferoperatorsor through other sources of data on such financialflows.

Estimations of the total remittances received byany single country generally rely on survey-basedestimates or on data from the national balance ofpayments.

Survey-based estimates are especially widespreadin Latin America, and are largely reliant on themethodology proposed by Orozco (2006). Thelatter uses United States census data and randomnationwide migrant surveys to estimate thepercentage ofmigrants that remitmoney, and datafrom money transfer companies to determine the“mode,median and average amount sent” (Orozco,2006:24;inBakker,2015:36).Thedataarecombinedinaformulathatallowscalculatingthe“totalvolumeof remittances by multiplying (1) the total numberof migrants, (2) the percentage of migrants thatremitand(3) theaverageamountremitted”(ibid.).4

4 Thismethodology is not applied globally, as it is difficult tooperationalizeitineverycountrygiventhatmigrationpatternsarecomplexandremittancesindeedoriginatefromdifferentsources.ForadiscussiononthemethodologyandtheLatinAmericancontext,see:M.Bakker,“Discursiverepresentationsand policy mobility: How migrant remittances became a‘developmenttool’”,Global Networks,15(1):21–42.

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Bakker(2015),however,pointsoutsomelimitations;forinstance,thedifficultiesofupdatingregularlythesurveydata, and thus theuseof a static coefficientofper capita remittances sentbymigrants; and thefact that using the increase in migrant stocks as aparametertoadjustremittanceestimatesintroducesabias,asthiswillnecessarilyimplyalsoanincreaseinremittances.

Data based on the balance of payments frameworkare the most widely used. Those datasets allow,among others, to estimate aggregate volumes, aswell as bilateral remittances following the modeldevelopedbyRathaandShaw(2007;seebelow).

According to the sixth edition of the IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6),twostandardcomponentsareusedtocalculateremittances:compensationofemployeesand personal transfers. These are completed bysupplementaryitems,whicharenotalwaysrecordedin the balance of payments (and are not discussedhere): capital transfers, capital transfers betweenhouseholds, social benefits, current transfers toNPISH5andcapitaltransferstoNPISH.6

Beforediscussingthestandardcomponents,itisworthmentioningthatthebalanceofpaymentsframeworkreliesonadistinctionofresidentsfromnonresidentsofareportingeconomy.Regardingresidence,theIMFspecifies:

AccordingtoBPM6,“[t]heresidenceofhouseholdsis determined according to the centre ofpredominanteconomic interestof itsmembers”.Thegeneralguidelineforapplyingthisprincipleis“beingpresentforoneyearormoreinaterritoryor intending to do so is sufficient to qualify” asbeing a resident of that economy. Short trips toothercountries–forrecreationorwork–donotlead toa changeof residence,butgoingabroadwith the intentionof staying one year or longerdoes(IMF,2009b:18).

Therefore, it isclear that remittancestatisticsbasedonthebalanceofpaymentsframeworkarenotbasedonmigratorystatusbutonresidentstatusofboththe

5 Nonprofitinstitutionsservinghouseholds.

6 For more details, see: International Monetary Fund (IMF),Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM6) (Washington,D.C., IMF,2009),pp.274and275.

employer and the employee. This is a crucial pointas,statistically,migrantswhoareresidentscannotbedistinguishedfromnon-migrantresidents.

Concerning standard components, compensation of employees representsthe“remunerationinreturnforthelaborinputtotheproductionprocesscontributedbyanindividualinanemployer–employeerelationshipwith the enterprise” (IMF, 2009b:19).When relatedtoremittances,compensationofemployees“referstotheincomeofborder,seasonal,andothershort-termworkers who are employed in an economy wherethey are not residentand of residents employed by nonresident entities”7 (IMF, 2009a:272). The latterimpliesthat,undercompensationofemployees,thetotalwagesofborder,seasonalandothershort-termworkers, and also the salaries of resident staff ofnonresidentemployerssuchasembassies,consulatesand international organizations as well as othernonresidentcompanies,arerecordedasremittances.The latter may constitute a significant part of thecompensationofemployeesinsomeeconomiesandmay therefore introduceabias intowhat isactuallyrecorded as remittances, and what is frequentlyinterpretedasmigrantremittances.

Personal transfers “consist of all current transfersin cash or in kind made or received by residenthouseholds to or from nonresident households.Personal transfers thus include all current transfersbetween resident and nonresident individuals”(IMF, 2009a:273). In other words, remittances sentby resident migrants are recorded together withanyotherpersonal transfersbetween residents andnonresidents.

Inconclusion,byaddingcompensationofemployeesand personal transfers, the balance of paymentsrecords remittances as defined by the IMF (seedefinition on p. 42), together with other transfersbetween residents and nonresidents. The bulkof such transfers may represent high amounts insome economies, for instance, where internationalorganizations, embassies, consular networks ornonresident companies are well established and

7 Italics added by the authors. It is worth mentioning thatstudents, medical patients, ship crew, diplomats, militarypersonnelandcivilservantsemployedabroadingovernmentenclaves,regardlessofthelengthofstayinahosteconomy,are considered residents of the originating economy (IMF,Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM6) (Washington,D.C.,IMF,2009)).

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employlargenumbersofresidentstaff.Itisthereforeextremely difficult to ascertain the extent to whichthese data can reveal actual migrant remittances,considering also that the balance of payments canonlyaccountforformallyrecordedtransfers.

Estimating bilateral remittances

Bilateral remittances are remittance flows betweentwo countries. Estimating bilateral remittances isseeminglymoreproblematicthanestimatingthetotalvolumeof remittances receivedby a single country.The World Bank modestly admits that: “crediblenational data on bilateral remittances are notavailable”,as“fundschanneledthroughinternationalbanksmaybeattributedtoacountryotherthantheactual source country” (Ratha and Shaw, 2007:43).For this reason, Ratha and Shaw (2007) proposed amethodologytocalculatebilateralremittances,usingthreeallocationrules:“(i)weightsbasedonmigrantstocksabroad;(ii)weightsbasedonmigrantincomes,proxied by migrant stocks multiplied by per capitaincomeinthedestinationcountries;and(iii)weightsthat take into accountmigrants’ incomes abroad aswellassource-countryincomes”(ibid.).

This method applies a formula to calculate theremittancessentbyasinglemigrantfromonecountrytoanother.Theaverageremittancesentbyamigrantfromcountryiindestinationcountryj(rij)ismodeledasafunctionofthepercapitaincomeofthemigrantcountryoforiginandthehostcountryorcountryofdestination. The result of this calculationmultipliedbythemigrantstockinthehostcountry j providesthetotalremittancesreceivedbycountry ifromcountryj. The sum of remittances sent from all destinationcountriestocountry iprovidesthetotalremittancesin country i, that isRi (whereRi is the total amountofremittanceinflowstocountryi,asreportedinthebalanceofpayments8;seeWorldBank,Migration and Development Brief23,p.279).

