Durham E-Theses

Balanced Wonder: A Philosophical Inquiry into the

Role of Wonder in Human Flourishing

PEDERSEN, JAN,BJERGGAARD,WAKATSUKI

How to cite:

PEDERSEN, JAN,BJERGGAARD,WAKATSUKI (2015) Balanced Wonder: A Philosophical Inquiry into

the Role of Wonder in Human Flourishing, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at DurhamE-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11406/

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission orcharge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro�t purposes provided that:

• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source

• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses

• the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.

Academic Support O�ce, Durham University, University O�ce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HPe-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107

http://etheses.dur.ac.uk

2

BALANCEDWONDER:APhilosophicalInquiryintotheRoleofWonderin

HumanFlourishingBy

JanBjerggaardWakatsukiPedersen

SubmittedforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy

SchoolofMedicine,PharmacyandHealth

DurhamUniversity

2015

Tomyfamily

MaiWakatsukiPedersen,Iris(2015).

TableofContents

Abstract 1

ListofIllustrations 2

Acknowledgement 3

Introduction 5

1.TheLureofWonder 15

1.1TheNameandRootofWonder 23

1.2AHistoryofWonder 26

1.3ProvisionalTaxonomyofAlteredStates 47

1.4EnemiesofWonder 64

1.5TowardsaPreliminaryUnderstandingofWonder 68

2.WonderandEmotion 72

2.1GroundsforInvestigatingWonderasanEmotion 73

2.2WhatisanEmotion? 80

2.2.1TheCognitiveApproach 86

2.2.2TheCognitiveApproachandEpistemicEmotions 91

2.3IsWonderanEmotion? 94

2.4OtherFacesofWonder 97

2.5Conclusion 100

3.WonderandImagination 101

3.1WhyInvestigateWonderinRelationtoImagination 101

3.2TheRangeandScopeofImagination 103

3.3MaryWarnockandImagination 106

3.4RonaldHepburnandImagination 116

3.5RogerScrutonandImagination 126

3.6Conclusion 138

4.ImplicationsoftheRoleofImaginationinWonder 141

4.1Wonder,PerceptionandImagination 141

4.2Wonder,ImaginationandtheDevelopmentofMoralScopeand

Sensitivity 148

4.3WondrousAfterglowsandDeepWonder 156

4.4.Conclusion 161

5.Wonder,HumanFlourishingandVirtue 162

5.1DouglasRasmussenandHumanFlourishing 163

5.2AlasdairMacIntyreandHumanFlourishing 172

5.3MarthaNussbaumandHumanFlourishing 180

5.4SourcesofHumanFlourishing 194

5.5WonderasaSourceofFlourishing 199

5.6Conclusion 216

Conclusion:WonderingaboutWonder 218

Bibliography 232

1

Abstract

Thephenomenonofwonderhasfascinatedscholarsforcenturies,yettodaythesubjectis

understudiedandnotrootedinanyspecificacademicdiscipline.Attemptsatbuildinga

preliminaryaccountofwonderrevealsthattheexperienceofwonderischaracterisedby

sevenproperties:wonder(1)issudden,extraordinaryandpersonal;(2)intensifiesthe

cognitivefocus;(3)intensifiestheuseofimagination;(4)instigatesawarenessof

ignorance;(5)causestemporarydisplacement;(6)makestheworldnewlypresent;and

(7)bringsemotionalupheaval.Furthermore,wondercanbedistinguishedfromother

similaralteredstates,includingawe,horror,thesublime,curiosity,amazement,

admirationandastonishment.

HumanflourishingisaconceptinethicsthathasenjoyedarevivalsinceElizabeth

Anscombe’s1958article‘ModernMoralPhilosophy’.ThroughtheworkofNeo-

AristotelianphilosophersDouglasRasmussen,AlasdairMcIntyreandMarthaNussbaum

whohavecontributedtothefieldaworkingmodelofhumanflourishingattentiveto

humannaturewasestablished.

Asaresultofin-depthexaminationofthecontributionofbothemotionand

imaginationintheexperienceofwonderthroughaNeo-Aristotelianlensitbecomes

evidentthatwondermaycontributetohumanflourishingviaanumberofeffects,

including(butnotrestrictedto)wideningofperception,extensionofmoralscopeor

sensitivityandpromptingdeepwonder,awondrousafterglow,openness,humility,an

imaginativeattitude,reverenceandgratitude.Importantly,forwondertoactasastrong

contributortohumanflourishingoneneedstowonderattheright(orappropriate)thing,

intherightamount,intherighttime,intherightwayandfortherightpurpose.

Cultivatingabalancedsenseofwonderisthusbynomeansaneasytaskbuthavinga

criticalattitudetowardsone’swondermentwouldaidonetowonderinavirtuousway.

2

ListofIllustrations

Page142

Figure4.1.GiuseppeArcimboldo,RudolfIIasVertumnus,Skoklostersslott,Skokloster,

Sweden(1591).

Page146

Figure4.2.PhillipeGrassous,HydrothermalWorm(2010)

Page218

Figure6.1.TheCoreConstituentsoftheExperienceofWonder.

Page223

Figure6.2.PossibleEffectsofWonder.

3

Acknowledgement

ThepresentdoctoralstudyonwonderhasgrownoutofaWelcomeTrustsupported5-

year,£2Mprojecton‘MedicineandHumanFlourishing’conductedbytheCentrefor

MedicalHumanities(CMH),SchoolofMedicine,PharmacyandHealth,Durham

University.Ithasbeenaprivilegetobeapartofthisprojectbuttowonderaboutwonder

isanunsettlingaffairandduringthecourseofmyundertakingIhaveeversooftenfound

myselftrappedinwhatseemedtobeaninescapablemire.Insuchsituationsunlessone

likeRudolfErichRaspe’sadventurouscharacterBaronMunchhausenhastheabilityto

pulloneselfoutoftroublebyonesownhairdeliverancedependsonthegoodwillof

others.IamnoMunchhausenandthusIwouldliketotakethisopportunitytothank

someoftheexcellentpeoplewhosewisdom,knowledgeandskillsIhaveenjoyed

throughoutmyyearsatDurhamUniversityandwhosesupportenabledmetopull

through.

FirstandforemostImustexpressmyinestimabledepttomysupervisors

ProfessorMartynEvansandDr.AngelaWoodswhodespitemymanyshortcomings

continuedtobelieveinmeandofferedhelpfulguidance,carefulcritiqueandcorrective

commentsatnumerousstagesinthewritingprocess.Manythanksalsotomyreviewers

fromtheSchoolofMedicine,PharmacyandHealth:Dr.SimonForrest,ProfessorJane

MacnaughtonandDr.LutzSauerteigforhelpfuladviceandencouragementduringmy

study.LikewiseIamgratefultoDr.IanKiddandDr.WilliamViney,DurhamUniversityand

ProfessorStephenPattison,UniversityofBirminghamfortheirmanycourtesiesand

academicadvice.

AbigthanksalsogoestomyfriendsGeoffBeyers,JakobMølbjerg,LoneStub

PetersenandmybrotherLarsPedersenforthoughtfulsuggestionsandcriticalcomments

onthethesis.IalsobenefittedfrommanyconversationswithmyfriendsMatthewNeale

andColinWildaboutlife’sbigquestions.ThanksalsogoestoDavidClinnickandJames

Walkerwhoinvitedmeintotheworldofarchaeology.

AdditionallyIliketoextendmyappreciationtoallmycolleaguesatthe

DeaconessFoundation,Frederiksberg,DenmarkbutespeciallytoPiaPalnæsHansenand

FredMaronwhokindlyinvitedmetwiceayearduringmystudytolectureatthe

DeaconessUniversityCollege,whichnotonlyprovidedmetheopportunitytosharesome

ofmyideasonwonderandhumanflourishingbutalsohelpedeasefinancialpressures.I

alsoliketothankSisterMaretePellePoulsenforahealingconversationaboutgaps.

4

AbigthanksgoestoThomasHirstandSamWalkwellformakingmymanywriting

hoursatStarbucks,Framwelgate-BridgeHouseinDurhammostpleasantandfor

providinganendlesssupplyofmyfavouritecognitiveenhancer:‘TallFilter’ata

reasonableprice.ThanksalsotofellowcustomeratStarbucksAllanBeattieforinteresting

andheart-warmingdiscussions.

AdditionallyIamgratefultomymentorsDr.HansFinkandProfessorSteen

WackerhausenatAarhusUniversityforinspirationallecturesthatstillliveoninmeand

fortheirencouragementtoadvancemyphilosophicalstudies.Mygratitudealsogoesto

PeterMartinFogh-sensei,SeidoRyuforextending‘Os(オス)!’atacriticaltimeand

EthanMonnotWeisgard-sensei,headofCopenhagenAikiShurenDojoforteachingme

thementalapplicationof‘Tainohenko(体の変更)’whichIhaveputtousefrequently

duringmystudy.LisewiseIamgratefultomyfriendsAstridPolato,FabioCicarelli,Frank

Kauf,CatherineRacineandClausSimonsenfortheirkindsupport. IwouldnotbewhereIamtodaywithoutthesupportofmyfamily.Iextendmy

thankstomywife’sgrandmotherChiba-chan(KiyoWakatsuki)whoatacriticalstagetold

methatshewasproudofmeandthatIwillappreciatemystudywhenIamasoldasshe.

Myparents-in-lawTetsuyukiandKeikoWakatsukiforacceptingmyreasonsfor

commencingthestudyandfortrustingthatIwouldremaincapableofcaringfortheir

daughterandgrandchildinspiteofit.LikewiseIliketothankmyownparentsKirstenand

FlemmingPedersen,mybrotherLarsPedersen,hispartnerPernilleDohnandmybrother

KimPedersenfortheircontinuousmoralsupportandfinancialaid.

MybiggestthanksgotomywifeAyakoandmydaughterMai.Maihasprovided

theartdepictingIrisonthededicationpageandsheisresponsibleforanimportant

exampleofwonderusedinthethesis.Ayakohasmorethanoftenpulledmeoutof‘the

mire’andIcannotexpresshowgratefulIamforherfortitude,kindness,patienceand

unshakeablesupportthroughoutmystudynotforgettinghercarefulcritique,suggestions

andproofreadingwhichhavesavedmefromavarietyoferrors.AyakoandMaiyouare

endlesssourcesofwondertome—Obravenewworldthathassuchcreaturesin’t!

JanBjergaardWakatsukiPedersen

Durham,UK

September,2015

5

Introduction

Inthedifficultcase,iftheauditorsarenotcompletelyhostile,itwillbepermissible

totryandwintheirgood-willbyanintroduction[...]Weshallmakeouraudience

attentiveifweshowthatthematterwhichweareabouttodiscussareimportant,

novelorincredible,orthattheyconcernallhumanityorthoseintheaudienceor

some illustriousmen or the immortal gods or the general interest of the state;

also if we promise to prove our own case briefly and explain the point to be

decidedortheseveralpointsiftherearemorethanone.

(Cicero,1989,I,21-23)

InthefollowingIshalldefendthethesisthatcultivatingabalancedsenseofwonderisa

strong contributor to living a flourishing human life. In order for the defence to be

successfulandthethesisbelievablethiscallsforasomewhatindepthunderstandingof

its constituents.Understandingwhat ismeant by ‘balance’, ‘wonder’ and ‘a flourishing

life’iskey,butitisthenotionofwonderthatwillreceivethemostsustainedattention.

Since wonder is the centrepiece of this thesis presenting a preliminary

identificationofwonder is inorder.Wonder isasuddenexperience that intensifies the

cognitive focus and awareness of ignorance about a given object. It is typically an

unsettlingyetdelightfulexperiencethatmakesoneawarethat theremightbemoreto

theperceivedobjectthatmeetstheeye.Thatwonderisdelightfulissupportedbyvarious

philosophical sources andonemightbeginbypointingout that in thePoetics Aristotle

writes that ‘wonder is pleasant’ (Aristotle, 2006, 1460a17). The Poetics is interesting

becausetherearediscrepanciesbetweensomeofthetranslationsofthisparticularwork,

whichisrelevanttothestudyofwonder.JoeSachs’2006translationwhichiscitedhere

clearlystatesthatwonderispleasantbutStephenHalliwell’s1995LoebClassicalLibrary

translation states that ‘awe is pleasurable’ (Aristotle, 1995, XXIV 1460a17). This is

confusinganddrawsattentiontothecuriousfactthatintheliteraturewonderandawe

are in some cases used interchangeably. To complicatematters literary scholar Dennis

Quinninformsusthatadmirationandwonderarealsosometimesusedinterchangeably

(Quinn, 2002, p. 4) meaning that when we read for example Aristotle’s The ‘Art’ of

Rhetoricwherehewrites‘thatwhichexcitesadmirationispleasant’(Aristotle,1926,III.i.

9—ii.3)itisimportanttokeepinmindthatitispossibletoreadthisparticularcitationas

‘that which excites wonder is pleasant’. This paints a somewhat muddled picture of

6

wonderbutalsoaddstotheallureofthesubjectasitinvitesustobegintothinkabout‘a

taxonomy of altered states’ specifying possible distinctions betweenwonder, awe and

admiration.Mounting further support for the idea that wonder is pleasant onemight

besidesAristotlealsopointtophilosopherConelisVerhoevenwhoindirectlysupportsthe

notionashearguesthatonecanonlywonderifoneis inasafeplaceorwonderwould

turnintoloathingandpanic(Verhoeven,1972,p.43).ContemporaryphilosophersPhilip

FisherandDerekMatraverslikewisesupporttheideathatwonderisjoyful.Fisherwrites

that ‘wonder is a sudden experience of an extraordinary object that produces delight’

(Fisher,2003,p.55)andMatraversmentionsinhisworkthatwonderhasahedonictone

(Matravers,2012,p.166).

Movingawayfromthenotionthatwonderisdelightfulonemightalsopointout

thatthereisasuddennesstowonder.Theexperiencehitsyouunannouncedlikelightning

anditseemsevidentthatitmayarisefromvarioussources.Seeingarainbowintheskyor

falling in loveorwitnessingsomeonepassawaymaypromptanexperienceofwonder.

Particularbooksandworksofartarewonderinducingastheyinviteustoseethingsfrom

adifferentandevenparticularperspective.Verhoevensuggeststhatlikepathos,wonder

is granted or inflicted (Verhoeven, 1972, p. 13) and in this respect wonder is not

somethingwecanwillourselvestoexperience;howeveritissomethingwemighthavea

talentfor(Verhoeven,1972,p.27).PhilosopherPaulMartinOpdalisofasimilaropinion

as he speaks of children having a capacity for wonder that might be turned into

philosophicalreflection(Opdal,2001,p.332).Furtherstillitseemsplausiblethatonecan

developabalancedsenseofwonder1thattranscendschildhoodwondermentsandbrings

forth an informed andmature kindofwonderment.What I refer to here is a senseof

wonderthatbynomeansisoftheextreme.Itistobeinaplacebetweenextremesthat

neitheraccommodatestheimmediatewondermentsofafoolorachildnordisplaysthe

outrighthostilitytowonderattributedforthesakeofargumenttothevulgar,crudeand

reductiveadult. Toharbourabalanced senseofwonder involvesbeingableat least to

some degree to harness or control wonder. It is a product of refinementwhere one’s

wondermentturnsouttobejustright.

1AccordingtopsychologistsWilliamComptonandEdwardHoffmanthephrase‘senseofwonder’wascoinedinthe1920’sbywriterandeditorofAmericanpulpmagazinessuchasWonderStoriesandAmazingStoriesHugoGernsback(Compton&Hoffman,2013,p.243).HoweverthismightbedisputedbecausethephrasecanalsobefoundinEnglishwriterW.H.Hodgson’staleTheSearcheroftheEndHousepublishedinTheIdlerMagazinebetween1910and1912(Hodgson,2006,p.8,89).ThephrasealsofiguresinthetitleofAmericanbiologistandconservationistRachelCarson’sfamous1965bookTheSenseofWonder(Carson,1984).UnlessstatedIshallinthisthesismakenodistinctionbetweentheword‘wonder’andthephrase‘senseofwonder’astheycanbeseenasdifferentexpressionsofthesamething.

7

ThisparticularlineofthinkingmighttosomeevokeAristotelianideasofvirtueand

rightly so.ForAristotlevirtue is connected to thenotionof themean,which is located

between excess and deficiency. Experiencing a sense of wonder while pondering that

bachelorsarenotmarriediswonderinginexcess.2Itistowonderfoolishlyorimmaturely

andsuchwonderwouldrestuneasilywithanysensibleperson.Tobelievethatso-called

expertsorauthoritieswouldhave theanswer toallquestionsand thatonecanescape

wondermentbyconsultingsuchwouldbetoharbouradeficientsenseofwonderwhich

equallywould sit illwith any tempered person. Towonder in a balancedway is by no

measureaneasytask,aswehumansunlikethependulumdonotautomaticallyreachthe

placeofequilibrium.Itissomethingweactivelyhavetoworkfor.Nowinvestigationsinto

abalancedsenseofwonderrepresentaratherunexploredareaandmoreworkistobe

done if a richer account is to see the light of day. Itwould be interesting to seewhat

possible consequences could entail too little or toomuchwonderment and if either of

thesehadanybearingupontheflourishingofthepersondoingthewondering.Ishallsay

moreaboutthisinalaterchapterbutfornowletmebrieflyaddresstheothersupporting

constituent,theflourishinglife.

Theideaofaflourishinghumanlifeisanideathathasgainedincreasedpopularity

sincephilosopherElizabethAnscombepublishedhernowfamousarticle‘ModernMoral

Philosophy’ (Anscombe,1958). In thearticle shepresentedhuman flourishingasanew

translationoftheoldGreekword‘eudaimonia’whichAristotlethoughttobethehighest

goodortheverygoalofhumanlife.UntilAnscombe’spublicationeudaimoniahadbeen

translatedas ‘wellbeing’ (takentobealmostsynonymouswith ‘happiness’),whichgave

the concept a distinctly subjective feel. The new translation worked in the opposite

directionandsuggestedthatalthoughthe ideaofhumanflourishing inamodernsense

does not encompass presenting a complete objective account of what characterises a

goodhuman life itnevertheless suggests that theremaybemore to thegood life than

individualsubjectiveaccountsmightreveal.Furthermoreitsuggeststhataflourishinglife

hastobemeasuredoverthecourseofawholehumanlife.Aristotlewrites:‘Oneswallow

doesnotmakeaspring,nordoesonefineday,andsimilarlyonedayorabriefperiodof

happinessdoesnotmakeamansupremelyblessedandhappy’(Aristotle,2003,I,vii.16).

Themainmessagehereisthatinordertoliveagoodhumanlifeoraflourishinghuman

life it isnotenough to feelhappy thesplit secondbeforeyou take leaveof it.Nor is it

2IowethispointtoHepburn(Hepburn,1980,p.6).

8

goodenough tohaveexperienced forexample twoyearsof absolutebliss ina lifetime

whiletheremainingtimewasforwantofabetterworddreadful.

Thereareatleasttworeasonswhyaninquiryintothelinkagebetweenabalanced

sense of wonder and human flourishing is important. First of all there is a gap in the

literatureonthesubjectmatter.Referencescanbefoundinworksthatdealwithwonder

andethicaldevelopmentbutnonethataddressesthesubjectmatterdirectly(Hepburn,

1980).Thismakesitimportantandworthwhilepursuing.Secondlyitwouldbeofinterest

to examine the possibility that a life encompassing a balanced sense ofwondermight

flourish to a larger degree than a life embracing wonderment in excess or no

wondermentwhatsoever.Abalancedsenseofwondercouldharnessthepositivesidesof

wonderment,which in turncanbeusedas inspiration forhowto livea flourishing life.

Suchwondermightfacilitateacriticalopennesstowardstheworld,whichinturnwould

helpkeep thenotionofhuman flourishing free fromnegativeconstraints. Inadditiona

balancedsenseofwondermaypromptthediscoveryofnewsourcesofflourishingandin

effectprovetheantidotetocomplacency.Mostpeoplewillovertimebecomesetintheir

waysanddevelopascopeofvisionthatmayreachfarbut isstill limitedbyhabits that

onemight be unaware of. A balanced sense ofwonder could prompt openness to the

positivesidesofeverythingfromreligious,political,scientificorphilosophicalthoughtsto

particularculturaloutlooks,waysoflifeorpraxis.

So far Ihave saidvery littleaboutwonder.Wonder isa captivating subject that

has received increased academic attention in recent times (Bollert, 2010; Deane-

Drummond, 2006; Evans, 2012; Fisher, 2003; Fleischman, 2013; La Caze, 2013; Nadis,

2005;Norris, 2001; Pasquale, 2003; Prinz, 2013;Quinn, 2002; Rubenstein, 2008; Tallis,

2012; Vasalou, 2012). It is captivating for several reasons, one being that as a subject

wonderiselusiveandhardtofullygrasp.Unliketheopticalmeteorologicalphenomenon

oftherainbowwonderdoesnotpresent itselfasanexternalobjectthatcanbereadily

studiedandexplainedbyobjectivescience.Wondermentseemstobeanentirelyhuman

phenomenon3 and it can spring from various situations. Witnessing something

spectacularlikearainbow,theauroraborealis,thebirthofachildorthesuccessofafree

solo climber4may verywell produce a sense of wonder. To reflect upon something is

anotherwonder-induceras itever sooften takesus to theedgeofourknowledgeand

3Itispossiblethatnon-humananimalscanexperiencewonderbecausethebrainstructuresofforexamplemammalslikedolphinsandchimpanzeesaresimilartothatofhumanbeings.4Freesoloclimbingalsoknownassoloingimpliesthattheclimberdoesnotrelyonanysafetyequipmentandforegoestheuseofropes,harnessesetc.,andreliesentirelyonherskillsfortheclimbtobesuccessful.

9

makesuswonderabouttheimplicationsofthequestionsweask.Bigquestionslikewhat

isthemeaningoflife;wheredidtheuniversecomefrom;istheuniversefiniteordoesit

extendintoeternity;whyitisthereatallandhowdoesonedeviseawiseanswertothe

questionofhowoneshouldlivearewonderinducingquestions.Thereasonforthisisthat

they are huge and difficult questions that have a tendency to lift us up above the

immediate practicalities of life andmake us think about our place in the universe and

whatwearedoingwiththetimegiventous.Anotherreasonwhywonderisfascinating

arisesfromthecuriousfactthatnodisciplinewithinacademiahasclaimeditasitsown.

Despite having been addressed by a variety of different scholars hailing fromdifferent

disciplineswonderremainsitinerantandunsettled.Toillustratejusthowwidespreadand

diverse theacademic interest inwonder isone could startbydrawingattention to the

disciplineofphilosophy.Philosophyhasalong-standingrelationshipwithwonder,which

goesbacktoPlatoandAristotle.Theirwritingssupporttheideathatphilosophybeginsin

wonder (Aristotle, 1989, 982b; Plato, 1989, 155d). Similarly in the area of theology

wondercomesacrossasthestartingpoint for theisticexperience(Hepburn,1980,p.1;

Keen,1969).ProfessorofReligiousStudiesRobertC.Fullerseemstosupportthatnotion,

ashebelievestheexperienceofwondercanlureusintoextendedengagementwithwhat

lies beyond the limits of rational engagement and that this is key in terms of

understanding spirituality (R. C. Fuller, 2006, p. 14). Furthermore Fuller observes that

experiences of wonder ‘are principal sources of what historians variously call nature

religion or aesthetic spirituality’ (Fuller, 2012, p. 85). This is to say a sensibility to the

sacrednessofnature;themysticaloraparticularpantheisticfeelingtowardtheuniverse

may emerge from wonderment (Fuller, 2012, p. 85). In addition theologian and

philosopher David B. Burrell points out that wonderment in the Abrahamic faiths is

connectedtoquestionsaboutcreation,thecontingencyofbeingandexaminationofthis

contingencytogetherwithourlivedexperiences‘thatisbothexpressedinsuchaccounts

andis inturncultivatedbythem’(Burrell,2012,p.235).Wonder isalsorelevanttothe

field of aestheticswhere objects such as the ElginMarbles5 have inspiredwonder and

indeed helped generate new wonders like John Keats’s poem ‘On Seeing the Elgin

Marbles’ from 1817 which dwells on the pangs of mortality and wonders of Grecian

grandeur(Keats,1978).Wondercanalsobeassociatedwithmodernsciencebecauseas

5The'ElginMarbles'isapopulartermreferringtothecollectionofstoneobjects-sculptures,inscriptionsandarchitecturalfeatures-acquiredbyLordElginduringhistimeasambassadortotheOttomancourtoftheSultaninIstanbul.AtthepresenttimetheycanbeviewedattheBritishMuseum.

10

philosopherHoward L. Parsonswrites: ‘A scientist can findamoleculeorprotozoanor

child or galaxy wonderful because he can be excited by the known and imagined

meaningsthathisscientificcommunityhassurroundedhimwith’(Parsons,1969,p.89).

PopularwriterRichardDawkinsalso thinks thatwonderandsciencewalkhand inhand

andhearguesthatscientificinvestigationcanbeinspiredbywonderandlikeartscience

iscapableofgeneratingnewwonders.Dawkinswrites:

Newton’sdissectionof the rainbow into lightofdifferentwavelengths ledon to

Maxwell’s theoryofelectromagnetismandthencetoEinstein’s theoryofspecial

relativity.Ifyouthinktherainbowhaspoeticmystery,youshouldtryrelativity.

(Dawkins,2006,p.42)

Scientific discoveries and developments like these can produce what Dawkins calls a

feelingof ‘awedwonder’,whichhedeemsoneof theuppermostexperiencesahuman

beingcanexperience(Dawkins,2006,p.xii).Nowleavingasidethequestionofwhether

there is sucha thingasahierarchyofexperiences that can supportDawkins’ viewand

whatsuchahierarchyactuallylookslikeitissafetosaythatnoteveryonewouldreadily

subscribe to Dawkins’ view. In support of this claim stands philosopher Ian Kidd who

distinguishesbetweenshallowanddeepwonderandarguesthatwondermerelypresents

itself inashallowwayforthescientistandthereisadeeperkindofwonderfusedwith

theethicaldimensionthatthescientistsimplymissesouton(Kidd,2014).NowDawkins’

conjunctionofaweandwonderremindsusthatwonderisacomplicatedsubjectbecause

as much as one might agree with Dawkins and think his conjunction fitting for the

experienceheisdescribingonewouldbeinclinedtothinkitpeculiarbecauseasmuchas

itispossibletomergeaweandwonderitisalsopossibletoviewaweandwonderastwo

completely different states ofmindprompting us to findout inwhat sense they differ

fromoneanother.

Butwhydoeswondertravel?Whyisitnotathomewithonediscipline,speciality

orbranchoflearning?Quinnpointsoutthatitmightsimplybebecausewonderdoesnot

fitanyspecialityanditmayprovedifficultforonebranchoftheacademictreetogivean

exhaustiveaccountofwonder.ThereisasQuinnputsit‘somethingasinherentlyabsurd

intheideaofawonderexpertasintheideaofanexpertonlife’(Quinn,2002,p.xi).In

otherwordsifonewishestolearnmoreaboutwonderitmightbeprudentnottogettoo

fixated on disciplinary lenses but look to wonder as something that digs beyond the

11

disciplinary barriers of academia. Perhaps wonder in this regard is initially best

understood by evoking the image of the primordial soup advocated by evolutionary

scientists. It isaplaceoforigin.It isastateofmind,whichpotentiallycangiverisetoa

desire for inquiry and for the academically inclined subsequent works be they either

scientificorartisticinoutlineorcomposition.

A thesisusually abides to some schoolof learning and the inquiry conducted in

this thesis is a philosophical one taking place within a medical humanities context.

Medical humanities ‘is a name for a conscious habit of thought, a willingness to see

medicinepainteduponaverywidecanvas—thecanvasofhumanexperience inall its

complexity, diversity, and unpredictability’ (Evans, 2002, p. 447). It represents a field,

whichroughlyspeakingprovidesnewperspectivesonmedicine throughthe lensof the

humanities and social sciences andbecause it is a field thatwelcomes interdisciplinary

workitprovidesasuitableenvironmentforthestudyofwonder.Nowphilosophyishard

to define but one area that has been a part of philosophy at least since the time of

Socrates is concept analysis and the critical scrutiny of ideas. Since the success of this

thesis reliespartlyona clear, rigorouspresentationofparticular key concepts, notions

andideasevokingaphilosophicalenquiryasa‘method’tomakethethesisbelievableis

apt. To strengthen this notion one might point out that since philosophy has a long

history of addressingwonder, balance (understood as virtue) and human flourishing it

seemsagoodchoicetoturntophilosophy.Inadditionitmustbesaidthatthephilosophy

or philosophical lens through which I am going to explore wonder qualifies as Neo-

Aristotelian, meaning that it draws on the work of Aristotle and a selection of

contemporaryphilosopherstowhomAristotleisasubstantialsourceofinspiration.Other

approaches to flourishing do exist but the present thesis does not consider such

alternatives,nordoesitinanywayrepresentathoroughapologyforNeo-Aristotelianism.

TheNeo-Aristotelianangleonflourishingisatoolchosenpurelybecauseitenablesusto

paintarichpictureofwonder.

Thisthesisisdividedintosevenpartsincludinganintroductionandaconclusion.Chapter

1, The Lure of Wonder aims at providing the reader a preliminary understanding of

wonder. The chapter opens with the presentation and brief examination of seven

examples of wonder, which gives the reader a basic insight into the phenomenon of

wonder.NextIexaminetheetymologicalrootsofwonderandhowwondercanbeseen

asanoun,averb,anadjectiveandanadverb,whichcanbeseenasanadditionalguideto

12

wonder. Thirdly I shall attempt to make the reader appreciate that conceptions of

wonder change over time by taking a brief look at the history of wonder. The fourth

movementwillexamineaselectionofalteredstatesbyaddressingwonder’srelationship

withawe,horror,thesublime,curiosity,amazement,admirationandastonishmentwitha

view to further clarifying what wonder is. This is followed by an examination of the

‘enemies of wonder’ in order to make clear why we sometimes avoid wonderment.

Finally in the interest of presenting a preliminary understanding of wonder that

transcends naïve sentiments and crude rationalisations I shall draw attention to some

contemporary writers on wonder and their views on the subject. Furthermore I shall

highlightadditionalresearchquestions,whichIintendtoanswerinthecomingchapters

includingifwondercanbeexclusivelyseenasanemotion;whattheroleofimaginationin

wonder is and in what sense wonder contributes to human flourishing. Thus the first

chapterbynomeansprovidesthefinalwordonwonder,butismerelyastepping-stone

tofurtherinvestigationsintothesubjectmatter.

Chapter 2, Wonder and Emotion investigates in what respect we may label

wonderasanemotionandifitispossibletolabelitexclusivelyso.FirstIelaborateonthe

rationaleforaddressingwonderasanemotionandnextIaddressthenatureofemotions.

Subsequently I commit to the cognitive approach to emotions represented by

contemporaryphilosopherAaronBen-Ze’evandlaterexploreanideaputforwardbythe

likewise contemporary philosopher Adam Morton depicting wonder as an epistemic

emotion. I then apply Ben-Ze’ev’s cognitive approach and Adam Morton’s notion of

wonder as an epistemic emotion to some of the examples depicting wonder as an

emotion provided in the first section in order to show in what respect the examples

reflect wonder as an emotion. Finally I shall explore what wemay call other faces of

wonderandarguethatasmuchasitcanbesaidthatwonderqualifiesasanemotionand

indeed an epistemic emotion wonder does not qualify exclusively as such because

wondermayindeedalsobelookeduponasamood,avalueandanattitude.

Chapter 3,Wonder and Imagination begins by recapturing and expanding the

rationaleforinvestigatingimaginationinconnectionwithwonder.Thisisfollowedbyan

introduction to imagination that aims to clarify the vastness of the subject matter.

Subsequently I shall present and comment on the work on imagination done by

philosophersMaryWarnock, RonaldHepburn and Roger Scruton in order to present a

modernaccountofimagination.Mychoiceofphilosophersrestsonthefactthattheyare

all contemporary thinkerswho through their individualworkhaveexpresseda singular

13

and bold view of imagination that when synthesised will help us establish in what

capacity amodern conception of imagination is involved in thewondering orwonder-

filledexperience.

Chapter4,ImplicationsoftheRoleofImaginationinWonderexaminesanarrayof

new examples from art, space-travel and philosophy that are particularly wonder

provokingwiththepurposenotonlyto furthersolidifyhowthe imagination isactive in

wonderment but also to show how an experience of wonder may: 1) influence our

perception; 2) increase our moral scope and sensitivity; and 3) facilitate what I call a

wondrousafterglow.

Chapter5,WonderandHumanFlourishingengageswiththreecontemporaryneo-

Aristotelian philosophical approaches to flourishing, and the first involves the work of

DouglasRasmussenwhoinhisapproachtoflourishingfocusesheavilyontheindividual.

Secondly IshallengagewithAlasdairMacIntyrewhosenotionof flourishingalertsusto

thesocialsideofflourishingandisgroundedintheideathatwearedependentrational

animalswith the ability to become independent practical reasoners. Finally Iwill draw

attentiontopoliticallyengagedMarthaNussbaumwhoseaccountofflourishingincludes

thenotionofthe‘thick,vagueconceptionofthegood’bywhichsheoffersabasiclistof

humanfunctionalcapabilitiesindicatingwhatisessentialtoeveryhumanlife.Thethree

approachescomplementoneanother inthesensethatasweprogressfromRasmussen

to MacIntyre and finally to Nussbaum we will see a continuing exploration of human

nature that will bring about a refined notion of what human beings have in common

rather than where they differ. The picture of human flourishing that emerges from

engagingwith these contemporary thinkerswill be utilised as a reference point in the

secondhalfof thischapterwhichexamineshowwondercanbeasourceof flourishing.

The secondhalf startswitha surveyofwhat itmeans for something tobea sourceof

flourishingandIshallengagewiththefollowingcandidates:literacy,friendship,humour

and physical exercise. Following this brief engagement I shall argue that wonder also

qualifiesasasourceof flourishingby lookingathowwondermayevokereverenceand

gratitude, help foster an imaginative attitude and give birth to openness and humility.

FinallyIshalladdresswonderasavirtueandarguethatabalancedsenseofwonderisa

strongcontributortohumanflourishing.

Conclusion:WonderingaboutWonderrecapturestheimportantfindingsfromthe

previous chapters and concludes that cultivating a balanced sense of wonder strongly

contributes to human flourishing. Additionally it offers some perspectives on possible

14

weaknessesof the thesisandhowthe thesis couldbeusedasa springboard for future

work.

BythisintroductionIhopeIhavewonthegoodwillofthereaderandmadeclearhowI

intend to build the defence ofmy thesis. Likewise I hope I havemanaged to spark an

interestinwonderbecauseasthefollowingchapterswillshowitisamostalluringsubject

matter.

15

1. TheLureofWonder

Bythetoilofothersweareledintothepresenceofthingswhichhavebeenbrought

fromdarknessintolight.

(Seneca,1997,p.34)

Intheattempttoreacharicherunderstandingofwonderitisusefultobeginbylooking

in detail at specific scenarios in which wonder emerges. Here I present and interpret

seven such situations which together ground the concept of wonder as it will be

investigatedinthisthesisasawhole.

Tobeginletusfocusonascenariothatmostofuswouldprobablyrecogniseaswonder-

filled:namely,therare,unexpectedandextraordinaryencounterwithgrandiosenatural

phenomena.Over the course of three consecutive nights fromNovember 10th through

November 12th 1833 one of themost spectacularmeteor showers in recorded history

took place. Elder Samuel Rogers witnessed the spectacle and in his autobiography he

writes:

Iheardoneofthechildrencryout, inavoiceexpressiveofalarm:"Cometothe

door,father,theworldissurelycomingtoanend."Anotherexclaimed:"See!The

wholeheavensareonfire!Allthestarsarefalling!"Thesecriesbroughtusallinto

theopenyard,togazeuponthegrandestandmostbeautifulscenemyeyeshave

everbeheld. Itdidappearas ifeverystarhad left itsmoorings,andwasdrifting

rapidly in a westerly direction, leaving behind a track of light, which remained

visibleforseveralseconds.Someofthosewanderingstarsseemedaslargeasthe

fullmoon,ornearlyso,andinsomecasestheyappearedtodashatarapidrate

across the general course of themain body ofmeteors, leaving in their track a

bluish light,whichgathered intoa thin cloudnotunlikeapuffof smoke froma

tobacco-pipe.Someofthemeteorsweresobrightthattheywerevisibleforsome

time after day had fairly dawned. Imagine large snowflakes drifting over your

head,sonearyouthatyoucandistinguishthem,onefromtheother,andyetso

thickintheairastoalmostobscurethesky;thenimagineeachsnowflaketobea

meteor,leavingbehinditataillikealittlecomet;thesemeteorsofallsizes,from

16

thatofadropofwatertothatofagreatstar,havingthesizeofthefullmoonin

appearance:andyoumaythenhavesomefaintideaofthiswonderfulscene.

(Rogers,1880,p.133-134)

Rogers was an educatedman and knew aboutmeteor showers; yet the extraordinary

intensity,thegrandeurandbeautyofwhathesawfilledhimwithwonder,andthushis

worldwas inawayenlargedorrenewedashebecameawarethat itcould indeedhold

such qualities. Indeed he acknowledges that his description may leave us with only a

“faintidea”ofwhatwasgoingonwhichcouldindicatethatwhatistrulywonder-filledis

beyondwordstodescribeandthat inordertoobtainaricherunderstandingofwonder

one must experience it personally. However, the subjective nature of this experience

doesnotmakeitsolipsistic:Rogers’accountspeaksclearlyofthepotentialcommunality

ofwonder and the notion that experiences ofwonder at least to somedegree can be

shared.

Movingawayfromwonder-provokingnaturalphenomenabutkeepingthe focusonthe

rare, unexpectedandextraordinary, the secondexample concernsphilosopher Juande

Pasquale’saccountofa life-alteringevent,which tookplace inhisyouth.Following the

funeralofhis17-year-oldcousinRichie,dePasqualefoundhimselfinachargedemotional

statebackinhismother’sapartment.DePasqualewrites:

WeweredrinkingcoffeewhenallofasuddenIregainedthesenseofmybody’s

presencebut simultaneously felt Iwas going to faint. Iwent into thebathroom

andbeganto furiouslysplashwateronmy face,notsomuchtowashaway the

tears as to vainly try to wash away my overwhelming sense of death. When I

lookedupintothemirrorInotonlysawRichie’sfacestaringbackatme,butmy

face,mymothersface,myfather’sface,mysister’sface–Everyman’sface.There

andthen,sufferingthemostunbearableofsorrowsthatapersoncanfeel,Iknew

Ihaduncoveredsomethingbig,thebiggestthingthereis.

(Pasquale,2003,p.4)

The“thebiggestthingthereis”,isfordePasqualetherealisationthatwehumanbeings

are mortal creatures. Realising one’s mortality for the first time can induce wonder

17

becauseitisadefiningmomentwhereoneispresentedwithanimposingrealitybeyond

one’sownandseeminglyanyone’scontrol.Confrontedwithdeath,werealisethatallthat

a person is, all that she knows and cares aboutwill at somepoint disappear. Realising

one’smortality leads toa seriesof imposingexistentialquestions:What shouldonedo

withthetimeonehasbeengiven?Howshouldonelive?Istheresomethingonemustdo

beforetheend?Isthereagoalorpurposetohumanexistenceandwhoorwhatwould

and indeed could operate as guarantor for any answer to suchquestions?As noquick

answercapableofwithstandingcriticalscrutinyiseasilyobtainablefacingsuchexistential

queriesmaywellprovokewonderment,although thiswill toanextentdependonhow

our individualmindsetsandcircumstances influenceourexperiencesandperception. In

this, as in all the examples I will discuss,my aim is not to claim essential or universal

qualitiesof theexperienceofwonderbut rather todevelopan insight into itspossible

constituents.DePasquale’sexamplerevealstheintenselysubjectivequalityofwonder—

heis,afterall,theonlyoneseeingthedifferentfacesinthemirror.Furthermorethisisa

suddenandextraordinaryexperiencebecausethedifferentfacesshouldnotbethereand

yetspringuponhimfromnowhere.

Astateofwondermayalsospringfromexperiencingsomethingthatcontradictsallthat

oneknowsortakesforgranted.Toillustratethismythirdexamplelookstothebeginning

of Shakespeare’s tragedy Hamlet, where we find Horatio, the learned friend of Prince

Hamlet,joiningthenightwatchmenMarcellusandBernardoontheirlateandbittercold

watchatElsinoreCastle.Onthepreviousnightthewatchmensightedwhatappearedto

be the ghost of the late king of Denmark, yet in order to give further weight to their

observationstheyhavecalleduponHoratiotovalidatetheirperceptionsandspeaktothe

ghostshoulditreappear.BeinganeducatedmanHoratioisatfirstscepticalofthewhole

businessbutastheapparitioncomesthefollowingscenetakesplace:

MARCELLUS Peace,breaktheeoff.Lookwhereitcomesagain.

BERNARDO Inthesamefigurelikethekingthat’sdead.

MARCELLUS Looks‘anotliketheking?Markit,Horatio.

HORATIO Mostlike:itharrowsmewithfearandwonder.

MARCELLUS Itwouldbespoketo.

BERNARDO Speaktoit,Horatio.

18

HORATIO Whatartthouthatusurp’stthistimeofnight,

Togetherwiththatfairandwarlikeform

InwhichthemajestyofburiedDenmark

Didsometimesmarch?ByheavenIchargethee,speak

(Shakespeare,1992,I.i.40-50)

Horatio declares that his response embraces both fear and wonder, due to the

unexpected and extraordinary encounter, which in this particular case involves the

paranormal. The ghost is an anomaly. It is thing that should not be there and its very

presence displaces Horatio because the world he inhabits has suddenly become a

strangertohim.Wemightevensaythatseeingtheghostdiminisheshisselfbecausenot

onlydoes it challengewhathe thought tobe realorotherwisea reasonablepictureof

howtheworldworks;italsogivesrisetoaidentity-crisesinvolvingquestionsaboutwhat

andwhoheis.Whathethoughttoberealorotherwiseareasonablepictureofhowthe

worldworks now stands challenged, and so does indeed his identity. Furthermore the

sceneindicatesthatexperiencingwonderatleasttosomedegreecanbeanarrestingor

astonishingaffairthatmaylastonlytemporarily.Theexampleinformsusthatwonderis

an experience, which starts with an intense moment of surprise and dislocation but

swiftlyleadsintoastrongdesiretoknowmoreandindeedtoact.

Literature offers vivid examples of wonder arising from unexpected encounters, and I

turninmyfourthexampletoGermanauthorThomasMann’snovelTheMagicMountain.

Inasanatorium inDavoshighup in theSwissAlpswe find theyoungprotagonistHans

CastorpattendinganX-rayexaminationofhistubercularcousinJoachimZiemssenwhois

inthecareofthechiefmedicaldoctorHofratBehrens:

”Clear picture,” said the Hofrat, “quite a decent leanness—that’s the military

youth.I’vehadpauncheshere—youcouldn’tseethroughthem,hardlyrecognize

athing.Theraysareyettobediscoveredthatwillgothroughsuchlayersoffat.

Thisisnicecleanwork.Doyouseethediaphragm?”heasked,andindicatedwith

hisfingerthedarkarchinthewindow,thatroseandfell.“Doyouseethebulges

hereontheleftside,thelittleprotuberances?Thatwastheinflammationofthe

pleura he had when he was fifteen years old. Breathe deep,” he commanded.

19

“Deeper!Deep,Itellyou!”AndJoachim’sdiaphragmrosequivering,ashighasit

could;theupperpartsofthelungscouldbeseentoclearup,buttheHofratwas

notsatisfied.“Notgoodenough,”hesaid.“Canyouseethehilusglands?Canyou

seetheadhesions?Lookatthecavitieshere,thatiswherethetoxinscomefrom

thatfuddlehim.”ButHansCastorp’sattentionwastakenupbysomethinglikea

bag,astrange,animalshape,darklyvisiblebehindthemiddlecolumn,ormoreon

therightsideofit—thespectator’sright.Itexpandedandcontractedregularly,a

littleafterthefashionofaswimmingjelly-fish.“Lookattheheart,”andtheHofrat

liftedhis hugehand again fromhis thigh andpointedwith his forefinger at the

pulsating shadow. Good God, it was the heart, it was Joachim’s honour-loving

heart, that Hans Castorp saw! “I am looking at your heart.” He said in a

suppressed voice. “Go ahead.” Answered Joachim again; probably he smiled

politely up there in the darkness. But the Hofrat told him to be quiet and not

betrayanysensibility.Behrensstudiedthespotsandthelines,theblackfestoonin

the intercostal space; while Hans Castorp gazed without wearying at Joachim’s

graveyard shape and bony tenement, this memento mori, this scaffolding for

mortalfleshtohangon.“Yes,yes!Isee!”hesaid,severaltimesover.“MyGod,I

see!

(Mann,1927,p.217-218)

The scene is wonder-filled for a number of reasons. First of all the protagonist is

experiencingwonderwhen he via the X-ray apparatus beholds the insides of his living

cousin including the pulsating heart and parts of his skeleton. The X-raymachine is a

technological wonder that gives Castorp a kind of augmented sight allowing him

momentarilytoseesomethingthatnormally liesbeyondoursenses.SecondlyCastorp’s

newfound‘ability’sharpenshiscognitivefocusandgivesrisetothoughtsaboutlifeand

death. Thus the example is complementary to de Pasquale’s as it brings into view big

questions about thenatureof existencewhich ifwewere to extrapolate is to say that

althoughwemay feel verymuch alive andwell our existence is transient andoneday

things inevitablywill come toanendwithoutus fully knowingwhyandwhy itwaswe

havebeenaliveinthefirstplace.InsupportofthisstandsMann’suseoftheLatinphrase

‘memento mori’, which translates into ‘remember that you have to die’6 and the

6ThisisassertedlaterwhenCastorphashisownhandX-rayedanddescribesitas‘helookedintohisowngrave’(Mann,1927,p.218).InterestinglyMannmighthavebasedtheskeletal-hand-as-a-reminder-of-deathdeviceonarealevent.WilhelmConradRöntgendiscoveredtheX-rayin1895andshortlyafterthe

20

exclamation ‘MyGod, I see!’which is emotionally charged and brings to our attention

that Castorp (and perhaps the reader as well) just ‘saw’ or realised something of the

utmost importance.Thirdly itgivesrisetoawarenessof ignoranceor lackofknowledge

because suddenly, courtesy of augmented sight, to perceive parts of the world that

hithertohaveremainedhiddenisalsotobecomeawarethatourknowledgeoftheworld

or what it encompasses is incomplete. Fourthly it invites us to wonder about what

technologiesareyettobediscoveredthatcanaidusinbeholdingaspectsofrealitythat

havesofarescapedus.

AsafifthexampleIcitethe17thcenturynaturalphilosopherRobertBoylewhoinrelation

tooneofhisobservationshasinterestingthingstosayaboutwonder.Boylewrites:

Yesterday,whenIwasabouttogotobed,anamanuensisofmine,accustomedto

make observations, informedme, that one of the servants of the house, going

uponsomeoccasiontothe larder,was frightedbysomething luminousthatshe

saw(notwithstandingthedarknessoftheplace)wherethemeathadbeenhung

upbefore.Whereupon,suspendingforawhilemygoingtorest,Ipresentlysent

forthemeat intomychamber,andcausedittobeplacedinacornerofaroom

capable of being made considerably dark, and then I plainly saw, both with

wonderanddelight, that the jointofmeatdid, indiversplacesshine like rotten

wood or stinking fish; which was so uncommon a sight, that I had presently

thoughtsofinvitingyoutobeasharerinthepleasureofit.

(Boyle,1672,vol3,p.651)

What is interesting from Boyle’s description is that his first reaction on seeing the

luminousmeatiswonderaccompaniedwithdelight.Thisisinotherwordsanemotional

upheavalbutunlikeintheexamplefocussingonHoratiofromShakespeare’sHamletitis

notconnected to fearbecauseBoyle (butnothis servant) isnot frightenedbywhathe

witnessesbut takespleasure in themysteriousglowandquickly setsout to investigate

the reason for its existence.HistoriansDaston and Park explain that to Boylewonders

suchastheglowingmeatwereconsidered‘primeobjectsofinvestigation’andthatBoyle

wassopleasedbytheuncommonsightofitthatitkepthimawakeintotheearlyhoursof

themorningdespitethefactthathewasnursingacoldhehadcaughtwhiletestinganew

telescope (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 13). This detail is important because it not onlydiscoveryhesubjectedhiswifeAnnaBerthaLudwigtothewondersoftheray.Uponseeingherskeletalhand,whichboreherweddingringsheexclaimed‘Ihaveseenmydeath’(Dresser,2014).

21

highlights the temporality of wonder indicating that experiences of wonder can be

momentaryaswellasenduringbutalsothattheemotionorfeelingofpleasurearisingin

conjunctionwithwonderperhapsfuelstheexperience.

Mysixthexampleofwonderdrawsonanotherphilosopher’sreflectionsoneventsfrom

his youth, namely Sam Keen who writes of an ordinary day in the city of Maryville,

Tennessee:

When I was six years old I was walking by a courthouse in a small town in

Tennessee.Amancameout,followedbyalargecrowd.Ashewalkedpastme,

hepulledaknife fromhisbeltandsaid,“Ipresentyouwiththisknife.”Before I

could see his face or overcome my shock and thank him, he turned and

disappeared.Theknifewasastrangeandmysteriousgift.Thehandlewasmade

out of the foot of a deer, and on the blade there was something written in a

foreignlanguagewhichnooneintowncouldtranslate.Forweeksafterthisevent

I livedwithapervasivesenseofgratitudeto thestrangerandwithawondering

expectancy created by the realization that such a strange and wonderful

happening couldoccur in theordinaryworld ofMaryville. If nameless strangers

gavesuchgifts,whatsurprisesmightbeexpectedintheworld?

(Keen,1969,p.211)

While it, too, emphasises the sudden and unexpected, Keen’s experience of wonder

springs from something as ordinary as gift-giving and is characterised by a long-lasting

‘wondrous afterglow’ that involves a sense of gratitude and wondering expectancy.

Keen’sexperienceofwondercontrastswiththoseofRogers’anddePasquale’sinthatit

emerges in amuch lessdramaticor emotionally chargedenvironment. Keen’s example

shows that wonder can emerge from a small abnormality in the ordinariness of the

everydayandsuggeststhatinwonderourcapacityforimaginationisputtouseaswetry

to understand the implications of our experience and answer the ‘what if’ questions it

givesriseto.

Thatexperiencesofwondercanbecontainedwithintheeverydayisalsothethemeofmy

seventhandfinalexample.Onanordinaryafternoonintheautumnof2014itoccurredto

metoshow‘theduck-rabbit’tomythenfour-year-olddaughterMai.Theduck-rabbit is

an ambiguous figure made famous in philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical

22

Investigations(Wittgenstein,1963,p.194)andconsistsofanimageinwhichbothaduck

andarabbitcanbeidentified.Uponshowingtheduck-rabbittomydaughtershereadily

recognisedtheduck,whichpromptedmetoaskherinateasingmanner‘areyousure’?

Puzzledbymyquestionandmischievouslooksheonceagainturnedherattentiontothe

image and after a few seconds I observed her eyes widening and her mouth opened

slightly before she gently uttered ‘it’s a rabbit’. My daughter’s experience, the

intensificationofhercognitivefocusandtheparticularexpressiononherface7duringher

moment of aesthetic appreciation reveal this experience as one of wonder. The

encounterwiththeduck-rabbitproducedasmallriftintheordinaryunderstoodaswhat

she takes for granted including the idea that she has a one-to-one relation with the

externalworld and that thisworld is reliable and consistentlypredictable. Throughher

experienceofwondershesuddenly‘saw’newpatterns,whichintroducedhertoaworld

where thingsarenotalwaysas they first appear tobeandmaydepend inparton the

beholder.Thissuggeststousthatperceptionisaninherentdynamismintheexperience

ofwonder.

