east africa outside influence and

8/11/2019 East Africa Outside Influence And

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East A frica O utside Influence and

Potent ial Conflict


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ONT NTS

ge

N O TE

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

I. SOMALI IRREDENTISM

The Ethiopian-Somali Arms BalanceThe Kenyan-Somali Arms BalanceSiad Bides His Time 5And Pursues the Diplomatic GambitSomalia's Economic Problems 5

Prospects for Detente 6Outlook for Future Military Action 6

II. THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION 6

Eritrea 7The Gallas 7Implications for the FTAI 7

III. OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONFLICT 7

Ugandan Attack on Tanzania 7Ugandan-Kenyan Tensions 8Ugandan Limitations 8

Kenyan-Tanzanian Relations 8

IV. THE SOVIETS IN EAST AFRICA 8

USSR and Somalia 9The Soviet Contribution 9The Quid 9


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geThe Soviet Presence and the War Issue 10USSR and Ethiopia 10USSR and Uganda

10

USSR and Tanzania 11USSR and Kenya 11

V. THE CHINESE IN EAST AFRICA 11

Tanzania 11Kenya and Uganda 12Somalia 12Ethiopia 12

VI. THE ARAB STATES IN EAST AFRICA 12

Somalia 12Ethiopia 12Other States 13

TABLE I 14

TABLE II 15

TABLE III 15


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EAST AFRICA: OUTSIDE INFLUENCE

AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT

NOTE

The continuing arms buildup in a number of East African countriesraises questions as to the stability of the region and the role of rivaloutside powers. At the request of the Department of State's AfricanBureau, we examine the prospects for conflict.

This Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the National

Intelligence Officer for the Middle East at the request of the Depart-ment of State. The initial draft was prepared by State/INR and CIAwith contributions from DIA. The final judgments were coordinatedwith State/INR, CIA and DIA.


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ON LUS ONS

here is at present considerable potential for conflict in East A frica.The risk of warfare arises from the chronic differences between manypairs of neighbors. Jeopardizing the peace are:

Somali irredentism which seeks to draw into the Somali-fold thoseparts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and the French Territory of Afars andIssas ( FTAI ) peopled by Somali-speaking nomads;

Instability in Ethiopia, which could lead neighboring countries toside with separatists or opposition elements, thereby provokingretaliation and hostilities;

Bad feeling among members of the faltering East African Com-munity (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania ), which finds its mostdangerous expression in the Ugandan President's paranoid viewof Tanzania.

Mistrust of neighbors and a sense of vulnerability have characterizedmost of the East African governments throughout most of the last dec-ade, accounting for an ever-increasing arms buildup in the area. TheSoviet Union has become the largest supplier of arms to East Africa.The West European input has diminished in the wake of decolonization.In recent years, the US has become a substantial supplier of arms,mainly to Ethiopia. Another supplier, especially to Tanzania, has beenChina. Several Arab states are giving increasing support to the insur-gents in Eritrea

W e believe that destabilizing inf luences will not diminish and thatthe risks of armed conflict will increase, since:

The Soviets and others will maintain an arms flow to East Africa;

Growing Arab support for the Eritreans makes it doubtful thatthe insurgents will modify their newly intransigent position onindependence;

The Eritrean conflict will probably reinforce centrifugal tenden-cies in other Ethiopian provinces;

___________________________________ In this paper East Africa covers Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.


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DIS USSION

I SOM ALI IRREDENTISM

. Somalia wants to acquire the Somali-inhabited

.

areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and the FTAI. TheSomalis probably hope to combine diplomatic and ilitary pressures when they judge that eitherEthiopia or Kenya is sufficiently weak internally.but it is also operationally integrating into its weap-equipment delivered since 1972.

. Somalia at present could seize and hold a

portion of Ethiopia or Kenya. But it would eventu-

lly face a retaliatory action in which its neighbors'

arger populations and resource bases would weigh

heavily. Somalia would also face international dip-

omatic pressures to return the seized territory. he Somalis do not want a prolonged war:--Their ailing economy could not support sus- ained military action;

--The Ethiopians and Kenyans could exploitpolitical and economic strains within Somalia;

--Somalia could not count on sustained resupply

rom the USSR

TheEthiopian Somali rms Balance

Ethiopia, as long as its internal cohesion lasts,has an overall advantage over Somalia. The Ethio-pian armed forces are twice the size of Somalia's,

nearly equal. Ethiopian military personnel, especi-ally pilots, are generally better trained, and theSomalia is currently resorting to diplomatic means,Ethiopians have the edge in antitank capability.However, the combat readiness of Ethiopian forces

ons inventory the sophisticated Soviet m ilitary has been severely impaired over the past yearbecause of the breakdown of discipline and thedisarray in the chain of comm and. Moreover, fight-ing in Eritrea has severely strained military logisticsand strategic reserve capabilities.