8 A parameter β, comprised between 0 and 1, allows Ri tocorrespond to the total remittances as identified in thebalanceofpaymentsframework.

9 Available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief23.pdf

The method that probably provides “the fullest,though arguably the least, accurate set of data”10on remittances is the Bilateral Remittance Matrix,developed and maintained by the World Bank.Indeed,afewobservationsregardingtheselectionofparameterstocalculatebilateralremittancesdeservetobementioned:

a. The calculation of the average remittance sentbyamigrantinadestinationcountry(rij)isbasedonmigrantstocks.However,asnotedbyseveralauthors(includingParsonsetal.,2005),thereisno consistent anduniversally agreeddefinitionof “migrant” and, even when migrant stocksestimates are available, these only take intoaccountmigrantswhoholdaregularstatus.

b. The difficulties associated with data derivingfromthebalanceofpayments(Ri)arediscussedintheprecedingsection.

c. Thegrossnationalincome(GNI)percapitaisanimportantparameterinthecalculation.However,the formula assumes that everymigrant sendsat least the equivalent of the GNI per capitain his or her country of origin (even when itmay be higher than the GNI per capita in thecountry of destination). This choice is justifiedby the assumption that “migration occurs inthe expectation of earning a higher level ofincomeforthedependenthouseholdthanwhatthemigrantwould earn in her home country”(RathaandShaw,2007:45).Thisfurtherimpliesthatmigrantsareassumedtoearnat least theequivalentoftheGNIpercapitaofthecountryoforigin,whichmaynotalwayshold true (notto mention that the GNI is an average thatdoes not reveal internal inequalities in incomedistribution).

Efforts to improve remittance data are laudable,and data suppliers have admitted the numerousinadequaciesof remittanceestimates.However, thisraises a question regarding what we can actually

10 Thisexpression,borrowedbyRathaandShaw(South–South Migration and Remittances, World Bank Working PaperNo.102,(Washington,D.C.,WorldBank,2007)),fromParsonset al. (“Quantifying the international bilateral movementsof migrants”, Working Paper T13 (Brighton, DevelopmentResearch Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty,UniversityofSussex,2005)),wasusedtoqualifythebilateralmigrationmatrixhostedbytheWorldBank.Inthisparagraph,theauthorsborrowthisphrasetoapplysuchqualificationtotheBilateralRemittanceMatrix.

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knowaboutmigrantremittances, andremittancesatlarge,giventhedebatablenatureof theparameterscommonly used to craft remittance statistics.Whatismore, it is indeed difficult to understandwhat isactuallymeasuredasremittancesand,therefore,whattheresultingtrendsactuallyrevealwhenremittanceestimates are compared over the years. While thismay not be problematic per se, for policymakingpurposes itmaybeproblematictorelyondatathatmaybeusefultounderstandtheevolutionofcertainparametersusedtoestimateremittances,butthatdonotreallyaccountformigrantremittancesasbroadlyunderstoodinthemigrationanddevelopmentpolicydomain.

Estimating remittance transfer costs

Information collected on remittance transfer costsduringthelastdecadehasshedlightonthehighcostsincurredbymigrantsaroundtheworldwhensendingremittances,andhascontributedtobringingthisissueto the forefront of the international developmentscene. Nevertheless, the data currently availableare not accurate and complete enough, neither toassessthetruecostofremittancesnortounderstandwhatdrivescostfluctuationsormonitor this rapidlyevolvingmarket.

Concerningcostestimationmethodologies,atpresent,the most complete data set on remittance transfercosts available is developed andmaintained by theWorld Bank (see Remittance Prices Worldwide11).Updated fourtimesa year since2008, thisdata setprovides information about the costs of sendingmoneyon227corridorsworldwide.

ThedatafromtheRemittancePricesWorldwidegroupattheWorldBankarecollectedsolelythroughmysteryshopping. Through this methodology, researchers– presenting themselves as customers – collectthe pricing information manually from the moneytransferserviceproviders,eitherbymakinganactualtransactionorbyasking thecostofa transaction inperson,overthephoneorthroughaWebinterface.Cost information is collected for each corridor andfortwodifferentsendingamounts(theequivalentofUSD 200 and USD 500), from a range of moneytransferoperatorsandbanks.Usingthismethodology,

11 Availablefromhttps://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en

theWorldBankcollectsaround20,000datapoints12eachyear,whicharethenusedtocalculatetheglobalaveragecostofremittances–that is,theaverageofthe average cost per corridor, weighted by the sizeof each corridor (based on the Bilateral RemittanceMatrixdiscussedintheprevioussection).

While the information on remittance transfercosts collected by the World Bank constitutes themost accurate global data set currently available, anumberoflimitationsinherenttothedatacollectionmethodologyandthewayindicatorsareconstructeddeservetobediscussed.

First,becausemysteryshoppingisaresource-intensivedatacollectionmethodology,thescopeofthedatasetmustbetargeted.Thislimitsthenumberofcorridorsthat can be monitored, the number of data pointscollectedoneachcorridorandthefrequencyofdataupdating.

Second,inmarketswherecostsfluctuatesignificantlyover time and where costs vary substantiallydependingontheamounttransferred,datacollectionregardingthecostsofsendingtwoamounts(USD200andUSD500) every threemonths canonly providean approximation to real costs. As amatter of fact,operatorswilloftenhavemorethan10differentpricingtiersbetweenUSD10andUSD5,000,withdifferentfeesforeachtierandusuallydifferentexchangerates.Asaresult,thedatacurrentlycollectedareasnapshotthatfailstodescribethebiggerpicture.

Finally,theRemittancePricesWorldwidegroupoftheWorldBankpublishesaquarterly report tomonitorthe evaluation of remittance transfer costs, usingtheaveragecostpercorridorasmain indicator.Themainlimitationofthecorridors’averagesisthattheyare not weighted by the number ofmigrants usingeachmoneytransferserviceproviderforwhichdataarecollected.Thismeans that in somecases,banksofferingunfavourableexchangerates(atleastfortheamountsforwhichdataarecollected)butusedbyafewmigrantswillskewtheaverageupwards.Likewise,ifanewmoneytransferoperatorofferinglowtransfercosts enters a market, the average will drop eventhoughonlya smallproportionofmigrantsuse thisnewservice.

12 Adata-pointreferstothecostsinformationofoneparticularserviceforoneparticularamount.

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Howthentoobtainbetterdataonremittancetransfercosts? First, we must admit that obtaining betterdataonremittancecostsisextremelychallenging.Inordertoaccuratelymonitortheremittancesmarket,we probably need to collect a hundred timesmoredata points thanwhatwe collect today. Automatedor crowd-sourced data collection systems are likelyto enable the development of a more completedatabase. Whenever possible, integration withmoney transfer service providers through API13 orWebscrapers14shouldbedevelopedtoreceivetheirprices in real time. For offline agent-based moneytransferserviceproviders,proper incentiveshavetobedevelopedtoencourageclientstoreportthecostsinacentraldatabase.