Theseexamplesgiveusapreliminaryideaofwhatcangiverisetoandisinvolvedinthe

experience ofwonder. Rogers’ report covering the 1833 Leonidmeteor shower shows

thatwondercanbeaccompaniedbyasenseofgrandeurandbeautyandpromptsusto

seetheworldanew.DePasquale’scasebroughttoourattentionthatwondermightarise

fromasudden,extraordinaryandpersonalexperiencethatrevealsourmortalitytousfor

the first time. From the paranormal goings on in Shakespeare’sHamlet we found that

wonder can be accompanied by fear, temporarily displaces or diminishes the self and

inspiresadesireforknowledge.TheexamplefromMann’sTheMagicMountainbrought

usinconnectionwith‘augmentedsight’andseeingapartoftheworldthatundernormal

circumstancesishiddentous.Wealsobecamefamiliarwiththeideathatawarenessof

ignoranceorlackofknowledgeisapartofwondermentinthesensethatthroughwonder

webecomeawarethatourknowledgeis incomplete.Boyle’sexperiencebroughttoour7FrenchpainterandarttheoristCharlesleBrun’sdepictsastonishmentincombinationwithadmirationasthewideningoftheeyesandgapingofthemouth(Onians,1994,p.17)(A.S.Harris,2004,p.307)butinLorraineDastonandKatharinePark’sWondersandtheOrderofNatureleBrun’sdepictionofastonishmentcombinedwithadmirationislabelled‘wonder’(Daston&Park,1998,p.319).InTheExpressionofemotionsinManandAnimalsCharlesDarwinpointstotheideathatsurpriseandastonishmentareexpressedinhumanbeingsbytheelevationoftheeyebrows,theopeningthemouthandtheprotrusionofthelips(Darwin,1999,XII).Ofcourseonemightsaythatastonishmentoradmirationdoesnotcorrespondwithwonder,butsincethesedifferentstatesofmindarehardtoseparatewithcertaintyonemightagreewiththeideathatthedepictionsbyleBrunandDarwinholdsomevalueandatleastgiveusanideaofthefaceofwonder.

23

attentionthatwonderisconnectedwithemotionalupheavalsuchasdelightandthatone

might take pleasure in the experience of wonder to such a degree that it may fuel a

sustainedinquiry intotheobjectofwonder.Keen’snarrativetoldusthatwondermight

arise from an ordinary event, that it intensifies the use of the imagination and can be

accompanied by a sense of gratitude and expectancy. My daughter’s wonder at the

ambiguityoftheduck-rabbitalertedustothenotionthatinwonderthecognitivefocusis

intensifiedandthatwonderopensusuptoaworldwherethingsarenotalwaysasthey

seem.

Examiningreallifesituationsandimaginaryonesisclearlyofgreatvaluewhenit

comes to building a preliminary notion of wonder, as they provide insight into the

constituents of wonder and invites further inquiry as they carry with them important

questions. These include: is wonder an emotion or feeling? What is the role of

imaginationandperceptioninwonderandinwhatcapacityisitbeneficialorgoodforus

towonder?Iamgoingtoaddressthesequestionsandmorethroughoutthethesisbutfor

nowandinordertocontinuetobuildourpreliminaryaccountofwonderletusfocuson

thenameandrootofwonder.

1.1.TheNameandRootofWonder

Plato’sdialogueCratylusemphasisesthatthecorrectnessofnamesisabigpartofgaining

knowledge and understanding (Plato, 1926`). It also stipulates that obtaining the right

understandingofaparticularwordisatrickymatterandthatetymologyasateachingis

compromised by the crippling conflict between on the one hand Hermogenes

(conventionalist)andontheotherCratylus(naturalist).8Theconventionalistwouldargue

that there is no correct usage of a particular namebesideswhat is supported by local

convention. For instance the aurora borealis is called ‘aurora borealis’ only because

learned people situated in a particular culture have settled upon that label. For the

naturalistthingsaredifferentandherewefindtheargumentthatnamesarenotchosen

arbitrarilyandthataparticularnamebelongsnaturallytoaparticularobject.According

toCratylusitisimportanttorealisethatifoneattemptstospeakofsomethingbycalling

it any name other than its natural name, one is completely failing to address it at all.

Given this unsettled conflict the use of etymology in the exploration of wonder is

8Ihaveadoptedthewords‘conventionalist’and‘naturalist’fromDavidSedley’s‘Plato’sCratylus’(Sedley,2013).

24

connectedwithanelementofuncertainty.Etymologyisnotanexactscienceandcannot

beusedalone topinpoint themeaningof aword. It can alsobe argued that it hasno

purpose in a philosophical inquiry, as it does not provide any security in terms of the

meaningoftheword.NeverthelessIshallarguethatetymologyisnotcompletelyuseless

to our current endeavour. Etymology can be used to indicate the root of wonder, its

possible variation inmeaning over different languages and revealwhether itsmeaning

changesdependingonhowoneusestheword.Onthatnoteletushaveacloserlookat

whatetymologycantellusaboutthethingcalled‘wonder’.

AccordingtoChambersDictionaryofEtymologytheword ‘wonder’derives from

theOldEnglishword‘wundor’meaningmarvellousthing.Thewordhas linkstotheOld

High German ‘wunter’ which in modern German has become ‘wunder’. It can also be

ventured that wonder has connections to the Old English ‘wundian’ and the German

‘wunde’meaningwoundorcutsuggestingthattobewonderstruckistobewoundedina

sense and that it is an experience that no doubt puts a person into sharp focus as no

woundislikelytobeinflictedwithoutcausingsomesufferingandpain.(Parsons,1969,p.

85)(Rubenstein,2008,p.9).Ona lessdramaticnotelexicographerEricPartridgepoints

outthattheOldEnglish‘wunder’maybeconnectedtotheGerman‘Wonne’meaningjoy

or delight (Partridge, 1966). This particular idea of wonder finds academic support.

Literary scholarPhilip Fisher forexample connectswonderwithdelight andadmiration

andpointsoutthattheLatinrootofadmirationis‘mira’whichalsoistheLatinnamefor

wonder and furthermore the root of thewordmiracle (Fisher, 2003, p. 11). Historians

Daston and Park also support this notion and add that admiration and objects of

admirationcalled‘mirabilia’,‘miracula’or‘ammiranda’astermsseemtohaverootinthe

Indo-Europeanwordfor‘smile’(Daston&Park,1998,p.16).LiteraryscholarsRobertM.

TheobaldandDennisQuinnalsofavoursthisconnectionandclaimsthatwritersinEnglish

suchasplaywrightWilliamShakespeareoftenusestheLatinate‘admire’asasynonymfor

wonder (Quinn, 2002, p. 4; Theobald, 1901, p. 83). Furthermore Quinn suggests that

‘admire’ is a word of the senses, of passions, and of the intellect and relates to both

seeing and knowing. This he relates to the Greek word ‘thau’ which may connect to

wonderor to lookat something inwonder.Wonder inGreek is ‘thauma’,derived from

‘thea’ (Quinn,2002,p.6). This root is incorporated in theEnglishword ‘theatre’which

referstoaplacewhereonecanencounterspectacularsightsandsounds.FinallyQuinn

informsusthat‘thea’relatestotheword‘theory’,whichtotheAncientGreekswasthe

wordforphilosophicalcontemplation(Quinn,2002,p.6).DastonandParkaresupportive

25

ofthisastheypointoutthattherootsoftheGreekwordthaumaisfoundintheverb‘to

see’(Daston&Park,1998,p.16).Howeverwhatthismeans isunclear,becauseonone

handitmightsuggestthatwonderappealstothevisualsense,whichisanotionstrongly

supportedbyFisherwhowrites:‘Wonderbindsthemindtoavisualexperiencethathas

calledattentiontoitselfbyitsbeauty,itsstrangeness,anditsorder’(Fisher,2003,p.121).

On the other it might entail that wonder has to do with perhaps visualisation or the

imaginingsofthemind’seyewhichpointstounderstandingorknowledge.Icanofferno

verdictsastowhichoneofthesestands iscorrectbutforourpurposessuffice ittosay

thattheyaretwofacesofthesamemarvellouscoin.

Wonder also bears resemblance to the Old Icelandic word ‘undr’, which in

Sweden,NorwayandDenmarkisknownas‘under’.Forsomethingtobean‘under’ it is

[attributed to] an extraordinary object, event or person of admirable composition or

character.ForexampleitcanbewellsaidthattheGreatPyramidofGizaisawonderor

extraordinary object because of its uniqueness. The same can be said aboutMahatma

Gandhi’s SaltMarch to Dandi in 1930 that alerted theworld to the burgeoning Indian

independencemovement.

In the Danish language one also finds the similar but more inquisitive word

‘undre’.ThisisequivalenttotheEnglish‘wonder’understoodinthecontextof‘Iwonder

what,Iwonderwhy,IwonderifandIwonderhow’anditallowsustosaythat‘wonder’

canbeusedbothasanounandaverb.Onewayof illustrating this is to return to the

paranormalgoingsonatElsinoreCastle.Seeingtheghostofthelatekingistothelearned

Horatio awonder (noun) but seeing the king alsomade himwonder (inquisitive verb)

aboutthenatureandpurposeoftheghost.Inadditionto‘wonder’asanounandaverb

‘wonder’ also presents itself as an adjective and an adverb. If ‘wonder’ is used as an

adjective it isusedtodescribeapropertyofsomethingmeaningthat ifweforexample

say thatHoratio isawondering (adjective)manwearegivingvoice tooneof theparts

thatmakeup theperson calledHoratio.Wonder canalsobeusedas an adverb in the

sense that we can do something wonderingly (adverb) indicating that the focus is no

longer on the wonder-filled thing in itself (noun) or that we actively wonder about

something (verb) or that we are describing a property of someone or something

(adjective)butonwonderas in ‘wearedoingsomething inaparticularway’.Wemight

say that after Horatio learned about the existence of the ghost he approached it

wonderinglyorinawonderingfashion(adverb).

26

As mentioned etymology is not an exact science and cannot dictate how we

shouldthinkaboutwonder.Becauseofthis,understandingbasedentirelyonetymology

canbedangerousaswemayendupbeingmisledasmuchasguided.Nevertheless for

ourpurposeshere I thinktheetymologicalexaminationheightensourunderstandingof

wonder as it points out some of the various different meanings and connotations

‘wonder’asawordmayhave.Wondercanbeseenasawoundbutalsosomethingthat

produces smiles, joy and delight. It may be that it is synonymous with marvel and

admiration and that it is a sensation connected to the senses. Furthermore it is

interestingthatwondercanbeusedbothasanoun,averb,anadjectiveandanadverb

indicatingthatwonderisnotjustaphenomenonthatonecanstudybutalsoanactionof

sorts—somethingthatonedoesandperhapsinaparticularway.Withthisinmindletus

looktowonderfromahistoricalperspective.

1.2.AHistoryofWonder

For thehistoricalaccountofwonder that I amabout togive I shall leanheavilyon the

workofliteraryscholarandhistorianofwonderDennisQuinnandhisbookIrisExiled–A

SynopticHistoryofWonder,whichstandsasoneofthemorecomprehensivehistoriesof

wonder in the literature. Despite being synopticQuinn’s book stands alone as awide-

ranging and lengthy historical account of wonder. To support Quinn’s work I will also

make references to a number of accounts targeting selected periods or themes in the

historyofwondersuchasphilosopherSylvanaChrysakopoulou’sessay‘Wonderandthe

BeginningofPhilosophyinPlato’ (Chrysakopoulou,2012)whichfocusesonphilosophy’s

beginning in wonder and historian John Onians’ essay ‘I wonder, A short history of

amazement’ (Onians, 1994), highlighting how wonder reveals itself through art and

engagementwithnaturalhistory.LikewiseIwillmakeuseofhistoriansDastonandPark’s

WondersandtheOrderofNature(Daston&Park,1998)whichfocusesonwonderfrom

themedieval period through to theenlightenment andhistorian FrankNadis’sWonder

Shows which begins where Daston and Park end their study namely with the

‘vulgarization of wonder’ (Nadis, 2005, p. 263). Now it is important for the reader to

realise that the frameworkof this thesisdoesnotallowa fullhistoryofwonder;hence

the headline ‘A History of Wonder and not ‘The History of Wonder’. This may be

disappointing but given that we are merely seeking a preliminary understanding of

wonder an incompletehistorical accountofwonderdepictingwhere the conceptionof

27

wonder takes a significant turn will be excused. Bearing this in mind let us begin by

addressingwhatmaybecalledearlycultivatorsofwonder,theancientGreeks.

TheAncientGreeksencompasseda civilisation thatdominatedGreece from the

8thor6thcenturiesBCEto600CE,whichsignalledthebeginningoftheEarlyMiddleAges

andthecontinuingriseofByzantium.Thisperiodofferstheearlymusingsonwonderand

sawthebirthofwhatwenowlabel‘classic’poetryandphilosophy.Thefirstspeculations

onwondercanbetracedbacktothepoetHesiodwhointheTheogony9informsusthat

the sea god Thaumas (wonder)married Electra and had three daughters including Iris

(rainbow)andthebeautiful-hairedharpiesAelloandOcypete(Hesiod,2006,Th266).Iris

isparticularlysignificantforourpurposeherebecauseshefunctionsasmessengerofthe

gods (Hesiod, 2006, Th780, 784) and as Onians has pointed out she represents ‘the

supremewonder,amiraclelinkingheavenandearth’(Onians,1994,p.32).Inawayshe

tiesthelandofhumanstogetherwiththerealmsofthegodsjustliketherainbowdoesin

Norsemythology(Bæksted,1990,p.40)10,yetdespitebeingamessengerofthegodsitis

possible toviewherprimarilyasa representativeofher father.Asadivinecourierher

beauty,shape,arrayofcoloursandtotheancientGreeksinexplicableappearanceinthe

skywouldmakeheartsleapjustaspoetWilliamWordsworth’sdidmanycenturieslater

(W.Wordsworth,1850,p.33).11

AlthoughonenowadaysmaydismissthepoetryofHesiodasmeremythologyitis

evidentthatIrisplaysanimportantroleinGreekclassicalphilosophy.Thereasonforthis

isthatPlatothroughSocratesmentionsherinthedialogueTheaetetus,whichcentreson

epistemology. The dialogue’s youthful namesake exclaims upon the realisation that he

doesnotknowwhatknowledgeisitself,‘Bythegods,Socrates,Iamlostinwonderwhen

I thinkof all these things, and sometimeswhen I regard them it reallymakesmyhead

swim.’(Plato1989,155d)Socratesreplies:

Theodorusseemstobeaprettygoodguesseraboutyournature.Forthisfeeling

ofwondershowsthatyouareaphilosopher,sincewonderisonlythebeginningof

9Theogonytranslatesinto‘birthofthegods’andisapoemwritteninHomericGreekaddressingtheoriginandgenealogyoftheGreekgods.10InNorsemythologytherainbowBifrostisthebridgeguardedbyHeimdalconnectingthedivinerealmofAsgardwithMidgard,theworldofhumans.11BritishRomanticpoetWilliamWordsworthwroteonthenightofthe26thofMarch1802thepoementitledMyHeartLeapsUpalsoknownasTheRainbow.Thepoemcontainsthefamouslines:‘MyheartleapsupwhenIbeholdarainbowinthesky’.

28

philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas made a good

genealogy.

(Plato,1989,155d)

ByreadingtheTheaetetuswe learnthatforPlatophilosophybegins inwonderandhas

closetiestoignoranceorlackofknowledge.12Wealsolearnthatmetaphoricallyspeaking

beholding Irisorbeing in a stateofwonder canbeanuncomfortableanddestabilising

experience inclined to make one’s head swim13. As daunting as this may sound it is

nevertheless thepathosand trademarkofaphilosopherasSocratesclearly states.This

attitude to wonderment encapsulates the very childhood of wonder in western

philosophicalthought.ToreachwhatQuinncallsmaturewonderwehavetogofurther

aheadintimeandaddressthechurchfathersoftheMiddleAges,butnotbeforesetting

asidealittleattentionforRomanphilosophy.

RomanphilosophyisbasedonGreekphilosophyandemergedin155BCEviatheefforts

madebyanAthenianembassytogetherlaterwithCiceroandVarrowhosoughttomake

GreekphilosophyaccessibletotheaverageRoman.HowevertheRomanswerepractical

peopleanddedicated little time tophilosophy.Whatnormally is referred toasRoman

philosophy are the deliberations of themoralists Cicero, Seneca,Marcus Aurelius and

Plutarch,buttomoralisedoesnotnecessarilyevokewondermentnordoesitnecessarily

meanthatitisphilosophy.AccordingtoQuinnmoralisingdemandsrathertheapplication

ofethicalprinciples to theactof correct living (Quinn,2002,97). It canbeargued that

Romans treasured Epicureanism14 and Stoicism15 and so the Romans must have been

philosophicallyinclined.HoweverbothphilosophiesoriginateinGreeceandcomewitha

12AristotleechoespartsoftheTheaetetuspassageinbookalphaintheMetaphysics(Aristotle,1989,I.II.6-11982b).13TheexamplefromPlato’sTheaetetusexposestheideaofwonderasdestabilisingandcausingone’sheadtoswimandinthisrespectittiesverywellintoideaofwonderasawound.InphilosopherSylvanaChrysakopoulou’sworkonwonderwefindsupportforthisnotionasshesuggeststhattheGreekword‘thauma’(wonder)isconnectedwiththeGreekword‘trauma’(woundorinjury)(Chrysakopoulou,2012,p.88).14EpicureanismisbasedonthethinkingofEpicurus(341-270BCE)whofounded‘theGarden’inAthenswhichfunctionsasbothschoolandcircleoffriends.ImportanttotheEpicureanwasmaterialismandarationalhedonisticethicsurgingonetostrivetowardspleasureinordertogainastateofwell-being.Thisisanentirelyindividualenterpriseandshouldbecultivatedpreferablyinagardenremotefromthenoisyworldofhumansandpoliticalintrigues(O'Keefe).15StoicismreferstoaGreekandRomanphilosophicalschoolofthoughtemphasisingonpersonaltransformationandfortificationofthemind.Theideaisthatanupcomingsagemusttranscendemotionsandreachformoralandintellectualperfection.InStoicthoughtthevirtuoussageisthoughttobetotallyimmunetomisfortuneandwouldineffectbehappy,whichhasgivenrisetotheideaof‘Stoiccalm’(Baltzly,2014),whichmaytranslateintohavingtheabilitynottogiveintoirrationalbehavioureveninthemostdireorepicsituations.

29

particularbitternessthatseemstoleaveverylittleroomforwonderment.Thehedonistic

element inEpicureanethics that flagspleasureandencourages the individual tosatisfy

herwishesanddesires togainwell-beingultimatelyentails a singularbitternessas the

avoidanceofpaineasilybecomes identicalwithpleasure itself.Potentiallythisprevents

theEpicureansfromenjoyingsuchhumangoodsaslove,physicalexercise,familylifeand

indeedtheactivityofphilosophyasallofthesepresentthemselvesasacombinationof

painandpleasure.FortheStoicRomansthechancesofencounteringwondermentwere

equally low because as represented by Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius the

concernformoralandpsychologicalquestionswasgivenprecedenceovermetaphysical,

logicalandcosmologicalquestions.Becauseof their idealismandyouthfulwonderment

theGreekscouldbecheerfullikeSocratesintheTheaetetus,butduetotheirrealismthe

Romans were soberly mature and very much in lack of wonderment (Quinn, 2002, p.

105).

WiththeRomanemperorConstantinetheGreat’sembraceofChristianitythelack

ofwondermentamongsttheRomanswasabouttochange.Howeverthereintroduction

of wonder in Roman life never restored wonder to its original youthful and distinctly

Greekform.Itremainedsoberandmatureyetgainedacrucialnewelement,namelyfear

orratherthefearofGod.FortheChristianthinkertheultimategoodwasGodandtogain

knowledgeaboutGodwasalongsidetheloveofGodconsideredtheultimategoal(Quinn,

2002,p.137).Tobewithouttheseelementsortothinkotherwiseweretostandoutside

Christianity.FortheChristianthiswouldmeanaconstantstrivingtowardsGodmotivated

bythefearofstandingoutsidethelightofGod.Alternativelyonecanpointoutthatthe

fearofaneternityintheinfernalregionsofcreation,whichChristianityalsopromisedif

onedidnotembraceChristianity,wouldnodoubtpromptmotivation.16

AsthevariousterritoriesoftheRomanEmpireduringthe5thcenturybegantofall

tohostilearmiesitmarkedthedeclineoftheRomanEmpireandthecomingoftheEarly

Middle Ages. Thiswas a troublesome period for the Roman Christians and culminated

with the sacking of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 CE (Augustin, 2002, p. 14) and the

demise of Romulus Augustus, the last emperor of the Roman Empire in 476 CE. Some

peoplesawthefalloftheEmpireaspunishmentforabandoningtheoldRomangods.In

responsetothisthephilosophicallyinterestedchurchfatherAugustineofferedhisgrand

16InBookXXIofTheCityofGodAugustineinformsusthatthebodiesofthedamnedwouldbetormentedintheeternalfire.

30

work The City of God17 aimed at aiding the doubtful by strengthening their belief in

Christianity (Augustin, 2002, p. 15). However before attending to Augustine’smagnum

opusletustakealookathisearlierautobiographicalwork,theConfessions.Augustine’s

confessional autobiography is relevant because in book X we find his reflections on

memory,whichhasinterestingthingstosayaboutwonder.Augustinewrites:

Great isthisforceofmemory,excessivegreat,OmyGod;a largeandaninfinite

[roominess:]whocanplummetthebottomofit?Yetisthisafacultyofmine,and

belongsuntomynature:norcanImyselfcomprehendallthatIam.Thereforeis

themindtoostraittocontainitself?Sowherecouldthatbewhichcannotcontain

itself? Is itwithout itself andnotwithin?How thendoth itnot contain itself?A

wonderful admiration surprises me, and an astonishment seizes me upon this.

Andmengoabroadtowonderattheheightofmountains,theloftybillowsofthe

sea, the long courses of rivers, the vast compass of the ocean, and the circular

motionsofthestars,andyetpassthemselvesby,norwonderthatwhileIspakeof

allthesethingsIdidnotseethemwithmineeyes;yetcouldInothavespokenof

them, unless those mountains, and billows, and rivers, and stars which I have

seen,andthatoceanIbelievetobe,Isawinwardlyinmymemory,yea,withsuch

vast spacesbetween,as if I verily sawthemabroad.Yetdid Inotswallowthem

into me by seeing, whenas with mine eyes I beheld them. Nor are the things

themselvesnowwithinme,buttheimagesofthemonly.AndIdistinctlyknowby

whatsenseofthebodyeachofthesetookimpressioninme.

(Augustine,2006,BookX,VIII)

From reading Augustine it is clear that even though the height of mountains and the

billowsoftheseamayindeedfosterasenseofwonderoneneedsnottravelfarorrely

solelyonnaturalwondersinordertoexperiencewonder.Reflectionuponthemysteryof

how we remember or recall past experiences can prove quite a sufficient source of

wonder and if not itmay flow easily from realising that we human beings are unable

exhaustivelytocomprehendourselves.InawayAugustineisurgingthereadertogetto

knowherselfjustlikeSocratesdidandsowithAugustineweseeaminorresurrectionof

theGreekwonder.BydedicatingtimeforintrospectionAugustineclaimswewilldiscover

17TheOriginalLatintitleis:DeCivitateDeicontraPaganosmeaningTheCityofGodcontrathePagans.

31

that human beings are truly wonderful as we are beings that cannot fully grasp or

understandourselves.

MovingontoAugustine’slaterworkTheCityofGodwefindthatitencapsulates

theideathathumanhistorysofarhasconsistedofabattlebetweentheCityofGodand

the City of Earth. The City of God refers to people of the Christian faith seeking the

eternaltruthsofGod.BycontrasttheCityofEarthreferstopaganpeoplewhomadethe

finite earthly life their business and pleasure. In time and if human kind embraces

ChristianitytheideaisthatTheCityofGodwillstandtriumphant.ForourpurposesBook

XXI of The City of God is particularly interesting because here Augustine discusses a

multitude of natural wonders and wonder inducing mekhanemata18 from Roman

naturalistGaiusPliniusSecundus’salsoknownasPlinytheElder’sencyclopaedicNatural

History(Pliny,1938).Amongthesewonderswefindthelegendaryfiresalamander19that

wasthoughttoliveinfire;theseeminglyever-activeyetever-lastingvolcanoMt.Etna20

andanironpicturesuspendedbetweentwomagneticstonesinanamelesstemplegiving

the spectator the impression that it floated in mid air (Augustin, 2002, Book XXI, VI).

Augustineused the first twoexamples inhisargument for the idea thatnoteverything

that ison firewillbeconsumed.Thisplayedan importantpart inhisoutlookondivine

punishment and the idea that sinners in the afterlife had to undergo purification by

eternal fire in order to gain entrance to Heaven (Augustin, 2002, XXI, II). The third

examplehelpedillustratetheexistenceofwondersdevelopedfromhumaningenuityand

possibly with demonic aid, which could lead people away from the Christian path

(Augustin,2002,XXI,VI).AdditionallyAugustinepointsoutthatthecreateduniverseisa

wonder designed for human pleasure and delight and that it in itself surpasses the

wonderofthethingsitcontains(Augustin,2002,BookXXI,VII).BythisnotionAugustine

pointsoutthateventhoughtheworldcontainsmanyobjectsofwonderthegreatestof

wonders lies inthemysteryandomnipotenceofGodwhocreated itall.Additionallyas

pointedoutbyDastonandPark it isAugustine’sviewthat there is ‘no inherentway to18‘Mekhanemata’isaGreekwordinwhichtheEnglishword‘mechanics’originatesanditreferstoartificiallymadeinventions,constructionsandmachines(Augustin,2002,907).19InthetimeofAugustinethefiresalamanderwasthoughttoliveinfire.Ithasbeenspeculatedthatbecausefiresalamandershaveahabitofresidinginwoodenlogsandthattheburningofsuchwascommoninancientandmedievaltimesthishascontributedtotheriseofthemythofthefiresalamander.Onecanimaginethatsomewouldmarvelatthesuddenappearanceofasalamanderintheirfireplacebutnotallwouldrealisethatthepoorcreaturewasmerelytryingtoescapeitsburningrefuge(Szeintuch,Tourgeman,&Zigdon,2005,p.102).20MtEtnaisavolcanoinItalythatwashighlyactiveduringancientandmedievaltimes.Itisplausiblethatitsactivityduringthesetimescontributedtothenotionthatnoteverythingisdestroyedbyfirebecausedespiteitssubjectiontofirei.e.frequenteruptionsMtEtnaremainedlargelyunchanged(Augustin,2002,p.902).

32

distinguish between apparently commonplace and apparently marvellous phenomena

sincealldependedondivinewill’(Daston&Park,1998,p.40).ThuseverythinginGod’s

creationiswonderful.

DespitetheeffortsofAugustineitwasnotuntilthelateMiddleAgesaroundthe

12thcenturythatChristianityrecoveredfromthecollapseoftheWesternRomanempire.

By then the first universities had emerged and Christendom saw the reappearance of

ancientGreek textscoming fromtheArabcountries.Amongthese texts translated into

Latin from both Greek originals and Arabic translations we find the nearly complete

philosophicalcorpusofAristotle.There-emergenceofAristotleposedanew“threat”to

Christianity as it offered a seemingly well thought-through pagan alternative to

Christianityclaimingthattheworldwaseternalandnosuchthingasanimmortalhuman

soul existed.21 As a response to this danger Thomas Aquinas in his writing sought to

reconcileAristotelianthoughtandtheCatholicfaith.(Quinn,2002,p.167).Indoingsohe

likeAugustinealsomanagedtorecoverabitoftheyouthfulGreekwonderthathadbeen

lostduringthepreviouscenturies.InhisSummacontraGentileshewrites:

Manhasanaturaldesiretoknowthecausesofwhateverhesees,andsothrough

wondering at what they saw, and not knowing its cause, men first began to

philosophise,andwhentheyhaddiscoveredthecausetheywereatrest.’Nordo

theyceaseinquiringuntiltheycometothefirstcause[…]Thereforemannaturally

desires, ashis lastend, toknow the first cause.ButGod is the first causeof all

things.Thereforeman’slastendistoknowGod.

(Aquinas,1976,BookIII,XXV)

The Thomistic idea of wonder being a desire for knowledge draws on Aristotle, which

becomes clearwhen reading theopening sentenceofAristotle’sMetaphysics: ‘Allmen

naturally desire knowledge’ (Aristotle, 1989, I). This is shortly followed by the

confirmationthatphilosophybeginsinwonder:

It is through wonder that men begin and originally began to philosophize;

wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual

21AristotleoffershisthoughtsonthesoulorpsycheinDeAnimaandlargelyitreadsasanalternativetoPlato’sideasontheeternalsoul.HoweverthecasemaynotbeasclearcutforinthethirdchapterofDeAnimaAristotleputsforththedistinctionbetween‘activeintellect’and’activemind’ofwhichthelattercanbetakenaseternal(Aristotle,1957,III,V,430a24-25).

33

progressionraisingquestionsaboutthegreatermattertoo,e.g.aboutthechanges

ofthemoonandofthesun,aboutthestarsandabouttheoriginoftheuniverse.

Nowhewhowondersandisperplexedisthoughtignorant(thusthemyth-loveris

inasenseaphilosopher,sincemythsarecomposedofwonder);thereforeifitwas

toescapeignorancethatmenstudiedphilosophy,itisobviousthattheypursued

scienceforthesakeofknowledge,andnotforanypracticalutility.

(Aristotle,1989,I.II.6-11982b)

Whereas the highest form of knowledge for Aristotle was scientia22 for Aquinas this

comprised of knowledge that precedes faith. Aquinas introduced another kind of

knowledgethatacknowledgesthemysteriousdimensionoffaith,referringtothekindof

knowledge thatwillnotbe revealedby reasonbut inprinciplecanonlybeknownwith

the aid of divine revelation (Aquinas, 2006, Part I, p. 10). This allows us to say that

although Aquinas evokes the notion that philosophy begins inwonder and thatwe all

seekknowledgeandabsenceofignorancehealsoteachesusthattheknowledgeofGod

isthehighestformofknowledgeandthereinliesthegreatestofwonder.

Aquinas completed his Summa Theologiae between 1265-1274 CE and one can

arguethatwith itspublicationtheMiddleAgesorscholasticismreacheda thrivinghigh

point.Howeverover thenext coupleof centuriesa seriesofmajor calamities spun the

EuropeanHighMiddleAge culture into an inevitable decline. TheGreat Famine (1315-

1317)isoneofthesecalamitiesasitendedthelivesofmillionsofEuropeans.TheBlack

Death (1348-1350) also qualifies as it ravaged and robbed Europe of 40-60% of its

population (Hays, 2005, p. 43). Furthermore the fall of Constantinople to theOttoman

Empirein1453wasaconsiderabledisasterforChristendomandcanbeseenasthefinal

blowtotheHighMiddleAges.

The Early Modern Era is a historical term that describes the period starting from

approximatelytheyear1500CEandendswiththebeginningoftheEnlightenmentin18th

century. The era covers a number of culturalmovements such as theRenaissance, the

AgeofDiscoveryandtheReformation,whichallgeneratedanatmosphereofchangeand

departurefromthescholasticorientatedMiddleAges.DuringthebeginningoftheEarly

22By‘scientia’ismeantthatonecometoknowsometruthP,wherePislogicallydeducedfrompremises,whichareuniversalandthereforenecessary.Anotherwayofexplainingthisisbyputtingforththefollowingsyllogism:Ifpremise1reads:allmenaremortalandpremise2reads:SocratesisamantheconclusionhastobeSocratesismortal.Theconclusionisscientificknowledgeastheconclusionislogicallydemonstrative.

34

ModernEraNeo-Platonism23presenteda strong intellectual currentand influenced the

philosopherNicholasofCusa.Nicholas’maininspirationwasPlotinusandinhisDeDocta

Ignorantia (On learned ignorance) he stated that since the infinite God stands in

contradictiontoallthatisfinite,wehumanbeings,understoodasfinitebeings,canhave

no knowledgeofGod (Cusa, 2001, p. 46). To a degree this also extends to thenatural

world, which for Nicolas was scarcely knowable due to its close connection with God

(Quinn, 2002, p. 168). When it comes to wonderment the new idea is that wonder

ultimatelypromptsus toembraceour ignoranceandafter thatsimply rest in faith.We

cannotknowGodandsowearelefttowonder(Quinn,2002,p.168).

Oftenportrayedas the first humanistGiovanni PicodellaMirandola inhis 1485

orationTheDignityofMangaveutterancetothenotionthatmanisthemostwonderful

ofearthlybeings(Mirandola,1956,p.3).Thismayatfirstglanceseemunexcitingandtoa

certainextentthisisthewholepoint.QuinnsuggeststhatthewayPicoisusingtheword

‘wonderful’ is synonymous with ‘estimable’ or ‘exalted’ and that the oration marks a

crucial turning point in the history ofwonder. The reason for this is that herewe find

literaryevidence foranearlyhyperbolizationofwonder (Quinn,2002,p.170).Another

reason why Pico is important to a study of wonder is because of the radical idea he

proposesregardinghumannatureandthehumancondition.Picoreveals in theoration

thatmanisgreatbecausehehasinfactnonatureandcanbeanythinghechoosestobe.

Humanbeingslackconditioning,asphilosophersElisabethandPaulRichardBlumexpress

intheirpaper‘WonderandWonderingintheRenaissance’(Blum&Blum,2011,p.6).In

thislighthumanbeingshaveinfinitepotentialandhavethefreedomtoononehandact

at the levelofbeastsandon theotherelevate themselves tobecomesomethingmore

(Quinn, 2002, p. 171). Regardless it is important to realise that no matter what one

choosestobeonefactremainsandthat is thatone ishuman.Thethingthatmakesus

human has nothing to do with what kind of life we chose to live or what actions we

perform.Itrestssolelywiththepeculiarandmostwonderfulfactthathumanbeingshave

thecapabilityforrationalthought(Quinn,2002,p.171).24

TheEarlyModernEraalso laidthefoundationforwhatwastobeknownasthe

new philosophy or science dedicated to the study of nature removed from all things

23Neo-PlatonismreferstothethoughtsofPlatoseenthroughtheeyeofhisdisciples.OnesuchdiscipleisPlotinus(ca.204/5–270CE).24IntheNicomacheanEthicsAristotlepointsoutthathumanbeingsharbourarationalcomponent(Aristotle,1941,I,xiii,15).

35

spiritual. One of the pioneers was the empirically minded Francis Bacon and to the

studentofwonderhesignalsthenextstepinthehistoryofwonder.AccordingtoBacon’s

TheAdvancementof Learning from1605CE thenewphilosophydoesnot ‘presumeby

the contemplation of nature to attain to the mysteries of God’ (Bacon, 1971, I). The

examination of nature does indeed produce knowledge but ‘having regard to God no

perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge’ (Bacon, 1971, I). Bacon

offersnoelaborationsonwhathemeansbywonderasbrokenknowledgebutmightrefer

totheideathatstudyingnatureprovidesnoknowledgeaboutthenatureofGodandthat

thestudentwillremainignorantinthatdepartmentregardlessofwhathemightdiscover

inrelationtonature.ToBaconwonder is the ‘seedofknowledge’ (Bacon,1971,p.17);

however when one uses the contemplation of nature as a lever to obtain knowledge

aboutGod,wondernolongeranswerstothatdescriptionandcomestoafullstop.From

thismoment on gaining knowledge becomes impossible andwe are once again left to

wonder(Quinn,2002,p.197).

Wonder as apassion is also important to anotherprominent figureof theEarly

Modern Age: Rene Descartes. Descartes was a reformer and his work Discourse on

Method (Descartes, 2008) aimed at arriving at clear and distinct ideas without for

example appealing to authority, which was widely practised in scholasticism. In his

treatise on the rainbow that accompanied the Discourse on Method Descartes’

explanationof theenigmasof the rainbowcompletelyputanend to the supremacyof

theAristotelianaccount,whichistobefoundinAristotle’sMeteorology(Aristotle,1951,

III, 4-5). Descartes’ work was so successful that today it remains a major source of

knowledgewith regards toexplaining the featuresof the rainbow (Fisher,2003,p.42).

Although scientificwork on the rainbow is interesting as it offers an alternative to the

myth of Iris it is nevertheless Descartes’ work The Passions of the Soul that is most

appealingtothestudentofwonder.Fromherewelearnthat:

Whenthefirstencounterwithsomeobjectsurprisesus,andwejudgeittobenew

orverydifferentfromwhatweformerlyknew,orfromwhatwesupposedthatit

ought tobe, that causesus towonder andbe surprised; andbecause thatmay

happenbeforeweinanywayknowwhetherthisobjectisagreeabletousorisnot

so,itappearstomethatwonderisthefirstofallthepassions.

(Descartes,1986,LIII)

36

It isclear that toDescarteswonder is the firstofall thepassions.25This restsuponthe

notion that when we find ourselves in a state of wonder as a result of encountering

somethingnewwearenotinapositiontojudgewhether‘thenew’isbeneficialtous.We

donotknowwhethertheobjectofwonderwillaidusorcauseusharm.Weareoblivious

towhethertheobjectistobeloved,hated,desiredorshunned,aseachoftheresponses

woulddependonknowingwhetheritisusefulorharmful,goodforusorbadforus.For

Descartes wonderment is situated between deficiency and excess. Never to wonder

equalsstupidityas it spellsoutamindthatneverobservesor takesnoticeofanything.

Wonderintheexcessisthereverseofstupidityandencompassesbeingastonished26by

literallyeverythingoneexperiences. InCartesianopticsnotbeingable tomarvelat the

auroraborealisthefirsttimeoneencounters it is justasbadaswhenone isconstantly

astonishedbycheapparlourtricks.Cartesianwondermentacknowledgesignorancewhen

something new is encountered but prompts investigation of the object of wonder.

Furthermoreoncean investigationhas identifiedtheobjectofwonderorwoven it into

the fabricof the familiar,perhapsasavariationofaparticularphenomenonorobject,

wonderment comes to an end (Fisher, 2003, p. 48). In this light it can be said that

Cartesianwondermentiseffectivelydismissedbyscience.

Descartesalsoinformsusthatwonderfadesaswebecomemoreaccustomedto

theexperienceofwonder.Hewrites:

Andalthoughthispassionseemstodiminishwithuse,becausethemorewemeet

withrarethingswhichwewonderat,themoreweaccustomourselvestoceaseto

wonder at them, and to think that all those which may afterwards present

themselves are common, still, when it is excessive, and causes us to arrest our

attention solely on the first image of the objectswhich are presented,without

acquiring any other knowledge of them, it leaves behind it a custom which

disposes the soul in the same way to pause over all the other objects which

presentthemselves,providedthattheyappeartoittobeeversolittlenew.And

25AccordingtoDescartesthereareatotalofsixprimitivepassionsandtheyarewonder,love,hatred,

desire,joyandsadness.HoweverthisdoesnotmeanthatthesearetheonlypassionsandinThePassionsof

theSoulDescartesmentionsamultitudeofotherpassionssuchashope,fear,jealousy,remorse,gratitude,angeranddisgusttonameafew.Theseotherpassionsareallcomposedofsomeofthesixprimitive

passions(Descartes,1986,LXIX).26DescartesusestheFrenchworkl`étonnementwhichhasconnotationstobeingthunderstruck.

37

thisiswhatcausesthecontinuanceofthemaladyofthosewhosufferfromblind

curiosity–thatis,whoseekoutthingsthatareraresolelytowonderatthem,and

not for the purpose of really knowing them: for little by little they become so

given over to wonder, that things of no importance are no less capable of

arrestingtheirattentionthanthosewhoseinvestigationsismoreuseful.

(Descartes,1986,LXXVIII)

Fromthispassagewelearnthatnotonlymusttheobjectofwonderbenewtousbutalso

thewholeexperienceofwondermustbenewinorderforustoexperiencewonder.The

consequencesofsuchanoutlookaredevastatingtowonderbecauseoncewefamiliarize

ourselveswith the experience ofwonder our ability to entertain a sense ofwonder is

declining.Saidinanotherwaythemoreexperiencesofwonderwesamplethelesslikely

wearetoexperiencewonderagain.Cartesianwonderisboundtobecomealessfrequent

experienceaswegrowoldersimplybecausetheexperienceofwonderbecomesacliché.

TheworkofDescartescontributedtotheendoftheEarlyModerneraandthebeginning

of what is known as the Age of Reason, The Age of Enlightenment or merely the

Enlightenment. The Enlightenmentwas a period that began roughly from themid 17th

century and lasted throughout the 18th century. It was a period characterised by the

applicationofreasonandempiricalscienceintheinterestofadvancingknowledge.Itwas

an intellectual revolution and as with all revolutions there were casualties. For the

student of wonder the scientific revolution further diminished the importance of

wonderment as wonders became quantifiable through the empirical lens. The singular

quality of for example Theaetetus’ wonderment became marginalised or of minor

importancetocontemporaryintelligentsia.

Oneoftheinterestingintellectualswhoengagedwithwonderdirectlyduringthis

period isAdamSmith.At theoutsetofhisHistoryofAstronomy he cautiouslymakesa

distinctionbetweenwonder,surpriseandadmiration.Smithwrites:

What is new and singular, excites that sentiment which in strict propriety is

called wonder; what is unexpected, Surprise; and what is great or beautiful

Admiration.

(A.Smith,1980a,p.33)

38

FromSmith’sdistinctionwelearnthatwonderarisesfromthenewandnovelbutthatitis

distinct fromwhat isunexpectedwhichbrings surpriseand from thegreatorbeautiful

which calls for our admiration. Quinn notes that Smith’s distinctions became popular

during the Enlightenment but that the identification of wonder with novelty would

eventuallydenigratewonderandadmirationwouldgraduallyloseitsmomentumdueto

itbeingseparatedfromwonder(Quinn,2002,p.240).WhatSmithmeansbysentimentis

unclear but given that he does not elaborate it can be argued that he uses the word

‘sentiment’assynonymouswith‘passion’.Theideathatwonderisapassioncomesunder

attackwhenwelooktotheworkofGermanphilosopherImmanuelKant.InhisCritiqueof

Judgement he reveals that Vervunderung, which translates into ‘astonishment’ or

‘wonder’ is ‘the affection produced by the representation of novelty exceeding our

expectations’ (Kant, 1987, p. 133). For Kant wonder is not a passion but an affection

contrastingBewunderung,whichtranslatesinto‘admiration’or‘esteem’.Thisdistinction

is important because according to Kant we do not put an end to our ‘admiration’ or

‘esteem’ of someone or something just because the novelty has worn off. To Kant

admiration or esteem is more enduring than wonder and the reason for this is that

admirationoresteemisfreefromanycontaminatingfeelings(Quinn,2002,p.243).

I shall now draw attention to the Enlightenment poet Alexander Pope. Pope is

interestingbecauseofhisdedicationtoscientificthoughtandneoclassicism,whichforced

asturdydiscontentwithwonder.InEssaysoncriticismhestates:‘ForFoolsadmire,but

menofsenseapprove’(Pope,1885a,391,p.59)andinthesixthepistleofthefirstbook

ofHoracehegoestoevengreaterlengthstoexpresshisaversion.Herehewrites:‘Notto

admire is all the art I know, Tomakemenhappy, and to keep them so’ (Pope, 1885b,

EpistleVI, ToMrMurray, 1-2, p. 300). The expression ‘not to admire’ is not coinedby

Popehimselfbutoriginatesintheexpression‘NilAdmirari’usedintheEpistleswrittenby

the Roman poet Horace. In here Horace links the notion of Nil Admirari to human

happiness by writing: ‘Marvel at nothing – that is perhaps the one and only thing,

Numicus,thatcanmakeamanhappyandkeephimso’(Horace,1955,EpistleVI).Itcan

be argued that Cicero also embraced this viewpoint. Written around 45 BCE Cicero’s

TusculanDisputationsofferscontemplationsonwhatpossiblewisdomcanfacilitatethe

alleviationofdistress;Ciceroarrivesatthefollowingnotiononwhatwisdomis:

39

The thorough study and comprehension of human vicissitudes, in being

astonishedatnothingwhenithappens,andthinking,beforetheeventiscome

thatthereisnothingwhichmaynotcometopass.

(Cicero,2001,III,30)

According to Cicero one must in order to be wise and to prevent stressful situations

anticipateeverypossibleoutcomeofagivensituationandnotbeastonishedbyanything

thatmightactuallyhappen.27

ItcanbearguedthatHorace,CiceroandPoperefertodifferentstatesofminddue

totheirrespectiveuseof‘admiration’,‘marvel’and‘astonishment’.Howeveritispossible

thatPope’s‘nottoadmire’,Horace’s‘marvelatnothing’andCicero’s‘beingastonishedat

nothing’allaresynonymouswith thenotion ‘wonderatnothing’.Thereason for this is

thatPopeusesthesameLatinphraseasHoraceandwhenweconsiderPope’ssupportof

scienceandbeliefthatwonderisforfoolsitappearslikelythat‘NilAdmirari’mayreferto

wonder at nothing. Upon considering why Horace should have less regard for

wonderment one possible reason is that Horace finished his formal education at the

AcademyinAthens.AtthetimeStoicandEpicureanphilosophydominatedtheAcademy

and it is likely thatHorace’s aversion towonder springs fromadeep involvementwith

thoseparticularphilosophies(Kierman,1999,p.25).Onadifferentnoteonecouldpoint

out thatCicerodoesnotusetheLatinphrase ‘NilAdmirari’but ‘NihilAdmirari’ (Cicero,

2001, III, 30) and therefore he is referring to something entirely different fromHorace

andPope.Howeversince‘nil’and‘nihil’referto‘nothing’inLatinitwouldseemfutileto

counterargueonthisbasis.

Despitenegativeexponentsofwonder likePopeand the fact thatwonderby theearly

18th century was connected with the vulgar i.e. ‘the barbarous, the ignorant and the

unruly’ people who celebrated ‘enthusiasm, superstition, and imagination’ (Daston &

Park,1998,p.343)wonderwassoontoenjoyarenaissance.Asthe18thcenturymatured

acountermovementtotheEnlightenmentknownasRomanticismarosequestioningthe

AgeofReasonand its disregard for thepassions. Romanticismalso referred to as ‘The

27Thisparticularattitudehassurvivedtothisdayandisdepictedinthe2008HBOTVseriesGenerationKillwhichfocusesonaRollingStonereporterwhotogetherwiththeUS1stReconMarinesexperiencetheAmerican-ledassaultonBaghdadin2003.Inepisode4entitled‘CombatJack’Lt.Fickutters:‘Observeeverything,admirenothing.’Thephraseisusedtokeepthemarinesalertandresistanttowonderment.Theideaisthatwondermentmakesyoulessalerttopotentialhostiles.IamgratefultomybrotherKimPedersenforpointingthisout.

40

RomanticEra’tookplaceapproximatelybetween1760and1850(Murray,2004,p.ix).It

isamovementthatisnotoriouslyhardtoframeanddefinebutitiscommonlyaccepted

thatthemovementwaslargelyartisticandfounditsexpressionineverythingfrommusic,

poetry and dance to literature and paintings (Murray, 2004, p. ix). The Romantics

attackedtheverybackboneoftheEnlightenmentwhichaccordingtophilosopherIsaiah

Berlin comprises of the following three propositions: 1) all genuine questions can be

answered,2)Theanswersareknowableand3)theanswersmustbecompatiblewithone

another (Berlin, 2001, 21-22). The general notion of the Enlightenmentwas thatwhat

Newtonachievedintheareaofphysicscouldlikewisebeappliedtotheethical,political

andaesthetic domains. (Berlin, 2001, p. 22).Questions likewhatone shoulddo in life,

how the perfect society was to be structured and what counts as beautiful were in

principleanswerablebyapplyingreason.Howeverthisstrictrationalisationofhumanlife

thatleavesnoroomforpassionsandwondermentwastotheRomanticsquestionableif

not downright awful. One Romantic poem that testifies to this effect is John Keats’s

Lamia.Herehewrites:

Donotallcharmsfly

Atthemeretouchofcoldphilosophy?

Therewasanawfulrainbowonceintheheaven:

Weknowherwoof,hertexture:sheisgiven

Inthedullcatalogueofcommonthings.

PhilosophywillclipanAngel’swings,

Conquerallmysteriesbyruleandline,

Emptythehauntedair,andgnomedmine—

Unweavearainbow,asiterewhilemade

Thetender-personedLamiameltintoashade(Keats,1988,II,229-238)

Keats’ antagonistic attitude towards natural philosophy understood as science and in

particular the work of Newton is clear from reading the poem. Newton’s success in

replicatingtherainbowinhisstudiesofprismswastoKeatsdevastatingtothepoetryof

41

therainbow28(Quinn,2002,p.270).Theprismwastheinstrument‘withwhichthefirst

borndaughterofWonderwouldbekilled’(Onians,1994,p.32).

AnotherRomanticthatquestionsthespiritoftheEnlightenmentand itssupport

ofthe‘NilAdmirari’attitudeisthepoetLordByron.InthesatiricalpoemDonJuanByron

proclaimsthathe‘nevercouldseetheveryGreatHappinessoftheNilAdmirari’(Byron,

1833,CantoV,C.).ImmediatelyafterwefindnotonlyagreetingtoHoraceandPope(the

firstfourlines)butalsoapowerfulcounterargumentthatchallengesthereasonableness

ofthe‘NilAdmirari’attitude.Itreads:

NottoadmireisalltheartIknow

(Plaintruth,dearMurray,needsfewflowersofspeech)

Tomakemenhappy,ortokeepthemso;

(SotakeitintheverywordsofCreech).

ThusHoracewroteweallknowlongago;

AndthisPopequotestheprecepttore-teach

Fromhistranslation;buthadnoneadmired,

WouldPopehavesung,orHoracebeeninspired?

(Byron,1833,CantoV,CI)

Byron’spointisthatifwecannotwonderwecannotbeinspired.IfPopeneverwondered

atthepoetryofHoracehisHorace-inspiredpoetrywouldneverhavetakenform.Inother

wordsByron claims thatpoetry cannot relyon the cold lightof reasonalonebutmust

begininwonder.

ItcanbearguedthatByron’sdislikeofthe‘NilAdmirari’attitudecapturesan

importantaspectoftheZeitgeistoftheRomanticEra.Howeverithastobesaidthatnot

allRomanticsdislikedthescienceoftheEnlightenment.ThepoetPercyShelley29for

28RichardDawkins’bookUnweawingtheRainbow(Dawkins,2006)hasborrowedthetitlefromKeatsandisabookthataimstoshowthatscientistscanretainasenseofwonderdespitetheirmethodsanddiscoveries.29MaryShelleyisthewifeofPercyShelleyandherattitudetosciencewasverydifferentfromherhusband’s.InherfamousnovelFrankensteinsheexpressesheraversiontothearroganceofscienceandpointsoutpossibledangerswiththeenterprisebycreatingFrankenstein’smonster–aman-madecreature

42

exampleembracedsciencequitepassionatelyandinthepoemQueenMabheenvisions

thatanearthlyutopiawillfollowtheadvancementofscience(Quinn,2002,p.269).The

poetWordsworthequallyembracedsciencebutalertedhisreaderstoitsdangers,oneof

thembeingcoldnessanddetachment.InAPoet’sEpitaphhewrites:

Physicianartthou?—one,alleyes,

Philosopher!—afingeringslave.

Onethatwouldpeepandbotanize

Uponhismother’sgrave?

(Wordsworth,1896,p.20)

The Romantic Era as a whole can be seen as a countermovement to Enlightenment

thought. Thedetachmentof the scientist andherdisregardof thepassionswas to the

Romantics a fundamentalmistake. The ultimate outcomeof the romantic revoltwas a

sharpdivisionbetweenscienceandpoetry.Sciencewouldinthenameofreasoncontinue

itsexplorationof thematerialuniverseandpoetrywould claim ruler-shipof theheart,

beauty, imagination, spiritandwonder (Quinn,2002,p.272). It canbeargued that the

tension between the divided was never harmonised and as Romanticism entered its

autumn years a deep chasm had opened between the two poles. Nevertheless as the

century progressed Romanticism as a countermovement lost its momentum and its

influencefadedinthefaceoftheadvancementofscience.

Throughoutthelate19thcenturyresurgencesofRomanticwondercanbefoundnowand

then.Howeverthesuccessfulapplicationofsciencehadatthistimebecomesoextensive

thatitsvaluewashardtoquestion.Furthermorescientificthinkingwascolonisingother

areasoflearning.JeremyBentham’s‘principleofutility’or‘GreatestHappinessPrinciple’

emphasisingthathappinessofthegreatestnumberisthemeasureofrightandwrongisa

goodexample(Bentham,1988,p.vii).TheworkofCharlesDarwinisanotherexampleof

thecolonisingpowerofscientificthought.InTheExpressionoftheEmotionsinManand

Animalsfrom1872Darwinexploresthefunctionalityofemotionalstatesandtheirlinkto

bereftofbodilybeautyanddestinedtobecomeoneoftheloneliestcreatureseverimaginedinEnglishliterature.

