eccssafe exploring the contribution of civil society to ... · eccssafe – exploring the...
TRANSCRIPT
9th May 2016
ECCSSafe – Exploring the contribution of civil society to safety Deliverable 2: Case studies and transversal analysis
Authors: Stéphane Baudé (Mutadis, France)
Gilles Hériard Dubreuil (Mutadis, France)
Drago Kos (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia)
Nadja Železnik (REC – Slovenia Country office)
Mateja Šepec Jeršič (REC – Slovenia Country office)
Attila Antal (EnergiaKlub, Hungary)
All rights reserved.
This work is protected by ’Attribution – Noncommercial – No derivative works’ Creative Commons Licence.
ECCSSAFE – EXPLORING THE CONTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO SAFETY
Deliverable 2: Case studies and transversal analysis
The research was led by: Stephane Baudé (Mutadis, France)
The research was financed by La Fondation pour une Culture de Securite Industrielle (FONCSI)
The research and its background can be found and downloaded from the website of Energiaklub Climate
Policy Institute and Applied Communications: www.energiaklub.hu .
ENERGIAKLUB 2016.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 5 2. Method and choice of the case studies ............................................................................ 7 3. The engagement of the Local Information Commissions attached to nuclear sites in the decennial
safety reviews of the reactors of Fessenheim nuclear power plant (France) ....................................... 8 3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 8 3.2. Method ................................................................................................................... 8 3.3. Context of the case study ............................................................................................ 9 3.3.1. The Local Information Commissions in France .................................................................... 9 3.3.2. The strategy for openness to society of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
(IRSN) 9 3.4. Presentation of the case study .................................................................................... 11 3.4.1. The 3rd decennial review of nuclear reactors: a convergence between 2 process of engagement of
civil society at the national and at the local level .................................................................... 11 3.4.2. Engagement of the CLS of Fessenheim and GSIEN in decennial safety reviews .......................... 11 3.4.3. A national process from 2009 to facilitate the engagement of the CLIs and the ANCCLI in the
decennial safety reviews of French nuclear reactors ................................................................. 16 3.5. Analysis of the case study .......................................................................................... 20 3.5.1. Understanding of safety and safety culture ..................................................................... 20 3.5.2. Definition of safety as a public affair ............................................................................ 21 3.5.3. Governance ........................................................................................................... 21 The building of working practices with EDF, the IRSN and the ASN on the decennial safety reviews have
been facilitated by the monopolistic position of EDF as the operator of all French nuclear power plants. 22 3.5.4. Controversies and co-framing ...................................................................................... 22 3.5.5. Trust .................................................................................................................... 22 Finally, the testing of procedures and processes for access of experts commissioned by civil society to
classified information and documentation of EDF has validated these procedures and processes, and first
of all the very principle that an expert mandated by civil society can access under these condition to
documents that cannot be made available to the public. This reinforces the transparency of the safety
system, which is a factor of reinforcement of trust in this system. ................................................ 23 4. The hazardous waste incinerator of Dorog (Hungary) ......................................................... 24 4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 24 4.2. Method ................................................................................................................. 24 4.3. Brief History of the Incinerator of Dorog and its Problems ................................................... 25 4.3.1. The Importance of Dorog and Considerations for Analysis.................................................... 25 4.3.2. The Birth of the Incinerator ........................................................................................ 26 4.3.3. Safety Problems at the Facility .................................................................................... 26 4.3.3.1. Illegal Waste Storage and Respiratory Diseases ......................................................... 26 4.3.3.2. Problems with Emission and Slag .......................................................................... 26 4.3.3.3. “Waste of Garé” .............................................................................................. 27 4.3.3.4. Water Pollution ............................................................................................... 27 4.4. The Role of the Local Participation............................................................................... 28 4.4.1. Why Should the Public Participate? ............................................................................... 29 4.4.2. Tools and Strategies used by the NGO ........................................................................... 29 4.5. Civil Contribution to Safety – Experiences of the Interviews ................................................. 30 4.5.1. Two Strategies: from Civil Activism to Negotiations .......................................................... 30 4.5.2. The NGO and the Expertise ........................................................................................ 30 4.5.3. Trust between Individuals .......................................................................................... 31 4.5.4. The Role of Communication and Motivation .................................................................... 31 4.5.5. The Local Government as a Mediator ............................................................................ 31 4.5.6. Strengthening the Cooperation between the Local and National NGOs .................................... 31 4.5.7. The Nature of the Trust............................................................................................. 31
4
4.5.8. Main investments concerning environmental protection at the incinerator .............................. 32 References .................................................................................................................... 33 5. The local partnerships for site selection for a low and intermediate level radioactive waste in
Slovenia ........................................................................................................................ 34 5.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 34 5.2. Method ................................................................................................................. 34 5.3. The local partnership approach in Slovenia ..................................................................... 35 5.3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 35 5.3.2. The LP concept in Slovenia ......................................................................................... 36 5.3.3. Financing .............................................................................................................. 37 5.3.4. The implementation of LPs......................................................................................... 37 5.3.5. SWOT assessment of LPs ............................................................................................ 40 5.3.6. A summary of Slovene local partnerships ........................................................................ 42 5.4. Summary of the answers from invited stakeholders ........................................................... 45 5.4.1. Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case of Local Partnership ............................ 45 5.4.2. Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety............. 48 5.4.3. Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance .................................................. 50 5.4.4. Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders ........................................... 52 5.4.5. Trust .................................................................................................................... 53 5.5. Analysis of the outcomes of the interviews ..................................................................... 55 5.5.1. Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case of Local Partnership ............................ 55 5.5.2. Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety............. 57 5.5.3. Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance .................................................. 57 5.5.4. Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders ........................................... 57 5.5.5. Trust .................................................................................................................... 57 5.6. Conclusions and recommendations ............................................................................... 59 5.7. References for the case study ..................................................................................... 61 6. Transversal analysis of the case studies ......................................................................... 62 6.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 62 6.2. Understanding of safety and safety culture and identification of the contribution of civil society to
safety 62 6.3. Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety............. 65 6.4. Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance .................................................. 66 6.5. Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders ........................................... 67 6.6. Trust .................................................................................................................... 68 7. Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 69 Annex 1 – Grid of analysis of the case studies .......................................................................... 70 Annex 2 – Convention governing access of the GSIEN to information for the 3rd decennial safety review of
Fessenheim 1 reactor ....................................................................................................... 72
5
1. INTRODUCTION
From the 1990’s to now, the European context has been marked by the emergence and the reinforcement
of reflections and research on the contribution of civil society to the quality of decisions concerning
hazardous activities in risk governance studies (cf. TRUSTNET European research projects series, the works
of O. Renn, the works of the International Risk Governance Council). It has also been marked by the
development of various legal, institutional and regulatory arrangements aiming to organise participation of
civil society and local stakeholders in decision-making concerning hazardous activities.
The interactions between civil society and local actors on the one hand and institutional actors engaged in
safety1 of industrial activities on the other hand are most often addressed either through the general issue
of stakeholder involvement, perception studies, risk governance studies or through the more general issue
of the exercise of democracy regarding technical issues. Social and human aspects of industrial safety are
addressed through the analysis of human and organisation factors of safety that are focused either on the
analysis of single organisations (e.g. operators2) and their safety culture or address a safety system where
safety is the result of the actions and interactions of operators, regulators and experts.
We can currently observe that some regulators and technical support organisations, in particular in the
nuclear field (e.g. IRSN in France, SITEX network in Europe), are developing new approaches where civil
society is incorporated in the safety system as an additional layer contributing to safety, moving from a 3-
pillar safety approach (operators, regulators, experts) to a 4-pillar conception including civil society.
In the same time, international organisations dealing with safety, in particular in the nuclear field, are
evolving from a vision of engagement of civil society purely focused on the issue of acceptation of
technological choices to an acknowledgement of a positive contribution of civil society to safety culture
and to safety itself3.
In the field of radioactive waste management, the COWAM (Community waste Management) European
research project series4 have emphasised the contribution of civil society to safety culture. In the nuclear
field, empirical studies5 have also started to emphasise the role of civil society as a contributor to safety.
However, this renewed role of civil society as regards safety has not yet been investigated from a
theoretical point of view.
In this context, the ECCSSafe (Exploring Civil Society Contribution to Safety) research project6 aims to
further explore the contribution of civil society to industrial safety by providing a theoretical framework
for the analysis of this contribution, analysing 3 concrete cases in the nuclear field and in other industrial
1 The concept of industrial safety is defined as the set of technical provisions, human means and
organisational measures internal and external to industrial facilities, destined to prevent accidents and
malevolent acts and mitigate their consequences.
2 In this document, the word “operator” refers to the whole organisation that operates a hazardous facility
(e.g. the electricity company operating a power plant).
3 See notably the report of the IAEA International nuclear safety group “INSAG-20: Stakeholder
Involvement in Nuclear Issues” (2006), which states that the “involvement of stakeholders in nuclear issues
can provide a substantial improvement in safety.
4 See the final reports of the European research projects COWAM, COWAM 2 and COWAM in Practice
available on the COWAM website www.cowam.com
5 See P. Richardson, P. Rickwood, Public Involvement as a Tool to Enhance Nuclear Safety, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, 2012. The study notably concludes that “there are tangible benefits
to be gained from a more frank relationship between the nuclear power industry and the public, … [which]
appears to represent a possible untapped asset for enhancing and maintaining safety. 6 ECCSSafe is supported by the French Foundation for a Culture of Industrial Safety (Foncsi)
6
fields in Europe and identifying key issues to address in further research and proposing guidelines for a
larger scale research.
At first, a theoretical and methodological framework7 has been developed in order to set up the
conceptual framework and methodology for choosing and carrying out the case studies. This document
notably included interview guidelines for the interviews, a grid of analysis for the case studies and criteria
for selecting the cases.
The present document presents the 3 case studies:
• The engagement of the Local Information Commissions attached to nuclear sites in the decennial
safety reviews of the reactors of Fessenheim nuclear power plant (France)
• The hazardous waste incinerator of Dorog (Hungary)
• The local partnerships for site selection for a low and intermediate level radioactive waste in
Slovenia
It then proposes a transversal analysis of the 3 case studies along the grid of analysis developed in the
theoretical and methodological framework (see grid of analysis in Annex 1).
7 cf. ECCSSafe deliverable 1: Theoretical and methodological framework
7
2. METHOD AND CHOICE OF THE CASE STUDIES
These three case studies have been selected out of 8 pre-identified case studies, including 4 cases in the
nuclear field and 4 cases in other fields of activity8 (the 3 selected case studies are in italics):
Case studies in the nuclear field:
o The engagement of the Local Information Commissions attached to nuclear sites in the decennial safety reviews of the reactors of Fessenheim nuclear power plant (France)
o The local partnerships for site selection for a low and intermediate level radioactive waste in Slovenia
o Civil society and local actors engagement on the safety of the Asse II mine (used as a radioactive waste storage) in Germany through a citizen advisory group coupled to an expert group
o Contribution of civil society organisations to the re-assessment of copper canisters quality in the radioactive waste programme of SKB in Sweden
Case studies in other fields of activity:
o The hazardous waste incinerator of Dorog (Hungary) o The break of the barrier at the Aika bauxite mine near Kolontár, Hungary o The role of the Local Information and Dialogue Committees (Comité Locaux d’Information
et de Concertation - CLIC) in the development of Plans for Prevention of Technological Hazards (Plans de Prévention des Risques Technologiques – PPRT) in France
o Management of risks of hydro power plant dam destruction at the hydroelectrical power station Golica in Austria (on border with Slovenia) on the Bistrica River
The 3 case studies fully developed in this report have been chosen on the basis of the following criteria:
Importance of safety among the addressed issues: safety issues should play a significant role in the considered process of interaction with civil society.
Availability of information on how engagement of civil society contributed to safety
Variety of stakeholders engaged in the considered case and availability of a diversity of stakeholders to be interviewed
Participation options and organisation: how participation process was organised, was it formal, the extent (only public hearings, or more intensive role in the process), or informal pressures groups by civil society?
Participatory influence: how the proposals and comments were addressed and taken into account, how the decisions were changed?
Extent of safety discussion
The three selected case studies all present a developed safety dimension and a possibility to have access
to different stakeholders, both from civil society organisations, from regulators and from other involved
actors (experts and technical support organisations, industrial organisations, local actors,…).
The method used to develop the case studies has involved collection of written information (reports,
minutes of meetings, websites,…) and desk work as well as interviews with a variety of stakeholders
engaged in the cases. The analysis of the case studies (and the process of information collection
beforehand) has been carried out according to the grid of analysis previously developed in ECCSSafe9,
which focuses on the following themes:
Understanding of safety and safety culture
Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety
Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance
Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders
Trust
8 a short description of the 8 cases is available in ECCSSafe deliverable 1. 9 The complete grid of analysis and the interview guidelines are available in ECCSSafe deliverable
1: Theoretical and methodological framework.
8
3. THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE LOCAL INFORMATION COMMISSIONS ATTACHED TO
NUCLEAR SITES IN THE DECENNIAL SAFETY REVIEWS OF THE REACTORS OF
FESSENHEIM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (FRANCE)
3.1. Introduction
This case study deals with the engagement of civil society actors in the three successive decennial safety
reviews of the reactors of the French nuclear power plant of Fessenheim. It describes and analyses how
hybrid local dialogue organisations, the Local Information Commissions (Commissions Locales d’Information
– CLI), gathering local elected representatives, local civil society organisations, representatives of the
workers of the power plant and qualified personalities, commissioned external expert assessment of the
decennial safety reviews of Fessenheim power plant. It also describes how this local process is embedded
in a broader process of opening of the governance of nuclear activities to civil society in the French
context from the beginning of the 1980’s to the beginning of 2010’s (with strong evolutions in the decade
of the 2000’s).
After a description of the method of the case study, we will describe the institutional context related to
the engagement of civil society in nuclear activities and its evolutions. We will then describe the process
of engagement of the Local information commission of Fessenheim in the three successive decennial safety
reviews of reactors of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant from 1989 to 2012. We will then describe the
national process led by the Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire – ASN) and the Institute
for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire – IRSN)
from 2009 to facilitate the engagement of the engagement of the CLIs in the decennial safety reviews of
nuclear reactors. Finally, the case study will be analysed according to the common grid of analysis
developed earlier in the framework of ECCSSafe.
3.2. Method
This case study was developed on the basis of
Desk research based on written documentation available about the considered process (reports, guidelines, laws and regulations, websites of the local information commission of Fessenheim, of the ASN and the IRSN, …)
Interviews of actors or representatives of institutions having played a key role in the considered processes. These interviews were carried out in a semi-directive way, based on the grid of interviews previously developed in the framework of the project. The interviews were carried out in conditions of confidentiality: the outcomes of the interviews are presented as an integrated analysis, without revealing the content of the individual interviews.
The people interviewed were the following:
Monique Sené, member of the GSIEN and member of the Scientific Committee of the National Association of Local Information Commissions and Committees (ANCCLI)
Ludivine Gili, Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN)
Franck Bigot, Deputy Director of the Division for nuclear safety expertise, Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Institute (IRSN)
René Junker, Member of the Local Information Commission of Fessenheim
Sophie Letournel, Head of the ASN Division of Strasbourg (competent for the Fessenheim power plant)
It has not been possible to interview a representative of EDF, the operator of the Fessenheim power plant.
The collected information has then been analysed according to the grid of analysis previously developed in
the framework of the project.
9
3.3. Context of the case study
3.3.1. The Local Information Commissions in France
In France, Local Information Commissions (Commissions Locales d’Information – CLI) are attached to most
nuclear sites. These committees are pluralistic dialogue forums gathering various types of local actors
(elected representatives, social and economic actors, environmental NGOs, and qualified personalities) in
order to facilitate dialogue of local actors with public authorities and operators. The CLIs have a general
mission of follow-up of the activity of nuclear facilities, local dialogue on safety, radiation protection and
impact of nuclear activities on people and the environment, and of information of the public on these
issues. The IRSN, the ASN and the organisation operating the nuclear facility are regularly invited to the
meetings of the CLIs but are not members.
The first CLI was the Local Commission of Surveillance (CLS) of Fessenheim, created in 1977 for the
Fessenheim nuclear power plant. The circular of the Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy of 15th December 1981,
known as “Circulaire Mauroy” opened the way to the official creation of CLIs in the vicinity of nuclear
installations by Departmental Councils, by encouraging – but not making compulsory – their creation. The
2006 Law on transparency and security in the nuclear field made the existence of the CLIs compulsory
around all nuclear sites and included provisions on the organisation, role and funding of the CLIs and
reinforced the legal basis of their missions.
The Mauroy circular also provided for a conference of presidents of CLIs to be held at least once a year. In
2000, this conference was transformed in a permanent organisation: the National Association of Local
information Commissions and Committees (Association Nationale des Comités et Commissions Locales
d’Information – ANCCLI). The ANCCLI facilitates exchanges of information and common reflections
between CLIS, supports the CLIs (notably through the Scientific Committee), facilitates relationships with
IRSN and the ASN and give the CLIs a voice at the national level, notably through the annual conference of
CLIs and by issuing White Papers on various issues (e.g. governance of nuclear activities, radioactive waste
management, emergency and post-emergency preparedness and management, dismantling of nuclear
facilities). The ANCCLI also created permanent working groups on various issues of interest for the CLIs,
including safety, as a tool to facilitate exchanges between CLIs and support their work.
Between the creation of the CLI and the creation of the most recent one in 2001, about 30 CLIs were
created. They represent a diversity of contexts and experiences that sheds light on the issue of the
contribution of local actors to safety and health and environmental protection around nuclear sites.
3.3.2. The strategy for openness to society of the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
(IRSN)
Since 2003, the IRSN has continuously developed a strategy of openness to society that has contributed to
modify the way expertise is framed, developed and made available by the IRSN.
This process began in a national context of general evolutions of risk governance affecting all types of
hazardous activities since the 1990’s. This context was notably the result of several public health scandals
in France and Europe like the “mad cow crisis“ or the “contaminated blood crisis“. This notably raised
public expectations about transparency and openness of expertise processes and about separation
between expertise and decision-making and about the independence of expertise organisations. In the
nuclear field, these expectations notably led in 2002 to the creation of the IRSN enacted by Law as an
autonomous institution in the form an independent public technical and scientific institute.
This context of change in risk governance also included new legal requirements for transparency and
public participation. At the international level, the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters was signed in 1998 notably
by EU member states including France and also by the European Union. At the national level, the legal
10
context included legal provisions for transparency and participation both for environment-related
decisions in general and in the nuclear field in particular.
The IRSN thus wished to evolve from being a public expert organisation supporting the decision-making
processes of State organisations to a vision of public expertise that also included being an expert also
acting for the public. The IRSN’s strategy of openness to society aimed to reach this objective by
experimenting new relationships with stakeholders from the civil society, contributing to increase the
transparency of its expertise processes while supporting the development of the technical capacities of
those actors regarding nuclear safety and radiation protection.
The IRSN’s strategy developed continuously from 2003 to the present day, through several important
milestones. The first one was the creation, in 2003, of an internal tool to develop and implement the
strategy under the form of a dedicated department: the Department for Openness to Society. This
Department aimed to
being an access point for stakeholders from the civil society;
involving IRSN in European projects related to risk governance;
and supporting operational IRSN teams’ work in their interactions with stakeholders.
New relations with stakeholders were developed through an experimental approach relying on pilot
projects in which IRSN experts engaged interactions with stakeholders from the civil society on concrete
cases.
The inner tools for developing the IRSN’s strategy were complemented by a cooperation framework with
the CLIs and the ANCCLI. In 2003, a cooperation agreement was thus signed between the IRSN and the
ANCCLI, which included cooperation with the CLIs on pilot projects with local committees and the creation
of joint thematic working groups on topics of particular interest for the CLIs. This agreement is based on a
mutual understanding that the development of the skills of CLIs and ANCCLI is beneficiary for the CLIs &
ANCCLI, the IRSN and the regulator – the Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire – ASN).
The engagement of the IRSN towards openness to society was reaffirmed in 2006 at the occasion of the
renewal of performance agreement between the IRSN and the State. The new performance agreement
included “meeting the needs of other social and economic actors” as one of the four strategic axis of the
IRSN in the performance agreement.
The IRSN finally materialised its engagements under the form of a Charter of Openness to Society in a two-
step process. A first step was the participation of the IRSN to the process of development of a common
Charter of Openness to Society by several public scientific and technical institutes covering different fields
of activity. The IRSN and 3 other public scientific and technical institutes signed the common Charter in
October 2008. The second step was the development of the IRSN’s specific Charter of Openness to Society,
which was issued in April 2009.
The Charter of Openness to society, as well as other strategic documents like the IRSN’s performance
agreement, notably makes explicit the approach of safety underlying the IRSN’s strategy. In this approach,
civil society is incorporated in the safety system as an additional layer contributing to safety, moving from
a 3-pillar safety approach (organisations operating nuclear facilities, the regulator – the ASN, and public
experts – the IRSN) to a 4-pillar conception including civil society.
11
3.4. Presentation of the case study
3.4.1. The 3rd decennial review of nuclear reactors: a convergence between 2 process of engagement of
civil society at the national and at the local level
The engagement of the CLIs and the ANCCLI in the 3rd decennial safety review of Fessenheim nuclear
power plant reactors developed at the crossroads of two processes of engagement of civil society in
nuclear safety issues.
The first one, at the local level, is the process of engagement of the CLS (Local Information and Surveillance Commission – Commission Locale d’Information et de Surveillance) of Fessenheim and the independent expert group GSIEN (Scientific Group for Information on Nuclear Energy – Groupe Scientifique d’information sur l’énergie nucléaire) in the successive decennial safety reviews of Fessenheim nuclear power plant.
The second process, at the national level, is the development by the IRSN, the ANCCLI and some CLIs (including the CLS of Fessenheim), as a part of the strategy of openness to society of the IRSN, of a pilot case aiming to facilitate the engagement of CLIs and the ANCCLI in the 3rd decennial safety review of French nuclear reactors, and the development of national guidelines by the ASN to facilitate the engagement of CLIs in the decennial safety review of nuclear reactors.
3.4.2. Engagement of the CLS of Fessenheim and GSIEN in decennial safety reviews
3.4.2.1. Engagement of the CLS in the 1st decennial safety review
In 1989, the Fessenheim nuclear power plant underwent the first decennial safety review of its two
reactors Fessenheim 1 and 2. At this occasion, in the framework of its mission of follow-up of the activities
of the nuclear power plant, the CLS of Fessenheim wished to have an independent opinion on the safety of
Fessenheim nuclear reactor 1.
On 14th April 1989, following a proposition made by the President of the CLS, the Department Council of
Haut-Rhin commissioned and funded a group of French and foreign experts (including members of the NGO
“French Group of Scientists for Information on Nuclear Energy” – Groupement des Scientifiques pour
l’Information sur l’Energie Nucléaire, GSIEN) to perform a safety assessment of the nuclear power plant at
the occasion of the shutdown of reactor 1.