Once a more accurate global data set on moneytransfer costs is available, various indicators can bedeveloped to monitor the evolution of the moneytransfer service offer. In order to assess the actualcostsincurredbymigrants,thedevelopmentofmorecomplexmodelswillbenecessary,includingdetailedinformationaboutmigrants’transferhabits(averageamount,frequency,typeofmoneytransferused,etc.),to calculate aweighted average cost of remittancesforeachcorridor.

Conclusion

Seemingly, at present, it is extremely difficult togenerate accurate data on the aggregate volumeofremittances,onbilateralremittancesandonremittancetransfercosts.Forpolicymakingpurposes, itmaybeworthexploringways to improveourunderstandingof remittance transfer costs by facilitating newpartnerships that allow for the development ofmore complex methodologies and datasets. Betterestimationsofremittancecostsarenotonlylikelytoinfluencethetransparencyof remittanceprices,butalsotoaddresscurrentprioritiesrelatingtoreducingremittancetransfercosts.n

13 APIistheabbreviationofapplicationprograminterface.ItisasetofroutinesandprotocolsthatallowtwoWebapplicationstointeractandshareinformation.

14 AWeb scraper is a computer software technique toextractinformationfromwebsites.

References

Bakker,M.2015 Discursive representations and policy

mobility:Howmigrantremittancesbecamea ‘development tool’. Global Networks,15(1):21–42.

InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)2009aBalance of Payments and International

Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM6).IMF,Washington,D.C.

2009bInternational transactions in remittances: guide for compilers and users. IMF,Washington,D.C.

InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)2013 International Migration and Development

Training Modules: Facilitator’s Guide.IOM,Geneva.

Orozco,M.2006 Conceptual considerations, empirical

challenges and solutions in measuringremittances. Centre for Latin AmericanMonetary Studies/Multilateral InvestmentFund, Mexico City. Available from www.thed ia logue .o rg /Pub l i ca t i onF i l e s /conceptual.pdf

Parsons,ChristopherR.etal.2005 Quantifying the International Bilateral

Movements of Migrants. Working PaperT13, Development Research Centre onMigration, Globalisation and Poverty, UniversityofSussex,Brighton.

Ratha,D.andW.Shaw2007 South–South Migration and Remittances.

World Bank Working Paper 102, WorldBank,Washington,D.C.

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TheprevalenceofirregularmigrationortahreebinSomalilandandPuntlandhighlightedbyrecentresearch,2coupledwithchangingasylumpolicies

towards Somali applicants in Europe, has promptedorganizations such as the InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)toraiseawarenessabouttherisksand consequences of irregularmigration, a practicethat isextremelyharmful tobothSomali youthandtheir families. International migration includes ayouth exodus from Somaliland, with an estimated400 to 700 Somaliland youth joining irregular flowstoLibyathroughEthiopiaandSudaneverymonth,asreportedbytheRegionalMixedMigrationSecretariatinOctober2014.

First- or second-hand knowledge of tahreeb iswidespread: every respondent interviewed by ourresearchteamreferredtosomeone–whetherfriendsor family members – who left through irregularmigration.Youthwhoembarkontahreebfacedangersnot just from thedurationof the tripbutalso fromsmugglers(magafes)wholuretheminwithimagesofaglorifiedlifeabroad.

Awareness-raisingabouttheissuehighlightschangesinasylumpolicies inEurope (especiallyNorwayandSweden,hometothelargestSomalicommunities inEurope),thelimitedchancesofsuccess,dangersandrisks during the journey, and challenges faceduponarrivalinEurope.TheIOMawarenesscampaignaimstobringgreaterawarenessofthehugerisksinvolvedin irregular migration where many fall victims totraffickingandunscrupulousmiddlemen,whileothersarriveinEuropeonlytorealizethatlifeisnotgreenerontheotherside.

1 NassimMajidi isDirectorandHeadofMigrationPracticeatSamuel Hall Consulting (www.samuelhall.org). This articleprovides highlights from studies conducted by Samuel HallConsulting for the International Organization for Migration(IOM)Somaliain2014/2015.

2 SamuelHallConsulting, Investing in Somali Youth? Exploring the Youth–Employment–Migration Nexus in Somaliland and Puntland, research study commissioned by IOM Somalia(2015).Launcheventtobeheld inNairobi,Kenya,on9July2015.

Irregular migration from the Horn of Africa to EuropeNassim Majidi1

ResearchforIOMshows3thatwhileawareness-raisingis key, most Somali youth are not naïve about thedangers and risks involved in migrating irregularly.Whythendotheystillchoosetodoit?Anyattemptattackling irregularmigrationmust lookat thedeepercausesoftheissuesatstake.

Key findings on irregular migration in Somaliland and Puntland

• Irregular migration without any type ofdocumentation–novalidID,passportorvisa–isthemainmethod and the only option formost,withthehelpofthemagafes.

• Tahreeb – a commonplace conversation. Irregularmigration is reported to be commonplaceconversation in teashops and cafeterias inSomalilandandPuntland’smaincitiesofHargeysaandGarowe.Communitymemberswanttoknowhow this relates to their religion. The role ofreligious leaders canbe emphasized to highlighttheincompatibilityoftahreebwithIslam.

• Youth awareness levels. Youth between 15 and24yearsoldrepresentthemaingroupmigratingfromSomalilandandPuntlandinsearchofjobs,abetterlifeandeducation.However,theimpactoftheirdecisionhasoftenwidespreadrepercussionsontheirfamilieswhofrequentlyareforcedtoselltheir houses and incur debt to help their youthtravelabroadorpaythemagafes.Despiteahighlevelofawarenessoftherisksinvolvedinirregularmigration,theyouthcontinuetoleaveSomalilandandPuntland insearchofaperceivedbetter lifeabroad.

• Social media – a missed opportunity.SmugglersuseFacebook to lureyouth in thepromisesofabetterlifeabroad.Giventheimportanceofsocialmedia for youth in Somalia, this tactic works.Socialmediaistheleastusedawarenesstool,yetthemostusedbysmugglerstoconvinceyouthto

3 Samuel Hall Consulting, Enabling Informed Decision-making among Potential Migrants in Somalia: Endline Assessment of the IOM Awareness Campaign,commissionedbyIOMSomalia(2015).

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leave. The lackof a strong socialmedia strategyis a missed opportunity, given how frequentlysocialmediaiscitedasakeymotivationchannelfor tahreeb in previous studies.4 A social mediastrategy to counter irregular migration fromSomaliaisneeded.