4. The Somali armed forces are nume rically su-perior in artillery, radar, and armor. Although thedelivery to the Ethiopians of M-60 tanks is helpingredress somewhat the armor imbalance, their great-est impact will be psychological. When all ofSomalia's MIG-21s become operational, its armedforces will have the edge in air power ( whichcould be offset if the Ethiopians obtained air-to-airmissiles for their jet fighters). The Somalis haveSAM-2/Guideline defensive missiles in place aroundMogadiscio.


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in February 1974 gave it a claim on Arab oil money.But the most promising donors, Saudi Arabia, Ku-wait, and Libya, dislike Siad's close Soviet ties

and doubt his commitment to Moslem values andculture.

15. A government reorganization last Decemberseems, in part, to have been another effort by Siadto improve the country's economic performance.His replacement of military officers with techno-crats better qualified to make economic decisionshas caused unhappiness in the defense forces. Mili-tary malaise, economic discontent in urban areasover high food prices and rationing, and religioustensions ( stemming from the execution of ten Mos-lem sheikhs) have fostered oppo sition to Siad.

He could conceivably try to distract attention fromdomestic problems with military adventures inthe Ogaden. But it is more likely that these prob-lems will constrain a military move.

Prospects for Detente

16. Ethiopia's military rulers have stated thatthey intend to grant more political autonomy toall the country's provinces, although it is uncertainhow much real decentralization will be tolerated.At some future time Addis A baba might reviveplans for joint Ethiopian-Somali development of

the Webi-Shebelli River region and exploration ofthe potential oil and gas deposits in the Ogaden.

17. More autonomy might defuse the Ogadenissue, but the Somalis would regard it as only atemporary palliative, with no substantial impacton their determination to bring the nomads underthe Somali flag. Nor is Somalia likely to agree toproposals for economic cooperation that implySomali recognition of Ethiopia's jurisdiction overthe Ogaden.

Outlook for Future Military Action

18. Siad has so far resisted the pressures of thoseOgadeni Somalis undergoing guerrilla training inSomalia to start insurgency against Ethiopia. Buthe might change his mind if the internal Ethiopiansituation continues to deteriorate, or if additional

Ethiopian army units in the Ogaden are sent toEritrea.

19. If the Somalis should take advantage of abreakdown of order in Ethiopia to move into theOgaden, they could count on the sympathy of mostArab states. Protests would come from the blackmember states of the OAU ( especially Kenya andits supporters ), but the OAU's ability to act mightbe impaired by divisions between its Arab andblack African members.

20. Kenya would probably offer Ethiopia limitedassistance in defense against Somali incursions. TheKenyans fear that a Somali takeover of the Ogadenmight lead to a renewal of Somali insurgency innortheastern Kenya.

II. THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION

21. The ruling Provisional Military Administra-tive Council (PMAC) is an unstable coalition ofdisparate military figures ranging from illiterateprivates to highly educated office rs. As it triessimultaneously to cope with the E ritrean insur-gency, defend the Ogaden against the Somalis, andimplement far-reaching internal reform, seriousstrains are developing. Also, the chain of commandhas never been firmly reestablished since the first

mutinies in early 1974.22. Anti-PMAC dissidence is steadily increasing.

Although the uncoordinated opposition groups donot yet pose a threat, a serious crisisprovokedby a military debacle in Eritrea or widespread re-sistance to land reformmight present an oppor-tunity to overthrow the PMAC leadership. Evenif the PMAC is ousted, indefinite military rule(perhaps interspersed with periods of military-guaranteed civilian government) is the m ost likelypattern for the coming years.

23. It is too early to say, of course, whether theregime which eventually emerges will be able tomaintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity. A weak-ening of the central government has historicallyencouraged centrifugal tendencies in the provinces.A contracting Amhara center, surrounded by weak,


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autonomous or independent states, would invite out-side intervention and destabilize the East Africanregion.