43

expressions(Darwin,1999).Howeverasmentionedthe late19thcenturyalsowitnessed

occasional upheavals of Romanticwonder.WilliamHamilton’s lectures onMetaphysics

andLogicpublishedposthumously in1859-60canbeconsideredonesuchupheaval. In

his lecturesHamiltondrawsattentiontopassagesinAristotle’sMetaphysicsbook1.2,9

andinGermanphilosopherFriedrichHeinrichJakobi’sWerkeVol.II.Hamiltonstartswith

Aristotle:

Wonder, says Aristotle is the first cause of philosophy: but in the discovery

that all existence is mechanism, the consummation of science would be an

extinctionoftheveryinterestfromwhichitoriginallysprang.

(Hamilton,1859,p.26-27)

HethencontinueswithaquotationfromJakobi:

Eventhegorgeousmajestyoftheheavens,theobjectofakneelingadorationto

an infantworld, subdues nomore themind of himwho comprehends the one

mechanical lawwhich the planetary systemsmove,maintain theirmotion, and

evenoriginallyformthemselves.Henolongerwondersattheobject,infiniteasit

always is, but at the human intellect alone which in a Copernicus, Kepler,

Gassendi, Newton and Laplace,was able to transcend the object, by science to

terminatethemiracle,toreavetheheavensfromitsdivinities,andtoexorcisethe

universe.Buteventhis,theonlyadmirationofwhichourintelligentfacultiesare

nowcapable,wouldvanish,werea futureHartley,Darwin,Condillac,orBoneut,

to succeed in displaying to us a mechanical system of the human mind as

comprehensive, intelligibleand satisfactoryas theNewtonianmechanismof the

heavens.

(Hamilton,1859,p.26-27)

HamiltonisclearlyanexponentforRomanticwonderinthesensethatheexpresseshis

discontentwithwhatheseesaswonder-lessscientificenquiry.Philosopher JohnStuart

Mill later challenges Hamilton’s viewpoint and argues that Hamilton ismistaken in his

viewthatscienceishostiletowonder.Millwrites:

I do wonder at the barrenness of imagination of a man who can see nothing

wonderful in the material universe, since Newton, in an evil hour, partially

44

unravelledalimitedportionofit.Ifignoranceiswithhimanecessaryconditionof

wonder, can he find nothing towonder at in theorigin of the systemofwhich

Newton discovered the laws? nothing in the probable former extension of the

solar substance beyond the orbit of Neptune? nothing in the starry heavens,

which,withafullknowledgeofwhatNewtontaught,Kant,inthefamouspassage

which Sir W. Hamilton is so fond of quoting (and quotes in this very lecture),

placedonthesamelevelofsublimitywiththemorallaw?Ifignoranceisthecause

ofwonder, it isdownright impossible that scientificexplanationcanever take it

away,sinceallwhichexplanationdoes,inthefinalresort,istoreferusbacktoa

priorinexplicable.WerethecatastrophetoarrivewhichistoexpelWonderfrom

the universe—were it conclusively shown that the mental operations are

dependentuponorganicagency—wouldwonderbeatanendbecausethefact,at

whichweshouldthenhavetowonder,wouldbethatanarrangementofmaterial

particles could produce thought and feeling? Jacobi and SirW. Hamiltonmight

haveput theirmindsatease. It isnotunderstanding thatdestroyswonder, it is

familiarity.

(Mill,1865,p.544-545)

The 19th century also saw a new batch of wonder advocates emerge, namely the

American transcendentalistswhoaccording toEnglish literaryscholarTonyTannerheld

central the idea that by beholding the world with the wonder of a child one would

recoverandretainasenseof itsactualglory(Tanner,1965,p.22).Tannerexplainsthat

wonder despite its fading status in Europe lived on in the American literature and in

particular in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and Walt

Whitman. Their transcendentalistwritingswere grounded in a particular need, namely

theneedtorecogniseandcontainanewcountryandthe‘wonderingvisionwasadopted

asaprimemethodofinclusionandassimilation’(Tanner,1965,p.10).

AdditionallyliteraryscholarFredNadispointsoutthatduringthe1830sand1840s

AmericawitnessedtheemergenceoftheAmericanWonderShows,whichthrivedonthe

experience of wonder. Boosted by a robust market economy, a wealth of printed

materials on science together with a strong public interest in science as well as

pseudoscience and religion (Nadis, 2005, p. 10), wonder showmen ‘worked at the

boundary of science and magic, relying on wonder to help their audiences suspend

45

disbelief’(Nadis,2005,p.14).FurthermoreNadiswritesthattostrengthentheimpactof

theirshowsthewondershowmencontinually:

Castscientificandtechnologicalbreakthroughsinmagicaltermsandremnantsof

amagicalworldviewinscientificterms.Especiallyusefulfromashowman’spoint

of view were electricity and other new invisible energy forms scientists were

uncoveringthatmightberegardedaspartofthesamespectrumastheinvisible

powersoftheancientworld.

(Nadis,2005,p.14)

Of notablewonder showmenCharles C. Camewho touredNewYork in the 1840s and

1850sofferingpatentmedicines,scientificlecturesandelectricalhealingdemonstrations

is worth mentioning (Nadis, 2005, p. 29). Another is Harry Houdini who in the 1880s

beforehemadehisnameasanescapeartistandanti-spiritualistconductedfakeséances

togetherwithhiswifeintheMidwestwhichincluded‘wonders’suchas‘floatingtables,

self-playingaccordionsandtheappearancesofspiritfaces’(Nadis,2005,p.122).

In1895GermanphysicistWilliamConradRöntgendiscoveredtheX-ray,whichas

mentioned earlier was later put to use in a wonder-filled existential way in Thomas

Mann’sTheMagicMountain.TheX-raysoonfound itsway intothewondershowsand

displaysoftheX-raybecamepopularateventssuchasthe1896NationalElectricExhibit

inNewYorkwhereinventorThomasEdisononsomeeveningsexplainedthemysteriesof

thenewfoundraytotheaudience(Nadis,2005,p.14).

Asthe19thcenturycomestoanend itbecomesapparentthatwonder isonthe

wanewhenitcomestoevokingthemysteriousandtherealmofscienceistheonlyplace

where ‘real wonder’ emerges.Writer, journalist and educator ArthurMee emphasises

this in his popular 1908 publicationChildren’s Encyclopedia as it includes a section on

wonders in nature as explained by science (Quinn, 2002, p. 275).30 In America realism

caughtupwiththewondershowmenand‘wonder-busting’magicianslikethenowolder

Houdinitookcentrestage(Nadis,2005,p.135-136).Nadisexplains:

Themagicianswerenotpreciselyeducatingtheiraudiences,but“wising”themup

totheartofdeception.Fromthemagicians’pointofview,thepassionforwonder

hadbecomeanappetitethatcouldneverleadtoilluminationbutwhichmight,if

30TheencyclopaediainspiredthepublishingcompanyWardLock&Coin1911tostartpublishingtheWonderBookseries.Thetargetgroupwaschildrenandfilledwithqualityphotographsthebooksdepictedasenseofwonderthatwasentirelyorientatedtowardsscienceandtechnology.

46

properlyarranged,providelightentertainment.Wonderwasnolongerlocatedin

“objects of wonder” but in the magicians’ skills and craft. Recognising the

disenchantmentoftheworld,thestagemagicianswereofferingavariantonthe

wondershow:onebasedinnaturalprogressthatexaltedingenuityandpotential.

(Nadis,2005,p.137)

Despitethedisenchantmentandthepublic‘turn’torealismRomanticismwasneverfully

thwartedbyscienceandaswecontinueintothe20thand21stcenturyonecanstill find

remnants of Romantic wonder in what Quinn calls ‘modernist phenomena’ involving

Occultisms,Gnosticism, Surrealism, Symbolism and Fantasy. (Quinn, 2002, p. 293). It is

notmybusinesstodepictthesemovementsindetailhereanditwillsufficetosaythatas

movementsorphenomenatheyallpromoteRomanticwonder.Thereasonforthisisthat

theyaskustoturnawayfromtheouterworldandfocusoninnerpersonalexperiences

(Quinn,2002,p.294).AsaconsequencewonderbecomesasQuinnwrites: ‘A resultof

direct innerexperienceofsomeultimate trans-orsur-realityattainablebynon-rational

means–Gnostic, revelation,magic,orart’ (Quinn,2002,p.294). It canbeargued that

herewonderfindsafunctionthatisnoteasilychallengedbyscience;howeveritisalsoa

function that academically speaking comes at a high price, as wonder conceptually

becomesincreasinglymysticalandsolipsistic.Somemightseethisasitsprimestrength;

however to immunise wonderment from scrutiny does not academically speaking

promoteunderstandingandmerelypromptssuspicionandscepticism.

We are now at the end of the historical exploration of wonder, but beforewe

continueletusbrieflysummariseit.Byprobingthehistoryofwonderparticularturning

points have come to light.We began by addressing the Greek myths as described by

Hesiodand learned thatwonder is connected to Iris, the rainbow,whodelivers tidings

fromthegods.FromPlatoitbecameclearthatwonderisthefeelingandstartingpoint(a

point shared by Aristotle) of philosophy and is bound togetherwith an acute sense of

ignorance,whichaltogethercanbequiteunpleasant.IntheMediaevalperiodAugustine

informsusthat it isquitepossibletomarvelat forexamplethemountainsandthesea

butthatintrospectionwillrevealthattheignoranceweharbouraboutourselvesismost

worthy ofwonderment. Furthermorewe also pick up fromAugustine that the created

universe is a source of wonder as it surpasses the wonder of the things it contains

indicating that the creator is the greatest wonder of all. Thomas Aquinas fused

Aristotelian thinkingwithChristianityand thought thatwonderwas thedesire toknow

47

God.MovingontothinkersfromtheEarlyModernPeriodNicolasofCusabelievedthat

wonderultimatelypromptsustoembraceourignoranceandrestinfaith,aswecannot

know God. The first humanist Pico della Mirandola offers us a chance to marvel at

ourselvesasfreerationalbeingswithoutanature.ToFrancisBacon,exponentofthenew

philosophy,wonder isbrokenknowledge.Thismeansthatwhenitcomestoknowledge

aboutGod the studyofnatureprovidesno clueandwe therefore remain in a stateof

wondermentaboutGod.ForDescarteswonderwasthefirstofallthepassionssituated

between deficiency and excess and so making it a passion worthy of the enquiring

scientificmind.Furthermorewelearnthatwonderfadesasourexperienceofitgrowsin

numbers. Moving on to the Enlightenment Adam Smith brings to our attention that

wonderisdistinctfromsurpriseandadmirationandarisesfromanencounterwithwhat

isnewandsingular.Kantdescribedwondernotasapassionbutaffectionproducedby

the representation of novelty exceeding our expectations and that this affection is

altogetherdifferentfromadmirationoresteem.Whetheritiscorrecttothinkofwonder

as something completelydifferent fromapassioncanof coursebedebatedand I shall

return to this in a later chapterwhen I addresswonder as anemotion. Fornow itwill

sufficetosaythatthesupremacyofreasonandmechanicalthinkingoverpassionproved

demeaningforwonderinthetimeaftertheEnlightenment.Howevertheviewofwonder

expressed by Enlightenment scholars was not unchallenged.With its emphasis on the

passions theRomanticsofferedan influential countermovementandByronpointedout

thatnottowonderwasproblematicbecausewithoutwonderinspirationwouldnotarise.

HoweverassciencecontinueditsadvancementRomanticism,whichwasalargelyartistic

movement, retreated.Throughout thenineteenthcenturywondercontinued todecline

despite sporadic upheavals of the Romantic kind. According to Quinn these upheavals

connect with Occultism, Gnosticism, Surrealism, Symbolism and Fantasy and present

wonderasaninnerpersonalexperiencefarremovedfromtheoutsideworldthatscience

hadclaimedasitsfocus.Theemphasisonpersonalexperiencepersiststothisday.

1.3ProvisionalTaxonomyofAlteredStates

InthissectionIshallexplorewhatmaybecalledaprovisionaltaxonomyofalteredstates.

Theaimistohighlightsomeofthefeaturesthatmakewonderdistinctfromaselectionof

relatedorsimilarexperiencesthatonemayreasonablymistakeforbeingwonder.Overall

Ishallexploresevensuchalteredstates:awe,horror,thesublime,curiosity,amazement,

48

admiration and astonishment but because of its particular importance to European

philosophyandtechnicalqualitythesublimewillreceiveextraattention.

Whatisawe?Whatdoesitmeantobeawestruckortostandinaweofsomething?Inhis

TheIdeaoftheHolytheologianRudolfOttoinvestigatestheexperiencethatunderliesall

religion, which he labelled ‘the numinous’. The numinous can be understood as the

‘whollyother’or‘thatwhichisquitebeyondthesphereoftheusual,theintelligible,and

thefamiliar,whichthereforefallsquiteoutsidethelimitsofthe‘canny’,andiscontrasted

with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment’ (Otto, 2010, p 26).

AccordingtoOttotheEnglishphraseorwordthat(toadegree)encapsulatestheaboveis

‘religious dread’ or simply ‘awe’ (Otto, 2010, p. 14). This particular take on awe is

somewhat echoed in Hepburn’s work, who suggests that awe is ‘dread mingled with

veneration, reverentialwonder’ (Hepburn, 1996, p. 201). To add further texture to the

notionofawepsychologistRobertA.Emmonsinformsthataweisanexperiencethatmay

arisefromavarietyofobjectsandeventsofmajestic,vastandpowerfulqualityandcan

produceasenseofbeingoverwhelmed(RobertA.Emmons,2005,p.240).Inthisrespect

it could be ventured that as a sensation awe is seldom joyous unless the object in

question is of a benevolent nature. A sense of joyous awe could spring from the

experienceofbeingsavedfromabandofthugsbyaheroofsuperiorstrength,sizeand

agility.Watchingthesunre-emergefrombeingovershadowedbythemoonduringatotal

solareclipsemaylikewiseproduceaweinconjunctionwithjoy.Despitetheexistenceofa

possiblejoyoussenseofaweitcanbearguedthatthetraditionalcompanionsofaweare

fearandterror.ObservingnaturalobjectslikeRakeknivenPeakfoundatthenorthendof

Trollslottet Mountain, Queen Maud Land, Antarctica may easily inspire awe in

conjunctionwithfearandterror.Oneneedonlyimaginewhatitmustbeliketoattempt

toclimb its640malmostverticalwallamidst theunforgivingandextremelyhostile icy

landscape.LikewiseitcanbearguedthattheswiftAmerican-led2003militaryinvasionof

Iraqproducedaweescortedbyfearandterror.31

Awe is sometimesevoked inconnectionwith thedivine;however it canalsobe

foundinrelationtonature,politicsandartaspsychologistDasherKeltnerandJonathan

31The2003invasionofIraqseemedexecutedonthebasisofa‘shockandawestrategy’designednottofacilitateexterminationbutcrushallhopeofresistance.SeetheintroductionofHarlanK.UllmanandJamesP.Wade,Jr.,ShockandAwe:AchievingRapidDominance(Ullman&Wade,1996).

49

Haidt point out andmay facilitate personal change or transformation in the form of a

radical alteration of a person’s outlook, attitude, and system of value or way of life

(Keltner,2003,p.297).Onecanimaginethatbeingthesolesurvivorofaseriousaccident

likeaplaincrashornaturalcatastrophelikeatsunamimayproduceasenseofaweand

inspire for example a change in attitude in termsof howone lives. The same goes for

people who have survived a heart attack, cancer or some other serious ailment. Life

altering experiences based on awe are as indicated also represented in the field of

religion and a prime example of such is the awesome circumstances that led to the

conversionofthebiblicalcharacterSt.Paul(Keltner,2003,p.298). InitiallySt.Paulalso

known as Saul was a persecutor of the early Christians but one day on the road to

Damascussomethingremarkablehappened:

Suddenlythereshinedaroundhima lightfromheaven:Andhefell totheearth,

andheardavoicesayinguntohimSaul,Saul,whypersecutestthoume?Andhe

said.WhoartthouLord?AndtheLordsaid.IamJesuswhomthoupersecutest:it

ishardfortheetokickagainstthepricks.Andhetremblingandastonishedsaid,

Lord,whatwiltthouhavemedo?AndtheLordsaiduntohim,Arise,andgotothe

city, and it shall be told thee what thou must do. And the other men which

journeyedwithhimstoodspeechless,hearingavoicebutseeingnoman.AndSaul

arosefromtheearth:andwhenhiseyesopened,hesawnoman:buttheyledhim

bythehand,andbroughthimintoDamascus.

(Bible,1994,Acts9,3-8)

ItseemsapttodescribetheexperienceofSt.Paulasoneofawebecauseoftheterrifying

majestic display of power God delivers. First God produces a sudden heavenly flash,

which causes Paul to fall to the ground and blinds him. Hereafter God without any

introductionand ina voicewithouta clearpointoforigin starts to interrogateSt.Paul

askinghimwhyheprosecutes.Thisisfollowedbythecuriouscomment:‘Itishardforyou

tokickagainstthepricks’.Nowwhatthelattermeansisuncertainbutoneinterpretation

couldbe that it isequivalent to ‘it isuseless to fightagainstmywill’or ‘it isuseless to

fightagainst thepowerofGod’. Inanycase thisdisplayofawesomepowerhasahuge

effect on Paul who offers his compliance. Subsequently he was ordered to go to

Damascus to await further orders,which he doeswithout questioning. The experience

hasahugeimpactonSt.Paulwhoasthestorygoesundergoesaradicaltransformation

andbecomesadevotedandgod-fearingChristian.

50

Inwhatsensedoesawedifferfromwonderthen?Keepinginmindthatexceptions

may be found32 one of the major differences it would seem is the notion that while

wonderhasa tendency tobeaccompaniedby joyordelightawehasa tendency tobe

experiencedtogetherwithasenseoffearandterror.Paul’sexperienceisclearlyacaseof

thelatter,makinghisexperienceoneofawe.Onecouldseektocounterthisbypointing

outthatthenarrativedoesnotsayanythingaboutPaulbeingawestruckbutonlythathe

trembles and experiences astonishment. Furthermore one could venture that what is

meantby ‘astonished’ couldbe ‘surprise’oreven ‘suddenwonder’which if truewould

casts a different light on Paul’s experience. However since it is conceivable that

astonishment isbuta componentofboth theexperienceofwonderandawe it canbe

venturedthatlabellingPaul’sexperience,asoneofastonishmentisinsufficientandthat

theremustbemore tohisexperience than ‘astonishment’ cancover. In this light Iwill

holdthatthereisgoodindicationthatwhatisafootinthecaseofSt.Paulisawe.Thisis

mainlybecausehisexperienceinvolvessubmissiontoanoverwhelmingpowerandisone

totally devoid of delight and joy.God seeks to dominate and succeeds via a display of

power,will and terror in the formof taking away Paul’s ability to see. This leaves him

quite vulnerable and completely in the hands of his comrades and it enables us to

understandwhatphilosopherMarthaNussbaumhas inmindwhenshewrites: ‘Wonder

and awe are akin, but distinct: wonder is outward-moving, exuberant,whereas awe is

linkedwithbending,ormakingoneselfsmall.InwonderIwanttoleapandrun,inaweto

kneel’(Nussbaum,2008,p.54).

ThesecondstateofmindIamgoingtofocusonishorror.Horrorsometimesappearsin

the literature onwonder indicating that the two are related or similar in composition.

Verhoeven for example writes that ‘wonder can shade from slight, by being way of

surprise, astonishment and amazement right up to way of dismay and horror’

(Verhoeven, 1972, p. 27). Another example is Daston and Parkwho find that although

wonderhasitsownhistoryitisneverthelessahistorythatiscloselyboundtothehistory

ofhorror,whichisbasedprimarilyontheirstudyofmedievalmonsters(Park&Daston,

32PhilosopherJeromeMillerpointsoutthat‘wonderincludesawewithinit,andcanevenbeindistinguishablefromit‘(Miller,1992,189).Hefurthermorestatesthatwhatmaypreventadistinctionisif‘thebeingswhichawakenwonderareexperiencedas,andidentifiedwith,beingitself.Forifwemakethatidentification,wewillworshipwhatweloveasultimatelysacred–untilwebegintorealisethatitisliabletonothingness’(Miller,1992,p.189).InhislaterworkphilosopherSamKeenalsoemphasisesonthecloseconnectionbetweenwonderandawe.Inhisunderstandingweperceivethemysteryofexistenceas‘atonceawesome-terrifying-majestic-overpoweringandfascinating-wonderful-promising-desirable’(Keen,2010,p.87).

51

1981,p.15).RegardlessIthinkthereisaqualitativedifferencebetweentheexperienceof

wonder and horror and to substantiate this difference I shall lean on the work of

philosopherJeromeMillerwhopromotesthenotionthathorrorrepresentsthesourceof

ourmostradicalquestionsandtoentertainasenseofhorrorsignalsadeparturefromthe

familiarandordinary.Asanunderlyingpremisehorrorencompassestheassumptionthat

thepersonexperiencingitiscomfortablysituatedwithinauniverseofmeaning.However

the actual experience of horror springs from the possibility that this given universe of

meaning isunder threatofbeingdismantled (Miller,1992,p.130). In this sensehorror

comesasadirectresultoflosingthecentrearoundwhichagivenliferevolvesandwhich

makes itacoherentwhole (Miller,1992,p.126).Formostofus losingthecentre from

whichwegravitate isararity,howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatwearetotallybereftof

theexperienceofhorror.WemighthaveexperiencedwhatMiller calls ‘intimations’or

hints of horror, which can take the form of the most insignificant interruptions in a

person’s life (Miller, 1992,p. 125).Miller gives theexampleofhiswifebeing forty-five

minuteslateincominghomeonewintereveningandcontinues:

AsIstandmusingbythewindowwatchingthesnowwrapeverythinginaneerie

silence,Ifindmyselfsuddenlyvisitedbyaninexplicableinklingofhorror,ahintof

someunspeakablepossibility.Mywife’slateness,althoughitseemstobeonlyan

event in my world awakens in me an intimation of radical disruption of it. By

virtueofherprimacyinmylife,byvirtueofthefactthatsheisnotsimplyanother

personinitbutthecentreintermsofwhichitisstructuredandfocused,mywife’s

deathwouldbetheendofmyworld.

(Miller,1992,p.125)

Itiseasytoseewhythemerethoughtoflosingsomeonewhoisplacedatthecentreof

one’sworldcanproduceintimationsofhorror.Howeversuchintimationsneednotonly

springfromcloserelationswithfamilymembers.Onecanimagineintimationsofhorror

emerge from reading literature or embarking on a study that challenge the order of

thingsasonehascometoperceiveitorhasbeentaughttoperceiveitduringone’slife.

Inwhatsenseishorrorthendifferentfromwonder?Broadlyspeakingbothhorror

andwonderseemtobeathreattotheintegrityofone’suniverse.AccordingtoMillerwe

areinastateofwonderwhenconfrontedwiththelimitationofourknowledgebutatthe

same time we are filled with the urge to further our knowledge (Miller, 1992, 130).

52

Horrorisdifferentinthesensethatitisarepresentationofthestructureofourindividual

universeofmeaningunderthreat.Itisdifferentbecauseweareverymuchawareofwhat

structuresouruniverseofmeaning.Weknowwhatitlookslikeandsowhathorrifiesus

cannotbetrulyunknown.Ifitwerewhollyunknownhowcouldweevenbegintoseeitas

apossiblethreattothestructureofouruniverseofmeaning?Whilewondertendstolead

us froma conditionof ignorance towards knowledgehorror has a tendency to leadus

from the familiar world of the known towards an unknown. While wonder tempts a

persontoruntowardsitsobjecthorrormakesonerunaway.Itcanalsobearguedthat

while horror threatens to destroy our universe of meaning wonder seems bent on

expandingit.Toexemplifythisonecouldlooktotheworksof20thcenturyweirdfiction

writerH.P. Lovecraftwho isperhapsmost famous forhishorror/science fictionstories

but also wrote stories of wonder similar in style to those of Lord Dunsany33. Now

Lovecraft’sCelephais illustrates verywell howwondermakesus run towards its object

andhowinwonderouruniverseisexpanded.Lovecraftwrites:

Therearenotmanypersonswhoknowwhatwondersareopenedtotheminthe

storiesandvisionsof theiryouth; forwhenaschildrenwe listenanddream,we

thinkbut half-formed thoughts, andwhen asmenwe try to remember,we are

dulledandprosaicwiththepoisonoflife.Butsomeofusawakeinthenightwith

strangephantasmsof enchantedhills and gardens, of fountains that sing in the

sun,ofgoldencliffsoverhangingmurmuringseas,ofplainsthatstretchdownto

sleepingcitiesofbronzeandstone,andofshadowycompaniesofheroesthatride

caparisonedwhitehorsesalongtheedgesofthickforests;andthenweknowthat

wehavelookedbackthroughtheivorygatesintothatworldofwonderwhichwas

oursbeforewewerewiseandunhappy.

(Lovecraft,2011,p.149)

Quite different is the themeof Lovecraft’s horror storyDagon (Lovecraft, 2008)where

theprotagonistafterdriftingaimlesslyfordaysonasmall lifeboatsouthoftheequator

encountersahugepolyphemus-likecreaturethat‘shouldnotexist’onavastupheavalof

the ocean floor. The story ends with the protagonist committing suicide by throwing

himself fromawindowonto the streetbelowbecause thehorrorheuncovered simply33LordDunsanyalsoknownasEdwardMoretonDraxPlunkettwasthe18thBaronofDunsanyinIrelandandafantasy-writer.AmonghismanypublicationswefindTheBookofWonderandTalesofWonder(Dunsany,2004).

53

destroyed his world. In other words the memory of the creature he encountered

effectivelyputanendtohisuniverseofmeaningandsohedecidedtocommitsuicideto

escapeortopermanently‘runaway’fromthehorroroccupyinghismind.

The next altered state similar to wonder I am going to address is the sublime.34 The

sublimehas inmanywayssufferedthesamefateaswonderbecausewhat ismeantby

the sublime in everyday speech is quite distinct from the meaning attached to the

sublime within academia. According to Holmqvist and Pluciennik the sublime in its

ordinary usage frequently addresses what is noble and morally positive (Holmqvist &

Pluciennik,2002,p.718)butwithinacademia it remainsadisputedtechnical termthat

duetoitscomplicatedhistoryandrelationshipwiththeRomanoratoryofLonginus,18th

century philosophy and politics, Romantic art, psychoanalysis and the depiction of

postmoderntechnologyisdifficulttocapture(Woods,2011,p.25).Thusthesublimeisas

itwerea‘shape-shifter’buttogetsomefootholdonthesubjectandastartingpointlet

usconsideradefinitionofferedbyliteraryscholarPhilipShawthatgoesasfollows:

In broad terms, whenever experiences slip out of conventional understanding,

whenever thepowerof anobjectorevent is such thatwords fail andpointsof

comparisondisappear,thenweresorttothefeelingsofthesublime.Assuch,the

sublimemarksthelimitsofreasonandexpressiontogetherwithasenseofwhat

liebeyondtheselimits.

(Shaw,2006,p.2)

Fromthisvantagepointthesublimereferstowhatwefeelwhenwefaceforexamplethe

foggyvistasinRomanticpainterCasperDavidFriedrich’s1818paintingWandererabove

the Sea of Fog and the state of mind we experience when beholding images of the

collapsing Twin towers in New York following the 2001 terrorist attack. Likewise it

specifiesthefeelingweexperienceuponwitnessingthesceneinFrancisFordCoppola’s

1979filmApocalypseNowwhereAmericanhelicoptersobscuredbytherisingsunattack

aVietnamesevillagetothesoundofRichardWagner’sRideoftheValkyries.Additionally

the sublime coverswhatwe experiencewhenwe behold the ominous stream of code

34ItderivesfromtheLatinsublimis,whichisacomplexwordcombiningsubmeaning‘upto’andlimen,whichreferstothetoppieceofadoor(Shaw,2006p.1).

54

behindeveryobject in the1999filmTheMatrixby theWachowski-brothersandOlafur

Eliasson’sInstallationTheWeatherProjectatTateModerninLondon2003.

Tofurtherourunderstandingofthesublimeletusnowfocusonthreeofitsmajor

contributorsstartingwithLonginus.Itiswidelyacknowledgedthatthefirstliterarywork

onthesublimeisPeriHupsousorOnSublimitybyLonginuswhoseidentityunfortunately

isamatterofcontroversy (Longinus,1995,p.145).Writtenaroundthe firstcenturyCE

this particular piece of work takes the form of an orator’s guide to how one might

manipulateanaudiencemosteffectively. FromLonginus’ textwe foremost learnabout

the effects of the sublime but also that the sublime stands in relation towonder and

astonishment.Longinuswrites:

For grandeur produces ecstasy rather than persuasion in the hearer; and the

combinationofwonder andastonishmentalwaysproves superior to themerely

persuasiveandpleasant.Thisisbecausepersuasionisonthewholesomethingwe

can control, whereas amazement andwonder exert invincible power and force

and get the better of every hearer. Experience in invention and ability to order

and arrange material cannot be detected in single passages; we begin to

appreciatethemonlywhenweseewholecontext.Sublimity,ontheotherhand,

tears everythingup like awhirlwindandexhibits theorator’swholepower at a

singleblow.

(Longinus,1965,p.2)

If one seeks to dominate an audience one must in Longinus’ view break away from

traditional oratory and make the audience experience a sense of wonder and

astonishment. The rationale behind this is that in comparison, oration based on

controllablepersuasionissimplynotaseffective.ToLonginustheeffectofthesublimeis

likeatsunamioravalanche.Itisanuncompromising,forcefulnaturaleventthatsweeps

everything along with it defying the will of any that might oppose it. Important to

Longinus’ viewof the sublime is thatwonderandastonishmentare subordinate to the

sublime as they both qualify as what tears everything up and get the better of every

hearer. Now itmight be true that astonishment contributes to this effect but it is not

necessarilythecasethatwonderdoes.Admittedlywonderinstigatesacertaininstability

whichincombinationwithastonishmentmayleaveusoverwhelmedorwonderstruckbut

the hearer needs not be a passive recipient completely ‘defenceless’ against Longinus’

55

whirlwindaswecanenvision thehearer tobeanactive listenerwhocanevaluateand

moderateherwonderment.

In1757EdmundBurkeanonymouslypublishedhisAPhilosophicalEnquiryintothe

OriginofOur Ideasof theSublimeandBeautiful,which like Longinus’work standsasa

landmark when it comes to inquiries into the sublime. For Burke the source of the

sublimeistheterrible.Hewrites:

Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to

say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or

operatesinamanneranalogoustoterror,isasourceofthesublime.

(Burke,1990,p.36)

Ontheoutset itappearsas if theBurkeansublime isrooted interrifyingnaturalevents

likethe1755Lisbonearthquake.Therationalebehindthisisthefactthattheearthquake

was caused by something outside human control and brought about pain and danger.

Nevertheless Burke’s contribution to the notion of the sublime comes with a certain

amountofambiguityandthisisduetoitsfocusoncognitionandthepsychologicaleffect

of terror. Shawpoints out that the ambiguity of Burke’s position becomes clear if one

lookstothesecondhalfofthequotationabove.Theword‘conversant’ indicatesashift

fromthesublimebeingaqualityinherentinparticularobjectstowardssublimitybeinga

mentalstate(Shaw,2006,p.49).Thisparticulardevelopmentissignificant,asLonginus’

naturalwhirlwindnowstandschallenged.

Kant’sCritiqueofJudgementalsocontainsdeliberationsonthesublimeandtakes

our understanding of the topic to an entirely new level. Kant refers to the sublime as

what is ‘absolutely large’ or that ‘in comparison with which everything else is small’

(Kant,1987,§25,).Thismaynotsoundrevolutionarybut important toKant’soutlook is

thatthelargenessissomethingthatisformedinourheadssotospeak.Kantwrites:

For what is sublime, in the proper meaning of the term, cannot be contained

in any sensible form but concerns only ideas of reason, which though they

cannot be exhibited adequately, are aroused and called to mind by this very

inadequacy,whichcanbeexhibitedinsensibility.

(Kant,1987,§23)

56

KeytoKant’sunderstandingofthesublimeisthatthesublimedoesnotresidewithinan

objectsuchasavastoceanheavedupbystorms,ablizzardoranicywastelandbutisa

productofthemindthat judgestheobjectassublimeandit is inthisrespectthatKant

placesthesublimewithinourheads.

In addition to the above it is important to point out that Kant distinguishes

between two forms of the sublime: the mathematically and the dynamically sublime

(Kant, 1987, §24). Themathematically sublime throwsadditional lighton thenotionof

thesublimeastheabsolutely largeasmentionedabovebecauseto judgesomethingas

absolutelylargeistoaddresstheboundlessnessoftheobject.Thisistheverycoreofthe

Kantiansublimebecauseunlikethebeautifulinnature,whichisconcernedwiththeform

ortheboundednessoftheobjectthesublimecanbefoundintheformlessorthatwhich

isunbound(Kant,1987,§23).Theexperienceofthesublimeinthisregardarisesnotfrom

thenaturalobjectbutfromcontemplationofthatobjectandmoresofromthefailureof

comprehendingtheparticularobjectinitstotality.

ConcerningthedynamicallysublimeKantwrites:‘Wheninanaestheticjudgement

we consider nature as a might that has no dominance over us, then it is dynamically

sublime’ (Kant, 1987, §28). To spell out what Kant has inmind consider this example.

WhenIwasachildmyfamilyandIwouldspendeverysummerinmygrandparents’beach

house, which was located on a small hill on the west coast of Northern Jutland in

Denmark. This meant that from time to time we had to endure powerful seasonal

thunderstorms and from those years I remember in particular one incident wheremy

motherduringanexceptionallyviolentthunderstormevacuatedmybrothersandmeto

thecarbecauseshejudgedthatthewoodenbeachhousewasnolongersafeforustobe

in.Weknewthatthecarwouldprovidesafetyfromthelightningduetoitsrubbertiresso

oncewewere all seated in the car the fear and terror of the stormwe all harboured

vanished.Myexperienceherecorresponds toKant’sdynamically sublimebecause from

our safe haven we could watch the magnificence of the storm knowing full well that

despite themultitudeof lightning strikes, the loudness of the thunder and thedistinct

smellofozoneintheairwewouldbesafeandlivetotellthetale.Thestormhadinother

wordsnodominanceoverusandwewereabletoaestheticallyjudgethestormasfearful

withoutbeingafraidofit,whichaccordingtoKantisanimportantpartofthedynamically

sublime(Kant,1987,§28).

TofinishthisbriefentryontheKantiansublimewemightsayasShawhaspointed

out that the Kantian sublime is neither entirelymaterialistic norwholly idealistic in its

57

naturebut isbornoutof a structuralnecessityor ‘ a supplementnotbelonging to the

realmsofeitherpureorpractical reason,butwhichyetmustbeassumed foreither to

cohere’(Shaw,2006,p.88).Inthissensethesublimecomesaboutwhenwerealisethe

transcendentaldimensionsofexperience(Shaw,2006,p.88).

Inwhatsensedoesthesublimedifferfromwonderthen?Fisherbelievesthat‘in

the sublime, fear and surprise, power and danger occur in a rich blend’ and that the

sublimestandsinsharpcontrasttowonderinthesensethatwherethesublimecouldbe

calledaestheticisationoffear,wonderistheaesthetisationofdelight(Fisher,2003,p.2).

IamsympathetictoFisher’sviewbecausetheliteratureonwondertendstofavourthe

connectionbetweenwonderand joyordelight.ExamplessuchasBoyle’sglowingmeat

examinedinthebeginningofthechapterpointinthatdirectionandsodoesthevarious

philosophicalwritingonwonder(Aristotle,1995,XXIV17-18;Evans,2012,p.6;R.Fuller,

2006, p. 380; Keen, 1969, p. 29; Matravers, 2012, p. 166). However we have also

acknowledged that wonder can be accompanied by fear as we saw in the example

involving Shakespeare’s Horatio and that wonder can be associated with a wound,

something traumatic or otherwise unpleasant (Chrysakopoulou, 2012, p. 88) (Parsons,

1969,p.85)(Rubenstein,2008,p.9)(Fleischman,2013,p.368).Thus, itmightbemore

accuratetosaythatwonder ismostlytheaestheticisationofdelightdespite itsobvious

vagueness.

Thedifferencebetweenwonderandthesublimemayalso lie in their respective

relationship with knowledge. Typically a sense of wonder entails awareness of one’s

ignorance(lackofknowledge)andadesiretoknowabouttheobjectorindeedsubjectat

hand.We find this exemplified inMann’s character Castorpwho does not quite know

what to make of the sight of his cousin’s beating heart, inner scaffolding and the

existentialthoughtsitgivesriseto.WemayalsoreasonablyspeculatethatShakespeare’s

characterHoratiolikewisedisplaysawarenessofignoranceandadesireforknowledgeas

heventures forthtogathermore informationaboutwhythedeadkinghascomeback.

LikewiseitisexemplifiedinthecaseofBoyleashestayedupallnighttryingtofigureout

why themeatwasglowing. In lightof thiswemight say that inwonder, thewonderer

(unconsciouslyperhaps)entertainsthehopethatfurtherinvestigationintotheobjectof

wonderwillgrantgreaterunderstandingorknowledgeofit,butthiskindofhopeisnot

necessarilypresentinthesublime.

Ifwe looktotheBurkeansublimeitcomesacrossasanexperiencethatputsan

end to our quest for knowledge, as we are overwhelmed with terror. The Lisbon

58

earthquake,whichwemaycallsublimeinaBurkeansense,tookthelivesofthousandsof

God-fearingpeopleand left survivorsand intellectualsponderingwhyGodwouldallow

such an event to happen. Philosopher Daniel Speak writes that the Catholic Church

explainedthattheearthquakeandthesubsequentfiresandtsunamiwereGod’swayof

punishing the sinful citizens but while the earthquake took place most people were

gathered in their churches and the red light districtwhich onemay reasonably expect

wouldbecategorisedasaplaceofsinbythechurchemergedlargelyunharmedfromthe

event(Speak,2014,p.94).InaBurkeansensetheLisbonearthquakeissublimefirstand

foremostbecauseof the terribledestruction it broughtupon the citizensof Lisbonbut

also because it was a dramatic blow to Christianity. It raised terrifying questions that

neededananswersuchaswhywouldGodpunishgoodGod-fearingpeoplewhileleaving

the sinful area of the city largely untouched; was God nothing likewhat he had been

construedtobeanddidthedestructionofLisbonhappenfornoparticular reasonthus

signalling thathumanbeingsare situated inaworldbereftofabenevolent intervening

divinecaretaker?

If we focus on the Kantian mathematically sublime the difference between

wonderandthesublimealsobecomesvisible.While thesublime isconcernedwith the

absolutely large and boundless, wonder (although it might be associated with the

vastness of space) facilitates a sense of boundness and connectedness without the

wondererreallyknowingwhy.This isexemplifiedbyKeen’sexperienceasheforweeks

after his experience of wonder found himself haunted by a wondering expectancy

signallingthatheisconnectedtotheworldanew.Hadhenotbeenabletoacknowledge

thisconnectionorenlargementofhisworlditisdoubtfulthathewouldhaveentertained

his ‘post taumaticexpectancy’andmighthave feltalienatedorotherwisedisassociated

instead. Continuing with Kant’s mathematically sublime there seems also to be a

difference between wonder and this version of the sublime in terms of the hope of

achievinggreaterunderstandingorknowledgeoftheobjectfacilitatingtheexperience.In

Kant’smathematicallysublimetheparticularexperiencearisesnotfromanaturalobject

suchasablizzardbutfromthecontemplationofthatparticularobjectandthefailureof

comprehendingitinitsunboundtotality.Becauseoftheunboundnatureofablizzardany

hopeofachievinggreaterunderstandingorknowledgeaboutit isthwartedbecausethe

blizzardisamorphousandundefined.Thusitmightbeventuredthatthemathematically

sublime unlike wonder is accompanied by a kind of ‘hopelessness’ because obtaining

furtherknowledgeabouttheunboundobjectofconcernisfutile.

59

Thedifferencebetweenwonderandthesublimealsopresentsitselfifwefocuson

Kant’sdynamicallysublime.While thedynamicallysublimedoesnotholdanydominion

over the self that is acknowledging it, the ideaof having a ‘solid self’ is not present in

wonderbecausewondergiveswaytoat leastatemporarydisplacement/diminishingof

theself.Thuswemightsaythatinwonderwearenotina‘safeplace’wheretheintellect

may appreciate ‘the boundless ocean heaved up’ (Kant, 1987, §28) or a violent

thunderstorm. Inwonderweareat leastmomentarily thrownorunhingedbecausewe

findourselvesconnectedtoalargerworld,whichwedonotfullyunderstand.Thecaseof

de Pasquale supports this because through the realisation of his mortality he also

recognisedtheconnectingandtroublesomequestionofhowtolive,towhichhehadno

answerandwhichperhapspromptedhisinterestinphilosophy.

ThethirdrelationalwordtowonderIshallbrieflyaddressiscuriosity;howeverIwillalso

focus briefly on amazement, admiration and astonishment. Curiosity and wonder are

sometimesusedinterchangeably.Weseethisforexamplewiththecabinetsofwonder35

fromRenaissanceEurope,astheyarealsoknownascabinetsofcuriosity(Onians,1994,

p.16)(Daston&Park,1998,p.260).Howeverthereisnoreasontopresumethatwonder

andcuriosityaresynonymous.InfactintheHighMiddleAgeswonderwasunderstoodas

something quite distinct from curiosity (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 15). To themedieval

philosopher wonder was awed reverence in conjunction with the uncomfortable

realisation of one’s ignorance. Curiosity on the other hand was viewed as a morally

ambiguousdesirecloselyassociatedwithlust,prideandthecravingofknowledgeabout

thebusinessofone’sneighbours.All inallcuriositywasanegativelychargedwordas it

promptedpeopletomingleinaffairsthatwerenottheirconcern(Daston&Park,1998,p.

305).Asmediaevaltimescametoanendashifttookplacethatchangedthefaceofboth

wonderandcuriosity.Thestatusofwonderdecreasedasitbecameassociatedwithdull

stuporandthevulgarpassionofthemassesratherthantherefinededucatedfeelingof

35Cabinetsofwonder,cabinetsofcuriosityalsoknownas‘Wunderkammern’containedaccordingto16thcenturyscholar,physicianandpioneeringconnoisseurSamuelQuicchelbergbothman-madeworksofart(artificialia)andobjectsfromnature(naturalia)(Turpin,2006,p.63)(Hajos,1958,p.156).Commontotheseobjectsweretheir‘wondrousnature’andcabinetsofwondercouldincludeeverythingfromthehornsofsupposedunicorns,stuffedcrocodiles,ostricheggs,rareplants,miniatures,bones,feathers,fossils,anatomicaldeformitiesinpreservingjars,phosphorescentminerals,andethnographicobjects(Arellano,2010,p.271-272)(Greenblatt,1990,p.29).AfamousWunderkammerisMuseumWorminanumbelongingtothe16th/17thcenturyDanishphysicianandantiquaryOlausWormiusorinplainDanishOleWorm.DepictionsofhiscabinetofwondermaybeviewedinLorraineDastonandKatharinePark’sWondersandtheOrderofNature(Daston&Park,1998,p.271)andCasperHenderson’sTheBookofBarelyImaginedBeings(C.Henderson,2012,p.xiv).

60

thephilosopher.Forcuriositytheshiftmeantanincreaseinstatusandrespectabilityasit

became associated with natural philosophy (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 305). A major

exponentofthis interpretationofcuriositywasThomasHobbeswhovieweddesireand

passionasthedrivingforceofhumanlife.Hobbeswrites:

Desiretoknowwhy,andhow,curiosity;suchasinnolivingcreaturebutMan;so

that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this singular

PassionfromotherAnimals.

(Hobbes,1992,I6)

According to Aristotle what makes us different from other animals is our capacity for

rational thought (Aristotle, 1989, A 980b 25-28). With Hobbes this notion gets

supplemented with curiosity, as rationality cannot alone account for what moves the

mindandbodyofhumanbeings.Onenoticeablefeatureaboutcuriosityisthatitisnever

quenched.Associatedwithgreedand independent fromneedandsatisfactioncuriosity

never rests and constantly yearns forwhat is novel and new (Daston& Park, 1998, p.

307).According tophilosopher JianhongChenHobbesadoptedanapproach towonder

similartothatofAristotlebutatthesametimehemadesurethatitwasnotatoddswith

theChristianoutlookonwonderemphasisingthat‘nothingcanbecalledwondersexcept

divinelywroughtmiracles’ (Chen, 2011, p. 130-132). In the eighteenth centurywonder

had lostmuchof its statusandaffiliationwith theacademicmindsetand curiosityhad

becometheprimemotivatorforthescientificendeavour(Daston&Park,1998,p.305).In

his 1937-38 lectures at the University of Freiburg Martin Heidegger addresses this

development and argues furthermore that it is amistake to think that philosophy still

beginsinwonderconsideringthatweliveintimeswherewonderisnolongerunderstood

inthesamesenseasinancientGreece.Asheputsit:

It has long been known that the Greeks recognised [thaumazein] as the

”beginning” of philosophy. But it is just as certain that we have taken this

[thaumazein] to be obvious and ordinary, something that can be accomplished

without difficulty and can even be clarifiedwithout further reflection. Formost

part,theusualpresentationsoftheoriginofphilosophyoutof[thaumazein]result

in the opinion that philosophy arises from curiosity. This is a weak and pitiful

determinationoforigin,possiblyonlywheretherehasneverbeenanyreflection

61

on what is supposed to be determined here in its origin. Indeed we consider

ourselves relieved of such reflection, precisely because we think that the

derivationofphilosophyoutofcuriosityalsodeterminesitsessence.

(Heidegger,1994,§36[155-56])

FurthermoreHeidegger’sanalysisofwonderinformsusthatwonderisquitedistinctfrom

amazement,admirationandastonishmentwhichhegroupsunderthewondrousandthe

marvellouswhichagainislinkedtotheappreciationoftheuncommon(Heidegger,1994,

§37 [156-57]). According to Heidegger to be amazed is to ‘ find oneself in face of the

inexplicable’ (Heidegger, 1994, §37 [162-63]) understood as how when something or

someoneamazesuswefaceaninabilitytoexplaintheobjectofamazement.Howeverif

wefindoutwhatmakestheobjectamazingtheamazementdisappears.Toexplainthis

wemight turntophilosopherBradElliotStonewhogives theexampleofamagic trick.

Everymagic trick is explainable andwith training one can learn to imitate it. However

when themagic trick is explained it is no longer amazing (Stone, 2006, p. 209-210). In

additionHeidegger claims thatoncewegetused to thenewandamazingwebegin to

cravemore(Heidegger,1994,§37[157-58]).Seeingthesamemagictrickoverandover

becomesatlengthboringandwebegintoseeknewvistasinordertofeelamazed.

Quinn has pointed out that in the English language the word ‘admiration’ is

sometimes used as a synonym for wonder (Quinn, 2002, p. 4), however to Heidegger

admirationisnotthesameaswonder.AccordingtoHeideggeranyonewholetherselfbe

admiredputsherselfdownorisofalowerrank(Heidegger,1994,§37).Wemightadmire

the artistry, grace, athleticism and technical skill of Cuban ballet dancer Carlos Acosta;

howevertheuseofadmirationisaccordingtoHeideggernottobemistakenforwonder.

Heideggerexplains:

Everyone who allows himself to be admired, and precisely if the admiration is

justified, isofa lowerrank.Forhesubordinateshimself totheviewpointandto

thenormsofhisadmirer.

(Heidegger,1994,§37[163-64])

IfIweretoallowmyselftobeadmiredbysomeoneIwouldhavetoacceptthisperson’s

ideaofwhat is admirablebut indoing so I becomedependentuponher admiration in

ordertobeadmirable.Furthermorethisdoesnotmakemeawonderorwonderfulbut

62

merely admirable following the measure of a particular person. In other words the

standard of admiration, which is put to use, is not my own, which means I will be

subordinate to the standard of the admirer and in this sense as Heidegger writes

admiration ‘embodies a kind of self-affirmation’ (Heidegger, 1994, §38 [163-64]).

FurthermoreasStonepointsoutifonewastodesireacontinuationofbeingadmiredit

woulddemandhardworkbecausetherearemanyadmirablepeopleinhistoryandsothe

academicwouldhave tobemoreprolific and the runner able to run longer and faster

thantheirpredecessors.(Stone,2006,p.210-211).

ToHeideggerbeingastonishedisthesameas‘retreatinginfaceoftheawesome,

uptowhatiscalleddumfoundedness’(Heidegger,1994,§38[165-66]).Itissomethingwe

cannotunderstandnorwillbeabletounderstandbecausewhenweareastonishedwe

allow the unusual to grow ‘precisely aswhat is extraordinary, intowhat overgrows all

usualpowersandbearsinitselfaclaimtoarankallitsown’(Heidegger,1994,§38[165-

66]).Thisisbecauseinourdullandstupefiedstatewehavelosttheabilitytotakeupa

positionwithregardstothethingthatcausesustobeastonished36.Heideggercontinues

bystatingthatwhenweareastonishedwearemindfulofthefactthatweare‘excluded

from what exists in the awesome’ (Heidegger, 1994, §38 [163-64]). However because

astonishment is in need of the extraordinary Heidegger categorises it differently from

wonder.Astonishment fades awayas repetition sets in and theextraordinarybecomes

theeveryday.Skiingthroughpowderysnowmayseemspecialandextraordinaryatfirst

but if youdo it everyday for awholewinter the extraordinary about it diminishes and

becomesaneverydaythingbereftofexcitement.

InHeidegger’s view amazement, admiration and astonishment aremore closely

linkedtocuriositythanwonder.Thereasonforthisisthatlikecuriositytheyareinleague

with the extraordinary, the strange and peculiar. Heideggerian wonder is entirely

different because ‘in wonder what is most usual itself becomes the most unusual’

(Heidegger,1994,§38 [165-66]). Inotherwords inwonderwe see theextraordinary in

the ordinary and this kind of wonderment entails a particular kind of understanding

namelythatinwonderanythingwhatsoeverbecomesthemostunusual.Heideggerwrites

thatthiskindofwonder‘nolongerencountersanythingthatcouldofferitanescape.It

36InThePassionsoftheSoulDescartesformulatesasimilarideaaboutastonishment.ToDescartesastonishmentiswonderinexcessandinhisviewastonishment‘canneverbeotherwisethanbad’becauseitleavesusimmobileandpreventsusfrom‘perceivingmoreoftheobjectthanthefirstfacewhichispresented(Descartes,1986,LXXIII).Inotherwordsbecauseofourastonishedstateweareunabletolearnmoreaboutthesourceofourastonishment.

63

no longer knows the way out but knows itself solely as being relegated to the most

unusualoftheusual ineverythingandanything:beingasbeings’ (Heidegger,1994,§38

[167-68]). Contrary to curiositywith its focus on the singular extraordinary object, one

caninwondermentaskwhyistheresomethingratherthannothing.Questionslikethese

arequestionsboundtomakeuswonderanduniquelysobecausetheymakeusseethe

extraordinaryintheordinary.

Wearenowattheendofwhatcanbeseenasapreliminarytaxonomyofaltered

statesofmindsimilartowonder.Westartedbyaddressingtheexperienceofawe.Awe

differs from wonder in the sense that it is usually accompanied by fear and terror

whereaswonder brings joy and delight. The second altered statewe focussed onwas

horror.Bothhorrorandwondercanbea threat toone’suniverseofmeaningbut they

differinoneparticularway.Whenwefeelhorroraboutsomethingwetendtoshunthat

thingbecauseitonlypromisestodestroy.Thisisinstarkcontrasttowonderbecausein

wondermentwewanttoknowmoreabouttheobjectthatcausesitbecauseitpromises

to expand our understanding of things. The third altered state I addressed was the

sublime.Thedifferencebetweenwonderandthesublimeresidesmainlyinthecompany

theykeepandintheirrespectiverelationshiptoknowledgeandunderstanding.Likeawe

thesublimefavoursthecompanyoffearandterror;howevertheseareseldomfoundin

wonderment, which is mostly accompanied by delight. The sublime also differs from

wonderbecauseitisfarmoredramaticinitseffects.Longinusspeaksaboutthesublime

asawhirlwindthattearseverythingupandexhibitsthewholepoweroftheorator ina

singleblow.ToBurkethesublimeisrootedinterrifyingobjectsandtoKantthesublime

canbebothfearinducingandatthesametimedelightful.FurthermoretheKantianview

informsusthatthesublimeisneitherapropertyofagivenobjectnoraproductofour

thinking. It is the feeling that is visited upon us when we realise the transcendental

dimensionsofexperience.MovingontocuriosityDastonandParkinformusthatcuriosity

isdifferentfromwonderinthesensethatasamotivatorforinquiryitisneverquenched

and in the Heideggerian sense it is therefore more fitting for modern inquiries than

wonder.Amazementdiffers fromwonder in thesense that it relieson theunknownor

uncovered properties of the object. Thus amazement is different from wonderment

becausewhatwe findwonder-filled does not necessarily stop beingwonder-filled just

becauseweknowhowitfunctions.Admirationislikewisedifferentfromwonderbecause

if we admire someone this person has to continuously increase her efforts for our

admirationtocontinue.Ifweweretofindapersonfullofwonderthisdemandwouldnot

64

bethere.ThelastalteredstateIaddressedwasastonishment.Astonishmentdiffersfrom

wonderinthesenseitfadesovertimeandthatbeingastonishedequalsbeingstupefied.