“SocialmedialikeFacebookshouldalsobeusedtocounterthespreadofmigrationandalsouseitasaplatformtospreadthemessage.MostyouthareonFacebookandthiscanbeofgreateffect.”(Shaban)

• Radio campaigns – a two-way feedback mechanism. Although there is nomechanism inplacetosharefeedbackreceivedbyradioandTVpartners, reporting from Radio Ergo shows thatreturnees,potentialmigrantsandtheirnetworksarewilling to talk about their experience, shareinformation and seek feedback. The internalsystem at Radio Ergo, for example, allows theaudience to call or text (SMS) to give feedbackto the channel. Comparing the feedback ratesto the migration campaign sessions with othertopics covered by the radio station, Radio Ergostaffreportedahigher-than-usualfeedbackrateson irregularmigration. “People responded; theydon’tnormallydoso.Manypeoplecalledtosharetheirexperience.Migrationishugeandtheywanttodosomethingaboutit”(RadioErgointerview).

• Targeting the source. While IOM has set upa robust campaign, the direct impact of thecommunityoutreachislimitedtoafewlocations–mainlyinurbansettings–thusreachingalimitedaudienceandnotnecessarily reachingmigration“at its source”, that is, in ruralareas fromwhichyouthfirstmigratetourbanareas,thenwestwardsirregularly. Awareness is needed to reach thesourcelocationsinmoreremoteareas.Thiscouldbeachievedbysettingupmobileteams(caravans)togototheremoteareasandsmallersettlementswhere radio and TV coverage is limited to raiseawareness.

4 SamuelHallConsulting,InvestinginSomaliyouth? Exploring the Youth–Employment–Migration Nexus in Somaliland and Puntland, research study commissioned by IOM Somalia(2015).

Risks of irregular migration

•Exploitation, violence and death on the way toEurope

•Little chances of being granted asylum orsubsidiarityprotectioninEurope

•Forced return to Somalia or living illegally inEurope

Key drivers and facilitators of tahreeb

Economic drivers

Lack of job opportunities in Somaliland’s andPuntland’s main cities mainly drives the youngrural–urbanmigrants,foreignmigrantsandreturneestoturntoirregularmigration.Aslongasjobscarcityandeconomicissuesarenotaddressed,tahreebwillbe seen as one of the only options for the youth.SomalilandandPuntlandarealsopointsofdestinationfor Somali migrants and economic migrants fromneighbouring countries, particularly Kenya, Ethiopiaand Eritrea. Puntland in particular is considered tobe one of themain hubs for irregularmigration, asBossassoisseentheepicentreforhumansmugglingintheHornofAfrica.ManymigrantsspendsignificantamountoftimeinPuntlandandSomaliland,andthe“destination” status of both areas requires furtherinvestigation.5

Animportantdimensionisthemixingofinternationaland internal migration among the youth – thepopulationonthemoveinSomalilandandPuntland.Returneescomebacktotheirhomelandwheretheyjoin theranksof thosemoving internally, fromruralto urban areas, in search of greater stability andopportunities. Internalmigration is the first step tointernationalmigration.

5 Samuel Hall Consulting, Market Opportunity Mapping in Somalia: A Value-chain Analysis and Rapid Market Assessment in Baidoa and Beletweyne Provinces (2014), study for theInternationalLabourOrganization,p.6.

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Boredom and lack of leisure and educational activities

“ThelifestyleisverydifferentfromwhatIamusedto–thereiscompletelynosociallife.”(Femalecase-studyparticipant,migratedfromSyriatoHargeysa,Somalia)

The Ministry of Youth, Sports and Tourism inSomaliland outlined that “there are no facilities forentertainment:nolibraries,noyouthcentres.Eveninschoolstherearenofacilitiesforentertainment.Thissituationresultsintwoissues:heorshemigrates,ortheyjoincriminalgangs.”

In Hargeysa and Garowe, new sports facilities haveproven very appealing to youth.A Turkish companyhas recently opened several football fields withsyntheticturf inHargeysa,and inGarowe,therearetwo fields where one can reportedly find half theyoung people in town. The lack of up-to-standardeducational facilitieswas also pointed out as driverofyouthemigrationfromSomaliland,particularlyofalreadyhighlyeducatedones. In case studies, focusgroup discussions and conversations, the desireto obtain a scholarship from a university abroadto pursue studies that are either not offered inSomalilandorcouldnotbepursuedforotherreasonswas particularly prevalent among already educatedyouth.Thereseemstobeawidespreadnotionamongstudentsaswellasemployersthattherighteducationcanonlybeobtainedabroad.

Higher education prospects

“IwanttolookforscholarshipsorapplytouniversitiesinEuropeortheU.S.A.andseeifIcangetadmitted.Ifso, Iwillaskmyfamilytoraisethemoneytohelpmemove.”(Femalecase-studyparticipant,alumnusoftheIOMinternshipprogramme,Burao)

Inasylumcountries, the lackofqualityeducation inSomaliawasoftenmentionedasthemainreasonforrefugees not wanting to return since parents wantthesameeducationalopportunities for theirkidsastheyexperiencedinthecampsorintheircountryofasylum.

The “greener pastures” phenomenon

The belief that life is better abroad drives Somaliyouth migration. Social media and networks havecontributed to widening the chasm between the

image and reality of migration abroad; while notconfrontedwith thedangersof themigrationpathsthere, or the challenges infindingemployment andhousing,theyouthseepicturesoffunactivitiesandsightswhichdonotexistinSomalilandandPuntland.Awareofthis,inthelatestDeclarationoftheMinisterialConferenceoftheKhartoumProcess,representativesofEUcountries,theEUCommissionandtheAfricanUniondefined“[a]ssistingthenationalauthoritiesinsteppinguppreventionmeasures,suchasinformationcampaignstoimproveawarenessofrisksofirregularmigration,withspecialregardstotraffickinginhumanbeingsandsmugglingofmigrants”asoneofthekeyareasofcooperation.6

Testing the odds – demand and supply

• Repeated episodes of irregular migration – a vicious cycle. When tahreebers are arrested orwhen failed asylum-seekers are sent home, theburdengoestotheir families.Their familiestakethemtorehabilitationcentres(shifo)iftheyhavepsychological problems, but if they arementallyokaytheyblendbacktotheircommunities.Thesepeoplearelikelytotrytomigrateagain.

• The secrecy around tahreeb. Somali youthkeepmigrationasecret.Theyouthplaytheseroles inthisprocess:

₋ Asfriendsofthepotentialtahreebers,theyouthkeepmigrationasecret.Itishighlyunlikelythatpersons going tahreeb will tell their parentsabout it. They will however tell their closefriends.₋ Theyouthcanidentifythepotentialtahreeberseasilyanddocounselling,becomingagentsofchange.₋ Theyouthcanadvocateforothers.InSomalia,youth under 30 years of age account for70percentofthepopulation.7Throughevents,competitions and tournaments, they are abletoreachsomanyothers.

