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ECPR General Conference

Université de Montréal, 26 - 29 August 2015

Panel: New Discussions/ Frontiers of Deliberative Theories

Ina Kubbe

Leuphana University Lüneburg

kubbe@leuphana.de

Research Design

Work in Progress

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Reciprocity and Democracy

Reciprocity is one of the basic norms of human being. However, it is still neglected in political science.

It refers to an individuals' in-kind response to friendly or hostile acts. Previous research from other

disciplines has shown that reciprocity generates positive externalities and implies the maintenance of

stable social societies. For example, it fosters the probability of an individual’s political participation.

Gutman and Thompson (1998) even promote the norm of reciprocity as the basis of deliberative

democracy. Under reciprocity, individuals use deliberation with the goal of reaching deliberative

agreement that, in turn, supports a political process fostering moral learning. However, reciprocity is

difficult to measure and previous research rather refers to trust and trustworthiness. By online

experiments, surveys and multi-level analysis, this study aims to measure reciprocity in a comparable

way to analyse in a second step the relationship between the norm and a country’s quality of

democracy.

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1 Introduction

Human behavior is strongly governed by individual’s norms. Norms are cultural products including

values, customs and traditions that represent an individual’s basic knowledge of what others do and

what others think that they should do. They are informal understandings that are regarded to exits as

collective representations of acceptable group conduct as well as individual perceptions of particular

group conduct (Sherif 1936; Cialdini 2003). As individuals are mutually dependent and reciprocal,

reciprocity is one of the norms that is deeply embedded in many social interactions. Hobhouse (1906,

p. 12) even claims that “reciprocity […] is the vital principle of society” and “a key intervening variable

through which shared social rules are enabled to yield social stability.”

Balancing receiving and taking, reciprocity refers to an individuals' in-kind or immaterial response to

friendly or hostile acts with no material gains expected by the actor (Falk and Fischbacher 2005;

Dohmen et al. 2009). This includes that reciprocal actors are willing to reward fair behavior (positive

reciprocity) and punish unfair behavior (negative reciprocity). Yet, while the norm of reciprocity is

universal, it functions differently in many social interactions and different cultures (Gouldner 1960;

Perugini et al. 2003; Henrich et al. 2010). Reciprocity implies that people categorize an action as kind

by viewing its consequences and also by the person's fundamental intentions. Even if the

consequences are the same, underlying intentions can cause an action to be reciprocated differently

(Gouldner 1960; Perugini et al. 2003). In contrast to economics and sociology, however, reciprocity is

still a neglected principle in political science and merits further investigation.

Besides the aim to bring the term and its measurement to political science research, the following

study seeks to answer the following research questions: What is the relationship between reciprocity

and a country’s quality of democracy? To answer this question, this study follows a multi-method

approach including online experiments, surveys with citizens and experts as well as multi-level analysis.

This project follows the concept of the “homo reciprocans” that assumes that people motivated to

improve their environment interact with a propensity to cooperate. Fehr and Gächter (2000, p. 159)

claim that “reciprocity means that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer

and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model. Conversely, in response to

hostile actions that are frequently much more nasty and even brutal.” According to this, I expect that

(positive) reciprocity is much stronger in well-established democracies.

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2 Theoretical Background

2.1 Reciprocity

The research on reciprocity has a long history (Becker 1986; Neusner and Chilton 2008). Already the

Edda, a 13th century collection of Norse epic verses, gives a succinct description of reciprocity (cited

from Fehr and Gächter 2000, p. 59): “A man ought to be a friend to his friend and repay gift with gift.

People should meet smiles with smiles and lies with treachery”. 1 Fehr and Gächter (2000) claim that

there is considerable evidence that a substantial fraction of people behave according to this dictum:

People repay gifts and take revenge even in interactions with complete strangers and even if it is costly

for them and yields neither present nor future material benefits.