Inastonishmentwe loseourability to takeupapositionwithregards to thethingthat

causes us to be astonished; however in wonderment this does not happen because

regardless of our wondrous state we are mindful of being excluded from what the

marvellousthingcontains.Unlikeinastonishmentwefindinwonderthemostusualand

ordinary extraordinary. Bearing the differences between wonder and awe, horror, the

sublime,curiosity,amazement,admirationandastonishmentinmindletusnowmoveon

totakeacloserlookatsomeoftheenemiesofwonder.

1.4.EnemiesofWonder

InarecentbookphilosopherRaymondTallislamentsthatdespitethemanywondersthis

worldhastoofferwearerarelydetainedbywonder(Tallis,2012,p.6).Thissectionaims

at providing some clue as to why this is so. Now the first ‘enemy of wonder’ I shall

address,‘naturalenemiesofwonder’isacategoryborrowedfromTallis(Tallis,2012,p.6)

thatreferstothefactthatwehumanbeingsareembodiedandvulnerablecreatures.By

evokingtheShakespeariannotionthattherewasneveraphilosopherwhocouldendurea

toothachepatiently37Tallispointsoutthatdestitutionandneed,hungerandthirst,illness

and pain, sadness and despair not forgetting bereavement, sense of rejection and the

fearofbeingthecauseofharmtoothersareallnaturalenemiesofwonder.Inaddition

what he labels ‘entire conditions of life’ understood as prison camps, war, poverty

including also the human tendency of taking on the responsibility for the welfare of

othersarealsotobeconsiderednaturalenemies.Factorssuchasthesesimplyrenderit

impossible for most people to entertain a sense of wonder because doing otherwise

wouldresultintheneglectofanimmediateandpressingunforgivingreality(Tallis,2012,

p.6-7).

Tallis also talks about something entirely different from natural enemies of

wonder,whichhecalls‘electiveenemiesofwonder.’Theelectiveenemiesofwonderare

attached toourmodernwayof life including itshabitof rushandbusyness.Amodern

lifestyle includes the ideaof free time. I say ideabecause it is far fromcertain that the

ideaoffreetimefindsitspracticalcorrespondence.AccordingtoTallisitisasymptomof

37Theline‘Fortherewasneveryetphilosopherthatcouldendurethetoothachepatiently’canbefoundinShakespeare’sMuchAdoaboutNothing(Shakespeare,1996,V.i.35).

65

modern living thatwe replicate the business ofworking life in our free time. In other

words we fill up our free time with demanding projects that not only demand the

excellenceofparticularskillsbutalsokeenattentionandtime.Tallis’point is thateven

thoughwehavefreetimewhich inprinciplecouldbeusedtowonderweoftenopt for

lettingourbusinesscoloniseourfreetimeleavingnoroomatallforwonder(Tallis,2012,

p. 8). Furthermore the fact thatwe are social creatures poses a great problem for the

occurrences of wonderment. Because wondering is essentially a lonely business,

whenever someone is wondering she is viewed as asocial or not committed to

corporationandseriousengagementwithagivenprojectorsituation.Imaginesittingina

pubwithafriendyouhavenotseenforawhile.Imaginefurtherthatthepersonyouare

meeting with now and then disappears into a state of wonder and that she does not

enlighten you as to what makes her wonder. Classifying the meeting as outright

successfulwould probably be an overstatement andmost peoplewould be inclined to

thinkofthemeetingasirritatingandnotworthrepeating.Wondersignalsamomentary

departure from the life we share with other people and ‘is more often part of our

solitude’(Tallis,2012,p.9).

I am sympathetic to Tallis’ account of both natural and elective enemies of

wonder; however with regards to the latter it can be argued that wonderment to a

certaindegreecanbeamutualexperience,whichtoanextentwouldbothcounterthe

notionthatwondermentisasolitaryexperienceandthatoururgetosocialisemakesus

less likely to experience wonder. Now Tallis does not deny the existence of shared

experiencesofwonderandpointsoutthatwemaywanttocommunicateourwonderfor

the purpose of validation (Tallis, 2012, p. 9). In addition it seems plausible that two

peoplemay be inspired by the same source ofwonder and experiencewonder at the

sametime.SomeyearsagomywifeandIclimbedMt.Fuji inJapan.Aswewatchedthe

sunrisetogetherfromthesummitwebothnotedthattimesomehowseemeddifferent.

We both became aware of an intense yet calm focus on the rising sun together with

openness towards theworldanda readiness for change.Webothnoted in silence the

arrayofcoloursfillingthesky,andwithitcameafeelingofdelightandjoytogetherwith

certainbafflementaboutwhattheworldis.NowIamnotclaimingthatourexperiences

of wonder were identical but during the conversations we had afterwards the above

mentionedseeminglysharedexperiencescameup.Itcanbearguedthatwearemerely

constructingthemasweengageinconversationandatthebottomlinetheyarenothing

butsocialconstructsorproductsofconvention.HoweverIfinditimportanttomarkthat

66

before we entered a discussion we sat with an individual experience, which found

resonance in theotherduringourconversation.Thisperhaps indicates that thesunrise

onMt Fujiwas of a particular kind and given that our respective experiences seem to

overlapwithregardstosomebasicelementsofwondersuchasdisplacement,openness

andjoyIthinkthissufficientlyprovesthatitisatleastnotunthinkablethatanexperience

of wonder can be shared. Based on this I claim that wonderment needs not be an

exclusively lonely business and that through shared experiences ofwonder (which still

needstobeexperiencedindividually)onemayweakentheimpactofelectiveenemiesof

wonder.

‘Well-temperedcuriosity’canalsobeseenasanenemyofwonder.Thisisanotion

favoured indirectly by the scientificallymindedAdamSmithwho claims thatwonder is

merelyanxiouscuriosityfromwhichweseektoridourselvesbyextendingourknowledge

(A. Smith, 1980b, II,5). In this sense wonder is not an experience to be savoured or

treasuredbut anexperiencewe should rootoutbyengaging in scientific inquiry.Once

knowledgeoftheobjectofwonderisobtainedtheanxietyofnotknowingwilldisappear

and all will be well. However if we in all matters were to be guided by a sense of

temperedcuriosityitwoulddemandabsolutefaithinthescientificmethodunderstoodas

theideathatnaturalsciencegiventimewouldbeabletoexplaineveryphenomenonthat

currentlymightgiverisetoasenseofwonder.Therearenonethelessquestionsaboutour

being and the very existence of the universe that seem to defy such an attitude and

Heidegger’s notion that it is awonder that there exists something rather thannothing

conferssupportonthis.

ContinuingwiththethinkingofHeidegger‘evolutionarysocialprogress’mightalsobean

enemyofwonder.ThiswasHeidegger’spointinhis1937-38lecturesattheUniversityof

Freiburg in which he claims that wonder is no longer a viable starting point for

philosophy.Heideggerexplainsthatwehavemovedonsincephilosophywasconducted

in ancientGreece andwe have now committed ourselves to curiosity to the extent of

beingobsessed.

Iwouldliketofinishthissectionbyaddressingwhatmaybelabelledas‘theurge

for contentment and stability’ as an enemy of wonder. Whenever we encounter

somethingwedonotunderstandorhaveinsufficientinformationaboutwecantrytodo

awaywiththeuncomfortablesensationbyobtainingknowledgeorunderstandingabout

theunknown.Thiswouldre-labeltheunknowntoknownoratleastframetheunknown

in suchaway that itno longer interferes inanuncomfortableway. Alternativelya far

67

more irrational and psychologically loaded reactionmay take placewherewe shun or

refuse to have anything to do with what makes us wonder because it makes us

uncomfortable. In such circumstances one might seek to deem wonder irrelevant,

unimportant,uninterestingorotherwisedowngrade inorderto justify theneglectof it.

This is a notion explored by philosopher Trevor Norris who is engaged in education.

According to Norris wonder can be a source of transformation and education (Norris,

2001,p.223).Howeverasateacherhehasexperiencedwhathecallsstudents’‘refusalto

wonder’andinthearticleentitled‘TheRefusaltoWonder’healertsustoamostbrilliant

exampleofthatveryphenomenon.Norriswrites:

In a lesson on consumerism in a Business Ethics course I recently taught, we

researchedthethirdworldlabourpracticesofthestudents’favouriteshoemaker.

At one pointmany students were fuming and attackedmewith ‘what’s wrong

with my Nikes?’ Others in the class suggested that people like working in

sweatshops.Thisencounterwiththenewanddifficultknowledgedidnotprovoke

wonder,butaggressiveandoftenpersonalattacks,creatingapalpableclassroom

tension.Wewill dowell to remember the fate of Socrates at the hands of the

Atheniandemos.AttimesIfeelluckytohaveescapedtheclassroomunscratched.

(Norris,2001,p.222-223)

In Plato’sTheaetetus the namesake of the dialogue declares himself lost inwonder as

Socrates’ ‘torpedo fish’ strikeshim.Violenceandaggression is verymuchmissing from

the scene. However according to Norris because human beings are political creatures

situations may arise where too much personal investment is at play for a person to

becomewonderstruck.Insuchacaseapersonmaydisplayarefusaltowonderandturn

aggressive (Norris, 2001, p. 222-223). In the example abovewe find the students in a

defiantandaggressivepositionsubmittingNorristopersonalattacks.Norrisclarifiesthat

thestudentsdonotfeeltheneedforchangedespitetheirabilitytoseethattheirsupport

of Nike is generating sweatshops in third world countries (Norris, 2001, p. 223).

Furthermoreheclaimsthatwhatwehavehereisaperfectcaseofwhatiscalled‘Calvin’s

refusal’which is a term coined by philosopherMegan Boler afterWatterson’s cartoon

characterCalvinwhoreturnsa librarybook loanedbyhismotherwith thecomment ‘It

complicatesmylife.Don’tgetmeanymore’(Megan,1997).InthelightoftheexampleI

think it is safe to say thatdue to thedestabilising impactofwonder it isplausible that

68

some politically engaged people of whom it can be said they live to defend particular

interestscoulddisplayadownrightrefusaltowonder.Furthermorewemightsaythatitis

important to acknowledge that a sudden expansion of one’s perspective following an

experienceofwondercanaschemistandphilosopherCatherineHurtMiddlecampargues

inducepain (Middlecamp,2009,p. 134)whichmostpeoplewould seekaquickescape

from.Middelcamp illustrates her point by referring to an old Sufi tale,which goes like

this:

”Oldwoman,howmuch for that rug in the stall?” theman inhorseback called.

“Onehundredrupee,sir”theoldwomananswered.“ItisafinerugandIwillnot

sellitforasinglerupeeless.”“Onehundredrupee,woman?”themansaid.“Why

onallmytravelsIhaveneverseenarugsofine.WhyinthenameofAllahareyou

askingonlyonehundred rupee?”And theoldwomanpaused inwonder and in

painandsaid:“because,sir,untilnowIneverknewthattherewereanynumbers

aboveonehundred.”

(Middlecamp,2009,p.134)

The tale clearly depicts that learning something new can be wonder-filled and

exhilaratingbutalsopainfulandwecanimaginethatforsomepeoplethepainfulpartis

sooverwhelmingthattheywillturnaggressivejustlikeNorris’sstudentstogetridofthe

painasquicklyaspossible.Alternatively itcanalsobearguedthatwhatwearedealing

withhere is largely amatter of psychology andultimately it boils down to anurge for

contentmentandstabilitythatoverrideperfectlylogicalandempiricallysoundarguments

that otherwise would make a strong case for personal change, transformation and

behaviouralmodification.

1.5.TowardsaPreliminaryUnderstandingofWonder

InthefinalsectionofthischapterIwilladdtoourpreliminaryunderstandingofwonder

by considering the outlooks on wonder by a selection of contemporary writers on

wonderment.

LetmeopenbyagainbringingthephilosopherRaymondTallistoattention.Tallis

argues thatwondershouldbe theproperstateofhumankind (Tallis,2012,p.22).Now

thereasonforthisisthatthereareanumberofthingsaboutourexistenceandtheworld

weliveinthataresimplywonder-filled.Onemaystartbypointingoutthatthefactthat

69

human beings exist is quite a wonder. That we are fleshly creatures endowed with

conscious thought which can be used to ponder our existence, formulate ideas and

contemplate whether a balanced sense of wonder is a major contributor to our

flourishing isa featureofourexistencethatspeaks towards the idea.Howeverwhen it

comestohowwonderistobeconceptualisedandhowandinwhatsituationsweshould

usetheword‘wonder’thereisafinelinetotread.Anotionofwonderthatencompasses

merelychildishwondermenteasilycollapsesintosentimentalismandisundesirableinthe

sense (Iwould imagine) that itwillnotachievemuchsupport fromscientistsandother

‘unweavers of the rainbow.’ Likewise a notion of wonder synonymous with curiosity

wouldproveunsatisfactoryfortheartist,poetandthephilosopher.Justbecausewecan

explain the appearance of the rainbow scientifically does not take away the impact a

rainbowhasontheaesthetically,poeticallyandphilosophicallyinclined.Arainbowinthe

skycanrenderuswonderstruckand indeedmakehearts leapuptoput itpoetically. In

thislightitwouldseemthatapreliminaryunderstandingofwonderwouldhavetotake

intoaccounttheachievementsofbothscienceandthearts.Fromtheliteraturethathas

come to my attention Robert C. Fuller’s understanding of wonder might suit these

‘demands.’ In Fuller’s view ‘wonder excites our ontological imaginings in ways that

enhanceourcapacity toseekdeeperpatterns in theuniverse’ (R.C.Fuller,2006,p.2).

Furthermore he thinks that experiences ofwonder can dramatically change perception

andaremorallyhelpfulinthesensethattheyprovideuswithasecondchancetochoose

whatkindofpeoplewewant tobeandcan inspireus tobecome true individuals, and

true cosmopolitans (R. C. Fuller, 2006, p. 158). In this sense Fuller’s takeonwonder is

bothdescriptiveandnormativeandwithregardstothelatteronemaysaythatalthough

Fullerclaimsthathedoesnothaveethicalortheologicalaspirationsconcerninghistake

onwonder(R.C.Fuller,2006,p.2)onecanventurethathisapproachisnotfarremoved

from the ethical. In fact it seems quite in tune with the writings of ethicist and

philosopherPhiloH.Hovewhowrites:

Wonder lies at the heart of what it is to be human: it places us directly and

transparently in the face of the world in which we live with others. Wonder

revealsthingsinanewlightandtendstopromotemindfulandgentleregardfor

their inherentworth […]Wonder isassociatedwithawiderangeofexperiences

and it is possible that it may arise in regard to anything; but a deep level of

70

wonder seems to reveal, or put into question, certain fundamental features of

humanexperiences;amongotherthings,wondercanexposeourvulnerability.

(Hove,1996,p.437)

Thatwethroughwondermentmaygiveourselvesasecondchancetobewhowewantto

be,tobecometrueindividuals,truecosmopolitansandtofacetheworldinwhichwelive

with others, directly and transparently promoting mindful and gentle regard for the

inherentworthofothers,arestatementsnotfarremovedfromoneanotherandhintsto

usthatwondermayindeedbeasourceofethicaltransformation.

AccordingtoFullerwonderisanemotionthathasthepowertotransformandnotonly

makes us sensible to an unseen order of life but also develops in us an enduring

reverencefor it (R.C.Fuller,2006,p.158).LikeTallis,Fuller is fora life inwonderment

although he acknowledges that it is possible to live a life without a sense of wonder.

Fuller also points out that ‘a life shaped by wonder is attuned to the widest possible

worldofpersonalfulfilment’(R.Fuller,2006,p.158)andhereheopensuptothenotion

thatwondermayhaveasignificantimpactonourlivesasflourishinghumanbeings.Hove

seems to suggest something along the same lines as he emphasises the possibility of

entertainingadeepsenseofwonderthatmayrevealfundamentalfeaturesofourhuman

lifesuchasourvulnerability.

Senecapointsout that it is by the toils ofothers thatwearebeing let into the

presenceof thingsandhereat theendof the introductionwehave reachedaplateau

wherewehavesomeoverviewofwonderandmaytosomeextentappreciatewhyitisan

alluring phenomenon and subject. Iris the rainbowanddaughter of Thaumas (wonder)

displays seven colours and by opening the chapter with seven colourful examples

gatheredfromreallifeexperiencesandfictionwehavehonouredherbysuggestingthat

the experience ofwonder contains seven constituents. The experience ofwonder is 1)

sudden,extraordinaryandpersonal.It2)intensifiesthecognitivefocusand3)theuseof

theimagination.It4)instigatesawarenessofignoranceorlackofknowledgeandcauses

5)temporarydisplacementordiminishingofself.Additionallyit6)connectsustoalarger

worldand7)bringsaboutemotionalupheavalwhichismostlyjoyful.Abriefsurveyofthe

etymologicalmeaningofwonderclarifiedtherootoftheword‘wonder’andhowwonder

can be seen as a noun, verb, adjective and an adverb. Engaging with the history of

wondermade it clear that our conception of the subject changes over time. This was

followedbyapreliminarytaxonomyofalteredstatessimilartowonderwhereanattempt

71

wasmadetodistinguishwonderfromawe,horror,thesublime,curiosity,astonishment,

admiration and amazement. Furthermore we considered some possible enemies of

wonder in order to find outwhywe sometimes forget or opt not towonder. Through

theseinvestigationstheconnectionbetweenwonder,emotionandimaginationhasagain

emerged and this connection is reinforced in the philosophy of wonder advocated by

contemporary philosophers Robert C. Fuller and Philo Hove. However their

complementary accounts leave certain questions unanswered including whether it is

possible to view wonder exclusively as an emotion and what is the exact role of

imaginationinwonder?Furthermore,whatarewetomakeofthenotionofdeepwonder

that Hove speaks of and in what sense wonder contributes to fulfilment or human

flourishing? I seek to answer these questions in the chapters to come alongside my

efforts to continue to explore the components and effects of wonder and mount

evidence in favourofmythesisstatingthatcultivatingabalancedsenseofwonder isa

strongcontributortohumanflourishing.

72

2.WonderandEmotion

[Socrates]Youfollowme,Itakeit,Theaetetus,forIthinkyouarenotnewatsuch

things.

[Theaetetus]Bythegods,Socrates, Iamlost inwonderwhenIthinkofallthese

things,andsometimeswhenIregardthemitreallymakesmyheadswim.

[Socrates]Theodorusseems tobeaprettygoodguesseraboutyournature.For

thisfeelingofwondershowsthatyouareaphilosopher,sincewonderisonlythe

beginningofphilosophy,andhewhosaidthatIriswasthechildofThaumasmade

agoodgenealogy.

(Plato,1989,155C-D)

Thepurposeofthischapteristoinvestigateinwhatrespectwemaylabelwonderasan

emotion and if it is possible to label it exclusively so. The investigation falls into the

followingthreeparts:FirstIshallelaborateontherationaleforaddressingwonderasan

emotionbyexaminingaselectionofexamplesemphasisingtheemotionalsideofwonder.

Ithenturntolookatavarietyofentriesintheliteratureonwonderdepictingwonderas

anemotion.

SecondlyIshalladdressthenatureofemotionsandexploretheconflictingideas

aboutwhatmakesupemotions.SubsequentlyIshallcommittowhatphilosopherAaron

Ben-Ze’evcallsthecognitiveapproachtoemotionsandlaterexploreanideaputforward

by philosopher AdamMorton depicting wonder as an epistemic emotion. The section

closes with applying Ben-Ze’ev’s cognitive approach and Adam Morton’s notion of

wonder as an epistemic emotion to some of the examples depicting wonder as an

emotion provided in the first section in order to show in what respect the examples

reflectwonderasanemotion.

ThirdlyIshallexplorewhatwemaycallotherfacesofwonderandarguethatas

much as it can be said that wonder qualifies as an emotion and indeed an epistemic

emotionwonderdoesnotqualifyexclusivelyassuchbecausewondermayalsobelooked

uponasamood,avalueandanattitude.

73

2.1GroundsforInvestigatingWonderasanEmotion

Theideathatwonderisanemotionseemsreasonablewhenwelooktotheexamplesof

wondermentionedintheopeningsectionofchapter1.RecallfromShakespeare’sHamlet

thatHoratiouponseeing theghost for the first time remarks that ‘itharrowshimwith

fearandwonder’(Shakespeare,1992,I.i.40-50).Thisparticularutterancecanbeseenas

areportonHoratio’semotionallifeindicatingthatheisexperiencingtwooramixtureof

twodifferentemotionsnamelyfearandwonder.

Likewise Keen’s recollection of being given a knife by a mysterious stranger in

Maryville, Tennessee evokes the idea of wonder being an emotion. It is entirely

reasonabletothinkthatthepervasivesenseofgratitudeandwonderingexpectancyhe

experienced in the weeks following the event was prompted by an initial emotion of

wonder produced by the extraordinary handover of the knife. When we read his

descriptiononecertainlygetsthesensethatthereisaparticularemotionalqualitytohis

experience,whichshouldnotbeunderestimated.

The wonder Boyle experienced upon witnessing the luminousmeat brought to

him from the larder by his servant again qualifies as an emotion.What points to this

notionisthataswemayrecall fromtheintroductionwonder ingeneral is joyfulandto

thinkofjoyasanemotionseemsreasonable.InfurthersupportofBoyle’swonderbeing

an emotional response stands the fact that he finds within him an urge to share his

experience,which leavesonewiththe impressionthathe isbeingmovedbysomething

from within. One might of course object to this notion and with reference to Tallis

(mentionedinsection1.4ofchapter1)arguethatwhatBoyleisdoingismerelyseeking

tovalidatehisexperienceofwonderandthuswhatisatplayhereisperhapsnotsomuch

anemotionalresponsebut infactBoyle’srationality.GivenBoyle’sscientificprofilethis

countsashighlyprobable,buttopushbackonecouldsaythattheargumentisweakened

bythefactthatatleastoneofhisservantshadalreadyexperiencedthesameluminous

qualityofthemeatandthatshouldprovideallthevalidationBoylerequires.Inthislightit

seemsoddtosuggestthatBoyle’surgetosharehisexperiencerestsmerelyonawishto

validatehisexperience.OnecouldarguethatBoylemightnothavethoughtveryhighlyof

hisservantsandthereforeitdidnotcrosshismindtoaskanyofthemtovalidatewhathe

sawwhichiswhyhepennedhisurgetosharehisexperiencewithsomeonehedeemed

worthy. This is indeed a possibility but also difficult to verify and thus it is far more

plausibletosaythatthejoyfulwonderBoyleexperiencedinconnectionwithhisdiscovery

74

waswhatmadehimwanttoshareit.Weareattractedtowonderbecauseitbringsjoy.It

makes our hearts leap up (W. Wordsworth, 1850, p. 33) and because of this feature

displays of wonder such as 18th century Prussian showman Gustave Katterfelto’s38

WonderofWondersShow39whichtookplaceatSpringGardensinLondonin1780(Nadis,

2005, p. 3) were popular. The same feature is behind the popularity ofmodern IMAX

filmsdepicting forexample thewondersofclimbingMountEverestorwhat it is like to

live on the International Space Station (Crosby, 2007, p. 1-2). The popularity of such

attractionsiscorrelatedwithourattractiontowonderwhichbesidesbeingenjoyablein

somecasesalsocompelsustosharethewonderweareexperiencing.

ToaddtoourcollectionofexamplesdepictingwonderasanemotionIshallnowturnto

thewonder-provokingactivityof stargazingor tobeprecisemeteor spottingwhichwe

havetouchedonearlier inconnectionwithRogers’experienceofwonderbroughtforth

by the1833 Leonidmeteor shower. The following three reports sparkedby the Leonid

meteorshowervisibleincertainpartsofAmericain1966willhelpmountfurthersupport

infavouroftheideathatwonderisanemotion.

ThefirstreportcomesfromDr.GeraldKuiperwhoobservedthemeteorshower

togetherwithanumberofhisstudentsonthe17thofNovember1966.ThenextdayDr.

KuiperputthefollowingentryinTheNewYorkTimes:

Thestudents…notedthetime,brightnessandtrajectoryofeachmeteor.Ashours

passeditwasdullwork.Atmostonlyabouttwoaminutewereseen.Thenabout

5A.M….,theratesuddenlybegantoincrease.Withinafewminutesthemeteors

were raining down so fast that further recording was hopeless. The students

38AccordingtoliteraryscholarFredNadis,KatterfeltowasoneofthefirstwondershowmentooperateinLondonduringthe18thcentury;howeversomeofthegreatestwondershowstookplacein19thcenturyAmerica.Wondershowmen‘workedattheboundaryofscienceandmagic,relyingonwondertohelptheiraudiencessuspenddisbelief.Topropuptheirversionofthefantastic,theycontinuallycastscientificandtechnologicalbreakthroughsinmagicaltermsandremnantsofamagicalworldviewinscientificterms’(Nadis,2005,p.14).AmongthemorenotablewondershowmeninAmericaareNicolaTeslawhomarvelledpeopleby‘subjectinghimselftoamillionvoltsofalternatingcurrentandthenburstingintoflamesonstage’(Nadis,2005,p.70)andHarryHoudinialsoknownastheHandcuffKingwhoamazedthecrowdswithhisstagemagicactsinvolvinghimescapingfromlegironsandhandcuffs(Nadis,2005,p.123).39Katterfelto’sshowwasessentiallyaperformancethatmixedmagicandscienceandaddressedtopicssuchas‘thepowersofthefourelements’orthemechanismbehind‘thunder,lightning,earthquakesanddifferentwinds’(Nadis,2005,p.3).InadditionKatterfelto’sshowswouldincludeeverythingfromtheexhibitionofasolarmicroscope‘thatprojectedenlargedimagesofthe“insects”heinsistedcausedtheinfluenzathendevastatingLondoners[tothesuddenappearanceofblackcatscalledtheDoctor’sDevilsthatatdifferentmoments]wouldloseandgaintailsandemitelectricalsparks’(Nadis,2005,p.3).

75

simply stood and gazed in wonder. They estimated that, during the 15-minute

peakoftheshower,the“stars”werefallingattherateof40asecond.

(Parsons,1969,p.88)

Inhis report toLeonidMAC40on the19thofNovember2002RobertGleaves recallshis

experienceofthe1966meteorshowerandgivesthisdescription:

IwassoundasleepwhenIwasawakenedbysomeoneshakingmeandtellingme

to get up quick. It was my mother and she seemed to be very excited about

something,nottellingmeatthatmomentwhatitwas,onlyaskingmetohurryup

andcomeoutsidewithher.IhadnoideathatwhatIwasabouttoseewouldburn

apictureinmymindthatwouldbewithmetothisday.Thereintheskywasthe

most incredible vision I have ever witnessed. It was as if every star was falling

from this north Texas sky, arcing the earth's dome of atmosphere in every

direction.Iwatchedwithmymouthwideopenfor30to45minutesandtheshow

neverseemedtoslowup!ItalmostbringstearstomyeyeswhenIstopandreally

thinkofhowincrediblethatmorningreallywas,butthethingthatreallymadeit

special formewasthedate----Nov.17th,1966............my17thbirthday.Whata

wonderfulgift.

(Gleaves,2002)

PamGlemmeralsowitnessedtheeventin1966andherLeonidMACreportfiledon18th

ofNovember1998reads:

Itwasn'tadarkandstormynight.Iwas14,andlivinginasmallhouseinShawnee

Mission, Kansas. That's eastern Kansas. I got up in themiddle of the night to

make my scheduled trip to the bathroom and as I glanced out the bathroom

window,streaksof lightfromthemoonlessdarkskycaughtmyeye. Imovedto

thesouthfacingbathroomwindow,andwhatIsawasIapproachedthatwindow

is indelibly etched inmymemory, even though it hasbeen some30odd years.

40LeonidMACisshortforLeonidMulti-InstrumentAircraftCampaignandisledbytheSETIInstitute,AerospaceCorporation,andNASAAmesResearchCenter.OneoftheactivitiesofLeonidMACinvolves

collectingwitnessreportsonthe1966Leonidmeteorshower.Moreinformationcanbefoundathttp://leonid.arc.nasa.gov/index.html

76

Oddindeed.I'msuremymouthgapedopeninwonderasIwatchedthenavysky

rain stars. It trulywas a constant shower of stars. At first, I was frightened. I

didn'tunderstandwhatwashappening.Then,thebeautyofittookover.Imust

havestoodthere30minutesormorewaitingfortheraintostop.Itneverdid.I

finally went back to bed feeling as if I had witnessed something that no other

person on the planet had seen.....or would ever see again. I live in Colorado

now...andwon'tbeabletoseetheshowerthistime.Isawitoncethoughalong

timeago....andIwon'teverforget.ItwasSPECTACULAR!

(Glemmer,1998)41

All of the above descriptions seem to suggest that the implicated “stargazers”

experienced a peculiar arresting emotion during the meteor shower. Furthermore all

threedescriptionsconnecttheexperiencetowonder.Kuiperobservesthathisstudents

simplystoodandgazedinwonder.Gleavescallsthemeteorshowerawonderfulbirthday

giftandGlemmerissurethathermouth‘gapedopen’42inwonderwhenshewatchedthe

skyrainstars.

Further support for depictingwonder as an emotion can be found in the literature on

wonder. Towards the end of the introductory chapter I highlighted the work of

contemporarywonder-theoristRobertC.Fullerwhothinksofwonderasanemotionthat

maygiverisetopersonaltransformationandmakesussensibletowhathereferstoasan

unseenorderof lifeand facilitates inusa lasting reverence for it (R.C.Fuller,2006,p.

158).Fuller’scontributiontotheunderstandingofwondercomesacrossaspraiseworthy

41Theopeningline‘Itwasn’tadarkandstormynight’seemssomewhatoddbutitmaynotnecessarilybewithoutadeepermeaning.Thisbecomesclearuponrealisingitcouldbeatwistonthefamousatmosphericphrase‘Itwasadarkandstormynight’featuringintheopeningsequenceofEnglishnovelistEdwardBulwer-Lytton’s1830suspensenovelPaulGlifford(Lytton,2010,p.13).StipulatingthatitwasnotadarkandstormynightcouldbeGlemmer’swayoftelegraphingthatshewasnot‘emotionallycharged’priortoherextraordinaryexperience,whichaddscredibilitytoherreport.Speculatingalongthesamelinesherparticularformulationcouldalternativelybeanattempttoflagthatherreportisconcernedwithanexperienceofaparticularkindofwonderi.e.naturalwonder,becausethephrase‘Itwasn'tadarkandstormynight’couldbeatributetoRachelCarson(animportantexponentofthewonderofnature)whoopensherfamousTheSenseofWonderwith‘onestormyautumnnightwhenmynephewRogerwasabouttwentymonthsoldIwrappedhiminablanketandcarriedhimdowntothebeachintherainydarkness’(Carson,1984,p.8).Ifindeedthisisthecasetheformulationaddscredibilitytoherreportbecausetoevokethenotionofnaturalwonderinrelationtosomethingasextraordinaryasthe1966meteorshowerseemsperfectlyappropriate.42Thisparticularexpressionfindssupport.Recallthatmydaughter’smouthgapedwhensheencounteredtheduckrabbitforthefirsttimeandthatitispossibletoviewleBrun’sdepictionofastonishmentincombinationwithadmirationandDarwin’sdescriptionofsurpriseandastonishmentastheexpressionofwonder(Onians,1994,p.17)(A.S.Harris,2004,p.307)(Daston&Park,1998,p.319)(Darwin,1999,XII).

77

because it synthesises and widens our understanding of the phenomenon of wonder

throughanevolutionary-adaptiveperspective43yetatthesametimeitpavesthewayfor

thinkingoftheemotionofwonderas‘oneprincipalsourceofadultspirituality’(R.Fuller,

2006,p.365)andasFullerwrites the idea that ‘a life shapedbywonderevidences the

veryexistential andcognitive sensibilities thatwould seem indispensable tohumanity’s

searchforreligiousmeaning’(R.Fuller,2006,p.384).

The idea that wonder is an emotion is not unique to Fuller. In fact the first

significanthintofwonderbeinganemotioncomesfromPlatowhoviewswonderasthe

feeling experienced by the philosopher (Plato, 1989, 155d). Later on in the history of

wonderwesawthatDescartesfoundwondertobethefirstofallthepassions(Descartes,

1986,LIII)andAdamSmithcalledwonderasentiment.Nowmanyotherwonder-theorists

besidesFuller,Plato,DescartesandSmithsupporttheideaofwonderbeinganemotion

andtoestablishaclearerviewofjusthowpopularthisideaisamongdifferentacademics

hailing froma varietyofdisciplineswemightbeginby turningour attention to literary

scholar James Vincent Cunningham. In hisWoe and Wonder: The Emotional Effect of

ShakespearianTragedyhearguesthat:

[Wonderis]anemotionlessdiscussedinconnectionwithtragedythaneitherfear

or sorrowandone that the literary person todaydoesnot easily thinkof as an

emotion,butitisacommonplaceintheRenaissanceespeciallyinconnectionwith

thedeathsofnotablepersonsandwiththeeffectsofdramaandfiction.

(Cunningham,1964,p.20-21)

Cunningham clearly states that wonder is an emotion, yet an emotion that is rarely

discussedincomparisontotheemotionoffearandsorrowwhenitcomestotragedy,and

particularlysoin1964comparedtotherenaissanceperiod.

Contemporaryphilosopher JessePrinz also thinksofwonder as anemotionand

arguesthatitisperhapsourmostimportantemotionbecauseithasinspiredhumanity’s

greatest achievements in science, art and religion (Prinz, 2013). According to Prinzwe

wonderatscientificdiscoveriesbecausethey takeusbeyondtheworldofappearances

and‘withitwediscoverendlessdepths,moreastoundingthatwecouldhaveimagined’

43Whatthismeansisthatemotionsarethoughttohavefunctionsi.e.theyfacilitateadaptationandcontributeultimatelytooursurvival(R.Fuller,2006,p.365).AccordingtoFullerthefunctionofwonderasanemotioninanevolutionaryaspectisthatitleadsto‘sustainedattentiontoone’ssurroundings’(R.C.Fuller,2006,p.11).

78

(Prinz,2013).Wewonderorstandinawe(whichaccordingtoPrinzisanintenseformof

wonder) at places of worship such as temples and cathedrals, as they have a way of

making us feel small yet elevated (Prinz, 2013). We wonder at art because art often

depicts religious outlooks and so it is that we can wonder at everything from the

limestone idol Venus ofWillendorf to the depiction of animals in the Chauvet cave in

Francethoughttohavebeenutilisedinshamanisticrites(Prinz,2013).

Quinn acknowledges that ‘wonder is a human emotion and not an idea or

concept’ (Quinn, 2002, xii) but it is ‘the passion that arises from consciousness of

ignorance’(Quinn,2002,p.11).AdditionallyQuinnpointsoutthatwonderisaspeciesof

fearorthemostrationalformoffearthat is,thefearof ignorance(Quinn,2002,p.17-

18).

PhilosopherSophiaVasaloualsosupportstheideaofwonderasanemotionandin

herintroductiontotheanthologyPracticesofWondershewritesthat:

Theappearanceofwonderatsomanyimportantlocationsinourpracticesserves,

ontheonehand,asatestimonytotheinherentcomplexityofthisemotion.Forif,

inmanyofourphilosophical,scientificandotherintellectualinquiries,wonderhas

oftenbeencastasthepassionofinquiryandconnectedwiththedesiretoknow

and understand, its presence in other practices as in spiritual or aesthetic

contexts—if indeedwemaydrawtheseboundarieswithsufficientdistinctness—

brings to the fore its character, notmerely as questing or inquisitive, butmore

importantly,asanappreciativeresponse.

(Vasalou,2012,p.2)

Vasalou clearly points out that wonder is an emotion connected with inquiry and the

quest for understanding but to her it may also pass as an appreciative response to

something.RecallthatwhenBoyleexperiencedtheluminousmeathiswonderfacilitated

anallnightinquiryintothenatureofthestrangephenomenon;howeverwecanalsosay

thatBoyle’swonderwasanappreciativeresponsei.e.,heunderstoodfullwellthatbefore

himwassomethingextraordinaryandmysterious.

Philosopher Marguerite La Caze is another patron of the idea that wonder

qualifiesasanemotionandsheargues inherWonderandGenerosity thatwonderand

indeedgenerosityplays importantroles inbothethicsandpoliticsandthatwonder isa

passion that enables aparticular response toothers that ‘accepts their differences’ (La

79

Caze,2013,p.1).Furthermoresheputsforwardthatwonder‘involvesrecognisingothers

as different from ourselves in that it is a response towhat is unfamiliar and away of

findingtheunfamiliarinthefamiliar(LaCaze,2013,p.1).

Thatwondercanbeclassifiedasanemotionislikewiseadvocatedbyphilosopher

MarthaNussbaumand in her opus on emotionsUpheavals of Thought shewrites that

wonderistheemotionthatresponds:

To the pull of the object, and onemight say that in it the subject ismaximally

aware of the value of the object, and only minimally aware, if at all, of its

relationship to her ownplans. That iswhy it is likely to issue in contemplation,

ratherthaninanyothersortofactiontowardtheobject.

(Nussbaum,2008,p.54)

Additionally she writes that wonder is the emotion that makes it possible for human

beings to transcend selfishness and respond to and recognise the inherent worth of

othersbecauseasshewritesit‘helpsmovedistantobjectswithinthecircleofaperson’s

schemeofends’ (Nussbaum,2008,p.55). In this sensewonder isan inclusiveemotion

thatasFullerwouldargueencourages‘empathyandcompassion[and]redrawsourworld

of concern, establishing truemutuality with a wider sphere of life’ (R. Fuller, 2006, p.

384). The idea thatwonder can be complexwhichwe saw in connectionwithQuinn’s

viewofwonderasaspeciesoffearcanalsobefoundintheofphilosophyofNussbaum

whostipulatesthat:

Wonderissometimesanimportantingredientinotheremotions.Ingriefthereis,

Ithink,oftenakindofwonder–inwhichoneseesthebeautyofthelostpersonas

akindofradiancestandingataverygreatdistancefromus.

(Nussbaum,2008,p.54)

Thisspeaksofthecomplexityofwonderandthatasmuchaswondermaybeaspeciesof

fearitcanalsobeapartofgrief.

That wonder is an emotion likewise comes natural to theologian Celia Deane-

DrummondwhoinherbookWonderandWisdomexploreswhatwonderunderstoodas

thedestabilisingyet‘innocentfeelingofamazementsocommoninlittlechildren’(Deane-

Drummond,2006,p.1)hastodowithwisdom,whichtoheraimsatpresenting‘apicture

80

of thewhole that enlightens rather than fragments knowledge fromdisparate sources’

(Deane-Drummond,2006,p.152).

Additionallywonderunderstoodasanemotiontoanextentfindssupport inthe

work of psychiatrist Pauls R. Fleischmanwho in his bookWonder argues that wonder

mightqualifyasanemotionbutthatwondercanalsobethoughtofasathought-pattern

or the absence of such (Fleischman, 2013, p. 109). Additionally Fleischmanwrites that

when we wonder ‘something about the world itself awakens in us’ and in this sense

‘wonder is a type of complex awareness which participates in complex knowing and

feeling’(Fleischman,2013,p.14).Tobeginappreciatingtheemotionalaspectofwonder

Fleischmansuggeststhatwebeginponderingwhatlifeisbecauseashewrites‘ifyouput

aneffortintounderstandingwhatlifeisyouwillfeelwonder’(Fleischman,2013,p.150).

Thinkingaboutwhatlifeiscanindeedprovokewonderbecausewhatconstituteslifeisan

elusive matter understood as it is not merely something we do not completely

understandbutalsoamatterweperhapsdonotevenunderstandhowtoapproachonce

webegintothinkaboutit.

Sofarwehavepaidattentiontoavarietyofexamplessupportingthenotionthatwonder

isanemotionandwehaveaddressedsomeofthewonder-theoristsinfavouroftheidea.

Of all the theorists Fleishman deserves special attention because asmuch as he is an

exponentof the ideathatwonderqualifiesasanemotionhealsoservesasa reminder

thatitisfarfromcertainthatwondercanbepigeonholedexclusivelyasanemotion.To

continuetoexploreinwhatcapacitywemaycallwonderanemotionitwillbeprudentto

addresswhatactuallymakesupanemotionandthisIshallturntonow.

2.2WhatisanEmotion?

Tosaysomethingaboutthewordemotion,whatitreferstoandwhenitenteredintoour

vocabularywemightbeginbybringingQuinnback into the spotlight.Quinnpointsout

thatthewordemotioncomesfromtheLatin‘emovere’meaning‘tomoveout’andthatit

enteredintotheEnglishvocabularyatsomepointinthe18thcentury(Quinn,2002,p.11).

AsawordithastoanextentreplacedolderexpressionssuchastheGreekword‘pathos’

andthelaterLatintranslation‘passio’,whichweknowinEnglishaspassion.Therendition

‘tomoveout’givesusahint in termsofwhatemotionsdo,namely that theymoveor

81

urgeustoactorbehaveinaparticularway.Nussbaumhasexpressedthiselegantlyinthe

introductiontoUpheavalsofThoughtwhereshewrites:

Emotionsshapethelandscapeofourmentalandsociallives.Likethe“geological

upheavals” a travellermight discover in a landscape where recently only a flat

plane could be seen, they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain, and prone to

reversal.

(Nussbaum,2008,p.1)

ToNussbaumemotionsarewhatgiveourmentallifecolourornuanceastheyshapeour

mental lives.Furthermoretheycanbecultivatedandqualifyas‘intelligentresponsesto

theperceptionofvalue(Nussbaum,2008,p.1).ThismeansthattoNussbaumemotions

arerelevantinmattersofethicaljudgementbecauseasshewrites:‘wecannotplausibly

omitthem,onceweacknowledgethatemotionsincludeintheircontentjudgementsthat

canbetrueandfalse,andgoodandbadguidestoethicalchoice’(Nussbaum,2008,p.1).

Nussbaum’scontributiontotheunderstandingofemotions is importantandthe

idea that emotions can be cultivated links up to her work in political philosophy and

ethics.Neverthelessher approach is butoneamongmanyand thenatureof emotions

andindeedthenatureoftheirexpressionisacomplicatedandcontroversialmatter.To

begin toappreciate thiscomplexityonecouldbeginbypointingout that thereare two

distinct ideas,which Ishall labelthe ‘culturalapproach’andthe ‘naturalapproach’that

havelongtroubledanddividedscholarsworkingonthesubject.

The cultural approach signifies that human emotions are social constructs

understood as philosopher Ian Hacking puts it on the basis that ‘emotions and their

expressionsarequitespecific toasocialand linguisticgroup’ (Hacking,2001,p.18).To

elaborateFullerexplainsthatthislineofthinkingholdsthat‘humanbehaviourandeven

“innerexperiences”(includingouremotionsorevenmysticalexperiences)’ (R.C.Fuller,

2006,p.21)are fabricatedbyculture.Theculturalapproach is inspiredbythe ideathat

humanbehaviourincludingemotionsvariesacrossculturesandtogetsomeholdonthe

scopeofthisidealetusturntophilosopherRobertC.Solomonwhoexplainsthat:

Therepertoireofemotionsinaculture(orasubculture)dependsnotonlyonthe

cultural backgroundand theenvironmentbuton thewaypeople talk and think

about emotions. In our society, conversations often tend to focus on outrage,

82

resentment,and,inaverydifferentmoodromanticlove.Wetalkverylittleabout

grief, very little about gratitude, although these two emotions form the

foundationofagreatmanyextendedconversationsandsoare“basic”emotions

inothercultures.AmongtheKululiofPapua,NewGuinea,forexample,griefand

gratitude form two of the central themes of the entire culture,while American

malestobeveryspecific,seemtofeelveryuncomfortablewithbothofthem.

(Solomon,2007,p.257-258).

Solomonclearlypointsout that therearevastdifferences in thewayemotionssuchas

grief andgratitudeare thoughtand talkedaboutacross cultureswhich speaks towards

theimportanceofcultureandsubcultureinthemakingofemotions.

For further clarificationofwhat itmeans thatemotionsare linked to social and

linguistic groups one can also turn to psychologist Vivian Burr who in her book Social

Constructionismgivesvoicetothesocialconstructionistviewofemotions.Shewrites:

Psychoanalysts take the view that there are discrete and identifiable emotions,

suchasanger,envyandhatred,whichareinnateinallhumanbeings.Theyarea

partofthewayhumanbeingsareconstructed,andthewordswehaveattached

tothemaresimplythelabelswehavechosentorefertotheseemotionalentities.

A social constructionist view, by contrast, would say that, in English-speaking

cultures, thewords ‘anger, ‘hatred’ and ‘envy’ and the concepts towhich they

refer pre-date any one person’s entry into the world as an infant, and in the

process of learning to talk we have no choices but to come to understand

ourselvesintermsoftheseconcepts.Thisviewwouldsuggestthatourexperience

oftheworld,andperhapsespeciallyofourowninternalstates,isundifferentiated

and intangible without the framework of language to give it structure and

meaning. The way language is structured therefore determines the way that

experiencesandconsciousnessarestructured.

(Burr,2003,p.48).

Tothesocialconstructioniststherearenoinnateemotionsassuch,whichwemaylabel

universal. From the very beginning of our lives we become socialised into a particular

contextandthustoputitbluntlywearetaughtwhattothinkandfeelbythemembers

andlanguageofthesocietyinwhichwearesituated.

83

To exemplify the idea that the culturewe are situated in determines how our

emotions develop we might turn to anthropologist Catherine Lutz who in her book

Unnatural Emotions reveals her study of the people inhabiting the island Ifaluk in the

South Pacific and their particular emotion ‘fago’ which she translates into

compassion/love/sorrow(C.Lutz,1988,p.12).Lutzwritesthattoreallyunderstandwhat

fago means ‘requires an understanding of the way the Ifaluk conceptualise positive

relationshipswithothers’(C.Lutz,1988,p.121),andthisindicatesthatinordertograsp

orunderstandfagoonehastosubmergeoneselfintothecultureoftheIfaluk.Againwe

seetheimportanceofcultureinthedevelopmentofemotions.

Toprovideanotherexamplehighlightingemotionsassocialconstructswemight

turntotheJapanesepsychiatristTakeoDoi.HisstudyontheJapaneseconceptof‘amae’

promptedhimtoarguethatitqualifiesasakeytounderstandtheJapanesepersonality

and that ‘amae’ which we may translate into ‘indulgent interdependence’ (Solomon,

2007, p. 258) or ‘sweet dependence’ (Hare, 1988, p. 10) in reality is completely

untranslatable because it has many meanings in Japanese and is an emotion that

‘intrinsicallyavoidsverbalisation’(Morsbach&Tyler,1998,p.290).Ifforargument’ssake

thisistruethoseoutsideJapanesesocietywillhavenoclueastowhatamaereferstoin

full and if one were to acquire such understanding it would depend entirely on one’s

ability to submergeoneself into Japanese cultureandonly throughbeingapartof the

Japaneseculturecouldweunderstandthetruemeaningof‘amae’.

Asmentionedearlier there isanother ideathat influencesthinkersonemotion,which I

havelabelledthenaturalapproach.NowintheearlierquotationfromBurritwaspointed

out that psychoanalysis builds on the idea of innate human emotions and thus the

practiceofpsychoanalysisrepresentsanoutlookonhumanemotionsquitedifferentfrom

that of the social constructionist. The idea is that emotions are a part of our human

makeupandthatnomatterwhatculture, socialgroupor languagegroupwebelongto

we all are equippedwith a particular set of emotions. This idea can be traced back to

ancienttimesandinsupportofthisstandsAristotle’sdeAnimaorOntheSoulasitisalso

calledwhereAristotledeliberates ifsomeoftheconditionsofthesoul (anger,courage,

desire,sensation)canbeattributedtothesoulonlyorifallofthemarebodilythingsand

happenings(Aristotle,1957,403a-403b19).44Aristotle’sconditionsofthesoulareuseful

44AristotledevelopshisviewofemotionsintheArtofRhetoricwherehefocusesonemotionssuchaspity,

angerandfearsoonemightlearnhowtomanipulatetheminone’saudience(Aristotle,1926,1378a20-

84

forourunderstandingofemotionsbecausetheycanbeviewedasprecursorsforwhatwe

todaywouldcall‘basicemotions’.NowaccordingtophilosopherPeterGoldietheideaof

basicemotionsinvolvesthat:

Our concept of emotions are organized hierarchically, with the non-basic

emotions falling under one or more of the basic emotions. So, for example, if

anger is a basic emotion, then less basic species of angermight be annoyance,

fury, rage, indignation and so forth. Other non-basic emotions could then be

comprised of a cocktail of basic emotions: jealousy, for example,might include

fear and anger. According to this view, then, basic emotions are themselves

commontoallhumans,andothersortsofemotionneednotbe.

(Goldie,2000,p.87)

That there might be such a thing called universal emotions is an interesting notion

becauseiftrueiteffectivelypointsoutahumancommunality.Howeverithastobesaid

thatwhatqualifiesasbasicemotionsisnotquiteasfixedassomeperhapswouldliketo

think and that the ‘list of basic emotions’ has virtually changedover time and is still a

matterofcontroversy.Tosubstantiate, the IndiantreatiseNatyashastra,aSanskrit text

dating back to the 3rd century BCE committed to investigations into the nature of

consciousness,distilsnineprincipalemotions:sexualpassion,amusement,sorrow,anger,

fear, perseverance, disgust, wonder and serenity (Shweder & Haidt, 2000, p. 399). A

different list canbe found in theLi Chi, aChineseencyclopaediadatingback to the1st

centuryBCEwhichdescribesthesevenfeelingsofmenas:joy,anger,sadness,fear,love,

disliking,andliking’(J.Russell,1991,p.426).IncontrastCicero’sworkhighlightsonlyfour

emotions namely lust/desire, delight, fear and distress (Cicero, 2001, IV, 13-15) and

Descartesnamessixsimpleandprimitivepassionsnamelywonder, love,hatred,desire,

joy and sadness (Descartes, 1986, p. 362). The philosopher Spinoza found there to be

threeprimaryemotionswhicharepleasure,painanddesire(Spinoza,1989,III,prob.59)

and philosopher Thomas Hobbes listed the following simple passions: appetite, desire,

love,aversion,hate, joyandgrief(Hobbes,1992, I,ch.6)LastlyDarwinidentifiedseven

1380a4).LikewiseheworksonemotionsandinparticulartheemotionofangerintheNicomacheanEthics

whereheemphasisesthathavingthecorrectemotionispartofbeingvirtuous(Aristotle,1941,1125b26-1126b9).

85

emotional expressions including low spirits (anxiety, grief, dejection and despair), high

spirits (joy, love, tender feelings and devotion), reflection (meditation, ill-temper,

sulkiness and determination), hatred (anger), disdain (contempt, disgust, guilt, pride,

helplessness,patience,affirmationandnegation)surprise(astonishment,fearandhorror)

andself-attention(shame,shyness,modesty,blushing)(Darwin,1999,VII-XIII).Nowthis

montage of discrepancy over basic emotions clearly is brought together from older

sourcesandthusonemightbeinclinedtothinkthatcontemporarypsychologycanoffera

conclusivevisionofwhatcountsas innatehumanemotions.Alasthis is inastrictsense

notthecase,whichbecomesobviouswhenweconsulttheworkofpsychologistRobert

Plutchikwho inEmotionsand Life:Perspectives fromPsychology,BiologyandEvolution

informsusaboutthevariations inthelistsofbasicemotionsadvocatedbyanumberof

modernscholars(Plutchik,2003,p.73).Thatwecannotsayforsurewhatmakesupthe

setofbasicemotionsisnaturallyaproblemandaseriouschallengetoadvocatesofthe

natural approach to emotions. Having said that, this does not mean that the cultural

approach prevails. The natural approach endures within the philosophy of emotions

because although theorists cannot completely agree on a list of basic emotions most

theorists recognise that fear, sadness and anger are basic emotions and consensus is

almostwithinreachwhenitcomestoemotionssuchas joy, loveandsurprise(Plutchik,

2003,p.73).