This pluralistic group was composed of 5 expert: Christian Kuppers et Lothar Hahn (Institut of Ecology of
Darmstadt, Germany), Jochen Benecke (Institut Sollner and University of Munich, Germany), Luc Gillon
(University of Louvain and Center for Nuclear Studies – SCK-CEN – of Mol, Belgium) and Raymond Sené
(CNRS - Collège de France and member of the GSIEN), and 2 associated consultants : Patrick Petitjean
(GSIEN) and Michèle Rivasi (CRII-Rad NGO, France).
This pluralistic expert group performed its work from 11th May to 18th September 198910. The works of the
pluralistic expert group notably included 3 working meetings with experts from EDF, the SCSIN and the
DRIRE, in presence of experts from the Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety – IPSN) as well as a visit
of the reactor building. The final report of the expert group was presented on to the CLS 18th September
1989 with presence of the press.
The expert group reported good working relations with the regulators (Central service for safety of nuclear
facilities – SCSIN, and Regional direction of industry & research – DRIRE), which accepted to participate to
working meetings, to answer the expert group’s questions and to give access to safety documents.
However, this first citizen assessment of the safety of reactors Fessenheim 1 and 2 was also characterised
by initial reluctance of EDF, the electricity company operating the power plant, to recognize the expert
group, meet the group directly and allow access to some documents. This reluctance has been partially
overcome during the expert group’s mission and the expert group finally had access to some safety
10 A complete description of the mission of the expert group is available (in French) in issue 98/99 of
GSIEN’s journal “La Gazette Nucléaire” (year 1989), in the article “Fessenheim, 10 years already”:
http://www.gazettenucleaire.org/1989/98_99p03.html
12
documents of EDF and experts from EDF took part to some working meetings with the pluralistic expert
group.
The conclusions11 of the pluralistic expert group stressed that, within the time and resources that were
available and with the fragmentary pieces of information at its disposal, the expert mission has tried to
form an opinion on the adequacy of the safety requirements of the actions performed during the ten-year
review, without being able to engage in a comprehensive expertise and a comprehensive study.
In its conclusions, the expert group considered necessary that EDF give more attention to safety checks
before restarting of the reactors and give further attention to safety issues including those related to
accident beyond design basis. It also regretted that a number of improvements could not been made
before restarting the reactor and recommended that these improvements can be made as quickly as
possible.
The expert group made 3 specific recommendations for safety improvement (based on comparison with
what exists in pressurized water reactors – PWR – of similar design):
Protection of nuclear fuel storage pool by a roof resistant to falling objects that may damage the fuel
Installation in the reactor building of a number of devices for measuring hydrogen that may be released in case of an accident beyond design basis (i.e. of a greater magnitude that the accidents scenarios taken into account in the design of the power plant).
Installation of fans in the reactor building to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen in the vicinity of the discharge cover of the pressurizer and neighbouring premises
The expert group also proposed several improvements in the system of monitoring of the environment of
the nuclear site as well as provisions to improve the protection of workers.
Considering the limitation of its works, the expert group concluded that it was able to make
recommendations to improve safety without allowing it to give a blank check. In these circumstances, the
expert mission considered it should not recommend postponement of the restarting of reactor Fessenheim
1.
In addition to the delivery of a report addressed to the CLS, the mission of the expert group was also
followed up by the CLS and its conclusions were presented ad discussed during a plenary meeting of the
CLS.
3.4.2.2. Engagement of the CLS in the 2nd decennial safety review
At the occasion of the 2nd decennial safety review, in 1999 the GSIEN was solicited anew by the CLS for
Fessenheim reactors 1, and accepted to carry out an external expertise on safety and environmental
impacts. The mission of the GSIEN was co-funded by the Departmental Council of Haut-Rhin and the ASN
and was organised after the 2nd decennial safety review. The mission given to the GSIEN was to give an
expert opinion on the safety of the nuclear reactor and on its environmental impacts based on the safety
case prepared by EDF and the safety report produced by the regulator as a result of the safety review.
To ensure better access of GSIEN to information than for the 1st decennial safety review, a convention was
signed between the ASN, EDF and the CLS. This convention ensured both the access of the experts from
GSIEN to the EDF’s safety case for the decennial safety review and confidentiality of commercially
sensitive information by non-divulgation clauses.
In order to facilitate information exchange, different technical meetings between EDF and the GSIEN were
organised on various issues:
steam generators,
11 A summary of the expert group’s conclusions is available (in French) in issue 98/99 of GSIEN’s journal
“La Gazette Nucléaire” (year 1989), in the article “Fessenheim, 10 years already”:
http://www.gazettenucleaire.org/1989/98_99p03.html
13
radiation protection of workers,
reactor vessel
containment building.
Due to this more structured framework, the GSIEN found the working condition be more satisfying than for
the 1st decennial safety review. However, GSIEN still pointed out a too constrained time frame to perform
a complete and thorough assessment of EDF’s safety file.
The GSIEN delivered its report to the CLS on 6th March 2000. In the report, the GSIEN stressed the
convergence between its own conclusions and the outcomes of the safety review of the regulator. It
pointed out different points related to:
the resistance of the reactor vessel
the analysis of incidents occurred since 1989
the catalogue of situations where the primary water circuit and the use of this catalogue
how the conclusions of the regulator resulting from the 1st decennial safety review were taken into account
The GSIEN concludes, as did the regulator, that the guarantee of a safe operation of the reactor up to 40
years (i.e. for 20 more years) is not demonstrated. The GSIEN also concludes that the operation of the
reactor for 10 more years can be done under satisfying safety conditions, under the condition of more
regular monitoring and good return of experience.
The expertise report of the GSIEN stressed that the conclusions of the pluralistic expert group
commissioned by the CLS during the 1st decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 1 led to additional
controls and improved the safety of the reactor. In particular, EDF has equipped the reactor buildings with
hydrogen recombiners to lower the risk of explosions due to hydrogen discharge. This modification was
made not only on Fessenheim reactors, but also in all nuclear power plants in France.
However, the GSIEN also pointed out that some points of concern expressed by the pluralistic expert group
during the 1st decennial safety visit were still not taken into account:
need to prove the resistance of the reactor building to an explosion
need to fix the opening device on the depressurisation valve of the reactor vessel
resistance of the nuclear fuel storage building to external aggressions
vulnerability of the facility to flooding.
In addition to the delivery of a report addressed to the CLS, the mission of the expert group was also
followed up by the CLS and its conclusions were presented ad discussed during a plenary meeting of the
CLS.
The GSIEN was solicited again one year later for the safety review of reactor Fessenheim 2, under similar
conditions (expertise carried out just after the decennial safety review of the reactor, funding from the
Departmental Council of Haut-Rhin, signature of a convention with EDF and the regulator and technical
meetings with EDF). The GSIEN was asked to deliver an opinion on the safety of the reactor – but not on its
environmental impacts.
The GSIEN report included opinions on the following points:
Monitoring of the reactor vessel resistance
Reactor containment structure
Seismic and flooding risks
Analysis of significant incidents
Mechanical aspects
Neutron flux
The GIEN concluded that, if they do not share EDF’s opinion in some cases, they acknowledge the efforts
made by the operating company to ensure the safety of the reactor, understand phenomena of ageing
under irradiation, and analyse incidents. They concluded that, it would be essential to reassess the
14
resistance of the reactor vessel after 25 years in order to follow-up the defects discovered during the 2nd
decennial safety visit.
The GSIEN finally included an estimation of the human resources that were necessary for the GSIEN’s to
carry out its expert assessment: 60 person-days, i.e. approximately 15 days of works for 4 experts.
Here again, the works of the GSIEN were followed-up by the CLS and their outcomes were subject of
presentations and discussion during a plenary meeting of the CLS.
3.4.2.3. Engagement of the CLS in the 3rd decennial safety review
At the occasion of the 3rd decennial safety review, the local commission of Fessenheim, nom named CLIS
(Local Commission of Information and Surveillance) commissioned anew in 2008 the GSIEN in 2008 to carry
out a complementary safety assessment.
This assessment was carried out under a different legal context than ten years before. In effect, the 2006
Law on Transparency and Safety in nuclear activities (TSN Law) makes compulsory the existence of one CLI
for each nuclear site, gives the chairmanship of the CLI to the Departmental Council, précises the
composition of the CLI members, and defines the mission of CLIs as a “general gives the CLI a general
mission of follow-up, information and dialogue on nuclear safety, radiation protection and impact of
nuclear activities on people and the environment as regards the activities of the site”. In this new legal
and regulatory framework, the activities of the CLIs are co-funded by the Departmental Council and by the
ASN.
Moreover, the public technical support organisation on nuclear safety and radiation protection (and
technical support of the ASN) had changed its status in 2002, becoming and fully independent institute,
the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté
Nucléaire – IRSN). Since 2003, the IRSN has engaged in a strategy of openness to society (see subsection
“context of the case study” above), which included support to activities of various CLIs and their national
association, the ANCCLI.
The first step has been the negotiation and signature of a convention (see Annex 2) between the
Department Council of Haut-Rhin, the ASN, the GSIEN and one expert commissioned by the Scientific
Committee of the ANCCLI, David Boilley, nuclear physicist and member of the Association for monitoring of
radioactivity in the West of France (Association pour le Contrôle de la Radioactivité dans l’Ouest – ACRO).
This convention set the perimeter of the experts’ mission, which was composed of the following themes:
Follow-up of the 2nd decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 1: assessment of the outcomes of the 2nd decennial safety review and lessons for the 3rd decennial safety review.
Reactor vessel
Fatigue defects
Reactor containment structure
Analysis of significant safety events and influence on safety
Nuclear fuel
The convention also fixed the costs of the expert group mission (50 000 euros) and their funding (50%
funding from the Departmental Council, 50% from the ASN). Finally, the convention set the confidentiality
conditions for the access to EDF’s documents: the expert group has access to EDF’s documents related to
the object of the expertise and commits not to reveal any document which is confidential according to the
provisions of the TSN Law12. According to the convention, the Departmental Council and the CLIS are
bound by the same engagement.
The way the mission was organised was also different than for the previous decennial reviews, as the time
frame of the experts mission was considerably extended compared to the first 2 decennial safety reviews,
and was larger than the time frame of the decennial safety review carried out by the ASN. The mission of
the expert group formally began on January 2009 according to the convention and ended in June 2010,
12 article 19 of the Law
15
while the decennial review lasted from 17th October 2009 to 25th March 2010. The mission of the expert
group was organised in the following way:
3 preparatory meetings of the expert group from 25th March 2009 to 8th June 2009
5 technical meetings with the expert group, the ASN and EDF on Fessenheim nuclear power plant site from 28th September 2009 to 12th May 2010. During some of these meetings, visits of the expert group in different parts of the nuclear power plants were organised, including a visit of the reactor building on 21st December 2009. The last two meetings were dedicated respectively to a debrief of the decennial safety review carried out by the ASN (25th March 2010), and to the statistical study of the incident which occurred between the end of the previous decennial review (2000) and the current one (2009)
The report of the expert group was issued on June 2010.
Beyond the technical meetings with the ASN and EDF, the expert group also had access, as an
experimental process (see section about “the IRSN pilot case on 3rd decennial safety reviews” below), to
the expertise o the IRSN. In effect, the IRSN gave the GSIEN access to its report on the 3rd decennial safety
review of the 900 MWE reactors in France13. This helped the expert group to refine its questions.
The works of the expert group were followed up by the CLIS and their outcomes were presented to the
CLIS and discussed during a plenary meeting of the CLIS.
All interviewees reported good working relations between the expert group, EDF and the ASN and stressed
the full commitment of EDF to facilitate the work of the expert group and give access to all requested
information (as stressed in the conclusions of the final report of the expert group). The CLIS underlined
that the way the expertise was carried out represented “the maximum that could be done” in this kind of
independent expertise process.
The expert group conclusions included various points related to the different topics addressed by the
expert group (as fixed in the convention). The general conclusion14 of the expert group was that “the
analysis of the files and of the answers given by both the operator and its technical support do not reveal
alarming factors, even if points concerning the maintenance, realization of works, training should be
better taken into account and be greatly improved.
However, some questions remain:
- For example, the resistance of the foundation raft in a severe accident sequence remains an important issue, and that to the extent the probability of such accidents would increase due to the general aging of the facility and the increased combustion rate of fuels.
- The waste issue, for those without disposal route and whose storage on site is not necessarily compatible with the geography of this site (flood risk, for example).
- The increase in releases of Tritium correlated to the switch to Cyclade fuel that drives the increased use of boron.
- The problems inherent in a system built with equipment designed more than 40 years ago. The rejuvenation of some equipment may create conflicts between existing technologies and those of 60-70 years.”
According to the GSIEN, the IRSN and the ASN, there was no significant divergence between the
conclusions of the expert group and the conclusions of the decennial safety review carried out by the ASN.
Following the 3rd decennial safety review ad the mission of the expert group, EDF reinforced the
foundation raft of the reactors and demonstrated that this reinforcement increased to 3 days (compared
to 12 hours before the reinforcement) the time in which the raft would be bored in case of a core
meltdown.
13 This report deals with the generic safety of French 900 MWE reactors and is not specific to a particular
facility. It assesses possible safety issues and points of attention for all the reactors of similar design. 14 See the final report of the expert group, available (in French) at: http://www.anccli.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Rapport-final-1-VD3-FSH-1.pdf
16
At the occasion of the 3rd decennial review of reactor Fessenheim 2 (carried out from 16th April 2011 to 6th
March 2012), the Departmental Council and the ANS commissioned and funded an expertise mission of the
GSIEN, on proposal of the CLIS, under similar terms and conditions as for the 3rd decennial review of
reactor Fessenheim 1. During the year 2011, the convention, similar to the one signed for Fessenheim 1,
was negotiated and signed between the GSIEN, EDF, ASN and the CLIS. The expertise carried out by the
GSIEN dealt with the following issues:
• Reactor vessel (aging of the vessel and follow-up of the vessel’s defects)
• Fatigue defects
• New steam generators (the steam generators were replaced by new ones at the occasion of the shutdown of the reactor for the decennial safety review)
• Confinement building
The mission of the GSIEN lasted from August 2011 to June 2012. The works of the experts were organised
in a similar way as for the 3rd decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 1. This process included
different technical meetings with EDF and the ASN as well as field visits.
The GSIEN concluded that “the files of the ASN, the IRSN, EDF and its technical support does not reveal
alarming factors and explains the restart authorization for 1 year to reactor Fessenheim 2.
However, the GSIEN stressed that some questions remain:
the control of the training of workers, the control of the realization of projects (quality of work sheets), monitoring of radiation protection (see ASN inspection follow-up letters);
the resistance of the foundation raft in a serious accident sequence remains a major question: GSIEN was not the recipient of technical records on this topic. A thickening of the concrete of the raft is under consideration. However, the GSIEN, in the state of his knowledge of the case, is not convinced that this operation can be performed because this thickening, requested for many years and still undergoing analysis, should absolutely be done before the end of June 2013.
Regarding the 3rd decennial safety review, the GSIEN expects the requirements that the ASN will issue to
allow or not the continued operation of Fessenheim 2, those requirements being expected for the end of
2012. GSIEN will analyse them for the CLIS.
Following the Fukushima accident, additional requirements should be available end of June 2012,
concerning among other things, protection against floods and the reassessment of seismic risk.”
In effect, the 3rd decennial safety review of reactor Fessenheim 2 as carried out after the Fukushima
accident, at a time when all European nuclear reactors underwent “stress tests” asked by the European
Commission.
Here again, interviews members of the GSIEN, the CLIS, the IRSN and the ASN noted a strong convergence
between the conclusions of the GSIEN and the conclusions of the ASN report on the decennial safety
review.
3.4.3. A national process from 2009 to facilitate the engagement of the CLIs and the ANCCLI in the
decennial safety reviews of French nuclear reactors
3.4.3.1. The ASN guidelines on the engagement of CLIs in the 3rd decennial safety review of
nuclear reactors
In parallel to the joint works of the IRNS, the ANCCLI and some CLIs, the regulator (ASN) has also prepared
“Guidelines on the engagement of the CLIs in the 3rd decennial safety reviews of 900 MWE reactors”, in
cooperation with the “Openness to society” unit of the IRSN. This document, issued as official guidelines
of the ASN, was first presented to the CLIs at the 21st annual national conference of CLIS on 9th December
2009; its final version was issued on 1st June 2010. These guidelines were prepared based on the
experience of the CLS of Fessenheim with the 3rd decennial safety visit of reactor 1, and on dialogue with
the CLIS and the ANCCLI, notably at the occasion of the 21st national conference of CLIs.
17
These guidelines are intended for the CLIs and aim to help them organising their engagement in the 3rd
decennial safety reviews and organise, if they would wish so, a pluralistic expertise. The document also
proposes guidelines for organising dialogue between the ASN, the CLIs and the organisation operating a
nuclear power plant.
The guidelines distinguishes three different possible levels of engagements fro the CLIs:
1. A simple information of the CLI by the ASN, which can be completed by presentations of the works carried out on specific themes
2. The organisation of a pluralistic expertise on a particular theme 3. The organisation of a pluralistic expertise on the whole decennial safety review, like the one
carried out by the GSIEN on the 3rd decennial review of Fessenheim nuclear power plant.
In the case of pluralistic expertise, the guidelines notably recommend to have a clear contractual
framework between the Department Council, the organisation operating the nuclear power plant, the ASN
and the experts. The convention signed between the Department Council of Haut-Rhin, the nuclear power
plant, the ASN and the experts for the 3rd decennial safety review of reactor 1 is proposed as a model of
such contractual framework. The ASN stresses that, according to the current legal framework, pluralistic
expertise processes carried out by the CLIs can be co-funded by the ASN for half the expenses.
The ASN included in its guidelines an indicative list of themes that can be included in the scope of
pluralistic expertise processes with propositions of independent experts that could be mobilised on each
theme. The guideline also includes a non-exhaustive list of themes on which the ASN can organise
information of the CLIs.
3.4.3.2. The IRSN pilot case on 3rd decennial safety reviews
In 2006, the national public debate on the EPR reactors developed in France raised issues concerning the
access of civil society to information and technical documents covered by industrial secret or secret
defence. As a result, the High Committee on Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety (HCTISN)15
recommended new procedures for improved access to information be tested on concrete cases.
In the framework of its policy of openness to society, the IRSN decided to take the 3rd decennial safety
review of Fessenheim 1 reactor as a pilot case to assess how the IRSN can facilitate the engagement of
CLIs in the process of the 3rd decennial safety review of French nuclear reactors. This pilot case took place
in a context of already existing cooperation between the CLIs, the ANCCLI and the IRSN through various
pilot cases and through joint working groups. The pilot process for the 3rd decennial safety review of
reactor Fessenheim 3 pursued three objectives:
to build upstream technical discussion with the Local Committees and experimenting procedures for the CLIs to access the operator’s safety reports;
to support capacity building for the CLIs in the perspective of the 3rd decennial safety review of nuclear reactors in France;
improving the IRSN’s knowledge of the expectations of the CLIs for the 3rd decennial safety reviews.
The method developed in this pilot case relied on a national working group including the IRSN, 4 CLIs
(Fessenheim, Gravelines, Blayais and Dampierre), the ANCCLI, EDF and the ASN. Access to information and
documentation was already guaranteed by the convention signed between EDF, the ASN, the CLIS of
15 The HCTISN was created by the 2006 Law on Transparency and safety of nuclear activities. It has a
mission of information, dialogue and debate on the risks associated to nuclear activities and the impact of
these activities on human health, the environment and nuclear safety. The HCTISN can issue opinions on
any issue in these fields as well as on the associated controls and information. It can also take up any
question related to accessibility of information on nuclear safety and make proposals aiming to
guaranteeing or improving transparency.
18
Fessenheim and the experts commissioned by the CLIS at the occasion of the 3rd decennial safety review
(see page Hiba! A könyvjelző nem létezik.).
The pilot case was developed between April 2009 and November 2010 and relied on 2 tools or forums of
exchange: the above-mentioned national working group and a final seminar involving a larger number of
CLIs and of participants. The IRSN took preliminary contacts with CLIs in April 2009. The national working
group involved in the project was then formed.
A second step in the cooperation process has the preparation of an independent review of the IRSN’s
safety report by an independent expert group (GSIEN) commissioned by the Fessenheim CLIS. The IRSN
sent its safety report to the GSIEN on May 2009.
In December 2009, the working group identified specific topics of interest for the CLIs in the 3rd decennial
safety review process.
In March 2010, a presentation of the IRSN’s safety report on Fessenheim nuclear power plant was made
available for the working group.
The final step of the process consisted in preparing and organising the final seminar of the project. From
May to June 2010, the national working group identified the topics to be addressed in the final seminar
and prepared the programme of the seminar.
The final seminar of the pilot case was organised in November 2010 and gathered about 35 people,
including participants from 10 CLIs as well as the ANCCLI. The programme of the seminar was organised
along two topics of particular interest for the CLIs:
How to implement an independent expert assessment of a decennial safety review at site level?
How can the CLIs perform a follow-up of the facility after the decennial safety review?
Three types of experts were involved in the cooperation process: the experts of the IRSN, experts from an
independent scientific group (GSIEN) commissioned by the CLI of Fessenheim, and other experts involved
in the decennial safety assessment (operator EDF, Nuclear safety Authority – ASN). Each of these 3 types of
experts had a specific role in the process:
The IRSN provided information to the CLIs and the ANCCLI on the safety assessment of the nuclear reactor of Fessenheim, in particular by making available the IRSN’s safety report;
The GSIEN provided independent expert review of the IRSN’s safety report;
EDF and the ASN provided insights on specific issues (stakes of safety assessment for EDF, regulator’s perspective for the ASN).
The CLIs and the ANCCLI took part in the process as civil society actors with particular awareness of
nuclear safety issues. In the process, their role was to
Contribute to the framing of the issues addressed in the decennial safety review;
Take benefit of the interactions with different types of experts in terms of empowerment and capacity to engage in the process of the 3rd decennial safety review.
Civil society actors involved in the process were essentially members of the CLIs and of the ANCCLI. The
members of CLIS and of the ANCCLI taking part to the national working group had access to information on
the safety review of the Fessenheim reactors by different ways:
access to the IRSN’s safety report
access to the independent analysis of the IRSN’s safety report made by the GSIEN
exchanges with the IRSN, the operator of the reactors (EDF) and the Nuclear Safety Authority within the national working group
final seminar of the project.
A broader range of CLI members (from 10 CLIs) had access to information on the safety review process
through the final seminar of the project.
19
The cooperation process resulted in competence building for the members of the working group. This
includes the participating CLIs but also the IRSN, which improved its understanding of the stakes of the
CLIs in the decennial review process and enhanced its capacity to interact with them in the decennial
review processes for other reactors.
