The first U.S. Navy experience with rotary-wing air-craft was not a good one. 'Ihe Pitcarin OP—i auto-giro. an airplane not a true helicopter. had been

tested and found wanting during the era between the\Xinrld Wars. It was not until Igor sikorsky introduced his

ti model helicopter on I 3 January 1 Y 2 that verti-cal takeu!'f and landing aircraft became ftasihle.Sikorsky had earlier flown the first practical American heli-copter. the VS-300, but that machine was only a testbed. TIte follow-un VS-316. designated the XR-4 by theU.s. Army, had a tWO-Seat sine-by-side enclosed cabin.A 200 horsepower Warner R-O-3 engine that ran a sin-gle overhead main rotor and a smaller anti—torque rotoron the tail powered the aircraft. The XR--t prototypecould hit a top speed of around S miles per hour,cruised at about O miles per hour, and had a range ofabout 130. In July 19'i2. the Navy tested its first One; anR--i transferred from the Army and then promptly redes-ignated HNS-I by the Bureau of Aeronautics. Two morewere requisitioned from Army stocks in larch I 9u3.The new helicopter was a success, and 22 more were pro-cured fbr use as trainei" beginning on in October 1943.The HNS-1 served as the p mary naval aviation helicoptertrainer until the Bell HTL-series replaced it.

'everal other early helicopters (the Platt LePage R-1 andthe Kellet R-2 and R-3 produced by other manufactur-ers were considered but not selected. All was not lost,however, because a bright young Kellet engineer, FrankPiaseuki. would later develop tandem—rotor helicoptersdiat wi )LIld become a mainslay of naval aviation. The Bell.\mrcral Company was too busy turning out jets to enterthe initial helicopter competition, but that corporation'smathematician and engineer Arthur M. Young wouldsoon revolutionize light helicopter design.

Sikorsky Aircraft produced 133 HNS helicopters; theNavy accepted 23, the Army kept 8. and the British RoyalAir Force got 2. 'I'he first shipboard helicopter trials\\ crc conducted by Americas first certified military heli—

copter pilot, Army Captain I—Iollingwortli "Frank"Gregui-v. He pLit his I INS through its paces i iv repeated-ly landing and taking off from the tanker Bu?lker Hill oper-ating in Long Island Sound oct 7 May 19u3. Coast Guardlieutenant Commander Frank A, Erickson flew the initialnaval service helicopter mercy mission when he deliveredtwo cases of blood plasma to a hospital at Sandy Hookon the New lersey shore. Doctors credited Erickson's time-ly arrival with saving several lives. Other rescue missionsaiding both civilian and iiiilitarv personnel in the NewYork area soon followed, The [.5. Army and the Officeof Strategic Services both used helicopters for special com-bat missions in Asia during World \Xir II.

The Navy was s;iul ed enough with the HNS to orderan additional LSO helicopters from Sikorsky. 100 I-lOS-i(designated E-nA by the I SAAF) and O H025- Is Armydesignation R-SA before the end of the war. The H( )S-1 was more compact, nv ire powerlul. and more maneu-verable than its FlN predecessir. It mounted a singleoverhead main rotor, and was powered by a 240 hpFranklin O-i0-9 engine. Three XHOS-ls were request-ed for testing from Army R-6A stocks in late 19-t2 and \Vcn'C

accepied h the U.S. Coast Guard, which by then run-ning Navy helicopter training at New "iark's FloydBennett Field in laicIi l")i4 After the war a secondhatch of 36 HOS—is were assinned to the Nave heli-copter development squadron (\'N-3) after passingacceptance tcsts. The Navy also took two HO2S-1 ArmyR-A test models in December 'l)-i, but opted to placean order l'or slightly modified S-1 commercial models(desigii;ited H035—l ) which became the standard Navy.\larinc. and Coast Guard light utility helicopters in 1947.

When the Coast Guard returned to the TreasuryDepartment from the Navy Department on 28 December194. the U.S. Navy took over helicopter training anddevelopment. Marine helicopter pilots learned theirtrade with VX 3 before moving on to IiJvL\-1 atQuantico, Virginia, prior to the Korean War.

Early Naval Helicopters

over and do what [they] thoughtproper [to] ensure the safety of the159th Field Artillery." The Marineshad neither detailed maps of thearea nor locating coordinates, sothey took to the air to conduct avisual reconnaissance and, hope-fully, find the lost Army artillery-men. This was done, and theMarines returned to meet the rescueconvoy on the road. After giving anestimate of the situation and furtherinstructions, the two Marines

returned to the Army position toprepare for the rescue column'sarrival. Concurrently, a helicopterpiloted by Lieutenant Lueddekecarrying the artillery regimentalcommander and his operationsofficer located several survivors ofan overrun artillery battery. Theydropped a note of encouragementthen led a relief party to the spot.During this excursion, Lueddeke'sHO3S-1 came under small armsfire and had to "buck and jerk" its

19

way out of the area using maneu-vers not found in the pilot's manu-al. Only helicopters could haveprovided such assistance. Groundtransportation would have beenunable to find the misplaced unitsin a timely manner, while a lightobservation plane could not havemoved back and forth betweenthe supported and supportingunits with such speed and effi-ciency. The helicopters of VMO-6saved the day.

National Archives l-'hoio (USMc) 127-N-A1990Air-sea rescue was an important mission flown by VMO-6 gratulated by his still-wet fellow VMO-6 observation pilot Captwith the first such rescue made in August. Here, Capt Alfred F Mc6'aleb, JrEugeneJ. Pope, at the controls of his HO3S-1 helicoptei, is con-

Two HO3S-1 helicopters, twopilots, and five mechanics as-signed to headquarters squadronin Japan were released from thatduty and joined VMO-6 at Chinhaeon 15 August, just in time for oneof the biggest battles for the PusanPerimeter. The 5th Marines hadbeen pulled back from Sachon,hurriedly replenished, and thenmarched north to seal off theNKPA penetration near Miryang.1-lelicopters were used for visualreconnaissance of the battle area,conducted liaison visits, scoutedthe routes of advance, screenedthe flanks, spotted artillery fires,

brought in supplies, and evacuatedcasualties as the Marines weretwice called on to throw the NorthKoreans back across the NaktongRiver. During that time the heli-copter pilots began to perfect eva-sive maneuvers that allowed themto dodge enemy ground fire. italso became obvious that the fraillooking helicopters were tougherthan previously thought. Severalwere hit by enemy small arms firebut kept on flying, and others sur-vived some very hard landings inrough country. As General LemuelShepherd later noted about thetoughness of helicopters: "I saw

20

Ithem] come in with a dozen Lulletholes [bud unless they are hit in avital part, they continue to fly."Still, the helicopters carred noarmor or weapons so they wereused in supporting roles exceptfor emergency evacuations ordeep search and rescue missions.The best tactic for those risky mis-sions was to get in and out asquickly as possible while flyingnap-of-the-earth using terrain tomask ingress and egress routes.

The Marine defense of thePusan Perimeter ended with thearrival of other elements of the 1stMarine Division and the remainder

and willingness to put in longhours. This was no small achieve-ment because helicopters requireda great deal more effort; morespare parts, more man-hours, andmore sophisticated tools and workspaces than did the OY Sentinels.On the other hand, Gottschalkalso noted that larger transporthelicopters could have providedmuch needed services such astroop lifts, resupply, and com-mand liaison, which were beyondthe capabilities of the HO3S-1.

General Craig, the first Marinecommander to use a helicopter asa command and control aircraftlater wrote:

of Major General Field Harris' 1stMarine Aircraft Wing fromCalifornia in preparation for thelanding at Inchon. By late August,the helicopter detachment hadlogged 580 sorties and 348 flighthours, conducted 35 medical evac-uations, and flew 85 aerial recon-

naissance missions. Throughoutthat time helicopter availabilitywas 100 percent. In his final reportMajor Gottschalk attributed thisremarkable accomplishment totwo factors: the excellent facilitiesat Chinhae and the ground sup-port crew's professionalism, skill,

Helicopters are a godsend.The mountainous terrain ofKorea presents a difficult prob-lem for security. . . . [Transport]helicopters would be ideal to[quicklyl post patrols and out-guards on high, dominatingterrain which would [normally]

A VMO-6 helicopter lands near the artilleiy positions of the HO3S was designated as an "observation "platform but was1st Battalion, 11th Marines, along the Nabtong River. The actually used as a light utility aircraft in Korea.

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A2204•

21

Airfield Designations

United Nations Command airfields in Korea used letter—number des-ignaters: the letter K' indicated a major air base: the letter X' indi-cated an auxiliary landing strip: and the letter A' indicated that the

airfield adjoined a U.S. Arm base or headquarters. During the Korean \\br,Marine helicopter srimiaclrons operated from the following locations:

Marine Observation Squadron 6 Son jong-ni (unnamed)Chinhae (K-b) Sohung-ni tX -ThK impo (K-i '1) Sinclion (X-83)Wiirisan K—2) Tonggo—ri (A—9)Yonpmi I(-27 Marine Transport Squadron 161\Jasan (unnamed Pusan (K—I I

Puhang ( K-3) Kangnung (K—i Sm

\\bnju (K-3M) Chodo-ri (N-83)Flongchon K- T) Yongpo-ni A-17)lc\\-;mndae—ri (unnanied) Iaejong—ni (A—3.3 I

S

copter. Almost any individualquestioned could offer somepersonal story to emphasizethe valuable part played by[the] 1-1035 planes. . . Thereis no doubt the enthusiasmvoiced . . . is entirely war-ranted. . . . No effort should bespared to get helicopters—larger than the HO3S if possi-ble—to the theater at once,and on a priority higher thanany other weapon. [We need]helicopters, more helicopters,and more helicopters.

before the landing at Inc/ion.

take hours to climb. . . . [Morehelicopters] would.., insure theearlier defeat of the enemy.They should be made availablefor use at the earliest possibledate.

He also noted other Serviceinterest in rotary-wing aircraft bystating: "The Army is enthusiasticover our ideas of employment ofthis type of aircraft and is goingahead with the idea of employingthem on a large scale." Like Major

Gottschalk, Craig also recom-mended that a transport helicoptersquadron be formed and sent toKorea as quickly as possible. TheDirector of Marine Corps Aviation,Brigadier General Clayton C.Jerome, made the case for addi-tional helicopters in a memoran-dum to the Deputy Chief of NavalOperations (Air):

There are no superlativesadequate to describe the gen-eral reaction to the heli-

22

On 9 September, VMO-6 wasplaced under the operational con-trol of the 1st Marine Division,commanded by Major GeneralOliver P. "0. P." Smith, and underthe administrative control of the1st Marine Aircraft Wing. TheMarines' next mission was des-tined to become a military clas-sicthe amphibious assault atInchon, a battle that dramaticallyreversed the course of the Koreanconflict. U.S. Army X Corps, spear-headed by the 1st Marine Division,launched a difficult daylong am-phibious landing then rapidlymoved inland to secure the supplydepot at Ascom City and KimpoAirfield. The campaign culminatedwith the retaking of the SouthKorean capital of Seoul. Thisseizure cut the enemy's main sup-ply routes and left the NKI'A forcesin the south isolated. By the timethe lead elements of X Corps inthe north and Eighth Army comingup from the Pusan Perimeterlinked up the NKPA was in fullflight. That once awesome fightingforce had been completely routedand was headed for the dubioussafety of North Korea.