Nowsettlingwhichofthetwoideasisthecorrectoneisbeyondthescopeofthis

thesisandgivenourpresentfocusnotatallanecessity.Forourpurposesitisprofitable

to keep both ideas in mind because both may help us understand wonder better. To

elaborate one might say that the cultural approach is merited because to say that

emotionsare socially constructedcanhelpcast lightonwhy theconceptionofwonder

haschangedovertimeandwhyitisthatforexamplethefeelingofwondercelebratedin

Plato’s Theaetetus as the beginning of philosophy is so readily dismissed by the 18th

centuryEnglishpoetAlexanderPopewhowerecallvoicedthatfoolsadmire,butmenof

sense approve. One possible explanation is that changes in the social climate and the

generalconceptionoftheorderofthingsdiscreditedwonderandfrombeingthefeeling

ofthephilosopheritbecamethefeelingassociatedwithnaivety.Inotherwordswecan

say that given the seemingly wonder-friendly culture of ancient Athens an upstart

philosopher would have been encouraged to see wonder in a positive light whilst a

student during the less wonder-friendly Enlightenment period with its emphasis on

reason in all likelihoodwould have been cultivated to think and speak ofwonder in a

86

muchmorereservedandnegativeway.Afurthermeritoftheculturalapproachisthatit

will help us remain critical towards whatever conclusions about wonder the natural

approachmightprovideusandnottobeletastraybywhatcouldbenothingbutsocial

trends in the current research climate on emotions, attempting to pigeonholewonder

merely as a complex emotion too muddled for serious attention or explain away its

significancebydescribingitassynonymouswithforexamplesurpriseorfear.

Nowkeepingthis inmindtogetherwiththeuncertaintiessurroundingthe listof

basicemotionsithastobesaidthattheapproachtoemotionsandindeedwonder(which

I shall elaborateon later in this chapter)drawingon thenatural approach toemotions

does offer a fruitfulway forwardwhen it comes to understandingwhat emotions are.

Thisisbecausethe‘war’betweensocialscienceandnaturalscienceisnotasprominent

asitwasinthe20thcenturyandthatsincethe1980sgeneticshaveestablishedthestrong

influence of biology on human behaviour. Likewise the disciplines of evolutionary

psychology aiming at explaining why ‘natural selection favours the kinds of mental

activity that we discern in organism today’ (R. C. Fuller, 2006, p. 21) and sociobiology

which is concerned with ‘why humans and other social organisms evolved particular

behaviour patterns’ (R. C. Fuller, 2006, p. 21) have emerged and advanced our

understandingofwhathumanemotionsare(R.C.Fuller,2006,p.21).Theadvancement

of our understanding of emotions that these newmovements have brought forth can

partlybefoundintheinsistenceofresearchersadvocatingthenaturalapproachto‘getto

the “bottom of things”, to identify the basic building blocks of emotions, the basic

emotions’ (Solomon,2002a,p.115).Toanextent thesenew fieldsanddisciplineshave

successfully merged the cultural approach and the natural approach recognising that

emotionsaregroundedinbiologybutsocialfactorsarealsoimportantinthegeneration

ofparticularemotionsandtheirexpression(R.C.Fuller,2006,p.26-27).

2.2.1TheCognitiveApproach

Thissectionbreaksawayfromthebig lines inthephilosophyofemotionsdrawnout in

the previous section and focuses on the cognitive approach to emotions which is a

particularviewofemotionsthatgainedmomentumafterthepublicationofpsychologist

UlricNeisser’s 1967bookCognitive Psychology (Neisser, 2014). The cognitive approach

advocatesthenotionthatemotionsareintentionalstatesofmindmeaningthattheyare

‘directed at or toward some object’ (Deigh, 2010, p. 17) and this approach is quite

87

suitable for an investigation intowonder becausewhenwewonder,wewonder about

somethingmeaningthatourwondermentisdirectedtowardaparticularobjectorevent.

The cognitive approach has in this respect a certain explanatory power as it allows

emotions tobecomepart of a larger affective realmandemotions tobebrokendown

intosmallersubcategories,whichconsequentlywillincreasethelevelofdetail,andthus

we stand a better chance of advancing our understanding ofwonder if indeed it is an

emotion.NowbeforeIsaymoreaboutthecognitiveapproachithastobesaidthatitis

not unrivalled or immune to criticism. The cognitive approach is an alternative to the

approach to emotions pioneered by psychologistWilliam James arguing that emotions

equalsfeelingsandareconnectedwithbodilystates.Jameswrites:

Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be

purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We

might see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it

righttostrike,butwecouldnotactuallyfeelafraidandangry.

(James,1884,p.190)

James’ idea is thatwithoutbodily feelings there is no such thing as emotions and that

bodily changes are responsible for emotions. Rooted in ancient Greek thought the

cognitiveapproach treatsemotionsas cognitive, thought-centredanddirected towards

theworld(Deigh,2010,p.17,26);(Goldie,2010,p.4).ThischallengesJames’sviewand

insiststhathisapproachplacestoomuchemphasisonbodilystatesandtoolittleonthe

cognitive aspect of emotions (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 179). For this reason the cognitive

approach is popular but in our endeavour to understand in what sense wonder is an

emotion we must exercise caution because as philosopher Simon Blackburn argues

emotionsarenotascognitiveassomemightthinkandthecognitiveapproachisfartoo

Apollonian45andfarlessDionysian46,leavingoutasNussbaumhasstated‘whatismessy

and ungovernable in the life of the passions’ (Nussbaum, 2008, p. 16). Whilst I

45ThetermisderivedfromtheGreekgodApollowho‘incarnatestheidealsweassociatewithClassicalGreekthought[andherepresents]ego,light,youth,purity,reasonableness,order,discipline,andbalance’(Keen,1969,p.152).46KeenexplainsthatthetermderivesfromtheAncientGreekgodDionysuswhoisgodoffertilityandresemblestheenergyofnature.TheGreeksassociatedhimwithwineandmetamorphosisandworshippingDionysuswasanenthusiasticenterpriseinvolving‘ecstasy,license,revelry,anddirectparticipation,byeating,inthelifeofthedyingandreborngod.IntheecstasyinducedbywineanddancingtheworshipperslosttheirownpersonalitiesandweremergedwithDionysus.Thustheboundariesseparatingman,nature,andthedivinewereerased’(Keen,1969,p.154).

88

acknowledgeBlackburn’scriticismIshallrefrainfromgoingintofurtherdetailsasthisis

beyondthescopeofmyinquiry47.Intheinterestofcastinglightonthepossibleemotion

ofwonder adapting the cognitive approach seemsmost promisingwith regards to this

particularendeavour.

Tocontinueandpresentamorein-depthaccountofthecognitiveapproachletusturnto

contemporaryphilosopherArronBen-Ze’evwhofindsthatatypicalemotion:

Isgeneratedbyperceivedsignificantchanges;itsfocusofconcernispersonaland

comparative;itsmajorcharacteristicsareinstability,greatintensity,partialityand

briefduration;anditsbasiccomponentsarecognition,evaluation,motivationand

feelings.

(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.61)

According to Ben-Ze’ev emotions call for our attention whenwe encounter significant

positiveornegativechangesinpersonalmattersorthestateofaffairsofthoseconnected

tous(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.42).Werespondtotheunfamiliarbuttheattentioncalledfor

doesnotpersistandafterawhilethechange isviewedasanormalstateofaffairsand

ceases to excite us (Ben-Ze'ev, 2010, p. 43). Emotions exist to protect our personal

concerns and in the event of an emotional change its importance or meaning is

comparative in the sense that it is against a personal referential framework or

backgroundthattheimportanceormeaningofthechangecanbeevaluatedandassessed

(Ben-Ze'ev, 2010, p. 44). In addition he explains that a typical emotion has four

characteristics: Instability, great intensity, partiality, and brief duration and four basic

components:Cognition,evaluation,motivationandfeelings(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.42).The

firstcharacteristic,instability,relatestothenotionthatemotionsareunstablestatesand

indicators of change or transition. Born out of a changing context ‘they signify some

agitation,theyare intense,occasional,and limited induration’ (Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.45).

Thesecondcharacteristic,great intensity, iscalledforduetothenotionthatsignificant

changerequiresthe‘mobilisationofmanyresources’(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.45).Thethird

characteristic,partiality,ishighlightedbecauseemotionsarepartialinthesensethatthey

canfocusonanarrowtarget,suchasapersonoralimitednumberofpeopleandexpress

apersonalandinterestedstandpoint.Ben-Ze’evexplainsthatemotionsinthissenseare

47InterestedpartiescanreadmoreaboutBlackburn’scriticismofthecognitiveapproachinhisbookRulingPassions(Blackburn,1998)andthearticle‘PrecisofRulingPassions’(Blackburn,2002).

89

similar to heat-seekingmissiles since their only concern is to find the heat-generating

target(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.45).Thefourthcharacteristicofemotionisbrevity.Ben-Ze’ev

states that typicalemotionsare relatively short-livedsinceapersoncannotmobiliseall

herresourcestoremainfocussedonaparticulareventforaprolongedperiod.Ifsoshe

would rapidly lose her ability to function adaptively (Ben-Ze'ev, 2010, p. 46). Amental

systemsimplycannotbeunstableforlongandstillfunctionnormallyandatsomepointit

will‘construethechangeasanormalandstablesituation’(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.46).Thus

emotionsaretransientstates;howeverfromthatitdoesnotfollowthattheirimpactona

personmirrors this particular quality. Ben-Ze’ev finds that ‘a brief emotional state can

haveprofoundandlong-lastingbehaviouralimplications’(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.46).

As mentioned Ben-Ze’ev also informs us that emotions contain four basic

components which ‘express a conceptual division of the elements of this experience'

(Ben-Ze'ev, 2010, p. 47). The first three components: cognition, evaluation and

motivationareintentional,meaningtheyrefertoasubject-objectrelationortheyareall

about‘beingaboutsomething’{Ben-Ze'ev,2010#15,p.47).Inotherwordsthematterat

handinvolvesourabilitytoignoretheconstantflowofstimuliinoursurroundingssothat

wemay form for example ameaningful relationship to another person. The final basic

component is feeling,whichBen-Ze'evascribestowhathecalls 'thefeelingdimension'.

Feelings are hard to describe and people often turn to the use of metaphors in the

attempt toconveyaparticular feeling.He furthermoreexplains that feelings reveal the

subject’s stateofmind in the formofaprimitivemodeof consciousness. Theyarenot

intentionalandonecannotdemandareasonwhyoneisfeelingsomethinginparticular.

‘Wecannotreasonpeopleoutoftheirtoothacheaswemightreasonthemoutoftheir

hatred[andthus]feelingsarenotsubjecttonormativeappraisal’(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.49).

The intensefeelingdimensionmayhaveapositiveandnegative influenceonthemind.

Onthepositivesidebeingarousedcanbecognitivelyadvantageoussinceitmightaidone

in(a)understandingparticularaspectsofagivensituation(b)heighteningone’sattention

and (c) increasingmemory (Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.48).On thenegativeside it canbesaid

that if one harbours intense feelings the intellectual faculties of a person might be

compromised, meaning that sound cognitive assessment in a given situation is

impossible.(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.48).

Returning to the intentional dimension and the component of emotion called

‘cognition’ Ben-Ze'ev claims that it delivers the needed information about a particular

situationorcontext.Howeverthisinformationisoftendistortedduetotheinfluenceof

90

(a)partiality,(b)closenessand(c)anintensefeelingdimension(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.47).

Ben-Ze'evexplainsthatpartialitycompromisesknowledgesincedistortedclaimsmaybe

adoptedduetolackofvisionorperspective.AccordingtoBen-Ze’evpartialityissimilarin

effecttothatofgreatcloseness,whichdisruptsthecognitivepartinemotionsandkeeps

us from seeing multiple facets of a given object. To illustrate this point he gives the

exampleoflookingatsomeonefromaveryshortdistance.Insuchasituationourvisionis

distortedandinordertogainamorecollectedandencompassingsightofthepersonin

frontofusdistanceisarequirement(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.48).Likewiseintensefeelingcan

causedistortionbecausewhenoneharbours such feelingsour intellectual faculties are

compromised‘andnolongerfunctionsnormally’(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.48).

With regards to the evaluative component of emotionBen-Ze’ev considers it of

the utmost importance as it assesses the merits of the information delivered by the

cognitivecomponentintermsofitsimpactonthewellbeingofaperson(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,

p.48).Imagineatiredstudentwalkingintoherfavouritecoffeebarwiththeintentionof

spendinga fewhourson readingHeidegger'sBeingandTimeoveracupofcoffee.She

learnsthatunfortunatelythecoffeebar isoutofcoffeebeansmeaningthatshecannot

enjoy her much-needed 'cognitive enhancer' while reading Heidegger. Evaluating this

informationupagainstherideaofherwellbeingshewoulddecideeithertostayandread

Heideggeroverforexampleacupofteaorsimplydecidethatthecoffeeistooimportant

tobemissedandthatshewillhavetotakeherbusinesselsewhere.

The final component in the intentional dimension is according to Ben-Ze'ev

motivation.Motivation is concernedwith a person’s eagerness to “maintain or change

present,pastorfuturecircumstances”(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.48).Amotivatedpersonmight

defyaconsiderableamountofobstacles inordertochangehercircumstances. Imagine

anupcomingballetdancerbentonbeinghiredbyamajorballet company. Shemight

defytheadviceofherparents,thepangsofpovertyoranxietyprovokedbytheintense

competitioninordertofulfilherdream.

So far we have engaged with the notion of changes and we have found that

emotions are personal and the importance of emotional change ismeasured against a

personal background. Furthermore we have explored the major characteristics of

emotion together with the basic components. However, Ben-Ze’ev’s description of

emotion does not stop here. He continues by stating that the intensity of a typical

emotiondependsonvariablesliketheevent’sstrength,reality,andrelevance(Ben-Ze'ev,

2010,p.50-51).Anevent’sstrengthdeterminestheintensityofanemotionalexperience

91

soifIamangrytheintensityofmyangerismeasuredagainstthelevelofdamageIhave

sufferedbecauseof theevent.Anevent’s reality refers towhatdegreewebelieve the

eventtoberealwhich istosaythatthemorewebelieveaneventtoberealthemore

intenseouremotionswillbe.Therelevanceofaneventislikewiseimportantbecausethe

greater therelevanceaneventhas themore importantand intense itwillbe.Adeadly

tornadohittingusrighthere,rightnowismorerelevanttousthanatornadohittingan

uninhabited area in Oklahoma because our lives are in danger and thus our emotions

wouldbemoreintense.

Our accountability, readiness and deservingness in relation to the event also

influence the way emotions work because they form the ‘constituting background

circumstances of the emotional event’ (Ben-Ze'ev, 2010, p. 52). By accountability Ben-

Ze’ev highlights responsibility and agency, which is to say that a higher degree of

accountabilityresultsingreateremotionalintensity.ByreadinessBen-Ze’evpointstothe

cognitive change that takes place in ourminds during an event. If something happens

unexpectedlyitgeneratesintensitybecauseashewrites:‘weareangrierifwehappento

beexpecting a contrary result, just as thequiteunexpected fulfilmentof ourwishes is

especiallysweet’(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.53).ConcerningdeservingnessBen-Ze’evpointsout

withreferencetoAristotlethatweallseekfairtreatmentandalthoughwemightdisagree

onwhatcountsasjustandunjustweallthink‘theselfisaworthwhileperson’(Ben-Ze'ev,

2010,p.53)(Aristotle,2003,V.ix.4-7).

Furthermore,contextualandpersonalityvariablesare influentialaswellwhen it

comes to emotional intensity (Ben-Ze'ev, 2010, p.54). What is at play here is that

‘personal traits, world views, cultural background, and current personal situation’ are

factorsthatmayfueltheintensityofanemotion.

AsalastentryBen-Ze’evclaimsthatemotionsbelongtoagreateraffectiverealm,

which includes sentiments, moods, affective traits and affective disorders (Ben-Ze'ev,

2010, p.61) meaning that this is a very versatile approach that provides a rich and

explanatorydescriptionofemotion.

2.2.2TheCognitiveApproach&EpistemicEmotions

Earlierweencountered thenotionofbasicemotionsand thepredicate ‘basic’ suggests

thereareotherkindsofemotionstoconsiderwhichweforthesakeofargumentcould

term ‘non-basic emotions’. Given that we do not have a complete list of the basic

92

emotions naming non-basic emotions is naturally problematic, but granted Plutchick is

rightinhisviewthataconsensushasbeenreachedstatingthatfear,sadnessandanger

arebasicemotionsthenemotionssuchasforexamplelove,jealousy,hate,joy,gratitude,

awe,grief,dread,reverence,hope,trust,humilityand(perhaps)wondercanbeclassified

asnon-basicemotions.InthehopeofadvancingourunderstandingofwonderIshallnow

focus on a particular subgroup of non-basic emotion labelled ‘epistemic emotions’ by

following philosopher Adam Morton who classifies wonder as an epistemic emotion

(Morton,2010,p.385,389).

To begin we might say that Morton is interested in how we acquire beliefs

correctlyandinthisrespectheidentifiesepistemicemotionsthataredirectedespecially

towards knowledge or epistemic ends (Morton, 2010, p. 386). In this respect he has

devised a list of possible candidates for epistemic emotions: ‘Curiosity, intellectual

courage,loveoftruth,wonder,meticulousness,excitementandhumility’(Morton,2010,

p. 386). It canbe ventured that theseparticular candidatesdonot representemotions

butareintruthvirtuesyetMortonremainsopentotheexistenceofepistemicemotions.

Thereasonforthisisinparttobefoundinhisdistinctionbetweenvirtue,characterand

emotion(Morton,2010,p.386).Forexample,Mortonclaimsthat ‘generosity’canrefer

tothreedifferentthings.Toharbourthevirtueofgenerosityonehastobegenerousi.e.

displaysgenerousactions,howeverinorderforagenerousactiontobevirtuousitneeds

tobebalanced:neithergivingtoolittlenorgivingtoomuch.Mortongivestheexampleof

apersoninacademiawhosegenerouscharacterandinsistenceonincorporatingthework

of an incompetent co-worker slows down a research project. This person harbours

generosityasacharactertraitbutshecannotbeviewedasvirtuoussincehergenerosity

isexcessive(Morton,2010,p.386).Emotioncontrastswithbothvirtueandcharacter.Itis

quitepossible to imagineapersonwhoafterexhibitinggreatgenerositymaysay, ‘Idid

not feel generous’ but this does not nullify her generosity (Morton, 2010, p. 387). The

opposite is also possible as one can imagine a person post displaying no generosity

whatsoever claims that she feels enormously generous. In either case, feelings do not

definewhetheranactisgenerousnordotheydefinewhetheritisvirtuous.

Morton also offers an alternative argument to distinguish virtue, character and

emotion through the concept of longevity. Virtues are normative concepts since they

‘pickoutdispositions toprofitable, correct,oradmirablepatternsofactionor thought’

(Morton,2010,p.388).Furthermore itcanbesaidofvirtues that just likeoneswallow

doesnotamakeaspringonevirtuousactdoesnotmakeoneavirtuousperson.Virtue,it

93

seems,appeals to longevity.Concerning thenotionofcharacter it canbesaid that just

becauseapersonloseshertempermomentarilyduringadiscussionitdoesnotmakeher

an angry character. Likewise, just because a cowardly character experiences a brief

momentofcourageitdoesnotfollowthatsheisnolongeracoward.Inthislighttheidea

ofcharacter likethenotionofvirtuedemandscertaindurability.Emotionsontheother

hand are, according to Morton, different since they are occurrent and ‘happen at

particularmomentsandthroughdeterminatestretchesoftime,duringwhichtheyhave

causal influence on the person’ (Morton, 2010, p. 388). FurthermoreMorton explains

thatemotionscanbeassociatedwithconsciousaffect,meaningwecanhaveafeelingof

being generous just as we can have conscious awareness about a particular thought

formation or pressing desire (Morton, 2010, p. 388). In addition emotions can also be

motivessincetheycan‘causebehaviourbymakingparticulardesiresandbeliefssalient’

(Morton,2010,p.388).

With regards to how we human beings acquire beliefs it is nevertheless still

possibleforthesceptictodenytheexistenceofepistemicemotions.Firstofallitisquite

plausible that an enquiring mind does not rely on emotions at all in the process of

obtainingknowledgebecauseitcanbearguedthatalloneneedsisthevirtuesofbeing

careful,curious,imaginativeandresponsible(Morton,2010,p.388).Secondlyevenifone

acceptsthatemotionshaveasayinvirtuousbehaviouritstillleavesroomforthesceptic

because feeling curious at a key moment in time does not mean that the emotion

functions epistemically (Morton, 2010, p. 388). NeverthelessMorton argues that there

areoccasionswherevirtuesarenotenoughandwhereemotionsplayakeyrolewhenit

comestoacquiringknowledge.Heclaimsthatanenquirybasedonemotion-lessvirtues

wouldbe shalloweror somewhat lighter in its constitution (Morton, 2010,p. 388). To

illustratethisMortonfirstpointstothenotionofmotivationandgivestheexampleofa

youngscientistwhosequalificationsareunquestionableifitwasnotforthefactthatshe

doesnotcareabouthersubjectandiscompletelydevoidofcuriosity.Shewantsacareer

andsheknowsthatbypushingaparticularlineofenquiryshewillbesuccessfulingetting

precisely that.According toMorton it isquitepossible that thescientistwill succeed in

producingexcellentscientificwork;however it isunlikelythatshewill revolutioniseher

fieldortakeachanceanddedicateherworkinglifetoalineofinquirythatforherseems

important (Morton, 2010, p. 386). In order to be a scientist par excellence one has to

harbourcertainmotivatingepistemicemotionsandinthisrespecthementionswonder,

curiosity and scepticism (Morton, 2010, p. 389). Without wonder the scientist would

94

neverwonderat anemergingpattern inherpoolofdata.Without curiosity shewould

neverponderhowscientistsviewherfieldcenturiesintothefuture.Withoutscepticism

shewould never stop at thinkwhether her enquirywould benefit from an alternative

perhapslesssupportedmethod(Morton,2010,p.389).

Secondly Morton argues that the epistemic emotions answering to curiosity,

worry, concern and interest are linked to obtaining knowledge and how we consider

relevantalternatives toagivenbelief. Ifone iscuriousaboutaparticularmatterone is

interestedinknowingthetruthandwouldnotjustsettlewithabelief(Morton,2010,p.

391).Knowledgeiswhatsatisfiescuriosityandobtainingknowledge‘requiresexploration

of a maze of possibilities, some consistent with the fact that is known and some

incompatible with it’ (Morton, 2010, p. 394). Refraining from exploring alternative

possibilitieswouldinduceepistemicworryorconcernaboutthetruthfulnessaboutone’s

knowledge.

ThirdlyMortoninvestigatesthenotionthattheemotionofresponsibilityislinked

toepistemicworry.Hearguesthatifonefeelsresponsibleforknowingsomethingabout

aparticular subjectonewouldexperienceepistemicworriesaboutpossibleunexplored

avenues(Morton,2010,p.396).Toillustratethisheasksthereadertoimagineascientist

inchargeofaresearchprojectseekingtoestablishifthechemicalsusedinthemakingof

aparticularbrandofbabybottlesarecarcinogenic.Thescientistmighthaveestablished

thatthechemical isharmlessinitselfbutwhenitcomestocontactwithplastic,normal

food acidity or with digestive enzymes things are no longer certain. The scientistmay

have cleared awide range of these combinations; however it is doubtful that she has

clearedallpossiblecombinations.ThereforeaccordingtoMortonshehastoremainalert.

InfactMortonarguesshehastobeworried,behauntedandthewholeaffairhastonag

her(Morton,2010,p.394).Harbouringtheepistemicvirtueofworryissimplynotenough

insuchasituation.Thescientistneedsepistemicemotionstobearesponsiblescientist.

2.3IsWonderanEmotion?

I shall now attempt to cast light on the stargazers’ peculiar arresting experiences by

makinguseof the insights intoemotion froma cognitiveperspectiveprovidedbyBen-

Ze’evandMorton.Itmaybeprudenttostartbyaskingifitisreasonabletothinkthatthe

stargazersareexperiencinganemotioninthearrestingmoment.AccordingtoBen-Ze’ev

and his take on emotions it seems the answer is yes. All the stargazers are facing

95

somethingextraordinary,unexpectedandveryrealandtheirreactionfitsverywellwith

Ben-Ze’ev’s description of an emotion. Ben-Ze’ev lists that an emotion contains four

characteristicsandfourcomponents.Thefirstcharacteristicisinstability.Inthisrespectit

canbesaidthat thearrestingmoment isamomentof transitionor transfiguring forall

the implicated stargazers. All the implicated parties have to face and cope with the

extraordinaryandunexpectedas thenormalappearanceof thenightsky is suspended.

Thesecondcharacteristicisgreatintensity.Inrelationtothestargazersitcanbeargued

that the arresting situation for them is a situation of great intensity due to the visual

onslaughtofthemeteorshower.Thestudentsfromthefirstexampleseemtotestifyto

thiseffectsincetheysimplystoptheirworkandgazeatthesky.Inthesecondexample

Robert’sexcitedmotherhurrieshimoutofbedandthefactthathedescribesthemeteor

showerasthemost incrediblevisionhehaseverwitnessedspeaksofgreat intensity. In

thethirdexamplePamdescribesherselfas frightenedand ignorantofwhat isgoingon

when she first encounters themeteor shower. This speaksof great intensity. The third

characteristic,partiality, isalsocalledfor inthethreeexamples.All the involvedpeople

focusinthesituationonaspecifictargetnamelythemeteorshower.Nothingelseseems

tomatter.ThefourthcharacteristicisbriefdurationandIshallarguethisisalsohonoured

by theprovidedexamples.For thestudents theevent isarresting for15minuteswhile

theshowerisatitspeak.Robertreportsthathewasheldcaptivebytheshowerfor30-45

minutesandPamreportsthatshestoodandwatchedtheshowerfor30minbeforeher

abilitytofocusdeclinedandshewentbacktobed.

According to Ben-Ze’ev emotions also have four components that we need to

consider before we can say that the stargazers are dealing with an emotion. The first

component is cognitionand is supposed todeliver informationaboutagiven situation;

however,inalltheexamplesthisfunctionishardatworkbutfailstodeliveracomplete

pictureofwhat isgoingon.Relyingontheirobservationalskillsandcountingabilitythe

studentsactionquicklycomestoahaltastheintensityofthemeteorshoweroverwhelms

them. Robert’s statement “I had no idea that what I was about to see would burn a

picture in my mind that would be with me to this day” speaks of a person who was

oblivious as to what was coming and was swept away by what he encountered. Pam

reports that when she first saw the unusual streaks of light in the sky she set out to

investigate but was filled with fright when she finally saw the navy sky rain stars and

foundthatshedidnotunderstandit.

96

Thesecondcomponentisevaluationandinrelationtothestargazersitseemsall

the involved evaluate the situation as not dangerous. The students gaze at the

phenomenon while standing still, Robert merely watches the sky and when Pam

overcomesherinitialfearshefocusesentirelyonthebeautyoftheshower.

Thethirdcomponentismotivation.Forallthestargazersitcanbesaidthatthey

hadaninterestinobservingtheshower.Otherneedssuchassleepweresuspendedand

inPam’scaseitmightalsohaveinterruptedherscheduledvisittothebathroom.

Thelastcomponentisfeelinganditseemsthatallthestargazersareexperiencing

anarresting feeling.Thestudents justgazeat themeteorsnotdoinganythingelseand

Robert andPam report that theyhad theirmouthsopen for 30-45minuteswhile they

were watching the sky. In addition judging from Robert and Pam’s reports it can be

argued that they both experienced increased attention and memory since they both

handedintheirreportsmanyyearsaftertheeventtookplaceandstillrecalltheeventas

wonderfulandspectacular.ClearlytheeventinthecaseofRobertandPamhadalong-

lastingeffect.

Basedonthisitseemsplausiblethatthestargazersareexperiencingsomekindof

emotion during the peak of the shower but does this emotion correspond towonder?

Morton says littleabout theepistemicemotionofwonder inparticular;however, from

his work we learn that if wonder indeed is an epistemic emotion it must be directed

towardsknowledgeorsomeepistemicend.Woulditbefittingtosaythatthestargazers

areexperiencingtheepistemicemotionofwonder?InthecaseofthestudentsIbelieveit

isaplausibleoption.Weknowthatthestudentssetoutonascientificmissioninorderto

learnhowtheparticularmeteorshowerworks.Weknowtheyreliedonobservationand

plannedtonotethefrequency,trajectoryandbrightnessofthemeteors.Wealsoknow

that they had to give up their endeavours when the rate of meteors increased

dramatically. It can be argued that the students at this point became stunned or

flabbergastedbytheintensityofthemeteorshower,whicheffectivelyendedtheirinitial

epistemic pursuits. Alternatively it can be argued that the students experienced a

transition in their epistemic focus. It is thinkable that the students initially were

motivated by curiosity and focused on collecting facts about the meteor shower.

Furthermoreitcanbearguedthatthestudentsatthepeakoftheeventwerepushedto

exchangethescientificoutlookwithamorewonderingphilosophicallineofquestioning.

Thiscouldincludeexchangingdesirestoknowaboutfrequency,trajectoryandbrightness

with reflections on for example the beauty of the event to thoughts of their own

97

existence in relation to the vastness of space or why there is something rather than

nothing. Taking this into account I think it is quite plausible that the students are

experiencingtheepistemicemotionofwonder.

ConsideringGleaves’andGlemmer’switnessreportsitseemstheyalsocouldhave

experienced an epistemic shift. From the time Gleaves’s mother woke him up and

usheredhimtofollowheroutsidehemusthavebeencuriousaboutwhatwasafoot.The

same goes for Glemmer when she saw the first streaks of light outside her window.

Secondslatertheybothfacedthefullforceofthemeteorshoweranditisquiteplausible

thattheyinthatverymomentbothexperiencedatransitionfrombeingmotivatedbythe

emotionofcuriositytothatofbeingmotivatedbytheepistemicemotionofwonder.

2.4OtherFacesofWonder

Sofaritseemspossiblethatwondercanbeviewedasanemotionormorespecificallyan

epistemic emotion. However this does not necessarily imply that wonder is only an

emotionandinthefollowingIshallbrieflydepictthreedifferentaspectsofwonderbased

on the work of Ben-Ze’ev, Parsons and Evans suggesting that wonder is perhaps best

viewedasnotmerelyanemotionbutmultifaceted.

Tobeginletusconsiderthepossibilityofwonderbeingamood.Amooddiffersfroman

emotion in the sense that emotions have specific intentional objects whereas moods

havegeneralordiffuseintentionalobjects(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.55).Furthermoremoods

differfromemotionsinrelationtothetimetheyoccupy.Emotionscanlastforsecondsto

daysbuttypically lastforafewminutestoafewhours(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.55).Moods

ontheotherhandtypicallylastlongerandtheirlifespanrangesfromhoursoverdaysto

weeksandmonths(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.55).Ithinkitispossiblethatonecanbeinamood

ofwonder. Imagineapersonwho formostofher adult lifehas advocatedaparticular

philosophy.Supposethenthatthepersonenrolsonaphilosophycourseandduringthe

coursesheencountersateacherwhosuccessfullyarguesagainstthephilosophysheuntil

thisverydayhasbuiltherlifearound.Furthermoreimaginethattheteacheralsooffers

the starting point of a newpromising philosophy,which the student has the optionof

exploringfurther.Ishallventurethatitisquitepossiblethatthestudentexperiencesthe

epistemic emotion of wonder at the moment her philosophy is refuted. Given her

particularstatusasaphilosophystudentitisalsopossiblethathernewfoundemotionof

wonder can evolve into a long-lastingmood that fuels her future inquiries into a new

98

promising philosophy. To exemplify we might draw attention to de Pasquale who

experienced an episode of wonder following the funeral of his good friend. It is quite

possible that the episodic wonder that revealed to him the fragility of human life

contributed to the development of a ‘wonder-filled mood’ that in the long run

encouragedhisphilosophicalattitudeandpursuitofaprofessionalphilosophiccareerand

aviableanswertothequestionofhowtolive.

Movingonletusnowconsiderwonderasavalue.TheworkofParsonsacknowledgesthe

emotionalaspectofwonderbutaddstothecomplexityofwonderbyintroducingitasa

value(Parsons,1969,p.85).AccordingtoParsonswonderingisanessentialcharacteristic

ofthehumanbeingwhopoeticallyspeakingisaproductofthestarsandatthebottom

lineacitizenof thecosmos (Parsons,1969,p.84).Heargues thatwhenthinkingabout

wonder one cannot avoid taking into account our relationship with the universe. He

furthermoreclaimsthatwonder:

Suggests a breach in the membrane of awareness [and resembles] a sudden

openinginaman’ssystemofestablishedandexpectedmeanings,ablowasifone

werestruckorstunned.

(Parsons,1969,p.85)

Parsonsexplains that tobewonderstruck is tobewoundedby the swordof apeculiar

eventinsuchawaythatitrendersoneopentoareformationofone’scurrentoutlook.

FurthermoreParsonswritesthat:“Theexcitationofwonderrangesfromthesuddenand

intense to the gradual and moderate, until it shades into ordinary emotion”(Parsons,

1969,p.85,86).Parsonsseemstoadvocateanotionofwonderthathasmanyfeatures.

Towards the end of ‘A Philosophy of Wonder’ he laments the separation of science,

aesthetic and humanistic values. Furthermore he believes that all three cultures are

fuelledbywonderyetthehumanisticsideisbeingneglected(Parsons,1969,p.100).He

continues by observing that without the humanities one cannot guarantee the

advancementofhumanvalue(Parsons,1969,p.100).Inordertoachieveaworldofvalue

one(accordingtoParsons)mustfirstofallguaranteeasufficientsupplyofbasicmaterial

goodsandservicesforall.Secondlyandperhapsmostinterestingforourpurposesishis

ideathatwemustencouragethewilltocreate–thewilltowonder.Parsonelaborates:

99

Thewill towonderwhich comeseasily for thewell fedandwell lovedandwell

taughtchild, isareadinesstoexploreandholdone’smindopen.[...]Philosophy

beginsinwonderbutwonderbeginsinthechild.Andwhilephilosophyinthefull

sense cannot be taught to the child, the philosopher who sets not just a

professionalbutalsoahumanvalueonwonderwillbeconcernedaboutasociety

that inhibits wonder in the child and adult and thus inhibits the very

reconstructionofsocietycalledfor.

(Parsons,1969,p.101)

Parsons’ idea of wonder as a value is interesting since it promotes a new aspect of

wonder.Hisinsightintowonderencouragesustoaskthequestionifwonderissomething

thatweshouldvalueandcultivateinourcitizens.Withouttouchingtheemotionalaspect

ofwonderthisbringswonderontothemoralandpoliticalsceneandencouragesusto

viewwonderasmultifaceted.

To continue our exploration ofwonder being something other than an emotion let us

nowconsider the ideathatwonder isanattitude.PhilosopherMartynEvanspointsout

thatwondercanbeviewedasanattitude(Evans,2012,p.4).AccordingtoEvanswonder

ariseswithinus.Itgrowsoutofpossibleordinarycircumstancesyetit issomethingthat

entertainsafocusinwhichtheordinaryischangedorsubmergedwiththeextraordinary

(Evans, 2012, P. 4). If one were to apply this notion to the three examples with the

stargazersitcanbesaidthattheirwondermentgrewoutofquiteordinarycircumstances.

ThenightskyisnotunfamiliartothemnorIimagineareshootingstarsormeteors.Inthe

caseof the students it isplausible topresume that this is inpart the reasonwhy their

nightoutunderthestarsuntil5AMwasfairlymundane.After5AMthingschangedand

with the sudden rise in the frequencyof incomingmeteors theextraordinary found its

wayontothescene.Ultimately itoverwhelmedthestudentsand itcanbearguedthat

wonder as a special attitude arose. Evans explains further that wonder is of a curious

intensified nature. What induces it can be unexpected, hard to comprehend but

neverthelesswe attach significance to it and seek to understand it (Evans, 2012, P. 4).

Mirroredagainstthecaseofthemeteor-seekingstudentsthishighlightsthesignificance

ofthesentence:‘thestudentssimplystoodandgazedinwonder’.Thesamegoesforthe

case of Robert and Pamwho describe themselves as gaping in wonder at the intense

meteorshower.Toeithergazeorgapeinwonderdoesnotmeanthatonehasgivenup

100

theenterpriseofobtainingknowledgeorreachunderstanding.Itisanintenseexperience

whichunderlinesthatoneknowsandunderstandssoverylittleabouttheobjectathand

anditsrelationtotherestoftheworld.48Itcanbearguedthatifastudentweretostand

andgaze inwonderatanextraordinaryshowerofmeteorsshewouldonlydoso ifshe

hadcultivatedaparticularattitudethatappreciatesthegrandeuroftheworldandhuman

existence, and thatwe human beings are, to use a biblical term, looking at theworld

through a glass darkly. From such an attitude a disposition to wonder may spring

understood as a willingness to be open to it and not to shun, dismiss, downgrade or

otherwisefear itasastateofmind. Inotherwordstohaveanattitudetowonder isto

becomewillingtosuspendatleastforawhilewhatwetakeforgranted,getinwonder’s

way,allowitintoourlivesandthroughittakeanextralookattheordinary.

2.5Conclusion

This chapter has been centred on the question ‘iswonder an emotion’? Based on the

above it can be concluded that it is quite plausible that wonder is an emotion or an

epistemicemotioninparticularbuttoclaimthatwonderisexclusivelyanemotionisan

overstatement.WonderisbestviewedasmultifacetedandIhavesuggestedfourpossible

avenuesonecouldexploretopaintwonderonabroadercanvas. Ihavesuggestedthat

wonder in addition tobeing anepistemic emotion couldbe lookeduponas amood, a

valueandanattitudeandeventhoughthesecandidateswereonlyexploredbrieflyIfind

that they sufficiently flag the importance of keeping an openmind when it comes to

depictingwonder.Inalllikelihoodwonderismorethanonething.

With thenotionofwonderbeingmultifaceted inmind let us now take a closer

lookattheroleofimaginationinwonderinordertocontinueourexplorationofwonder.

48Wonderinrelationtoignoranceisnotanovelnotion.InPlato’sTheaetetus,adialogueonthenatureof

knowledge,thecharacterTheaetetusconfessesthatheremainsignorantaboutthenatureofknowledgeandthatithasproducedinhimasenseofwonder(Plato,1989,155C-D).

.

101

3.WonderandImagination

Wonder responds to how the perceived differs from the expected, how the

imaginedsupplantstheusual,howaneventmakesuswonder.

(Moore,2006,p.498)

Thischapterinvestigatesinwhatcapacityimaginationisacomponentoftheexperience

ofwonderandtheresultsachievedwillbeutilisedinthesubsequenttwochapters.

The investigation begins with recapturing and expanding the rationale for

investigatingimaginationinconnectionwithwonder.Thisisfollowedbyanintroduction

toimaginationthataimstoclarifythevastnessofthesubjectmatter.SubsequentlyIshall

presentandcommentontheworkonimaginationdonebyphilosophersMaryWarnock,

RonaldHepburnandRogerScrutoninordertopresentamodernaccountofimagination.

Mychoiceofphilosophersrestsonthefactthattheyareallcontemporarythinkerswho

throughtheirindividualworkhaveexpressedasingularandboldviewofimaginationthat

when synthesised will help us establish in what capacity a modern conception of

imaginationisinvolvedinthewonderingorwonder-filledexperience.

3.1WhyInvestigateImaginationinRelationtoWonder

Theincitementtopayattentiontoimaginationinconnectionwithwondermountsfrom

whathasbeenexploredsofar inthethesis.ThecaseofdePasqualeremindsusofour

wonder-filledabilitytoenvisionourownmortalityanditssignificance.Thesurveyofthe

etymologyofwonderindicatedthatwonderhassomethingtodowithvisualisationorthe

imaginingsofthemind’seyeandhowwecometounderstandorknowthings.Fromour

dealingswiththehistoryofwonderweareencouragedtothinkthatthereisaconnection

betweenwonderand imagination.Augustineforexampleremindsusthatourability to

callupsightssuchasmountainsandrivers frommemorywithinourselves isawonder-

filled feature of our nature. The connection between wonder and imagination is also

expressed in the contemporary philosophy of wonder. Fuller and to an extent Hove

whomImentionedduringtheendoftheintroductorychapterflagaconnectionbetween

wonderandimagination.Fullerthinksthat‘wonderexcitesourontologicalimaginingsin

waysthatenhanceourcapacitytoseekdeeperpatternsintheuniverse’(Fuller2006,p.

2)whichpointstotheideathatinwonderweputbeforeourselvesdepictionsofhowthe

world fundamentally is. Furthermorehe thinks that experiences ofwonder can change

102

perception,aremorallyhelpfulandmay inspireus tobecometrue individualsand true

cosmopolitans (Fuller 2006, p. 158). Hove believes wonder reveals things in a new

perspective(whichhintsthatweputsomethingnewbeforeourmind’seye)andmakesus

mindfuloftheinherentworthofothersandthatadeeplevelofwonderhelpsusbecome

awareoffundamentalfeaturesofourconditionsuchasourvulnerability(Hove1996,p.

437).Tobetterunderstandtheroleof imagination inwonder,howwondercanchange

perceptionorhelpusgainperspective,howwondercanenhanceourmoralscopeandin

whatcapacity it ispossibletosaythatapersonwhoentertainsavivid imaginationalso

harboursadeepsenseofwonderitisimportanttocastsomelightonwhatimaginingor

imaginationmeans.

An investigation into how imagination is a part of thewonder-filled experience

canalsobegroundedinthenotionthat it followsnaturallyfromhowwonderhasbeen

presented in thisdissertationso far. In the introduction Idefined ‘wonder’asasudden

experiencethatintensifiesthecognitivefocusandawarenessofignoranceaboutagiven

object. This definition communicates an idea of wonder that is flexible and does not

pigeonholewonderornarrowitdowntobeforexampleexclusivelyapassionoremotion.

Thedefinitionisinclusiveandsupportstheideathatwondercanalsobeclassifiedasan

attitudeoravirtue.Inwonderthereisagatheringofattention;asharpeningofthefocus

andtherealisationthatoneisignorantabouttheobjectofone’swonderment.Theseare

all qualities of the wonder-filled experience that are supported by other scholars of

wonder such as philosopher Sophia Vasalou, who speaks of wonder as ‘attention

arresting’(Vasalou2012,p.4);itlinkstoFisher’sworkashedefineswonderas‘asudden

experienceofanextraordinaryobjectthatproducesdelight’(Fisher2003,p.55);andthe

definition pays homage toMiller’s emphasis on the notion that ‘were there no given,

wondercouldneverspringonusitsunpredictablesurprise,wouldneverbeabletosneak

upandstartleus into realizing thatwedonotknowwhat lies righthere in frontofus’

(Miller 1992, p. 40).My definition ofwonder claims no originality but it is useful as it

allows further investigation intowonderand inparticular in relation to imagination.To

elaborateonemightstartwithpointingoutthatjustbecauseoneisexperiencingwonder

as something sudden, arresting, attention gathering and as something that produces

awarenessofone’s ignoranceaboutagivenobject,doesnotmeanthatone’smindhas

cometoacompletestandstill. If thiswere indeedso, thestateof themind inquestion

wouldbemoreattunedtothatofastonishmentperhaps.Itistruethatanexperienceof

wonder can be astonishing but in the pure or distilled case it is perfectly possible to

103

depictwonderasanexperiencethatspringssolelyfromtheinitialinabilityofthemindto

produce satisfying cognitive schemata i.e. to comeupwithdepictionsof theperceived

object of wonder that would make sense to the wonderer and integrate with her

knowledgeandunderstandingabouttheorderofthingswithoutintroducingproblemsor

dissonance. The idea is that when a person is wonderstruck, she actively seeks to

understand and attach meaning to what is perceived but does so without completely

succeeding.Ithinksuchaprocessishighlyimaginativebutforthisnotiontobeworthits

saltwemust establish a clearer ideaofwhat is actuallymeantwhenweuse theword

‘imagination’.

3.2TheRangeandScopeofImagination

AccordingtophilosopherEvaT.Branntheword‘imagination’connectingwiththeword

‘image’ entered the European vocabulary via Augustine in the 5th century CE (Brann,

1991,p.18,20)andderives,asphilosopherErnanMcMulleninformsus,fromtheuseof

the Latin term ‘imaginatio’ (McMullen, 1996, p. 231) or as Brann states ‘imaginem’ or

‘imago’ (Brann, 1991, p. 18). Furthermore and to paraphrase Brannwemight say that

imaginationisassociatedwiththeLatinword‘imitatio’indicatingthatimaginationhasa

mirroringorcopyingaspect(Brann,1991,p.18).

Thetopicofimaginationiscomplexanddifficulttoapproach,whichaccordingto

philosophers Warnock and McGinn rests on the fact that it covers a vast territory

(Warnock, 1976, p. 9; 1994, p. 1) (McGinn, 2006, p. 2). In support of Warnock and

McGinn’sviewstandsBrann’smagnumopusTheWorldoftheImagination,whichdespite

itsimpressivehandlingofthehistoryofimaginationisselectiveinitscoverageanddoes

notconsideraspectsofimaginationsuchasHallucinogenicImageryorNon-VisualImage-

Formation(Brann,1991,p.9-15).

Furthermore the topic of imagination cannot be allocated exclusively to a

particularfieldordiscipline.Imaginationisimportanttophilosophywhereitplaysapart

in ideas about perception. This is noticeable in the works of philosopher David Hume

where the imagination is considered thepower thatenablesourminds to repeat ideas

before itself (Hume, 1985, p. 56). Imagination also plays a role in philosophical ideas

about personal identity and in this regardWarnock states that imagination aids us ‘in

makingsenseof,orinterpret,thepast’(Warnock,1994,p.126).Furthermoreimagination

isimportanttothephilosophyofeducationandphilosopherRonNormaninformsusthat

104

thisissobecauseimaginationhelpsustranscendconventionalthinking(Norman,2000,p.

1).

Imagination is also important in the field of psychologywhere it plays a part in

relation to having imagery. This becomes clear if we look to the phenomenon of

hypnagogicimagery,whichreferstotheimagesacknowledgedbyapersontransitioning

between being asleep and being awake (Brann, 1991, p. 333). Imagination is likewise

importantwithregardstodreamswhereMcGinnarguesthatdreamsaremadeofimages

(McGinn,2006,p.4).Withinpsychologypretendplayalso involvesthe imaginationand

according to psychologist Paul L. Harris to engage in pretend play ‘offers a way to

imagine,exploreandtalkaboutpossibilitiesinherentinreality(P.L.Harris,2000,p.8).

Imaginationislikewisecrucialtotheproductionandapprehensionofworksofart

(Warnock,1976,p.35).Inthisrespectwemightsayittooktheimaginarypowerof19th

century illustratorGustaveDore to depict the scenes fromDante’sTheDivine Comedy

because the surroundings inwhichwe findDante have an air of otherworldliness that

haveverylittleresemblanceifanytoourordinaryworld(Dore,1976).

Furthermore imagination is important to the field of religion. In this regard

McMullen points out that the idea of image is significant to all of the monotheistic

religions in the sense that the supremedeity cannot be imagined (McMullen, 1996, p.

253). Philosopher Aaron Hughes suggests that ‘the imagination is responsible for

translatingtheincorporealdivineworldintocorporeal,materialimages’(Hughes,2002,p.

33). In this sense the imagination plays a part in what we might call the mystical

experienceofthedivine.

Tocomplicatemattersthereisatrendintheliteraturetoqualifyimaginationwith

anotherword inorder tonarrowdown thekindof imagination inquestion.Togivean

exampleletusfocusonhistorianRobertMuchembled’sideaof‘collectiveimagination’49

andthatthedevilasweknowhiminthewestisaproductofsuch.ToMuchembledour

currentideaofthedevilisthesynthesisofsimplerumours,folklore,literature,paintings,

religion, politics and films which we may group as ‘hidden players’ that generate

explanatory systems which in turn motivate individual as well as group behaviour

(Muchembled, 2003, p. 2). In this sense our conception of the devil is contextual or

socially constructed, meaning that he owes his ‘solidification’ to cultural forces. In

49SociologistGeradDelanty’sideaof‘CosmopolitanImagination’(Delanty,2008),EthicistsDavidF.CaldwellandDennisMobjerg’snotionof‘MoralImagination’(Caldwell&Moberg,2007)andpoliticalphilosopherJasonFrank’s‘PoliticalImagination’(Frank,2009)qualifyasadditionalexamplesofthetrendofaffixingimaginationwithanotherword.

105

supportofthisviewstandsthefactthatconceptionsofthedevilchangeovertimeand

that‘olderversions’inalllikelihoodwouldseemridiculoustopeoplelivingamodernlife.

This becomes apparent when we consider the devil-sightings of medieval monk Raoul

Glauberwhodescribeshimasa small, scrawnymanikin indirtyclothing (Muchembled,

2003,p.14)andthedepictionofthearchfiendgiveninDante’sTheDivineComedywhere

he is presented as a three-faced, sinner-devouring giant with batwings (Dante, 1995,

XXXIV).BycontrastwemayacknowledgethedepictionofthedevilbyEnglishpoetJohn

Miltonwhereheisnotsomuchdescribedasbeastlyandinhuman,buttakestheformof

a beautiful fallen angel with a rebellious streak not far removed from the heroic and

iconoclastic intellectual. Likewise we would perhapsmore readily accept variations on

Milton’sSatan like theonewe find inTaylorHackford’s1997 filmTheDevil’sAdvocate

wherethedeviltakestheformofashrewdandexploitivemalemanagerofaNewYork

law firm (‘curiously’ namedMilton) (Hackford, 1997).Nowwemight agree or disagree

with Muchembled’s view of the devil as a product of our collective imagination but

regardless ofwhich standwe takewe can appreciate the rationale behind affixing the

word‘collective’inordertofine-tunethequalityofimaginationdependingonthenature

ofinquiry.

Imaginationisdifficulttograspbecausetherangeandscopeofthesubjectisvast

and connects with a multitude of different fields of inquiry such as philosophy,

psychology,artandreligion.Imaginationcomesacrossasanindividualcognitivecapacity

orqualitythatisinvolvedinmatterssuchasperception,personalidentityandtheability

to transcend conventional thinking. Likewise it plays a part in generating images and

enablesforexamplepretendplayandtheproductionandapprehensionofworksofart.

Thesubjectof imagination is furthercomplicatedby the fact thatonemightencounter

‘imagination’combinedwithanotherwordindicatingaparticularkindofimagination.In

this respect we looked at Muchembled’s ‘collected imagination’ which enriches our

conception of imagination by pointing out that imagination is notmerely an individual

capacity or quality but can also be seen as a mass phenomenon that can give life to

particularideasorimaginingssuchasthedevil.

Ourengagementwithimaginationsofarhasprovideduswithasomewhatbroad

understanding of the subject but to take this further and build a richer conception of

imagination that can help us understand the role of imagination inwonder let us now

turntoexamineWarnock’sRomanticapproachtoimagination.

106

3.3.MaryWarnockandImagination

Warnock’s Romantic approach to imagination including her views on imagination in

relation to educationhasbeendevelopedover the courseof threebooks: Imagination

(Warnock, 1976), The Uses of Philosophy (Warnock, 1992) and Imagination and Time

(Warnock,1994).

Herapproachisperhapsnotsomuchanoriginalpositionasapositiveappraisalof

aparticularviewoftheimagination,namelytheRomantic.Basicallysheasksusto‘take

theromanticconceptionofimaginationseriously’(Harrison,1978,p.553)andthereason

forthatisthatWarnockrendersit‘impossibletounderstandtheconceptofimagination

withoutattemptingtounderstandtheromanticversionofthisconcept,even if it isnot

theonlypossibleversion’(Warnock,1976,p.201).

To begin to articulate Warnock’s approach in more detail let us look at the

concludingremarksofherbookImaginationwhereshestatesthatimaginationis:

Apower in thehumanmindwhich isatwork inoureverydayperceptionof the

world,andisalsoatworkinourthoughtsaboutwhatisabsent;whichenablesus

toseetheworld,whetherpresentorabsentassignificant,andalsotopresentthis

versiontoothers,forthemtoshareorreject.Andthispower,thoughitgivesus

‘thought-imbued’perception(it‘keepsthethoughtaliveintheperception’),isnot

only intellectual. Its impetus comes from the emotions as much as from the

reason,fromtheheartasmuchasfromthehead.