Eritrea

24. The currently high level of insurgency inEritrea stems as much from PMAC weaknesses asfrom insurgent capabilities. An Ethiopian regimewhich managed to overcome its internal divisions,demonstrated an ability to govern, and possessedsome diplomatic skills might be able to preventEritrean secession. Federation might eventuallyprove to be an acceptable compromise. Althoughsome insurgent leaders may balk at a form ula thatfalls short of total independence, the Tigrinya-speaking, Christian half of the population might

prefer to maintain some political ties with Ethiopiato balance the influence of Arab states on theMuslim half.

25. But continued political disarray in AddisAbaba increases the likelihood of Eritrean inde-pendence and possible further fragme ntation. Eri-trean Muslims are themselves divided along triballines. The conservative Afars, for example, havelittle in common with radical insurgents and mightinsist on an autonomous state. An independent Eri-trea would be even m ore unwieldy if it absorbedother Tigrinya-speaking areas in northern Ethiopia,

especially the province of Tigre ( whose ex-gov-ernor is cooperating with the Eritrean insurgents )and parts of Begemdir and Wollo provinces.

The Gallas

26. The Gallas, Ethiopia's largest single ethnicgroup ( 40 percent of the population), pose anotherpotential threat. The Gallas are split internallyby clan, wealth, dialect, religion, and the degreeto which they have assimilated Amhara cultureand are scattered throughout the country's prov-

inces. Although Galla plotting against the PMACcontinues, the conspirators' goals seem to be theeasing of grievances rather than the creation ofa separate state. The Gallas would lack the easyaccess to foreign support enjoyed by peoples con-

centrated on the peripheral areas bordering theRed Sea and Somalia.

Implications for the FTAI

27. An independent Eritrea might combine forceswith Somalia to press France to relinquish theFTAI. The French, however, want to play a sig-nificant role in the Indian Ocean, and Djibouti'sstrategic importance has increased with the immi-nent reopening of the Suez Canal and the forcedFrench withdrawal from southern Indian Oceanbases. Reinforced French garrisons in the FTAI,while incapable of preventing limited incursions,could halt and eventually repel any invasion. Con-cerned now about the longevity of Ethiopia'sPMAC and its ability to resolve the Eritrean fight-

ing, the French are reportedly trying to improverelations with the Eritrean insurgents and to gainsupport from neighboring Muslim states for a con-tinued French presence. If faced with a possibleSomali takeover, Red Sea littoral states would betorn between their an ti-imperialist sentiments andtheir distaste for a Soviet-backed Somali presenceon one side of the Bab-el-Mandab.

28. In the long run, there is a question whe therFrance w ould have the political will to stay onin the face of a major challenge requiring anothercolonial war. In the meantime, the French seem

disposed to stay indefinitely.

III. OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONFLICT

Ugandan Attack on Tanzania

29. The greatest potential for conflict amongUganda, Tanzania, and Kenya stems from the er-ratic behavior of Ugandan President Amin, whocontinuously encourages belief in threats wherenone exist. He frequently uses the slightest pretextfor making bellicose accusations that Tanzania,alone or in conjunction with Ugandan exiles, is

planning an imminent attack on Uganda. On theseoccasions Amin puts his forces on increased alertand sometimes sends reinforcements to the border.His impulsiveness could result in further borderskirmishes, such as occurred in 1972 when Tan-


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zania's President Nyerere supported an unsuccess-ful Ugandan exile attack. Since then, however,Nyerere has not gone beyo nd providing the exilesasylum in Tanzania.

Ugandan-Kenyan Tensions

30. Uganda has close relations with Somalia, andKenya is concerned that Amin might undertakesome supportive military action if Mogad iscio in-stigated a renewal of the insurgency in Kenya'sNorth East Province or ordered the Somali armyinto action. If Somalia asked for support, Aminmight be willing to reinforce his troops on theborder to tie down some Kenyan forces.

31. Other factors contribute to tensions betweenUganda and Kenya. Amin shares many Ugandans'

resentment toward Kenya. Ugandans consider thatthe countries' former close economic associationpermitted Kenya to industrialize and prosper atUganda's expense. Kenya controls the major landroutes to the sea, and Kenyatta has not hesitatedto use this leverage. On a personal level, Aminalso resents Kenyatta's prestige in Africa.

32. The presence of U gandan exiles in Kenyacould trigger incidents. Amin might respond to anyKenya-based attempt to overthrow him with a showof force on the border. A miscalculation by eitherside or an accidental confrontation between op-posing troops could lead to fighting.