To prepare for the Inchon land-ing, Major Gottschalk divided hissquadron into forward and rear

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A130052MajGen Field Ha rris, left.. commanding general of the lstMarineAircraji Wing,.M/Gen Oliver P Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Division, and BGenThomasJ. Cushman, assistant wing commander, meet in Tokyo, Japan, a week

The Irichon-Seoti! Campaign

echelons. The forward echelon, 10officers, 48 enlisted men, and 8helicopters, loaded on board Jap-anese-manned LST Q079 atChinhae. During the voyage, theMarines and Japanese crew sharedmess facilities. Luckily, detach-ment commander Captain VictorArmstrong spoke fluent Jap-anese—he had resided in Japanfor 15 years before the outbreak ofWorld War II. Four officers and 43enlisted men remained behind tosafeguard squadron property atChinhae.

Once ashore the Marine heli-copter detachment picked up rightwhere it left off, but on a muchlarger scale, The main missionsremained command and liaison,aerial evacuation of seriouslywounded, combat search and res-cue of downed fliers, and visualreconnaissance. Although thenumber of HO3S helicopters haddoubled since August, thedemands for their time continued toincrease.

Major General Smith, the 1stMarine Division commander and aformer member of the ShepherdBoard in 1946, quickly became ahelicopter advocate. "The heli-copter was of inestimable value tothe division commander and hisstaff in keeping personal contactwith subordinate units in a mini-mum of transit time," he asserted.Generals Smith and Craig, nowassistant division commander,depended upon helicopters to visitthe front on a daily basis and unitcommanders scouted proposedroutes of advance, although emer-gency medical evacuations weregiven priority over liaison andreconnaissance. With as few asonly four helicopters operational,however, command and liaisonvisits were often interrupted whenthe commander's helicopter wasdiverted for emergency missions.When critically wounded men

needed a ride the generals andcolonels either used alternativetransportation or waited until their"chopper" returned. The list ofdignitaries using helicopter trans-port during September 1950included Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, commander LieutenantGeneral Lemuel Shepherd, Com-mandant Clifton B. Cates, and XCorps commander, U.S. ArmyMajor General Edward M. Almond.At Inchon, just as at Pusan, themost often heard complaint abouthelicopters was that there werenot enough of them.

Although Marine helicoptersplayed no combat role on the firstday at Inchon, Navy helicoptersdid spot naval gunfire during thepreliminary bombardment. On 16September (D+i), Marine heli-copters entered the fray flying 14missions. The landing ship-basedMarine "whirlybirds" flew recon-naissance and artillery spottingmissions over Wolmi-do Island,and First Lieutenant Max Nebergallpulled a Navy pilot out of thedrink. On the afternoon of 17September, ground Marines cap-tured Kimpo Airfield, the largest

"Whirlyhird" pilots in Korea were famous for their daring frats while rescuingdowned flyers and evacuating seriously wounded men; among the vey bestwere lstLts Robert A. Lon.gstaff and Gustave F Lueddeke, Jr of VMO-6.Tragically, the Marine Coips lost two of it inostpromisin,q pioneer helicopter pilotswhen Longstaff was killed in ac/ion at the Ghosin Reservoir and Lit eddeke suc-cumbed topoliomyeliti.c not long after returning from Korea.

National Archives Photo (tJSMc) 127-N-A130403

23

airfield in Korea, virtually intact.The first US, aircraft to land therewas Captain Armstrong's HO3S,which arrived at mid-morning on 18September as Marines searched forthe remnants of the previousnight's NKPA counterattack force.Armstrong carried two early pro-ponents of Marne helicopter oper-ations, Lieutenant General Shep-herd and his operations officerColonel Victor H. Krulak.

On 19 September, the 1stMarine Division moved its com-mand post from Inchon to Oeoso-ri. The next day VMO-6 moved tonearby Kirupo, which thereafterserved as the squadron's base ofoperations until the subsequentmove north. The final phase of theInchon turning movement—therecapture of Seoul—was about tobegin, and helicopters proved tobe particularly valuable when ter-rain obstacles separated elements ofthe division during the drive toretake the capital. The generaloperational pattern was for onehelicopter to be earmarked foreach regimental commander inaddition to one each for the divisioncommander and his assistant com-mander. The regimental heli-copters were primarily used forreconnaissance and medical evac-uations, the division commander'sfor liaison, and the assistant divisioncommander's for reconnaissance;any unassigned helicopters under-went maintenance while standingby for emergency evacuations orcombat search and rescue.

The major obstacle on the way toSeoul was the Han River. Brig-adier General Craig used his heli-copter to locate a suitable crossingarea, scout key terrain, and surveythe road approaches to the SouthKorean capital. Although fewenemy soldiers actually showedthemselves, Captain Armstrong,Craig's pilot, had to dodge scat-tered small arms fire along the

ation.

way. As a result of his aerial recon-naissance, Craig recommendedthat the 5th Marines move acrossthe Han at an abandoned ferry sitenear Haengju and then seize thehigh ground overlooking Seoul.

Just as before, combat searchand rescue was an important addi-tional duty for the helicopters ofVMO-6. On 21 September 1950,the squadron received word that apilot had gone down behindenemy lines and was jammedinside his cockpit. Anticipating a

24

difficult extraction, First LieutenantArthur 11. lIancroft loaded hisplane captain on board then tookoff to make the rescue. The areawas "hot," so friendly planes main-tamed a rescue combat air patrol tostrafe any enemy who showedtheir heads. Bancroft set his HO3Sdown and remained at the con-trols while the helicopter idledwith its rotor blades slowly turning.The crew chief could not free theencased pilot alone, so Bancrofthad to leave the aircraft to assist.

Oepartnient of Oefense Photo (USMC) A130249Capt Victor A. Armstrong, right, proudly displays the cake sent from the carrierPhilippine Sea (CV 47.) as Maf Vincent J. Cottschaile, VMO-6's conrmandin,gofficer, looks on. Capt Armstrong made a daring behind-the-lines rescue of a Navypilot shot down near Seoul and the cake was sent ashore as a mark of appreci-

I.

1

Who was the First Marine Helicopter Pilot?

here is some dispute about who the first MarineCorps helicopter pilot actually was. According toMarine lore that honor goes to fighter ace and

famed test pilot Marion E. Carl, but the official records ofthe naval service identify Major Armond H. DeLalio asMarine helicopter pilot number one, and Marion Carlhimself proclaimed that Desmond E. Canavan was prob-ably the first Marine to fly a helicopter.

Accorcling to the Marine Corps' official history,Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973, "Major GeneralMarion E. Carl is generally credited with being the firstMarine to learn how to fly a helicopter in July 1945 [butiit was not until some years later that he was officially des-ignated [as such]." In his autobiography, Pushing TheEnvelope (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994),Carl relates that he learned how to fly a Sikorsky FINS (R-4) while a test pilot stationed at the Naval Air Test Center,Patuxent River, Maryland. He was given about threehours of instruction before he soloed. In that same meni-oir, however, he states that fellow Marine DesmondCanavan was flying helicopters in late 1944. Carl's claimthat he was helicopter pilot number one rests upon the factthat he was the first Marine to log the 40 hours requiredfor cerrification even though he never applied for such cer-tification. Neither Car nor Canovan appear on the navalservice helicopter pilot certification list prior to june 1950.

Marine Corps Historian Lynn Montross, the recognizedauthority on early Marine helicopter operations, listsNavy Cross holder Armond DeLalio as having flown U.S.Navy helicopters at New York's Floyd Bennett Field thenunder the auspices of the U.S. Coast Guard in 1944. He isofficially recognized as the first Marine certified as a heli-copter pilot, achieving that honor on 8 August 1946.DeLalio was the operations officer for Navy helicoptersquadron VX-3 at that time. He was killed during a testflight in 1952 when a rocket-assisted takeoff pod nial-fi.inctioned causing his HRS helicopter to catch fire and thencrash.

The Navy register of early helicopter pilots lists 250 qual-ifiers prior to the onset of the Korean War in June 1950;33 are Marines, including three enlisted naval aviation pilots(the famous "Flying Sergeants" of the Marine Corps).

While who should be recognized as the true "GrayEagle" of Marine helicopter aviation remains murky, thereis little doubt about the specific incident that started theMarine Corps helicopter program. That event occurred atQuantico, Virginia, in 1946 and was described by helicopterpioneer Edward C. Dyer:

One clay Marion Carl, a test pilot at Patuxent, flewa helicopter to Marine Corps Schools to demon-strate it to the students. . . . He hoisted [LieutenantColonel Victor Hi Brute Krulak ... about 15 feet [off

25

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

LtcolArmond H. DeLalio, reciienl of/he Navy Cross forheroism as a pilot with Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron241 during the batt.le of Midway and a Marine Corpshelicopter pionew, was honored in 1965 when an dc-mentaiy school at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, wasdedicated in his name.

the groundl and pulled him into the cockpit.[Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B.l Twining and I werestanding by the window and watching and I said 'Bill,let's . . . quit fooling around.' He said 'OK! Hewrote the theory . . principles . . . backgroundreasoning . . . and I wrote [an implementationl pro-gram."

Marion Carl recalled that he specifically selectedLieutenant Colonel Krulak because his small stature andlightweight could be accommodated by the limited roomand lift capability of his HOS-1 helicopter. Krulak there-after became a helicopter devotee.

While the two Marines busily freedthe trapped pilot, the helicopter'scollective friction device workedloose and the plane tipped on itsside where the beating rotorsdestroyed the aircraft. Luckily,Lieutenant Robert Longstaff wasable to pick up the grounded trioalthough his overloaded HO3Sstaggered under the excessiveweight until it reached friendlylines. Bancroft then promptlymounted another helicopter to res-cue a second Navy flier before theday ended.

Two days later, Captain Arm-strong recorded the longest searchand rescue operation yet by aVMO-6 helicopter when he flewnearly 100 miles behind enemylines to rescue a downed Navypilot. On the return flight, he ranout fuel over friendly territory,temporarily put down, refueled,and then landed at Kimpo afterdark using a flashlight to illumi-nate his control panel. The res-cued pilot turned out to be asquadron commander from thecarrier Pbilipine Sea (CV 47).The next day, VMO-6 received alarge layer cake, compliments ofthe U.S. Navy as a reward forArmstrong's fine work. Converse-ly, Lieutenant Longstaff flew theshortest rescue mission of the warpicking up a pair of Marines froma Grumman F7F Tigercat thatcrashed after taking off fromKimpo. That mission on the 25thtook less than six minutes. Thepilot was Lieutenant Colonel Max j.Volcansek, Jr., of Marine NightFighter Squadron 542, one of threesquadron commanders to godown that day.

A more dramatic rescue alsooccurred on 25 September. A Navyhelicopter "on loan" to the Marinessuffered battle damage during adeep rescue mission and wasforced to put down near the HanRiver. Word that an American air-

crew was down in enemy territorydid not reach the division air offi-cer until about 2100—after sunset.Captain Armstrong took off de-spite the fact that the HO3S hadneither proper instrumentation norlanding lights for limited visibilityflying. Armstrong needed botharms and both feet to control thehelicopter, so he held a flashlightbetween his knees to illuminatethe unlit instrument panel. Hespotted the downed aircraft in theglow of light cast from the burningcity of Seoul and set down on anearby sandbar. The crew, a Navypilot and a Marine enlisted man,swam to Armstrong's waiting heli-copter for a safe ride home. 1-Teonce again had to rely uponmakeshift lights upon arrival at thelanding zone.