The process thus enabled the CLIs and the IRSN to identify topics of particular interest for the CLIs during
a periodic safety review. In particular, this cooperation led the CLIs and IRSN to identify and share the
CLIs’ needs for playing an active, meaningful and effective role in decennial safety review:
Access to technical trainings
Information sharing between CLIs
Dialogue forums between CLIs and with the institutional actors of periodic safety reviews (IRSN, Nuclear Safety Authority, operator)
Access to diversified expert support resources: IRSN, Scientific Committee of the ANCCLI, independent expert, …
The specifications of the safety review for Fessenheim nuclear power plant were also adapted as a result
of the cooperation process.
Finally, at the end of the process, some CLIs considered continuing the process in an autonomous way in
the context of the 3rd decennial safety reviews of the French nuclear power plants. As a consequence, the
IRSN continued to engage with the CLIs and the ANCCLI on the issue of decennial safety reviews through
meeting with different working groups of the ANCCLI and discussions with the ANCCLI on the ways the IRSN
can support the engagement of the CLIs in the decennial safety reviews. The ANCCLI is currently defining
with the IRSN the issues on which it wished to engage in the framework of the 4th decennial safety visits of
French nuclear reactors.
3.4.3.3. The IRSN-ANCCLI seminar on human and organisational factors
Following the Fukushima catastrophe (11th March 2011), it appeared that this accident was due not only to
a natural disaster, but also to human and organisational factors16. This led the CLI and the ANCCLI to pay
particular attention to the human and organisational factors in safety.
On 18th June 2013, the IRSN and the ANCCLI organised a seminar17 for the members of the different CLIs on
this theme. The objective of this seminar was to facilitate the building and reinforcement of the
competences of CLIs on this issue and organise exchanges between the different stakeholders (IRSN, ASN,
EDF, HCTISN and CLIs). The seminar gathered about 60 people, including 40 members from 20 CLIs.
This seminar enabled the participants to share information on the history of how human and organisational
factors have been taken into account in the expertise on nuclear safety, identify themes to further
investigate following the Fukushima accident and discuss issues like competence management or
subcontracting.
16 The Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) set up by the Japanese Parliament
to investigate the Fukushima accident concluded that Fukushima was a “manmade” disaster (see
executive summary of the commission’s report on
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/NAIIC_report_lo_res10.pdf). 17 The programme of the seminar and the support documents of the different presentations made are
available on the IRSN website: http://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Nucleaire_et_societe/expertise-
pluraliste/IRSN-ANCCLI/Pages/2-Seminaire-Juin-2013-Facteurs-organisationnels-humains-surete-
nucleaire.aspx
20
3.5. Analysis of the case study
3.5.1. Understanding of safety and safety culture
Both the documentation and the interviews show that all involved actors (EDF, the ASN, the IRSN, the CLIS
of Fessenheim and the experts it had commissioned) share a common understanding of safety as a
continuous improvement process.
The understanding of the role of the civil society in this process evolved through time between the first
decennial safety review of Fessenheim 1 reactor in 1989 to the end of the expertise mission of the GSIEN
on the decennial safety review of Fessenheim 2 reactor. Initially being an initiative of the local actors, the
engagement of the CLIS of Fessenheim in the decennial safety reviews now has become something usual.
The experts commissioned by the CLIS of Fessenheim had a high level of technical qualification and
demonstrated the capacity of civil society to produce sound competent and precise assessment of
technical safety issues with nuanced conclusions. They played both a role of expertise and of mediation,
conveying the results of their expertise to the CLIS in an understandable way. The CLIS represented a
second level of mediation as it gave account of the outcomes of the expertise of the GSIEN to the general
public through its information tools (website and newsletter) in a form accessible to the general public.
The engagement of the CLIS of Fessenheim and of the experts it commissioned for the first and second
decennial safety review had an actual impact of safety as it led to some technical modifications of the
facility and to adaptations of its monitoring programme. For the 3rd decennial safety review, there is a
convergence of views between the CLIS, the GSIEN, the IRSN and the ASN on the fact that the engagement
of the GSIEN did not bring up safety issues that would not have been detected by EDF or the ASN assisted
by its technical support organisation, the IRSN. However, the engagement of civil society played a role of
stretching and led the IRSN and ASN to better explain and justify their assessments. Two quotes from the
interviews18 illustrate this assessment of the role of civil society:
“A virtuous process which challenges everyone to better express and explain one’s positions”
“It is good to have an external glance on the way safety is managed in the nuclear facilities, in
order to cope with the fact every human system generates habituation”
In the current French nuclear safety system, there is a shared understanding between the CLIS and the
ANCCLI, the ASN and the IRSN that the first responsible of the safety of nuclear power plants are the
organisations operating them (in the case of France, EDF), which is then complemented by the ASN (and
its technical support organisation, the IRSN) as a second layer of safety, the engagement of civil society in
safety issue representing a third layer of safety in this system which plays a specific role of quality
insurance, both from the point of view of institutional players and from the one of civil society. The
engagement of the CLIs on the nuclear safety reviews, which was an unexpected initiative form the CLS of
Fessenheim in 1989, now appears as a normal and desirable component of the process of the decennial
safety visits and is supported by both the regulator (ASN) and its technical support organisation (IRSN).
In the framework of this case study, it was not possible to determine if EDF also shares or not this
understanding of the safety system where civil society (and in particular the CLIs and the ANCCLI)
constitutes a fourth pillar of nuclear safety. What can be traced in the interviews and documents is the
evolution of EDF’s attitude along the successive decennial safety reviews, from reluctance to acknowledge
the initiative of the local commission of Fessenheim to a full cooperation and extended and regular
dialogue with the local commission and its experts. According to all interviewees, EDF is fully “playing the
game” of the engagement of the CLIs in the decennial safety reviews and contributed to create an
enabling environment for the CLIs by giving access to its documents and make its own experts available for
meetings and exchanges with the CLIS and its experts.
18 The method of the interviews includes an engagement of confidentiality on the content of individual
interviews. The interviewees are therefore not identified in the quotes.
21
This shared understanding of civil society as a component of the safety system (at least shared between
the CLIs and ANCCLI, the ASN and the IRSN) is the outcome of a co-evolution process between civil society
and the institutions responsible for safety. This co-evolution process, which deployed both at the local and
at the national level, combines the progressive engagement of civil society organisation in safety issues,
which becomes more and more structured, with the evolution of the institutional framework, which
becomes more and more supportive to the engagement of civil society. In this process, both civil society
and nuclear safety institutions progressively experienced and acknowledged the benefits of civil society
engagement for safety and for the clarity and transparency of the safety system.
Beyond the contribution of civil society to safety itself, the interviewees also identified the engagement of
civil society in safety issues as a factor improving transparency of the safety system and mutual
understanding between EDF, the ASN, the IRSN and civil society organisations. The integrity and quality of
the work of the IRSN, ASN and CLIs is not questioned by any side. Finally, confronting the assessment of
the ASN and the IRSN to external expert scrutiny also contributed to demonstrate the independence of
these organisations.
3.5.2. Definition of safety as a public affair
In the considered case, the relationship between EDF, the regulator, its technical support organisation and
civil society actors is structured around a common good recognised by all: ensuring that existing reactors
operate at the best safety level. All actors share the view that safety is not granted once for all and
requires permanent vigilance and improvement. Institutional actors (the ASN and the IRSN) note that civil
society organisations actively engage in safety issues and that dialogue on safety of existing nuclear power
plants between civil society organisations, EDF the ASN and the IRSN can be organised whatever the
position of these civil society organisations vis-à-vis nuclear energy.
The fact that nuclear energy production is recognised as a public affair in (e.g. an activity having
consequences on other actors than the ones carrying out the activity, thus giving ground for these actors
to influence the activity) and the consideration of safety as a common good is reflected in the institution
of the CLIs, which are at the same time dialogue forums where safety issues can be discussed between all
the concerned stakeholders and organisations capable of taking action (e.g. by commissioning non-
institutional experts to analyse the safety of the reactors at the occasion of decennial safety reviews), this
action being supported by the IRSN and the ASN.
The process of decennial safety reviews also showed an agreement between all actors on the basis of
safety assessment and on what should be investigated.
The access to information and expertise for the CLIS and the experts it commissioned has been improved
from one decennial safety review to the next one through the three successive decennial safety reviews.
Starting from a point where the access to the documents of EDF was a subject of tensions during the first
decennial safety review, the safety system (including the CLIS and its experts) has created a framework
enabling access to EDF’s documentation as well as a facilitated access of civil society to the expertise of
the IRSN and of the ASN. For the third decennial safety review, this framework set a time frame that
accommodates the limitations and constraints of civil society experts. All actors now consider this
framework and the associated practices of work satisfactory, although the limited number of available
independent exerts still constitutes a limiting factor.
3.5.3. Governance
The governance framework in which the engagement of civil society on safety issues took place has
evolved from 1989 to 2012. This evolution has been a result of both the engagement of the civil society
and of the willingness of institutions (including the Parliament) to open the governance of nuclear society
to civil society actors. This evolution included both local and national components:
At the local level, the conventions between EDF, the CLIS and the ASN have clarified the
22
conditions of work and of access to information of the expert commissioned by the CLIs of Fessenheim and the conditions of interaction between EDF, the ASN, the IRSN, the CLIS of Fessenheim and the experts commissioned by the CLIS.
At the national level, the Mauroy circular of 1981 gave a first institutional framework for the creation of CLIs, which was reinforced and clarified with the 2006 Law on transparency and safety of nuclear activities. This Law grants a precise role of information and follow-up of nuclear activities to the CLIs and the ANCCLI.
Organisations like the ANCCLI (which gives a voice to the CLIs at the national level and facilitates inter-CLI dialogue) and processes like the pilot process developed by the IRSN o the decennial safety visits enables to establish links between the local and the national levels in this governance framework.
Beyond the formal governance framework, a steady cooperation has developed between the CLIs and the
ANCCLI, the IRSN and the ASN. This cooperation goes far beyond the sole issue of safety reviews of nuclear
reactors and encompasses a wide diversity of other issues: radioactive waste management, post-accident
situations, decommissioning of nuclear facilities, …
The building of working practices with EDF, the IRSN and the ASN on the decennial safety reviews have
been facilitated by the monopolistic position of EDF as the operator of all French nuclear power plants.
3.5.4. Controversies and co-framing
No controversies were identified by the CLIS, the GSIEN, the ANCCLI, the IRSN and the ASN in the process
of decennial safety reviews. The issues addressed were of technical nature plus the issue of human and
organisational factors affecting safety.
The interviewees stressed that they observed, over decades, a progressive separation between the debate
on nuclear energy and the debate on safety of existing reactors, and a capacity to avoid pro/anti nuclear
polarisation of debates. One of the interviewees however noted that the debate on the extension of the
lifetime of French nuclear reactors is now reconnecting the issues of the debate on nuclear energy and the
issue of nuclear safety, while this does not impede constructive discussions on safety.
In a landscape where a diversity of positions exist vis-à-vis nuclear energy, the CLIs and the ANCCLI aim to
constitute independent information relays with a critical eye between the public and the regulator, the
public expert (the IRSN) and the operator of nuclear reactors (EDF). In the case of Fessenheim, this
independence has been well supported by the capacity of the CLIS to commission a sound external
assessment of the safety review.
3.5.5. Trust
Through the successive decennial safety reviews, EDF and the other institutional actors of safety have
demonstrated have been demonstrated that civil society actors are capable of constructive interactions.
The convergence between the safety assessment of the ASN, IRSN and CLI/ANCCLI reinforces the
credibility of IRSN and ASN. This did not damage the credibility of the CLIs and ANCCLI as the experts
commissioned by the CLIS were capable of a precise safety assessment, and pointed out different points of
improvement of safety.
The engagement of civil society played a role of quality insurance for the safety system and reinforced the
trustworthiness and robustness of the safety system as a whole and contributed to the transparency and
readability of the safety system. In particular, the interactions between the CLIs and the IRSN and the ASN
at the occasion of the 3rd decennial safety review (both the process in Fessenheim and the national pilot
case developed by the IRSN) resulted in an improvement of the information delivered by these two
organisations, which adapted their communication to better fit the needs of the civil society and the
public.
23
Finally, the testing of procedures and processes for access of experts commissioned by civil society to
classified information and documentation of EDF has validated these procedures and processes, and first
of all the very principle that an expert mandated by civil society can access under these condition to
documents that cannot be made available to the public. This reinforces the transparency of the safety
system, which is a factor of reinforcement of trust in this system.
24
4. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATOR OF DOROG (HUNGARY)
4.1. Introduction
Chapter 1 of this case study is concerning the brief history of incinerator in the town of Dorog. There are
several factors why we have chosen Dorog as the subject of this study, for instance the civil participation
was really active before and after the Hungarian regime change, so this is an ongoing civil (“watchdog”)
control. According to the history of Dorog, Chapter 1 is dealing with several safety problems of more than
25 years: illegal waste storage and respiratory diseases; emission and slag problems; “waste of Garé”;
serious water pollution.
Chapter 2 is relating to the role of Environmental Protection Association of Dorog (EPAD): we are
elaborating the aims of public participation, analyzing the tools and strategies of the Association, which
has changed a lot during the operation of the incinerator.
Chapter 3 is about the experiences of the interviews. Several important conclusions can be drawn:
From the late 1980s (before the Hungarian regime change) to the early 2000s the strategy of the local NGO can be characterized by massive civil resistance, pressure on the incinerator and environmental authorities, demonstrations. From the last huge disaster (water pollution in 2004) the Association has basically changed its model. The new strategy is based on negotiation with the incinerator.
The NGOs motivate the incinerator to operate correctly, on the other hand they have to trust each other. This trust depends on personal relationship.
The constant presence of civilian control must be interiorized to the company.
Without professional expertise the civil organization does not understand the operation of the facility or the relating problems, they cannot control the incinerator.
It would be the task of the Hungarian state strengthening the civil capacities (this is capacity building in a broad sense).
The civil contribution to safety depends on personal relationships between civil activists and employees of the industrial facility.
There is a very poor cooperation between the local and national/international NGOs: they do not share
their personal, professional experiences or coordinate their strategies. In the future contribution to the
local and national trust, it would be necessary to strengthen the collaboration between the several types
of NGOs and to reconcile their interest.
4.2. Method
The case study of Dorog is based on desk research and interviews of different stakeholders. According to
Deliverable 1: Theoretical and methodological framework (19 February 2015) the interviews have been
built on a very various range of practical experience: industry, experts, and civil society, local
communities (see the detailed profiles in the Appendix II). Unfortunately the Hungarian environmental and
nature protection systems have been transformed in the recent months. The Environmental and Natural
Protection Authorities have been integrated to the local Government Offices, which are the parts of the
central Government at county level (there are 20 Government Offices in each counties and one in
Budapest). Up to the closing date of this final version of the case study we do not receive a response about
our interview’s request with a representative of the competent Environmental and Natural Protection
Authority.
That’s why the theoretical and methodological framework used for the interviews has been semi-directive
and a qualitative rather than quantitative survey, on one hand we have used the interview guidelines and
on the other hand we have modified and completed at some points these questions according to Hungarian
25
case. We have invited the interviewees to present as much freely their experiences as they can. We detail
hereunder the different questions that have been covered during the interviews.
The interviewees were the following:
Mr. Attila Szuhi, energy policy expert and former activist of Humusz Waste Prevention Alliance19, which is a national NGO relating to environmental protection.
Mr. János Tittmann, Mayor of Dorog since 1994, between 2002-2010 Member of the Hungarian Parliament.20
Mr. Tamás Nádor, environmental activist and representative of Environmental Protection Association of Dorog, which is a local NGO.21
Mrs. Katalin Lágler, general manager of Sarpi Dorog Ltd. 22 (member of Veolia Group23) since 1997.
4.3. Brief History of the Incinerator of Dorog and its Problems
4.3.1. The Importance of Dorog and Considerations for Analysis
There are four main factors why the case of Dorog has been chosen the subject of this analysis:
a) Relating to the history of the Hungarian civil sphere this is the only case in which before and after
the Hungarian regime change the civil participation and resistance was efficient and remarkable.
b) According to this specificity we can investigate the potentiality and specifications of the social
participation, the resources and attitudes of the civil activists.
c) The role of the civilian control is not particularly significant in terms of violence or preventing the
investment. The real importance is the civil ongoing ("watchdog") control, which could point out
several misappropriation about the facility.
d) The inhabitants and civil activists of Dorog have experienced at first-hand why the social
participation is so important and how it could contribute to safety culture.
19 Their mission: “Humusz Waste Prevention Alliance, originally established by five Hungarian
environment protecting organizations in 1995, works for presenting waste poor, environment conscious
solutions and lifestyle examples. We do show that there is a form of being, in which money and
consumption are not prior to everything else, but one may still be satisfied within it. With the solutions
recommended by us we wish to revive the small, local communities, to turn people towards each other
again, instead of turning towards objects, and to restore trust through common adventure…. The
objective of Humusz is to make sustainable production and consumption an everyday practice in Hungary.
We work in order to create the will, to disseminate the knowledge required and to develop the societal,
economic and environmental framework of conditions needed. In this regard we consider civil
communities, teachers and students attending higher education to be our outstanding allies. Our tools
include the provision of information, education and consulting, the research for good practices,
developing and establishing waste prevention examples, and the stimulation of community co-
operations.” Source: http://www.humusz.hu/english/one-day-you-will-end-humusz-anyway/721 20 Source: http://www.dorog.hu/index.php?nyelv=angol 21 Source: http://dke.hu/ 22 Source: http://www.sarpi.hu/fooldal/lang:en 23 Source: http://www.veolia.com/en
26
4.3.2. The Birth of the Incinerator
The idea of incinerator originated back to the Communist ages (in 1984), when the three main Hungarian
pharmaceutical company decided to build a incinerator for hazardous waste. Dorog has been accepted for
two simple reasons: it situates in the center of an industry region, and 20 thousand barrels of hazardous
waste have been accumulated around this area.
The facility met with a huge social resistance, which was really unprecedented before the Hungarian
regime change. In 1984 the land-use permit has been withdrawnd by the local authorities and the central
government took over the case. Meanwhile the citizens of Dorog started to collect signatures for protest
petitions, public forums has been initiated by local organizations. The constructions began in 1985 by the
direct force of the Communist government. Before the Hungarian transition the protesters set up one of
the first Hungarian green social organization in 1988 (Environmental Protection Association of Dorog).
After the regime change the ‘Dorog-saga’ has not finished, because under the new circumstances the
relevance of the social control has been increased. The incinerator was denationalized.
The trial operation of the incinerator was in 1989, the commissioning in 1991, the initial capacity was 25
thousand tons. In 1991, the facility got final approval. Although the incinerator would burn the waste of
the three pharmaceutical companies and the county, later the facility’s license had been extended to the
entire country.
4.3.3. Safety Problems at the Facility
From the beginning, detailed earlier, operation of the incinerator is burdened with several serious
technical and environmental problems. We can say that the incinerator constantly provided causes and
reasons to the civil participation and control.
4.3.3.1. Illegal Waste Storage and Respiratory Diseases
At the beginning of the operation, in the first part of 90s thanks to the investigation of Environmental
Protection Association of Dorog, it came to light that the incinerator stored hazardous waste at the local
railway station without any permission and safety measures. Although the company was fined 25 million
Forints, this was not an isolated case. The civil activist of the Association brought to light that the
proportion of children with respiratory diseases has been cautiously increased and by the end of 90s it was
more than three times the national average.
4.3.3.2. Problems with Emission and Slag
In the 90s there were also several problems with the filtration system, namely the dust removal equipment
did not meet the emission standards. The company had been operating for a long time with inaccurate,
unsuitable emission instruments. In this case the town of Dorog and the public pressured the company and
forced it to perform the needed measurements relating to the emission.
It was also a huge problem to remove the slag from the incinerator. The slag was stored for a long time
near the facility, without any environmental permission. According to Humusz, a Budapest-based
environmental NGO specializing in waste issues: “The company does not have the necessary
documentation, which is inevitable for the reliable and safe operation. Although the incinerator has the
high level ISO 14001 certificate, the slag is not treated in a proper way. After burning 21 000 tons of
waste approximately 12 000 tons of solid incineration residue is generated every year. This amount has
been landfilled on the slag landfill of the incinerator, in the city area with no respect to the regulations
between 1996 and 1998. The landfilled slag has already significantly polluted the groundwater but not
yet the karst water.”24 This caused serious groundwater pollution, according to an expert research
chlorinated solvents, carbohydrogens, benzenes, dioxins and different organic compounds can be found in
the groundwater. The Environmental Protection Association of Dorog and the whole public sphere
pressured the company to eliminate the pollution.
24
Humusz, 1995
27
4.3.3.3. “Waste of Garé”
One of the most important scandals relating to the operation of the incinerator is the “waste of Garé”.
The case of Garé25 is very similar to Dorog and the case reveals the problems of incineration itself.
Because of the heavily polluted site, Garé has become one of the most dangerous cases of the Hungarian
environmental history. This hazardous waste dumping site in Garé, a small village in southern Hungary,
was used by the Hungarian Chemical Company for 10 years during the 1970s and 1980s. Because of
financial difficulties the company was unable to comply with the standards and orders of the
environmental authorities to clean up the site. In the early 1990s the company established a joint firm
with a French hazardous waste incinerator company to build an incinerator near the dumping site. The
planned incinerator would have burnt all the waste in one and a half years, but thereafter would have
handled additional waste from other places. The problem of hazardous waste treatment and the planned
incinerator represent a priority environmental dilemma for the southern region of Hungary. The key
question is whether Hungary needs a second hazardous waste incinerator in addition to the existing one in
Dorog. Due to strong opposition from the public, the regional inspector refused to issue an environmental
permit in this case.
The first Government of Viktor Orbán solved this huge environmental and social crisis by burning the waste
of Garé in the operating incinerator at Dorog. Despite the fact that it was technically unsuitable, the
Government tried it: during the experimental burnings it has been showed that that the incineration of the
waste of Garé emitted six times more dioxins than the environmental limits.
Residents of Dorog protested against the burning of unknown type of toxic waste; the NGO claimed that
the incinerator failed to keep its emissions below the allowed maximum.26 As a result of the civil protest
the company gave up the burning process, nevertheless until then a huge amount toxic waste has been
burnt by the incinerator. In addition, the company tried again the incineration in 2001, and the only thing
which prevented this, was the huge pressure by the residents.
4.3.3.4. Water Pollution
The latest pollution due to the incinerator happened in the summer of 2004. In that summer, the
incinerator leaked a huge amount of toxic waste into the soil, contaminating local drinking water sources.
According to Humusz, from one of the deposit tanks of the Dorog waste incinerator pollution was leaked
out into the Danube and from there to the drinking water of Esztergom. Technical problems, technological
indiscipline and human faults caused the environmental catastrophe. The environmentalists expressed
their concerns that there were many malfunctions and the company informed the authority with a
significant delay and did not even let the authorities’ people into the site right away. Furthermore
information was kept back so the authorities were not aware of the different pollution materials which
were spilled. Due to the lack of information the prohibition of the drinking water consumption came into
force with remarkable delay. As a result the inhabitants were drinking the polluted water for many days.