Ugandan Limitations

33. The Ugandan army's confidence that it hasweaponry superior to its adversaries might makeit adventurous and give it an initial advantage, butit appears unlikely that it could sustain cross-border operations for long. S ustained offensiveaction wiuld be limited by logistical deficiencies,which result both from the depressed state ofthe Ugandan economy and poor military manage-

ment. The Ugandan army also suffers from thelow quality of officers, lack of discipline, and fre-quent reorganizations and personnel shifts, mostlyresulting from Amin's continuing purges.

34. In contrast, the Kenyan and Tanzforces have better leadership and havetime to prepare defenses along the rUgandan attack routes.

Kenyan-Tanzanian Relations

35. Kenya's and Tanzania's economic itend to be oppo sed, and their political oriendiffer. Many Tanzanians consider Kenya asciety which retains many undersirable traitsthe days of B ritish rule, while Kenyan leabelieve that China and the USSR have all too minfluence in Tanzania. Nonetheless, KenyattaNyerere have a personal relationship which husually enabled them to smooth over differenceand each government considers the other natioia bastion of stability in contrast to Uganda. Evenif there were a military takeover in either countrythe new rulers would probably be preoccupiedwith maintaining themselves in power rather thaninitiating military adventures.

IV. THE SOVIETS IN EAST AFRICA

36. Outside powers, drawn to East Africa fora number of reasons, have materially altered thebalance of forces there, and by their involvementhave given international significance to local con-frontations. No estimate of the prospects for warbetween Somalia and its neighbors or other lesserconflicts in the area can ignore the Soviet factor.An assessment of likely Soviet behavior towardMogadiscio or Addis Ababa depends in turn onwider considerations of Soviet policy.

37. Regional rivalries provide opportunities forthe Soviets to promote themselves as an arms sup-plier and to gain access to military facilities. Thesesame rivalries also can limit Soviet freedom toact, since close identification with one party ina dispute generally restricts influence with another.Furthermore, Soviet influence is nowhere so great

that Moscow can exercise unlimited control overinternal or regional developments. The prospectof becoming embroiled in regional disputes thatit does not want and could not stop thus injects


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an element of caution into Soviet conduct in EastAfrica.

38. The Soviet Union has found military aid tobe the most effective means of gaining influenceand cooperation. It has become the major arms sup-plier to Somalia and Uganda, has signed significantnew arms agreements with Tanzania, and in the pasthas made periodic overtures to Kenya and Ethiopia.In the economic sphere, in contrast, t he Soviets havebeen less active except for fishing and port con-struction. Moscow has extended economic creditsto all East African countries, but has done little toencourage their use.

39 . The Soviet Union's interests in East Africa arepolitical and strategic and in most respects are ex-tensions of Soviet interests in the nearby Arabian

Peninsula and Indian Ocean. Moscow's East Africaninterests are:

reducing Western influence, power, and pres-ence;

gaining political influence on the southernedge of the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sealittoral, and supporting and protecting itsflanks in the Middle East;

securing access to support facilities for itsnaval forces in the Indian Ocean;

countering Chinese influence.

USSR and Somalia

40 . The Soviet Union's focal point in East Africahas been Somalia. By meeting Somalia's needs formilitary aid where the West has been reluctant, theSoviets have gained a significant political positionand convenient access to Somali military facilities.

The S oviet Contribution

41. Soviet influence in Somalia has gradually in-

creased since 1969 and appears to have rea ched apeak with President Podgorny's visit and the signingof a Friendship Treaty in July 1974. This treaty, likethose the Soviets signed with Egypt, Iraq, and India,

underwrites Moscow's economic and military aidcommitments and possibly reduces frictions in theday-to-day administration of aid agreements.

42. The Soviet Union is Somalia's major sourceof arms. This supply is limited mainly by Somalia'sability to absorb and effectively utilize relativelysophisticated weaponry and by Moscow's desire tomaintain some balance in the region. During thepast year, nevertheless, Moscow has begun supply-ing surface-to-air missiles and MIG-21s. In addition,the Soviets have provided training to the Somali AirForce and are building a large airfield for it nearMogadiscio.

43. The Soviets have become important economicaid donors, but the total value of their economiccredits ( about $90 million extended, $47 milliondrawn) is less than that offered by the Chinese( around $132 million extended, $43 million drawn ).