Thus far in Korea, VMO-6 hadlost helicopters to operational inci-dents but had suffered no fatali-ties. Tragically, this string of luckcame to an end on 29 September.A vMo-6 Sentinel was shot downabout five miles north of Seoul.Reports indicated the aerial ob-server was killed in the crash, butthe pilot was able get out. FirstLieutenants Lloyd Engelhardt andArthur Bancroft, both of who pre-viously had logged deep searchand rescue missions, were at thedivision command post when thecall for help came in. Both imme-diately volunteered to go, butMajor James Cupp, the division airofficer, ordered them to wait untilmore detailed information becameavailable. A few minutes later theylearned that the OY went downbeyond the Marine frontlines nearUijongbu, an unsecured areateeming with enemy and knownto be infested with antiaircraftguns. Bancroft, who won a coinflip to decide who would makethe rescue, took the lead withEngelhardt trailing by about a halfmile. They found the crash site,

26

but as Bancroft's helicopter beganto settle it was hit by enemy fire anddisintegrated in a fireball. Engel-hardt called for fighter planes tosurvey the area. They reportedBancroft had been killed, andthere was no sign of the downedpilot. First Lieutenant Arthur R.Bancroft thus became the firstMarine helicopter pilot to die inaction.

Helicopters became crucial forcommand liaison. The rugged ter-rain, a major river, and wide dis-persal of fighting units made con-trol difficult. Helicopter mobilitymade it possible for commanders toscout approach routes, identifykey terrain, attend conferences inthe rear, and then quickly there-after meet subordinate comman-ders face-to-face. On 28 Septem-ber, Major General Smith coordi-nated the defense of Seoul as hevisited each of his three regimentalcommand posts: the 1st Marines atSeoul's Duk Soo Palace; the 5thMarines at the Seoul Women'sUniversity; and the recentlyarrived 7th Marines on the city'swestern outskirts. The 1st and 5thMarines were to defend in placewhile the 7th attacked towardUijongbu. On 3 October, Arm-strong flew Commandant Cates onan aerial survey of the Inchon-Seoul area and a frontline inspec-tion tour highlighted by observationof an attack by the 7th Marines onthe 4th. This was the final groundcombat action of the campaign,although Marine helicopters con-tinued to fly deep rescue and med-ical evacuation missions fromKimpo throughout the rest ofOctober. Lieutenant Engelhardtrescued a Marine pilot nearChunchon on 3 October and thenplucked an Air Force pilot up atSihyon-ni on the 5th.

When the Inchon-Seoul cani-paign was officially declared over atnoon on 7 October 1950, VMO-6

U.S. Naval Aviation Designations

D uring the Korean conflict, the Navy Bureau ofAeronautics used designation systems that con-veyed a lot of inlormation abou its squadrons and

aircraft in a concise manner,Squadron Designations:

The Bureau reci ignized three aircraft squadron types.lighter than ;tir (Z); hew. icr than air (V: and helicopter(1-1). tn addition, Marine aircraft squadrons were identi-fied by the insertion ul the letter M" between the aircrafttype and the squadron function. In general, a three let—er prefix fi dli iw ed by up to three numbers was used to

identify individual Marine aircraft squadrons. The first let-ter (:1 "V' or "fl') identihed the primary aircraft typeused by the squadron. the second letter ("Mn identifiedit as a Marine aviation unit, and the third to" indicatinghservation and "R" for transportation) identified the

sqii:icIroi's primary mission; the numbers in the suffixsometimes identified the squadron's unit affiliation andalways noted its precedence order.

Thus, \ \I( )-6 was the sixth heavier-than-air MarineOl)servai ion squadron formed. The single digit indicatedthat the sqtudri)n was not specifically affiliated with a par-ticular aircraft wing observation squadrons wereattached to ground units). On the other hand, I BiN- 161was the first Marine helicopter transport squadronassigned to the is) Marine Aircraft Wing (the first "1" indi-cating initial assignment to the wing, numbers ahove

were used for non-fixed wing aircraft, and the last "1"signifying it was the first squadron formed).

Aircraft Designations

tndividual aircraft designations used a similar identi-fication system. The Bureau of Aeronautics gave eachnaval aircraft a mixed letter and number designation.

Except for experimental or prototype helicopters, thefirst letter was an "f-I" indicating rotary-wing status: thesecond letter indicated its primary purpose ("0" forobservation, "N" for transport. or 1" for trainer); a num-ber (except in the ease of the first niodeb indic;tted themanufacturer's sequence for producing that specific air-craft type: the next letter identified the manufacturer(:1." for Bell, "P' for Piasecki, or "S for Sikorshyf- and thenumber following a dash indicated a sequential modifi-cation of that aircraft model,

Thus, the l-103S-1 was Sikorsky Aircraft's third modelobservation helicopter with one modific'at ion; the I-IRPwas Piasecki's first transport helicopter; the H't'l,--t was thefourth modification to Bell Aircraft's original trainer heli-copter; the HC5S was Sikorskys fifth obser ationmodel: and the HRS-1 was Sikorsky's Iii's) transport heli-copter,

The Bureau's system was a good one that remained inuse for four decades, hut there were :i few problems.Fit's), aircraft were often used for roles other than thoseassigned. For example, the HO3S-1 was actually a utili-ty aircraft that during field service performed mans' risksother than observation, a task that actually became a sd-dora-used secondary mission in Korea. Second. the pro-liferation of missions and manufacturers as time passedled to confusing duplication of letters i "T" was various-lv used to indicated torpedo, trainer, and transport air-craft). Third. lack of inter-Service consistency producedconfusion (the Navy H035-1 was an H-5F to the AirForce and Army). The naval aircraft designation systemwas replaced by a joint aircraft designation system in 1962.hut the Bureau's squadron designation system remains ineffect.

helicopters had flown 643 mis-sions, evacuated 139 seriouslywounded men, and rescued 12 air-men from behind enemy lines orout of the water.

The success of VMO-6's fledg-ling helicopter detachment hadwide-ranging effects that spreadwell beyond the theater of opera-tions and impacted more than justthe Marine Corps. in the UnitedStates, military dogmatists andcivilian pundits complained longand loud about lack of inter-Service unity in Korea. However, inthe words of Major General John P.Condon, an expert in joint opera-(ions and an experienced air

group commander in Korea: 'Thefarther from Washington, the lessinter-Service differences came intoplay." This dictate was borne out byMarine helicopter operations inlate October. On the 21st, CaptainGene W. Morrison made a series offlights to evacuate eight seriouslywounded Army paratroopers fromSukchon to Pyongyang in hisHO3S. Three days later, CaptainWallace D. Blatt, who had provid-ed helicopter coverage for thewithdrawal of U.S. forces fromChina, and First Lieutenant CharlesC. Ward flew deep into enemy ter-ritory to rescue a pair of Air Forcepilots down near Koto-ri, more

27

than 100 miles inland from theirtemporary base at Wonsan Harbor.These were only a few of manytimes Marine helicopters rescuedor aided other American service-men in Korea. Although both theU.S. Navy and Air Force were fly-ing helicopters in Korea, theMarine success with rotary-wingoperations at Pusan and Inchonprodded the Air Force to attachhelicopter units specifically ear-marked for medical evacuation toArmy field hospitals. Likewise, aclamor for organic transport andobservation helicopters arose fromU.S. Army commanders. The utili-ty and practicality of helicopters in

combat zones had been firmlyestablished by the Marines ofVMO-6 in less than three months.

General MacArthur's successfulturning movement at Inchon dras-tically changed the course of theKorean War. Thereafter, the NKPAwas a broken machine with itsscattered remnants headed for theprotection of North Korea's hinter-lands or a safe haven inside China.MacArthur, sensing a chance toend the conflict by trapping theremaining North Korean forces,sent his United Nations Commandspeeding north beyond the 38thParallel in a race for the Yam Riverdespite warnings not to do so.

MacArthur split his forces tohasten the pursuit. He ordered dieEighth Army forward in the westand opted to use X Corps, includ-ing the 1st Marine Division, for anamphibious landing at Wonsan innortheast Korea, Once again,VMO-6 split into forward and rearelements, The advance party (4officers and 70 enlisted menknown as the "surface" echelon)embarked on board LST 1123 andthen sailed for Wonsan on 13October. Most pilots, all VMO-6aircraft, and a skeleton ground-support crew remained at Kimpo.Fifth Air Force specifically taskedthe Marine helicopters with sup-porting a U.S. Army parachutedrop near Pyongyang, but theMarines also would conduct com-bat search and rescue as needed.This "flight" echelon was com-posed of 17 officers and 19 enlist-ed men with Captain Armstrong asofficer-in-charge. The stay-behindelement was to continue opera-tions from Kimpo until ramp spaceat Wonsan became available.Included in the helicopter flightechelon were several newlyarrived pilots and replacement air-

craft ferried in froni the UnitedStates on board. the aircraft carrierLeyte (CV 32). The new aircraftwere welcome additions thatmarIe nine Marine HO3S heli-copters available.

United Nations ground forcespressed forward against onlytoken resistance. A South Koreandivision occupied Wonsan in earlyOctober, but the amphibious taskforce carrying VMO-6 had to marktime sailing up and down the eastcoast until the harbor could becleared of mines. Consequently,members of VMO-6's stay-behindechelon actually set clown inNorth Korea before the advanceparty. On 23 October, CaptainBlatt and Lieutenant Ward flewnorth from Kimpo to Wonsan. Theairfield served as the squadron'sGap! Wallace D. Blatt, a helicopterpilot assigned to VMO-6 in Korea,had been a Marine multi-enginedtransport pilot at Guam andOkinau,a during World War II. Helearned to fly helicopters immediatelyafter the war and was thejirstMarin.ehelicopter pilot deployed overseaswhen heflew a borrowed Navy HO3S-I during the occupation of NorthChina.

National Archives Photo (USMc A130580

28

home base from then until VMO-6moved to Yonpo on 3 November.The embarked surface echelonfinally got ashore on the 25th, andthe flight echelon completed itsmovement to Wonsan three dayslater.

Immediately after landing, the1st Marine Division began opera-tions. One regiment occupiedWonsan and manned two battal-ion-sized outposts (Majon-ni to thewest and Kojo to the south) whiletwo regiments proceeded about 50miles north to the poit ofHungnam and the railway junctionat J-Iarnhung before moving outtoward the Chosin Reservoir some78 miles farther inland. Althoughintelligence estimates indicatedthere would he little resistanceand X Corps commander, MajorGeneral Edward M. Almond, want-ed a rapid inland movement, theenemy had other ideas. A nightattack at Kojo caught the Ameri-cans by surprise and. cut the mainsupply route while unexpectedlystrong NKPA forces encircled theMajon-ni outpost. With no over-land routes open, helicoptersbecame the only reliable link withboth outposts.