(Warnock,1976,p.196)

According toWarnock imagination isaqualityof themind thatnotonly influencesour

everydayperceptionoftheworldbutalsohowweperceivetheworldintheabsenceof

things.Thelatterpointisimportantbecausetheabilitytoperceiveabsentthingsiswhat

enablesmetoholdbeforemymind’seyeavisionoftheworldthatcontainsforexample

myfamilyandfriendslivingfarawayandattachimportancetothemdespitethefactthat

theyareoutofmysensoryreach.Warnockfurthermoreinsiststhatimaginationisfuelled

notmerelybyourintellectunderstoodasourcapacityforreasonbutalsoourcapacityfor

having emotions. This makes sense because our ability to put before the mind’s eye

visionsof absent relatives and friendsmight alsoencompassor evenbe fuelledby the

107

feelings we have towards such people including for example that we long to be with

them.

Warnockcontinuesbystatingthat:

Thereissomesenseinwhichtheromanticversionistrue,andfitsthefacts.Itfits

thefactsinthisway.Thereisinallhumanbeingsacapacitytogobeyondwhatis

immediatelyinfrontoftheirnoses.Indeedthereisanabsolutenecessityforthem

todo so. That theyareable touse language is sufficientproofof this, since, to

speak in truism, thatwe describe things and classify them entails thatwe look

beyondtheimmediatelypresent,byrelatingthepresenttothepastandfuture,to

whatwehaveexperiencedbeforeandexpecttoexperienceagain.

(Warnock,1976,p.201)

ThekeypointoftheRomanticpositiononimaginationisthatweallhavethecapacityto

gobeyondwhatisinfrontofus.

Warnockgoesontostressthenecessityofimaginationasitisresponsiblefor‘the

application of thoughts or concepts to things, andwithout such application no human

discourseandnogoal-directedactivitywouldbepossible,andthatbywhich,asfaraswe

can,we‘seeintothelifeofthings’’(Warnock,1976,p.202).Tobettercomprehendwhat

WarnockhasinminditwouldbehelpfultotakeacloserlookattheRomanticsandtheir

outlookandonewayofdoingthatistobeginbyrehearsingsomeofthepivotalpointsof

the philosophy of transcendental idealists50 such as Kant and reactionaries to Kantian

philosophysuchasphilosopherFriedrichSchellingwhowemightsayinpartinspiredthe

Romanticoutlook.Kantdividedtheworldintothe‘worldforus’andthe‘worldinitself’

insistingthatwedonothaveaccesstothelatterandthatitwouldforeverbebeyondour

reachandthatwearesituatedinaworldofappearances(Kant,1996,A38/B55).Nowin

Warnock’sviewthisparticularnotionbecamethecentreofgravityforpost-Kantianssuch

50InphilosopherPatriciaW.Kitcher’sintroductiontoWernerS.Pluhar’stranslationofKant’sCritiqueofPureReasonshewritesthatthepurposeoftranscendentalphilosophyistoexamine‘thenecessaryconditionsforknowledgewithaviewtoshowingthatsomeofthosenecessaryconditionsareapriori,universalandnecessaryfeaturesofourknowledgethatderivesfromthemind’sownwaysofdealingwiththedataofthesenses’(Kant,1996,xxxi).Theideaisthatinourendeavourtogainknowledgeofthingswemakeuseofcategoriessuchaspaceandtime,whicharenottobefoundintheworldofexperiencebutareverymuchaprioriformsofperception.Inthissenseavitalpartoftranscendentalphilosophyisaboutrealisingthat‘ourknowledgeofspatialpropertiesoftheobjectsweperceivedonotderivefromsensorydata,butfromourminds’ownwayofinterpretingsensorydata(Kant,1996,xxxviii,xxxix).

108

asSchellingwhorebelledagainsttheKantiandivisionbetweentheworldinitselfandthe

worldforusbyinsistingthat:

Therearenottwokindsofstuffintheworld,mind-stuffandmatter-stuff:Thereis

onlyone.TheKantianmysteryofthething-in-it-self,lyingbehindthephenomena

whichweperceiveandreducetolaw-abidingorderintheworld,hasbeenmoved

bythesimpleexpedientofdenyingthatthereisanysuchmystery.Whatweorder

bymeansofthecategoriesofourunderstandingisnotmereappearances,itisthe

thingsthem-selves.Forthethingsarealsoourownideas.Andthereforeitcanbe

saidthatthecategoriesorrulesoftheminddomorethanorder;theycreate.But

very important for Schelling, the creation of the world lies below the level of

consciousness.Whenwe try to find out what this unconscious creation is, and

howitworks;andwhenwebegintodoconsciouslywhatwehave,allofusalways

doneunconsciously,thenwhatwehaveisart.

(Warnock,1976,p.66)

Inthislighttheimaginationhasa‘world-creatingfunction’,whichistiedupnotonlywith

creativitybutalsoinsomesensewithtruthbecauseinthatviewthereisnothingbeyond

whatweperceive.

The notion of the imagination as ‘world-creating’ is important to the further

development of the Romantic conception of imagination advocated especially by

Coleridge.AccordingtoWarnockColeridge’stravelsinGermanymadehimawareofthe

thoughts of imagination expressed above and he sought to include them in his own

approachtoimagination(Warnock,1976,p.73).TheinfluenceofGermanphilosophyon

Coleridgebecomesclearbyreadinghis1802poemDejection:anOde.Thepoemspeaks

of the loss of the shaping spirit of imagination and the joy that comeswith using the

imagination.WithoutthejoyWarnockwrites‘wemerelysee;andwemayevenseethat

thingsarebeautiful,butwecannotfeelthattheyareso’(Warnock,1976,p.78).Warnock

explains that joy according to Coleridge is synonymous with the soul or to put it

differently the inner power that animates us – which gives us life. Additionally she

explainsthat‘itisjoywhichconvertsaperceptiontoafeeling,anditisthisthatislostin

thelossoftheshapingpowerofimagination’(Warnock,1976,p.78).FromthisWarnock

distils that the Romantic position on imagination initially has two functions which

together allowus to ‘shapebymeansof some innerpower and […] to feel’ (Warnock,

109

1976,p.78).FeelingsandindeedemotionsareimportanttotheRomanticconceptionof

imaginationandaccordingtoWarnockthis isbecausetheylinkthepersonexperiencing

them with what is universal (Warnock, 1976, p. 81). According to Warnock Coleridge

writes:

OnFridaynight8thFebruary1805myfeeling,insleep,ofexceedinggreatlovefor

my infant seen by me in the dream, yet so that it might be Sara, Derwent or

Berkeley,andstill itwasanindividualbabeandmine.Ofloveinsleep—asortof

universal-in-particularness of Form seems necessary—vide the note preceding,

andmylines“AlllookorLikenesscaughtfromEarth,AllaccidentofKindorBirth,

Had passed away: there seemed no trace of Aught upon the brighten’d face

Upraisedbeneaththeriftedstone,SaveofoneSpirit,allherown.She,sheherself

andonlyShe,shoneinherbodyvisible.”Thisabstractselfisindeedinitsnaturea

Universalpersonified…willnotthisproveit(sc.Love)tobeadeeperfeeling,and

with such intimateaffinitywith ideas, so tomodify themandbecomeonewith

them,whereastheappetitesandthe feelingsof revengeandangercoexistwith

theideas,notcombinewiththem;andaltertheapparenteffectoftheforms,not

theformsthemselves.Certainmodificationsoffearseemtoapproachnearestto

thislove-senseinitsmannerofacting.

(Warnock,1976,p.81)

Warnock’sinterpretationofthisratherobscurepassagegoesasfollows:

HereColeridgeseemstometobesayingtwothings.First,thatif,intheabsence

ofarealobject,onehasaveryvividimageofit(aForm)thenthereisanecessary

connection between feeling love for it (or fear of it) and seeing the form as

somehowstandingforauniversalorgeneralthing,aswellastheparticularthing

ofwhichitistheformorimage.Secondlyhesuggeststhatloveandsomesortsof

feararetheonlyemotionswhichhavethisuniversalizingpower.Whichmakeus

feel, that is, that the image before us has a general significance beyond itself,

thoughstillretainingitsparticularcharacter.

(Warnock,1976,p.81-82)

110

Warnock condenses her interpretation into three elements,whichmakes upwhat she

calls thecombiningpowerof the imagination(Warnock,1976,p.82). Itgoesas follows

andshouldbeself-explanatory:

Weseehereconnectedthreethings:thepoweroftheimaginationtoconjureup

an image; its power tomakeus see the imageasuniversally significant; and its

powertoinduceinusdeepfeelingsinthepresenceoftheimage.

(Warnock,1976,p.82)

WhenaddressingtheRomanticconceptionoftheimaginationitisimportanttoconsider

themore ‘systematic’ writings on imagination from Coleridge’sBiographia Literaria. In

thisworkColeridgedivides imagination into twokinds: Theprimary and the secondary

imagination.Coleridgewrites:

The primary imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all

human perception and as a repetition on the finite mind of the eternal act of

creation inthe infinite IAM.Thesecondary Iconsiderasanechooftheformer,

coexistingwiththeconsciouswill,yetstillasidenticalwiththeprimaryinthekind

of its agency, and differing only in degree and in themode of its operation. It

dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is

rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealise andunify. It is

essentiallyvital,evenasallobjects(asobjects)areessentiallyfixedanddead.

(Coleridge,2004,XIII)

WarnockinformsusthatColeridge’sideaofprimaryimaginationmirrorsthephilosophy

of both Kant and Schelling. When it comes to speaking about the imagination as a

function and its role in perception and knowledge of the world we are clearly in the

territoryofKantbecausethis theme iscentral tohisCritiqueofPureReason (Warnock,

1976,p.91).Thingsbegin todeviate fromKant’soutlookand towards thatofSchelling

when Coleridge begins to address creativity but according toWarnock it is unclear to

whatextentColeridgeembracestheoutlookofSchelling.Shewrites:

Itmaybe said that he is not completely committed, at least in this passage, to

idealism;fortheworkofactualcreationisascribedtothedeity,whilethehuman

111

imagination is a ‘repetition’ in human terms of this divine activity. Perhaps we

mustbecontenttosaythatthereisnoclearanswertothequestionwhether,in

Coleridge’sview,theimaginationdoesordoesnotcreatetheworld.

(Warnock,1976,p.91)

MovingontoColeridge’ssecondaryimaginationitisWarnock’sviewthatitoriginatesin

thewritingsof Schellingandhisnotionof thepoetic faculty (Warnock,1976,p.91). In

Warnock’s view the activity of Coleridge’s secondary imagination is the ‘re-creation of

somethingoutofthematerialswhichwehavefirstacquiredfromperception’(Warnock,

1976,p.92)anditisherethatwefindroomfortheartist–thepoetassomeonespecial

whohastheabilitytoconsciouslymakeuseofherspecialabilitythatisherparticularfine

tunedimaginationtotiethingstogetherorshapethingsintooneinaworkofartsuchas

apoem.

Warnock’swork on the imagination signals notmerely that it is important to take the

Romanticconceptionof imaginationseriouslybutalsothateducatingtheimaginationis

worthyofourattention,whichinlightofherviewwouldentailaneducation‘notonlyfor

theintelligencebutalsofeelings(Warnock,1976,p.202)’.Warnockexplains:

The belief that there ismore in our experience of the world than can possibly

meettheunreflectingeye,thatourexperienceissignificantforus,andworththe

attempttounderstandit…thiskindofbeliefmaybereferredtoasthefeelingof

infinity.Itisasense(ratherthananiteminacreed)thatthereisalwaysmoreto

experience,andmoreinwhatweexperiencethanwecanpredict.Withoutsome

suchsense,evenatthequitehumanleveloftherebeingsomethingwhichdeeply

absorbsourinterest,humanlifebecomesperhapsnotactuallyfutileorpointless,

butexperiencedasifitwere.Itbecomes,thatistosay,boring.

(Warnock,1976,p.202-203)

Theimportanceofeducatingtheimaginationandtheviewofitasawardagainst

ennui isalsopromoted in thechapterentitled ‘Educating forPleasure’ inherbookThe

Uses of Philosophy. Here Warnock argues that using the imagination is pleasurable

because it deals with the possible as well as the actual, the underlying as well as the

superficialortheobvious’(Warnock,1992,p.153).AdditionallyWarnockwritesthatthe

112

imaginationisthefacultythatallowsustothinkofthings,whicharenotthere. It isthe

faculty thatenablesus toplan for the future– it is the faculty that ‘makesus feel that

there exists an infinity of possibilities [or that]we shall never come to an end of that

whichweareinterestedin’(Warnock,1992,p.154).

InherbookImaginationandTimeWarnocklikewiseputsforththeimportanceof

educatingtheimagination.Shewrites:

Ifwecaneducateachild’simagination,wewillgivehimaplaceintime.Wewill

allow him to stretch his sense of the present back to the past, both his own

individualpast,andthepastoftheworldasawhole.Butweshallalsofreehimto

contemplatehisfuture,hisown,andthatoftheworld.

(Warnock,1994,p.189)

InthiscitationWarnockstressestheimportanceofeducatingtheimaginationbecauseit

willsetapersonfreeandgiveherasenseofcontextandanideawhosheis,whatshehas

beenandhowshemightdevelopfurther.Toputitdifferentlywemightsaythathavinga

sense of past, present and future is essential to sporting a personal identity or

entertainingasenseofcontinuityinone’slife.Ifonedidnothavetheabilitytoputbefore

themind’seyethesetemporalaspectsoflifeitmightwellbesaidthatonewouldnever

rise above the level of the wanton who unconsciously and without her say is pushed

around by a variety of factors such as personal appetites, the will or actions of other

peopleandtrendsinstigatedbyandpromotedbysociety.

TorecapitulatethegravitationalpointsofWarnock’sapproachtoimaginationwecansay

thataccordingtoWarnockimagination:1)playsaroleinoureverydayperceptionofthe

worldandabsentthings;2)isfuelledbyourrationalityandouremotions;3)isuniversal

becauseweallhavethecapacitytogobeyondwhatisinfrontofus;4)makesitpossible

to apply thought and concepts to things and ‘see into the life of things’meaning, that

whenweuse it,weparticipate increatingtheworldwepartake in;5)hasacombining

power that enables us to put before our mind’s eye an image, see it as universally

significantandentertaindeepfeelingsinthepresenceofit;6)mustbeeducatedandnot

merely for the intelligencebutalso feelings;and7) ispleasurablebecause itdealswith

thepossibleaswellastheactualmeaningthat itenablesustograsppast,presentand

113

future and thus sets us free to form a conception of context and to build our own

personalidentity.

Warnock’sviewofimaginationbroadensourunderstandingofthesubjectandin

thislightIwillnowturntotheroleofimaginationinwonder.

ThefirstaspectofWarnock’sapproachIamgoingtoaddressis‘imaginationasanimator’

anditsrelationtowonder.Warnockproclaimsthatimaginationisapowerofthehuman

mind that gives life to our everyday perception of the world and our thoughts about

absentthings.Additionallyitiswhatenablesustoattachsignificancetowhatweperceive

and(drawingonourrationalaswellasouremotionalcapacities)tocommunicateit.Now

inlightofthisaspectofWarnock’sapproachtoimaginationisitpossibletoelaborateon

the notion of wonderment? I think the answer is yes because it is the activity of the

imagination in wonder that enables us to perceive, communicate and behold what is

significant about a concrete object of wonder. To exemplify we might recall Boyle’s

experienceofwonderpromptedbyhisencounterwithapieceofluminousmeatbrought

tohimfromthelarder.FirstitisreasonabletosuggestthatBoylethroughtheuseofhis

imagination perceived the object of wonder for what it was, i.e., a piece of luminous

meat.Secondit isreasonabletosaythatitwasduetohisactiveuseoftheimagination

that he realised the uncommon quality of the object of wonder and thus attached

significancetoit.Thirdlywemightsaythatbecausehehadnopriorexperienceofmeat

thatglowsinthedarkitwouldbenaturalforhimtogivethoughtstoitsnatureandput

before hismind’s eye a variety of possible explanations or theories and perhaps even

thoughtsontheconsequencesoftherebeingsuchathingasluminousmeatintheworld.

In this sense it is the activity of imagination in wonder that makes our experience of

wonder comes alive. In wonder we actively use our imagination to seek a satisfying

cognitive schema of what we experience but fail to obtain, such that the object of

concernisneverfullybeheldorunderstood.Thisexplainswhyanexperienceofwonderis

‘life-giving’, invigorating or otherwise intenselymoving because in wonder we are not

only animated by the activity of the imagination but we are also animated by the

realisationthatdespiteourimaginativeeffortsacompleteandsatisfactorypictureofthe

objectofwondersimplydoesnotarrive. In this lightwecanalsosaythatwonderhere

distinguishesitselffromKant’sdynamicallysublimebecauseinwonderthereisnofeeling

ofsuperiorityoftherationalintellect’sabilitytoharnessnature.Insteadweareleftwith

anawarenessofourignorance.Nowonecouldobjectbyinsistingthatsuchrealisationis

114

notlife-givingatallbutmerelyfrustrating.Whilst IamsympathetictothisviewIwould

arguethatonecanexperiencethefrustratingpartalsoaslife-givingbecausealthoughour

lackofknowledgeorunderstandingabouttheobjectofwondermayfrustrateusitalso

compelsus to continue tobroadenour knowledgeor gainbetterunderstandingof the

objectinquestion.

ThenextaspectofWarnock’sapproachto imagination Iwould liketoaddress is

concernedwithwhatcanbeviewedas‘theuniversalityofimagination’anditsrelationto

wonder. Warnock holds that we must recognise the universality of imagination as a

function i.e., that imagination is connected to our rational as well as our emotional

capacities; is exercised by everyone; a part of everyone’s experience and should be

educated. I support Warnock’s position but one might have reservations as to what

extent the imagination can be educated. Recall thatOpdal is of the view that children

have a capacity for wonder, which over time might turn into philosophical reflection

(Opdal,2001,p.332).ReadingOpdalencouragesustothinkthatwonderlikeimagination

isuniversalandcanbeeducatedandthuswemayask ifeducatingthe imaginationwill

helptransformchildishwonderintophilosophicalreflection.Ithinktheargumentcanbe

madebecauseinorderforphilosophicalreflectionwhichwemayreasonablysayinvolves

theexerciseoftraditionalacademicvirtuessuchascriticality,clarity,rigourandrichness

ofperspective inone’s thinking toemerge somethinghas togenerate it anda suitable

candidatecouldverywellbethe imagination.Thissupposition is in linewithWarnock’s

view of education and supports the view that educating the imagination may lead to

wondermentequal tophilosophical reflection.However itmight alsobe supposed that

wedonotallstartwiththesametalentorcapacityforimaginationandwonderandthat

itisnotatallagiventhateveryonewillemergeashighlyimaginativeandaswonderersof

thephilosophicallyreflectivekindfromaformaleducation.Inthissenseeducationisnot

merely a question of input/output and thus just because one is educated does not

guaranteeanelaborateabilitytowonderandimagine.Thissignifiesacrucialpointinthe

philosophy of education where attitudes towards how we start out as human beings

differ, but it is notmy business to defend any of these attitudes here. However I am

inclined to think thatalthough it cannotbeguaranteed thateducationbringsaboutan

elaborateabilitytowonderandimagineitisneverthelesssafetosaythatcertainformsof

educationor trainingencourage thedevelopmentofa senseofwonderand theuseof

imaginationmorethanothers.Aneducationthatis‘wonderfull’oraneducationthatat

leastinpartintroducesthestudenttowondersandtheactivityofwondercouldprompt

115

not only the development of particular skills but could potentially also allow for the

cultivationofthestudentinawaythatheightensherimaginarypoweranddeepensher

senseofwonder.

Moving on let us now consider ‘wonder as conveyer of the universal’. In

Warnock’s view a core feature of the Romantic account of imagination is that it has a

combiningpowerthatenablesus tocallupan image,attachuniversalsignificanceto it

while entertaining certain feelings in the presence of it. Warnock elaborates on the

connectionbetween imaginationand theaffective realmbyhighlightingColeridgewho

claims that there are only two universalising emotions, namely fear and love which

‘makesusfeel,thatis,thattheimagebeforeushasageneralsignificancebeyonditself,

thoughstillretainingitsparticularcharacter’(Warnock,1976,p.82).Nowgiventhatthe

imagination is activeduringanexperienceofwonderand that inwonderwedealwith

emotionalupheavalmostly intheformof joybut insomecasesperhaps intheformof

somethingclosertofear51wemightbeinclinedtothinkthatwondercangiverisetothe

idea that the object of wonder has a general significance beyond itself — that it is

universally important. In supportof suchan inclination stands thecaseofdePasquale.

ThroughhisexperienceofwonderdePasqualeconfrontednotjusthisownmortalitybut

alsohumanmortalityandthushisexperiencerevealednotmerelysomethingimportant

abouthimselfbutageneralfeatureofwhatitistobehuman.

Tofurthersupporttheideathattheexperienceofwondercanconveysomething

generallysignificantbeyond itself letusreturntoRogersandGlemmer’swonderat the

1833 and 1966 Leonid meteor showers, respectively. Rogers labels the 1833 meteor

showerthegrandestandmostbeautifulsightheeversawandGlemmermentionsthatat

firstshewasafraidbecauseshedidnotunderstandwhatwasgoingonbutthenasense

ofbeautyofthescenetookoverandshejuststoodtherewatchingtheskyfor30minutes

ormore.NowIthinkitcanbearguedthattheseexamplesconveysomethingsignificant

beyond itself, namely that we live in a world of grandeur and beauty and that it is

possibletoperceivethatfromtimetotime.

51Itispossibletolinkwonderwithfear.Quinndescribeswonderasaspeciesoffearorthemostrationalformoffeari.e.thefearofignorance(Quinn,2002,p.17-18),andfearisalsolinkedtowonderinFleischman’sworkandinparticular‘DarkWonder,’anotionthatemergesoutofhisanalysisofHermanMelville’sMobyDickhighlighting‘theabilitytoacceptdestructionasthecounterplayerofcreation’(Fleischman,2013,p.368).WonderandfeararealsobroughttogetherinthescenefromShakespeare’sHamletthatImentionedearlierwhereHoratiofirstseestheghost.

116

This endsmy dealingswithWarnock and her approach to imagination,which helps us

understand something about the role of imagination in wonder. To recapitulate the

activityoftheimaginationinwonderwhichisbothrationalandemotionalenablesusto

perceive,communicateandbeholdwhatissignificantaboutaconcreteobjectofwonder.

Furthermore imagination makes our experience of wonder come alive and during

wondermentwe are animatedby the realisation that despite our imaginative efforts a

completeandsatisfactorypictureoftheobjectofwonderdoesnotarrive,consequently

makingusawareofourignorance.Byrecognising‘theuniversalityofimagination’wealso

broughttolightthatbecauseimaginationplaysapartinwondermentitmakessenseto

speak about the universality of wonder. As much as the use of the imagination is a

characteristicofbeinghumansoiswonder.Byaddressing‘wonderasaconveyerofthe

universal or general’ we also uncovered that because of the activity of imagination in

wonderment onemight through an experience ofwonder suddenly recognise that the

objectofwonderhassignificancebeyonditself.Toexemplifythiswelookedatthecaseof

de Pasquale and his realisation of not only his own mortality but also everyone’s

mortality.FurthermorewelookedtostargazersRogersandGlemmerwhothroughtheir

experiencesofwonderrecognisedgrandeurandbeautyintheworld.Nowasmuchaswe

mightthinkthatwondercanbeaconveyeroftheuniversalorgeneralitisimportantnot

togettoocarriedaway.Notallthatwondermayrevealtothewondererisuniversaland

thereisadangerinventuringtoofarinone’sgeneralisations.Toexplorethisfurtherlet

usnowturntotheworkonimaginationbyphilosopherRonaldHepburn.

3.4RonaldHepburnandImagination

RonaldHepburn’scontributiontothephilosophyofimaginationasIwillpresentithereis

basedonhisarticle‘LandscapeandtheMetaphysicalImagination’.

Hepburn opens his article by posing the question ‘what is it to appreciate a

landscapeaesthetically?’(Hepburn,1996,p.191)Hethenproposesthreedifferentlevels

of aesthetic landscape appreciation, ofwhich the first is concernedwithwhat he calls

‘purely sensory components’ such as ‘colours, shapes, sounds, tactile sensations [and]

smells [which rarely] if ever exists on its own’ (Hepburn, 1996, p. 191). In appreciating

landscapeswetakethesecomponentsand‘conceptualise,werecognise,weaddcontext,

background,seekoutformalrelationships–reflectively’(Hepburn,1996,p.192).Thefirst

layerofappreciationisabouttakingrawsensorydataandmakingsomesortofmeaning

117

outofit.Forexample,inourappreciationofadistantmountainwemayidentifyapatch

ofgreencorrespondingtothegrasslandatthebottomofthemountain.Inaddition,we

may identifyanumberof reddotsonthesteepmountain’swallsasmountainclimbers

wearingredjacketsandthewarm,prickly,soothingsensationweexperienceonourfaces

whileperceivingtheseclimbersastheburningeffectofthesunshiningbrightinthesky.

A second layer reveals ‘expressive properties, and the thought of changes over

time–evenofdrama’ (Hepburn,1996,p.191).A thincascadeofglitteringwhitesnow

and icecomingdownthemountainsidecouldbe thoughtofasaharbinger,warningus

that anavalanche is imminent, and this endangerswhatotherwisewouldbeapristine

andtranquilappreciationofamountainouslandscape.

Athirdandfinal layermayconveyhowtheworldfundamentallyorultimately is

(Hepburn,1996,p.191).FlyingovertheicywastesofSvalbard,Norwaymightsuggestto

us that the world is fundamentally harsh and inhospitable, in contrast to our viewing

more temperate and cultivated landscapes fromabove suchasOxfordshire in England.

Alternatively, as Hepburn points out, a particular landscape may bring about an

experienceofnatureasloadedwith‘poignantbeauty[that]onsomeoccasionseemsto

speakofa transcendentSource forwhichwe lackwordsandclearconcepts’ (Hepburn,

1996,p.191).Hepburn’sview in these last two instances is illustrativeofwhathecalls

‘metaphysical imagination’ (Hepburn,1996,p.192). Inotherwords,whenwebeholda

particularlandscapeourmetaphysicalimaginationmaybeexercisedtotheextentthat:

Weseethelandscapeasominous,cosmicallyominous,orasrevealing-concealing

astillgreaterbeautythanitsown.Inawordthen,themany-levelledstructureof

aesthetic experience of nature can include great diversity of constituents: from

themostparticular-rocks,stones,leaves,clouds,shadows–tothemostabstract

andgeneralwaysweapprehendtheworld–theworldasawhole.

(Hepburn,1996,p.192)

Hepburnelaboratesbystating:

Metaphysical imagination connects with, looks to, the ‘spelled out’ systematic

metaphysicaltheorisingwhichisitssupportandultimatejustification.Butalsoitis

nolessanelementoftheconcretepresentlandscape-experience:itisfusedwith

thesensorycomponents,notmeditationarousedbythese.

118

(Hepburn,1996,p.192)

To Hepburn there are clearly different dimensions to appreciating a landscape

aesthetically, and themetaphysical one allows for the apprehension of theworld as a

wholeor thedevelopmentofa conceptionofhow theworld is structured. Inaddition,

Hepburn acknowledges that themetaphysical imagination is notmerely a lofty add-on

signallingahierarchicalstructuretotheaestheticappreciationofagivenlandscape.The

metaphysical imagination is to be understood as an integrated part in the total

appreciationofalandscape,drawingonbothmetaphysicaltheorisingabouttheultimate

structure of the world and the sensory components that landscape-experiences also

consistof.52

Although Hepburn appreciates the metaphysical imagination he makes it clear

that there isadangerofover-valuing itoryielding to itsauthoritywithoutquestion. In

this respect he positions himself as a critic of Warnock’s conception of imagination.

Hepburnwrites:

While not unaware of its limitations, she [Warnock] accepts an essentially

Romantic conception of imagination and its products as ‘in some sense’ true.

Imaginationis‘thatbywhich,asfaraswecan,weseeintothelifeofthings’;or,it

is ‘ability to see through objects… to what lies behind them’. It is through the

power of imagination that we have ‘intuition of the infinite and inexpressible

significance of the ordinary world’. These remarks, intriguing though they are,

leavemeuneasy, since theydo seem to inviteus to givemetaphysical-religious

imaginationtoomuchindependentauthority,andtheycarryariskoflosingfrom

sightitsabilitytorenderequallyvividquiteincompatibleviewsoftheworld.

(Hepburn,1996,p.195)

To illustrate what Hepburn has in mind, imagine an astrophysicist and a theologian

standingonahillintheearlymorninghoursobservingtherisingsun.Asthelightslowly

butsurelytransformsthenightskyintoapristinecollageoflightblueandpinkandlater

52ItispossibletoquestionHepburn’suseoftheword‘theorising’herebecausewemightaskwhatdoesittaketotheorisemetaphysically?Doesoneneedthemindofabrilliantmetaphysicianinordertodoitorisitanactivitythattheaveragepersoncanindulgein?HepburnissilentonthematterandsowemightsaythatifmetaphysicaltheorisingisforeveryoneitmightbesuggestedthatwereadHepburn’s‘theorising’as‘conjecturing’,whichisalooserterm.

119

transfigures the misty landscape below the hill into a sea of gold, the metaphysical

imaginationoftheastrophysicistproducesanexperienceofoverwhelmingbeautyanda

convictionofnatureasutterlymaterialisticanddevoidofdivinity.Theverysamescene

mayalsogiverisetoanexperienceofoverwhelmingbeautyinthetheologianbutunlike

the astrophysicist, her metaphysical imagination informs her that the beauty of the

sunriseisthehandiworkofGodandthatherabilitytorecognisethisverybeautyconfirms

thatsheasahumanbeingiscreatedintheimageofGod.Nowbothclaimsarevalid,vivid

products ofmetaphysical imagination but they are also incompatible because logically

speakingtheycontradicteachother.Toanonlooker,itmustseemthatonlyoneofthem

canbetruebecauseeitherGodexistsorhedoesnot.

Thedangerofbecomingavictimoftheillusory,thefantasticorthefancifulwhile

engaging inmetaphysical imaginings concerning the “true” structure of the universe is

ever present. To establish amore sustainable vision of nature as it really is additional

supportinfavourofaparticularrevelationcourtesyofthemetaphysicalimaginationmust

bebroughttolight.Ifforargumentsakeweweretosupportthetheisticviewexpressed

intheexampleaboveHepburnwouldsaythatinordertopledgeourconfidenceinitwe

would as a minimum have to rely on ’a background of sound theistic metaphysical

argumentandtheory’(Hepburn,1996,p.195).Bypassingsuchwould,asHepburnargues,

render us incapable of making the leap from the noetic quality of our metaphysical

imaginings to ‘noesis in the full sense – a knowledge-claim about how the world

ultimatelyis’(Hepburn,1996,p.195).NowtofullycomprehendwhatHepburnistalking

about we have to understand what is meant by the word ‘noetic’. According to the

InstituteofNoeticSciences(IONS)noeticderivesfromtheGreekwordnoēsis/noētikos,

meaning inner wisdom, direct knowing, or subjective understanding ((IONS), 2014).

AdditionallyphilosopherandpsychologistWilliamJamesexplainsthatwhenthingshavea

noeticquality:

Itseemstothosewhoexperiencethemtobealsoastateofknowledge.Theyare

statesof insight intodepthsoftruthunplumbedbythediscursive intellect.They

are illuminations, revelations, full of significanceand importance, all inarticulate

though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of

authorityforafter-time.

(James,1985,p.380-381)

120

To experience something having a noetic quality is powerful but the authority of the

experiencedoesnotgobeyondtheindividualexperiencingit.Itsimplydoesnotcutitasa

knowledge-claimandwhateverauthoritytheexperienceexercisesoverthepersonhaving

it isconfinedtothatpersononly.Returningtotheexamplewiththeastrophysicistand

the theologian I focussedon the theologian andher claim that the sunrise is a sign of

God’s presence in the world, but let us now pay attention to the astrophysicist’s

materialisticviewoftheuniverse.Forsomebodytoexpresssuretyaboutthenotionthat

everythingisessentiallymaterialisticanddevoidofspiritletaloneadivineonedemands

furthersupportifitistopassasaknowledge-claim.Ifthiscannotbeprovidedthesurety

is undermined and the expressed view as itwere is nothingmore than a questionable

personalbelief.

To continue our exploration of Hepburn’s approach to imagination let us now take a

closer look at his idea of ‘layered imagination’ and how thatmay relate towonder. In

Hepburn’sviewwhenweappreciatealandscapeaestheticallytheimaginationisatwork

onthreedifferentlevels,thesensory,theexpressiveandthemetaphysical.Grantedthat

Hepburnisrightaboutthisandthatimaginationhasaroletoplayinwondermentwecan

say that the wondering or wonder-filled experience likewise is layered. Suppose we

witness somethingwonderful like the Leonidmeteor shower that Elder Samuel Rogers

wasso luckytosee in1833. Itcouldbearguedthatduringwhatwemaycall first layer

wonderment the imagination is providing us sensory data, which enables us to begin

appreciatingthewonderbeforeusorinthiscaseabove.Thesecondlayerofwonderment

isconcernedwithrevealingexpressivepropertiesoftheobjectofwonderandinthiscase

I think it is fair tosay that it reveals tous that themeteorshower isextraordinaryand

significant in lightof itsmagnitude,rarityandbeauty.Thethird layerofwonderment is

concerned with the metaphysical and so we may ask what could experiencing a

wonderful event like the 1833 Leonid meteor shower possibly have on our current

metaphysicaloutlook?Onepossibility is that thenaturalormaterialisticworld is grand

andbeautiful. Rogers knewabout thenatural phenomenonofmeteor showers andhe

linkshiswondertothegrandeurandbeautyoftheevent,whichhestrugglestodescribe.

Anotherpossibility is to link theevent toa religiousview.Rogers’sbiographymentions

thatsomereligiouspeoplesawthemeteorshowerasasignthatjudgmentdaywasnear

andthattheydroppedtotheirkneesconfessingtheirsinsandprayedformercy.Likewise

Rogers reports thatsomepeopleconjectured that theeventwas the first inaseriesof

121

fearful calamities that Godwould bestow upon them because he was displeasedwith

them (Rogers, 1880, p. 134). The layered approach to imagination advances our

understandingofwonderbecauseithelpsusgetclosertowhatwecanagreeuponwhen

itcomestoasharedexperienceofwonder.Whereaswemightagreeonforexamplethe

first two layers we might not agree on the third layer and thus we can say that the

layeredapproachmayhelpusfleshoutindividualinterpretationsofthewonderful,which

Ishouldthinkqualifiesasadvancement.LikewiseitcomplicatesWarnock’spositioninthe

sense that Hepburn’s view prompts us to bemindful about what we, courtesy of the

imagination, hold significant and especially about what we grant significance beyond

itself.

ContinuinginthissamespiritthenextaspectofHepburn’sapproachtoimaginationIam

going to address is concerned with ‘imagination as conveyer of truth’. Given that

imaginationhasaroleinwondermentisitplausibletothinkthatwondergivesusaccess

tothetruthofthings?Ontheonehandonecouldargueyesbecausethereisarevelatory

andnoeticquality towonder in thesensethat itdoesmakeusawareofour ignorance

and in some cases like in those of de Pasquale and Castorp from Mann’s The Magic

Mountainwondermentrevealssomethinguniversali.e.,ourmortality.Ontheotherhand

wemustexercisegreatcautionbecause justbecauseoneperson judgesherexperience

asaconveyeroftruthitmaynotnecessarilyqualifyassuch.Toelaborateletusreturnto

Hepburn’sviewofimagination.AmeritofHepburn’sworkisthathenoticesandexpands

Warnock’sRomanticviewof imaginationbyhighlighting thedangers involvedwith that

position.ForHepburn,thekeyproblemwithWarnock’sapproachtoimaginationisthatit

might leadustothinkthattheuseof imaginationalonecan leadtotruth.Accordingto

Hepburn this is to venture too far because it seems to grant too much independent

authoritytotheimaginationandespeciallyimaginationofthemetaphysical-religiouskind

(Hepburn, 1996,p. 195). Thedangerwith this sortof imagination is asHepburnwrites

thatweeasilyoverlook‘itsabilitytorenderequallyvividquiteincompatibleviewsofthe

world’(Hepburn,1996,p.195).ThisisanimportantpointbecauseasHepburnwrites:

If, for instance the theisticmetaphysical imagination is tobe takenas true,may

wenotalsorequire,asaconditionofourconfidenceinit,abackgroundofsound

theisticmetaphysicalargumentandtheory?Cananythinglessthanthatjustifythe

122

move fromnoetic quality to noesis in the full sense – a knowledge-claimabout

howtheworldultimatelyis?

(Hepburn,1996,p.195)

Ifabackgroundofsoundtheisticmetaphysicalargumentandtheorycannotbeprovided,

chances are that what is at play is but fancy and that the imagewe think of as truth

revealingisbutdeceptiveorfalseorthatourinterpretationsofitareone-sidedorsimply

wrong.Mygrandfatherwasbornin1910andduringhislifetimetheworldsawitsfirstjet

engineandthefirstcontrails(shortforcondensationtrails)appearedinthesky.Oneday

heobservedsuchatrail intheskyandwhilehebeheldwhatheknewtobethesignof

technologicaladvancementandthepromiseofamore‘airborne’futureforhumankind

henoticedtwoelderlyladiesclosebywatchingthecontrailswhileexcitedlyfoldingtheir

handsand loudlypraisingGod forwriting to them.Tomakesenseof theviewthat the

contrails were in fact the handwriting of Godwould demand a fair amount of theistic

metaphysical argumentation evoking the idea that human beings are created in God’s

image and that, for instance, technological advancement is themanifestation of divine

powerorcreativity.SoHepburn’ssuggestionabouthavingnoeticinsight‘cleared’upby

further metaphysical argumentation seems good advice also when it comes to

experiences ofwonder. It prevents us from being let astray bywonderment and from

becomingvictimsofun-reflectedinterpretations.

Moving on let us now address what wemay call the ‘commensurability’ in Hepburn’s

outlook. It is amerit of that outlook that it ties inwellwith Fuller's idea that ‘wonder

excites our ontological imaginings in ways that enhance our capacity to seek deeper

patterns in the universe (R. C. Fuller, 2006, p. 2). With Hepburn’s explanation of

metaphysical imagination we may arguably be better equipped to understand this

particular capacity and some of its potential shortcomings: for instance, consider this

quotefromFuller:

A life shapedbywonder is thusmore likely to steeramiddlecoursebetweena

purelysecularlifeandanarrowlyreligiouslife.Ontheonehandwonderprompts

ustodivergefromapurelysecularoutlookon life. Itenticesustoentertainthe

possibility that our highest fulfilment might require adapting ourselves to a

metaphysicalreality.Yet,ontheotherhand,wonderencouragesanopen-ended

123

or heuristic approach to life. It thus imbues personal spirituality with a fresh

quality,makingitunlikelythatwewillreduceourbasicbelief intheexistenceof

something“more”tonarrowdoctrinesorcreeds.

(R.C.Fuller,2006,p.2)

Fuller's approach to wonder is a positive one, as he clearly speaks of the merits of

wonder, its link to spirituality and how a life shaped by wonder will prevent us from

adoptingnarrowdoctrinesandcreeds.This isbelievable if the imaginationprompted is

akin to thatofHepburn’smetaphysical imaginationbecauseaccording toHepburn, the

credibilityofsuch imaginingsdependsonwhetherwecanrenderthemsustainableand

coherent.Ifleftuncheckedtheimaginationinvolvedismoreakintothatoffancyandwe

face an increased likelihood of deluding ourselves. To understand this in depth it is

necessary to explore what wemean when we use the word ‘fancy’. Fancy appears in

Milton’spoemParadiseLostwhereMiltonreferstoitashis‘internalsight’(Milton,1998,

VIII, 461). Having sight indicates the ability of themind to visualise, generate internal

imagesortoputitsimplytoimagine.Thisspeaksofacorrespondencebetweenfancyand

imaginationbutasBrannhaspointedoutduring theseventeenthcenturyapreference

forimaginationaroseandacertaindevaluationofthefancytookplace(Brann,1991,p.

22). An exemplification of this devaluation can be found in Coleridge who in his

BiographiaLiterariamadeadistinctionbetweenimaginationandfancycategorisingfancy

assomething‘lower’thantheimagination.OfthefancyColeridgewrites:

Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and

definites.TheFancyisindeednootherthanamodeofMemoryemancipatedfrom

the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by the

empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word choice. But

equallywiththeordinarymemory,theFancymustreceiveall itsmaterialsready

madefromthelawofassociation.

(Coleridge,2004,XIII)

Coleridge’sdescriptionofthefancyiscrypticbutwhatIbelievehesaysisthatthefancy

isnothingmorethanaformofmemory—mechanical,rigidanduncreativeinfashion.

A touch of devaluation of the word ‘fancy’ can also be found in poet Babette

Deutch’sremarksonthetopic.Shestates:

124

Fancy.Asnounas‘awhimsicalnotionorthementalfacultyresponsibleforit’;as

adjective, the property of being pretentiously fine; as verb, the pursuit of a

frivolouspreference. Insometexts fancy is thespecific facultywhoseproduct is

thefantastic.

(Deutch,1957)

AccordingtoDeutch‘fancy’canbeusedindifferentconnections;howevertheideathat

fancyiswhimsicalorreferstoamentalfacultythatisresponsibleforwhimsicalbehaviour

carrieswith itaslightnegativeconnotation.Thenotionthat fancyasaverbsignals the

pursuit of a frivolous preference or that fancy highlights the product of the fantastic

pointsinthesamedirection.

Toexplore this furtherwemight say that tobewhimsical is todisplayacertain

unpredictability or erratic behaviour that in some instances fosters amusement. If true

this supports thenotion that fancycarrieswith ita certainnegativeconnotation in the

sensethatapersongivingherselfuptothefancyorwhoisfancifulissomeoneeasilyled

astray or deceived. To illuminate this in a betterwaywemight say that JaneAusten’s

characterMrs Bennet fromPride and Prejudice qualifies as awhimsical character or a

personendowedwitha fancifulminddue toherexcitablebehaviour togetherwithher

imaginedsusceptibilitytotremorsandpalpitations.

The lady in Michel deMontaigne’s essayOf the Force of the Imagination who

thoughtsheswallowedapinalsocarriesanimportantmessageaboutthewhimsicaland

deceptiveaspectoffancy.Montaignewrites:

A woman fancying she had swallowed a pin in a piece of bread, cried and

lamentedasthoughshehadanintolerablepaininherthroat,whereshethought

she felt it stick; but an ingenious fellow that was brought to her, seeing no

outward tumournoralteration, supposing it tobeonlya conceit takenat some

crust of bread that had hurt her as it went down, caused her to vomit, and,

unseen,threwacrookedpinintothebasin,whichthewomannosoonersaw,but

believingshehadcastitup,shepresentlyfoundherselfeasedofherpain.

(Montaigne,2012,p.336-337)

125

OnecanarguethattheladyinMontaigne’sexampleisfancifulbecauseherimaginingsof

thepininsideherselfmadeherexperienceexcruciatingpainwhichiswhollyimaginaryin

originandwhichdisappeareduponherwitnessingthecrookedpininthebasininwhich

shevomited.

ReturningagaintoFullerwecansaythathisaccountofwondermaybeinneedof

modification because it becomes hard to see how ontological imaginings following an

episode ofwonderwill necessarily remain on the virtuous path revealing a vision that

doesnotdescendintoamishmashof,asHepburnwouldsay,‘agreeablesensorystimuli

orreverie’(Hepburn,1996,p.192).IndefenceofFuller,onecansaythatsincehemakes

no claims that the revelations of an experience of wonder have authority beyond the

individualexperiencingit,hisaccountstillstands.Furthermore,thatduringwonderment

one ventures upon ontological imagining does not necessarily mean that one

automaticallyrendersthemtrueandevenifonedoesFullerdoesnotstatethatwhatever

is experienced carries a truth-value that extends beyond the individual. In this sense,

Fullerkeepstheexperiencewithinthedimensionofthepersonal;howeverifwesearch

forthekindoftruththattranscendspersonalmetaphysicalimaginingsbroughtaboutby

an episode of wonder which we might add still can be deluded or simply a case of

ontological ‘Imagineering’ i.e., the activity of deliberate engineered imaginings, further

metaphysicalargumentationandtheoryasaminimumrequirementmustbepresented.

InanycaseHepburn’scarefuldeliberationshelpusstay‘intellectuallyhousebroken’and

remindsustobewaryofover-interpretingexperiencesofwonderandhavingtheworks

oftheimaginationleadusastray.Truthiselusiveandtheabsolutefragile.

Tosumup,IappreciateHepburn’sanalysisoftheworkingsoftheimaginationand

I propose to adopt and retainhis three-fold viewof aesthetic perception. Furthermore

Hepburn’spointabout themetaphysical insecuritywe facewhenweput thethree-fold

view to use is important and in the interest of advancing our understanding and

knowledgewewilldowellbykeepingthefallibilityoftheimaginationinmind.Doingso

instigateshumblenessandscepticismtowardsprofessedabsoluteconceptionsofhowthe

worldworkswhichasaresultmightawakenaparticularmoralsenseinus.Iwillsaymore

aboutthisinthenextsectionthatdealswithRogerScrutonandhissingularapproachto

imagination,whichincorporatesthenotionofaspectperception.

126

3.5RogerScrutonandImagination

Scrutongiveshisaccountof imagination inhis1974bookArtandImagination,which is

gearedtowardstheformulationof‘atheoryofaestheticjudgementandappreciationin

termsofanempiricistphilosophyofmind’ (Scruton,1974,p.1).Artand Imagination is

divided into three parts of which the second deals specifically with the topic of

imagination.MyfocuswillbeprimarilyonthisparticularsectioninScruton’sworkandI

shallnotdealwiththefirstpartofhisbook,whichengageswithaestheticdescriptionand

evaluation, nor the third part of hiswork that dealswith how the imagination can be

broughttobearonart.

ToScrutonimaginationisaspeciesofthought(Scruton,1974,p.113)inthesensethatit

equals unasserted thought and qualifies as that ‘which goes beyond what is believed’

(Scruton,1974,97).Thisistosaythat‘inimaginationoneisengaginginspeculation,and

one is not typically aiming at a definite assertion as to how things are. In imagination,

therefore, one goes beyondwhat is strictly given’ (Scruton, 1974, p. 98). Furthermore

Scrutonthinksthatimaginationisarationalactivitybecause:

The man who imagines is trying to produce an account of something, and is,

therefore,tryingtorelatehisthoughtstotheirsubject-matter:heisconstructinga

narrative,andtodothisitisnotsufficientmerelytogobeyondwhatheisalready

‘given’.Itisnecessarythatheshouldattempttobringwhathesaysorthinksinto

relation with the subject: his thoughts must be entertained because of their

‘appropriateness’.

(Scruton,1974,p.98)

InScruton’sviewimaginationhastwostrands,oneofthembeingpredicative,theother

adverbial(Scruton,1974,p.93).Toexplainthepredicativestrandallowmetobringmy

daughter on to the scene who at the time of me writing these lines is fascinated by

Superman.Nowmydaughter can imagine she is Superman and she can see herself as

Superman.ShecanalsoformanimageofSupermanandshecanimaginewhatitwould

belikeifshewasSuperman.Allthispredicatesanactivityormentalactofmydaughter.

Theadverbialstrandisdifferentfromthepredicativebecauseitneednotbeamentalact.

In this regard we may say that my daughter can also be doing something with her

127

imagination or imaginatively, using her ‘imagination in the performance of some task

(whetheritbefulfillingapracticalaim,oracquiringsomeparticularpieceofknowledge)

(Scruton, 1974, p. 93). Scruton elaborates by stating that imagination is like thinking.

‘Thinkingisamentalactivity;doingsomethingthoughtfullyisoftennot’(Scruton,1974,p.

93).

ForScrutonimaginationsuppliesarubricunderwhichavarietyofphenomenacan

begrouped(Scruton,1974,p.91).Thesephenomena,touseScruton’sownwordsare:

Forming an image (‘picturing’); imagining in its various forms (imagining that…

imaginingwhat itwouldbe like if…, imaginingwhat it is liketo…,someof these

constructionsarepropositional,somenot;somerelatetoknowledgethat…some

toknowledgebyacquaintance);doing somethingwith imagination, (imagination

asadverbialratherthanpredicative);usingimaginationtoseesomething;seeing

anaspect

(Scruton,1974,p.92)

The interestingthinghere isconcernedwithwhatformingan imageorpicturingmeans

and Scruton’s idea of using the imagination to see something including an aspect of

something.

Scruton holds that forming an image or picturing can be grouped under

imaginationbecause like imagination it is subjected to thewillunderstoodaswhenwe

receivetherequestto‘imagineorformanimageofsomething’(Scruton,1974,p.95)we

canas itwere immediatelyconjureupan imageofsomethingorputbeforeourmind’s

eyeaparticularpicture(Scruton,1974,p.94).

Nowconsiderusingtheimaginationtoseesomethingorseeinganaspect.Thisis

animportantpartofScruton’sviewofimaginationanditreferstotheideathat‘ittakes

imaginationtoseefromthecircumstancesthatone’sfriendisunhappyorhurt’(Scruton,

1974,p.107).Inthislightimaginationinvolvesperceptionbutalsoperceptivenessandas

Scruton points out itmight verywell be that itwas precisely the inability to flesh out

thesetwoaspectsof imaginationthat ledColeridgetoconcludethat‘imaginationisthe

primesourceoftruth’(Scruton,1974,p.107).Byhighlightingthecomplexphenomenaof

‘seeing an aspect’ under the umbrella of imagination Scruton offers a very nuanced

picture of imagination which complicates matters and consequently challenges the

Romanticposition.Scrutonwritesthatoneaspect‘isgivenbypropositionalconstructions

128

oftheform:‘IttakesimaginationtoseethatXissad’(Scruton,1974,p.107).Theother

aspectpresentsitselfviathemetaphoricalsenseof‘see’asin‘ittakesimaginationtosee

thesadnessinX’sface(Scruton,1974,p.107).Inthissensethesecondaspectrelatesto

the formation of a hypothesis and whereas only the first aspect may be labelled as

cognitiveunderstoodasakindofjudgementthesecondaspectdoesnotqualifyassuch

becausewhatone‘”sees”one“sees”without,inanystraightforwardsense,believingitto

bethere’(Scruton,1974,p.107).

Scrutonelaboratesonthissomewhatcrypticnotionbystatingthat:

It isnot seeing thatX’s face is the faceofa sadman (forexample),or that the

musicisthekindofmusicthatwouldbeproducedbyasadperson(forexample),

orthatlivingonHillFarmtendstomakepeoplesad(forexample),thatconstitutes

this kind of seeing, althoughmaking these judgementsmay help to put us in a

positionto‘see’thesadnessthatisthere.

We cannot explain this sense of ‘see’ as ‘see imaginatively’, and hence

relatetheelementofimaginationtotheadverbialsense.Forseeing,inthenormal

sense,isnotthekindofthingthatcanbedoneimaginatively.Itisnotavoluntary

activity,andisnotwithinthecontrolofthought.Toaddimaginationtoseeingis

tochangeitfromseeingto‘seeing’.

(Scruton,1974,p.107-108)

In the last part of this citation Scruton refers to thenotionof seeing an aspect and to

expand on this Scruton states that ‘”seeing an aspect” cannot be analysed in terms of

“seeingthat’’becauseitdoesnotreducetoasetofbeliefsabout itsobject,norevena

set of perceptual beliefs’ (Scruton, 1974, p. 109). In this sense there is a problemwith

what category ‘seeingas’belongs tobecause it isamatterofperception.Toelaborate

Scruton brings to attention the ambiguous figure of the ‘duck-rabbit’, which we

encounteredearlier in connectionwithmydaughter’sexperienceofwonder.We recall

that the ‘duck-rabbit’ is an image inwhich both a duck and a rabbit can be identified

which we of course may find amusing but the picture holds a deeper secret. When I

showedthe‘duck-rabbit’tomydaughterMaiforthefirsttimesheimmediatelyidentified

the duck but only later with a certain amount of puzzlement (perhaps even wonder)

recognisedtherabbit.Herpuzzlementisentirelyjustifiedbecausethe‘duck-rabbit’brings

out theperhapsunsettling truth thatalthoughwemightsee thepicturedifferently the

129

picturedoesnot change.What is it that changes thenwemightask?Well,wechange.