The Quid

44. In return for their assistance, the Soviets nowhave apparently unrestricted access to the northernport of Berbera, which is the port most frequentlyused to support the USSR's Indian Ocean navalforce. The importance Moscow places on Berberawas underscored by the recent visit of Soviet navalcommander Admiral Gorshkov to Somalia. Althoughthere are no ship repair facilities ashore, Soviet tend-ers provide in-port maintenance and minor repairs.In addition, the Soviets use the port fo r crew rest,have a barracks ship, and have constructed a bar-racks compound. There is also a Soviet naval com-munications relay facility near Berbera.

45. There are indications that the Soviets arebuilding a facility at Berbera to handle cruise mis-siles for their Indian Ocean naval force. The facilityis the first of its kind discovered outside the USSRand when completed will improve the reload capa-bility of Soviet ships and submarines equipped withcruise missiles. Moreover, recent evidence shows

that within two miles of the Berbera facility theSoviets are building a new airfield with a run-way apparently long enough for the biggest Sovietaircraft.


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46. The Soviets would undoubtedly like to stageperiodic naval reconnaissance flights from Somalia,possibly following the pattern established in Guinea,from which they periodically operate TU-95 Bear-Dreconnaissance flights. Indeed, the Soviets already

have taken advantage of Somalia's strategic locationby stationing naval reconnaissance aircraft ( theIL 38s) in Somalia during their naval exerciseslast month.

The Soviet Presence and the War Issue

47. Despite Moscow's military quid pro quo withMogadiscio, the Soviets have sought to dampenSomali irredentist ambitions. The USSR prefers totake advantage of regional tensions without en-couraging actual hostilities that might endanger itsaccess to Somali facilities.

48. Should the Somalis decide to go to war, theSoviets would counsel restraint but probably wouldstand behind Somalia, at least in a limited engage-ment. The Friendship Treaty commits the USSR andSomalia to consult in the event of a threat of war.This provision gives Moscow grounds for urging re-straint but does not obligate it to come to Somalia'said.

49. For leverage, the Soviets will probably con-tinue discreetly to limit resupply of ammunition,spare parts, equipment, and petroleum in order torestrict Somalia's ability to conduct a protractedwar. But to soften the repercussions of such actionMoscow would probably offer to ba ck Somalia inany subsequent negotiations and would replaceequipment lost during the fighting.

50. Moscow's refusal to endorse Somali's irreden-tist claims probably has been a contributing factorto Soviet unpopularity in some government circles.However, Siad and those officials who feel the So-viet presence is beneficial appear to have the upperhand in the Somali government at this time. Never-theless, Siad remains sensitive to criticism from his

Arab and African friends regarding his close tieswith the Soviets. The Soviets also are being blamedincreasingly by some Somalis for Siad's unpopulardomestic moves.

USSR and thiopia

51. The Soviets clearly have favored the recentrevolutionary changes in Ethiopia, but have so faradopted a cautious approach to the PMAC. Al-though the Soviets have reportedly discussed thepossibility of military aid with the Ethiopians, nocommitments have been made, primarily becauseof Moscow's desire not to offend Somalia. But theSoviets may believe they have some leeway to dealwith Addis Ababa without serious damage to theirSomali relationship.

52. Future Soviet initiatives most likely will betied to Ethiopian internal developments. Moscowwould favor and might even support a regime thatreduces its ties with the West. But unless the Ethio-pians made a radical break with the US, includingthe ouster of US military personnel, the Sovietswould probably refrain from becoming deeply in-volved and would continue to view the Addis Ababaregime s basically unstable.

53. Moscow's treatment of the Eritrean problemhas likewise reflected caution. The Soviet presscriticized the secessionist rebels and the Sovietshave reportedly pressed the South Yemenis to stopsupporting the Eritreans. It is unlikely, however,that the Soviets will offer Addis Ababa arms tofight the rebels.

USSR and Uganda

54. The Soviet Union renewed its military aidprogram to Uganda last year following a reductionin Western aid, and quickly became the country'sprincipal arms supplier. The Soviets are providingmodern equipment, including MIG-21s. As a resultof Moscow's generosity, Uganda's neighbors, especi-ally Zaire and Kenya, have become suspicious ofMoscow's ( a s well as Am in's ) intentions. It ishighly doubtful, however, that Moscow wantsUganda to become a serious threat to its neighbors.The Soviet risk in supplying the quixotic Amin withthis equipment is partly offset by the latter's grow-ing dependence on Soviet good will.