The 1st Marine Division wasalerted that the Kojo garrison wasunder attack in the early morninghours of 28 October. Emergencyrequests for medical assistance,specifically aerial evacuation heli-copters and a hospital receivingship in addition to ground rein-forcements, were cuickly actedupon. Six HO3S helicopters weredispatched. As Captain GeneMorrison later recalled, the situatio.nwas desperate enough that henever shut his engine clown afterarriving at Wonsan on his ferryflight front Kimpo. Instead, hereceived a hurried cockpit briefand was on his way to Kojo with-out ever leaving the aircraft.Captains Blatt and Morrison, and

11w Chosin Reservoir

1-4/

The hospital ship Repose (AH 17) at anchor in InchonHarbor Note the helicopter landing pad mounted on the

Department of Defense Photo (uSMC) A134641shz 's stern; ibis configuration became standard on all hos-pital ships during the course of the Korean War

Lieutenants Engelhardt, Lueddeke,and Ward, collectively flew 17 seri-ously wounded men from Kojo tothe hospital ship Repose (AH 17) atWonsan Harbor. Captain GeorgeB. Farish provided airborne searchand rescue. During a search on 29October, he spotted the word"HELP" spelled out in straw abouta mile northeast of Tongchon. AsFarish trolled the area, a lone figureemerged from cover and thenbegan waving. Farish shouted:"Hey Mac, looking for a ride?" Hethen plucked up the first of sever-al lost Marines he brought in thatday. During several of the rescuesFarish left his helicopter to assistbadly wounded men to the idlingaircraft. Unfortunately, his daringattempt to rescue a Navy pilotunder fire late in the day came tonaught when it was discovered theman was already dead.

Helicopters played an importantrole at Majon-ni, a vital road junc-tion located in a Y-shaped valleyabout 25 miles west of Wonsan.

Capt Gene W. Morrison, a helicopterpilot with VMO-6, was one ofthefirstMarine "Whirlyhirds" to arrive innorthern Korea from Kimpo Airfield tosupport the ('hosin Reservoir cam-paign. At Yonpo Airfield, he wasimmediately diverted to help evacuateserious wounded Marines from Kojo tothe hospital ship Repose C4H 17) inWonsan 1-Jarbor.National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A130604

29

The village was occupied withoutresistance on 28 October, but with-in a week the garrison was com-pletely surrounded and the vulner-able main supply route becameknown as "Ambush Alley." Radiocommunications between Majon-ni and Wonsan was uncertainbecause intervening high groundand intermittent atmospheric inter-ference allowed an open windowof only a few hours each day, so theonly reliable communications linkswere messages carried in and outby helicopter or OY pilots. For themost part, the Majon-ni strongpoint was supplied by airdrop andcasualty evacuation was by heli-copter from 2 November until thesiege lifted.

The Chosin Reservoir campaigntested the endurance of the"whirlybirds" and the skill of theirpilots and the fortitude of theirground crews like no other periodbefore Chinese anti-aircraft firebegan to light up the cloudedskies of northeast Korea. The via-

bility of extended helicopter oper-ations at high altitude and in diffi-cult weather conditions was at thattime still conjectural. It wasbelieved that helicopters might notbe able to operate safely at anypoint beyond Chinhung-ni at themouth of the Funcilin Pass, abouttwo-thirds of the way to theChosin Reservoir, due to the thin airat that altitude. The effect of pro-longed cold weather on helicopter

operations was also a source ofconcern. This issue came to thefore when Captain Eugene Popehad to return his 1-1035 after onlyfour minutes aloft because the col-lective and cyclic controls weretoo stiff to adequately controlflight. Ground crews subsequentlyswitched to light weight lubricantsand tried to either hangar or coverall aircraft when not in use. Thesemeasures compensated for, but

30

did not completely alleviate, coldweather-induced problems. Re-duced lift in low temperatures athigh altitude and flight in windyconditions made flying in themountainous terrain hazardous,but there was no choice whenemergencies occurred. It alsobecame apparent that ground-effect hovers would not be possiblein the foreseeable future. An addi-tional problem was the ungainlyconfiguration of the HO3S-1,which required stretcher cases toextend outside the cabin. Sub-freezing temperatures and extremeairborne wind chill factors putalready wounded men at risk forfrostbite while enroute to safety.Thus, the already limited flightenvelope of the H035-1 was furtherrestricted by terrain and weather.

On 2 November, the 1st MarineDivision began its ascent towardthe reservoir following a heli-copter reconnaissance of theSudong Valley. No enemy troopswere located from the sky, hutground units were soon mixing itup with the first Chinese Com-munist units yet encountered.General Smith ignored. the advice ofthe X Corps commander to speed itup and instead moved his divisionsteadily ahead along a single-laneroad, keeping all units tied in andestablishing strong points alongthe way. His foresight and pru-dence likely saved the 1st MarineDivision from annihilation whenthe Chinese sprang their trap a fewweeks later.

Helicopters scouted hill-maskedflanks, reconnoitered the roadway,laid communications wire, provid-ed radio relays, and brought incrucial small items in addition. totheir by-then normal jobs of com-mand liaison and medical evacua-tion. Despite increasingly poorweather, First Lieutenant Wardflew 115 miles from Yonpo toSongjin to rescue an Air Force air-

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borne forward air controllerwhose plane had gone down nearthe Chosin Reservoir on 5 No-vember. The HO3S was badly buf-feted by crosswinds and strainedto bite into the chilly thin air.Three days later, Captain Pope'shelicopter was blown out of thesky by turbulent winds while on aresupply run. The helicopter was awreck, but Pope escaped withoutserious injury. Lieutenant Wardarrived to take him out but wasbeset by a temperamental starter, soboth pilots spent the night at aground command post.

By 26 November, the 1st MarineDivision was dangerously spreadout. Little active resistance had yetbeen encountered, but veterancommanders were leery thatthings might be going too well.The Marines had moved upward

through the snow-covered Fun-chilin Pass over the main supplyroute, a treacherous, icy, winding,narrow, dirt road. General Smithwisely established a series of out-posts along the way; a regimentalsupply base at Koto-ri just north ofthe Funchilin Pass, an airstrip anddivision headquarers at Hagaru-rion the southern tip of the reservoir,a company-sized outpost guardedthe Toktong Pass from Fox Hill,and a jump off point manned bytwo regiments at Yudam-ni on thewestern tip of the reservoir.

Conditions were terrible. Swirl-ing snow and sub-zero tempera-tures were the result of the winds,which blew down from Man-churia. It would be hard to imaginemore difficult flying conditions forhelicopter operations. The bitterlycold, short days and lack of repair

31

facilities hampered helicoptermaintenance. It was under thesedire circumstances that the mettle ofVMO-6's helicopter section wastruly tested.

Beginning on the night of 27November, the advance elementsof the 1st Marine Division becameheavily engaged at Yudarn-ni andHagaru-ri. The fierce fighting atthe Chosin Reservoir required anall-hands effort by VMO-6 whenmore than six Chinese divisionstried to overrun two Marine regi-ments and cut the main supplyroute at several points. Helicopterpilots Blatt and Morrison bothreported enemy roadblocks be-tween Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, thefirst official confirmation that the1st Marine Division was surround-ed. The Marines' abortive advancewas about to become a breakout,

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A4912

Aerial evacuation of wounded and severely frostbitten Gottschalk's squadron conducted a total of 191 helicopterMarines and soldiers from Hagaru-ri saved numerous lives. evacualions out of a total of 1,544 flights.From late November lv mid-December, Maj Vincent .1.

an epic of modern warfare duringwhich the Marines attacked in adifferent direction" bringing outmost of their equipment and all oftheir wounded.

Several helicopters moved for-ward to Hagaru-ri to save flighttime on 28 November, and allavailable aircraft flew from dawnuntil dusk each day for the nextweek-and-a-half. General Smithoften used helicopters to visit hisscattered units during that time.The helicopters of VMO-6 logged40 sorties (1 reconnaissance, 16transport, and 23 medical evacua-tions) in 73.7 flight hours on the29th. Fifty seriously injured menwere flown out and numerousvital supplies (particularly radiobatteries and medicine) werebrought in; General Smith visitedthe forward command posts, and alarge group of enemy was spottedby helicopter that day. CaptainFarish's HO3S was hit severaltimes as he delivered supplies to an

isolated rifle company perchedatop Fox Hill. As he later related:"They ran me off." Farish limpedback to Hagaru-ri and safely land-ed under covering fire by theMarines in the perimeter, but his air-craft was operationally groundeddue to damage to the main rotortransmission. The next day, Lieu-tenant Engelhardt's HO3S was hitwhile delivering vital radio batter-ies to Fox Hill. A bullet just missedthe pilot, and the helicopter was sodamaged that it had to return tobase for emergency repairs aftercarrying out one wounded Marine.Forty-three other casualties weresuccessfully brought out that day aswell by the HO3S-ls of VMO-6.Helicopters carried out 50 wound-ed and brought in medical sup-plies, gasoline, radio batteries, andtank parts in almost 60 hours offlight time on 30 November.

The Marines consolidated atHagaru-ri, broke out of the Chi-nese trap at Koto-ri, and moved

National Archives Photo (USN) 8O-G-420288

Helicopter pilot IstLi Robert A. Long-staffposes in front of his F103S-.7 heli-copter decked out in flight gear afterdelivering a downed Navy airman tothe Sicily (CVE ii8j Longstaff wasthe second Marine helicopter pilotkilled in action when his aircraft washit by antiaircraft fire at the ChosinReservoir.

back toward the sea by way of anair dropped Treadway portablebridge that spanned the FunchilinPass. Throughout the ordeal at thereservoir, helicopters were theonly dependable means of physicalcontact between scattered tinits.They provided liaison, reconnais-sance, and medical evacuation;whenever a "whirlybird" flew amedical supply mission, ammuni-tion and radio batteries were part ofthe incoming load. These opera-tions were not without cost. On 3December, First Lieutenant Long-staff was killed at Toktong Passwhen his helicopter was broughtdown by enemy fire while trying torescue a critically wounded man.Captain Blati played a role in adaring but ultimately tragic event.After several frustrating hours tryingto start his frozen helicopter, i3lattwas finally able to get his aircraft tocrank up just as an emergency res-cue mission came in. Blatt took offbut then returned when the cover-ing air patrol told him an ax and fire

Although operating at the extreme edge of their performance envelope, theMarine J-103S-ls of VMO-6 provided reliable service at the Chosin ReservoirDuring the most criticalperiod the squadron 'is helicopters and OYs provided theonly physical contact between units separated by enemy action.

National Archives Photo (usMc) 27-N-A5398

32

a-—-- aa -

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1.

Pohang to the Punchbowl

extinguisher would be needed tofree the trapped pilot, Ensign JesseL. Brown, USN. Arriving at thescene, ]3latt joined NavyLieutenant Junior Grade Thomas J.Hudner, Jr., who had purposelycrash-landed his plane in order toassist Brown. Despite their bestefforts, they could not extract themortally wounded man before hedied. The saddened men had toreturn empty handed, but Hudnerlater received the Medal of Honorfor his unselfish actions to rescuethe United States Navy's firstAfrican-American combat pilot.

After the 1st Marine Divisiondeparted Koto-ri for Hungnam on6 December, VMO-6 moved back toYonpo. During the ensuing voyagefrom l-Iungnam some of thesquadron's helicopters were eai-marked to conduct emergency res-cues during carrier-borne air oper-ations. On 12 Decembei; the firstelements of the squadron (includ-ing two helicopters) began to backload on board LST Q082 for imme-diate transportation to Hungnam,which would then be followed bya seahorne redeployment toPusan. Seven helicopters remainedbehind until additional ship spacescould be found. On 17 December,three HO3Ss flew from their tem-porary home on the beach atWonsan to the battleship Missouri(BB 63) and then each trans-shipped to three different carriers(the Leyte [CV 321, Princeton [CV371, and Philippine Sea [CV 47]) forduty as standby plane guards, afourth HO3S served the heavycruiser St. Paul (CA 73). Threeadditional helicopters embarkedon board the Missouri late in theday. Enroute, Lieutenant ColonelRichard W. Wyczawski, commanderof Marine Fighter Squadron 212,was charged with overseeing themovement of VMO-6's "lostsheep" during the voyage toPusan. They were successively

located on board their variousships and then gathered together onboard the light carrier Bataan(CVL 29) as the convoy sailedsouth. Unfortunately, three heli-copters were damaged enroute byhigh winds and heavy seas. Thefour operable "whirlyhirds" flewoff their host carriers to Masan on26 December 1950. The otherswere off loaded at Pusan Harborand underwent repairs.