Our perception changes oncewe likeMai realise that the image holdsmore than the

depictionof a duck.We realise that theduck like the rabbit aremerely aspects of the

image.

Scruton ends his discussion on ‘seeing as’ by stating that ‘”seeing as” is like an

“unasserted”visualexperience: it is theembodimentofa thoughtwhich, if “asserted”,

would amount to a genuine perception, just as imagination if “asserted”, amounts to

genuinebelief’(Scruton,1974,p.120).ThislastpointisimportanttoScrutonbecausea

part of his project in Art and Imagination is to show that ‘‘the unasserted’ nature of

‘seeingas’dictatesthestructureofaestheticexperience‘(Scruton,1974,p.120).Inthis

sense it is crucial to realise that for Scruton an important part of ‘seeing as’ when it

comestotrulyunderstandingaestheticdescriptionsisthattheycannotbetakenliterally

(Scruton,1974,p.122).Theunassertedvisualexperiencegivesusan ideaofsomething

thatmightbethecaseratherthansomethingthatisthecase.IfIwasaskedtodescribe

my depiction of the ancientGreek poet andmusicianOrpheus it is quite possible that

somepeoplewoulddisagreewithmeandfindmyeffortsfancifulandencouragemeto

imaginehimdifferently. Inotherwordsaspect-seeing is subject to changeand isnot a

guaranteed fancy-free enterprise, but is nevertheless an enjoyable part of appreciating

somethingaesthetically(Scruton,1974,p.143).

TocontinueourexplorationofScruton’sideaofimaginationletusnowconsiderwhatis

‘absent’orwhatis‘notpresent’in‘unassertedthought’is,perhaps,comparabletowhat

makesroomfororgivesrisetowhatis‘newlypresent’inwonder(Evans,2012,p.11).To

illustratethiswemightrecalldePasquale’sexperienceofwonder,whichinvolvedseeing

his cousin Richie’s face, his own face and amultitude of other faces in the bathroom

mirror in conjunction with the stark realisation of a seemingly inescapable human

mortality. To say that the faces he saw and his realisation of human mortality were

literallythereinthemirrorisanoverstatement.Itwillbefarmorebelievabletosaythat

they were aspects absent in a literal sense but very much there for de Pasquale as

productsofhisimaginationunderstoodasunassertedthoughtandwhatmadetheworld

newlypresenttohimorinotherwordswonderfulforhim.53

53Thisisnottosaythatallinstancesofunassertedthought,orofchangedaspectperception,areinstancesofwonder–northatunassertedthoughtoraspectperceptionconstituteswonder.Theimportantpartistoacknowledgethattheroleoftheimaginationmaybeparallelinboth.

130

The same can be said about Sam Keen’s experience of wonder following being

handed themysterious knife by a complete stranger in the ordinary city ofMaryville,

Tennessee.Asenseofgratitude,expectancyandhowtheextraordinarymaybefoundin

theordinaryhauntedKeenforweeksafterthehandoverbuttosaythatthesefacetswere

apartoftheactualhandoveroftheknifeisanoverstatement.Itwillbebettertosaythat

theywereabsentinaliteralsensebutpresentintheformofaspectscourtesyofKeen’s

imaginationunderstoodasunassertedthoughtandthusmadehimseetheworldanew.

To give a third example,when Iwas thirty-five years old I lost a good friendof

similaragetocancer.Herdeathtroubledme(andstilldoes)becauseatthetimeshehad

recentlymarried,becomeamotherandhadatlonglastfoundthepeaceandhappiness

shehadsoughtmostofheradultlife.ForyearsfollowingherdeathIkeptseeingherface

whenever I foundmyself inacrowdofpeople.Herfacewouldappearmomentarilybut

longenoughformetorealisethatshewasthere.ThefirstcoupleoftimesIsawherIwas

tosay the leastsurprisedandentertainedasenseofsuspensionbecause Iwas thenas

muchasnownotaccustomedtoseedeadpeoplewalking.IneachcaseImadeaneffort

toapproachmy friendbutbefore I could reachproximity suitable for conversation she

would fade away and become someone else. At subsequent sightings (and this in

particular when seeing her had become a part of my quotidian life) I merely

acknowledgedherpresenceandwentaboutmybusinessand in thesecasesshewould

usuallyvanishatadistanceof5-8metersasquicklyas shecameabout.How isone to

think about such events? My prevailing theory is that due to my fading eyesight I

unfortunatelyhavedevelopedaproblemwithdistinguishingor identifying faces froma

distanceanditisparticularlydifficultformetodistinguishbetweenfacesinafastmoving

crowdbecausemyeyescannotadapt to the fastchangingenvironment. Inconjunction

with the ‘trauma’ or ‘thauma’ of my friend’s death, which might have left me more

troubledthanIrealisedatthetime,‘seeing’herinthecrowdwasmerelyaprojectionof

what in a fashionoccupiedmymind.My friendwasnot there in the crowd in a literal

sensebutverymuchpresentasafabricofmyimagination.InthissenseIdidnotperceive

the externalworld directly, butwhat I sawwas influenced by the thing that perceives

whichinthiscasewasmyself.

Wasthisanexperienceofwonder?Ithinkyes,becauseexperiencessuchasthese

hint to us something important about human perception, which takes us beyond the

notionthatweexperiencetheworldintherawortoputitdifferentlythatweenjoyaone

toonerelationshipwiththeworldaroundus.Experiencessuchasthesearesuggestiveof

131

aKantian conception: humanbeings are situated in aworldof appearanceswhere the

thingsinthemselvesareunknowntousandarelikelytoremainso(Kant,1996,A38/B55).

Whatwedoknoworcancometoknowabout istheexperientialworldortheworldof

appearancesbutthisentailsnotonlythescrutinyoftheobjectsastheyappeartousbut

alsothescrutinyofusasbeingsofperception.Itseemstomethatregardlessofwhether

oneisfamiliarwiththephilosophyofKantthenotionthatweliveinasubject-dependent

worldofappearances,andthatthingsinthemselvesareobscuretous, isatremendous

sourceofwonder.

From these examples I think it is reasonable to propose a link betweenwhat is

absentinimaginationasunassertedthoughtandthatwhichinwonderisnewlypresent.

Let us attempt further to spell out in what sense what is literarily absent in ordinary

aspectperceptionismomentarilypresentinwonder.

One possibility is that it is amatter ofwhat is displaced: that is to say that in

ordinaryaspectperceptionwhatisdisplacedisthecontentofthethoughtunderstoodas

thesadnessofsomeone’sfaceorthejollinessofaparticularmelodywhereasinwonder

thatwhichisdisplacedisnotsomuchtheobjectofwonderbutourselves;orratherthat

ourframeofreferenceisdisplacedallowingusatleastmomentarilytobetransfiguredor

transformed. This resonateswith de Pasquale’s experience because it can bewell said

that seeing the faces in the mirror that should not be there and the subsequent

realisation of his mortality displaced him/diminished his sense of self, which indicates

transfiguration. The same is afoot in Keen’s example where we can say that he is

displaced by his newfound gratitude, wondering expectancy and view of the

extraordinary in the ordinary.We can also say that it takes place in the third example

involvingmeseeingmydeparted friend invariouscrowds.Here it canbeargued that I

wasdisplacedbythesuddenrealisationthatImightjustunconsciouslybecolouringwhat

I seebyprojectingthememoryofmyfriend’s faceonto faces Icouldnotdistinguish in

thecrowdsduetomyfadingeyesight.

To further articulate the connection between what is absent in imagination as

unassertedthoughtandthatwhichinwondermakestheworldnewlypresentitmightbe

conjecturedthatinwonderwhatisordinarilyunassertedisatleastmomentarilyasserted.

Thismakessensebecauseforsomethingtobeasserteditisdemandedthatitberealto

us - that itbecomeknown.The first time I ‘saw’my friend in thecrowd Iat least fora

momentbelievedshewasthereinarealsensedespitethefactthatIknewshecouldnot

be.

132

LetusnowfocusonScruton’snotionof‘seeingas’asamixturebetweenthesensoryand

theintellectual,howsuchexperiencesaresubjectto judgementofappropriatenessand

howthisrelatestowonder.

Tobeginwemightponderwhetherwonderwasanappropriatestateofmindfor

dePasquale,Keenandmyselftobeinfollowingtheparticularsofourindividualcases.If

wefirstlookatthecaseofdePasqualeitistemptingtosubscribehiswondermentsolely

tohimseeingamultitudeoffacesinthemirrorbecauseitiswhatimmediatelystrikesus

asextraordinaryabouthisexperience.HoweverasmuchasthisisextraordinaryIwould

argue that it alone does not justify his wonderment, but rather the fact that the

extraordinarinessofseeingthe faces in themirror inconjunctionwithhis realisationof

mortality‘displaces’him.

Keen’sexamplefollowsasimilarpattern.Ithinkitisentirelyappropriateforhim

inhis situation towonderbutnotmerelybecausea strangerhandedhimamysterious

knife.Hiswonderisappropriatebecausethehandoveroftheknifeinconjunctionwithhis

new found sense of gratitude; wondering expectancy and acknowledgement that

something extraordinary happened in the otherwise ordinary world of Maryville

‘displaced’him.

The same can be said about my own case involvingme seeing the face of my

deceased friend in thecrowd.Onecould think itentirelyappropriate forme tobe ina

stateofwonderfollowingthefirstsightingandthisnotmerelybecauseIsawthefaceof

my departed friend in the crowd.Mywonderwas appropriate because in conjunction

withseeingmyfriend’sfaceIseriouslyquestionedtherealityofwhatIperceived,which

brought about the unsettling and displacing realisation that I am living in a world of

appearanceswheretoputitbluntlytheworldformeisinpartfabricatedbyme.Nowthe

kindofdisplacementIamadvocatingheredoesnotentailacompletelossofthesenseof

coherence nor does it compel us to accept a solipsistic stance signalling that nothing

exists outsideourownminds.What I amproposing ismerely an altered stateofmind

thatforsometimeleavesusunhingedinthesensethatweareexperiencingadisruption

inourordinaryperceptionorperhapsanexpansionofitwherewebecomeawareofnot

onlyahithertounknownpossibilitywhich includes therebeingmore to reality thanwe

thinkbutindeedthatthis‘more’mightjustatleastinpartbecreatedbyourselves.

Wheredoesthis leaveus?It leaveuswithapreliminaryacceptancecriterionfor

wonderment stating that for someone’s wonder to be appropriate or to wonder

133

appropriatelyinvolvesthatonehassomethingtowonderatwhichisextraordinary,vivid

and significantand thatothers canunderstandwhyagivenobject iswonderful. This is

nottosaythatwearenecessarilyassessingwhetherwhatisclaimedtobewonderful is

trulywonderful.Whatisrequiredismerelythatwecanacceptthataparticularobjector

situationmaygiverisetowonderment.Tobetterunderstandthisitmightbeprudentto

giveanexampleofasituationwhereitisinappropriatetowonderortoputitdifferently

whereapersonclaims something iswonderfulbutwherewecannotacceptorat least

willhaveseveredifficultyinacceptingthattheobjectinquestioncangiverisetowonder.

SuchasituationmaybefoundintheCoenbrothers’2009filmASeriousManwherethe

heavilytroubledprotagonistLarryGopnikisbeingadvisedbyajuniorrabbiwhowithout

takingthetimetobecomefamiliarwiththemanyparticularsoftheprotagonist’stroubles

includingthathiswifewantsadivorcesuggeststhatGopnik’ssalvationliesinarenewed

senseofwonder.Thesceneplaysoutasfollows:

Juniorrabbi:‘CanIsharesomethingwithyou?BecauseI,too,havehadthefeeling

oflosingtrackofHashem,whichistheproblemhere.Itoo,haveforgottenhowto

seehimintheworld,andwhenthathappensyouthink,“Well,ifIcan’tseehimhe

isn’tthere.He’sgone.”Butthat’snotthecase.Youjustneedtorememberhowto

seehim.AmIright? Imean…Theparking lothere.Notmuchtosee. But ifyou

imagineyourselfavisitor,somebodywhoisn’tfamiliarwiththeseautosandsuch,

somebodystillwith thecapacity forwonder.Someonewitha freshperspective.

That’swhat it is,Larry.Becausewiththerightperspective,youcanseeHashem,

youknow,reachingintotheworld.Heisintheworld,notjustinshul.Itsoundsto

me like you’re looking at theworld, looking at yourwife, through tired eyes. It

soundslikeshe’sbecomeasortofthing…Aproblem.Athing’.

Gopnik:‘SheisseeingSyAbleman’.

Juniorrabbi:‘Oh.’

Gopnik:‘They’replanning…That’swhytheywanttheget’.

Juniorrabbi:‘Oh.I’msorry’.

Gopnik:‘Itwashisidea.’

Juniorrabbi:‘Well,theydoneedagettoremarryinthefaith.But…Thisislife.You

havetoseethesethingsasexpressionsofGod’swill.Youdon’thavetolikeit,of

course.’

Gopnik:‘Thebossisn’talwaysright,buthe’salwaystheboss.’

134

Juniorrabbi:‘That’sright!Thingsaren’tsobad.Lookattheparkinglot,Larry.Just

lookatthatparkinglot.’

(Coen&Coen,2009)54

Thescene ishilarious,absurdand important toourendeavourbecauseasmuchas the

rabbicanseethewonderintheparkinglotitisimpossiblefortheprotagonistandindeed

theaudience toaccept that it even in somevague sensecangive rise towonderment.

This is sobecause theparking lot is soutterlyaustereandbleak thatonewillprobably

needthemindoftherabbiinordertofinditwonder-filled.Wemightevensaythatthe

latterisnotenoughbecausenothinginthesceneindicatesthattherabbihimselffindsit

fullofwonder.Forallweknowhecouldbemakingitallupinhisdesperateattemptto

soundwiseandknowledgeable.

Supposedlyonecouldventurethatthewonderoftherabbiisjustifiedbecausehe

is referring to religious wonderment, which emerges through acknowledging the

existenceofGodandrecognisinghishandiworkineverythingaroundus,eveninthemost

mundaneof things suchasa forlornparking lot.Naturally this complicatesmattersbut

neverthelessthecriticismIhavevoicedisnotcompletelythwarted.Thereasonforthatis

thatthereisalogicalproblemwiththinkingofeverything(eventhoughitisattributedto

God)aswonderfulbecauseifeverythingiswonderfulwemightaswellsaythatnothingis

wonderful.Nowby emphasising there being ‘objects ofwonder’ and ‘objects bereft of

wonder’ I am in effect stating that wonder may not entirely reside in the eye of the

beholder.This isahighlyproblematicpositionbecausewearenowineffectaddressing

whetheraparticularobject(thethinginitself)isawonder(noun)ornot.Asmuchasone

candisagreewiththerabbithatthebleakandaustereparkinglotiswonderfulwecannot

bypass that itmightbe so tohim,meaning thatwe cannot ignore theworkingsof the

individualsubjectwhenitcomestoexperiencesofwonder. Intheinterestofadvancing

ourunderstandingofwonder Iproposeacompromise involvingwhatwecouldcall the

“density”ofwondermeaning that someobjects like for example the cometHale-Bopp

whichwasvisiblefromthenorthernhemispherein1997are‘moredenselypacked’with

wonder;understoodassuchobjectsaremore likelyto inducewonder incomparisonto

therabbi’sparking lot.Myreasonforsayingso is thatobjectsorphenomena likeHale-

Bopp are rare and extraordinary celestial travellers that when observed and when54ThescenecontainsthreeJewishwords,whichareimportanttounderstandinordertofullycomprehendwhatisgoingon.‘Hashem’referstoGod.‘shul’meanssynagogueand‘get’referstoaritualdivorceordivorcepapers.

135

reflecteduponquickly liftusoutofour immediatecontextandengageour imagination

onametaphysicallevelremindingusaboutthevastnessofspaceandthetinyandfragile

partweoccupy. In this sensewearemovingaway fromtheeither/orattitude towards

wonder and towards an approach involving a more/less attitude in order to

accommodatethe ideathattherearesomeobjects likeHale-Bopp,whichwecanmore

easily accept as wonderful, while others seem like truisms or objects whose

wonderfulnessisentirelyidiosyncratictothewonderer.

A different aspect of Scruton’s philosophy involves what we might call ‘continuity

between intense experiences and subsequent living’. This is centred on questioning

whetheranaestheticexperiencecanbemorethanjustathought.Scrutonbelievesthisis

sometimesthecasebecauseasheputsit‘whatIfeelinthepresenceofworksofartmay

finditsultimateexpressioninmybehaviourtowardsmyfellows.My‘imagined’feelings

can show their effect in the expressions of their ‘real’ counterparts’ (Scruton, 1974, p.

131).InthisrespectScrutonspeaksofatestofsinceritythatcandeterminewhetherour

aestheticexperiencesareatoddswithourselves.Toillustratehispointhementionsthat

ifapersonclaimsthatherfeelingsoftendernesshavebeenawokenbytheportraitofa

child but proves herself incapable of feeling tenderness towards a real child then her

aestheticexperienceisatoddswithherselfandconsequentlynotsincere.

Nowwemightponderifitwouldbepossibletoputforthasimilartestofsincerity

whenitcomestoclaimsordescriptionsofwonderfulthingsorobjects. IndeedIbelieve

this is the case because if something is truly wonderful it is likely to produce in the

wonderer a particular state of mind involving perhaps a kind of subdued or subtle

reverence,gratitudeoropennesswhichdonotonlyexistinthemindofthewondereras

afleetingthoughtbutarealsocarriedoutinaperson’sbehaviour,actionsandmayeven

helpshapetheperson’slifeovertime.ThewaywonderworksisthussimilartoScruton’s

idea of aesthetic experience and to illustrate how let us again focus on de Pasquale’s

wonderment, which comes across as sincere because his experience produced a deep

reverenceforhumanmortalitythatwouldlatershapehisphilosophicaloutlookandhow

he liveshis life.LikewiseKeen’swonderment lookssincerebecauseforweeksfollowing

hisbeinghandedthemysteriousknifeheexperiencedgratitudetothestrangerandwhat

hecallswonderingexpectancy.AswithdePasquale,Keen’s lifehas turnedout tobea

wonder-filledoneandalthoughitprobablywouldbeanoverstatementtosaythatitwas

thewonderfulhappeninginMaryvillethatledtoalifetimeofwondermentforKeenasa

136

philosopher we can definitely say his subsequent philosophical openness meets an

importanttestforthesincerityofhiswondering.

InlightofScruton’sapproachtoimaginationletusnowconcentrateonthepossibilityof

‘cultivating a habit of wonder’. Cultivating such a habit is a notion that is somewhat

supported by at least two philosophers of wonder, namely Verhoeven and Opdal.

Verhoeventhinksthatonemighthavea ‘talent’forwonder,whichhintstousacertain

disposition or capability that may or may not be advanced or developed further. The

same goes for Opdal who suggests that children’s wonderment might turn into

philosophicalreflectionovertimeindicatingnotonlythepossibilityofanevolutionofan

individual’s relationship with wonder including perhaps an increased sophistication of

whatiswonderedatbutpossiblyalsothehabitualreturntothewonderful.

How isone tocultivateahabitofwonder?Onewaymightbe is toeducate the

imagination.55Wecancultivateahabitofwonderbecausewecantrainourimagination

tosuchanextentthatwebecomeaccustomedtolookingfortherichestpossibleaccount

of something. This is to say that we cultivate an outlook that is generous enough to

presentuswithavarietyofaspectsorperspectivesofwhichsomemayexhibitwhatwe

might call the ‘unasserted extraordinariness’ of a particular object, phenomenon or

event, which on occasions leaps out as asserted andwonderful. To put it differently I

believe it is possible that we can train ourselves to have an eye for the ordinary as a

conveyer of the extraordinary which springs to mind as asserted and newly present

duringanexperienceofwonder.

‘Experiencingthingsfortheirownsake’ isanotherelementofScruton’sphilosophythat

wemightexplore inconnectionwithwonder. Inhisaccountofthe imaginationScruton

emphasises that aesthetic enjoyment is the enjoyment of an object for its own sake

(Scruton,1974,p.143)56.Iftheactivityoftheimaginationplaysapartinwonderitmight

helpexplainwhywonderoftencomesacrossasajoyfulexperiencebutwillitmakesense

tosaythatwhenwefeeljoyduringanepisodeofwonderwefeelittowardstheobjectof

55BothScrutonandWarnocksupportthepossibilityofeducatingtheimagination.Scrutonsuggeststhatourtasteorabilitytoappreciatesomethingaesthetically(whichinvolvestheuseoftheimagination)canbeadvancedbyeducation(Scruton,1974,p.142-143).Warnockislikewiseforeducatingtheimaginationandshesuggeststhatonewayofachievingsucheducationistoallowtheuseofcreativity(Warnock,1976,p.10,207).56Warnocksupportstheideathatmakinguseoftheimaginationisjoyful.Thisissobecausetoherimaginationequalsshaping,whichisessentiallyconnectedwithjoy(Warnock,1976,p.78).

137

wonder for its own sake? Iwould argue against this because although onemight take

pleasureintheobjectofwonderapartoftheenjoymentwefeelcanalsobelinkedtothe

very ‘displacement’ or ‘diminishing of self’, as I have termed it, which the wonderful

object facilitates.What makes wonder joyful is in other words not only the object of

wonder but is also connected towhat it does to us. This takes us back to the idea of

wonderhavinganemotionalcomponentor feelingdimensionbecause itcanbeargued

thatduringwondermentweexperienceemotionalupheavalmostlyintheformofjoyand

thatthishassomethingtodowiththedisplacementorthediminishingoftheselfwefeel

during wonder. If this is the case it helps us grasp how wonder can be cognitively

advantageous.

Movingonwemightalsosaythatapartoftheenjoymentofwonder lies inthe

reverence, openness and gratitude, which one might experience in connection with

wonderaswesawinthethreeexamplesusedearlierinthissection.Inadditionwemight

findpleasureintheawarenessofignorancethatcomeswithwondermentandindeedjoy

intheinvitationtoundertakefurtherenquiriesandbringnewdiscoveriestolight,which

the wonderful object gives us. To exemplify this we might return to Shakespeare’s

character Horatio who experienced both fear and wonder during his paranormal

encounterwiththeghostofthedeadkingbutalsothedriveforinquiryandtodiscover

thereasonwhytheapparitionwalkedthenight.ThesamecanbesaidaboutRobertBoyle

and his wonder at the luminous meat brought to him from the larder by one of his

servants. A part of his joy was no doubt the appearance of the meat itself given its

unusual qualities, but another source of his enjoyment was his own

displacement/diminishing of self and the invitation to inquiry that thewonderfulmeat

broughtforth.

ThisendsmydealingswithScruton’sapproachtoimagination,whichaddstothecomplex

picture of imagination and its role in wonderment that has emerged in this chapter.

AmongstwhathasbeendisclosedinthesectioninvolvingScruton’sapproachtheideaof

displacement/diminishing of self seems most striking because not only does it help

explainwhywonderment is a powerful and intense experience; it also hints to us that

inherenttowondermentthereisapotentialforlearningsomethingbeitsomethingnew

about theobjectofwonderor simplyaboutourselvesas thekindofperceptivebeings

thatweare.Fromthisvantagepointweshallcontinuetorefinetherelationshipbetween

wonderandimagination.

138

3.6Conclusion

The goal of this chapter has been to show inwhat capacity thewonderful experience

involves thework of the imagination.We began by looking at a range of literature of

wonder where imagination is involved in order to further clarify the rationale for

investigating imagination in connection with wonder. Subsequently a general

introduction to imagination was given followed by three different approaches to

imagination represented by Mary Warnock, Ronald Hepburn and Roger Scruton.

Warnock’sRomanticapproachrevealedthatimaginationiswhatanimatesourperception

andmakes us able to go beyond what is directly in front of us. AdditionallyWarnock

brought to light that imagination is connected to creativity and that educating the

imagination is importantbecauseusing the imaginationdrawsnotonlyon the intellect

butalsoonouremotionsandfeelingsandplaysaroleinhowwecanliberateourselves

fromthewantonlifeandbecomedirectorofourownlife.Warnock’scontributiontothe

philosophy of imagination enabled us to expand our understanding of wonder by first

highlightingtheanimatingorlife-givingaspectofthewonderfulexperience.Inthisregard

itwasbrought forward that the imagination is active inwondermentwherewe seeka

satisfyingcognitiveschemaofwhatweexperiencebutfailtoobtain,suchthattheobject

ofconcern isnever fullybeheldorunderstood.Furthermore itwashighlightedthatthe

intensityofthewonderfulexperiencecouldbeexplainedbythenotionthatinwonderwe

realise that despite thework of the imagination a completely satisfying picture of the

object of wonder simply does not arrive. By addressing Warnock’s notion of the

universalityof imagination in relation towonder itbecameclear thatsince imagination

playsapart inwonder,wondercarriesa certainuniversalityaswell. In this respectwe

entertainedtheideathatitistheworkofimaginationinwonderthathelpsturnchildish

wonderintophilosophicalreflectionandthatattaininganeducationthatis‘wonderfull’

could deepen one’s sense of wonder. By addressing wonder as a conveyer of the

universalwealsofoundthatbecauseofthelabourofimaginationinwonder,wondercan

giverisetotheideathattheobjectofwonderhasageneralsignificancebeyonditself—

that it isuniversally important,and inthisrespectwe lookedtothenotionthatweare

mortalcreaturesandthatweliveinaworldthatisgrandandbeautiful.

BypayingattentiontoHepburn’snotionofmetaphysicalimaginationas‘layered’,

we found that the first layer of wonder enables us to gather data and appreciate

139

something as wonderful; the second layer enables us to see the object of wonder as

significantandthethirdlayerallowsforindividualinterpretationsoftheobjectofwonder

conveying how the world fundamentally is structured. In connection with Hepburn’s

approachwealsoaddressedthenotionofimaginationasconveyeroftruthandtheidea

thatbecauseimaginationisatworkinwonderment,wonderisaconveyeroftruth.Here

it was brought to light that while it is conceivable that there is a revelatory or noetic

qualitytowondercautionmustbeexercisedwhenitcomestoascribingatruth-valueto

the wonderful experience because metaphysical imagination has the ability to bring

about equally cogent but incompatible views of how the world fundamentally is put

together. The notion of commensurability was likewise addressed in connection with

Hepburn’s approach and we found it quite compatible with Fuller’s idea that wonder

activatesourimaginationandencouragesustoseekdeeperpatternsintheuniverse.

Via Scruton’s approach to imagination we became aware that imagination is

important to aesthetic appreciation and can be viewed as unasserted thought, which

goes beyond what is believed or that which is strictly given. Imagination is a rational

activitythathastwostrands,oneofthembeingpredicative, theotheradverbial,and it

equipsuswitharubricunderwhichavarietyofphenomenacanbegrouped.Important

toourendeavour isoneparticularphenomenonnamed ‘aspectseeing’whichallowsus

for example to see the sadness in someone’s face. The notion of aspect seeing is

significant because we are in effect putting forth a hypothesis based on what we see

without in any straightforward sense believingwhatever it is thatwe see to be there.

Seeinganaspectofsomethingor ‘seeingas’ isakintoanunassertedvisualexperience,

meaning that when it comes to appreciating something aesthetically it should not be

takenliterally.

Scruton’s approach to imaginationalsohelpedusadvance theunderstandingof

imagination’sroleinwonderment,asitenabledustocraftalinkbetweenwhatisabsent

inimaginationasunassertedthoughtandwhatinwonderisnewlypresent.Inwonderwe

experience the world as newly present and we do this because we are displaced,

understoodinthesensethatourframeofreferenceisdisplacedallowingusforperhaps

merelyamomenttoassertwhatisnormallyunassertedandthusexperienceourselvesas

transfigured. Scruton’s approach also allowed us to consider what it takes for us to

wonder appropriately and in this respect a preliminary acceptance criterion for

wondermentwasproposedstatingthatforsomeonetowonderappropriatelyshehasto

wonder at what is extraordinary, vivid and significant and that her wonderment, as it

140

were,canbeacceptedbyothers.Scruton’sapproachtoimaginationlikewisegaveriseto

thoughts about the continuity between intense experiences and subsequent living in

relationtowonderanditwasbroughtforththatifsomeoneisexperiencingwonderina

true sense she experiences being in a state of mind that embraces perhaps a kind of

subtlereverence,gratitudeoropennessthat influenceherbehaviourandmaycontinue

todosoovertime.AdditionallyinconnectionwithScruton’sapproachwetouchedonthe

notionofcultivatingahabitofwonderviaeducatingtheimaginationanditwasventured

thatby trainingour imaginationwecanbecomeaccustomedtoalwaysseekingout the

richestpossibleaccountofsomethingandhaveaneyefortheordinaryasconveyerofthe

extraordinary.InconnectionwithScruton’sapproachwealsoexaminedifthejoywefeel

during an episode of wonder can be exclusively linked to the object of wonder. The

answerwasnotnecessarilyso,becausealthoughitispossibletofindjoyintheobjectof

wonder a part of the joy might also consist of 1) being displaced/experiencing a

diminishingofself;2)thereverence,opennessandgratitudeonemightexperienceand3)

theawarenessof ignoranceabouttheobjectofwonderandtheinvitationtoundertake

furtherenquiries.

Lastly it canbe said that the threeaccountsof imaginationpresentedprovidea

rich view of imagination and from the analysis it is evident that imagination plays a

significant role in theexperienceofwonder. To take this further and inparticularwith

regardstowhattheactivityofimaginationinwonderdoestousIshallinthenextchapter

exploretheimplicationsoftheroleofImaginationinwonder.

141

4.ImplicationsoftheRoleofImaginationinWonder

And as the moon rose higher the inessential houses began to melt away until

gradually Ibecameawareof theold islandthat floweredonce forDutchsailors’

eyes—a fresh, green breast of the new world […] for a transitory enchanted

moment man must have held his breath in the presence of this continent,

compelled into an aesthetic contemplation he neither understood nor desired,

face to face for the last time in history with something commensurate to his

capacityforwonder.

(Fitzgerald,2012,p.243)

Thischapterbuildsonthepreviousandisconcernedwiththeimplicationsoftheroleof

imaginationinwonder.Viatheexaminationofanarrayofnewexamplesfromart,space-

travelandphilosophythatareparticularlywonderprovoking Ihopenotonly to further

solidify how the imagination is active in wonderment but also how an experience of

wondermay:1)influenceourperception;2)increaseourmoralscopeandsensitivity;and

3) facilitate a wondrous afterglow and deep wonder. The chapter also functions as a

bridgetothenext,whichfocusesonwonder,humanflourishingandvirtue.

4.1.Wonder,ImaginationandPerception

Fromtheexaminationofthreedifferentexamplesthissectionaimstosupportthe idea

thatthewonder-filledexperienceengagesourimaginationtotheextentthatitmayalter

ourperceptionandenrichourperspective. Ishallfocuson,first,GuiseppeArcimboldo’s

portraitRudolf II asVertumnus,second, thewonder thatmay spring fromseeingEarth

fromspace,andthird, themicroscopeandthetelescope,which liketheX-raymightbe

labelled technologicalwondersorartefactsofwonder.Enrichmentofperceptionowing

to the activity inwonderment neednot spring froma particular source ofwonder but

mayemergefrommanydifferentones.

Asannouncedthefirstexampleconcernsthe16thcenturyManneristoilpainterGuiseppe

Arcimboldo and his 1591 portrait Rudolf II as Vertumnus (figure 4.1) (Daston & Park,

1998, p. 211). The portrait is important to the present study first of all because it is

extraordinary inthesensethat fruitsandvegetables fromvariousseasonsmakeupthe

142

depictionof Rudolf II illustrating that he is onewithVertumnus theRoman godof the

seasons and so reigns forever having within him ‘the eternal spring of the mythical

GoldenAge’(Daston&Park,1998,p.211).

Secondly the painting is relevant to wonder because despite the allure of the

minutely detailed fruits and vegetables their arrangement portrays Rudolf II with a

strikingresemblance.

Thirdly the painting evokes wonder

because of its ingenuity. One cannot but

marvelatthealmostunfathomablefinesseit

takesforanartisttobringapaintinglikethis

to life. Just to come up with the motif is

profound and this speaks in turn of one of

thekey featuresaboutManneristart.When

beholdingaManneristpainting likeRudolf II

asVertumnusoneislikelytowondernotonly

at the painting itself but also at the

extraordinarily imaginative powers of the

painterwhopaintedit(Daston&Park,1998,

p.210).

Fourthlyuponbeholdingtheextraordinarypaintingonemightbeginimaginingthe

characteristicsofRudolfII includingwhathethoughtwasthetruenatureofourhuman

conditionandinwhatsensehisoutlookontheworlddifferedfromours.Atthetimeofits

creation the painting would have been controversial, representing the antithesis to

centuriesofChristian thinkingwherewonderandmeaning in lifewere tobesoughtby

obtainingknowledgeofGodandhowtoliveaChristianlife.Inotherwordsthepainting

speaks of rebirth and the patterns of thought we today would attribute to the

renaissancemind. It speaks of aworld newly born andof a perspectiveon thehuman

conditionfilledwithpossibilitiesandthepromiseoftransmutation.

In support of these claims one might for example link the painting with the

humanist ideas of Pico della Mirandola who as we recall from the first chapter gave

utterance to the notion that human beings are wonderful in the sense that we lack

conditioning,meaningthatwearenotcompelledtoactlikewildanimalsbutalsoableto

riseabovesuchactsandbecomesomethingelseentirely.

Figure4.1.GuiseppeArcimboldo,RudolfIIas

Vertumnus,SkoklosterCastle,Skokloster,Sweden(1591).

143

Tothewonderingcontemporaryviewerthefruitsandvegetablesmotifmayalso

conjure up imaginings of human beings as creatures ‘grown out of the planet’ who

depend on its continuing survival and ‘wellbeing’. To continue this line of thought we

might say that theportraitdepictsacertain ‘earthliness’ inconnectionwithhuman life

whichmaytosomeprovokeimaginingsofanalternativewayoflife,quitedifferentfrom

the one lived in for example polluted megacities of concrete, glass and steel. It may

inspireanoutlookdifferentfromthatofthehumanistPicodellaMirandolawhowerecall

arguedthathumanbeingsarefreebecauseournatureisnotsetinstone.Itmayinspire

us to ponder if our happiness is linked to what we might call twenty-first century

romanticismwherethemessuchasecologicalsustainability,greenenergyandveganism

togetherwithacloseconnectiontothelandareimportantthemes.

In light of these interpretations Arcimboldo’s painting provokes an attitude of

wonderbecausewhenviewedwithacertainattitudeitallowusatleastmomentarilyto

transcendthedefaultcognitiveschematicofourplaceintheorderofthings,experience

theflightoftheimaginationandenjoyanenrichmentofperceptionandperspective.

ThenextexampleconcernstheimageoftheEarthseenfromspace.Tohelpillustratethe

importance of this image I shall look at a selection of excerpts from the short 2012

documentary film Overview. The film is directed by Guy Reid, produced by Planetary

Collective andbesides being a stand-aloneproject it functions as a prelude to the film

Planetaryandfeaturesanarrayofcommentatorsfromdifferentbackgroundswhoshare

theirviewsontheunderstandingandimplicationsofseeingplanetEarthfromspace.

Thefirstexcerpts Iamgoingto lookat involvestatementsbelonging inorderof

appearance to author Frank White, Apollo astronaut Edgar Mitchell and philosopher

DavidLoy:

In1968Apollo8wenttothemoon.Theydidn’tlandbuttheydidcirclethemoon

and Iwaswatching iton televisionandata certainpointoneof theastronauts

casuallysaid ‘we’regonnaturnthecameraaroundandshowyoutheearth’and

hedidandthatwasthefirsttimeIhaveeverseentheplanethanginginspacelike

thatanditwasprofound.

(Reid,2012,FrankWhite)

144

ThebeautyofseeingEarthasaplanetasopposedtobeingdownhereamongitis

a wonderful experience that instructs to get into what we call the Big Picture

EffectortheOverviewEffect.

(Reid,2012,EdgarMitchell)

Ithinkthatformelikeformanyotherpeopleitwasquiteashock.Idon’tthink

thatanyofushadanyexpectationsabouthowitwouldgiveussuchadifferent

perspective.Ithinkthefocushadbeenwearegoingtothestars.Wearegoingto

otherplanetsandsuddenlywelookbackatourselvesanditseemstoimplyanew

kindofself-awareness.

(Reid,2012,DavidLoy)

Theseexcerptsprovidearoughsketchofwhatwearedealingwith.Whitemakesitclear

that for him seeing the image of the Earth hanging in space for the first time was a

profound experience. Mitchell who actually went into space and saw the Earth from

space elaborates by calling the experience beautiful and wonderful and brings to our

attention theeffectknownas theOverviewEffect.57 Loy reflectson the implicationsof

seeing Earth from space for the first time and explains that for him it was a shocking

event that changed our perspective and generated a new kind of self-awareness. Loy

continues:

Within theWestern tradition I think it isquitenewandquite shockingbecause

therehasbeenmuchmorethesenseofseparation.Butifyoulookatothernon-

Western cultures especially in Asia the emphasis on those has always been on

realisation that the self and theworld is not separate fromeachotherbut that

theyarereallyinterconnected,thattheindividualselfandthespeciesasawhole

isamanifestationofthelargerwhole.

(Reid,2012,DavidLoy)

As forMitchell’sexperience, it seemsevident that inwonder the imagination is ignited

paving the way for an enriched perception of things. It is clear that as his experience

57TheOverviewEffectisatermcoinedbyFrankWhitein1987involvingacognitiveshiftinducedbyachangeinphysicalperspective.OneofthemostimportantchangestothemindexperiencingtheOverviewEffectisthat‘everythingisinterconnectedandinterrelated,eachpartofasubsystemofalargerwholesystem’(White,1987,p.4).

145

unfolds he is not able fully to comprehend it indicating that his imagination fails to

providehimwithasatisfyingcognitiveschemaoftheobjectofwonderbeforehimwhich

inthiscaseistheEarthseenfromspace.Memoriesofhisexperiencecontinuetohaunt

himandeventuallyleadhimtoconsulthislocaluniversityandasktheirhelpinclarifying

it.Additionallywemightsaythathisexperiencegaverisetoaperceptualchange,which

via the Buddhist concept of Savikalpa Samadhi58 hewas later able to express inmore

detailasexperiencingtheworldwithecstasyandasenseoftotalunityandoneness.

Iwouldargue that the self-awarenessorenhancedperception the imageof the

planet hanging in space produced directedMitchell towards the ontological because it

conjuredupideasorimagesofour“truenature”asbeingsnotseparatedfromtheplanet

butbeingsthatareinterconnectedandthatweasaspecieshaveaparttoplayintheway

theplanetunfolds.

Upon considering the excerpts from Overview and the interpretations I have

offeredIthinkweareinapositiontosaythatjustlikeArcimboldo’spaintingofRudolfII

asVertumnus the imageof Earth situated in the voidmay inducewonder, promptour

imagination and help us perceive our place in the order of things in a way perhaps

radicallydifferentfromwhatweareusedto.

Theemphasisonsightisalsoimportantinthethirdandfinalexample,whichfocuseson

twoparticularscientificartefacts,namelythemicroscopeandthetelescopethatjustlike

theX-rayiscapableofhelpingustoseetheworldanew.

Letusbeginwiththemicroscope.Themicroscopeisaninstrumentthatmakesit

possible to see objects that are too small for the naked human eye to capture. Itwas

constructed towards theendof the16th centuryandalthough thereare controversies

about its original inventor it is clear that spectacle-maker Zacharias Janssen and

astronomer Galileo Galilei were involved in its development (Doron, 2012, p. 180).

Around the time of its invention itwas a radical instrument and for some a source of

endlesswonderasitprovidedanopportunitytogazeintoa‘newworld’(Doron,2012,p.

192).Otherswereinspiredbyitsmagnifyingpropertiestorenewtheirfaith inGodas it

helped‘manifesttheinfinitepowerofGodinthemostlowlyandfamiliarplaces’(Doron,

2012, p. 192). The 17th centurymicroscopist Louis Joblot captures thewonders of the

microscopeaptlyinhisObservationsd’historienaturellefaitesaveclemicroscope:58IntheBuddhisttraditionSamadhireferstoastateofdeepconcentrationdevelopedthoughmeditationpractice(Lopez,2004,p.554).Savikalpaisacomplexwordthatincludestheword‘sa’meaning‘with’and‘vikalpa’meaning‘conceptuality’.IamgratefultoMatthewNealeforpointingthisout.

146

Thewholeofnatureturnedouttobenew[…]themicroscopehelpedusdiscover

on the face of the earth a small world that was entirely new, and gave us the

opportunity to see in every single thing an infinity of beings no less wonderful

thananywehavehithertoknown.

(Doron,2012,p.192)

Through the microscope Joblot experiences the world anew in the sense that beings

whose existence he hitherto had been completely unaware of suddenly sprung to life

beforehis‘augmentedeyes’.Itisnothardto

imagine that such an experiencemust have

been wonder-filled and to capture some of

its essence we might consider Philippe

Crassous’ 2010 capture of a hydrothermal

worm via a scanning electron microscope

(figure 4.2) (Crassous, 2010). Hydrothermal

wormsaredeep-seacreaturesaboutthesize

of bacteria, and are mainly found close to

hydrothermal vents in the ocean and they

look absolutely monstrous. Crassous’

dramatic depiction not only sends a clear

message about how far microscopy has

evolvedintermsofrevealingdetailsofobjectstoominisculeforustosenseunaidedbut

alsoprovideuswithanideaofthekindofwonderpeoplemusthaveexperiencedupon

observing microscopic beings for the first time. Additionally one might point out that

Crassous’ worm also functions as a tribute to the marvellous ‘supposed macroscopic’

monstrositiesassociatedwiththeimaginingsofthemedievalandrenaissanceperiodand

whichwestillwonderattoday.59

Theveryrealisationthatthereissomethingbeyondournormalscopeofvision–

something that we without the aid of a microscope would totally miss out on—

encourageswonderment. It ignites the imagination and enriches our perceptionof the

orderofthingsfor it raisesmanyquestionsabouthowthishiddenmicroscopicworld is

59Forinsightsintosuchmarvelsandimaginingssee:(Park&Daston,1981),(Pare,1982)and(N.R.Smith,2002).

Figure4.2.PhillipeGrassous’2010captureofahydrothermalwormviaascanningelectron

microscope.Picturetakenfromhttp://www.fei.com/image-gallery/the-

hydrothermal-worm/

147

intertwined with our everyday lives. One could argue that the development of

microbiology and itswell-known importance to contemporarymedicine andhealthcare

takes the punch out of this argument. One could also press the point that since the

inventionof themicroscope themicroscopicworldhasbeen researched so extensively

that it hardly qualifies as terra incognita anymore, which consequently brings about a

certaindiffusionofatleastsomepeoples’senseofwonderinrelationtoit.Howeveritis

fairtosaythattheextenttowhichwecanexploretheworldofthemicroscopicdepends

ontheadvancementoftechnologyandourcapabilityofproducingimagesofever-smaller

things. Thus to say that themicroscopicworldhas lost itswonder is anoverstatement

becausewearefarfrombeingabletoexploreeverythingandevenif itwaspossibleto

have fully explored the world of miniscule things it would still be wonder-filled to

creatures like us precisely because we do not have access to it without the aid of

technology.

Likewiseperhapsthetelescope isanartefactthatcanfacilitateanexperienceof

wonderbecauseitallowsustoseeobjectstooremoteforournormalsighttodetect.The

16thcenturyGerman/Dutchspectacle-makerHansLippershey iscreditedfor inventing it

(King, 1955, p. 30) but it was the improvements to the instrument by Galileo and his

applicationofittothefieldofastronomythatwithourpresentpurposeinmindmakesit

important.Toelaborateon thispointconsiderAmbassador toVeniceunder James ISir

HenryWotton’sletterofMarch13th1610totheEarlofSalisburyconcerningtheworksof

Galileo:

IsendherewithuntoHisMajestythestrangestpieceofnews(asImayjustlycall

it)thathehatheveryetreceivedfromanypartoftheworld;whichistheannexed

book of the Mathematical Professor at Padua, who by the help of an optical

instrument […] hath discovered four new planets rolling about the Sphere of

Jupiter […] so upon the whole subject he hath first overthrown all former

astronomy…andnext all astrology. By thenext ship your Lordships shall receive

frommeoneoftheaboveinstruments,asitisbetteredbythisman.

(Wotton,1907,p.486-487)

Like themicroscope the telescope allows us to see parts of theworld that is normally

hidden to us and upon discovering such parts the idea of how theworld looks and is

ordered is at risk of being overthrown or transfigured.WhatWotton speaks of in the

148

lettertotheEarlofSalisburyisatestimonytothiseffect.Galileo’stelescopicobservations

involved Jupiter’s four major moons Io, Europa, Ganymede and Callisto and their

existencecastthegeocentricmodeloftheworldandthepracticeofastrologyintodoubt

because neither of these could account for the existence of these moons. This was a

monumentaldiscoveryand similar to thewonder theeducatedpeopleof Europemust

have experienced when they learned that Christopher Columbus had found a vast

continent to thewest and so had to change themap of the knownworld, the people

aroundGalileomusthavemarvelledathistelescopicobservationsandtheirimplications.

Wotton foronecertainlydidashe sent the strange tidings to theEarlofSalisburyand

rightlysobecauseGalileo’sobservationsindeedmarkedthebeginningofaparadigmshift

andtheendofanerawheretheuniversewasthoughtorderly.

Havingone’sideaofhowtheworldisstructuredoverthrownisacolossalevent.It

must have encouraged imaginings of an alternative architecture of the universe and

perhaps even depictions of what other secrets the telescope in time would reveal as

featuresofourworld.AstheobservationsofGalileowereimpossibletoignoreandsince

theycontradictedthegeocentricworldviewandthatofastrologyitledtheintellectualto

analtogetherdifferentplaceorwithadifferentperceptionoftheorderofthings.

Artefactssuchasthemicroscopeandthetelescopeserveasatestimonyofhuman

ingenuityandthefactthatweamongmanythingsareartefact-makingcreatures.Thefact

thatwecaninventwondersthatenrichedourlimitedsensesenablingustogazefurther

andbringtoourattentionanunseenorderofthingsthatwouldotherwisebebeyondus

speaksofourinherentlywonderfulnature.

4.2 Wonder, Imagination and the Development of Moral Scope

andSensitivity

Someexperiencesofwonder ignite the imagination and can give rise to anewkindof

perceptionthatdevelopsmoralsensitivityorencouragesanincreaseinmoralscope.To

illustrate how thismay come to pass I shall first pay attention to political philosopher

RobertNozick’s‘experiencemachine’whichisathoughtexperimentthatprovokesusto

givethoughttowhatwereallycareoutaboutandwhatkindoflifeisworthwhileliving.

SecondlyIshallexaminepoliticalphilosopherJohnRawl’sthoughtexperimentthe‘veilof

ignorance’ thathas enjoyedmuchdebatewithinphilosophical andpolitical circles as it

149

contributes towards the clarificationofhowwemightorder a just society. Then I shall

looktotheconceptof ‘speciesism’advocatedbymoralphilosopherPeterSinger,which

has contributed towards an increased awareness of animal rights and howwe human

beings often think of ourselves as harbouring a special moral status in comparison to

otherbeingsontheplanet.

Nozick’sExperienceMachinehasthepurposeofestablishingacaseagainsthedonismand

aims todrawoutwhat theparticipant in theexperiment really treasures in life.Nozick

writes:

Suppose therewereanexperiencemachine thatwouldgiveyouanyexperience

you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that

youwould thinkand feel youwerewritingagreatnovel,ormakinga friend,or

reading an interesting book. All the time youwould be floating in a tank, with

electrodesattachedtoyourbrain.Shouldyouplugintothismachineforlife,pre-

programming your life’s experiences? If you are worried about missing out on

desirableexperiences,wecansupposethatbusinessenterpriseshaveresearched

thoroughly the lives ofmany others. You can pick and choose from their large

libraryorsmorgasbordof suchexperiences, selectingyour life’sexperiences for,

say,thenexttwoyears.Aftertwoyearshavepassed,youwillhavetenminutesor

ten hours out of the tank, to select the experiences of yournext two years.Of

course,while in the tank youwon’t know that you’re there; you’ll think it’s all

actuallyhappening.Otherscanalsoplugintohavetheexperiencestheywant,so

there’snoneed to stayunplugged to serve them(Ignoreproblemssuchaswho

willservicethemachinesifeveryoneplugsin).Wouldyouplugin?Whatelsecan

mattertous,otherthanhowourlivesfeelfromtheinside?Norshouldyourefrain

becauseofthefewmomentsofdistressbetweenthemomentyou’vedecidedand

themoment you’re plugged.What’s a fewmoments of distress compared to a

lifetimeofbliss(ifthat’swhatyouchoose),andwhyfeelanydistressatallifyour

decisionisthebestone?

(Nozick,1974,p.42-43)

Theexperiment is relevant toour currentexplorationofwonderand imagination for a

numberofreasons.Firstofallitisaboutimaginedstateofaffairstwiceoverinthesense

150

thatwearenotmerelyaskedtoimaginesuchathingastheexperiencemachinebutalso

toimaginewhatwewouldchoseifweweregiventheopportunitytoenterit.Thisgives

rise to wonderment because as much as the thought experiment can be criticised as

science fiction or detached from reality the question of what we would choose in a

situationwherewehad theoptionofplugging into themachine isa seriousoneanda

potentialanswerwouldrevealwhatwereallycareaboutandmaypotentiallyserveasa

startingpointforfurtherethicalenquiries.Inthisregardtheexperimentpromptsasense

ofwonderandengagesour imaginationbecausemostofuswouldbegintounderstand

thatwhat reallymatters tousdigsbeyond immediatepleasures and theexperienceof

howweliveourlives.Suchmattersareonlyapartofwhatwetrulycareaboutbecause

‘wewanttodocertainthings,andnot justhavetheexperienceofdoingthem’(Nozick,

1974,p.43).

Nozickalsopointsoutthatwedonotwanttoenterthemachinebecausewecare

aboutwhatkindofpersonsweare.Wehavean interest in livingauthentic liveswhere

ourexperiencesarereflectedinthecharacterwerepresent,butifweplugourselvesinto

themachinetheveryrelationshipbetweenourexperiencesandourcharacterfadesaway

makingtheactofattachingourselvestotheexperiencemachineasortofsuicide(Nozick,

1974, p. 43). This may sound excessive but according to Nozick if a person has been

plugged into the machine for a long time it becomes impossible to determine the

character of such a person,which to an extent reflects a personwhono longer exists.

Because theperson in the tank isbeing fedartificialexperiencesofherownchoicewe

cannotdetermine if she isgood-hearted, caring, courageous, intelligent,patientandso

on.Atbest she isbuta thing ina tankoran indeterminateblob touseNozick’swords

(Nozick, 1974, p. 43). One may ask but what if the person in the tank could be

experiencing wonder? Would that not make the choice to plug into the machine

attractive? Not necessarily because it prompts difficult questions such as whether the

experienceofwonderisanendinitselforimportantinitself,notforgettingifwonderis

attractivemerely because it is pleasurable and if wonderwould be attractive if it was

accompaniedbyanemotionalupheavalclosertofearratherthanjoy.

Moving on the thought experiment can also give rise to awondering reflection

about reality; to what extent contact with a deeper reality matters to us; and it may

promptustoreflectuponwhattheworldis,whatandwhoweareandtowhatendwe

haveorderedourlives.InNozick’sviewtheexperiencemachinedeprivesusfrombeingin

touch with a deeper reality because of its artificiality. One could argue that a deeper

151

reality in theory could be simulated but such a simulationwould be aman-made one

meaning that the thing in the tank, regardlessofhowwe lookat it, is cutoff fromany

contactwiththedeeperrealitybeyondtheconstructedonebeingfedtoit(Nozick,1974,

p.43).InthisregardNozick’sthoughtexperimentpromptswonderbecauseitrequiresus

toimagineacertainstateofaffairsortoputitdifferentlyitdrawsusintotheseserious

anddeeperissuesandthusitmightgiverisetowhatwecouldcallanewperspectiveor

perceptiononhumanlifeandsparkmoralquestionsconcerninghowweshouldliveand

towhatendweorganiseour lives. In thissensethewonderwemightexperience from

engagingwithNozick’sexperiment resonateswellwithFuller’soutlookonwonderas it

encouragesusto livea life ‘attunedtothewidestpossibleworldofpersonalfulfilment’

(R. Fuller, 2006, p. 158) or human flourishing because it questions the stewardship of

pleasure.Fromthisvantagepointweareabletosaythattheexperienceofwonderthat

arisesfromengagingwithNozick’sthoughtexperimentcanbeasourceofethicsandgive

wayforanincreaseinmoralscopeandsensitivity.