55. Soviet motivation appears to be largely polit-ical opportunism in the wake of declining Western


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influence in Uganda. The Soviets are s triving toencourage Amin's anti-Western posture and to pre-empt any move by the Chinese to secure a ctiveinfluence. Looking beyond Amin, Moscow undoubt-edly hopes that continued Soviet military aid will

increase the dependence of the Ugandan armedforces on the USSR.

USSR and Tanzania

56 . The Soviet Union has shown interest duringthe past year in expanding ties with Tanzania. TheSoviets signed new arms agreements with Dar esSalaamtheir first since the mid-1960swhich mayhave put the total value of Soviet military aidabove that of China, Tanzania's major arms sup-plier until now. The agreements reportedly providefor $74 m illion worth of S oviet arms, including

MIG-21s and surface-to-air missiles.

57 . Moscow's interest in Tanzania transcends itsdesire to compete with the Chinese. Tanzania pos-sesses potentially valuable ports, and the Sovietsprobably hope that by being generous in their mili-tary aid they can persuade D ar es Salaam toreconsider its opposition to port calls by naval shipsfrom non-littoral countries.

58 . The Soviets also value Tanzania's locationnear southern Africa, where the accelerating paceof change in the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesiais spurring Moscow's interest.

USSR and Kenya

59 . Soviet-Kenyan relations continue to be cool.The Kenyans blame the Soviets for increasing thedanger of war by providing arms to Somalia andUganda. The Soviets have tried to allay Nairobi'sfears by claiming that the arms are intended onlyfor defensive purposes and by suggesting that theKenyans could also receive some. So far, however,the Kenyans have put their requests for arms tothe UK and the US.

60. In addition to offers of arms, the Soviets haveshown an interest in expanding ties between theSoviet and Kenyan trade unions. The Soviets alsoapproached the Kenyans about allowing Soviet

technicians to visit Mombasa on a regular basis tosupervise the repair of Soviet fishing vessels.

V. THE CHINESE IN EAST AFRICA

61.The Chinese have long placed a premium

on improving relations with East African govern-ments and since the mid-1960s have been cautiousto avoid entanglement with anti-regime groups. Allsigns point to a continuation of this policy. TheChinese are equally wary of involvement in disputesbetween A frican states. Peking's military aid toEast African countries will probably continue atcurrent levels. Political factors as well as resourcelimitations are likely to preclude any major newprograms in the military sector.

62. China's policy toward East Africa is moti-vated by its desire:

to counter, where possible, the growth of So-viet influence ( as in Somalia );

to retain its lead over the Soviets where itsinvestments are substantial ( Tanzania );

to cultivate new African partners as part ofits campaign to play a major role in ThirdWorld matters.

63. China can be expected to continue to keepa careful watch over the growth of Soviet andWestern military power in the region. The Chinese

are particularly wary of the potential strategicthreat of a Soviet naval presence in the IndianOcean. There are clear indications that Chinafavors a US naval presence in the area althoughthe Chinese try to make political capital by verballyattacking the intrusion of both superpowers intothe region. Thus China supports an Indian Ocean zone of peace.

Tanzania

64. Tanzania was the point of entry for Chinain East Africa in 1964 when the political situation

provided an opening for Chinese assistance, firstto the island of Zanzibar and later to the mainland.The country has remained the focus of China'smost extensive activity in Africa, primarily because


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of the magnitude of the TanZam railway project.2Even after the railway is completed, however, Chinawill remain Tanzania's major economic aid donor.China has also been Tanzania's principal supplierof military assistance. Peking hopes that close co-

operation with Tanzania will convince other de-veloping countries of China's value as a friend andpartner.

Kenya and Uganda

65. Neither Kenya nor Uganda figures promi-nently in Chinese policy planning. Peking main-tains studiously correct relations with Nairobi, butit has not moved toward any major programs there.Given Kenyatta's disposition to keep Chinese pres-ence at a minimum, bilateral relations will prob-ably continue to develop at a relatively slow pace.

66. Peking seems skeptical of close involvementwith Uganda's erratic Amin. Prospects for muchcooperation are poor; China could not competewith the Soviet Union in providing Amin withsophisticated military hardware even if it wereinclined to do so. Nor is China likely to suggestincreased economic ties with a regime whose com-mitment to development is negligible.