The return to Masan closed thebooks on the Chosin Reservoircampaign. During the movementnorth and the ensuing breakoutbetween 28 October and 15

December, Marine helicoptersflew 64 reconnaissance, 421 trans-port, 191 medical evacuation, 60utility, and 11 search and rescuemissions; more than 200 woundedmen were flown out, most ofwhom would have died withoutspeedy medical assistance. All ofthis, of course, could not havebeen possible without the out-standing support of the tirelessground crews aided by Mr. HaroldNachlin, the much-respected civil-ian technical representative fromSikorsky Aircraft. As impressive asthese achievements were, however,the Chosin campaign once againpointed out the inadequacy of theHO3S as a military aircraft. A moreeffective medical evacuation plat-form was desperately needed, aswas a viable transport helicopter.Fortunately, each of these was inthe pipeline and would soon seecombat service.

The unexpected CommunistWinter Offensive initiated thelongest retreat in American mili-tary history. While X Corps pulledback from northeast Korea, theEighth Army fell back more than600 miles before halting south ofSeoul. During the next eight

33

months the U.S. Marines wouldrest and rebuild at Masan, chaseelusive North Korean guerrillasnear Pohang, lead the UnitedNations Command drive up cen-tral Korea from Wonju to the1-Twachon Reservoir, survive thelast major Chinese offensive of thewar, then once again claw theirway north to a rugged mountainarea just north of the 38th Parallelwhere the U.N. lines wouldremain until the end of the war.Throughout those U.N. counterof-fensives the helicopters of VMO-6continued to provide outstandingsupport.

While the Marines in Koreawere slogging their way back fromChosin, several Bell HTL heli-copters arrived in Japan. The HTLwas a two-seat, single-engine aircraftthat was already familiar to evetyhelicopter pilot because they hadlearned to fly helicopters usingBell-made trainers at Lakehurst andQuantico. These small "fishbowls"(so called due to their prominentplexiglass bubble canopies)mounted two evacuation pods,one on each side of the fuselage.This handy configuration made theBells much better adapted formedical evacuation than the vener-able Sikorskys. Unfortunately, theirrelatively underpowered engineswere unsuited for high-altitude,cold-weather operations, so theywere kept in reserve until theMarines returned to Pusan. Most ofthe older HTL-3s were assigned toheadquarters or maintenancesquadrons while all of the newerHTL-4s went to VMO-6. The planwas to gradually replace the HO3S-is as HTL-4s became available. On28 December 1950, three HTL-4s,two I-1TL-3s, and another HO3S-1joined the ranks of VMO-6. FirstLieutenant John L. Scott flew thefirst operational mission with anHTL-4 on 2 January 1951. As theNew Year dawned, VMO-6 mus-

Bell HTL

Thanks to the opening credits of the long-runningtelevision series "MASH' a helicopter deliver-ing wounded men to a field hospital remains one

of the most enduring images of the Korean conflict. Theaircraft featured on that show was a Bell Model-47, thesame type flown by the Marines under the designationI-ITL and by the Army and Air Force as the H-13.

The Model-47 first flew in 1946, was granted the firstever U.S. commercial helicopter license in 1947, andremained in production for almost 30 years. Militaryversions saw extensive service in both Korea andVietnam, and several generations of naval aviation heli-copter pilots learned to fly using HTLs. Early modelHTL-2 trainers used at Lakehurst Naval Air Station, Newjersey, mounted wheels instead of skids and were cov-ered in fabric when the first Marine trainees learned tofly rotary-wing aircraft. The Chief of Naval Operationsdesignated the HTL as the prospective observation heli-copter in 1949. The press of combat operations inKorea, particularly the need for a more suitable aerialmedical evacuation platform than the HO3S, led to a mas-sive influx of HTL-4s to Marine Observation Squadron 6at the end of 1950.

The unique technical feature of all Bell helicopters wasa two-bladed rotor and stabilizer system that reduced fly-ing weight without harming performance, and theunique visual feature of the HTL was its clear Plexiglas

VMO-6 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov52

"goldfish bowl" cabin canopy that allowed all-roundvision. The HTL-4's squat configuration and skidsallowed it to land in rough terrain while the inclusion oftwo exterior stretcher pods made it the preferred aircraftfor field evacuations of seriously wounded men.Unfortunately, it had an unreliable engine and a notori-ously weak electrical system that together requiredinordinate maintenance time while its limited fuel sup-ply severely reduced the helicopter's combat radius.

Several generations of naval aviators learned to flyusing HTL trainers, and the Bureau of Aeronautics even-tually purchased more than 200 HTLs, the last of whichwere still regularly flying more than two decades after thefirst one took to the air. Advanced versions of the HTLdeveloped into the UH-1 Huey and AH-1 Cobra, theutility and attack helicopters that arm today's FleetMarine Forces.

Aircraft Data

Manufacturer: Bell Aircraft CompanyPower Plant: 200 hp Franklin 0-335-5Dimensions: Length, 41'S": height, 9' 2": rotor, 35' twoblade with stabilizerPerformance: Cruising speed, 60 mph; ceiling, range, 150milesLift: Pilot plus two passengers or two externally mount-ed stretchers

34

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1130600

Capt George B. Parish, a helicopterpilot with VMO-6, stands by his BellHTL. Farish, by late 1950, had panic-pued in more than 100 combat mis-sions and was responsible Jbr theevacuation f more than 55 seriouslywounded United Nations troops.

tered 13 helicopters and nine OYobservation aircraft. An influx offresh faces was a welcome sight aswell because, according to CaptainGene Morrison, "the old handswere . . . pretty tired" after six-months of grueling combat duty.Just as with the ground units, a sig-nificant personnel change wasunderway. The Regulars were giv-ing way to recalled reservists. By theend ofJanuary 1951, the number ofReserve pilots in VMO-6 equaledthe number of Regulars.

The 1st Marine Division spent amonth recuperating throughoutthe uneventful respite at theMasan Bean Patch. During thattime, VMO-6 operated from anairstrip near the waterfront. Amaintenance detachment includ-ing four officers and 11 enlistedmen moved from Korea to ItamiAir Base in Japan to prepare thegrowing fleet of arriving heli-copters for combat service. Mosthelicopter missions at Masan wereutility and liaison flights, althoughoccasional aerial reconnaissanceand familiarization flights were

also made. Concurrently, planswere being formulated for theMarines to move about 70 milesnortheast to secure the X Corpseastern flank by conductingantiguerrilla operations near thecoastal village of Pohang.

Helicopters proved invaluablefor liaison work even before the1st Marine Division moved to Po-hang. unfortunately, poor weatheroften hampered flying conditions.General Smith had several hair-raising encounters en-route toplanning conferences, but healways arrived on time. TwoHO3S-ls were tossed about byhigh winds as they carried GeneralSmith's forward command group

to meet with the new Eighth Armycommander, Lieutenant GeneralMatthew B. Ridgway, USA, on 30December 1950 at Kyongju. Theymade it on time despite the har-rowing flight conditions. On SJanuary 1951, General Smith wassummoned to a commander's con-ference at Taegu. Dense foggrounded all fixed-wing aircraft,so Smith boarded LieutenantLueddeke's HO3S for the flight.Lueddeke followed some dimlyvisible railroad tracks at about 400feet, twice having to suddenlyswerve to avoid mountainsidesalong the way. Once, the visibilitywas so reduced that Lueddeke hadto Pitt the plane down in a rice

One qf the little noted, bitt important inLcsions performed by VMO-6 helicopterswas laying telephone wire between frontline positions. Here, a squadronground crewman loads wire spools onto a HTL-4 flown by Capt James R.O Moore.

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) Al 31086

35

—-.

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paddy; Smith lit his pipe and madesmall talk while waiting to resumehis journey. Not long thereafter,the pair took to the air once again;this time using roadside telephoneposts to guide them.

In early 1951, the 1st MarineDivision rooted out remnants of aNorth Korean division that hadinfiltrated the region surroundingPohang and threatened X Corpsheadquarters at Taegu. Dubbedthe "Pohang Guerrilla Hunt," thecampaign sought to secure thisarea as it held the only usable porton Korea's southeastern coast, themain supply route for east-centralKorea, and three vital airfields.

The VMO-6 ground support ele-ments moved from Masan toPohang by air, truck convoy, andship beginning on 13 January1951. The move was complete by16 February. Pohang's mountain-ous and forested terrain hid theenemy who qUickly broke up intosmall groups when the Marinesarrived. The solution was satura-tion patrolling. The Marines sentout fire-team and squad-sizedpatrols operating from platoon-and company-bases to flush outenemy stragglers. Helicopters wereused for observation, reconnais-sance, laying wire, command andcontrol, medical evacuations, re-supply of isolated small units, andtransportation of fire teams toremote hilltops. The guerrillaswere driven underground byrelentless Marine pressure, but notdecisively defeated. In the wordsof the official history: "Jn retro-spect, had [a fulli squadron of heli-copters been available . . . its quicklift . . increased mobility and sur-veillance would have made quite adifference in the conduct ofaction." Unrealized at the time, theuse of helicopters at Pohang wasactually a foretaste of the methodsthat would he used by the U.S.Marines and Army on a much larg-

National Archives Photo (UsMc) 127.N-A131826

Capt Clarence W Parkins points outthe spot where he was forced to crashland his helicopter in the water duringa test flight. Parkins later becameVMO-6's acting commander.

er scale in Vietnam more than adecade later.

The most notable helicopterincident of the guerrilla huntoccurred when First LieutenantJohn Scott flew the first night med-ical evacuation by a Bell heli-copter. There were several othernerve-wracking experiences aswell, On 27 January, for example,an HTL-4 flown by Captain HaroldG. McRay caught a skid on a low-strung cable and crashed whileattempting to takeoff from An-dong. The aircraft was wreckedhut neither the pilot nor his pas-senger, Brigadier General Lewis B."Chesty" Puller, who had been"frocked" to this rank the nightbefore, were injured.

The helicopters of VMO-6 evac-uated 59 men, most from the 7thMarines at Topyong-dong, be-tween 25 and 31 January.Helicopter evacuations directly tohospital ships became routineoperations. The advantages of thistime-saving and life-saving methodwere enumerated by Captain John

36

W. McElroy, USNR, the comman-der of the hospital ship Consola-tion (AH 15): "tests ... conclusive-ly proved the superiority of [heli-copters for] embarking and evacu-ating patients to and from the ship.There was less handling in thatpatients were moved directly fromairstrip to ship in one short hop,thereby eliminating . . . long andrough stages by boat and ambu-lance [andil 'choppers' [could] oper-ate when seas were too rough forboat handling." When the Con-solation returned stateside for anoverhaul in July, a helicopter-land-ing platform designed by MarineMajor Stanley V. Titterud wasadded and Marine pilots instructedthe ship's company in proper land-ing procedures. Upon return her toKorean waters, a pair of Sikorsky H-19 (U.S. Air Force designation forthe HRS) search and rescue heli-copters were stationed permanent-ly on board the Consolation tocarry out medical evacuationflights. U.S. Army aircraft eventual-ly replaced these Air Force heli-copters. Operations became sosmooth that it was not unusual fora litter case to be off the helicopterand on the way to the emergencyroom within a minute or less.Eventually, all hospital ships weresimilarly outfitted with landingplatforms. There is no definitivetally as to how many seriouslywounded men were saved due tothe swift treatment afforded by thehelicopters of all Services, hutmost estimates reach well into thehundreds.