Nowadays, the term can be found in several disciplines and theories such as the Social Exchange

Theory, Social Capital Theory, Evolutionary Psychology2, Cultural Anthropology, Rational Choice Theory

or Social Psychology (Axelrod 1984; Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Kolm

2009). For instance, in social psychology reciprocity has been used to explain changes in attitudes

(Cialdini et al. 1992), interpersonal perception (Kenny et al. 1996), aggression (Robarchek and

Robarcheck 1998), intergroup interactions (Goren and Bornstein 1999) or gift giving (Cialdini 2008; see

also Perugini et al. 2003). In the political science literature, however, reciprocity still received little

attention.

Famous studies focussing on reciprocity are originally worked out in the field of anthropology.

Malinowksi’s (1922) ethnography of the Trobriand Islands described the complex institution of the

Kuala ring, a ceremonial exchange system conducted in the Milne Bay Province of Papua New Guinea,

and became foundational for subsequent theories of reciprocity and exchange. He carefully traced the

network of exchanges of bracelets and necklaces across the Trobriand Islands and found out that there

are differences in the degree to which people expect returns. Following him, reciprocity is a mutually

gratifying pattern of exchanging goods and services.

In 1960, Gouldner defined reciprocity from a cultural perspective as a moral norm and one of the

universal “principle components” of morale codes: “In sum, beyond reciprocity as a pattern of

exchange and beyond folk beliefs about reciprocity as a fact of life, there is another element: a

1 Also Cicero speaks of reciprocity: “There is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness” (Cicero), adding

that “all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit.” (quoted in Gouldner 1960, p. 161). Similarly, Simmel (1950, p. 387) remarks

that social equilibrium and cohesion could not exist without "the reciprocity of service and return service," and that "all

contacts among men rest on the schema of giving and returning the equivalence."

2 For example, evolutionary psychologists have used the norm of reciprocity to explain altruism by emphasizing our

expectations that “helping others will increase the likelihood that they will help us in the future.” The underlying justification

lies in the human desire to reciprocate kindness and cooperate for survival value has enabled our continued existence in a

hostile world. Thus, the norm of reciprocity ultimately has survival value (Aronson 2007).

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generalized moral norm of reciprocity which defines certain actions and obligations as repayments for

benefits received” (p. 170). He found out that reciprocity functions differently across cultures3

(Gouldner 1960; see also Sahlins 1974).4

Some researchers even speak of a concept of reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher 2005; Dohmen et al.

2009). The concept of “homo reciprocans” assumes that people motivated to improve their

environment interact with a propensity to cooperate – while the homo economicus would not

necessarily engage in reciprocal behavior, where he/she does not advance his/her material self-

interest. For homo reciprocans, however, reciprocal actions are driven by reciprocal motivations:

direct utility value is placed on rewarding or punishment (Falk and Fischbacher 2005). In contrast to

the rational-choice assumption that individuals are mainly motivated by self-interests, studies have

illustrated they also have concerns for fairness, others‘ well-being and therefore behave reciprocally

(Maximiano 2012). Fehr and Gächter (2000) demonstrated that 40-66 percent of subjects display non-

selfish behavior. In contrast to cooperative or retaliatory behavior in repeated interactions, reciprocity

is an in kind or immaterial response to beneficial or harmful acts with no material gains expected by

the actor. In general, in all cases of response, some degree of reciprocity is necessary for the

communication to continue in an amicable way (Sahlins 1974). Warfare is also been seen as an

response (negative reciprocity) (Mauss 1974).

Previous studies have examined reciprocity either as a dependent (causes) or independent variable

(consequences). The latter perspective has shown that reciprocity has a strong positive impact on

individual and social well-being. By strongly influencing certain economic, social and political

outcomes, it generates positive externalities by being one of the central prerequisites for social capital

(El-Attar 2007). The basis of social capital is that it is attractive for individuals to exchange resources

with each other. That is why, people act reciprocally and organize themselves into groups in order to

3 For example, in the Philippines the compadre system overtly pervades the political, economic and institutional spheres.

Compadres (i.e., friends) are bound by a norm of reciprocity. If one man pays his compadre's doctor's bill in a time of need,

the friend may be obligated to help the former's son to get a government job. Here the tendency to govern all relations by

the norm of reciprocity is relatively legitimate, overt, and powerful. However, in the United States such tendencies with the

norm are assumed to be weaker because friendship relations are less institutionalized; there is no “compadre system”

(Gouldner 1960).

