eavesdropping one-time tokens over magnetic secure transmission in samsung pay · 2019-12-18 ·...

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EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY DAESEON CHOI, KONGJU NATIONAL UNIV. YOUNHO LEE, SEOULTECH

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Page 1: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME

TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC

SECURE TRANSMISSION IN

SAMSUNG PAY

DAESEON CHOI, KONGJU NATIONAL UNIV.

YOUNHO LEE, SEOULTECH

Page 2: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMITTION

BY LOOPPAY

▶US Patent 8628012

Page 3: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

MST (CONT)

▶Emitting magnetic pulse

Magnetic pulse

Source : http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/magnetic/curloo.html

Coil in the smartphone’s device Coil in the card reader head

Page 4: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

LOOPPAY CLAIMS

▶The transmission between a LoopPay-enabled

device and the POS reader must be activated by the

user, it only lasts for a few milliseconds and can only

be done over a very short distance (1 to 4 inches).

- https://www.looppay.com/faqs/

Page 5: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

ARE THEY RIGHT?

Page 6: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

MOBILE CARD READER

STRUCTURE

Page 7: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

WHAT IF THE COIL IS BIG?

Page 8: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

HOW FAR: 1.5M

Page 9: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

SAMSUNG PAY SERVICE

ARCHITECTURE

Server in

Credit

card

service

company

POS

device in

a store

2) One time token

number emission

via MST

Smartphone

supporting

Samsung Pay

3) One time

token number, ID

of POS

0) Fingerprint

authentication

(Unknown) One time token

information and the

corresponding card number

may be exchanged in

registration

1) FIDO authentication

Samsung pay servers

(FIDO authentication server + token

management server)

4) Token

verification

5) Payment

completion

message with the

name of the store

and the amount of

money paid

Page 10: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

PROPOSED ATTACK TYPE 1

Server in

Credit

card

service

company

POS

device in

a store

2) One time token

number emission

via MST

Smartphone

supporting

Samsung Pay

3) One time

token number, ID

of POS

0) Fingerprint

authentication

4) Token

verification

3) One time

token number

2) Eavesdrop the

One time token

number

Mobile

POS

Page 11: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

PROPOSED ATTACK TYPE 2

Server in

Credit

card

service

company

POS

device in

a store

2) One time token

number emission

via MST

Smartphone

supporting

Samsung Pay

3) One time

token number, ID

of POS

0) Fingerprint

authentication

4) Token

verification

One time token

number

2) Eavesdrop the

One time token

number

Internet

3) One time

token number, ID

of POS

Page 12: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

FOR ATTACK PAYMENT

Page 13: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

TYPE 2 ATTACK

SYSTEM STRUCTURE

Page 14: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

CAPTURED SIGNAL

▶Sound of magnetic strip card

▶Sound of Samsung pay

Page 15: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

THE SOUND CONSISTS OF

Source : http://jetruby.com/expertise/magnetic-stripe-reading/

Page 16: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

DECODING RULE

▶Binary

▶Digits

Page 17: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

DECODING RESULT

Demodulated

binary

Decoded digits

Page 18: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

IN VARIOUS SITUATIONS

Page 19: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

THE RESULTS ARE

Page 20: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

IN LAB : TYPE 1 ATTACK

<victim’s

smartphone>

<eavesdropper

Device

: sniff Samsung

Pay token>

<mobile pos><attack payer’s

Device

: emit MST of

Sniffed token>

Send

Sniffed token

Via Internet

Page 21: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

REAL WORLD : TYPE2 ATTACK

Page 22: EAVESDROPPING ONE-TIME TOKENS OVER MAGNETIC SECURE TRANSMISSION IN SAMSUNG PAY · 2019-12-18 · Samsung Pay 3) One time token number, ID of POS 0) Fingerprint authentication (Unknown)

DEMO

▶Sniffing Samsung pay token in 1.8m away

https://youtu.be/6Nfyy92Go_M

▶In lab, type1 attack

https://youtu.be/NUvW_D4NA_s

▶Real time wormhole attack of Samsung pay

https://youtu.be/7VsHbrtPs0c