On 1 February, Captain GeneMorrison made a daring nightlanding on the deck of the Con-solation. The next day a similarevacuation flight to the Consola-tion almost ended in tragedy whena delirious patient became so vio-lent that Captain Clarence W.

Parkins had to make an unsched-uled landing so he and the corps-

man on board could subdue andbind the man. Parkins thenresumed the mercy flight.

From Pohang, the Marines weretapped to lead IX Corps up thecenter of the peninsula during aseries of limited objective attacks,Operations Killer, Ripper, andRugged, collectively called the"Ridgway Offensives." These suc-cessive attacks, which began inlate February and continuedthroughout March and April, grad-ually pushed the Communists out ofthe Som River Valley and backabove the Hwachon Reservoir.During that time, VMO-6 followedin trail of the advance, successive-ly moving forward from Pohang toChung-j u, Wonju, Hongchon, andChungchon, only to move backagain when the Chinese mountedtheir spring offensives.

The Marines jumped off on 21February, but traffic congestiondelayed the arrival of Marineassault troops and hampered com-mand and control. Luckily, Gen-eral Smith had the use of a heli-copter and was able to communi-cate directly with his subordinatesand be present to observe the ini-tial attack. In the words of MarineCorps historian Lynn Montross:'Only the helicopter . . . enabledGeneral Smith to solve his timeand space problems prior toOperation Killer. The division wasrequired to move 150 miles byroad and rail from Pohang to theobjective area near Wonju in centralKorea, with only one road beingavailable for the last 30 miles."

Three days later, Marine Gen-eral Smith was hurredly sum-moned to the IX Corps advancedcommand post to take commandafter the commanding generaldied of a heart attack. This battle-field promotion, however, wasonly temporary until a more seniorArmy general arrived. Smith com-mandeered a Marine helicopter to

use during his time at IX Corps.As he later explained: "at theCorps level the helicopter waseven more essential for commandpurposes than at the divisionlevel."

Just as before, although not anofficial task for observationsquadrons, combat search and res-cue missions remained a high pri-ority. Captain Morrison picked up aMarine fighter pilot downed nearSong-gol on 12 March. On 27

37

March, two Marine helicoptersflown by Captain Norman C.

Ewers and First Lieutenant Robert A.Strong were called out to conducta search and rescue mission for anAir Force C-119 Flying Boxcar thathad gone down behind enemylines. They found the site, setdown, picked up three injuredcrewmen, and recovered the bodyof a fourth airman. The impact ofhelicopters on operations in Koreawas such that by that time this dar-

Marine OperationsSpring 19510 30

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MACAN

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ing mission that would once havegarnered stateside headlines, hadbecome routine.

Between 1 January and 30March, VMO-6 evacuated 539woLinded Marines (60 in January, 99in February, and 370 in March).The helicopter section was ex-tremely fortunate; it lost only twoaircraft (General Puller's HTL-4and an HO3S-1 lost to a takeoffincident on 12 March) and suf-fered no one killed in action.Unfortunately, the month of Aprilwas a tough one; three helicopterswould be lost during heavy fighting.

April began with a command

As coinmandinR officer of VMO-6,

change for VMO-6. Major Gotts-chalk departed on the last day ofMarch and the officer-in-chargehelicopter section, Captain Clar-ence W. Parkins, became the actingsquadron commander until thearrival of Major David W. Mc-Farland who would command thesquadron for the next six months.The squadron at that time num-bered 28 officers and 125 enlistedmen with nine OY observation air-craft, five HO3S-ls, and six 1-ITL-4s.

The 13th of April was a busyday for helicopter search and res-cue. First, Captain James R.

O'Moore and Technical Sergeant

Philip K. Mackert took off tosearch for a lost aircraft with thehelp of a flight of Marine Corsairs.They were unable to locate thatpilot and one of the Corsair escortswas shot down. O'Moore set hisHO3S down, then he and Mackertrushed over to try to save the pilotbut it was too late. Later that day,Captain Valdemar Schmidt, Jr.'sHO3S-1 was brought down byenemy fire during a rescue missionabout 20 miles behind enemylines. Several hits from small armsfire caused a loss of power andcontrol as the helicopter made itsfinal approach. He crash landed in

artillery accuracy, the mere presence of an OY overheadwould often silence enemy artillery.

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A131'164

Maj David WMcFarland initiated night aerial observation flights by OYplanes. Instead of the intended improvement in Marine

38

hilly terrain and his aircraft rolledover upon impact. Schmidt suf-fered only minor injuries, but hispassenger, Corporal Robert Sarviawrenched his leg, cut his hand,and went into shock. Americanaircraft circling above kept theenemy at bay with strafing runsuntil helicopter pilot CaptainFrank E. Wilson arrived on thescene. Wilson picked up the twoMarines in addition to the AirForce pilot they had came afterand then made his precarious wayback in the dark, flying an over-loaded helicopter without naviga-tional aids. Jeeps, trucks, andflares lit the field for Wilson'sreturning aircraft.

Not every mission had a happyending. Sometimes, despite greateffort on the part of helicopterpilots, a rescue could not be made.On 14 April, Captain GeneMorrison made three attempts topick up a downed pilot, but hisHO3S was turned away by enemyfire each time. Captain NormanEwers then tried, but he took somany hits he had to return to baseempty handed as well. Plans weremade to rig a stretcher to lift thepilot out the next morning, butinclement weather intervened.When OY aircraft flying over thetarget area could not locate theman, the helicopter rescue wasscrubbed.

On the night of 22 April, theChinese mounted their longexpected Fifth Phase Offensive.When a South Korean unit on theMarines' left flank broke and ran,the 1st Marine Division pulledback and formed a semi-circle onthe high ground to defend severalvital river crossings. The bitterfighting, collectively known as thebattle of Horseshoe Ridge, wasmarked by fierce hand-to-handcombat and several last ditchdefensive stands by isolated unitsthat equaled the combat intensity at

the Naktong bulge or the ChosinReservoir. The division sufferedabout 500 casualties in three daysfighting.

The last days of April found thehelicopters of VMO-6 busily evac-uating wounded men from dawnuntil dusk in an all-hands effortuntil the Marines reached the NoName Line. At about 0600 on the23d, all helicopters were airborneand most continued operationsthroughout the day with 36 indi-vidual flights made (15 by HO3S—lsand 21 by HTL-4s). Fifty woundedMarines were evacuated. CaptainDwain L. Redalen logged 18 evac-

uations in almost 10 hours of flying;First Lieutenant George A. Eatonwas a close second with 16 menbrought out. The next day an i-1TL-4 was lost to enemy fire when FirstLieutenant Robert E. Mathewsonwas shot out of the sky as heattempted a medical evacuation.Enemy fire hit the engine, instru-ment pedestal, and tail sectionsrendering Mathewson's aircraftuncontrollable as he hovered overthe air panels set out to mark thelanding zone. Mathewson crash-landed but was uninjured.Lieutenant John Scott, who set arecord with 18 evacuations in one

Capt Norman C. Ewers receives word that a helicopter is needed in the forwardarea fore reconnaissance mission. During daylight hours VMO-6pilois stood bywith elements of the 1st Marine Division, maintaining constant contact with tac-tical air controllers by field telephone.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A131065

39

Division.

day, tried to fly in despite the dan-ger, but was waved off byMathewson who then picked tip arifle and temporarily joined theinfantry. 1-us crippled aircraft wasdestroyed by dernolitions beforethe Marines departed. Thirty-twohelicopter missions were flown,and about another 50 seriouslywounded were evacuated byMathewson's fellow pilots.

The United Nations Commandbriefly regrouped behind the NoName Line, repelled a secondCommunist offensive, then onceagain set off north—this timeheading the Kansas Line along the38th Parallel. Non-stop fightinghad exhausted the enemy and hisforces were seriously depletedafter suffering grievous losses inthe recently concluded springoffensive. The desperation of theenemy was evident as unprece-dented numbers of them began tosurrender. This time it was the

Communists who were "huggingout." By the end of June, theUnited Nations Command wasonce again about to enter NorthKorea. At that point, the Com-munists called for a cessation ofoffensive actions as a prelude topeace talks. The United Nationsaccepted this condition, and thefighting forces of both sides tem-porarily settled down along a linenot far from the original pre-warborder between the two Koreas.

During August, VMO-6 operat-ed from Songjong until the 28th,then moved to Sohung. The monthsaw several rescue missions. FirstLieutenant Joseph C. Gardiner, Jr.,picked up a downed Marine fight-er pilot on 12 August. On 28August, Major Kenneth C. Smedleyused his HTL-4 to pull two com-munications men stranded on asmall island in the middle of arapidly rising river out of harm'sway. That same day, Captain

40

Frank E. Wilson lost control of hisHTL-4 when a crewman jumpedout of the hovering aircraft duringan attempted rescue. CaptainFrank C. Parks was credited withsaving several lives by deliveringwhole blood in darkness on 29August despite the fact his heli-copter had no lit instrumentation,no landing lights, and no hominglocator.

When peace talks broke dow.n inSeptember, Lieutenant GeneralJames A. Van Fleet, USA, comman-der of the Eighth Army since mid-April, mounted a series of limitedattacks intended as much to pres-sure the Communists back to thepeace table as to secure dominatingterrain just north of the KansasLine. The Marine sector featured avolcanic depression known as thePunchbowl. Its capture was a

bloody three-week slugfest foughtover nearly impassable roadlessmountain terrain, so helicopterswere much in demand. Marinepilots were at risk as they couni-geously defied enemy fire on theirmissions of mercy. The H03 andHTL helicopters delivered smallloads of medicine, ammunition,and radio batteries to the front andthen brought out 541 severelywounded men. Another frequentmission was the delivery of wholeblood to forward-deployed Med-ical Companies A and E of the 1stMedical Battalion.

On 16 September the light heli-copters of VMO-6 evacuated 85men. First Lieutenant JosephGardiner led the pack with 17medical evacuations. Major Ed-ward L. Barker's HTJ. was hit byenemy artillery as he tried to liftout a pair of wounded Marines. Heescaped without injury, hut one ofhis passengers succumbed to hiswounds before reaching medicalsanctuary. The following day,Captain William G. Carter's HTL-4crashed while conducting an

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A132015

Istit/Oseph C. Gardiner, left; an HO3S-1 pilot with VMO-6, is awarded a NavyCommendation Ribbon and a pair of gold stars denoting second and thirdawards of the AirMedaifor combat actions during the Inchon-Seoul campaign.Marine helicopteniplayed an important role in the drive inland by providing trans-portation, tnedtcal evacuation, and visual reconnaissance for the 1st Marine

Arrival of IIMR-161

emergency medical evacuation.Ground personnel attempting toassist the landing on rough terraingrabbed the helicopter's skids hutinadvertently tipped the aircraftcausing it to crash. The aircraftwas lost and the pilot suftèrednon-threatening injuries. CaptainGilbert R. Templeton's HO3S-1was hit by enemy fire during aresupply mission on 21 Septem-ber; Templeton was able to returnto base for repairs, but the missionhad to be scrubbed. Major Ken-neth C. Smedley, the squadron'sexecutive officei crashed whenhis HO3S-1 lost hover and setdown hard on uneven ground.When the plane began to slip overthe steep cliff, Smedley had tointentionally roll the helicopter onits side to stop its descent. Neitherhe nor his passenger was injured,but the helicopter was wrecked.