4 Sahlins (1974) built further on the ideas of Malinowski (1922) and Gouldner (1960), by proposing that when kinship distance

increases, less reciprocity and solidarity are experienced from a relationship. He constructed a continuum for reciprocity,

based on time span and equality of exchanged goods. When the time lapse between an offered resource (e.g.a gift) and

returned resource is short, and contents are about equal, there is balanced exchange. If this time lapse is longer, unspecified,

and contents of the gifts are of heterogenous nature, there is generalized reciprocity. There are also cases of unreciprocated

action. If the gift is not returned, this is called a pure gift. If the gift is involuntary, this is called a theft, or negative reciprocity

(Sahlins 1974).

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achieve levels of cooperation needed for improving society in general – for example by improving

public health, and society-wide levels of education, wealth, or individual welfare. Strong reciprocity is

also a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or

collective action (Fehr et al. 2002). By reciprocity strong relationships and mutual trust develop (Carlin

and Love 2013). People who trust others more and share more norms and values of reciprocity will

tend to participate more, and to have more interest in politics. In this way, reciprocity fosters an

individuals’ engagement in civic and political participation, taking part in the decisions on policy issue

that affect economic, political and social domains (e.g. increasing voting turn-out) (El-Attar 2007).

This study begins with observing reciprocity as a dependent variable. In a second step, it will be

analyzed if there is a relationship between reciprocity and a country’s quality of democracy.

2.2 Reciprocity and Democracy

There is rare literature, besides the book of Gutman and Thompson (1998) that focus on the linkages

of reciprocity and the political domain, in particular the quality of democracy. Gutman and Thompson

(1998) promote the norm of reciprocity as the basis of deliberative democracy5. Deliberative

democracy asks citizens and officials to justify public policy by giving reasons that can be accepted by

those who are bound by it. It relies on the norm of reciprocity.

In democratic politics citizens must cooperate to make their lives go well. Based on mutual respect,

reciprocity regulates public reason in a deliberative democracy, where public reason is defined as the

terms in which citizens justify to one another their claims regarding all goods. Deliberative democracy

does not require consensus on public policy or constitutional law. Since politics cannot be purged of

moral conflict, it seeks a common view on how citizens should publicly deliberate. Gutman and

Thompson (1998) claim that when citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social

cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral

disagreement. The authors believe that a deliberative perspective can help resolve some moral

disagreements in democratic politics. They assume that its greater contribution can be to help citizens

treat one another with mutual respect as they deal with the disagreements that invariably remain.

Since citizens in a pluralist society are likely to continue to hold competing comprehensive views, the

principles of democracy must provide some guidance for living with fundamental moral disagreement,

5 Deliberative democracy or discursive democracy is a form of democracy in which deliberation is central to decision-making.

It adopts elements of both consensus decision-making and majority rule and differs from traditional democratic theory in

that authentic deliberation, not mere voting, is the primary source of legitimacy for the law. Deliberative democracy is

compatible with both representative democracy and direct democracy. Some authors use the term to encompass

representative bodies whose members authentically deliberate on legislation without unequal distributions of power, while

others use the term exclusively to refer to decision-making directly by lay citizens, as in direct democracy.

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not simply resolving it. Thereby, reciprocity provides this guidance by setting standards for practices

of mutual respect. As a result, “Reciprocal democracy” accepts the need to promote sustentative moral

principles in politics that could become part of a public morality for the society as a whole. In cultivating

the virtue of open-minded commitment among citizens and in encouraging an economy of moral

disagreement in politics, reciprocity orients citizens and public officials towards a deliberative

perspective compatible with continuing moral agreement. The norm of reciprocity supports a political

process that promotes a society’s moral learning.

Gutman and Thompson (1998) claim that reciprocity can be seen in the difference between acting in

one’s self-interest (e.g. taking advantage of a legal loophole) and acting fairly (following rules in the

spirit that one expects others to adopt). Under reciprocity, individuals use deliberation with the goal

of reaching deliberative agreement that, in turn, supports a political process fostering moral learning.