There was no accurate information on the pollution in the water, their composition and therefore not even
on their impacts on the human life. The drinking of the water from the pipeline was prohibited
temporarily (the inhabitants could drink water in bottles only for weeks). “Residents of surrounding
settlements could not drink tap water for two weeks, and the company is now facing not only a huge fine
but also an ever-louder demand that the incinerator be shut down.”27
25
Fülöp Sándor (1996). Case Examples from Central and Eastern Europe. Garé Hazardous Waste Incinerator Case. In: REC, 1996 Source: http://archive.rec.org/REC/Publications/BndBound/Hungary.html 26
Gille, 2007 174. p 27
Gille, 2007 175. p
28
There were several demonstrations, collecting signatures, residential forums. The NGOs demanded the
following:
to suspend the operation of the incinerator until the entire environmental impact assessment,
the punishment of the people in charge,
the remediation of the damaged environment,
compensation of the city and the inhabitants,
strengthening the environmental and health authorities in order to be able to prevent stricter
the hazardous activities in the future,
the cost of environmental restoration should be paid by the concerned companies,
the relevant regulations should be more severe,
the municipalities and public should be regularly informed,
and the municipal and public control of companies with hazardous activities should be
implemented.
The company and its management have been fined, but there were no further (for instance criminal or
administrative) consequences. However, these massive protestations were needed to inform and protect
the public.
The operator (at that time, ONYX Hungary Kft.) had submitted a request to the environmental authorities
for additional capacity enlargement in September 2004, just weeks after the serious water pollution
occurred in Esztergom. Although the authorities gave a free way to the capacity enlargement, many NGOs
expressed deep concerns about the company which caused a serious environmental pollution. The
increased capacity meant that the absolute amount of emitted pollution was increasing, even if the
emission is below the value limits. Based on past experiences, the local NGO considered the capacity
enlargement as a serious mistake.
4.4. The Role of the Local Participation
After the regime change in 1989-1990, the Environmental Protection Association of Dorog continuously
struggled against the contamination of the facility. The Association has become a member of Humusz
Waste Prevention Alliance, which is a network of Hungarian civil organization and was established in 1995.
The civil association has become an unavoidable player at the local politics with several representatives at
the town council. One of the matchless outcomes of the Association is establishing a local newspaper,
called Green Lines (Zöld Sorok)28 concerning local and regional environmental issues. It is nearly
unprecedented that an NGO can establish and finance a local medium. This was one of the main factors of
the success of this environmental movement.
The protests with thousands of participants indicate the power of the organization. Without this
continuous civil control the incinerator would have caused several irreversible damages (for instance at
the case of Garé). We can say that the civil society contributed to safety and sometimes took over the
authorities’ responsibility. The case of Dorog was proved awareness-raising at the national level. The fact
that the Hungarian public could know about the problems and doubts about the procedure of incineration
depended on this persistent civil activism.
According to Kiss: “In modern societies dealing with environmental issues has become a part of everyday
life. Making decisions on waste- or water-related issues is part of the public discourse in Hungary as well.
The Hungarian literature on public participation discusses different participatory tools applied in
particular policy fields. Public participation seems to have greater significance in environmental decisions
28
Source: http://dke.hu/index.php/zold-sorok-lapszamai?start=25
29
than any other kind of democratic decision making processes.”29 The Environmental Protection Association
of Dorog has proven that in the field of environmental protection there are several formal and informal
participative techniques which could be very successful against industrial facilities.
4.4.1. Why Should the Public Participate?
If we would like to understand the civil tools and techniques, we have to answer the question why the
public should participate in environmental decisions? There are several arguments relating to public
participation. Kiss Gabriella distinguishes six arguments: “Democratic arguments come from the theory of
democracy itself and the three models of democracy. Arguments from Habermas’ theory are based on
deliberative democracy and communication theories. Green arguments are rooted in the concept of
sustainability and connected to the model of environmental democracy. The arguments on risks and
particularly environmental risks are based on the different risk approaches and assessments. The
relationship between science and society could be the basis for the next argument. The behavioral
arguments stem from behavioral economics and add a psychological point of view to these approaches.”
4.4.2. Tools and Strategies used by the NGO
Sherry R. Arnstein argues “that citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the
redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and
economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots
join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated,
programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it is the
means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of
the affluent society.”30 Arnstein classified the types of participation and "non-participation". This typology
of eight levels of participation is “arranged in a ladder pattern with each rung corresponding to the
extent of citizens' power in determining the end product.”31 We would like to use this concept to
illustrate the evolution of techniques of the Environmental Protection Association of Dorog.
Eight rungs of citizen
participation
Type of citizen participation
Tools and Techniques used at the Case of Dorog
Cases, Disasters When?
(8) Citizen Control
Citizen Power Visiting the Facility Direct Cooperation Interpersonal Relations
- Last 5-10 years
(7) Delegated Power
(6) Partnerism
(5) Placation
Tokenism
Demonstrations Data Requests Environmental Information Litigation Pressure on Environmental Authorities
Water Pollution “Waste of Garé”
1990s-2000s
(4) Consultation
(3) Informing
(2) Therapy
Non-participation
Demonstrations Civil Disobedience Collecting Signatures Residential Forums Litigation Pressure on Local and Central Power, Environmental Authorities
Problems with Emission and Slag Illegal Waste Storage and Respiratory Diseases
1980s-1990s (1) Manipulation
Figure 1 Arnstein’s Participation Ladder and the Case of Dorog
According to the safety problems a significant displacement has happened as the local NGO of Dorog
changed its strategy and the incinerator accepted the Association as a partner as well. The emergence of
29
Kiss, 2014 13. p 30
Arnstein, 1969 216. p 31
Arnstein, 1969
30
this trust structure is the main contribution to safety. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the
demonstrations and pressuring were unnecessary, because without these tools the cooperation would not
have happened.
4.5. Civil Contribution to Safety – Experiences of the Interviews
The management of the incinerator felt for a long time that the continuous public opposition makes them
impossible to work properly and destroys the confidence in safety operation. The cooperation might have
been improved during the last 5-10 years as the company and the local NGO made an agreement
concerning public cooperation. According to that the NGO has the right to visit the incinerator with other
experts. The emission data are sent to the municipality regularly.
4.5.1. Two Strategies: from Civil Activism to Negotiations
As it has been elaborated, the Environmental Protection Association of Dorog changed its participation
strategy: from the late 1980s (before the Hungarian regime change) to early 2000s this strategy can be
characterized by massive civil resistance, pressure on the incinerator and environmental authorities,
demonstrations. Roughly from the last huge disaster (water pollution of Danube in 2004, see Chapter I.
Point 3.D.) the Association has basically changed its model. As Mr. Tamás Nádor, environmental activist
and representative of Environmental Protection Association of Dorog, pointed out: “The first period is
about the legal and civil attack on the incinerator. We used the decisions of the environmental authorities
and sued the company several times. In this period the facility has chosen a very flawed strategy: they
explicitly denied the existence of the problem and refused to explain the problems to the NGOs and the
residents.” Mr. Attila Szuhi, policy expert and former activist of Humusz Waste Prevention Alliance,
confirmed this statement and pointed out, that the company refused to acknowledge the committed
mistakes.
Mr. Nádor also argued that the Association failed to understand how the incinerator operates exactly.
“When the civil control loses its self-control, it could be very dangerous and contra productive.” – It has
been confirmed by Mr. János Tittmann, Mayor of Dorog. According to Mr. Nádor, the new civil concept is
based on negotiations. On one hand the NGOs motivate the incinerator to working correctly, on the other
hand they have to trust each other. This trust depends on personal relationship (see Point 4.). This new
approach has been incorporated to Charter of Environmental Protection Association of Dorog which is
really unique in the Hungarian civil sphere: “The Association implements the social control of industrial
facilities by a method based on multi-stakeholder and democratic procedure, and this method takes into
account the interests of all stakeholders. At the same time, the Association ensures priority to human
health, well-being and environmental protection against the interest of for profit organizations and
polluters.”
4.5.2. The NGO and the Expertise
Mr. Nádor emphasized that the civil expertise relating to the technical side of the incinerator is crucial,
because the civil organization can ask technical details. However, it is quite difficult to control the
company, because of the professional and information asymmetry. He also claimed that the Association
has no financial resources to employ a permanent expert. This problem has been confirmed by Mrs. Katalin
Lágler, general manager of Sarpi Dorog Ltd. She pointed out that the local NGOs have just a very few
professional experiences and expertise capacity. Without professional expertise the civil organization does
not understand the operation of the facility or the relating problems, they cannot control the incinerator.
According to Mrs. Lágler it would be the task of the Hungarian state strengthening the civil capacities (this
is the capacity building in a broad sense). From an industrial perspective, this would be very useful,
because the NGOs could contribute to the trust toward the facilities. She drews attention to the possibility
that without a well-grounded civil expertise the NGOs can arouse panic very easily. So the lack of
expertise is very dangerous and could damage the trust.
31
4.5.3. Trust between Individuals
According to Mr. Nádor’s and Mrs. Lágler’s opinion, the civil contribution to safety depends on personal
relationships between civil activists and employees of the industrial facility. On one hand this could be
invaluable and effective; thanks to these networks the Environmental Protection Association of Dorog has
changed its offensive strategy. On the other hand, it could be very dangerous that the civil-industrial
partnerships depend on personal relations, for instance the transformation of the organizations could
destroy the results which have been achieved. Mr. Nádor put it very clearly out that from a wider
perspective of the public the cooperative relationship between the civil sphere and the industrial facility
could be seen preposterous. It may occur that the NGOs have been bribed by the companies. Mr. Nádor
stated, that creating the trust the local and national green organizations have to find a sensible balance
between the negotiation and other strategies. But it is also true, that this interpersonal trust could
overflow and impact the trust concerning the incinerator.
4.5.4. The Role of Communication and Motivation
According to Mr. Nádor the communication plays a crucial role in process of creating trust among
residents. Before the strategy change of the Association, one of the main mistakes committed by the
company was the lack of the communication. Mr. Nádor stated that the incinerator did not have a
communication strategy and person. In this field the things are changing very slowly, Mrs. Lágler said that
even today there is no real spokesperson at the company. We have mentioned the role of motivation in
the process of creating trust. Mr. Nádor pointed out that the NGOs have to motivate the industrial
facilities to working correctly. From other point of views it means that the new strategy of the Association
is that the constant presence of civilian control must be interiorized by the company.
4.5.5. The Local Government as a Mediator
Mr. Tittmann elaborated that the local government and of course the mayor play important role in the
process of creating safety. On one hand, the local institutions are at least as critical with the incinerator
as the NGOs, on the other hand local representatives mediate between the local public and the company,
and at the same time convey the sentiments of the general public regarding of trust. According to Mr.
Tittmann, the role of civil activism leads directly or indirectly to strengthening the control systems within
the company and the environmental authorities as well.
4.5.6. Strengthening the Cooperation between the Local and National NGOs
Mr. Nádor is convinced that there is a huge difference between the local and the national NGOs’ strategy.
The national (ex.: Humusz, Clean Air Action Group) and international NGOs (ex.: Greenpeace) are
interested in offensive strategies, for instance demonstrations, civil disobedience, collecting signatures
litigation. The first part of Dorog’s history can be characterized with these techniques. As it has been
elaborated here, there was a shift according to the local NGO’s (Environmental Protection Association of
Dorog) strategy. The new local approach is based on negotiation and close cooperation with the
incinerator. Mr. Nádor pointed out that there is a very poor cooperation between the local and
national/international NGOs: they do not share their personal, professional experiences or coordinate
their strategies. In the future contribution to the local and national trust, it would be necessary to
strengthen the collaboration between the several types of NGOs and to reconcile their interest.
4.5.7. The Nature of the Trust
It has been stressed by all the interviewees that in addition to meeting the legal conditions there is a core
element of the trust, this is the sense of trust. According to Mrs. Lágler Katalin the incinerator can support
this sense of trust by three ways: industrial security, environmental security and transparency. Mr. Nádor
pointed out that the company needs to cooperate with the civil sphere, because it cannot communicate in
a credible way. The nature of the trust is very sensitive, because if the incinerator informs the public
about the safety it does not necessarily create trust: the civil aspects are crucial building the structures of
trust.
32
4.5.8. Main investments concerning environmental protection at the incinerator
It has been summarized here, what the main environmental investment were during the last 10 years. It
was declared by the incinerator, that the installation of these pieces of equipment is motivated by the
environmental protection interest declared by the local NGO.
Year Type of the Investment Importance of the Investment
1998 Catalytic dioxin
decontamination
The harmful dioxins and furans are atomized to its natural
compounds (carbon dioxide, hydrochloric acid and water)
during catalytic oxidation procedures.
2002 Turbine-generator
It is used to recycle of the calorific value of waste, since
water vapor is prepared by the released thermal energy, this
vapor is can be used to produce electricity.
2008 Emergency reservoir pool
The final element of the water safety system, which aims
that when the existing water treatment facilities (rainwater
pools, water pools, car washing basin, etc.) has become full,
this element would provide an additional 3 500 m3 storage
capacity by an overflow system, thus among the most
unfavorable conditions, liquid phase material will not get out
from the facility.
2009 Inerting container park and
extraction
Nitrogen flooding system for storage of liquid waste in
containers. It aims to exclude the formation of an explosive
gas mixture (creating an oxygen free environment), as well as
the extraction aims to eliminate a possible diffuse air
pollution
33
References
Arnstein, Sherry R. (1969): A Ladder of Citizen Participation. In: Journal of the American Institute of
Planners, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1969. 216-224. pp32
Baudé, Stéphane – Dubreuil, Gilles Hériard – Kos, Drago – Železnik, Nadja – Koritár, Zsuzsanna (2015):
ECCSSafe – Exploring the contribution of civil society to safety. Deliverable 1: Theoretical and
methodological framework (19 February 2015). Safera
Faragó Klára – Vári Anna – Vecsenyi János (1990): Csak ne az én kertembe! Konfliktus a dorogi veszélyes
hulladékégető körül. [Not in my Backyard! Conflicting Views on the Siting of a Hazardous Waste
Incinerator] Magyar Közvéleménykutató Intézet, Budapest
Faragó Klára – Vári Anna – Vecsenyi János (1989): Not in My Town: Conflicting Views on the Siting of a
Hazardous Waste Incinerator. In: Risk Analysis
Volume 9, Issue 4, December 1989, 463–471. pp
Gille Zsuzsanna (2007): From the Cult of Waste to the Trash Heap of History: The Politics of Waste in
Socialist and Postsocialist Hungary. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis
Humusz (1995): The biggest hazardous waste incinerator of Hungary.33
Kiss Gabriella (2014): Why Should the Public Participate in Environmental Decision-Making? In: Periodica
Polytechnica 22 (1). 13-20. pp
REC (1996): Beyond Boundaries. The International Dimensions of Public Participation for the Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. Manual on Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making34
32
http://lithgow-schmidt.dk/sherry-arnstein/ladder-of-citizen-participation.html 33
Source: http://www.humusz.hu/hirek/biggest-hazardous-waste-incinerator-hungary/753 34
Source: http://archive.rec.org/REC/Publications/BndBound/cover.html
34
5. THE LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR SITE SELECTION FOR A LOW AND INTERMEDIATE
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN SLOVENIA
5.1. Introduction
The interactions between civil society and local actors on the one hand and institutional actors engaged in
safety of industrial activities on the other hand are most often addressed either through the general issue
of stakeholder involvement, perception studies, risk governance studies or through the more general issue
of the exercise of democracy regarding technical issues. Social and human aspects of industrial safety are
addressed through the analysis of human and organisation factors of safety that are focused either on the
analysis of single organisations (e.g. operators) and their safety culture or address a safety system where
safety is the result of the actions and interactions of operators, regulators and experts. In this context,
the ECCSSafe (Exploring Civil Society Contribution to Safety) research project aims to further explore the
contribution of civil society to industrial safety by providing a theoretical framework for the analysis of
this contribution, analysing 3 concrete cases in the nuclear field and in other industrial fields in Europe
and identifying key issues to address in further research and proposing guidelines for a larger scale
research.
5.2. Method
The research team developed specific criteria in order to select 3 case studies among the 8 pre-identified
case studies: two in the nuclear sector and one in another field of activity. For the selection of the case
studies the following criteria have been used:
Importance of safety among the addressed issues: safety issues should play a significant role in the considered process of interaction with civil society.
Availability of information on how engagement of civil society contributed to safety
Availability of stakeholders to perform the research: are there different actors available for performance of the investigation?
Number of different actors involved in the process: description of different group of actors involved in the process (CSO, NGO, local committees, regulators, implementers, ....)
Participation options and organisation: how participation process was organised, was it formal, the extent (only public hearings, or more intensive role in the process), or informal pressures groups by civil society?
Participatory influence: how the proposals and comments were addressed and taken into account, how the decisions were changed?
Extent of safety discussion: which factors were disused and opened? Based on those criteria also a case study on functioning of local partnerships for site selection of
radioactive waste repository in Slovenia has been selected. In this report the case study is presented,
using the methodology as proposed in the report Theoretical and methodological framework35. The case
study includes information from desk research about the context of local partnerships and results of the
interviews with different stakeholders having taken part to the local partnerships functioning in Slovenia.
In total 12 individuals were invited to participate and responds from 9 people were obtained. The
interviews were designed to provide a qualitative rather than quantitative survey. The received opinions
from all different stakeholders involved in the siting experiences provided the inputs for analyses about
different topics of investigation: Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case of Local
Partnership, Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety,
Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance, Controversies and co-framing of safety issues
with stakeholders and Trust. The analyses of those topics provided the inputs for conclusions in which the
role of civil society in safety improvement can be assessed and the challenges can be addressed.
35 S. Baudé, G. Hériard Dubreuil, D. Kos, N. Železnik, Z. Koritár (2015) Theoreticl and methodological
framework, Deliverable 1, Exploring Civil Society Contribution to Safety, February 2015
35
For the study of the contribution of civil society in achieving better safety in the case of local partnerships
Brežice and Krško in the site selection process for radioactive waste (RW) repository a general
questionnaire, which was developed in the deliverable of consortium Theoretical and methodological
framework was modified for the case of repository site selection. It is given in appendix in English and
Slovene version together with general introduction text that provided the context of the research and
brief description for participants as well as the modes of reply.
It was stressed that the project ECCSSafe explores the contribution of civil society and local actors to
enhancing the safety of industrial activity and the safety culture. The analysis would include discussion on
siting of RW repository in France, remediation of industrial accident in Hungary and the experience with
siting the repository for radioactive waste in Slovenia. As case in Slovenia local partnerships in Krsko and
Brežice were chosen as one of the concrete examples of civil society involvement in the discussion
regarding the disposal of low and intermediate radioactive waste and, in this debate on the safety linked
to nuclear facilities. The information clearly outlined that the main objectives was to identify and define
the nature of risk and added value contribution of civil society to the safety of the facility. The
investigation included especially information with regard to the quality of decision-making and
management processes, the quality of expertise and the impacts on values and safety culture. The
questionnaire comprises five themes, namely: understanding of the safety and safety culture, the
definition of safety as public affairs, risk management activities, polemical views of stakeholders and the
issue of trust.
Based on the analyses of the site selection process the institutions and civil society associations which had
an important role in the Slovene siting process were invited to participate and provide answers to the
questionnaire. The invited participants were:
ARAO – Slovene national radioactive waste management agency as an implementer of the RW
repository, initiator of the local partnerships, funder and coordinator,
MOP – Ministry of environment and spatial planning in Republic of Slovenia, responsible for spatial
planning activities and coordination until adoption of governmental decree
SNSA - Slovene Nuclear Safety Authority – regulatory body in Slovenia responsible for radiation
protection and nuclear safety
Municipalities Krško and Brežice as the official authorities in the site selection process and
involved in the local partnerships,
Local partnership Krško – association established for co-ordination of local partnership with the
memberships
Local partnership Brežice – association established for co-ordination of local partnership with
president of the steering committee and vice president
New Posavje nuclear local partnership – a new local partnership established in 2015 for following
developments on nuclear in the region with president of steering committee
All together 12 persons were invited to respond using different channels (e-mail, voice records, personal
interview). From those invited together 9 replies were received, representing all variety of actors in the
process.
5.3. The local partnership approach in Slovenia
5.3.1. Introduction
In Slovenia local partnerships were established to serve as the organizing framework for all activities
undertaken during low and intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW) repository site characterization
and confirmation of potential sites. They were providing a platform for cooperation and, to some extent,
for decision-making by local stakeholders. Local partnerships (LPs) were designed by ARAO as a draft
proposal stressing the possibility of individual municipalities to redesign the approach according to their
needs, and introduced in local municipalities. After discussions and modifications with citizens and local
councils agreements on the LP frame had been signed by local mayors and the director of ARAO. The idea
of LPs was taken from the approach developed in Belgium due to the fact that ARAO had experienced
36
similar failed site selection process for LILW repository in 1993 and was looking for international
developments in this area. Based on bilateral agreement between Niras/Ondraf and ARAO the exchange of
information included also the approaches to site selection, therefore already in 1997 first discussions on
this including University of Antwerp (prof. Eric van Hove) took place. ARAO investigated thoroughly the
approach, modified it to suit the Slovene case and introduce basic principles to all municipalities at the
meeting in 2002. As agreed the structures, the status, the organization and the mode of operation were
adapted to fit the characteristics and expectations of the Slovene local communities.
5.3.2. The LP concept in Slovenia
Figure 1 represents the partnership model as articulated in Slovene policy, envisaging the establishment of
local partnership through a steering committee with the role to coordinate and facilitate the participation
and involvement of citizens. To involve as many people as possible different tools could be used, e.g.
committees; working groups; presentations; round tables; workshops or any other appropriate way to
engage local residents. During the establishment of the local partnerships a program that defined them in
terms of purpose; principles; goals; participants; function; information accessibility; decision-making;
funding and time frame, had to be prepared and accepted by all partners.
Figure 1 - General scheme of local partnerships in Slovenia (ARAO, 2005)
The function of local partnerships was formalised in administrative procedures, such as the preparation of
a National spatial plan for a LILW repository, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, etc., in
which Slovene legislation prescribes public participation. With regard to other issues related to site
selection the LPs would have an informal role as participants discussed field investigations; design
solutions; safety aspects; environmental impacts; development possibilities due to compensation for the
limited land use; societal and health issues and all other aspects relevant, or interesting, to the local
community. The LPs would also have an obligation to organize broader discussion and form working
groups; inform the public; hold round tables in communities and involve independent expert knowledge on
particular issues. The work of the local partnerships would be public, minutes, invitations and documents
were to be published on a web page, or via established local channels.