The fighting for the Punchbowllasted until late September. Afterthat, both sides settled down andbegan to dig in. The capture of thePunchbowl marked the last majoroffensive action by the Marines inKorea.

As the first year of the KoreanWar came to a close there could belittle doubt that the helicopter wasthe most important tactical innova-tion to date. The plucky little aircrafthad proven themselves adaptable,versatde, and survivable. The abil-ity of the helicopter to traverse difficult terrain, to land in tight spots,and to rapidly scout unfamiliar ter-ritory made it the preferred mode oftransportation for generals andcolonels; downed pilots couldlook forward to being hoisted outof the freezing water or grabbed upfrom behind enemy lines with acertainty never before experi-enced; and almost 2,000 men hadbeen lifted to hospitals with in afew hours of being wounded, afactor that greatly increased sur-vival rates. There was little doubt

the helicopter was here to stay,but thus far in the war the 'whirly-birds" had not yet been used fortheir proposed main missions andoriginal raison d'etre: vertical en-velopment and assault support.This was due to the inadequate liftof the machines currently avail-able, but that was about to changeas the war entered its second year.

Marine Transport HelicopterSquadron 161 (HMR-161) was thefirst transport helicopter squadronin history. It was also the first fullhelicopter squadron committed tocombat. Mounted in brand newSikorsky HRS-1 helicopters, HMR-161 arrived in Korea in earlySeptember 1951 and was soontesting new operational methodsunder actual combat conditions, alittle more than one year afterBrigadier General Edward Craig'soriginal recommendation that sucha squadron he sent into combat.The squadron's arrival at that par-ticular juncture in the war was for-tuitous because the 1st MarineDivision, then slogging its waynorth against stubborn Communistresistance in the mountains ofeast-central Korea, was led by twoearly and very influential propo-nents of helicopters—divisioncommander Major General GeraldC. Thomas and his chief of staffColonel Victor H. Krulak. BothMarines were plank holders in thehelicopter program; from Wash-ington, D.C., and Quantico, Vir-ginia, they pushed for adoption ofrotary-winged aircraft and created atest-bed squadron immediatelyafter the war. Krulak helped writeinitial helicopter doctrine anddrew up many of the first opera-tional plans used by HMX-1, whileThomas pushed for expandedhelicopter development at Head-quarters Marine Corps in the

41

immediate post-war period, thengained practical experience intheir use at Quantico after hisreturn from China in the late1940s. Both men were knownthroughout the Corps as innova-tors and visionaries, but they alsogarnered reputations for thoroughplanning and meticulous execu-tion of those plans. in retrospect, itwas clear that HMR-161 and the1st Marine Division formed a per-fect match.

Plans to create transport heli-copter squadrons had been on theboard well before the outbreak ofthe Korean War. In fact, early post-war planners envisioned a Marinehelicopter aircraft wing comprising10 squadrons with 24 helicopterseach. The proposed machinesshould be able to carry 15-20 menor 4,000 pounds of cargo. This wasno small order because that numberof aircraft just about equaled theentire American helicopter pro-duction to that time and no existinghelicopter could come close to lift-ing the specified number of troopsor amount cargo. The main stickingpoints were lack of funds, a ceilingon aircraft procurement, and—most importantly—lack of a suit-able aircraft. The demands of theKorean War loosened up fundingand virtually eliminated aircraftprocurement restrictions. Thus, theonly remaining roadblock becamethe machines themselves.

Long-range plans in the late1940s called for the creation of upto six transport helicopter squad-rons by the mid-1950s. Thisleisurely pace was driven as muchby technology as by anything else.The Marines wanted a reliable,high-performance, heavy-lift heli-copter to carry cohesive tacticalunits ashore from escort carriersand then rapidly build up supplieswithin the beachhead. The problemwas the machines of the day weretoo limited in range, lift, and

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Sikorsky HRS- 1National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-433339

he 1-IRS transport helicopter was the military ver-sion of the Sikorsky 5-55 commercial aircraft. It fea-tured the familiar Sikorsky design signatures, a

single overhead main rotor and a small anti-torque rotoron the tail boom. Although many of its componentswere simply enlarged versions of similar ones found inthe 1-1035, the FIRS did not look much like the Marines'earliest observation helicopter. It was much larger, itscargo space included seats for eight passengers, thetwo-seat cockpit was located high on the fuselage and setfarther hack than the MOSS, and the engine was mount-ed. low on the front of the aircraft rather than high amid-ships. Although initially selected as only an interimmodel until a larger heavy-lift helicopter became available,the Navy Department eventually purchased 235 variantsof the S-55. The U.S. Army and Air Force flew similar mod-els as H-19s, and the Coast Guard variant was the HO4S-3G.

The Marine Corps turned to the Sikorsky S-55 after itsfirst choice, the Piasecki H-16, outgrew the ability tooperate from small escort carriers—foreseen as thetransport helicopter's primary mission. The Navy wasalready looking at one version of the S-55; an antisub-marine variant designated the H045. There was no obvi-ous external difference between the HRS and the 1-1045.This was because the main difference was each respec-tive aircraft's mission, The Marine transport helicopter didaway with mine detection equipment but mountedtroop seats and had self-sealing fuel tanks. The mostinnovative feature of the S-55 was its engine placement.It was set low in the helicopter's nose. A drive shaft ranup through the hack of the cockpit to provide power tothe three-bladed overhead main rotori The engine place-ment made it easy to reach, cutting maintenance tinie.That configuration also eliminated critical center-of-gravity problems that plagued both the HO3S and the

42

HTL. The HRS also mounted a drop hook to carry exter-nal loads under the cabin. The main shortfalls of the FIRSwere that the machine was underpowered and mechan-ical failures required them to he grounded on severaloccasions. No Marine HRSs were lost to enemy fire, hutseveral crashed while hovering and at least two wentdown in mid-air due to engine failure.

The H..RS was a great step forward, hut it was not thetransport helicopter Marine planners envisioned. Theywanted an aircraft that could carry 15 or more men toensure unit integrity during assaults and generatingenough lift to carry most division equipment. The mainproblem with the FIRS was lifting power. Although ratedfor eight passengers, in the harsh reality of the Koreanmountains the MRS could only carry about six men—onlyfour if they were fully combat loaded. Both IgorSikorsky and Frank Piasecki worked feverishly to deliv-er a more capable aircraft, but that advance would haveto wait until the development of a practical turbine heli-copter engine.

The first hatch of Marine FIRS-is included 60machines and the second order of HRS-2s mustered 91,the final version (HRS-3) included 89 more. Only the firsttwo variants saw action in Korea, hut some HRS-3s werestill in the Marine inventory when their designation waschanged to the CH-19E in accordance with theDepartment of Defense unified designation system in1962.

Aircraft Data

Manufacturer: Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United AircraftCorporationType: Transport helicopterAccommodation: Ten-places (two crew antI eight passengersIPower Plant: One 600 hp Pratt & Whitney R-1340-57Cruising speed: 80 mphPayload: 1,050 pounds

IT- - -

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...-..v---..,. ...-—.—.--' Sf

avionics. Frank Piasecki's tandemrotor helicopters seemed to offerthe best potential. However, thedevelopment of an improved ver-sion of the Flying Banana was tak-ing too long, and its projected sizewas not compatible with escortcarrier deck space. The Marines,therefore, reluctantly opted to gowith an interim transport heli-copter until a more capable air-craft became a reality. Themachine they chose was a variantof the Sikorsky model 5-55, whichwas already in naval service as theHO4S. The HO4S featured thestandard Sikorsky frame: a singleoverhead rotor with a tail-mountedanti-torque rotor. Many of its com-ponents were little more than larg-er versions of those of the H035,hut a front-mounted engine great-ly enhanced ease of maintenanceand in-flight stability. Luckily, theantisubmarine warfare HO4S heli-copter required only minor modifi-cations to meet Marine Corps

requirements. A Marine assaulttransport helicopter, designatedthe HRS, was created by eliminatingthe antisubmarine warfare suitesand then adding self-sealing fueltanks and placing troop seats inthe cargo hay. An initial order for 40HRS-ls was sent to SikorskyAircraft in July 1950. The "interim"tag, however, may have been pre-mature. Every U.S. Armed Serviceand many of our allies eventuallyused the S-55 (designated H-19 bythe Army and Air Force), and 235HO4S/HRS variants entered navalservice over the next decade.

On 15 January 1951, the firstMarine transport squadron wasformed at Marine Corps Air StationEl Toro. The unit tentatively wasdesignated HMR-1 ("H" for heli-copter, "M" for Marine, "R" fortransport, and "1" for first), butthat name was changed before thesquadron became operational.The new squadron was given theprefix "1" because it would be

assigned to the 1st Marine AircraftWing; the middle number "6" wasadopted because the highest fixed-wing designator to that time hadbeen "5"; and the last "1" indicatedit was the first squadron formed,thus the new squadron becamei[-TMR-i.61. The commanding offi-cer was Lieutenant ColonelGeorge W. Herring, the formerexecutive officer of HMX-1. A mixof regulars and reservists populat-ed the new transport helicoptersquadron. Most of the pilots, likethe squadron's executive officerMajor William P. Mitchell, hadbeen fixed-wing pilots in thePacific. Lieutenant Colonel Her-ring, however, had received theNavy Cross as a Marine raiderbefore receiving his wings. Whilethe mix of regular and reservepilots was about equal, most of thesquadron's enlisted personnelwere reservists. The squadrontrained at the Navy's formerlighter-than-air base located at

modern warJàre as envisioned by she

Marine corps 1-lisrorical center 'horn collection

In July 1951, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 would he used instaged a helicopter demonstration for the press at Camp Marine corps.Pen.dlelon, C'a4lbrnia. Its purpose was to show how helicopters

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support to ground troops.

Tustin, California, not far fromCamp Pendleton while waiting forits new helicopters. The squadrongradually built up to its fullstrength of 43 officers and 244enlisted men flying 15 MRS-i heli-copters before receiving orders toprepare to ship out for Korea inJuly 1951.

The squadron embarked at SanDiego on 16 August with the heli-copters and aircrews on board theescort carrier Sitkoh Bay (C\TE 86)and the equipment and a workingparty on board the civilian-manned cargo ship Great Falls.The squadron arrived at Pusan on2 September. In Korea, HMR-161came under the administrative

control of the 1st Marine AircraftWing and. the operational control ofthe 1st Marine Division, the samecommand and control arrange-ments used by VMO-6. Four daysafter landing, HMR-161 movedfrom airfield K-i (Pusan East) toairfield K-iS (Kangnung Airdrome)in central Korea. From there, theadvance echelon moved by truckand air to X-83 at Chodo-ri, anauxiliary airstrip not far from thedivision hea.dquarters, alreadyhosting VMO-6. A rear echelonremained at K-iS to conductadvanced maintenance and makecomplex repairs.