6 Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the KhartoumProcess(EU–HornofAfricaMigrationRouteInitiative),Rome(2014). Available from http://italia2014.eu/media/3785/declaration-of-the-ministerial-conference-of-the-khartoum-process.pdf

7 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Somalia Human Development Report2012: Empowering Youth for Peace and Development (Mogadishu,UNDPSomalia, 2012),p.xix.

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“It isdifficult for them to tell you that theywant totahreeb,atleastthatdoesnothappenfortherecord.Theintentionis,however,clearontheirfacesbecausetheyalways talkabout thesuccessfulones (whoareinEurope)ratherthantheoneswhoarestuckonthewayandtheproblemsoftheroutetoEurope.”(Fieldresearcher,Garowe)

The key role of the middlemen (magafe) in migration

Magafemeans“apersonwhonevermisses”.MagafeshavecontributedtotheriseinmigrationthroughLibyabyenablingtheyouthto leavewithoutmoney.“Sub-magafes” in Bossasso, Hargeysa, Garowe and otherareas recruityoungpeople to travelabroad.Theydonotaskformoney,butoncetheyouthhavearrivedatthedestination,themagafescallthefamiliesoftheseyoungpeopleandthreatentocutofftheirbodypartsorkillthemunlessaransomispaid.Familiesareforcedtopaytheransom,mainlybysellingproperty.8Inmanycases,thesub-magafesmayfirstaskquestionsaboutthepropertyofthetargetedyouthtoensuretheygettheirmoney’sworth.9Effortstocombattheseactivitiesarelimitedbythepositiveperceptionsoflifeabroad.

8 Interviewwith the DeputyMinister of Planning in Garowe,December2014.

9 Interview with an official from the Puntland DevelopmentResearchCenter(PDRC)inGarowe,December2014.

What is being done?

Progress to date

Awarenesscampaignsonirregularmigrationgeneratemore discussions and result in better knowledgeabouttherisksinvolvedinirregularmigrationandlifeinEurope.However,moreneedstobedonetotacklethe root causes of irregular migration, such as thecreationof youth employment andopportunities inSomalilandandPuntland.

Challenges ahead

Given the economic instability in Somalia and thedecreasing likelihood of asylum-seeking applicantsto gain asylum in Europe, the number of Somaliyouth migrating irregularly to Europe is only likelyto increase. As such, awareness campaigns alonecannot lead to behavioural changes but must beaccompanied by programmes specifically targetingyouthandemployment.n

“Given the economic instability in Somalia and the decreasing

likelihood of asylum-seeking applicants to gain asylum in

Europe, the number of Somali youth migrating irregularly to

Europe is only likely to increase.”

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Snapshot of migration trends in the Mediterranean Tara Brian1

Continuing a surge in migration across theMediterranean lastyearwhichsawthearrivalin Europe of over 220,000 people, already

more than 135,000 migrants have disembarked inSouthernEuropeinthefirstsixmonthsof2015.ThevastmajorityhavedonesoinItalyandGreece,withbothcountrieseachreceivingnearly50percentofallarrivals.Fewerthan100migrantshavedisembarkedinMalta,althoughtheselownumbersarepartlydueto disembarkation arrangements under the TritonOperation. Spain has received fewer than 2,000migrantstravellingbyseathisyear.WhiletheCentralMediterraneanroutefromNorthAfrica(mainlyLibya)toItalyandMaltawaspredominantlastyear,in2015travel along the Eastern Mediterranean route hassurgedandnowmatchestheCentralMediterraneaninvolume.Aswasthecaselastyear,theMediterraneancrossing has proved extremely dangerous, alreadytakingnearly2,000livesthisyear.Thespringof2015sawanunprecedentednumberofdeaths,particularlyin theCentralMediterranean. InApril,anestimated800migrants losttheir livesinthelargestshipwreckintheMediterranean inrecentmemory,whentheirboatcapsizedwiththemajorityofpassengerstrappedinside. This high rate of death plummeted throughMayandJune,however,andinJunetherewereonlyanestimated10deaths.ThisarticlepresentsabriefsnapshotoftheflowsacrosstheMediterraneanandthetollonhumanlife.

While migration across the Mediterranean towardsSouthern Europe has long occurred, the numbersmaking this crossing have surged in the past twoyears.Relative topreviousyears,numbers spiked in2011duringtheArabSpringtoover71,000;however,theywere still only one third the level reached lastyearwhenover220,000migrantswereestimatedtohavecrossedseaborderstoSouthernEurope.Whilethecausesofthisincreasearedebatedandcomplex,it is clear that conflict, poverty and repression incountriesoforiginhavebeenthemajorforcespushing

peopleto leave.Worseningconditions inLibyahavelikely contributed to the departure of migrantscurrentlyinthecountry,andperhapscontributedtotheriseindeparturesfromTurkey,particularlyinthecase of Syrians. Recent research byAltai Consultingdocuments the huge pressure faced bymigrants inLibyatodepartthecountry,withfewoptionstodosootherthanbysea.2

The Eastern Mediterranean route has seen anunprecedented increase in the number ofmigrantscrossingtoGreecethisyear,withanaverageofnearly800arrivals daily in June2015.Maritimearrivals toGreece in just the first six months of the year arealready almost double the total number for 2014(roughly 68,000 in these months compared with34,400 inallof2014).3 In2014,maritimearrivals toGreecewereaboutonefifththesizeofarrivalstoItaly(170,100).Thisyear,however,arrivalstoGreecematchthe numbers disembarking in Italy. The increase inflowsintheEasternMediterraneandoesnotcoincidewith a decrease in numbers crossing through theCentralMediterranean,however.FlowstoItalyhaverisenbyroughly5percentwhencomparedwiththeflowsinthistimeperiodlastyear.

SyriansarebyfarthelargestgrouparrivinginGreecethrough the Aegean Sea, while far lower numbersthanlastyeararechoosingtheCentralMediterraneanroute. Syrians represent 56 per cent of maritimedetectionsinGreeceinthefirstfivemonthsof2015.BetweenJanuaryandtheendofMaythisyear,over22,000 were reported by the Hellenic Ministry ofInterior and Administrative Reconstruction; another6,000weredetectedonlandborders.Thismovementisclearlyaresultoftheongoingconflict,withSyriansnotevenfactoringinthetopfivenationalitiesoforiginin2011.Afghansmakeup the second largest groupof arrivals, although Syrians still more than double

2 AltaiConsulting, Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots(Cairo,IOM,2015).Availablefromhttp://www.altaiconsulting.com/docs/migration/Altai_Migration_trends_accross_the_Mediterranean_v3.pdf

3 DatafromtheHellenicMinistryofInteriorandAdministrativeReconstruction,andtheHellenicCoastGuard.

1 Tara Brian is a Research Officer of the Migration ResearchDivisionattheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)HeadquartersinGeneva.