The objectives of the LPs were:
To provide all the relevant information on the topic
To disseminate knowledge
To enable the local public to take part in the discussions, to express opinions and demands
To involve the local public in the decision making process within the legislation provisions from the very beginning
To build trust among participating parties.
37
The duration of the LPs (February 2006 - March 2010) was determined by the time span of the siting
process in the agreement signed between mayors and ARAO and they were to end with the confirmation of
a location for the LILW repository. But in the basic documents (like status, work programs for functioning
of LPs) which were later prepared by representatives involved in the LPs some modification were brought.
In LP Krško it was introduced and agreed that the LP should be in function also after the site would be
selected. Therefore local residents and NGO members of the LPs were not satisfied with the termination
particularly since the work program stated that the duration of the LP was not limited to site selection
phase and that the work would continue afterwards.
5.3.3. Financing
Local partnership had funds for its functioning (administration and committees functioning), informing of
public, site visits, expenses for work of reporters and reviewers and any other activity which was
supported by the competent decision making body. Additionally there have been also funds for
independent expert opinions and studies which would be requested by partners. They should be connected
with repository development, but also some other connected topics were supported on the proposal. The
Terms of reference for the expert opinion or study were drafted by experts (usually from ARAO as a
member of LP) but always accepted by the decision making body of LP.
The funds were limited for particular year and defined by ARAO (table 1), but decision on the use of the
funds was taken by the local partnership official representatives. According to the agreements the amount
represented the upper limit for each year, the payment were performed based on the real costs of
activities and on the invoices for administrative support. The details of the activities for particular year
were defined at the beginning of year in work program for LP, at the end of the year the LP were
presenting the report on the use and on the implementation of work program. In fact, LP use the ARAO
planning and reporting system and project management for individual actions.
In € 2006 2007 2008 2009
Local partnership 84.000 96.000 96.000 96.000
Independent studies 42.000 41.750 41.750 45.000
Table 1 - Funds for the individual functioning of LP by year
Important aspect of local community participation presented compensations given by the state because of
the limited land use because of the nuclear facility, namely:
In the municipality of Krško (7,3 M€ total compensation for NPP and for future LILW repository):
20% of municipalities compensation (1,46 M€) for additional benefits for groups of citizens
(children, elders, the ill); about 500 €/year bruto for inhabitants in the area of 1500 m circle
around NPP (around 300 people).
The share of Brežice municipality and the other communities (Kostanjevica, Sevnica and Kozje) in
the financial compensations is smaller in comparison with Krško (together 2,7 M€ from which 1,66
M€ for municipality Brežice).
5.3.4. The implementation of LPs
The initiative of ARAO to organize and support LPs in participating communities led to two different
partnerships. In Krško municipality the structure of LP was quite complex in fact over organised, centred
on five thematic committees with a support structure comprising a coordination committee with elected
representatives, a secretariat and general assembly, as shown in Figure 2. The thematic committees were
to discuss and provide suggestions on important issues (technical, environmental, socio technical,
requirements from Aarhus convention, etc.) and the coordination committee to coordinate, organize and
survey the work of the LP, the latter included representatives of ARAO and the municipality. The
establishment of the LP was coordinated by the mayor, with the support of a public relations agency which
38
also provided services to the Krško municipality. The public relations agency was perceived as primarily
representing the mayor’s interest and the city council majority. In addition the LP’s secretary was
appointed from staff of Krško municipality and was under the control of the mayor who was in good
relation with NPP staff and who was consequently very successful in obtaining “nuclear” money for Krško
municipality. That is why the LP was perceived as being controlled and managed by local “nuclear lobby”.
Figure 2 - Scheme of LP Krško
At the beginning citizens were very interested. Many different people, with different background and
representing different areas of interest attended the meetings. Some participants, who were representing
the nuclear industry, were professionals, participating in the LP meetings as part of their regular job while
majority were volunteers. This, knowledge divide, raised the issue of trust in and fairness of the process,
as well as the question of representation, but it was not addressed in a way that made it transparent, or
official. However, slowly the number of participants at the meetings decreased and only the most
persistent stayed on, with some individuals hijacking time to air their personal grievances with the
municipality. The most important issue of interest appeared to be the compensations and this became the
focal point of dispute but also the main reason of LP low image in public. At the end the LP Krško proposed
a criterion for the allocation of compensation stating that ½ of the compensation would go to individuals
and ½ to the municipality budget. Although the general assembly accepted this proposal the Krško
municipality council rejected it. A call for a local referendum, to establish the consent of the municipality
council to the proposal of a Decree of national spatial plan for a LILW repository, was also rejected by the
council, with the explanation that it was not making a decision but only giving consent, for which a
referendum was not mandated. Three months after the adoption of the Decree of a national spatial plan
for a LILW repository in the municipality of Krško, by the Government of Slovenia in December 2009, all
financial provisions for LP work were terminated. The LP activities stopped when there was no funding
available anymore.
The LP in Brežice municipality was organised much more according to the general scheme from ARAO, as
shown in figure 3. In the beginning, just after the decision by the government to start with site selection
several presentations for citizens, different groups of public and decision makers were organized (end of
2005). The LP was implemented with a steering committee, comprising eight members nominated by the
municipality council, mayor and local residents in the potential location and ARAO, as the decision making
body in March 2006. The local partnership adopted a program of activities and started its work with
information activities, visits, presentations, independent studies and organization of working groups based
on the request from citizens.
39
Figure 3 - Scheme of LP Brežice
In May 2006 an initiative against potential proposed location formed a strong civil movement. The
community council decided to withdraw the potential location, but opted to stay in the local partnership
and to identify a new potential location. This nearby potential location, which was in the same
municipality Brežice, but in another community, was adopted officially into the procedure in beginning of
2007, which resulted in changes of the LP steering committee structure to address the specificities of the
new location and ensure representation.
The LP Brežice was very active and undertook many activities connected to site selection and confirmation
in the municipality. The activities included presentations of the site selection process and issues of
radioactivity and RW management for local community and citizens groups, visits to the Information
center and the Central interim storage of RW for specific groups of local residents, the establishment of
information points in the local community, performance of different independent studies on the proposed
topics and presentation to the public with discussions, communication activities, web pages and media
articles, provision of information for municipality and local councils on local partnership activities and
involvement in international projects (CIP, CARL, OBRA).
There were also many public presentations of requested independent studies addressing different topics,
such as:
Expert opinion on assumptions about the presence of radioactive waste in closed mine, analysis of samples
Occurrence of cancer in municipality Brežice compared to the rest of Slovenia
Measurements of specific radionuclides in food samples harvested on the area of municipality and environmental radioactivity measurements
Legal aspects and regulation restrictions
Finally, the Brežice location was refused due to the conflicts with the spatial planning act for a hydro
power plant, although the process for this started later than the process for repository siting (the
potential location was on the territory planned as retention area for the HPP). The decision was
considered unfair within the LP, but among the municipality officials there was relief that they were not
selected.
40
Figure 4 - Potential locations for LILW repository in Vrbina
5.3.5. SWOT assessment of LPs
Both local partnerships have been included also in EU projects, like COWAM, CIP and OBRA. In the frame of
one meeting within national stakeholders group in CIP project the evaluation of local partnerships
functioning was performed. It was based on the SWOT analysis, which is a strategic planning method used
to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats involved in a project. Upon the local
partnerships in Krško and Brežice having existed for over a year and a half, assessment of the situation and
identification of both obstacles and difficulties that need to be solved in the future, and subject fields
that need further analysis or exchange of European experience has been carried out. In the evaluation
besides local partnerships members also other involved stakeholders participated.
As the time to carry out the SWOT analysis at the workshop was limited it was decided to develop draft
SWOT in advance where all participants were invited to take part. The questionnaire included the
following questions:
1. What are the (internal) strengths of the local partnership in the process of siting a LILW
repository?
2. What (internal) weaknesses hinder a more effective operation of the local partnership in the
process of siting a repository?
3. What (external*) opportunities can improve the efficiency of the local partnership and
successfully conclude the process of siting a repository?
4. What (external) threats can in your opinion hinder or even jeopardize the operation of the
local partnership and the process of siting a repository?
Divided into four working groups of different stakeholders, participants of the workshop discussed
preliminary analysis proposals and completed the analysis. By awarding a particular number of points they
arranged the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats mentioned according to their significance.
The plenary session included a presentation of those aspects of analysis that the participants found most
important, and was followed by a discussion. The findings of SWOT analysis include an analysis of
individual values, as well as ranking according to their importance. It is presented in the table 2.
As stressed by the participants, the SWOT analysis is flawed in that specific findings for weaknesses and
threats do not refer to the operation of LPs, but to difficulties and circumstances that LPs come across,
which are mostly not within their competence.
41
Strengths Weaknesses
- Integration of local actors,
nongovernmental organizations and civil
society (13)36
- Providing information (10)
- Opportunities to participate in decision-
making processes (5)
- Learning about best practice examples
(5)
- Better decisions (4)
- Learning about and researching the role
of individual actors (4)
- Opportunity to consult and make
arrangements as well as exchange of
opinions and experience of participating
partners
- Enhanced confidence among partners
and reduced obstacles
- Enhancing the partner culture among
three partners (although the situation is
not perfect)
- Defective dialogue culture and the
resulting decrease of interest in
cooperation (10); Dialogue is often limited
to a small circle of people; No direct
dialogue between the inhabitants and the
Agency for Radiactive Waste Management,
the municipality is the mediator
- Unrealized expectations and decreased
interest in local partnership cooperation;
Unrealistic expectations, difficult to
implement (6)
- Motivation for participation – increased
role of opinion leaders (6)
- Disregarding the local partnership
importance, principles and rules (6)
- Politicization (6)
- National institutions not included in
communication with the local partnership
(5)
- Insufficient, biased information; national
institutions to be included in the
information flow
- Irrational use of funds
- Partial interests problem; many understand
the local partnership as a platform for
marketing their interests
- Insufficient knowledge, skills and rules of
local partnership operation
- Lack of cooperation with other local
partnerships
- Insufficient representation i.e. structure
of local partnership participants: not all
layers of population are equally represented
(i.e. civil initiatives, NGO...), which results
in the affected local population not being
represented
- Lack of trust in institutions
- Undetermined relation between the local
partnership and the municipality;
prevalent role of the Mayor; Municipal
councillors do not participate in the local
partnership; Agreements are made outside
the local partnership;
- The role and purpose of the local
partnership and not explained well and
often enough in public and in media.
- Doubt about the name local partnership
being appropriate
36 The numbers in brackets represent the importance placed on individual aspect with regard to priorities
of workshop participants. Low numbers are not stated.
42
Opportunities Threats
- Awareness that issues of national interest
may be solved in a specific local
community; mutual understanding for
interests of other parties – also on the
part of local community towards the
government (14)
- Financial compensation Reaching an
agreement and producing criteria and
methods with regard to allocation of funds
acquired to compensate negative impacts,
determined according to the distance from
a facility and irrespective of current
interests of local (10)
- Reconciling of interests, the impact of
population on region’s development;
Improving long-term social relations (8)
- Foreign experience; Connecting local
players, NGO and civil society on
international level (4)
- Access to information; Interest in
information; Research incentives (4)
- Awareness of the importance of
participation
- Politics and experts’ understanding and
willingness to improve the quality of life in
immediate surroundings; Quick response of
politics and experts to local partnerships’
initiatives
- Objective local media coverage
- State of Slovenia’s energy balance and
EU policy
- Dialogue between various expert fields;
Understanding of experts and their
decisions
- De-ideologisation of environmental issues
- Opportunity to settle debt; Opportunity
to solve issues from the past or unsolved
issues
- Opportunity for the government to adopt
this approach in other projects (HE,
Feniks)
- Informing Slovene general public about
this area and process
- Maintaining local partnerships after the
landfill siting is finalised
- Unsuitable criteria to examine regions and
allocate compensations (13)
- Unsuitable and highly complex
procedures; Stimulation of rivalry instead
of cooperation (12)
- Interference of politics; Political
propaganda for self-promotion (8)
- Pursuing specific, personal or local
interests with almost no possibility to
provide legal framework (6)
- Solving issues on the street (6)
- Broken agreements, unfulfilled politics’
promises; poorly defined agreements (5)
- Subjective media, boosting negative
public opinion (5)
- Time pressure (5)
- Disregarding relevant local partnerships’
proposals (4); Rigid national institutions,
Treating local partnerships’ proposals
selectively
- Underestimating public views
- Insufficient awareness of leading players’
responsibility
- Local partnership feels as if treated as a
non-equal partner
- Risk of neglecting environmental
protection and biotic diversity
- High costs
Table 2 - SWOT - Analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of Local partnerships
operation in Krško and Brežice
5.3.6. A summary of Slovene local partnerships
The LP in Brežice: Several presentations for citizens, different groups of public and decision makers
started just after the decision by the government. The formation of a steering committee with eight
members, nominated by the council, mayor, locals and ARAO took place in March 2006. The local
43
partnership accepted a program of activities and started working with information activities, visits,
presentations, independent studies and organising working groups. In May 2006 a strong civil initiative
moving against the application formed in the local community. Due to it being pre-election time (summer
2006) the community council decided to withdraw the potential location, but opted to stay in the local
partnership and to identify a new potential location.
The LP in Krško: Several presentations for citizens, decision makers and local politicians started early in
spring 2006. There was a very strong and decisive involvement of the mayor in LP work: preparation and
adoption of the program and formation of working groups/committees for sustainable development,
technical issues, for environment and health, limited land use and for consideration of Aarhus convention.
A latent civil society initiative became partner in the partnership.
Although the contracts for the LPs were signed by the municipalities and the ARAO there were always
three partners in the local partnership: the municipality (council and mayor), ARAO and the local public
(which is not a legal entity so it could not sign the contract). ARAO participated in the LP activities all the
time, it also participated in the decision-making in LP, but it had only two votes out of 14. The ultimate
intent with the LP was to empower the local public (as the weakest link) to participate in the site
selection process on an equal basis with the municipality and ARAO.
The role of the LPs was to build trust and to enhance social acceptability of the LILW repository, not to
make a decision on the site. Through the LP local people would obtain information and knowledge about
the repository, so their fear and resistance would be reduced. The LPs were establish to problematize the
depository siting in dialogue with experts, investors, other stakeholders and also with local people in other
countries with similar experiences. Local people were even involved in the decision making process to
suggest proposals but it was up to government institutions and experts to decide how to deal with the
suggestions. Through all these activities the local public should gain trust in the government and experts
that work together to find the best solution. Therefore The LPs did not have a decision-making role, only
advisory. This certainly was one of the main setbacks of Krško LP. The LP did not have formal power and
at the same time they did not succeed to build reputation in public. Therefore, although locals demanded
that the final decision on siting the repository would be accepted on referendum in the particular
municipality, idea was not realised. After a public opinion poll which showed an approximately 50%-50%
result, a decision on the site was made by the municipality council in Krško. Thus, a site was selected near
the existing NPP, in the municipality of Krško.
Generally speaking, the fact that stakeholders had at least partial control over the procedure, that they
had the possibility to get relevant information, and opportunities for contact with responsible persons,
mitigated their previously more or less completely negative attitudes and enabled wider discussion of the
relevant issues. Different interests of diverse stakeholder groups were still evident, though due to the
process of involvement they were slowly converging. Local stakeholders were not so much interested in
broader issues; their problem was the location of a facility in ‘their’ community and may have had less
interest in the issues that did not directly involve their immediate environment. Certain groups of
stakeholders were officially defined (e.g. by law: ARAO, local community council, nuclear industry
representatives), while some were self-organized (e.g. local NGOs). There were also transitions between
those categories, e.g. a self-organized group could become formally recognized, mainly because it
expressed a prevailing interest of the particular community.
Of particular interest are groups that used the nuclear issue as a tool to achieve recognition and political
goals other than ecological ones. The stakeholders also changed during the processes. Survey data show
that they acquired greater knowledge and understanding of nuclear issues. While this knowledge could
support quite opposite attitudes, contacts between different stakeholder groups were easier and less
tense. In principle, especially members of the local communities were satisfied with the process of their
involvement and contacts with ARAO representatives.
44
Participation in a siting process is only a small part of the whole procedure of solving radioactive waste
management problems in the country, not the end point. A number of factors influence it and its
effectiveness, the perception by participants not being the least important. Also the waste management
problem is embedded into a wider frame of all nuclear issues, ranging from a HLW repository, to a second
NPP block. Current public dissatisfaction could be projected into the future with devastating consequences
for establishment of much needed trust between involved parties. The problem is much wider and it is
quite clear that some players are still not aware of.
Local partnerships were evidently designed to re-establish trust and communication between interest
groups (would be partners) with special regard to bring closer social and technical views on repository. But
as evaluation of the established LP confirmed, intended integral socio-technical communication on nuclear
waste repository failed once again. The range of reasons is wide and extends from historical, cultural,
political background to local set of activists and professional political representatives. If we try to
synthesize this complex “action network” the following emphasis seems important: a) New attempt to
integral socio-technical solution with help of LP was very much “path dependant” i.e. accompanied with
historical socio-political legacy and experiences generating suspicion and disbelieve due to past neglect of
local public opinion, attitudes and concerns. b) Local partnership did not eliminate the competition to
control discourse on nuclear repository. Dichotomies like social vs. technical experts, politics, vs. civil
society institutions (NGO), local vs. national interest groups are persisting. Instead of partner relations
between interest groups instrumental communication public relations techniques are proliferating. c)
Formal - informal dichotomy in institutional arrangements and communication processes was quite
evident. Informal local – national political networks played very important role in the game. d) Complex
structure of local partnership was in fact harming deliberation, because it was fully controlled by local
political professionals. As a consequence some of the most affected groups were marginalised. e)
Envisioned compensations to local community hosting repository were motivating new tensions and
preventing trust building between involved actors. f) Substantial part of the lay public remains
uninformed. On the other side technical experts remains surprisingly “immune” to social construction of
nuclear risks. g) As soon as the location for repository was formally adopted, the LP in Krško was
cancelled. The ideas that lay groups are not competent to participate in the decision making process were
renewed. The final outcome of partnership is suboptimal location of planned repository and not very
harmonious or trusted relations between affected actors.
45
5.4. Summary of the answers from invited stakeholders
The replies of invited participants are grouped according to five topics which were part of the
questionnaire. The responds are given in the attachment as originally received (as written answers,
transcriptions of recorded interviews or summary of the position in more relaxed discussion). Here the
answers are translated to English (if received in Slovene). The information on the institution or association
is also presented since this has a very big impact about the opinion and assessment of the local partnership
functioning.
5.4.1. Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case of Local Partnership
How would you define safety in case of LILW repository? What is your perception of safety?
How would you evaluate safety in this case?
Could you/your organisation/company/institution/… in case of Local Partnership achieve the
level of your definition of safety? What did you do to achieve this safety?
Civil society representative (1) in Local Partnership Krško
With regard to safety, it is necessary to take into account several aspects: environmental impacts, which
include the direct effects of objects and entities, and environmental effects, which include psychosocial,
medical and economic aspects and the environmental impact caused by the long duration of the load. With
regard to safety, it is necessary to highlight the risk of long-term safety and stability.
In the case of LILW repository, too little emphasis was given to safety during the siting so far. Explanations
were given using too high professional level and thus frequently not understandable to most stakeholders.
Featured were only aspects of safety, covering the technical implementation of the project and general
safety assessment, about other above-mentioned safety aspects there was too little said or were not
addressed. There was absolutely not enough emphasis given to modern safety threats, which nuclear
facilities are subjected to. The biggest mistake from safety or environmental point of view and which is
considered by the majority of stakeholders which are the third partner in the process (that is civil
society), is the construction of underground silos, which essentially prevent displacement of waste in case
of any safety threats. Such a solution was also contrary to the applicable legislative provisions, which
were, in our opinion, fairly professionally prepared.
Local partnership37 could achieve a satisfactory level of safety only if the voice of civil society
stakeholders would be more respected. It would mean to acquire independent study if they had the funds,
to ensure legal certainty, to hire independent experts and the like. We were constantly reminding on
safety aspects (at workshops and meetings), but there has been hardly any effect. Finally, it should be
noted that we also collected 1,425 signatures for a referendum which were ignored by the mayor.
Civil society representative (2) in Local Partnership Krško
The first thing I associate with safety is trust. If confidence is not about safety, we cannot talk about it,
because the feeling is present that someone wants to circumvent us.
When two members of LP (ARAO and municipality) left the partnership and stop financing it, the trust of
the population was lost and thereby put the safety of the nuclear facility under question. If they do not
know how to behave with the people, they will not be able even to manage more difficult technical issues
related to nuclear energy, which is not yet fully explored.
LP did not reach safety as defined above. It turns out that neither the state nor the ARAO, and the least of
all the people who are employed in the NPP and the top experts in this field, have not been able to
convince the policy that must gain the trust of the citizens. They have not acquired it, because there was
37 In this context the local partnership is meant just as the interested population as a third partner in the
LP. Within the LP Krško there was no agreement between different partners for majority of issues, the
municipality and ARAO partners were prevailing and were having economic interest.
46
no social acceptance for LILW repository, not to speak about spent fuel repository and the second block of
NPP. If the trust would be present, to discussion could be completed to the end, they would probably
come to a common point. Unfortunately, this did not happen, confidence has been lost and it will be very
difficult to restore.
Civil society representative in Local Partnership Brežice
For the LP safety was one of the fundamental issues, for which they were involved in the project. It is
understood as an urgent precondition for local populations to coexist with a nuclear facility. If there is no
safety guaranteed coexistence with such facility is not possible. If coexistence is not provided, normal
management and work facilities are not possible. Within the LP safety was well defined, all activities were
focused in this direction (90% of activities), and the majority of research was touching safety. Safety in
respect of the repository, in my opinion should encompass two things:
The loss of fear of the local population against this object: people must recognize that the facility
is safe for their life and
Operation of the object detected without emissions to the environment: safety must be ensured so
that the object has no impact on the environment.
LP in the context of improving the safety of planned repository produced the analyses and studies of
fruits, plants and the environment, the training related to safety was organized as well as the site visits of
repository sites abroad for local population.
The concept of safety and social acceptability was virtually equal - in the case of Brežice, because the
project did not develop so far to begin to talk about technical issues. The discussion was only on whether
it would be possible to select the site at the end can. We have achieved a significant increase in social
acceptance. Today, the acceptability is only at the baseline level or even lower. People were disappointed
because of state attitude towards them. When they are no longer needed, they dismiss them as the spent
material.
If we would go forward in the direction of activities, as it was planned, it would have resulted in safety
level described above. The approach was right (of course, never for all - scepticism is always present), but
if the state would be cooperative there would be no big opposition.
In my opinion coordination with Ministry of Environment has not been effective, the only thing we could
achieve was that ministry started with presentation of siting of all projects which are of national
importance in Posavje. When coordinating the priorities of individual large / dangerous projects, it was
shown that Brežice are not a priority. Location in Brežice for LILW repository was rejected from the
beginning, because the interest of Krško was too high. It was throwing sands in the eyes to the locals, and
not something constructive for the project itself.