When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they

try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreement. Reciprocity allows some space

for bargaining as well as for comprehensive moral views, as long as these are constrained by

reciprocity. Following this argumentation, I assume the following theoretical and empirical

relationship: Reciprocity -> Deliberation -> Quality of Democracy. A high degree of reciprocity leads to

high deliberation. Deliberation, in turn, has positive consequences for a country’s quality of

democracy. In my study, I will analyse these relationships by experiments, surveys and statistical

methods.

I expect that “a higher norm of reciprocity leads to a higher country’s quality of democracy”.

3 Measurement

3.1 Reciprocity

Clearly, norms are inherently difficult to measure. Reciprocity is usually operationalized by means of

indirect indicators. There have been different approaches to this, some involving the use of proxies

that have not always been very rigorous or conceptually satisfactory. Often they include validity

problems. In most cases, reciprocity is measured by games such as gift exchange games, trust

investment games or public good experiments (Berg et al. 1995; Fehr et al. 1998; Charness 2004) or by

surveys, asking respondents about their general attitudes or past behavior (Fehr et al. 2002; Karlan

2005). This subjective data have been used by sociologists, psychologists, and economists to measure

respondents‘ well-being, their feelings, beliefs, expectations and behavioral intentions (Maximiano

2012). I measure reciprocity by a multi-method approach including online experiments, surveys with

citizens of democratic states and statistical methods.

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To clarify and measure reciprocity, I refer to the two key elements of reciprocity: positive and negative

reciprocity) (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Perugini et al. 2003; Dohmen et al. 2009; see also Schubert and

Lambsdorff 2014).

Positive Reciprocity

Positive reciprocity describes the degree to which an individual rewards kind actions. It refers to

responding to a positive action with another positive action. It includes the cooperative reciprocal

tendencies i.e. inclinations to give back in a cooperative manner (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Perugini et

al. 2003). Positive reciprocal actions differ from altruistic actions as the former only follow from other

positive actions. They differ from altruistic actions in that those are not actions taken with the hope or

expectation of future positive responses. The focus of reciprocity is centered more on trading favors

than making a negotiation or a contract with another person. With reciprocity, a small favor can

produce a sense of obligation to a larger return favor. This feeling of obligation allows an action to be

reciprocated with another action. Because there is a sense of future obligation, reciprocity can help to

develop and continue relationships with people. Reciprocity works because from a young age on

people are taught to return favors and to disregard this teaching will lead to the social stigma of being

an ingrate (Olsen and Spelke 2007).

Positive reciprocity has been demonstrated in experimental settings where contracts are incomplete

and workers reciprocate generous wages with high effort, even though there is no way to enforce

contracts (Fehr et al. 1998; Brown et al. 2004). It also explains why individuals reward trust in the well-

known trust game (Berg et al. 1995; Falk and Zehnder 2007). Psychological and economic studies have

demonstrated, for example, that smiling waitresses get tipped much more than less friendly ones (Tidd

and Lochard 1978; Bodvarsson and Gibson 2003; Bodvarsson et al. 2003; Conlin et al. 2003). Other

examples are the calls for contributions to charities being accompanied by small gifts or the use of free

samples of a certain product in supermarkets (Cialdini 2008).

Negative Reciprocity

Contrary to positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity describes the extent to which the individual

punishes unkind actions. It includes retaliatory aspects i.e. the aspects of trying to get back and cause

harm. A person gives goods or labor and expects to be repaid immediately with some other goods or

labor of the same value. Negative reciprocity can involve a minimum of trust and a maximum of social

distance; indeed it can take place among strangers (Sahlins 1974). An example of negative reciprocity

can be selling prepared food in an urban center at an inflated price when there is very little completion

and high demand.