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them.Together,SyriansandAfghansmadeupabout80percentofarrivalsinthefirstfivemonthsoftheyear,andcomprised86percentofmaritimearrivalsin 2014. Other nationalities are far less significant,and include Pakistanis, Iraqis and Somalis in 2015.Whilein2014,Pakistanisarrivingbyseawerealmostnon-existent,thisyearalreadyover2,000haveusedthisroute.

In the Central Mediterranean, Eritreans are thedominant nationality, with the share of Syriansdroppingin2015.In2014,SyriansandEritreansmadeup45percentofirregularmaritimearrivalstoItaly,with Syrians predominating.West African countriesfeaturedinthetopfivecountriesoforigin,althoughin far lower numbers. In 2014, arrivals of Malians,Nigerians andGambians together stillmadeup lessthanhalfthenumberofSyrianandEritreanarrivals.In fact, among the top seven countries of origin ofirregular arrivals to Italy in 2014, 76 per centwerefrom key refugee-producing countries (the SyrianArab Republic, Eritrea, the Occupied PalestinianTerritoryandSomalia).In2015,therehasbeenalarge

decreaseinnumbersofSyriansarrivinginItaly,withagreatersharechoosingtheEasternMediterraneanroute. Between January and end of May this year,Syrians were only the fourth top country of originof irregular maritime arrivals to Italy, and numberswere just one third the number of Eritrean arrivals(3,185versus10,985).Eritreansbyfaraccountforthelargest shareofall arrivals thisyear,at23percent.WhileWest African countries feature higher on thelistofarrivals,thisismoreareflectionofthedecreaseinSyrians than it isof an increase inWestAfricans,althoughthesenumbershaverisentoadegree.Thedecline in Syrians using the Central Mediterraneanroute may be attributed partly to their efforts toavoidLibya,which is increasinglyhostile toSyrians,4

andalsocouldbetheresultofworseningconditionsin countries neighbouring the Syrian Arab RepublicwhichholdveryhighsharesofSyrianrefugeesrelativeto their nativepopulations.Whilemigrants are alsodeparting from Egypt, research by Altai Consultinghasfoundthatroughly80percentofboatarrivalsinItalyin2014departedfromtheLibyancoast.5

4 AltaiConsulting,Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots(Cairo,IOM,2015).Availablefromwww.altaiconsulting.com/docs/migration/Altai_Migration_trends_accross_the_Mediterranean_v3.pdf

5 Ibid.

Deaths in the Mediterranean by month, 2014 and 2015

Source: All data are estimates. Data are gathered from IOM field offices and media reports. Note: *Deaths in June are until 30 June, in 2014 and 2015.

53Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Despite the increase in flows on the EasternMediterranean route, the Central Mediterraneanremainsbyfarmoredangerous.Sofarthisyear,97percent of deaths in theMediterranean have occurredin the Central Mediterranean, with about 3 deathsper every 100 migrants attempting the crossing. Incontrast, theEasternMediterraneanhasseenfewerthan 40 deaths, or 0.05 deaths per 100 travellers.Aprilwasthemostdeadlymonththisyear,withover1,200 dying during their journeys, almost all in theCentral Mediterranean. This is about seven deathsperevery100attemptingthecrossingintheCentralMediterranean. Until the end of April, deathswereover18timeshigherthanthesameperiodtheyearbefore.However,inMayandJune,numbersofdeathshavefallensignificantly,withjust95inMay2015ascomparedwithabout330inMay2014,andonly10inJune2015comparedwithroughly320in2014.Thus,in total, deaths this year are now about 2.5 timeshigherthaninthesamepointin2014.Itremainstobe seen if this trendwill continue, but seems likelythatthissummerseasonwillbefarlessdeadlythanthelast.Seetableonthepreviouspageforthedeathsin theMediterranean from January to June in 2014and2015.

Political and media attention has been heavilyconcentrated on the Mediterranean Sea, anddeservedlyso.Boatloadsofmen,womenandchildrenadriftinthehighseashavebecomeavisiblereflectionof the suffering of thousands to reach Europe.However,whatremainslargelyhiddenistheextremedangerencounteredallalongthelandjourneytotheshoresofNorthAfrica.Inmid-June,thebodiesof18migrantswerefounddecayinginthedesertbetweenNiger and Algeria,most likely having succumbed todehydration and exhaustion after getting lost alongtheway.6Anadditional30bodieswerefoundseveraldays later near Dirkou. These deaths are far fromisolatedincidents,andyetwearealmostblindtothemajority of those occurring. There is no attempt tosystematically monitor these routes that crisscrossvaststretchesofland,norescuemissionstofindlivingor deadmigrants and thus their deaths go entirelyunrecorded.

6 Reuters, “18 migrants found dead in Niger's desert,IOM says”, 14 June 2015. Available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/14/us-niger-migrants-idUSKBN0OU0OM20150614

AnotherneglecteddimensionofthesituationintheMediterraneanistheramificationsforthefamiliesofthosewhodie.Whenentiregroupsdieatsea,familiesathomemaynotknowiftheirrelativesmadeittothecoast,perished in the sea crossingor lost touch forotherreasons. It isnotknownhowmanydeathsgounreported.EvenwhenestimatesofthemissingareavailablefollowingshipwrecksintheMediterranean,bodies are more than often not found. Even whenconsideringonlythebodiesrecoveredfromthesea,themajority arenot identified.A recently launcheddatabase tracking deaths in the Mediterraneansince1990has found thatof thebodiesbrought toSouthern Europe, almost two thirds had not beenidentified.7 Research has shown the devastatingeffectsamissingpersonhasonfamilies.Notonlydofamiliesexperiencewhathasbeencalled“ambiguousloss”,butamissingpersoncanaffectfamilydynamicsandsocialrelations,thefamily’seconomicsituation,aswellasprocesseslikeinheritance,remarriageandguardianship of children.8We still know little abouthowfamiliesaccessinformationandwhattheirneedsare.A secondannual reportonmigrant fatalities tobe published by IOM thiswinterwill address thesechallengesofidentificationandsupporttofamilies.n

“Not only do families experience what has been called ambiguous loss, but

a missing person can affect family dynamics and social

relations, the family’s economic situation, as well as processes

like inheritance, remarriage and guardianship of children.”

7 VrijeUniversiteitAmsterdam,HumanCostsofBorderControl,2015.Availablefromwww.borderdeaths.org/

8 See, for instance: InternationalCommitteeof theRedCross(ICRC),«Étudesurlesbesoinsactuelsdesfamillesdemigrantssénégalais disparus. » (Geneva and Dakar, Senegal, ICRC,2013). Available from www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2013/familles-migrants-senegalais-disparus.pdf

54 Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Mediterranean Update Missing Migrants Project 9 July 2015

Greece 75,970

Italy 74,009

Spain 1,217

Malta 94 Total 151,290

Estimates based on data from respective governments and IOM field offices as of 09/07/2015. Data for Greece until 8 July.