Slovenian nuclear safety administration representative
In the case of disposal of low and intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW) safety of the repository is
reached when engineering and natural barriers can ensure that the environment and the population from
deposited radioactive waste in repository are not burdened beyond the prescribed limits.
For siting the LILW repository, the aspect of safety of the repository is estimated at a generic level, which
means that in case of further more details safety analysis and assessments of the repository the results
could be complicated at a later stage. In-depth analysis is carried out in the later stages of the project
development, and will confirm the success or failure of the site selection.
For local partnership it is difficult to achieve safety assessment, as it should have a very high level of
knowledge to be able to consider whether it achieved a satisfactory level of safety. Local partnership,
which does not have knowledge and skills, should trust the regulatory authority to assess the safety, or
hire organizations to assist them in assessing the safety and thereby obtain confidence in the project. The
main purpose of the local partnership is to establish a trusted relationship between the local community
and the facility.
47
Municipality of Krško representative
I define safety as a situation when you do not feel that your life is threatened. Safe and professionally
retained radioactive waste is the last step in the management of these wastes. For the safety of LILW
repository in all aspects it was taken care during the preparation of the necessary documentation for the
adoption of spatial planning documents for the siting of the object. Local partnership was involved in all
phases of the project of establishing of spatial plan and also in terms of social acceptability of facility.
Agency for Radwaste management representative38
Safety of a LILW repository is understood as a set of procedures, systems, structures, and components that
in a combined manner assure a comprehensive radioactive waste management system, that complies with
all standards of health (occupational and public health) and environmental protection.
Safety played an important role in the mixed-mode approach to site selection and national spatial plan
preparation and adoption. Safety aspects were elaborated in the preliminary safety report that was
required already in the procedure of adoption of national spatial plan.
Local partnership did not specifically discuss the preliminary safety report but was focused mainly on
general aspects of public participation in the decision-making procedure. Due to the concept of local
partnership in Slovenia, ARAO could only suggest relevant topics but could not influence the topics that
local partnership wanted to discuss.
Former employee of ARAO responsible for stakeholder’s engagement
In a narrow sense the safety of RW repository is understood as conditions that nuclear safety and radiation
protection for workers, population and environment is assured throughout the repository life cycle – from
selection of suitable site, to design of repository, to operation, closure and post closure period. In broader
concept the safety is understand as a condition that the repository is developed so that the citizens
perceive it as a safe installation without negative consequences to the population and environment. In
this way the concept of safety is much wider and includes also some elements which cannot be defined
very precisely, with numerical limits. The influences can be on health, environment, economics,
psychology and society. The last two impacts are very broad and diverse. In evaluating safety the
associated risks should be identified together with uncertainties.
In the case of repository site selection the safety issues were presented mainly in the narrow sense,
providing the information on possible effects of repository on health of workers and population and
impacts on environment under different normal and accidental events, and different scenarios (normal
and alternative) after the closure of repository. The two main documents were presented: Special Safety
Analyses for repository and Environmental Report. The first document is very technical, but the second
one is intended for public as part of the public hearing documents in the Strategic Environment
Assessment process and was written in a quite understandable language. In local partnerships attempts to
discuss the safety were given, but it was clear that the conceptualisation of citizens what are safety issues
were different from the nuclear experts.
Local partnerships did open several issues that were from their perspective also related to safety. Some
examples are the content and extent of field investigations at potential locations, where they included
propositions to extend the territory of investigation. New potential location proposition was evaluated and
measurements of ionizing radiation were done in relation to local products and environment. Assessment
of the health study on the occurrence of cancer in the area in comparison to the rest of Slovenia was
prepared and inclusion of the additional scenarios and accidental events in the safety analyses was made
(airplane drop). Impacts of repository development on the economic and social development of community
were studied.
38 ARAO disclaimer: The answers given above were prepared for this questionnaire and are given for the
purpose of this questionnaire only. These answers do not replace statements and positions of ARAO given
in published mission and vision statements available also in yearly reports.
48
Ministry of Environment representative
I understand safety as a professional assurance that such measures are adopted which contribute to the
protection to the maximum extent possible. Institution of LP in which local population is involved in
project is urgent and necessary. Their role is mostly that they draw attention to the problems and raise
various issues. Given LP Krško and Brežice I believe that they did not fully function, because they
unfortunately failed to reach a solution. Even otherwise, I have mixed feelings, because it seemed that
individuals want to implement certain interests.
5.4.2. Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety
What were the conditions for public inquiries/contributions in the framework of Local
Partnership? Under what circumstances could public make these contributions/inquiries?
Did public have access to expertise? What kind of?
What kind of capacity/resources could the public use during the case?
How do you perceive success in this case? What does success mean for you in this case?
How was public control achieved in this case?
Civil society representative (1) in Local Partnership Krško
Within local partnership, we have had the opportunity to ask questions, make comments and
contributions. The questions at the workshops, seminars and meetings were accepted, but on the spot
there were mostly no real answers. Most of the comments and suggestions in the continuation were not
considered.
The LP has had access to most of the studies which were made by ARAO (environmental assessment, safety
studies) in the process of preparation documentation and siting. Later it turned out that some of the data
from the studies were excluded as well as that some of the studies and research were done in such a way
that they met investors’ expectations. Studies were produced mostly by domestic experts who have been
closely associated with the client (ARAO).
Financial and human resources management was in hands of two stakeholders of LP (municipality and
ARAO) so that the third stakeholder (civil society) did not have a significant impact on it and was not able
to use it. Professional materials were mainly extracted from internet sites, which were in the majority in
the English language and thus inaccessible to many people.
I estimate that Krško local partnership at least from the perspective of interested residents have not been
successful. From our point of view neither the state nor the local authority has respect the provisions of
signed international agreements and conventions that give the inhabitants certain power for participation
in the decision-making. I estimate that public oversight and public participation in the formulation of
technical solutions have not been reached.
Civil society representative (2) in Local Partnership Krško
The public can just trust in presented technical data, but it cannot judge upon them. As for the technical
aspects of safety, the objective of LP was largely achieved. Professionals who have demonstrated
technical solutions to lay population put great efforts in that, which I think was good. Access to
information, studies and sources relating to the technical aspects has been enabled. This area has been
relatively well treated and covered, and (depending on the ability of the public) beautifully presented.
Everything else (political will, financial matters) remained intact, by using hidden agendas, so also the
already established trust was destroyed.
The public opinion poll, which was conducted in the municipality by ARAO in 2009, namely showed an
increase of acceptability, but it is my suggestion that money can do everything. This facility does not have
societal acceptance and support. The investor was supporting and participating in local partnership in
order to force certain things, but they did not meet the agreement with population, therefore the
acceptability for facility was not achieved. Partnership was set up precisely with a view to obtain the
acceptance.
49
Civil society representative in Local Partnership Brežice
The overall assessment is positive; the public was given the opportunity for participation. We had access
to studies and we suggested some studies to be done in addition. ARAO was at that time extremely
cooperative. The public was given the opportunity to tell everything.
As for performance, the partnership has been partially certainly successful. Especially in the first stage
when some of the important steps were carried out. But we did not manage to be there until the end
because we were previously excluded, in fact excluded from the process itself and we were not able to
determine whether the location is suitable for the siting of the repository or not. It hurts us as well that
there is no continuation of the process. Even in neighbouring location it seemed that it was only a political
solution in agreeing and adopting decisions where the location for repository would be and had no
connection with the professionalism.
The public (within LP) had the opportunity to comment, the other question is, how many responds were
gathered from ARAO. There, to our proposals was not constructive co-operation. Proposals were rejected
because there was obviously Krško location forced from beginning. It is clear that these decisions were
taken long before the official confirmation on the municipal council was taken in 2009.
Official explanation for not following comments provided by LP Brežice was that the potential location in
Brežice (a new one, proposed by LP) is on a retention area of hydro power plant, and therefore does not
provide safety. This argument is increasingly seen as unproven as flood situation is the same at both
locations (also at confirmed Vrbina site).
Unfortunately the partnership was abolished before we could work on serious technical solutions. After all
these years, I think that surface disposal would be technically much better, safer and cheaper. Still, I
doubt that the existing terrain is suitable for the type of repository as selected (silo type of facility,
underground), after talking with elderly locals, miners I heard the opinion that land will spit it out. Also,
the site is located within Zagreb airport landing corridor, and at visible distance from NATO's military
airport at Cerklje, (which may be in the reserve scenario serves as a combat airport) reflecting the
ignorance / non-compliance with local conditions.
Slovenian nuclear safety administration representative
I think that public control and public participation has been achieved in technical solutions, both through
the action of local partnerships as well as public presentation and public discussion of the proposed
solutions. The procedure in several places was provided for public participation, they could took
advantage of this opportunity and actively participated in the creation of solutions. The interested public
has access to studies and expert opinions, of course, if they take this opportunity. In the case of the siting
of the repository, the SNSA did not receive any application for any such documentation by public.
Municipality of Krško representative
Conditions for participation in LP were excellent. The interested public had the access to all available
expert opinions, which were at disposal at that time. LP was successful; it was made in a way to enable
cooperation.
Former employee of ARAO responsible for stakeholders’ engagement
Local partnerships were having possibilities to participate in different topics: they were involved in formal
procedures (spatial planning process and strategic environmental assessment) but also in informal
evaluation of potential locations suitability. The differences of established local partnerships in two
municipalities also resulted in different decision making settings. In Brežice the decisions were discussed
and taken by steering committee, but the proposal was coming from all citizens. In the Krško the decision
making process was organised within the assembly and all member of local partnerships were discussing
and taking decisions. More formal structure however also complicates the efficiency and effectiveness of
decisions.
50
The local partnerships were able to access the studies and expert opinions which were developed for their
potential locations. Majority of the raised questions were addressed, special funds were enabled for
conducting separate studies and expertise according to their opinion.
The funding was assured for all period of LPs functioning – the resources were very high and were
controlled by the LPs itself. Some money was given for administrative support, some for functioning of LPs
and some for activities. A separate yearly budget was foreseen for studies and expertise.
The conditions for LPs were very good and according to the best available practice worldwide. It is also
true that this approach was arranged for the first time in Slovenia due to the fact that previous attempts
to site the location for repository failed. The different composition and arrangement of LPs was the result
of negotiations with individual municipality and resulted in two different modes: one mainly very
independent of elected municipality representatives (mayor and council members) and the other very
connected to municipality organisations. Both were accepted by implementing organisation ARAO. The
local partnerships were successful in helping to site the location for repository, but they also brought some
unsolved problems, mainly linked with the use of the compensation funds and very different amounts
given to different municipalities.
The public was able to participate in the process and was given opportunity to participate also in technical
solutions regarding the repository. The real use this opportunity took a lot of efforts still from those who
participated.
Agency for Radwaste management representative
We should clearly distinguish environmental and health aspects of safety and security and physical
protection aspects of safety. The later (security and physical protection) should be treated as properly
protected information to assure its purpose (as prescribed by valid legislation).
Local partnership (and other involvements of the public) has certainly improved the transparency of the
process. The involvement of the public (general public, technical public, scientific independent public,
etc.) in the planning process increases the number of potential questions posed to the internal and
external experts. Such broad thinking can improve the “think-tank” and as such improves the process.
On the other hand, the time scales on which different stakeholders operate are very different. On one side
we have some representatives, expecting results within a day, and on another side we have other
representatives, that require months or years to prepare and present answers with required scientifically
certainty. This miss-match could lead to miss-understandings, which need to be resolved in appropriate
dialogs between stakeholders.
In case of LILW repository siting the local partnership could have access to all documents that were
presented in the strategic impact assessment phase, including preliminary safety report. The experts that
could comment and explain the documents to the members of the public were available through local
partnership, independent studies, including safety studies could also be made on request of the
partnership. 13 studies were commissioned by the local partnerships in the period 2006-2010; 6 of them
dealt with the issue of safety and impacts on health, environment and future development of the local
community, 7 with the issue of financial incentives.
Members of local partnership showed more interest for leadership and policy making aspects than for
technical questions. Because of small number of participants and consequently low representativeness of
this body it could not be as efficient and credible as expected.
5.4.3. Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance
What actors are/have been involved in the Local Partnership with regard safety?
What was the role of different actors with regards safety?
Was there any interaction between the actors?
Civil society representative (1) in Local Partnership Krško
In the local partnerships have been in terms of providing safety included only one of the partners - ARAO
who participated in the production of safety documents. Other experts who participated or produced
commissioned studies were marginal.
51
Because of that they have a role to convince the local population that they offered the best solution.
Among these actors (the experts from nuclear), the cooperation was good because they had the same
goals. Various positions almost were not present.
Civil society representative (2) in Local Partnership Krško
Actors participating in the local partnership were practically two: one was civil society (residents) and the
other was state (through various institutions - municipalities and ARAO). In this game the state can do with
residents whatever it wants. LPs have been established with an agenda to enable that state would achieve
its purpose (location). Behind the state the nuclear lobby was hidden – it did not participate openly.
It is difficult to talk about safety if we are talking only about the minor percentage of the safety posed by
the repository. All the rest (of high level radioactive waste, the second block of NPP) are topics that we
could not speak about. The population is not asked about these questions, people are not informed what is
happening in the NPP. Exercises for emergency preparedness and response are carried out as a desk
exercises included only those who need to be familiar with the matter, the residents do not know about
anything. Even masks and protective clothing are not given to be at least aware that something can
happen. Residents are totally unprepared. They believe that it will never happen, as they were convinced
of this. However, if something should happen, it would prove disastrous situation, how uninformed people
are. They do not know that in case of an emergency they only have few hours to leave the area.
Civil society representative in Local Partnership Brežice
Cooperation with ARAO was good, while municipality was not really interested in active cooperation in LP.
On one hand it allowed full independence of LP, on the other hand we did not get help when it was
needed. The mayor was present only in one meeting with ARAO, and even then at a stage when everything
was already lost. Also at co-ordinations with MOP, where municipal clerk was involved, we could not
influence the decision, since the arrangements were made in advance. ARAO was acquainted with the
activities of LP. LP was slightly less informed about plans of ARAO and has naively believed in fairness, for
what later turned out that there was not the case from management side.
LP did not want preferential treatment; we just want to have a fair and equal attitude! They were aware
that in the case of equal conditions it would be likely to choose the Krško location due to economic
reasons. But LP cannot accept hypocritical, insidious and corrupt relationship they had in the last phase of
the LP.
Municipality of Krško representative
Those who had an interest participated in the LP. The role of LP was the assessment of social acceptability
in particular in terms of safety. Actors in the LP Krško have perfectly worked together with each other.
Former employee of ARAO responsible for stakeholders engagement
In local partnerships there were in general 3 groups involved: implementer ARAO (national radioactive
waste management organisation), representatives of municipality and elected representatives (city
council) and citizens (local population).Occasionally different experts were attending presentations,
meetings, round tables, etc.
In depth discussion on the safety were organised but the level of discussion was focused mainly on the
concerns of citizens. To discuss safety related issues in depth one should prepare the citizens differently.
The discussion was mainly the field for improving the confidence between different groups. Also within the
civil society representatives and local population there were different level of knowledge, interest and
also opinion and perception. During different events the collaboration was established and better
connections were started.
Agency for Radwaste management representative
In local partnerships there were 3 partners involved: waste management organisation (ARAO) as
implementer, elected representatives of local community (city council) and volunteering representatives
of general public (local citizens).
Discussion on the safety analyses were organised but the level of discussion was focused mainly on the
general concerns of citizens, for examples increased cancer risk. The participants of the discussions from
52
the general public and local community did not really question safety related issues and they expressed
that they trust technical experts (and ARAO) to provide a safe solution. The discussion was mainly the field
for improving the trust between different groups.
5.4.4. Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders
What actors are/have been involved in the Local Partnership with regard safety?
What was the role of different actors with regards safety?
Was there any interaction between the actors?
Civil society representative (1) in Local Partnership Krško
Cooperation among stakeholders was in the first phase quite constructive. Later in the process this
cooperation was only between the municipality and ARAO, the residents were more and more opposition,
because virtually none of the proposals were taken into account.
In the initial stage almost all topics were addressed (technical aspects, safety aspects, economic aspects,
environmental aspects and social acceptability). In the last year we talked only about the purely social
acceptance, but despite the positive decision of the municipal council about repository, the acceptance
within the residents had not been reached.
The differences were mainly in the areas of selection of suitable sites, repository type and mode of
compensation to local residents. The information were obtained through visits abroad in similar
environments and the on the Internet.
Civil society representative (2) in Local Partnership Krško
Substantive cooperation within LP is referred only to the safety in respect of the repository, which
represents only a small percentage of the problem. 95% of the problems, however, were not the subject of
debate. If they like with 5% safety show how everything is safe, they are making fools of us. However, if
they think this is true, they are fools themselves. When talking about safety, we spoke only on the
technical aspects of the repository; the long-term aspects were not discussed.
The partnership could lead to an agreement - as residents bear a particular burden they would need to get
compensation. In the case of Krško it has been achieved, but with a major flaw that this money is again
left to the budget of municipality which can use it and have the residents for fools. Money is spent
unintentionally; it gives the power and authority over the people.
LP made very clear model, which included criteria for compensating, depending on the proximity of the
object. For residents would get at least partial satisfaction. Thus, when this proposal was not adopted,
they have shown the political and technical immaturity and inability to manage these issues.
The funds intended for LP was directed by municipality for LP secretary and to local PR company which
performed according to instructions from municipality. Two thirds of the funds was managed by
municipality. One-third went for the excursion, the rest we have worked on a voluntary basis.
Civil society representative in Local Partnership Brežice
The information was made available for LP and received from ARAO, but we missed transparent approach
where partners would be presented all matters of interest. It turned out in fact that various partnerships
were based on different contracts. LP Krško had a contract for cooperation during the period of siting, the
documents acquisition, construction and operation, while LP Brežice only had a contract for the time of
siting. But it should be noted that in the final stage also LP Krško was circumvented and abolished.
Objections were raised as soon as the question of equality was raised (that also in Brežice deep borehole
investigation should be performed with completely transparent field research). ARAO excuse was that they
could not get licenses because Brežice apparently become "too dangerous" rival. The percentage of public
acceptability in the Brežice started to rise and approached dangerously those in Krsko. Therefore, the
process has been very rapidly finished. Cooperation with ARAO and municipality was very good in the first
phase, lacking only a little more agile attitude from municipality Brežice. In the second stage (last year)
ARAO departed from the LP. We felt that we were serving only as a cover for ARAO that the process of
selection between two locations was transparent and that they easier legitimized the decision about
repository. It was a well-planned game, which was also nicely performed. Civil initiatives were politically
motivated.
53
Funds for the operation of the LP were enough and could be independently managed. The funds were
allocated transparently and used effectively. An added value of LP was also that we have learned a lot
from the cooperation.
Slovenian nuclear safety administration representative
In the process of site selection for repository the regular coordination were held, led by the responsible
ministry for adoption of the national spatial plan. In co-ordination also LPs participated. In co-ordination
meetings mainly procedural issues were discussed. Contextual discussions were little, and began more
towards the end, when things were just before the adoption of the national spatial plan. There were no
objections within the process. The notable evolution was the development of knowledge about the
repository concept (saturated geological repository environment) between the various stakeholders. Given
the fact that we are regulatory body assessing the safety of the repository we had all the information
available through the procedure of issuing opinions in the process of adopting national spatial plan.
Municipality of Krško representative
Cooperation between various stakeholders was good and argumentative. The main themes were the safety
and compensation for the acceptance of this object. Objections have been made on the method and
amount of compensation.
Former employee of ARAO responsible for stakeholders engagement
Cooperation between different stakeholders was formed and started as a good promise. But later in the
process some actors perceived the participation of others as not so positive any more. We could say that
there was a lot of suspicion of different hidden agenda among all and the first very positive attitude were
changing. The formal actors did not do enough to stop the suspicions and to support the open and
transparent collaboration. It was also evident that the problems which arose were not solved properly and
according to some procedures.
Within local partnerships all different topics were discussed: technical solutions, safety and environmental
issues, economic impacts, information distribution and communication activities, the use of compensations
and social acceptability.
The main points of disagreements were depending on local partnerships, but connected to the potential
location, type of facility at the location, use of compensation, the process how to adopt the site, what is
social acceptability.
The access to information was given in several different ways: meetings, web pages, presentations and
round tables, material available at info points, visits of other examples in the world, participation in
international projects devoted to radioactive waste management.
Agency for Radwaste management representative
Local partnerships for LILW repository siting were active in years 2005-2009 and after 6-10 years it is
difficult to give very precise answers. If stakeholders are considered as members of three partner groups
(municipality, ARAO, general public) then we evaluate the cooperation between them as being correct and
satisfactory in general.
Safety culture and transparency are intertwined with all segments of our operation. Safety along with
environmental and social acceptability is our primary consideration.
The access to information is given in several different ways: meetings, web pages, presentations and
round tables, material available at info points, excursions to similar facilities in other countries, …
In the first years of the LP, various topics were discussed: safety, impacts of the repository on human
health, environment, economy, future development of the local community, restricted land use and
financial compensations. The dissemination of information was good, communication was vivid and
multidirectional. In the final stage the discussion was reduced almost only on the financial
compensations. Conflicting views among the members were related to this issue.
5.4.5. Trust
How would you characterize the interaction (if any) between actors/stakeholders?
What were the main points of interaction/the main topics of discussions?
54
At which points could you identify controversies?
How could you get your information?
Civil society representative (1) in Local Partnership Krško
In the case of LILW repository the general observations from interested residents is that neither local
community-municipality, nor the appropriate state institutions can be trusted. First their main interest is
to obtain the highest possible economic impacts, and as much money for granted consent, the other
because they want to solve the problem with as low resistance as possible.
The radioactive waste management and repository establishment in the world is not new, there are
already established an excellent technologies that are used and has proved to be good. For this reason, it
is also necessary to trust the experts to choose high-quality technology.
In order to increase trust a direct, open and honest dialogue would be required with equitable
consideration of all stakeholders. This should be followed by timely and correct communication.
Due to unacceptability of public participation and poor cooperation between the stakeholders' the
confidence in this case is still poor. For most people interested the siting process it is not yet completed.
Also other nuclear related issues were not resolved. In May this year a Posavje Nuclear local partnership
was established (currently the stakeholders are only interested people from Posavje municipalities), and
we expect to begin resolving the issues with NPP.
Civil society representative (2) in Local Partnership Krško
The sense of LP is that people, who know the local environment in detail, can contribute this knowledge in
finding solutions and engaging. If the population already has to bear the burden, it is necessary to discuss
also about the payment. This idea we wanted to carry out, but unfortunately without success.
It happened just the opposite - the contribution of the public did not increase confidence. LP showed that
the inhabitants were prepared to examine whether the municipality and the state are trustworthy. In the
end, with their exit they proved that they were not worthy. It is the biggest indicator of success and this
LP. Social acceptance has not been reached. Prior to the construction licence there will be again time to
ask for social acceptance.