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Negative reciprocity is relevant in bargaining games, for example in terms of willingness to reject unfair

offers even at a personal cost (Camerer and Thaler 1995; Perugini et al. 2003), and for willingness to

punish others who violate norms of cooperation or fairness in public goods games (Fehr and Gächter

2000). Such “altruistic punishment” (Fehr and Gächter 2002, p. 137) by homo reciprocans can be the

primary driving force behind sustaining cooperative norms in a variety of institutional settings. For

example, with regard to corruption, reciprocal actors are willing to punish unfair behavior and the

violation of norms of cooperation or fairness. Following Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Bowles and Gintis

(2004), humans are willing to punish norm violators even when such punishment is costly and they do

not benefit personally (see also Carpenter and Seki 2011).

Control Variables

By a questionnaire, I will also control for an individual’s age, gender, education, maritual status, region

of residence, religion, belonging to a discriminated group, political orientation (left vs. right), income

and a country’s economic situation. El-Attar (2007), for example, measures an individual’s attitudes on

norms of reciprocity in Germany and illustrates that the most important effect is due to the fact of

belonging to a discriminated group, then the level of education, then gender, being married and

income. He shows that (1) belonging to a discriminated group reduces the disposition to accept norms

and values of reciprocity. (2) More education has a strong positive effect on reciprocity. (3) Women

have a significantly higher norms of reciprocity. (4) Low income respondents are less disposed to follow

norms of reciprocity. (5) He also indicates that older people tend to believe that rules and norms of

reciprocity are more important (see also Bereby-Meyer and Fiks 2013). (6) More religious people tend

to have higher norms of reciprocity. (6) Right-wing people have lower norms of reciprocity. Being

extreme left-wing is also negatively related to the norm of reciprocity. Again the highest value is

reached in the center-left. Moreover, being left-wing is positively correlated with the level of

education, reinforcing this effect even more.

Online Experiments

The online experiments will be conducted with citizens by means of the software Unipark

(http://www.unipark.com/de/). I have already carried out a pre-test.

The experiment consists of two persons that are randomly and anonymously divided into two groups

(player 1 / player 2) and play with each other. Each person is endowed with the same amount of money

(e.g. 5 euro)6. Player 1 can either decide to keep her 5 euro which choice ends the game and both

players get a payoff of 5 euro or can pass the entire 5 euro to player 2. If she chooses to pass the money

6 To avoid that the participants pursue just material gains, I chose the low symbolic amount of 5 Euro.

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to player 2 it is tripled by the experimenter and player 2 can then decide to keep the additional 15 euro

for himself or can return 7.50 euro to player 1, what results in (0 euro, 20 euro) and (7.5 euro, 12.5

euro) payoff respectively (see the following graphic 1).

The strategies can be given the following names: in the first stage player 1 chooses either to exit or to

engage. If player 1 chooses to engage (positive reciprocity), player 2 can in the second stage chooses

then between cooperate (positive reciprocity) and defect (negative reciprocity) (see graphic 1).

Graphic 1: Experiment on Reciprocity

Source: Berg et al. 1995

After playing the game, the participants need to fill out the following survey.

Survey

The participants of the experiment will also get the following survey that measures positive and

negative reciprocity. To check that the items consistently reflect the construct it is measuring (positive

or negative reciprocity) they will be checked by a reliability analysis. In statistical terms, reliability

analyses are based on the idea that individual items (or sets of items) produce results consistent with

the overall survey. I have also already conducted a pre-test of this survey.

1. Age: …..years

2. Gender: □ Female □ Male □ Other

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3. Maritual status:

Are you □ married □ in a relationship □ single?

Children: □ Yes □ No

If yes, how many: …

4. Educational background

What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a

student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]:

□ 1 No formal education

□ 2 Incomplete primary school

□ 3 Complete primary school

□ 4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type

□ 5 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type

□ 6 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type

□ 7 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type

□ 8 Some university-level education, without degree

□ 9 University-level education, with degree

Field of Study: …………….

5. Religion: □ Islam □ Jewish □ Hindu □ Catholic □ Protestant □ Atheist □ None

□ Other ………….

6. Income:

“How much is your monthly income from all sources, excluding investment income?”

………….

7. Political orientation: ”In politics people sometimes talk of ”left” and ”right”. Where would you place

yourself on this scale, where 1 means the left and 5 means the right?”