TOP FIVE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN 1 January—31 May 2015

#MissingMigrants MissingMigrants.iom.int

Greece Italy Malta Spain Total

Syrian Arab Republic

Eritrea

Afghanistan

Somalia

Nigeria

22,582

219

10,053

971

269

3,185

10,985

62

4,958

4,630

0

0

0

3

0

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

2015 2014

January February March April May

Destination

Orig

in C

ount

ry

SPAIN

DEATHS *18

Arrivals 1,217

*includes deaths en route to Canary Island.

Arrivals 74,009

Arrivals

94

Arrivals 75,970

MALTA

GREECE

DEATHS 55

DEATHS 1,841

Arrivals Deaths Major land migration connecting routes.

ITALY

77 12 24

359

10 69 50

1,265

329

95

MIGRANT FATALITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

25,767

11,204

10,115

5,932

4,899

MIGRANT MARITIME ARRIVALS 2015 Total Arrivals: (to date) 151,290

Running total *Until 9th July

1,031

1,914

The Missing Migrants Project is a joint initiative of IOM’s Migration Research Division (MRD) and Media and Communications Division (MCD).

June

10

318

July*

288

39

*Arrivals figures refer to irregular maritime arrivals only

22,582

219

10,053

971

269

55Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

GLOBAL OVERVIEW: OVER 2,700 MIGRANT DEATHS TO DATE IN 2015

#MissingMigrants MissingMigrants.iom.int The Missing Migrants Project is a joint initiative of IOM’s Migration Research Division (MRD) and Media and Communications Division (MCD).

KEY DATA ON MIGRANT FATALITIES

NORTH AMERICA

SOUTH AMERICA

SOUTH AFRICA

ASIA

AUSTRALIA

Caribbean

Central

America

US/Mexico

Border

Mediterranean

Horn of Africa

Bay of Bengal

South-East Asia

48 Deaths

460 Deaths

15 Deaths

East Asia

Deaths

2

Deaths

86

1,914Deaths

20 Deaths

EUROPE

Deaths

46 Deaths

19

Deaths

105

SUPPORTING FAMILIES OF MISSING MIGRANTS

GLOBAL INFORMATION HUB ON MIGRATION

The project underlines the global scale of the crisis by sharing key information on migrants dying along migrato-ry routes around the world. The platform also enables feedback from migrants and families of the missing.

The project empowers fami-lies of the missing by provid-ing information and guidance, including on identification of the missing and dead, with the aim of affirming the rights and dignity of migrants and their families.

The Missing Migrants Project is the only global database sharing key data on deceased and missing migrants around the world. The aim is to strengthen advocacy and sup-port a more informed policy response.

Deaths between 1 Jan 2015 — 9 July 2015 Regions Deaths a Mediterranean 1,914 Bay of Bengal 460 US/Mexico Border 105 Horn of Africa 86 Sahara 48 South–East Asia 48 Caribbean 46 Europeb 20

East Asia 15 Central America 19 Southern Africa 2 TOTAL 2,763

MISSING MIGRANTS PROJECT Deaths during migration around the world

Legend: (a) These figures refer only to deaths that have been reported; unknown numbers are not recorded. This map represents only a base minimum. (b) Includes deaths in Northern Europe, Southeastern Europe, and Western Europe. * Data compiled by IOM’s Migration Research Divisions (MRD). All numbers are mini-mum estimates based on data from respective governments and IOM field offices as of 09/07/2015.

AFRICA Sahara Deaths

48

56 Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Publications

Headstart to Integration: A Global Review of Pre-departure Support Measures for Migrants2015/302pages/EnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

The aim of this report is to establish promisingpractices in pre-departure integration support forimmigrantswithaparticularfocusonpromotingearlylabour market inclusion in line with the migrants’level of qualifications and competences. The studyalso examined the services that assist migrants tofind their way in a new country and become partof a new community, with a focus on practicesrelevant for integration of immigrants entering thecountries of destination for the purposes of work,family reunificationand studies, as implementedbyarangeofpublicandprivateactors.Toachievethis,theanalysisclassifiesthesepracticesandapproachesdrawingonglobalevidenceandwithafocusontheEuropeanNeighbourhoodcountries,WesternBalkansand Turkey. Based on the information collected,commondenominators,factorsofsuccessorfailure,thestructureofsuchmeasuresandtheirlinkwiththepost-arrivalphaseareanalysed.

This publication has been produced within theframework of the project “HEADSTART: FosteringIntegration Before Departure” managed by theInternational Organization for Migration (IOM), inpartnership with the World Association of PublicEmployment Services (WAPES) and authorities incharge of integration issues in Austria, the CzechRepublic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands,Portugal and Slovakia, and co-financed by theEuropean Union Integration Fund, Ministries ofInteriorofItalyandAustriaandtheCentralAgencyfortheReceptionofAsylumSeekers intheNetherlands(COA).

The Middle East and North Africa: Annual Report 20142015/72pagesEnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

In 2014, significant flows of migration to, throughandfromtheMiddleEastandNorthAfricacontinuedunabated. Ongoing conflict, economic stagnation,andpoliticalturmoilweremaindriversofmigration,though motives for movement remain complex.Irregular migration – especially for vulnerable orunder-protected people such as unaccompaniedminors, women and sexual minorities – exposedmigrants to an array of risks as they attempted toattainphysicalsafetyandeconomicstability.

The2014annualreportonIOM’sworkintheMiddleEast and North Africa is organized thematically,reflecting the areas of work carried out by theorganization: emergency and humanitarianoperations, migrant assistance, integrated bordermanagement, support for migration policy, labourmigrationandhumandevelopment.

Migration health is a cross-cutting area of workreflectedinmultiplesections.Thereportalsoincludesa sectionon researchandpublications, aswell as adataanalysissectionwhichpresentsacomprehensivebreakdownof personswhohavebefitted from IOMactivitiesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricain2014.

The Middle East and North Africa AN

NUAL

REPO

RT20

14AN

NUAL

REPO

RT20

14

Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa47C, Abu El-Feda Street, Zamalek, Cairo, Egypt

Tel.: +202 2736 5140 • Fax.: +202 2736 5139 • E-mail: ROCairo@iom.intWebsite: www.iom.int

57Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Ideas on How to Facilitate Departure, Return and Reintegration Assistance2015/48pagesEnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

Thispapershallprovideanewimpetustothefieldofreturncounselling,aswellasreturnandreintegrationassistance in Switzerland in a view to discuss anddevelop these furtherwithall relevant stakeholdersinthisfield.Thepaperalsoaimstoprovideacommonassessmentofallcurrentlyusedinstruments,aswellas discuss innovative ideas that could help advancethe modern mechanisms and general structure ofreturnandreintegrationassistanceprogrammes.