LP Civil society representative in Local Partnership Brežice
Public participation has increased confidence in the safety and the project itself. If the case would be
posed again, they would certainly involve more people from several local communities.
Stakeholders would not trust to the state ever again. They entered into partnership with no expectations
for earnings, in the end, that was the part of the state policy maneuverer. It has left a bitter aftertaste,
which is important not only for that repository, but for all future projects which will be implemented. The
electricity production group GEN and the Nuclear Power plant of Krško company (Nuklearna Elektrarna
Krško – NEK), owned by GEN, are vehemently about the second block as it is self-evident that it will be
built because a lot of money was already invested - but the willingness of the people will happen here!
As a respond to unmet promises of ARAO the newly formed nuclear Posavje local partnership turned out.
ARAO had promised many things, but when it came to the target location – site for repository – all the
promises were forgotten. But from a location to the building is still far away and the new partnership is
necessary and useful. When the activities related to the construction will started also the activities of the
new partnership will escalate.
Slovenian nuclear safety administration representative
I think we can trust the various stakeholders who participated in the phase of adoption of spatial planning
act. Depending on the nature of the object and the fact that it is the first time we locate such a facility in
the area, it was felt the lack of understanding of the process of radioactive waste disposal (within the
majority stakeholder).
Just sile disposal of radioactive waste in geological formations is a proven technology that we trust. It is
true that any repository with the design in relation to the geological host environment is unique and
special case, which has to be well examined, especially the interaction of the disposal facility and its
surroundings. At the stage of site selection, the technology (detailed concept) has not yet been developed
and it is difficult to assess.
55
Local partnership participated actively in the process of site selection. In our view, it contributed to the
social acceptance of this object, but not least, the compensation to the local community played a decisive
contribution to social acceptability.
Municipality of Krško representative
Yes I trust the technology based on presentations of various studies. Confidence in the local environment
is high.
Former employee of ARAO responsible for stakeholders engagement
The possibilities for building the trust in different actors were given although at the end all different
groups were expressing certain level of disappointment with the trust. Civil society representatives were
not trusting ARAO and municipality and vice versa. This was especially typical for case of LP in Krško was
the decision to support the site was first made by city council.
The proper trust in technology was achieved by all members of LPs. There was a certain degree of
scepticism for the type which was selected (silo type of repository in saturated zone) but was afterward
accepted.
The building of trust is a very demanding task and should have a special attention. Basically we could
assess that the trust was important component of LPs, but it is very hard to assure for a very long time
under different conditions that the trust is continuously maintain. The preconditions for trust, e.g. the
clear and open decision making process was not fully achieved. But there have been many opportunities
for information exchange and for communication.
The participation of public definitely increased the trust in the process of site selection, but at the same
time also made clearer that such processes should be well design in the process term, flexible enough to
address different situations and that the fairness should be constantly looked at. The termination of LPs
after the site was selected was not the best idea, especially since one LP (in Krško) had in their statute
promise that they will be in function also after the selection of the site.
Agency for Radwaste management representative
We strive to build constructive and cooperative relationships with stakeholders. Public participation and
relations with public concerned are very important part of our stakeholder map and as such
communication with the public is contributing to trust and relation building.
It is difficult to generalize the aspect of trust building. ARAO is constantly establishing, fostering and
improving relationship with various stakeholders in order to improve the conditions for building and
sustaining the trust. We believe that transparent and open communication from the sides of all
stakeholder groups is the necessary but not sufficient background for reciprocal trust. Other factors, like
general political and economic situation, social stability, level of knowledge etc. also influences the trust.
5.5. Analysis of the outcomes of the interviews
5.5.1. Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case of Local Partnership
One of Local Partnership basic aim was to “standardise” or “calibrate” the safety evaluations for RW
repository in which local/regional population were invited and participated. In this respect two level of
safety aspects should be considered and differentiated: a) direct and b) indirect safety influences of RW
repository operation, meaning that two level operational strategies are needed. The benefit of structured
common understanding would be long term stability and trust in safety performance of repository. But
quite evident and important problems (obstacles) in reaching such stable understanding of safety were
identified. First of all the differences in comprehension of information about LILW repository safety
between experts and local residents are still substantial. This is somehow surprising since all important
information on safety of LILW repository are formally available already for a long time, as claimed by
regulators and other responsible institutions. Second very important and recognised problem is
concentration on technical dimensions of safety only mainly by regulators and implementer. This is also
surprising and very difficult to explain since the socio psychological, cultural, ideological etc. influences
are evident, stressed and analysed in a number of social experts reports on safety perception of nuclear
56
technology. Because of these major difficulties, building of trust between all stakeholders involved
remains a basic precondition to improve understanding of safety and safety culture. The fact that
retrievability of LILW is not an option and was never open and discussed also does not contribute to build
trust in safety culture of main protagonists. In situation of low trust all options should remain open to
discussion although supported by few and weak arguments.
A lot of suggestions how to improve LP functioning was mentioned and this should be treated as an
indicator of dissatisfaction with LP work. The same is with endeavours to get the reliable guaranties on
safety performance. The problem is that those who should deliver “reliable guaranties” are not reliable.
However the independent funding for LPs was established as perhaps the most basic precondition to reach
reliable information since it would enable to hire independent experts. However the independence of use
of the funds was hindered as the contracts were signed between ARAO (implementer) and municipalities
(mayor). So it was at the end the structure of LPs and the municipality who agreed on the use of funds. In
one LP (Brežice) the activities were very clearly decided at the LP structures, including the independent
studies. In another LP the decision was to have a special entity (public relations agency) hired for
performing support communication activities for LP in Krško. By coincident this agency was providing the
activities also for mayor and majority of nuclear industry companies. One of the most eloquent conclusions
is that open communication is precondition of safety performance but vice versa also safety is
precondition of open communication and cohabitation of nuclear technology installations since there is no
need to hide anything from concerned people. Even more: open information distribution, researching and
proactive education of local people to make them competent for dialogue and to improve safety culture
are basic preconditions to reach legitimate decision making on LILW siting. To reach such an “ideal” state
the coordination, even synchronisation of involved institutions from local to national level should be
organised. Many remarks on problems in safety understanding and improving overall safety culture suggest
that these problems go beyond the capacities of involved institutions.
Were coordination actions of MOP (Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning) effective and
whether it was possible to achieve any change in the administrative procedure?
Quite wide spread is opinion that Ministry of environment and spatial planning (MOP) was not efficient
enough in coordinating the LP participation in siting decision making. The design of administrative
procedures was underestimating specific circumstances in decision making about nuclear technology. On
the other side inefficiency is not surprising since in Slovenia in general trust in governmental institutions is
extremely low. This unfavourable socio-political context nevertheless harms very much the efficient
participation in decision making. In particular case distrust was strengthened by rather evident
observations of the participants representing local civil society that formal administrative procedures were
strongly influenced by hidden political interests and hidden agenda. Further Local Partnership members
openly admit that they were not competent enough to participate in decision making process, since their
knowledge on technical dimensions of the LILW repository was not appropriate. Distrust in administrative
procedures was therefore also a consequence of low “technical” competences of some LP members. The
formal structure of LP was not sensitive enough to consider and solve these problems. For instance it was
not designed to empower the LP members to participate in discussions on safety. General fact that safety
in broader sense, in fact “social construction” of safety, depends very much on value structure was often
ignored. As a consequence quite strong division on safety evaluation emerges between technical experts
and local population represented in LP. In such formal institutional arrangements safety was understood as
too complicated set of procedures, systems, structures, and components, something very abstract and too
complex to be efficiently applied. On the other side the local population in fact the representatives of the
local population in LP were dealing with much more “simple” dilemma, how the LILW repository will
influence their life and the value of their real estates. The legitimisation of safety performance by LP, and
local population was in such condition rather improbable. Quite substantial evolution of administrative
procedures would be needed. Overall the role of LP was interpreted as ambiguous, even confusing by its
membership. The same is valid about the evaluation of final effects of LP. The fact that the organisation
and role of LP in different municipalities differ quite a lot contribute to confusion.
57
5.5.2. Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety
Rather strong impression of LP membership is that safety expertise was arranged largely according to the
interests of state i.e. ARAO. This is rather surprising because common understanding of LILW safety was
one of the fundamental objectives of the LP. The feeling of manipulation was reinforced since the
problems presented in public discussions were first formally accepted to be later often ignored. People
believe that the expertise was made public but not in integral version. Supposedly some important
information was removed. These are of course rather strong accusations and should be further examined,
but nevertheless even if these feelings are false they indicate strong distrust between LP membership and
the representatives of other stakeholder especially government institutions. After long lasting of LILW
siting including participation of local population some substantial safety questions remain open. Local
representative are expressing strong doubts on project. Even within the civil society representatives and
local population there exists quite different level of knowledge, interest, opinions and perceptions and
evaluations of LP performance. Although the criticism is quite strong, some are claiming that the overall
conditions for LP work were good and according to the best available practice worldwide. The LP
contributed to more transparent procedures. But rather important numbers of LP members remains critical
about whole proceedings. These disagreements are quite important and should be further carefully
analysed. In this respect it is possible to assert that the public control of the LILW siting project from
safety perspective by LP was not achieved entirely or it was only partially fruitful. It is important to stress
that there exist quite important disagreements between different LPs. Nevertheless, rather strong
impression is that the participation of local people represented by LP was just a performance to satisfy
formal and informal EU participative standards and that this is the reason why the substantial discussion
on safety as public affair was mostly missing.
5.5.3. Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance
One of the most convincing indicators of weak substantial discussion on LILW disposal safety is finding that
some LP members remain very critical about the people’s knowledge on how to act in dangerous event. In
depth discussion on the safety were organised but the level of discussion was focused mainly on the
concerns of citizens. Because there still exist a kind of knowledge deficit about very practical procedures
in dangerous events some members of LP state that citizens should be educated and instructed by
independent experts. Only then in depth discussion of safety related issues could be possible. But first of
all the organised discussions should improve the confidence between groups. In this respect some events
were organised and collaboration was established but evidently the prime objective was not achieved.
Therefore the management (governance) of nuclear technology as hazardous technology is still in its
beginnings.
5.5.4. Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders
At the beginning the cooperation between stakeholders in framing the safety questions of LILW siting
proceedings was apparently appropriate, but soon enthusiasm vanished. One of the reasons was formal
informal divide which become quite transparent and obvious, and which activated hidden list of fears and
suspicions. Although all basic information was available to LP members by ARAO, more transparent and
interactive approach was missing. As a consequence co-framing of safety issues was very difficult to
achieve. In this respect differences between LP Krško and LP Brežice were disturbing. A lot of energy
(time) was lost in procedural questions, mainly as a consequence of unclear status of LP but also because
of different interests and perception of safety issue between LP members. In short there was a lot of
suspicion on different hidden agenda. At first very positive attitude changed and distorted communication
flow between different stakeholders inside and outside of LP. For instance the institutional actors (state
and municipality) were not active enough to stop the rumours on suspicions and to support open and
transparent collaboration between “partners”. It was also evident that some exposed problems were not
solved properly according to agreed procedures.
5.5.5. Trust
Background social context of many complications in communication campaign on safety of LILW repository
was mutual low trust of all parties involved - from local to national level. At the time the LPs were active
58
and leading the discussion on LILW repository safety the only exception in this respect were EU
institutions. After the termination of LPs even EU institutions wasted their credibility potential and as a
consequence trust in EU institutions and projects is nowadays rather weak. This is the reason why it is now
much more difficult to build confidence in safety of LILW siting with the support of European initiatives.
The deterioration of the trust includes European expert groups as well. Even the attempts to raise low
level of trust are not that efficient as it looks like at the beginning of the LPs activation. This is partly due
to specific historical socio-political and economic development of Slovenia. Initially LPs proved that
people were willing to cooperate and participate in decision making about LILW repository siting. But at
the same time they suspiciously observe the roles of other stakeholders and constantly test the credibility
of its performance. As it was mentioned already above the double role of local (municipality) and national
(state) institutions was recognised and this was taken as a proof of their low credibility. This was finally
confirmed with termination of the LPs as soon as formal adoption of LILW repository site as prime
objective was achieved. It is possible to make sarcastic conclusion that the success of LP was to show real
credibility status of state and municipality. But knowing the contextual circumstances of building and
maintaining trust it is obvious that this is rather difficult and enigmatic endeavour. The idea to make
breakthrough with local people participation in LILW repository siting by innovative LP was nevertheless
good in line with theoretical and practical knowledge. But as it was demonstrated, the precondition for
trust building, e.g. transparent and open decision making process, was not present. Why this happened is
rather perplex question. The answer should be traced further examining the political culture, i.e. value
structure of all stakeholders involved in LP.
59
5.6. Conclusions and recommendations
Two level of safety should be considered and differentiated: a) direct and b) indirect safety influences of
NPP operation, meaning that two level operational strategies are needed. It is obviously that partnership
relations cannot be established merely declarative or formally, but this can happen only if a minimum
consensus about problems and priorities is achieved. This was not the case in the examined LP.
Establishing a true partner relationship in itself requires a willingness to learn and sometimes even accept
views and interests of the partners. From this perspective, a key requirement for building genuine
partnerships is learning from partners including ongoing integration of new knowledge in the process of
participatory decision-making. One of the fundamental characteristics of approach that includes
continuous learning and adaptation to new insights is constant self-evaluation of the partner relations.
This was missing although it has substantial impact on partnerships performance. It should be considered
that RW siting is part of a much wider and very complex nuclear energy technology issues. This actually
means that even the most sophisticated local efforts to establish democratic decision making should
consider the wider international decision making arena.
Differences in comprehension of information on LILW safety between experts and local residents are
still substantial and inhibit co-framing of safety issues. Recognised problem is also concentration on
technical dimensions of safety only. More efficient distribution and dialogical discussion are obviously
needed. But the most important need is building of trust in all stakeholders involved. Distrust was
strengthened by the fact that formal administrative proceedings were strongly influenced by hidden
political interests and hidden agenda! These remain basic precondition to improve understanding of safety
and safety culture. A kind of “catch 22” is present: the problem is that those who should deliver “reliable
guaranties” are not reliable.
Background social context of many complications in communication campaign on safety of LILW was
mutual low trust of all parties involved - from local to national level. Many remarks on problems on
safety understanding and improving overall safety culture suggest that these problems go beyond the
capacities of stakeholders involved in LP. It seems that, at least at the local level information process has
already reached a level of maturity, even saturation respectively. But analysis has shown that even in
this area substantial improvements are possible in particularly in interactivity of the information flow.
Coordination, even synchronisation from local to national level should be reconsidered. Overall the role
of LP was interpreted as ambiguous, even confusing by participants. A lot of energy (time) was lost in
procedural questions, mainly as a consequence of unclear status of LP but also because of different
interests and perception of safety issue between LP members. It makes sense to pay down the detailed
procedural rules and the reasonableness of the organizational structure for the participatory involvement
of local partnership. Rather strong impression is that the participation of local people represented by LP
was just a performance to satisfy formal and informal EU participative standards. Quite substantial
evolution of administrative procedures would be needed. Formal informal divide become quite
transparent and activated hidden list of fears and suspicions. Instead of integration and reduction of
different opinions and attitudes formal and informal divide contributed to rather substantial growth of
differences between civil society and representatives of formal governing institutions (municipality, ARAO
etc.). One of the most important reasons of these divide was (is) conceptual difference in defining safety
issue.
Basic aim of the local partnerships to achieve optimal information and participation of the public on the
basis of mutual trust in in LILW repository siting procedures was not accomplished entirely. The mistrust
is mutual, "people" do not trust any political nor professional institutions, and these also do not trust the
"people". The aim of the LP will be achieved when the majority of active participants as well as passive
audience will believe that argumentative logic it is most important to reach understanding of the whole
problem set, rather than simply promoting the interests of individuals or certain social groups. It makes
sense to formulate the objective of the LP more realistic and to avoid political correct discourses.
60
The institutionalization of LP should take into account unequal power, unequal ability of organized
activities and the differences in the available knowledge and information of partners involved. Equating
unequal positions does not lead to partnerships. Representativeness of all interest groups in LP is essential
for attaining the legitimate operation of LP. Some Local Partnership members were not competent enough
to participate since their knowledge on technical dimensions of the LILW deposition was not appropriate.
Distrust in administrative procedures was therefore also a consequence of low “technical” competences of
some LP members. Although the criticism is quite strong, some are claiming that the overall conditions for
LP work were good and according to the best available practice worldwide. In this respect the
participation of local civil society in local partnership was positive experience. Some important
recommendation on safety issue, health standard quality of life in the region and compensations because
of limited space use were discussed and presented in LP agenda. However the most important question
how to distribute these compensations was implemented against the civil society will. This is the main
reason why the new local partnership is organized on regional level (including both Krško and Brežice
municipalities).
The analyses of the case of local partnerships also provide evidences that the participation of civil society
can have positive impacts on the safety of planned facility, especially if the safety is understand in a
broader term. The proposals for additional measurements in the field investigations, and some new
relevant scenarios for safety assessment of repository were identified also due to public participation in
local partnerships. Additionally the other important issues related to broader definition of safety were
analysed, like health impact of the local population from current NPP operation, cancer occurrence study
and comparison with the rest of Slovene territory, impact of the regional development. The local
partnerships also assured constant stretching of the responsible institution (constant requests for
information and explanations) therefore also helping the proponents to more clearly explain the scientific
evidences and to direct the research capacities to address open questions.
The new challenge in respect to civil society engagement and safety improvement would be to perform
the investigation of the on-going process where all drawback, reported in this analyses, could be better
solved.
61
5.7. References for the case study
ARAO (2005) Lokalno partnerstvo – vsebinske teze (Local partnership – esssential theses), Ljubljana,
Brežice (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) Program delovanja lokalnega partnerstva v Občini Brežice s poročili o
izvedenih aktivnostih (Operational programme for the local partnership in the municipality of Brežice
with reports on executed activities)
Krško (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) Program delovanja lokalnega partnerstva v Občini Krško s poročili o
izvedenih aktivnostih (Operational programme for the local partnership in the municipality of Krško with
reports on executed activities)
MOP (2004) Program priprave DLN za odlagališče NSRAO (Programme of preparations of the National
Spatial Plan for an LIWL repository), Ljubljana
Stéphane Baudé, Gilles Hériard Dubreuil (Mutadis, France), Drago Kos (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia),
Nadja Železnik (REC – Slovenia Country office), Zsuzsanna Koritár (EnergiaKlub, Hungary) (2015)
Theoretical and methodological framework, Paris
62
6. TRANSVERSAL ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES
6.1. Introduction
The objectives of ECCSSafe were notably to
Identify and specify the nature and added value of the civil society contribution to industrial safety;
Sketch out favourable conditions and means for the development of a contribution of civil society to the safety of industrial activities;
This chapter sketches out the different lessons that can be drawn from a transversal analysis of the 3 case
studies using the grid of analysis that was developed by the ECCSSafe project. As this project is an
exploratory research based on a reduced number of case studies (3 cases), it is difficult to infer some
generalities from such a limited empirical basis.
Yet, the comparison of the 3 case studies developed in this report nonetheless enables to draw some
lessons, which will have to be confirmed and refined by larger-scale research relying on a wider empirical
basis.
The outcomes of this transversal analysis are presented hereafter. The lessons learnt from the transversal
analysis of the case studies will be presented according to the different items of the grid of analysis
developed in ECCSSafe.
6.2. Understanding of safety and safety culture and identification of the contribution of civil society to safety
The case studies show that, under favourable circumstances, civil society can and has actually contributed
to safety of industrial activities. The engagement of the CLIs in the decennial safety visits of French
nuclear reactors and the mobilisation of civil society on the Dorog incinerator in Hungary demonstrate
actual improvements in safety due to the engagement of civil society organisations. If the Local
Partnerships in Slovenia have enabled a wide variety of local actors to address technical safety issues, it
was not possible to identify a clear impact on the safety of the LILW repository.
I these three case studies, we have identified that civil society has contributed to safety in the context of
the cases in different ways:
Stretching regulators and organisations operating hazardous facilities: in the French case study, the engagement of independent experts by the CLIS resulted in a sound assessment of safety issues, with informed and precise identification of points for improvement. The critics and questions formulated by the CLIS were partly taken into account by the electricity company operating the Fessenheim nuclear power plant and led to safety improvements. The existence of an informed and competent external scrutiny on the successive safety reviews has played a role of stretching of the electricity company and of the regulator and led the operator of the facility and the regulator to progressively set up conditions for both facilitating the assessment of safety reviews by experts commissioned by the CLIS and enabling better articulation between the institutional process of safety review and the external scrutiny organised by the CLIS. In the Hungarian case study, civil society organisations first played the role of whistleblowers regarding the unsafe operation of the incinerator and the damages caused to the environment, in a context in which the regulation system was not successful in ensuring the safety of the facility. In the Charter of the Environmental Protection Association of Dorog (EPAD), this mission of stretching is explicitly stated: “the Association implements the social control of industrial facilities…”. Moreover, the action of the EPAD, the municipality and the citizens of Dorog led to different safety investments by the company operating the incinerator between 1998 and 2009 (see table page Hiba! A könyvjelző nem létezik.). The Local Partnerships in Slovenia did constitute tool for informing and raising awareness of local actors and played a role of stretching of the radioactive waste agency (ARAO) through constant requests for information and explanations. However, the LPS were cancelled as soon as the location for the repository was formally adopted, thus ending their stretching capacity.
63
Identifying undetected safety issues: In the French case study, the engagement of civil society in the 1st and 2nd decennial safety review enabled to identify a few safety questions that were not identified by the electricity company or the regulator. Some of the points raised were taken into account and led to safety improvement (e.g. hydrogen recombiners meant to lower the risk of explosions due to hydrogen discharge were installed not only in the Fessenheim nuclear reactors but also in all other French nuclear power plants). During the 3rd decennial safety review, there was strong convergence between the opinion of the experts commissioned by the CLIS and the regulator, and the engagement of civil society did not lead to identify safety issues that would not have been identified by the regulator or the electricity company. In the Hungarian case of the Dorog incinerator, the investigations carried out by the Environmental Protection association of Dorog have highlighted various serious safety issues (e.g. storage of hazardous waste in the railway station without permission nor safety measures, or identification of water contamination caused by improper and unauthorised slag storage near the facility) that the institutional safety management system relying on the operating company and the regulator was unable to identify.
Pushing to reinforce some dimensions or include new dimensions in safety assessment: in the Slovenian case study, proposals for additional measurements in the field investigations and some new relevant scenarios for safety assessment of repository were identified as a result of public participation in local partnerships. Also, issues related to a broader definition of safety were analysed in the local partnerships like cancer occurrence study and comparison with the rest of the Slovene territory. In the French case study, the engagement of the CLIs and ANCCLI contributed to the renewed attention given to human and organisation factor following the Fukushima accident, which led to the organisation of a specific seminar gathering EDF, the ASN, the IRSN, the ANCCLI, carious CLIs and other actors.
