economics of the legal process. car accident i hit you with my car and cause $10,000 in damages we...
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Economics of the Legal Process
Car Accident I hit you with my car and cause $10,000 in damages We both believe that there’s an 80% chance I’ll be
held liable if we go to trial
Suppose going to trial cost each of us $3000
There’s room to negotiate a settlement
You expect to recover: (0.80)($10,000) = $8000
Your net gain from going to trial = $8000 - $3000 = $5000
My expected cost of going to trial = $8000 + $3000 = $11,000
Car Accident What if one of us has private information?
Suppose I’m more pessimistic about a trial’s outcome?
Suppose I’m more optimistic about a trial’s outcome?
P(liable) = 90%
P(liable) = 10%
Settlement more likely
Settlement less likely
The Legal Process Previous assumptions:
Legal system works flawlessly Legal system is costless
Objective: Min Social Costs = ca + c(e)
Damages = Actual Harm
Administrative costs Cost of errors
Wrong precaution levelsWrong activity levels
A Legal Decision TreeInjury?
Sue?
Settle or Exchange info?
Bargain
Trial
Appeal
end
end
end
end
end
end end
win
win
lose
lose
yes
yes
no
no
settle
settleDon’t settle
info
What is the value of a legal claim?
Handout
Determining the # of Suits The # of legal claims filed depends on:
# injuries Cost of filing a complaint Expected value of a legal claim
Damages Awarded
Number of claims filed
d~
What does the relationship look like?
Determining the # of Suits
Higher FC means: Fewer lawsuits and lower ca
Larger # of injuries go unpunished, therefore higher c(e)
EVC
Number of potential plaintiffs
FC
Class Action lawsuits?
Appropriate where individual harms are small but aggregate harms are large
suedon’t sue
Client – Lawyer Problems Asymmetric info
Lawyer knows the law Client knows the facts
Optimal payment system Hourly pay? Per service charge? Contingency fee?
Exchange of Information Pre-trial “discovery” phase
Voluntary pooling of info Parties tend to reveal info that corrects the other
side’s relative optimism Parties tend to withhold info that corrects the other
side’s relative pessimism Involuntary pooling of info
Correcting relative pessimism makes settlement less likely
But it does reduce overall uncertainty which makes settlement more likely
You reveal your medical x-rays to show severe
damages
Was that crunching sound a broken hip?
US vs Europe
Impact on social costs?
Pre-Trial Bargaining Plaintiff will accept settlement S if: S > EJP – LCP
Defendant will offer settlement S if: S < EJD + LCD
What does a “reasonable” settlement look like?
Where: S = settlement EJP = expected judgment LCP = litigation costs
S > $8000 - $3000 = $5000
S < $8000 + $3000 = $11,000
Trial Europe: inquisitorial system US: adversarial system
Who pays the costs of trials? US: each side pays their own costs United Kingdom: loser pays all costs
“Judges have incentives to do what is right and easy; lawyers have incentives to do what is profitable and hard.”
Trial Unitary trials: liability and damages Segmented trials: liability then damages
Burden of proof Criminal cases: “innocent until proven guilty” Civil cases: plaintiff typically has burden
Standard of proof Civil cases: “preponderance of the evidence” Criminal cases: “beyond a reasonable doubt”
Appeal Federal courts:
District courts (94)
Circuit courts of appeal (12) Supreme Court
Matters of law vs Matters of fact
Impact on social cost: ca + c(e)
“right of appeal”
“discretionaryreview”