1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □

8. Belonging to a discriminated group: ”Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group

that is discriminated against in this country?” □ Yes □ No

If yes, please, place yourself on this scale, where 1 means I disagree strongly and 5 means I agree

strongly?

1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □

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Positive Reciprocity

(measured by 4-points scale: 1 disagree strongly – 4 agree strongly) (see also Perugini et al. 2003; El-

Attar 2007)

a) “I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before”

b) “If someone does a favor for me, I am ready to return it.”

c) “If I do something that is beneficial for someone else, then I expect that person to return a favor.”

d) “If someone does something that is beneficial to me, then I am prepared to return a favor, even

when this was not agreed upon in advance.”

e) “If someone is helpful with me at work, I am pleased to help him/her.”

f) “I’m ready to do a boring job to return someone’s previous help.”

g) “When someone does me a favor, I feel committed to repay him/her.”

h) “To help somebody is the best policy to be certain that s/he will help you in the future.”

i) “If someone asks me politely for information, I’m really happy to help him/her”

j) “If someone lends me money as a favor, I feel I should give him/her back something more than what

is strictly due.”

k) “If I help tourists, I expect that they will thank me nicely.”

l) “I avoid being impolite because I do not want others being impolite with me.”

m) “I do not behave badly with others so as to avoid them behaving badly with me.”

n) “If someone suggests to me the name of the winning horse at the race, I would certainly give him/her

part of my winnings.”

o) “I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before.”

p) “When I pay someone compliments, I expect that s/he in turn will reciprocate.”

q) “If I work hard, I expect it will be repaid.”

r) “I am ready to do a favor to people even if they didn’t do a favor for me before.”

Negative Reciprocity

(measured by 4-points scale: 1 disagree strongly – 4 agree strongly) (see also Perugini et al. 2003)

a) “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take my revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the costs.”

b) “I am willing to invest time and effort to reciprocate an unfair action.”

c) “I am kind and nice if others behave well with me, otherwise it’s tit-for-tat.”

d) “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her.”

e) “If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her.”

f) “If someone is unfair to me, I prefer to give him/her what s/he deserves instead of accepting his/her

apologies.”

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g) “I would not do a favor for somebody who behaved badly with me, even if it meant foregoing some

personal gains.”

h) “If somebody is impolite to me, I become impolite.”

i) “The way I treat others depends much on how they treat me.”

j) “I fear the reactions of a person I have previously treated badly.”

k) “If I don’t leave a good tip in a restaurant, I expect that in future I will not get good service.”

l) “It is obvious that if I treat someone badly s/he will look for revenge.”

m) “I am only doing a favor to people who already did a favor for me before.”

3.2 Democracy

To measure the quality of democracy, I use an average score by Freedom House (political rights and

civil liberties) that is transformed to a scale of 0-10 and Polity IV that is transformed to a scale of 0-10

as well.7

Freedom House evaluates each country’s political rights as well as civil liberties with a rating from 1 to

7, where 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. Political rights ratings are based on an

evaluation of the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of

government. Civil liberties ratings are based on an evaluation of freedom of expression and belief,

associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. The

ratings of political rights and civil liberties are determined by the total number of points (up to 100).

Each country receives 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions; countries receive 0

to 4 points on each question, with 0 representing the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of

freedom. The average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings determines the country`s overall

status: Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0) or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). Freedom House also assigns

upward or downward trend arrows to countries that saw general positive or negative trends during

the year that were not significant enough to result in a ratings change (Freedom House 2015).

The Polity IV Project carries data collection that especially includes indices that measure the degree of

democracies and autocracies for purposes of comparative, quantitative analyses. The Polity score

covers all independent states with a total population greater than 500.000 for a time period from 1800

to 2013 and captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary

monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The indicators are primarily based on subjective

interpretations of historical material and similar sources by experts Polity IV.

7 Thereby, the scale of the variables ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Moreover, the

version of Polity IV has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average

Freedom House measure. Hadenius and Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better, both in terms of validity

and reliability than its constituent parts (Quality of Government 2015).

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