Acting as an additional layer of quality insurance of the safety system: both in the French and in the Hungarian cases, civil society played the role of an additional layer of vigilance in the safety system, without substituting to the role of the organisation operating a hazardous facility nor to the role of the regulator. In the Hungarian case, society detected serious safety issues that were undetected before. In the French case, this led to reassurance of the reliability of the safety system.
Contributing to improve the transparency and readability of the safety system: in the three cases, the engagement of civil society contributed to transparency. In the Slovenian case, although there was frustration from numerous local actors engaged in the Local Partnerships, the LPs enabled a wide range of local actors to familiarise with the safety assessment processes, the licensing process, and better understand how safety was dealt with. In the French case study, the commissioning of experts by the CLIS led to explanations on what were the key issues at stake in the decennial safety reviews, how safety was assessed, and enabled the CLIs to better perform their mission of information of the population.
If the cases enabled to identify possible (and observed) contributions of civil society to safety to safety,
they also showed that this contribution of civil society to safety requires favourable conditions to develop.
These conditions include:
The existence of a clear and legitimate governance framework, enabling cooperation between operators of hazardous facilities, regulators, technical support organisations and civil society without blurring roles of these actors.
Access of civil society to information appears as a basic condition for engagement of civil society in safety issues and the autonomous development of autonomous investigations on safety issues by civil society organisations. However, this is not granted in all cases, as one of the first goals of civil society engagement seems to the very access to information. In the French case study, during the 1st decennial safety review, the experts commissioned by the CLS/CLIS experienced difficulties in accessing to some documents of the company operating the nuclear power plant. These difficulties resided in conflicts between access to information and industrial secret. These difficulties were overcome during the 2nd and 3rd decennial safety review by the signature of a convention granting access of the experts commissioned by the CLIS to the operator’s documentation, with the engagement of these experts not to disclose these documents. Similarly, in the Hungarian case study, the engagement of civil society resulted notably in an informal agreement between the company operating the incinerator and the Environmental Protection Association of Dorog, granting access to regular information about pollutant emissions by the incinerator and enabling members of the NGO to organise visits of the facility.
Access of civil society to expertise, including independent expertise and institutional expertise.
64
Access to institutional and non-institutional expertise is necessary for civil society to engage on technical issues, while access to expertise residing outside the institutional system of safety management is needed fro civil society to challenge institutional expertise. In the Hungarian case, there is some degree of access of the local NGO to expertise through the participation of experts from national NGOs to visits of the incinerator, however, the limits of this access to expertise was also stressed as there is no possibility for the NGO to commission or hire experts. In the Slovenian case, there was access of the Local partnership to the institutional expertise (notably the one of ARAO). However, the LPs did not succeed in reducing the knowledge gap between local actors and institutions having expertise in radioactive waste management. In the French case, there was access to both institutional expertise of the IRSN in a way that was tailored for the CLIs and access of the CLIS of Fessenheim to non-institutional experts through the commissioning of the GSIEN and other experts to make a critical assessment of decennial safety reviews.
Technical mediation: access to technical expertise is not enough for civil society actors (especially some without highly developed technical knowledge) to engage in safety issue. They also need actors playing a function of technical mediation or of translation in order that technical issues are presented in a way that is accessible to civil society and that related to its concerns. This role of technical mediation can be played by non-institutional experts (like the GSIEN in the French case study, or national NGO experts in the Hungarian case study) or by institutional experts (e.g. the IRSN supporting the work of the CLIs and the ANCCLI in the French case). In the Slovenian case, it seems that insufficiencies in this mediation function was one of the source of the frustration of local actors regarding the persistence of the gap between institutional experts and local actors.
Resources and empowerment of non-expert actors. Resources are needed in order to support empowerment and skills building of civil society actors engaged on safety issues. However, the mere existence of resources is not sufficient, as shows the case of the Local Partnerships. In order for resources to actually result in empowerment and skills building, it is necessary that civil society and local actors can influence the way the resources are used and are given some autonomy (e.g. in the Slovenian case, the lack of independence of the use of the funds was identified as an important flaw in the way Local Partnerships were organised, as the contracts for establishing the LPs were signed between the radioactive waste management agency and the municipalities).
The balance of power between civil society and institutional actors is also an important factor. The capacity of civil society to exert external pressure on the institutional system is a way to increase the chances that the institutional system takes due account of the contributions of civil society. In effect, in the case of the Dorog incinerator, it is the capacity of civil society and local actors to mobilise, organise demonstrations… that finally pushed the operating company to correct some safety issues then to engage in a more cooperative approach with civil society.
The considered cases also show that civil society contribution to safety can occur even if not all these
conditions are met (e.g. in the case of the Dorog incinerator, civil society actors succeeded to influence
safety although it had limited access to expertise and resources and no specific governance framework
facilitating their engagement). However, in the framework of an exploratory study such as ECCSSafe based
on only three cases, it is difficult to define precisely the sets of conditions which enable or not a
contribution of civil society to safety.
The understanding of safety differs in the three case studies. In the French case studies, where the
experts commissioned by the CLIS have a very high level of competence in nuclear safety, there is
convergence of views between these experts, the regulator and his technical support organisation to see
safety as a continuous improvement process, which is not only a matter of compliance with standards.
Here, the experts commissioned by the CLIS play not only a role of assessment of safety issues but also a
role of technical mediation, constituting an interface between the CLIS (with its pluralistic membership:
NGOs, workers of the nuclear facility, elected representatives and qualified personalities) and institutional
actors as regards safety issues. In the Hungarian case, safety is understood by civil society as an absence
of damage to health and the environment and the detected environmental damages caused by the
incinerator are identified as flawed safety. Here, the actions of civil society (e.g. demonstrations, trials,
..) resulted in forcing the company operating the incinerator to pursue a common goal with the local NGO:
reducing the environmental impact of the facility. In the Slovenian case, the LPs were composed of various
stakeholders wishing to engage in issues related to radioactive waste management ant the siting of a LILW
repository, including lay local citizens. In this case, the LPs did not succeed in reducing the knowledge and
competence gap between the local actors and institutional actors (e.g. the radioactive waste management
Agency, ARAO).
65
6.3. Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to safety
The different case studies show processes where the actual safety system progressively opens from a point
where safety is meant to be addressed by operators and regulators (and their technical support
organisations) to a point where it is commonly accepted that new players from civil society are engaged in
safety issues.
In France, the creation of Local Commissions attached to nuclear sites originated from the will of both
elected representatives and civil society organisations to follow-up nuclear facilities, and in particular
related safety issues. In the case of the decennial safety reviews of the Fessenheim nuclear reactors, the
decennial safety review were not originally meant to include a contribution from civil society and the
engagement of the CLS in an external assessment of the safety review was an unexpected initiative. This
evolved up to the point where the nuclear safety authority issued official guidelines to facilitate the
engagement of the CLIs in the 3rd decennial safety reviews of French nuclear reactors.
In the Hungarian case study, the Environmental Protection association of Dorog progressively set up the
conditions to be accepted as a partner by the management of the incinerator. Unlike the French situation,
this happened through an informal agreement rather than formal conventions; however, this informal
agreement is still in force today, and is enforced essentially by the balance of power between local actors
and the company operating the incinerator.
In the Slovenian case, the Local Partnerships were meant from the beginning to include local actors
(including volunteer lay citizens) into the decision-making process and giving them an opportunity to
engage in issues related to radioactive waste management and LILW repository siting. Here, this
engagement of civil society was presented as a common goal of the radioactive waste management
agency, the municipalities, the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning and the local actors and civil
society organisations engaging in the local partnerships. However, the LPs only partly fulfilled their
objective, as they did not actually enable local actors to build sufficient skills and knowledge to form their
own assessment of safety issues. Local actors therefore became progressively doubtful about the sincerity
of the intentions of the radioactive waste management agency and the municipality of Krško, as the LPs
were seen by an increasing number of local actors as aiming first and before all to promote the
acceptability of a project of LILW repository rather than enabling local actors to form an autonomous,
informed and sound opinion about the project.
In the three case studies, we can observe different ways of acknowledging and supporting the formation of
a “public” associated to safety issues, in John Dewey’s sense of the “public”, i.e. the people affected by
an activity, which progressively structure to investigate and influence this activity.
In the Slovenian case study, the LPs are tools to acknowledge and form this “public” as any local actor
(including lay citizens) had the possibility to become member of the Local Partnership. Here, there was no
“selection” of the public. However, if the LPs succeeded to some extent to help local actors to understand
issues related to LILW repository (including safety issues), the way it enabled them to actually influence
the decision-making process was questioned.
In the Hungarian case study, the public was composed of the municipality of Dorog, lay citizens (which
took part to the demonstrations against the incinerator) and the Environmental Protection Association of
Dorog. Here, this public formed spontaneously without any supporting process (e.g. like the CLIs and the
ANCCLI in France or the LPs in Slovenia). The Environmental Protection Association of Dorog plays a role of
an interface between the public and safety issues, which is explicitly stated in the Charter of the
association: “The Association implements the social control of industrial facilities by a method based on
multi-stakeholder and democratic procedure…”. The municipality has played a role of mediation between
the association and the company operating the incinerator.
In the French case study, the public of safety issues is composed of several layers:
66
The inhabitants of the department of Haut-Rhin, which are informed by the CLIS about the activities of the nuclear power plant,
The members of the CLIS (local elected representatives, workers of the power plant, local civil society organisations and qualified personalities) who have built sufficient knowledge to formulate relevant questions and have critical views on how safety is dealt with,
The groups of experts commissioned for the different decennial safety reviews. Here the GSIEN can be considered both as part of the “public” associated to the issued of the safety of Fessenheim power plant (although not being local actors) and as an external actor playing a role of scientific mediation.
In the three case studies, the process in which the “public” (in Dewey’s sense) develops its investigations
regarding safety had different origins. In the Slovenian case study, the process was triggered and
supported by the Government and the radioactive waste management agency. In the Hungarian case, the
process was an autonomous process of mobilisation of civil society and local actors. The French case
represents an hybrid situation in which the CLS of Fessenheim (the first CLI to be created for the first
French nuclear power plant) was at first created by local elected representatives but was then recognised
as a valuable initiative by the government, which then encouraged local elected representatives to create
similar local commissions. From the beginning of the 1980’s to the beginning of the 2010’s, the CLIs
become more and more institutionalised through:
Recognition by the nuclear safety authority and by its technical support organisation (the IRSN) of the contribution of the CLIs to safety debates by the nuclear safety authority
Development by the CLIs of an autonomous national organisation, the ANCCLI
Inclusion of the CLIs in the legal framework of nuclear activities by the 2006 on safety and transparency of nuclear activities.
As regards access to expertise, In the Slovenian case, there was some access to expertise through the
access to existing studies and the possibility to have complementary studies done. However, the studies
presented to the LPs were produced by domestic experts with strong links with the radioactive waste
management agency and there was no room for pluralistic or independent expertise. In the Hungarian
case, there was no specific access to expertise except the participation of experts from national NGOs in
the site visits organised by the Environmental Protection Association of Dorog. The lack of access to
expertise is clearly identified by the association as a weak point. In the French case, the CLIS of
Fessenheim had the possibility to commission experts of its choice to investigate the safety of the nuclear
reactors at the occasion of the three successive decennial safety visits. Moreover, hey also benefited from
the expertise of the IRSN and the ASN during working meetings and during the pilot case organised by the
IRSN for the 2rd decennial safety review. This access to different sources of expertise enabled the CLIS to
be very specific and well-informed in forming its opinion on safety issues.
Autonomy of civil society and its ability to mobilise means and expertise according to its own needs seem
key conditions for civil society to develop its inquiries regarding safety issues and exert influence on how
these issues are dealt with.
6.4. Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance
The three case studies show different governance settings as regards the inclusion of civil society actors.
In the Hungarian case, the formal governance system is essentially centred on the interactions between
the operator of the incinerator and the regulator, with no role of civil society. Civil society however
succeeded to put sufficient pressure on the company operating the incinerator to obtain to complement
this by an informal governance layer: the informal agreement between the company and the
Environmental Protection Association of Dorog. This agreement, which has never been questioned by the
company or by the association since it came into force, de facto gives the Environmental Protection
Association of Dorog a capacity to put the safety of the incinerator under scrutiny (notably through visits
of the incinerator and access to emission data) and inform the population about the safety performance of
the facility. This role is reflected in the Charter of the association.
In the Slovenian case, the Local Partnerships proposed a structured way to include civil society and local
actors in the decision-making process about LILW repository siting. A formal governance system was put in
67
place, which included a wide range of local actors. However, the Local Partnerships seemed to have little
influence on the final decisions as, according to interviewed civil society actors, the decisions seemed
essentially influences by direct negotiations behind closed doors between one of the candidate
municipalities (Krško), the Slovenian Government and the radioactive waste management organisation.
Moreover, the LPs were stopped after the end of the siting process. The local actors are therefore not
considered as players in the safety system.
In the French case, the safety governance system progressively evolved from the 1980’s to the 2010’s from
a three-pillar safety systems relying on operators of nuclear facilities, the regulator (ASN) and its technical
support organisation (the IRNS) to a four-pillar system including civil society and local actors – through the
CLIs and the ANCCLI – as an additional safety layer. This evolution is made explicit in documents issued by
the IRSN And the ASN and the role and means of the LCIs and ANCCL are clearly defined by the legal and
regulatory framework. CLIs and ANCCLI have no power over safety decisions. However, they have a general
mission of follow-up of nuclear sites (including safety issues) and have developed close cooperation with
the IRSN and the ASN. Their engagement in safety issues is now included in official guidance documents
issued by the regulator. The system of CLIs and ANCCLI enables civil society organisations and local actors
with various positions as regards nuclear energy to interact with the ASN, the IRSN and organisations
operating nuclear facilities on the basis of the recognition of safety of nuclear facilities as a common good
shared by all actors.
6.5. Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders
The three cases studies show different approaches of co-framing of safety issues.
In the Hungarian case, the relations between the company operating the incinerator and the
Environmental Protection Association of Dorog were at first marked by conflict, the association and the
local actors using means like demonstrations and trials to exert pressure on the company to reduce its
impact on health and the environment. In this conflicting context, there was no room for co-framing of
safety issues. After the shift of strategy of the local association from civil activism to negotiating with the
incinerator company, steady relationships have been developed between staff members of the incinerator
and the association. However, it is not possible to know from the available sources if this has led to a co-
farming of safety issues between the association and the incinerator. The shift of strategy towards
cooperation between the association and the incinerator gave the association new opportunities to access
to information through cite visits and access to regularly updated emission data.
In the Slovenian case, the Local Partnerships were meant to enable local actors to investigate issues
related to LILW repository, including safety issues. However, the LPs did not make room for reformulating
safety issues, and different safety issues of concern for the LP members were impossible to address (e.g.
retrievability of waste, long-term aspect of safety). There was still a conceptualization of safety issues by
citizens that was different from the one of the nuclear experts and the LPs did not constitute a tool for
bridging these two visions of safety. Access of LP members to information was made through access to
existing studies and through presentations made before the LP. However, the absence of technical
mediation facilitating the understanding of highly technical issues by LP members, the impossibility for LP
members to choose their own experts and some language issues (some documents were delivered in
English with out translation in Slovenian), this formal access to information did not result in an actual
possibility for local actors to enter in depths in technical safety issues.
In the French case, the issues to be addressed during the safety assessment by the experts commissioned
by the CLIS of Fessenheim was defined by the CLIS itself. The experts commissioned by the CLIS had a
similar language as the institutional actors of safety (EDF, the ASN and the IRSN) and there was no
fundamental difference in the way these different actors conceived safety issues. Neither the GSIEN nor
the ASN nor the IRSN did identify particular points of controversy between the experts commissioned by
the CLIS and the other actors. As regards access of civil society to information, the convention signed
between the GISEN, the experts it commissioned, the ASN and EDF constituted a successful attempt to
reconcile access of civil society to information and industrial secret. It has been identified as a good
68
practice by the ASN in its guidelines for the engagement of CLIs in the 3rd decennial safety reviews of 900
MWe reactors.
6.6. Trust
Trust plays a key role in the capacity of civil society to influence safety in the three case studies.
In the Hungarian case study, after the conflict phase, new relations were built between the Environmental
Protection Association of Dorog and the incinerator. Besides the agreement of the company operating the
incinerator to have site visits from the association, personal relationships have been developed between
civil activists and staff members of the incinerator. According to both the association and the company,
these relationships are a condition for the contribution of civil society to safety in the Dorog case. This is a
strength but also a weakness as this makes the contribution of civil society to safety vulnerable to staff
changes and organisational changes. This also puts at risk the civil society organisations of being too close
from the company operating the incinerator and losing trust of the public; this is why the local association
has to find a balance between negotiation and other strategies.
In the Slovenian case, after initial enthusiasm, strong mutual mistrust rapidly developed between civil
initiatives and lay citizens on the one hand, and political organisations and the radioactive waste
management organisation in the other hand. This mistrust was triggered notably by the insufficient
capacity of the local partnerships to take into account and mitigate power inequalities and inequalities in
knowledge and information, and also by strong suspicions of an hidden agenda of both local political
institutions and organisations responsible for radioactive waste management (Government and radioactive
waste management agency).
In the French case, trust is the result of the continuous interactions between the various members of the
CLIs (elected representatives, representatives of workers of nuclear facilities, civil society organisations
and qualified personalities) on the one hand and between the CLIs and the ANCCLI, the operators of
nuclear facilities, the regulator (ASN) and the public expert (IRSN) on the other hand. This trust is not
blind trust, but trust in the mutual capacity of these actors to have constructive interactions in order to
contribute to safety. This trust is regularly tested through all previously mentioned interactions and
supposes autonomy of action for all parties and access to means and expertise.
69
7. CONCLUSIONS
Safety requires permanent vigilance and improvement, and the three considered cases show that civil
society can bring its contribution to this under favourable conditions. Civil society has a specific role to
play that is different from the one of regulators, experts and organisations operating hazardous facilities,
and civil society does not substitutes to them (see page 62). The case studies also show that safety as a
common good can be a basis for cooperation between civil society, organisations operating hazardous
facilities, regulators and experts.
The three cases also show that the development of the contribution of civil society to safety is a long-
lasting process that involves skill building, evolution of formal and informal governance frameworks. As
the considered cases involved some duration (two of the cases extend through decades), we can observe
that favouring civil society contribution to safety is a co-evolution process between institutional actors,
organisations operating hazardous facilities and civil society organisations: while the engagement of civil
society develops, institutional players are inclined or pushed to make room for civil society contribution
and the safety governance adapts.
However, if different contributions of civil society to safety have been identified (see page 62) together
with a set of favourable conditions supporting these contributions (see page 63 and below), this
exploratory study does not constitute a complete characterisation of how civil society can contribute to
safety. Further research should be developed to better characterize this and sketch out governance
framework, processes, institutional arrangements that can favour fruitful engagement of civil society in
industrial safety issues.
70
ANNEX 1 – GRID OF ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES
Understanding of safety and safety culture in the case study
What is the implicit understanding of safety in the case study? Is it a question of conformity with existing standards of safety?
o Are there elements of safety culture and of understanding of safety shared between civil society actors and experts?
How does civil society contribute to safety and safety culture? o Identifying new questions that may impact safety that have been ignored or neglected by
experts? o Questioning models and underlying hypothesis? o Stretching the experts and regulators? o Other?
Definition of safety as a public affair and definition of the “public” associated to
safety
Is safety meant to be addressed by operators and the authorities only? Or is safety understood as belonging to the affairs of the public for it can be adversely affected?
o Is the expert/lay people divide in safety evaluations recognised as a problem or is this divide interpreted as “normal”, inevitable, or ignored …?
To what extent does “a public” exist as regards safety in the context of the case study?
What are the conditions for the public to develop its inquiries regarding safety? Are these conditions created by civil society? By public authorities? By the operators?
What is the statute of expertise? o To what extent does the public have access to existing expertise? To what extent does the
public have the capacity and resources to develop its own expertise? o Are the players (and the public) in the position to make a distinction between facts (or lack of
facts) and value options?
Governance of hazardous activities and safety governance
What kind of governance is supporting the management of safety? Does it include explicitly or implicitly civil society as an actor in safety?
Does the governance of safety include interactions of several categories of actors with distinct and clear remits and deontological rules?
To what extent is safety perceived as a result of balanced and fair interactions of several public and private institutions together with components of the public?
Is safety recognised as a common good by civil society actors and other actors? What are the formal and informal arrangements used to manage in common safety as a common good and how is common good management articulated with public regulation and markets? How do actors contributing to safety adapt the existing formal and informal governance system to fit evolving needs and emerging issues?
Controversies and co-framing of safety issues with stakeholders
What are the identified controversies in the process? What is the degree of polarisation of the participating public? Is the debate framed by a “pros and cons” implicit structure? To what extent do the several concerned parties in the case study regard safety as a common good beyond pro and cons positions?
Are controversies of purely technical nature or do they mingle scientific, technical, economic, legal and moral aspects? In this case, how is this mix dealt with? To what extent are the values ruling the expertise, the safety trade-off and the information gaps made explicit to the actors?
o Is so called “social construction of technological safety” recognised in expert circles, activists and other stakeholders?
How do civil society actors access to information about hazardous activities and safety issues? For operators, authorities and experts, what are the rationales for making information available or
71
conversely for concealing information?
Does the interaction with the public provoke some significant changes in the technical concepts as well as in the framing of the questions at stake?
To what extent does safety management take place in a larger perspective involving the justification of the activity? Do interactions with the public open the way to the reframing of the rationales that support this justification?
How is addressed the dilemma between “contributing to safety maintenance” and “avoiding the hazardous activity”?
Trust
How rational and transparent are the conditions to establish trust in particular social situation?
Are there institutionalised possibilities to reinforce trust in industrial (technological) safety?
How much contingent outcome (unpredictable, undesirable events) are threatening trust in safety of particular technology?
How much this notion of trust as a link between faith and confidence is recognised and how much it is threatening the stability of technology operation?
How much trust in technology is dependent on trust in people who manage these technology (and vice versa)?
Is it possible to take “calculated risk” but be unaware of the dangers. How much these blindness is present in particular situation?
Is it possible to confirm this balance in particular social condition?
Is this “socialization” of risk recognised and accepted as normal, or is recognised and articulated as a problem?
The opposite of trust is not simply mistrust. In its most profound sense, the antithesis of trust is thus the state of mind which could best be summed up as existential angst or dread. Are such extreme qualifications recognised in expert and public discourses?
72
ANNEX 2 – CONVENTION GOVERNING ACCESS OF THE GSIEN TO INFORMATION FOR
THE 3RD DECENNIAL SAFETY REVIEW OF FESSENHEIM 1 REACTOR
73
74
75
76
77
78