Somalia

67. In Somalia the Chinese run a poor secondto the Soviets. Only in economic aid have theChinese surpassed the Soviets, as noted in para-graph 42 above. Somalia can be expected to seekcontinued Chinese activity as a balance to theSoviets. On their side, the Chinese can be expectedto bide their time, hoping to profit from some futuremisstep.

Ethiopia

68. Some of Ethiopia's new military rulers haveshown interest in Chinese development modelsand may request increases in the economic creditsthat Peking extended to Haile Selassie's govern-

ment. There have also been reports that the PMAC

The construction of the 1,200 mile railway is the largestfinancial and technical assistance project that Peking hasever undertaken.

wishes to obtain Chinese military aid. But Pek ingis hesitant to become closely identified with a rulingcoalition whose lifespan is so uncertain. The Chi-nese are also wary of engaging in a costly armscompetition with Moscow so far from their borders.

Greater involvement, whether political, economic,or military, will be delayed until the Chinese be-lieve that the situation has stabilized.

VI. THE ARAB STATES IN EAST AFRICA

69. For the past decade and a half, East Africahas been one of the arenas in which Israel andthe Arab states have maneuvered for support bymeans of trade, a id, and political pressure. Withthe steady erosion of the Israeli position and theincreasing power accruing to the oil-producingstates, the Arabs have been increasingly involved

with other East African issues.70. The Arab states have not m arched in lock

step, although on Arab-Israeli issues and on sup-port for Muslim minorities they have maintainedsomething of a comm on front. But it is on theissues of the Soviet presence and radicalism inEast Africa that the interests and policies of theArab states diverge.

Somalia

71. The Arabs are the Soviets' only significantcompetitors in Somalia. Since its adherence to theArab League in February 1 974, Somalia has beenthe primary recipient of Arab aid in East Africa.But the most generous Arab donors are conserva-tive states which have made new aidapart fro mdrought reliefconditional upon a reduction ofSoviet influence. Siad is willing to make some con-cessions to the Arabs ( for exam ple, he recentlymade Arabic an official language), but not to thepoint of jeopardizing Soviet military assistance.Nevertheless, in the event of a cooling in Soviet-Somali relations, Siad might look to Arab countriesfor spare parts and surplus Soviet weaponry.

Ethiopia

72. Until 1973, Ethiopia was the cornerstone ofIsrael's East African policy. In return for a bal-


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anced diplomatic stance in the Arab-Israeli dispute,the Israelis supported Ethiopia with economic aid,military training and advisers. Ethiopia's diplo-matic break with Israel in the midst of the 1973war was forced by Arab pressure, but many Arabsare skeptical of the permanence of the split. Israelundoubtedly views the upsurge in Eritrean fight-ing with misgivings, and fears an Eritrean successwould establish another hostile Arab pow er onthe shores of the Red Sea.

73. After the break w ith Israel and the oustingof Haile Selassie, the Arabs began a flirtation withEthiopia. But the appeal of the new governmentin Addis Ababa decreased following the politicalexecutions in November 1974 and deterioratedfurther when its hard line on Eritrea committedthe PMAC to a resumption of m ilitary operationsagainst the insurgents.

74. The Arabs are now maintaining some dis-tance from Ethiopia's military government, and areproviding increasing assistance to the Eritrean in-surgents. Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen( Sana) have generally sought a negotiated settle-ment in Eritrea and have tried to counter inroads

by militant Arab states ( Iraq, Syria, Libya andSouth Yemen) and communist countries. But SaudiArabia might step up its aid to the insurgents ifEthiopian policy toward Eritrea becomes increas-ingly repressive. A large influx of arms from

Saudi Arabiaor Libya or Iraqmight enable therebels to resume the offensive.

Other States

75. Shortly after Idi Amin seized power inUganda, he ended the previous close relationshipwith Israel. Since then, Uganda has taken a vio-lently anti-Israeli position, established a c lose re-lationship with Libya, and has received some mili-tary aid from Egypt. Tanzania has been sendinghigh-level delegations to the Arab world in anattempt to acquire financial aid, and so far hasreportedly received a loan from the Arab League.Kenya has attempted to ma intain a continuing,albeit unpublicized, relationship with Israel. Con-tinuing Israeli military sales are a symbol of thislink. Nonetheless, Kenya is also trying to improveits relations with the Arabs, even to the point ofestablishing diplomatic ties with an Arab outsidersuch as South Yemen.

east africa outside influence and

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