The fact that HMR-i61 was evenin Korea was at least partially due

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the efforts of Major GeneralThomas and Colonel Krulak whoactively pushed to speed the paceof getting transport helicoptersinto the combat zone. Thomas andKrulak were well aware of thetechnical limitations of the MRS-Iand the demands of Korea's difficultweather and rugged terrain, sothey began testing iLs abilitiesslowly. The initial helicopter oper-ations were modest ones to testthe waters, carefully conductedwith little risk. First came a coupleof resupply efforts well shieldedfrom enemy observation anddirect fire. Next came small-scaletroop lifts, eventually increasing tobattalion-sized movements. Tac-tical innovations were also on theagenda: counter-guerrilla activi-ties; a night assault; and rapidmovement of rocket batteries. Itwas not long before a division oflabor emerged.. The smaller aircraftof VMO-6 concentrated on med-ical evacuations, reconnaissance,observation, and liaison work,while HMR-161 conducted aerialresupply, moved troops, andexperimented with vertical envel-opment. Although the MRS coulddo everything its smaller kincould, medical evacuations andcombat search and rescue weresecondary missions for HMR-161.This was possible because of thestatic nature of the fighting. In fact,the combat situation eventuallybecame stable enough that it waspossible to increase emphasis onamphibious training even thoughthe squadron remained in thecombat zone, a factor that lent ele-ments of realism and urgency tothe helicopter training programthat were probably not present atQuantico, Virginia, or OnslowBeach, North Carolina. The stun-ning success in Korea of heli-copters used for assault supportsilenced critics and convertedskeptics. In the words of historian

Marine corps 1-listorical Center Photo collectionA Marine Sikorsky HRS-1 transport helicopter is loaded on board the escort car-rier Sitkoh Bay (CVE 86) at San Diego, calfornia. for the journey to Korea. Thearrival of J-JMR-767 and the HRS-1 would mark a new era in Marine airborne

•National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156740

LtCol George W Herring, right, com-manding officer of HMR-161, is wel-corned to Korea by LtCol Edward V.Finn the is! Marine Division's airofficer. LtC'ol Herring commanded theworld's first transport helicoptersquadron used in combat.

Lynn Montross, with the introduc-tion of HMR-161 to Korea "a newera of military transport haddawned."

The first order of business was toconduct familiarization flights sothe pilots could become accus-tomed to the terrain and. get a feelfor the tactical and operationalconditions at the front. The veteranpilots of VMO-6's helicopter ele-ment indoctrinated the new menof HMR-161 in flying conditionsand combat procedures. Also dur-ing this time various potentiallanding zones and flight routeswere identified. While the pilotswere busy flying, selected mem-bers of the shore party battalionbecame familiar with helicopterlanding and loading procedureswhile planners met to prepare forthe squadron's first combat opera-

tion. General Thomas wiselydecided to use a series of cautiousactivities until both the helicoptercrews and ground units got up tospeed, he then pushed an aggres-sive agenda featuring a wide vari-ety missions tha.t became progres-sively more complex and thatthoroughly tested existing opera-tional procedures and new theo-ries for helicopter employment.

The initial combat operation byHMR-161 took place only twoweeks after its arrival. It wasdubbed Operation Windmill tohonor the HRS's unofficial nick-name, "Flying Windmill." Mindful ofthe chaotic experiences of the firstPackard exercise at Camp Lejeune,North Carolina, and well aware ofthe dictates of Phi h-31, Krulak andThomas ensured the new transporthelicopters would he carefully

MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, center, in corn mand of the 1stMarine Division, discusses plans for using the new 10-placeSikorsky HRS-1 helicopters with the leaders of HMR-161,LtCol George W Herring, the commanding officer, right,

and his executive officer, Maj William P Mitchell. Thomaswas instrumental both in bringing helicopters into theMarine Corps and getting the first Marine helicopter trans-pon squadron to Korea in .195.?.

National Archives Photo cusMc) 127-N-132027

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673 toward Hill 749 . oursupply and evacuation routewas four miles of mountainousfoot trails. The oniy way tokeep supplies movingwas by using Korean ServiceCorps porters [They]could not keep up with thelogistical demands imposedby heavy casualties and highammunition expenditure [so]I-IMR-161 was called in to fillthe . . . gap."

integrated into a Marine air-groundcombat team, not just used as a"nice-to-have" aviation adjunct aswas sometimes the case withVMO-6's light helicopters. One ofthe first steps in this process was totrain elements of the 1st ShoreParty Battalion for helicopter oper-ations. Shore parties had beenformed during World War II tohandle supplies coming ashore bylanding craft. The logical exten-sion of this mission to landingzones as well as landing beacheseventually led to the formation ofspecially trained helicopter sup-port teams. In addition, the ener-getic division chief of staff,Colonel Krulak, held a series ofplanning conferences with the 1stMarine Division staff even beforeHMR-161 was in Korea to draw uptentative standard operating pro-cedures. Ground units needed tolearn the intricacies of helicoptermovement and their leaders wereencouraged to apply the uniquecapabilities of helicopters in tacticalsituations. Before HMR-161 leftKorea, its helicopters had per-

formed virtually every missionenvisioned under operational con-ditions. The squadron's main func-tions, however, were to test thepracticality of vertical envelop-ment and to practice assault supportby ferrying troops and deliveringsupplies to units in the field. Thelatter was the most exercised mis-sion while on the East-CentralFront. After moving to westernKorea in 1952, emphasis eventual-ly shifted to vertical envelopmentusing a continuing series ofamphibious exercises. These exer-cises and combat operations werethe foundation of the sophisticatedairmohile tactics and techniquesstill used by the U.S. Army andMarine Corps of today.

In September 1951, Marineswere clearing the enemy from aseries of ridges around an extinctvolcano called the Punchbowl.The ground battalion commander,Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B.

Nihart described the difficult tacti-cal situation:

"We were attacking from Hill

On 12 September, the first com-bat helicopter support team—aplatoon from 1st Shore PartyBattalion—attended briefings a-bout proper loading techniquesand learned how to transmit land-ing signals to incoming aircraft.The next morning was devoted toarranging supplies into 800-poundbundles. The first flight consistingof four helicopters made its wayabout seven miles and thendeposited the shore party landingpoint section to enlarge andimprove the landing zone, directlanding operations using hand sig-nals, unload arriving helicoptersand collect cargo bundles, establishsupply dumps, and load battlecasualties. In mid-afternoon, sevenHRS-ls began lifting off with cargoloads suspended froni belly hooks.The ingress and egress routes fol-lowed a deep valley that maskedthe helicopters from direct enemyobservation. A restrictive fire planwas in effect to avoid friendly fire.The landing zone was markedwith fluorescent panels, hut thefirst incoming aircraft could onlyplace two of their four wheels onthe landing platform, which wassituated on the reverse slope of asteep hill. The first supply heli-copter dropped its sling at i6ioand then picked up seven battlecasualties (two stretcher cases andfive walking wounded). Opera-tion Windmill I comprised 28

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A156768Vital supplies are transjè rred from a truck to a helicopter for delivery to front-line troops. Helicopters 0/len offered the only practical way to supply positionsin the trackless mountain terrain near the Punchhowl.

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flights that delivered 18,848pounds of supplies and evacuated74 seriously wounded men. Theelapsed time was two hours and 40minutes with a total of 14.1 flighthours logged. Lieutenant ColonelNihart's final evaluation of HMR-161's first combat action in sup-port of his battalion was that "they

performed admirably."Continued fierce fighting in the

vicinity of the Punchbowl, particu-larly for an outcropping dubbed"the Rock," led to the secondtransport helicopter assault sup-

port mission. Spurred on theunquestioned success of WindmillI as well as the need for heavy for-tification materials such as sandbags, timber, barbed wire, andland mines, it was decided to con-duct a follow-on aerial supplyoperation, Windmill II. The need tomove bulky fortification materials toa nearly inaccessible positiondrove operational planning. Sandbags, barbed wire, land mines,and timber were all too cumber-some and heavy to be moved for-ward by Korean laborers so

General Thomas turned to hisrotary-winged "mule train" for thesecond time in a week. The formalrequest was made on the morningof 19 September, approved beforenoon, and underway before night-fall. Ten HRS-ls delivered morethan 12,000 pounds of cargo using16 flights in about one hour. Thesame operational procedures forWindmill I were used: an advancehelicopter support team wasinserted to operate the landingzone; the helicopters used coveredand concealed routes; and materi-al was delivered using sling-loaded bundles for speed and easeof handling. The major differencewas the rapid planning process,this time preparations took only afew hours instead of several days.Once again, the helicopters ofHMR-161 did within a few hourswhat would have taken the trail-bound. South Korean porters several

47

With the ability of HMR-161 todeliver supplies fully established,the next evolution was to lifthuman cargo. This was OperationSummit. The mission was for the 1stMarine Division reconnaissancecompany to replace a SouthKorean unit occupying Hill 884, akey observation post located atopa rugged mountain. It was estimat-ed that it would take a Marine riflecompany about 15 hours to scalethe roadless heights with all resup-ply thereafter accomplished eitherby foot or by helicopter. GeneralThomas decided instead to mountthe first combat helicopter trooplift in history.

Once again, careful planningand preparation were the hall-marks of this operation. Lieuten-ant Colonel Herring and MajorMitchell coordinated their tacticalplans with Major Ephraim Kirby-Smith (the ground unit comman-der) and worked out the loadingplans with First Lieutenant Richard

Manic transport helicopter "HR-ia" one of 15 HRS-ls assigned to HMR-161, landsto deliver supplies near the Punch howl. Detachments from the 1st Air DeliveiyPlatoon loaded the supplies while helicopter support teams from the 1st Shore PartyBattalion controlled the unloading at forward area landing zones.

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A131993

days.

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C. Higgs, representing the divisionembarkation section. Aerial recon-naissance indicated the landingwas going to be a tight squeeze.The only two available spots werelocated some 300 feet below thetopographical crest about a foot-ball field length apart, and eachwas less than 50-feet square with asheer drop on two sides. Terrainlimited each landing zone to onearrival at a time. Operational plan-ning was based upon the dictates ofPhib-31 and practical experienceduring the Windmill operations.The landing force would consist ofa reinforced reconnaissance com-pany. Helicopter support teamsfrom the 1st Shore Parry Battalionwould control loading and unload-ing. Landing serials were compiledand rehearsals began on 20

without landing.

September. H-hour was slated for1000 the next day.

Several problems soon becameapparent. First was the number oftroops each helicopter could carry.The HRS-1 was rated to carry eightcombat-loaded troops but practicalexperience in California and Koreaquickly showed this figure to beoverly optimistic. The actual safeload was six men carrying onlysmall arms and personal equip-ment. A second problem wasweather. The threat posed by highwinds and the possibility of limitedvisibility or rain influenced opera-tions. An additional problem in themountainous region was reliableradio communications. The solu-tion was to earmark one helicopteras a radio relay aircraft, the firstuse of a helicopter for air-to-air

48

command and control duringground operations.

Operation Summit was delayedon the morning of 21 September bydense ground fog. Finally, about ahalf-hour later than expected, thefirst wave of three helicopters atlanding field X-83 departed for the14-mile run to Hill 884. Theyapproached their objective flyinglow along a streambed betweenthe rdgelines and then hoveredover Hill 884's reverse slope. Asecurity element went hand-over-hand down knotted ropes andthen fanned out. Next in were twolanding site preparation teams.About 40 minutes later, idling heli-copters at X-83 received word tobegin loading. Each carried fiveriflemen. Two hundred and twen-ty four men, including a heavy

prepackaged materials that were carried in nets, t%tted by a

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-Al 56727A Sikorsky MRS-i transport helicopter delivers supplies powered winch, and dropped by a remotely controlled hookusing "sling loading" techniques, Sling loading employed that allowed helicopters to rapidly deliver vital supplies