Inthispaper,theIOMandSRCproposethefollowingmaininitiativesforthefuturemanagementofpublicreturnassistanceprograms:(a)openingupofreturnassistanceprogrammesstoawidergroupofpeople;(b) introducing innovative approaches to returnassistance;and(c)strengtheningcooperativeworkinEurope,particularlytheEuropeanUnion.

Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots2015/196pagesEnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

Thisstudy,byAltaiConsultingforIOM’sRegionalOfficefortheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA),createsafreshandupdatedunderstandingofthedynamicsofmigrationflowsacrosstheMediterranean.

Fieldworkwas conducted between November 2014and February 2015 across seven countries in theMENA regionandEurope (Egypt, Italy, Libya,Malta,Morocco, Spain and Tunisia), and involved in-depthinterviews with more than 130 migrants and keyinformantsacrossalllocations.Thestudyparticularlyfocuses on two routes: theWesternMediterraneanroute from Morocco to Spain, and the CentralMediterranean route from North Africa (typicallyLibyaorEgypt)toItalyorMalta.

58 Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Policy Brief Series Issue 3 | Vol. 1 | June 20152015/8pagesEnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

Migration – internal and international – is animportantfeatureofthesociallivesofpeopleacrossWestAfrica.Whilemovementswithinthesubregionaregenerallyduetocomplexandmulti-causalfactors,natural resource scarcity has served to influencemovements especially in rural areas. Drawing fromresearchinruralnorth-westernBenin,thispolicybrieflooksattheeffectofmigrationonthein-landfisheriessubsector and emphasizes the need for effectiveparticipationofallstakeholdersinthemanagementofnaturalresourcestoimprovelivelihoodsintheregionfacingpopulationgrowthandclimatevariability.

Resolving Post-Disaster Displacement: Insights from the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)2015/82pagesEnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), was one of thestrongest tropical cyclones in history, and madelandfall in the Philippines in early November 2013,with winds exceeding 300 km/h and a 5-m stormsurge. Over 4 million people were displaced, withdamage to housing and infrastructure across a vastareaofthecountry.Theeventpromptedalarge-scalehumanitarianresponse,ledbytheGovernmentofthePhilippinesandwiththesupportofitscivilsociety,theprivate sector and the international partners.Whilemajor progress has been made in terms of relief,recovery and reconstruction, significant challengesremain.Thereportdrawsonanewhouseholdsurveyand extensive interviews with affected communitymembers, government officials and other keystakeholders to examine the question of durablesolutionstodisplacementinpost-HaiyanPhilippines,recognizingthatthechallengesfacedintheaftermathofthedisastermaybeasourceofinsightforresponsestootherpost-disasterdisplacementcrises,bothinthePhilippinesandelsewhere.

59Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

MPP Readers’ Survey

Migration Policy Practice (MPP) waslaunchedthreeyearsagoandtheeditorswouldnowliketoinvitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinashortreaders’satisfactionsurvey.

Thepurposeofthissurvey,whichcanbetakenanonymously,istohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimaryinterestsinourjournal.Thesurvey’sresponseswillcontribute,inparticular,toadjustingandimproving,asappropriate,MPP’scontentandstyle,andthusthereader’sexperience.

Shouldyouwishtoparticipateinthissurvey,pleaseclick here.

Thankyou.

International Dialogue on Migration No. 24 – Migration and Families2015/102pagesISSN1726-2224/ISBN978-92-9068-695-8EnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

This publication contains the report and supplementarymaterials about theworkshoponmigrationand families,whichwasheld inGeneva, Switzerland,on7and8October2014,withintheframeworkoftheInternationalDialogueonMigration(IDM).Theworkshopwasthesecondinaseriesoftwoworkshopsorganized in 2014 under the overarching theme, “MigrationHumanMobilityandDevelopment:EmergingTrendsandNewOpportunitiesforPartnerships”.It focusedon familymigrationandon thedifferentialandchallenging impactofmigrationonthefamilyunitanditsmembers,andofferedpolicymakersandpractitioners anopportunity to showcase and exchangepolicies, cooperationandpartnershipframeworks,andlessonslearned.Theworkshopalsodiscussedpracticalsolutionsattheregional,nationalandinternationallevelstorespondtothechallengesthatmigrantfamiliesandtheirmembersarefacing.

60 Vol. V, Number 2, April 2015–June 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Call for authors/Submission guidelines

SinceitslaunchinOctober2011,Migration Policy Practice haspublishedover110articlesbyseniorpolicymakersanddistinguishedmigrationpolicyexpertsfromallovertheworld.

Past authors have included, inter alia:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) andSpecial Adviser to the President of Benin; John K. Bingham, Global Coordinator of civil societyactivities intheUnitedNationsHigh-levelDialogueonInternationalMigrationandDevelopmentandtheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment;Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje,ChairoftheGFMD2013-2014;Mark Cully,ChiefEconomistattheAustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection;António Guterres,UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees;Khalid Koser,ChairoftheWorldEconomicForumGlobalAgendaCouncilonMigration;Khalid Malik,DirectoroftheHumanDevelopmentReportOffice,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP);Cecilia Mamlström,EUCommissioner forHomeAffairs;Ali Mansoor,Chairof theGFMD2012;Andrew Middleton,DirectorofCulture,RecreationandMigrantStatistics,AustralianBureauofStatistics;Najat Maalla M’Jid,UnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesaleofchildren,childprostitutionandchildpornography;Robert A. Mocny,DirectorofUS-VISIT,USDepartmentofHomelandSecurity;Imelda M. Nicolas,SecretaryoftheCommissiononFilipinosOverseas(CFO),OfficeofthePresidentof the Philippines; Ignacio Packer, Secretary General of the Terre des Hommes InternationalFederation; Kelly Ryan (CoordinatoroftheIntergovernmentalConsultationsonMigration,AsylumandRefugees–IGC,Geneva);Martin Schulz,PresidentoftheEuropeanParliament;David Smith,DirectorofSurveysandReporting,AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection;Sir Peter D. Sutherland,SpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretary-GeneralforMigration; Ambassador William Lacy Swing,DirectorGeneraloftheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM);Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; Catherine Wiesner, DeputyAssistantSecretaryofState,BureauofPopulation,RefugeesandMigration,USDepartmentofState.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

•Notexceedfivepagesandbewritteninanon-academicandreader-friendlystyle.

•Coveranyareaofmigrationpolicybutdiscuss,asfaraspossible,particularsolutions,policyoptionsorbestpracticerelatingtothethemescovered.

•Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant publicadministrations,orcivilsociety,inothercountries.

Articlesgivingaccountofevaluationsofspecificmigrationpoliciesandinterventions,includingbothevaluationfindingsandinnovativeevaluationmethodologies,areparticularlywelcome.

To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

• Solon Ardittis(sardittis@eurasylum.org);and

• Dr Frank Laczko(flaczko@iom.int)