RobertNozickisnottheonlypoliticalphilosopherwhomakeswonder-provokingthought

experiments thatactivatethe imaginationandhelpusgainmoralsensitivityandscope.

PoliticalphilosopherJohnRawls’sthoughtexperimentthe‘veilofignorance’,whichstems

fromhisopusATheoryofJustice(Rawls,2000)alsoqualifies.InATheoryofJusticeRawls

argues that ifwewere tobuildan ideal just society it is vital firstofall toestablishan

originalposition,thatisapositionthatnullifiesthebiasesofthe‘builders’.Humanbeings

unfortunately have a tendency to exploit one another or to make unjust rules and

regulationsthatsomehowfavouraparticularkindofpeopleoraparticularwayoflife.In

order toeliminatesuchbiasesRawlssuggests thatbeforewebegindesigning this ideal

justsocietywemustputourselvesbehinda‘veilofignorance’.Rawlswrites:

It isassumedthen,thatthepartiesdonotknowcertainkindsofparticularfacts.

Firstofall,nooneknowshisplaceinsociety,hisclasspositionorsocialstatus;nor

does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his

intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor again, does anyone know his

conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan for life, or even the

special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to

optimismorpessimism.Morethanthis,Iassumethatthepartiesdonotknowthe

particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its

152

economicorpoliticalsituation,orthelevelofcivilizationandculture ithasbeen

able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to

whichgenerationtheybelong[…]Asfaraspossible,then,theonlyparticularfacts

whichthepartiesknowisthattheirsociety issubjecttocircumstancesof justice

andwhatever that implies. It is taken for granted, however that they know the

general facts about human society. They understand political affairs and the

principlesofeconomictheory;knowthebasisofsocialorganizationandthelaws

of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know whatever

generalfactsaffectthechoiceoftheprinciplesofjustice.

(Rawls,2000,p.118-119)

Thegeniusoftheexperimentisthattheparticipantisforcedtoimaginetheoutcomesof

therulesandregulationssheputsforthandthekindofsocietyitultimatelywillfabricate

while knowing that she has to participate in the society she is ‘designing’ in some

unknown form and to labour towards a society that is not in her favour would be

counterintuitive.Inthissensetheexperimentwillmakethehomophobeponderwhether

it is justtorestrict therightsofcitizens inthe idealsocietybasedonsexualorientation

nowthatshemayendupbeingahomosexuallivinginthatverysocietyherself.Likewise

the experiment is bound tomake the racist person consider whether her ideas about

assigningspecialprivilegestopeopleofacertainraceintheidealsocietyarejustbecause

shedoesnotknowwhichracesheasacomingcitizenoftheidealsocietywillbelongto.

Inadditionwecansaythattheexperimentencouragesthemisogynisttoreconsiderhis

position on women and how his views are to be incorporated into the ideal society

becausehemayhavetoliveinthatsocietyasawoman.

NowRawls’sthoughtexperimentisapowerfultoolthatmayhelpusexplorewhat

wethinkisjust;howeveritisalsoanexperimentthatmaypromptanattitudeofwonder

not so much because it promotes certain political liberal values but because the

participant quickly becomes aware of any biases or unjust personal preferences she

harboursinrelationtotheimaginedjustsociety.Tosuddenlyfacesuchanawarenessis

displacingandleadstoadiminishingofselfbecausealthoughwecansaythatthroughthe

experiment the participant might gain a new understanding of herself this particular

understandingorenlargementofherworldalsoencompassesanawarenessofignorance

about herself including perhaps how she has come to harbour the particular biases or

personalpreferencesshehappenstohaveinthefirstplaceandwhyitisthattheyhave

153

remainedhiddenuntilnow.Suchawareness intensifies thecognitive focusbecause the

participant turnedwondererwill nowvia theuseof the imagination seekboth to fully

grasphernewlypresentsituationanddoawaywithherignorance.Howeverbecausefull

understandingdoesnotarriveasenseofbeingdisplacedorhavingone’sselfdiminished

emergesleavingthewondererinastateofemotionalupheavalinaworldnewlypresent.

InthislightitisclearthatparticipatinginRawls’sthoughtexperimentisanexercisethatis

likely to inducewonder, but canwe say that theexperienceofwonderemerging from

engaging in Rawls’s thought experiment also facilitates an increase in moral scope or

sensitivity?Yesandno Iwouldsay.Yesbecause the increasedself-awareness including

theawarenessofignorancecanbeseenasabulwarkagainstoverconfidenceorabsolute

surety,whichfuelsmanyanunjustmoralconviction,and it leavesoneopentowonder

both inanepistemicandmoral sense.Nobecause it isquitepossible thatbecause the

thought experiment is destabilising some people would simply refuse to wonder and

deploy psychological defence mechanisms in order to preserve emotional stability.

Furthermoreonemightsaythattheparticularopennesstowonderthattheexperiment

might install depends verymuch on the individual’s ability to use her imagination and

becausesomepeoplehaveapooruseof thisparticularabilityor simplydonothavea

talentforitwecannotsayforsurethatwonderprovokingthoughtexperimentssuchas

theveilofignorancewillresultinanincreaseinmoralscopeorsensitivity.Atbestwecan

saythatitisapossibleeffectofthewonderexperiencedthroughengagingwithit.

Moving on let us now look to the term ‘speciesism’ coined in 1970 by psychologist

Richard D. Ryder (Waldau, 2001, p. 5, 23-29) and brought to the attention of a wider

audiencebyphilosopherPeterSinger(Singer,1990,p.213;1993,p.61-62).Accordingto

Singerspeciesists ‘givegreaterweighttothe interestsofmembersoftheirownspecies

whenthereisaclashbetweentheirinterestsandtheinterestsofthoseofotherspecies’

(Singer,1993,p.58). Tocontextualise thiswemighthighlight thatmanyhumanbeings

areconsumersofanimal-basedfood,clothingandcommoditiesmadefromanimalssuch

aswalletsandbracelets.Wecouldalsosaythathumanbeingshaveanaffinityforusing

animalsforentertainmentandthattheexistenceofinstitutionssuchaszoos,aquariums

orcircuseswhereanimalsareoftenkeptunderquestionableconditionsisatestimonyto

this effect. Furthermore it can be pointed out that human beings without much

consideration at least in some parts of the world use animals for research and that

154

countless animals have in the past suffered and perished due to scientific

experimentationaimingatproducingknowledge,humanmedicineorcosmetics.

Now realising what speciesismmeans and that one qualifies as a speciesist by

endorsing animal suffering through consumer habits can for some call up at least

momentarily an experience of wonder because they may never have thought of

themselvesascontributorstoanimalsuffering.Itmightturneverythingupsidedownand

especiallyifapersonpriortobeingpresentedtheconcept,entertainedunconsciousideas

thatruledoutthepossibilityofnon-humananimalshavingmoralstatus.Fuller’sideathat

wonderexercisesourontologicalimaginationcomesintoplayherebecauseforsomethe

realisationthatoneisaspeciesistcanbedisplacingordiminishtheselftotheextentthat

it provokes a re-examination of one’s outlook on the position of human beings in the

worldincludingperhapstheviabilityoftraditionalwesternideasconcerningtheposition

ofhumanbeingsinthe‘hierarchyofthings’.Whatwearetalkingabouthereisthekindof

ideas thathavehelped shape thewestern approach to animals suchasAristotle’s idea

that ‘plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good ofman’

(Aristotle,1967,I. III.7);thepartoftheBiblewhereitsays:‘AndGodsaid,Letusmake

maninourimage,afterourlikeness:andletthemhavedominionoverthefishofthesea,

andoverthefowloftheair,andoverthecattle,andoverall theearth,andoverevery

creeping thing that creepethupon theearth’ (Bible, 1994,Genesis1:26);Aquinas’ idea

that‘itmattersnothowmanbehavetoanimals,becauseGodhassubjectedallthingsto

man’spower’ (Aquinas,1947,questions64.1and65.3)andKant’snotiondictating that

‘sofarasanimalsareconcerned,wehavenodirectduties.Animalsarenotself-conscious,

and are theremerely asmeans to an end. That end isman’ (Kant, 1963, p. 239-240).

Understandingthatoneisaspeciesistisaprocessthatislikelytofuelwonder,igniteour

imaginationbutwillitnecessarilybringaboutanincreaseinmoralscopeandsensitivity?

No, because although somemight begin to activelyminimise the use of animal-based

productsorcompletelyconverttoavegetarianorveganlifestyleitisfarfromcertainthat

everyonewillbemotivatedtosuchactionfromdealingwiththeconceptofspeciesism.

Somepeopleadvocateadifferentandperhapstothemabsolutecreedorsystemofbelief

that is never questioned and which does not recognise themoral importance of non-

humananimals.Inotherwordstheyaresimplynotcompelledtochangeoreventoplay

with the thought that giving non-human animals moral status is a sign of moral

advancement.Additionallywemayspeakoftherefusaltowonderandtheideathatfor

some people the power of habit is simply too great, meaning that once you have

155

establishedaparticularwayoflifeyouaremoreorlesssetinyourwaysandtochangeis

farfromeasybecauseitbringsdiscomfort,whichmostpeopleshun.

Taken this intoconsideration I think it fair tosay thatbecomingaware thatone

qualifiesasaspeciesistinviteswonderandtheintenseuseoftheimaginationbutitneed

not increasemoralscopeandsensitivity.Anincreaseinsuchis inthisrespectnotakey

component or constituent ofwonder but at best a possible effect or result of it. Now

despite this formulation some might still think that I have spoken too warmly about

Nozick’s experience machine, Rawl’s veil of ignorance and the concept of speciesism

advocated by Ryder and Singer and howwe through our engagementwith themmay

experiencewonder,theflightoftheimaginationandthatthisinsomecasesmayresultin

an increase inmoral scope and sensitivity. It can be argued thatmy argumentmerely

speaks to thealreadymorally inclinedbut suchanobjectionseems to take forgranted

thattheamoralpersonexists,apositionwhichisworthwhileexamining.Infactitisquite

possiblethattheamoralpersonisamodernmythbecausegivinguplivingtheethicalor

moral lifeequalsgivingup finding robust reasons foraction i.e. reasons that transcend

purely selfish and egoistical attitudes or unexamined emotions and feelings. Of course

onecouldarguethatthisdeprivationofreasoningisindeedthemodusoperandiformany

people but such an attitude does not entitle us to say that such people are amoral. It

merely suggests the sidetracking of moral reasoning and the prevalence of immoral

behaviour.Tobeimmoraldoesnotmeanthatoneisbeyondmoralsbutmerelyindicates

thatapersonbehavesinconsideratelywithnoorlittlecareforselfandothers.Thuswe

are still able to say that for some thewonder thatwill emerge fromengagingwith for

example the concept of speciesism can give rise to an increase in moral scope and

sensitivity.

It can also be speculated that what appears as immunity or indifference to an

increaseinmoralscopeandsensitivityasapossibleeffectofwondersignalsarefusalto

wonder.Itcouldverywellbethatapersonrecognisestheemergingwonderbuttreatsit

asathreattoherintegrityandforthesakeofpreservingherstablewayoflifedissociates

herselffrompossibleeffectsoftheexamplesorplainlydeniestheirimportance.However

suchbehaviourdoesnotmeanthatherhostilitytowonderispermanentorentitlesher

to amoral status. Given that human beings are always situated in a limbo between

actualityandpotentiality,meaningthattheyinherentlyharbourthepotentialforchange,

wecannotcompletelyruleoutthatapersonentertainingarefusaltowonderwillnotat

somefuturepointrecognisethevalueofitandexperiencethepossibleeffectsofwonder.

156

Toputitdifferentlywecouldspeculatethatrealisingthatoneisaspeciesistandwhatit

impliesmayneedsometimeinorderto ‘sink in’.Thepoint isthatan increase inmoral

scope and sensitivity following an experience of wonder needs not take place in the

moment of wonder but can happen over time. Taking this into consideration I should

think that the existence of the amoral person, immune to the possible transfiguring

effects of wonder is a doubtful matter and that one with the passing of time may

experienceanincreaseinmoralscopeandsensitivityasaresultofwonder.

Thisconcludesthesectiononwonder,imaginationandthedevelopmentofmoralscope

andsensitivityasaneffectofwonderandIshallnowmoveonandelaborateonhowthe

activity of the imagination in the wonder-filled experience is connected to wondrous

afterglowsanddeepwonder.

4.3WondrousAfterglowsandDeepWonder

ThroughoutthisthesisIhavereferredtoKeen’swonder-filledencounterwithastranger

inMaryville,Tennesseewhogavehimamysteriousgiftintheformofaknife.Ihavealso

mentionedthatduring theweeksafter this strangemeetingKeenexperiencedwhathe

refers to as a pervasive sense of gratitude to the stranger who handed him the knife

together with a rather mysterious ‘wondering expectancy’ brought about by the

realisationthatthiswonderfulhappeningtookplaceintheordinaryworldofMaryville.In

connection with Keen’s encounter I suggested that what he experienced during the

weeksfollowingthehandoveroftheknifecouldbetermeda‘wondrousafterglow’butI

refrainedfromdisclosinganyfurtherdetailastowhatthistermcovers.

Awondrousafterglowisfirstandforemostapossibleeffectofwonder,whichisto

say that it strictly speaking is not a part of what we can call the core components of

wonder.Itisastateofmindthatcanspringfromwonderwhichpersistsovertime60thus

qualifying as a sort of “lingeringwonder” involving in some instances (like in Keen’s) a

pervasivesenseofgratitudeandawonderingexpectancy.

Nowgiven that gratitude is anemotion (Solomon,2007,p. 257-258) and that a

‘wonderingexpectancy’involvesinsomevaguesenseafeelingthatsomethingpositiveis

goingtohappenwemightinconjunctionwiththefactthatKeen’sexperiencelastedfor60PaulR.Fleishman’sviewofwondersupportstheideathatwondercanpersistovertime.Hespeaksaboutwonderbeingthe‘experiencethatendureinyourpsyche,thathitcharideandwon’tletgo’(Fleischman,2013,p.112).

157

weeksponderifawondrousafterglowinanysenseisanemotion.Thisisquiteplausible

because there is judging from Keen’s recollection a strong feeling component to the

experience; however because of the endurance of the experience and the difficulty of

describingwhatitactuallyconsistsofperhapsitisbesttothinkofawondrousafterglow

asamood.InsupportofthisstandsBen-Ze’evwhowerecallinformsusthatasopposed

toanemotion,whichcanlastforsecondstodaysbuttypicallylastsforafewminutestoa

fewhours amoodhas general or diffuse intentional objects andmaypersist for hours

overdaystoweeksandmonths(Ben-Ze'ev,2010,p.55).

Anadditionalkey featureof thewondrousafterglowcouldbe that it ignites the

imagination and opens up themind to a different and perhapsmore embracing view.

Keen’spervasivesenseofgratitudetothestrangerwhohandedhimtheknifesuggestsso

becausetoharbourasenseofgratitudeisnotnecessarilyasstraightforwardasitmight

seem.Keen’slaterworkontheemotionofgratitudesupportsthatbecausehestatesthat

whenweexperiencegratitude‘weperceiveexistenceasanunconditionalgift,ablessing,

abeatitudebestowedonusthatwehaveneitherearnednordeserved’ (Keen,2010,p.

91). In this light Keen’s gratitude to the stranger means something more than being

thankfultosomeoneforreceivingagiftinanordinarysense.Itbearswitnesstoaperson

whobyhavingaknifepresentedtohimasagiftfromacompletestrangerforsometime

hasopenedup to aworldbeyond thephysical.Or toput it differently it suggests that

throughhisexperienceKeenbecameopentoametaphysicalandontologicaldimension

or to paraphrase Keen the appreciation of ‘beingwithin the eternalmystery of Being’

(Keen,2010,p.91).

Tocastfurtherlightonthenotionofawondrousafterglowletusturntotheidea

ofdifferentiatedwonderwhichItouchedontowardstheendofchapter1withreference

toHove’s idea thatadeep levelofwondermay reveal certain fundamentalsabout the

humanconditionincludingthatwearevulnerablecreatures.Hove’sdeeplevelledwonder

hintsattheethicaldimensionofhumanlifeandthis isanotionthatresonateswiththe

contrastsuggestedbyphilosopherIanKiddbetweendeepandshallowwonder,pointing

totheformerasdrivenbyanethical imperativeandthelatterasguided‘merely’byan

intellectual one (Kidd, 2014). For Kidd shallow wonder corresponds to the kind of

wondermentthatscientistsandunweaversoftherainbowsuchasDawkinsdefendand

he argues that although such wonderment can be powerful it merely inspires further

scientific work. To harbour a deep sense of wonder is for Kidd to engage with the

158

metaphysical and ethical. It is to walk a path that ultimately leads to wisdom (Kidd,

2014).61

ToelaborateonKidd’sdistinctionwemightsayoftheshallowwondererthatshe

doesnotgetpushedoutofher‘comfortzone’inthesensethatwhateverpuzzlementthe

experience of wonder brings to life the shallow wonderer will dismiss it as broken

knowledge and attempt to rectify it within her current scientific perspective. The

experienceofwonderdoesnotbringabout(oratleastisnotrecognisedbythewonderer

as) a framework-shattering cognitive shift that boosts the imagination and enables a

recognitionofthemetaphysicalandtheethical,andsotheshallowwondererremainsin

asenseuntouchedoruntransformed.

Ofcoursethis isnottosaythatascientistcannotbeadeepwondererorthata

person qua being a scientist forever will be bereft of deep wonderment. It is quite

possible tobecommitted to scientificworkand theaccumulationof knowledgeandat

thesametimeseetheimportanceofthemetaphysical;theethicalandbesidesminding

one’s scientific interest be on a quest for wisdom. However I would argue that deep

wonderdemandstheintenseuseoftheimaginationbecausetohavebeforethemind’s

eyeaclearcutpictureofthedomainofscience,theareaofmetaphysicsandtherealmof

ethicsisnoteasytoexcludeastheyaretoanextentinterwoven.

In the attempt to push Kidd’s idea further we might speculate if there is a

connectionbetweenKidd’snotionof ‘shallow’and ‘deep’wonderandScruton’s ideaof

imaginationas‘seeing’and‘seeingas’.AccordingtoKidd‘Shallow’wondergivesriseto

anepistemicimperativeunderstoodasweattempttogainknowledgeaboutaparticular

matter. ‘Deep wonder’ is an entirely different thing because during an experience of

‘deep wonder’ an ethical imperative emerges which encourages us to act and live

differently. Now I think Scruton’s idea of imagination as ‘seeing as’ fits very well with

Kidd’s‘deepwonder’andthuswemightsaythatin‘deepwonder’wegofurtherbeyond

theobviousorthestrictlygivenwhilenotdepartingfromtheappropriate.Inthissenseit

is imaginationas‘seeingas’orthatwhichallowsustodetectthesadness insomeone’s

facethatpropelsusintotheethicaldimension.Toelaborateitisimagination,as‘seeing

as’ that allows us to recognise and embrace for example the vulnerability, mortality,

sameness, needs, importance or value of the other. To exemplifywemight argue that

philosopher Jeremy Benthamdisplayed a remarkable sense of ‘deepwonder’when he

61FormoreinsightintotherelationshipbetweenwonderandwisdomseetheologianCeliaDeane-Drummond’sbookWonderandWisdom(Deane-Drummond,2006).

159

wrotethefamousfootnoteinAnIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation

reading:

Thedaymaycomewhentherestoftheanimalcreationmayacquirethoserights

whichnever couldhavebeenwitholden fromthembutby thehandof tyranny.

The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason

why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a

tormentor.Itmayonedaycometoberecognizedthatthenumberofthelegs,the

villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally

insufficientforabandoningasensitivebeingtothesamefate.Whatelseisitthat

shouldtracetheinsuperableline?Isitthefacultyofreason,orperhapsthefaculty

ofdiscourse?Butafull-grownhorseordogisbeyondcomparisonamorerational,

aswellasamoreconversableanimal,thananinfantofaday,oraweekorevena

month,old.Butsupposetheywereotherwise,whatwoulditavail?Thequestionis

not,Cantheyreason?norCantheytalk?but,Cantheysuffer?

(Bentham,1879,p.311)

For amanofhis timeandposition to recognise the valueofpeoplewhose skin-colour

varies from his and to extend this value to non-human animals by highlighting the

importanceoftheirpossiblecapabilityofsufferingdefinitelyspeakstowardsit,becauseit

can be rightly said that Bentham in his outlook ventures beyond the normsorwhat is

strictlygivenbythecultureheissituatedin.Inthissenseitmightbesuggestedthathis

philosophicaloutlookisrootedin‘deepwonderment’wheretheappropriateusageofthe

imaginationas‘seeingas’hasallowedhimtherecognitionofthevulnerability,mortality,

sameness,needs, importance,valueandsoforthofcreaturescapableofsuffering.That

is, he puts forth an aspect of such creatures unfamiliar to or ignored by many of his

contemporariesandindeedmanypeopletoday.Inadditionwemightsaythatreadingthe

Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation today can be a highly edifying

experience because it easily provokes a deep sense of wonder that sets ablaze our

imagination as ‘seeing as’ enabling us to recognise the importance of for example the

sufferingofanimalsandsoineffectelevatesusontoethicallyspeakinghighergrounds.

In this lightwonder comes across as an enduringmatter and soherewe find a

possible connection between deep wonder and the idea of a wondrous afterglow;

160

however the two concepts are not necessarily identical. Deep wonder is enduring,

involves an ethical imperative and ignites the imagination, but even though the

experience is likely to hold an emotional component it is quite possible that this

component undergoes modification. I say this because all of the major ethical

philosophical traditions including virtue ethics, deontology and utilitarianism represent

the exercise of emotional control and finding reasons for action.With this inmindwe

have an incitement to view deep wonder as an attitude, a disposition or simply the

outcomeof philosophical reflection.Awondrous afterglow looks different in the sense

that it is enduring, involves the metaphysical but need not involve the ethical. The

imagination is clearly active during the experience and there is a strong emotional

component to it, which lasts over time, giving us the incitement to classify thewhole

experienceasamood.

Theintenseuseoftheimaginationstandsasanimportantcommunalitybetween

deepwonderandawondrousafterglowforwithout it the finerpointsof the individual

experiences are unlikely to be perceived. To give a few examples, it will be hard to

experience deep wonder in connection with Nozick’s experience machine without an

intense use of the imagination because it is the imagination that reveals to us the

problemsofpluggingintothemachine.Itisthesameintenseuseoftheimaginationthat

reveals injustice in connection with Rawls’ thought experiment the veil of ignorance.

Furthermorewemightsaythatitistheintenseuseoftheimaginationthatinconnection

with the concept of speciesism enables us to abstract ourselves from the habits and

customary beliefs that otherwise promote the practice of speciesism. Concerning

imaginationandawondrousafterglowwecansaythat it iscourtesyofthe imagination

thatKeenisabletoexperiencegratitudeandawonderingexpectancybecauseunlessthe

imaginationwasactivehewouldnotbeabletoputbeforehismind’seyeeveninavague

sensewhohewasgrateful to andwhathewasgrateful fornot to forgetwhathewas

expectinginallhiswonder.

Does this enable us to say that it is the intense activity of the imagination that

makestheseexperienceshappen?Notquite,becauseitcanbearguedthatalthoughthe

intense use of the imagination is important the gradual deepening of wonder or the

longevity of the wondrous afterglow as a mood is also influenced by the degree of

dislocation,reorientationordisplacementandawarenessofignoranceweexperiencein

suchstatesofmind.

161

4.4.Conclusion

By engaging with Arcimboldo’s Rudolf II as Vertumnus; seeing Earth from Space; the

microscope and the telescope this chapter has brought forth that an experience of

wondermay alter our perception and enriches our perspective in such away thatwe

mightquestionourverynatureandplaceintheuniverse.

WithreferencetoNozick’sexperiencemachine,Rawls’sveilofignoranceandthe

conceptofspeciesismpromotedbySingerithasalsobeenarguedthatanexperienceof

wondermayignitetheimaginationtosuchadegreethatanewkindofperceptionthat

developsmoralsensitivityorencouragesanincreaseinmoralscopeemerges.

Finally we explored the relationship between a wondrous afterglow and deep

wonderandfoundthatalthoughthereareoverlapsbetweentheexperiencesdifferences

can be detected. Deepwonder comes with an ethical imperative and seems to be an

attitude, disposition or the outcome of philosophical reflection whereas a wondrous

afterglowneednotinvolvetheethicalandappearstobeamood.

Wehavenowreachedtheendofourexplorationoftheimplicationsoftheroleof

the imagination in wonder and the time has now come to situate wonder in a wider

context. Inthenextchapter IaimtofurtherexplorewonderthroughaNeo-Aristotelian

lensinvolvingtherelativelyrecentethicalterm‘humanflourishing’andtheideaofvirtue.

This togetherwithwhatwe have uncovered aboutwonder so farwillmake clear how

cultivatingabalancedsenseofwondercontributesstronglytoourflourishingashuman

beings.

162

5.Wonder,HumanFlourishingandVirtue

Butallthesameweoughttoconsiderthecasestillmoreclosely.Forthediscussionisnot

aboutanincidentalmatter,butaboutthewayweoughttolive.

(Plato,2013,I.352d)

This chapterdrawson the findingsonwonder from theprevious chapters andaims to

show thatwonder cancontribute towardshuman flourishingor in short flourishing.To

makethisworkitisimportanttounderstandwhatflourishingmeans.Differentdisciplines

have contributed to the literature on flourishing and to ensure a reasonable

understandingofflourishingonecouldhavefocussedonclassicalhedonism:a‘theoryof

value inwhich pleasure is the sole good and pain the sole evil’ (Sumner, 1996, p. 83).

AlternativelyonecouldturntopsychologistMartinSeligmanandadoptanapproachto

happinessandflourishingwhichemphasisesahighdegreeofpersonalisation(Seligman,

2011). Likewiseonecouldapproach flourishing fromaneconomicalangleand focuson

thesatisfactionofbasiceconomicneedsasthefoundationofhappiness(Layard,2011).

Anotherpathtounderstandingflourishingcouldbeobtainedbypayingdirectattentionto

qualityof lifemeasuresandhowhealthcare isusing such todeterminewhatwellbeing

consistsof(Brock,1993).NeverthelessinthischapterIshalldrawapictureofflourishing

from altogether different sources. More specifically I will initially engage with three

contemporaryNeo-Aristotelianphilosophicalapproachestoflourishingofwhichthefirst

involvestheworkofphilosopherDouglasRasmussenwhooffersthoughtsonflourishing

focussing predominately on the individual. Secondly I shall engage with philosopher

AlasdairMacIntyrewhosenotionofflourishinghighlightsthesocialaspectofhumanlife

and is grounded in the idea thatwearedependent rational animalswith theability to

become independent practical reasoners. Finally I will draw attention to philosopher

Martha Nussbaum whose account of flourishing has a political ring and includes the

notion of the ‘thick, vague conception of the good’, bywhich she offers a basic list of

human functional capabilities indicating what is essential to every human life. The

exegesisofNussbaum’sworkisgivenmorespacethantheothercontributorsbecausein

ordertopresentwhatfromherviewpointisessentialtoeveryhumanlifeIhavefoundit

necessarytocite largepassagesfromherwork.Thethreeapproachescomplementone

another in the sense that aswe progress from Rasmussen toMacIntyre and finally to

Nussbaumwewillseeacontinuingexplorationofhumannaturethatwillbringabouta

163

refinednotionofwhathumanbeingshaveincommonratherthanwheretheydiffer.The

picture of human flourishing that emerges from engaging with these contemporary

thinkers will be utilised as a reference point in the second half of this chapter which

examineshowwondercanbeasourceofflourishing.Thesecondhalfstartswithabrief

investigation of what it means for something to be a source of flourishing and I shall

engagewithaselectionofcandidatesthathavebeenselectedpartlybecausetheyareof

particularvaluetomebutalsobecausetheydemonstratethediversityoffactorsthatcan

act as sources of human flourishing. They include literacy, friendship, humour and

physicalexercise.FollowingthisbriefengagementIshallarguethatwonderalsoqualifies

asasourceofflourishingbylookingathowwondermayevokereverenceandgratitude,

and help foster an imaginative attitude and a disposition to wonder that embraces

openness and humility. Finally I shall address wonder as a virtue and argue that a

balancedsenseofwonderisastrongcontributortohumanflourishing.

5.1DouglasRasmussenandHumanFlourishing

This section is concerned with the philosopher Douglas Rasmussen’s Neo-Aristotelian

approach to human flourishing from his article ‘Human Flourishing and the Appeal to

HumanNature’(Rasmussen,1999).Thisarticleis importantbecausewhilst itappealsto

human nature it also recognises human individuality. As Rasmussen puts it ‘the

fundamental intuitionbehind thisprojecthasbeennotonly that it is the flourishingof

individual human beings that ultimately matters but the individuality of flourishing as

well’ (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 43). Rasmussen offers a contemporary outlook on human

flourishinginvolvingsomecentralfeaturesofAristotle’sphilosophy(Rasmussen,1999,p.

2). Among these central features we find the concept of Eudaimonia, which has been

traditionally and inaccurately translated into ‘happiness’ and thus communicating the

ideathatitreferstoasubjectivegoodratherthananobjectiveonewhichitwasforthe

ancients Greeks (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 2) (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 59). Because of this

Eudaimoniaisoftenmisperceivedasonlyasubjectivegoodandnotanobjectiveone.In

additionRasmussenstipulatesthathumanflourishing isatechnicalandcomplexnotion

and that its exact meaning is somewhat obscured by a variety of different theories

concerningthehumangood.FurthermoreRasmusseninformsusthathumanflourishing

is a relatively new term in ethics and is a crucial part of theNeo-Aristotelian ethicist’s

164

endeavour to establish an alternative to consequentialistic and deontological ethics

(Rasmussen,1999,p.1-2).

More specifically Rasmussen’s Neo-Aristotelian approach to human flourishing

involvesaviewofthehumangoodthatis1)objective,2)inclusive,(3)individualised,(4)

agent-relative, (5) self-directed, and (6) social (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 3). In addition

Rasmussenemphasisesthatpracticalwisdomandhumannatureissignificanttohuman

flourishing(Rasmussen,1999,p.14,30).InwhatistocomeIshallbrieflydealwitheachof

thesecomponentsinturn.

1.ToRasmussenhumanflourishingisanobjectivegoodandistobeconsideredan

activity,anactualityandanendorfunction. Inthissensehumanflourishing isawayof

lifethatinvolvesparticularactivitiesandisdesiredforitsownsake(Rasmussen,1999,p.

3).InadditionRasmussenpointsoutthathumanflourishingis‘that-for-the-sake-of-which

human conduct is done and though flourishing is dependent on human agency for its

successitsstatusasultimateendisnotagentdependent’(Rasmussen,1999,p.3).

2. Despite being the ultimate end of human conduct human flourishing in

Rasmussen’sviewisaninclusiveendthatdoesnotreducethevalueofanythingelseto

that of meremeans (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 3). Furthermore Rasmussen points out that

human flourishing is to be viewed as themost final end understood as an end that is

neversoughtforthesakeofanythingelseasitincludesallfinalends.Inthislighthuman

flourishing includesandincorporatesbasicgoodssuchasknowledge,health,friendship,

creative achievement, beauty, andpleasure; and such virtues as integrity, temperance,

courage,andjustice.This isgroundedintheideathatthegoodsandvirtuesmentioned

areallfinalandvaluableintheirownrightsbutatthesametimetheyqualifyaspartial

realisationsorexpressionsofthemostfinalend,whichishumanflourishing.Inthissense

itisquitepossibletocategoriseforexampletheactofstayinghealthybothassomething

thatonedoesfor itsownsakeandsomethingthatonedoesforthesakeofflourishing.

Rasmussenarguesthatthisispossiblebecauseflourishingisnottheresultoftheefforts

ofalifetimenoris ittobeseenasafutureenjoymentbutisequivalenttothatofalife

thatisworthwhilethroughout(Rasmussen,1999,p.3-5).

3. Rasmussen views human flourishing as individualised and diverse. ‘No two

casesofhumanflourishingarethesameandtheyarenotinterchangeable’(Rasmussen,

1999,p. 6).Unlike thedaily-recommended intakeof vitamins andminerals thegeneric

goods and virtues of human flourishing cannot be determined according to a natural

backdrop and applied in the same manner across different human lives. My wife’s

165

flourishingforexampleisnotcompletelythesameasmine,meaningthat ifwehaveto

determine what makes a human being flourish a certain degree of personalisation is

called for. In Rasmussen’s view it is only when an individual’s particular talents,

potentialitiesandcircumstancesarejointlyengagedthatthegoodandvirtuesmentioned

earlierbecomereal,orasheputsit,achievedeterminacy(Rasmussen,1999,p6).

4. InRasmussen’sperspectivehumanflourishing isalsoagent-relativeandthis is

to be understood in the sense that it is always the good for some person or other

(Rasmussen,1999,p.6). Inaddition it is importanttorealisethatonedoesnotflourish

automatically and that a person is not merely a placeholder for flourishing. In

Rasmussen’s view the value of human flourishing is found in and exhausted by those

activitiesof aperson that constitute thatperson’s flourishing’ (Rasmussen,1999,p. 6).

What this means is that there is an intimate relationship between flourishing and a

person’slife.Rasmussenexplainsthatthestatusofhumanflourishingasultimateendor

value comes fromwithin and is obtained only in relationship to a person’s life. In this

sensehumanflourishingdoesnotrefertosomevaluewecanpointtobutissomething

that involves a reference to the individual for whom it is good. At first glance agent-

relativitymay seem confusing becausehow canhuman flourishing uphold its objective

imageandatthesametimeclaimthisintimaterelationshipwiththeindividual?Thetwo

notionsseemtobepolesapartandincommensurable.Rasmussendefendshispositionby

pointing out that unlike the kind of utilitarianism advocated by philosophers such as

HenrySidgwickandJohnStuartMillhisconceptionofhumanflourishingdoesnotrelyon

the ambition of establishing an ethical system that is impersonal and agent-neutral.

AccordingtoRasmussensuchethicaltheorisingisunsound.Asheputsit:

There is no great divide in thenatureof things between the facts that can and

cannot be ethically relevant. Particular and contingent facts can be ethically

important. Of course, some may be more important than others in achieving

human flourishing, but this cannot be determined from one’s armchair alone.

Certainly, there is for this neo-Aristotelian view, no basis for holding that

individual, social and cultural differences among people are ethically irrelevant.

Theyaretothecontrary,highlysignificant.

(Rasmussen,1999,p.8)

166

The important point here is that just because something is considered a value to an

individual’spersonalprojectandnooneelse’sitisbynomeansmorallyirrelevant.Infact

Rasmussenemphasisestheopposite isthecaseandhearguesthatsuchvaluesdeserve

attention simply because of their relation to the individual. Consider the climber Alex

HonnoldwhowithouttheuseofropescalecliffssuchasthenorthwestfaceofHalfDome

in Yosemite National Park, US. Most people would probably find his climbing activity

unnecessarily riskyoreven immoralbut forAlexHonnold freesoloclimbing isvaluable

andsoaccordingtoRasmussenmorallyrelevantwhenwejudgehischaracterbecausewe

aretalkingabouttheflourishingofAlexHonnoldandnotforexamplemine.

Rasmussenalsomentionsamore subtle confusionwithagent-relativityand this

involves theproblemofwhether somethingcanbeofvalue in itsownrightandat the

same time be agent-relative (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 9). According to Rasmussen this

objectionmakes themistake of confusing instrumental valuewith agent-relative value

and points out that though it is conceivable that all values may be related to some

individualthisdoesnotmeanthattheirvaluerestsintheirbeingmeansorinstruments.

TofurthersupporthiscaseRasmussenremindsusthathumanflourishingisinclusiveand

hisapproachtotheconceptinvolvesthattheconstituentgoodsandvirtuesarevaluable

intheirownrightbutatthesametimeessentiallyrelatedtoindividualhumanbeingsand

the lives they live. In this sense there can be no talk about incompatibility concerning

somethingbeingvaluableinitsownrightandagent-relativebecausethevalueofgoods

and virtues is not a matter of their being means or instruments of flourishing but as

Rasmussenwrites ‘theirbeingexpressionsor realisationsof it’ (Rasmussen,1999,p.9).

Furthermorethenotionsthathumanflourishingistheultimatevalueandthat itcanbe

perceived as agent-relative are quite compatible. This is because the goal is the

flourishing of each individual and its value is found in the activities that ‘comprise the

fulfilment of individual human beings’ (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 9). In this sense it is

importanttounderstandthathumanflourishingisnotsomethingthatcompeteswiththe

good of individual humans but essentiallymakes up the very flourishing of their lives.

Thus thegoodof individuals is their individual flourishingand individual flourishingand

humanflourishingareessentiallythesame.

Confusion may also appear in relation to agent-relativity because it can be

mistaken for egoism. Rasmussen explains that because human flourishing is agent-

relativeitdoesnotimplythathumanflourishingcannotincorporateconcernorworryfor

others,orthatactingforthewelfareofanothercouldnotbetheprimarymotivatorfor

167

one’sbehaviour (Rasmussen,1999,p.10). Inthissense it ispossiblethatacting forthe

good of another could prove to be as Rasmussen writes only-good-for-you and not

necessarilyanyoneelse.Parentsgoingoutoftheirwaytonurturetheirchildrenorfriends

helpingoneanotherexemplifyhowflourishingcanbeagent-relativeandinvolveconcern

for others. According to Rasmussen it is even plausible to perceive agent-relativity as

compatible with concerns for others in situations that are not viewed as situations of

flourishing.To illustratewhatRasmussenhas inmindherewemightpointout that fire

fightersmayrisktheirlivesintheattempttosaveapersontrappedinaburninghouseor

auniversityprofessormaysacrificehervaluablesparetimeinordertoaidaparticularly

troubledstudent.Ifhumanflourishingwereacompletelyegocentricenterpriseitwould

behardtoimagineaflourishingfirefighterandindeedauniversityprofessorsacrificing

themselvesandtheirtimeinthewaydescribedabove.Basedontheseexamplesitseems

clearthatagent-relativityandegoismaretwodistinctthings.

5. According to Rasmussen human flourishing is also a self-directed activity

meaning that self-direction is necessary ‘to the very character of human flourishing’

(Rasmussen, 1999, p. 10-11). In other words there would be no point to human

flourishing if self-directionwasnotapartof it. InadditionRasmussen insists that ’self-

direction is the central necessary constituent or ingredient of human flourishing – that

feature of human flourishing without which no other feature could be a constituent’

(Rasmussen,1999,p.11). The idea ishere thatonedoesnot flourishautomaticallyand

that regardless of one’s achievements in life self-direction is crucial to all acts of

flourishing(Rasmussen,1999,p.11).Toflourishasahumanbeingissomethingthatone

does and one has to make an effort to ‘discover the goods and virtues of human

flourishingaswellastoachieveandimplementthem’(Rasmussen,1999,p.11).

6. By nature human beings are social animals (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 12).

Rasmussen points out that our maturation requires a life with others and unlike

mushroomswe do not reachmaturity all by ourselves. A human being is a beingwith

other-orientated potentialities and our flourishing depends on their actualisation

(Rasmussen,1999,p.12). In this sense it is important tonote thathavingconcerns for

othersortoentertainsocialconcerniscrucialbecausehumanflourishingisachievedwith

andamongothers.Rasmussen’spoint is thatwearenotabstract individualsbutbeings

tiedtosocietyandcommunityandthatasheputsit‘muchofwhatiscrucialtoourself-

conception and fundamental values is dependent on our upbringing and environment’

(Rasmussen, 1999, p. 13). In this respect onemightwonder if it is at all possible for a

168

hermit to flourish or if this is simply ruled out per definition. Rasmussen does not say

anything specific about this but he does offer a few clues to his position on the issue.

Rasmussen is a neo-Aristotelian and in this article hementions the Aristotelian notion

that ‘only a beast or a godwould live outside the polis’ (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 13) and

pointsoutthatoursocialityiscrucialforourself-understandingandwell-beingandthat

‘concernforpoliticalframeworksisnotethicallyoptionalfortheindividual’(Rasmussen,

1999,p.13).InthislightmyunderstandingisthatRasmussenwouldarguethatlivingthe

lifeofahermitwouldgreatlycompromiseaperson’sflourishing.

Rasmussen’s six points about human flourishing in a Neo-Aristotelian light are

insightfulandofferanentry-pointtohumanflourishingwithaviewofthehumangood

thatisobjective,self-directed,sociallyachievedandyetremainingexceedinglypersonal.

AsRasmussenwrites:‘thegood-for-meisnot,andcannotbe,thegood-for-you,butthisis

nottosaythatanychoicemustbeone’sownandmust involveconsiderationsthatare

uniquetooneself’(Rasmussen,1999,p.14).

This concludes the presentation of Rasmussen’s view of flourishing. However

thereismoretobesaidabouthisaccountandIshallnowmoveonandbrieflyexamine

his interpretation of the role of practical wisdom and the appeal to human nature

inherenttotheneo-Aristotelianconceptionofhumanflourishing.

Rasmussen emphasises that in addition to acknowledging the above-mentioned

sixcomponentsitisimportanttorecognisetheroleofpracticalwisdomandtheappealto

humannatureinhumanflourishing. InRasmussen’sviewpracticalwisdomreferstothe

excellent or virtuous use of practical reason; practical reasonmeaning the intellectual

facultyexercised inrelationtoguidingconduct (Rasmussen,1999,p.16).Toappreciate

the importanceofpracticalwisdom inRasmussen’sapproach tohuman flourishing it is

vital to remember that he advocates theexistenceof a plurality of goods.Given these

circumstances practical wisdom is a necessity and is presented as the ability of the

individualtoworkoutwhatisdesirableandchoiceworthywithregardstotheflourishing

lifeamongstamyriadofdifferentvaluablegoods.Rasmussenemphasisesthesignificance

ofpracticalwisdomevenfurtherashestatesthatnosinglegoodorvirtuequalifiesasa

supergoodorasupervirtuehavingtheabilitytoreduceallothergoodstobeingmerely

of instrumental value (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 14). Goods such as health, creative

achievement, friendship,beauty,pleasure,andknowledgeandvirtuessuchas integrity,

courage, temperance, and justice all seem necessary for human flourishing and are in

Rasmussen’s view to be considered valuable in themselves as opposed to having the

169

statusofmeremeans(Rasmussen,1999,p.14).FurthermoreRasmussenmentionsthat

each is but one of the components of flourishing and because human flourishing is

individualisedeachonemustbeachieved,maintained,andenjoyedinawaythatallows

them to be ‘integrated with everything else that makes up the flourishing life of the

individual whose flourishing we are talking about’ (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 14). For

Rasmussenhumanflourishingisclearlylinkedtotheindividualandgoodsandvirtuesare

achieved via considering one’s set of ‘circumstances, talents, endowments, interests,

beliefs, and histories that descriptively characterize the individual [including that]

individual’s community and culture’ (Rasmussen,1999,p. 14).Now thisparticular view

casts light over Rasmussen’s account of human nature and its involvement in human

flourishing.Headmitsthatanexaminationofhumannaturemayrevealwhatherefersto

asbasicorgenericgoodsandvirtues.Howeversuchanexaminationdoesnotbringforth

‘whattheweightingorbalancingofthesegoodsandvirtuesshouldbefortheindividual

(Rasmussen, 1999, p. 14). In this respect what constitutes human flourishing for any

individualisnotrevealedinfullfromanexaminationofhumannature.Humannatureis

neverthelessstillveryimportanttotheNeo-Aristotelianconceptionofhumanflourishing

becausetheappealtonaturesignalsthat‘humanflourishingistheend(telos)orfunction

(ergon)ofhumanlife’(Rasmussen,1999,p.32).AccordingtoRasmussenitalsocombats

a serious critique of the role of nature in human flourishing labelled the ‘naturalistic

fallacy’ stating that it is amistake to ‘deduce a statement ofwhat ought to be froma

statementofwhatisthecase,ordeducingastatementaboutavaluefromastatement

aboutfact‘(Rasmussen,1999,p.32).Rasmussenexplainsthatifhumanflourishingistobe

understoodasthenaturalendforhuman lifeand ifweweretoacceptthatthehuman

goodconsistsinthatveryendthenitisnotthecasethatallfactsarevalueless.According

toRasmussen‘thismeansthatforhumanbeingstheirgoodisbasedonandunderstood

in terms of facts pertaining to their nature’ (Rasmussen, 1999, p. 33). Furthermore it

reveals that ‘for the class of beings that have natural ends or functions, goodness is

ontological in the sense that it is apotentiality that is actualised’ (Rasmussen,1999,p.

33).WhatRasmussenstipulateshereisquitecontroversialbecauseitmeansthat‘itisnot

always a fallacy to go froma fact to a value, because some facts are inherently value-

laden’(Rasmussen,1999,p.33)asitwere.

170

Whilst Rasmussen’s account provides a good entry point to human flourishing and

thereforeisrelevanttoourenquiryintowondertherearepotentialproblemsassociated

withhisview.

The first concern I shall voice is related to Rasmussen’s idea that a full

examinationofhumannaturemayrevealonlywhatisbasicallyandgenericallygoodfor

humanbeings in termsof their flourishing. Essentially I thinkRasmussen is right about

this but it is important to note that it is hard if not impossible to knowwhenonehas

reachedafullor justsufficientunderstandingofhumannature.Thus it isessential that

one should continue toexaminehumannature as it couldpotentially reveal important

and yet unrecognised features of our shared human nature and may give us a more

detailedaccountofwhatweshouldcareabout in relationto thekindsofcreatureswe

areandhowweflourishinthewidestpossibleunderstanding.

The second concern I have about Rasmussen’s account of human flourishing is

about his idea that individual flourishing is achieved via considering one’s set of

circumstances, talents, endowments, interests, beliefs, and histories that descriptively

characterise the individual including that individual’s community and culture.

Rasmussen’sviewseemsagreeablebutcouldperhapsbenefitfromfurtherspecification.

To illustrate this onemight for example focus on the problem concerning the task of

finding out one’s talents and endowments, which can be hard to determine with

certainty.Consider forexample the caseofdePasqualewhom Imentioned in the first

chapter. Inhisarticlea ‘WonderFullLife’hereportsthatasanineyearoldhewasput

intoaclassforthementallyretardedbecausehistestscoreontheaverageI.Q.testwas

asheputsit ‘justahairabovewhatanorangutanwouldhavescored’(Pasquale,2003).

Hadhenotquestioned‘authority’atthetimeitisquitepossiblethathewouldhavebeen

discouraged from further education, neverwould have pursued a career in philosophy

andconsequentlylateronneverhavewrittenabouthis‘WonderFullLife’intheinspiring

way that hedoes. This example illustrates potential problemswith these sorts of tests

andhowtheyareusedasguidesinpeople’slives.Regardlessofthequalityofaparticular

testandthequalityofitsapplicationitcanbeventuredthattheresultsitdeliversmust

always be met with a critical eye. The danger is that the result is taken to be a fact

understoodassomethingabsoluteandunchangeableovertimeandsocanbeusedwith

certainty to determine the future for a person.Wonder is called for because it can be

argued thatsucha testaims to flesh theverynatureofaperson,which isproblematic

becausethepersonwhoistestedissituatedinaspotbetweenactualityandpotentiality.

171

Who is to say for surehowapersoncandevelopand towhatextentpastandcurrent

challengescannotbeovercomeandextendaperson’sflourishing?Thispointstotheidea

that if one does not wonder at attempts claiming certainty about one’s talents or

endowmentsitcouldpotentiallyhaveacolossalnegativeinfluenceonone’sflourishing.

A similar point about criticality can be made about Rasmussen’s emphasis on

communityandcultureinhisapproachtohumanflourishing,whichbringsmetomythird

andfinalconcerninrelationtoRasmussen’saccountofhumanflourishing.

To recapitulate Rasmussen thinks that goods and virtues are achieved via

considering one’s set of circumstances, talents, endowments, interests, beliefs, and

histories that descriptively characterise the individual including that individual’s

communityandculture(Rasmussen,1999,p.14).InthisregardIthinkit isnecessaryto

depict in greater detail in what sense communities and in particular culture influence

one’s flourishing. For example most people would agree that having good health is

valuable to human flourishing but how health is understood and how it is positioned

amongst the various other goods in terms of importance may differ from culture to

culture. To give an example, consider the ancient state of Sparta which, owing to its

militaristic focus, viewedhealthand fitnessof thecitizens tobeofutmost importance.

This entailed that children were examined for their health and fitness and those that

were considered ‘puny and deformed’ were thrown into a chasm to die, effectively

practisinga formofeugenics (Cartledge,2001,p.84) (Richard,2005).Furthermore, the

primaryobligationforaSpartancitizenwastobeagoodsoldierwhoseworthexceeded

thatofseveralmenbelongingtoothercities (Connolly,2006,p.38). It isquitepossible

thatgiven thisparticular culturehisviewofhealthdiffers significantly fromthatof the

averagepersontoday.Thisexampleclearlyillustratestheimportanceandroleofculture

in depictingwhatmakes a ‘good’ good, and its influence on human flourishing. As the

anthropologistAdamKuperpointsoutinhisbookCulture:TheAnthropologist’sAccount:

‘Cultural identity can never provide an adequate guide for living. We have multiple

identities,andevenifwehaveaprimaryonewemaynotwanttoconformtoit’(Kuper,

2000, p. 247)What Kuper in effect is stating is thatwhen one is concernedwith how

humanbeingsmayflourishitisimportanttoadoptacriticalattitudetocultureincluding

thecultureoneissituatedin.

This concludes thepresentationof Rasmussen’s approach tohuman flourishing.

Rasmussenpointsoutsomeimportantfeaturesabouthumanflourishingincludingthatit

isobjective,inclusive,individualised,agent-relative,self-directed,andsocialandhisfocus

172

onpracticalwisdomandhumannature.Rasmussenprovidesgreatinsightintothenotion

ofhuman flourishing,but I think it strange thatRasmussen saysnothingaboutwonder

andtheindividual’scapacityforwonderbecausewhenitcomestothekindofindividual

flourishing he advocates there is indeed much for the individual to wonder about

including what human nature consists of and in what sense such a nature demands

attention in relation to the formulation of whatmakes a particular individual flourish.

FurthermorewondermentiscalledforwithregardstoRasmussen’sapproachbecausehis

emphasisonindividualflourishingpayslittleattentiontothepossiblegenericgoodsthat

maybedeterminedfromaninvestigationofhumannature.Inordertomakeadvancesin

thisareaIshallnowturntothephilosophyofAlasdairMacIntyre.

5.2AlasdairMacIntyreandHumanFlourishing

ThissectionwillengagewiththephilosopherAlasdairMacIntyreandhisbookDependent

RationalAnimalsinwhichhepresentsanapproachtohumanflourishinggroundedinthe

idea that we are vulnerable dependent rational animals with the ability to become

independent practical reasoners.MacIntyre’s contribution to the debate about human

flourishing is important toourpresent investigationaboutwonderbecausehe furthers

the enquiry into human nature and what we have in common rather than where we

differ.DependentRationalAnimalsisinMacIntyre’sownwordsaworkofcorrectionand

signalsadeparturefromhisearlierapproachtomoralphilosophy(MacIntyre,1999,p.x).

One significant departure involves the attempt to integrate what he calls Aristotle’s

metaphysicalbiology62 inhisapproach toethics,which isanotionhe repudiated inhis

earlier book After Virtue. What this means is that instead of attempting to give an

accountofvirtue thatsituatesvirtuewithinsocialpractices, the livesof individualsand

the lives of communities (which was the focus in After Virtue) Dependent Rational

Animals centres on the notion that human beings are biological entities and that to

supposeanethicsindependentofbiologyiswrong(MacIntyre,1999,p.x).Inadditionitis

importantasMacIntyrealsoexplainsnottoseehisbookasanattempttoonceandforall

62MacIntyredoesnotofferadefinitionofwhathelabels‘Aristotle’smetaphysicalbiology’buttounderstandwhathemeansingreaterdetailonemightexaminehisviewofteleology.PhilosopherChristopherStevenLutzreportsthatinalecturepresentedinNotreDamein1995MacIntyrevoicedthathisaccountofteleologypresupposesthathumanbeingsdespitetheirdifferenceshareacommonidentityandwhathecallsaspecies-specificnotionofflourishing,andacommonteleologicalgoal.InadditionandimportanttothenotionofmetaphysicalbiologyMacIntyrestatesthatthesethingscannotbereducedtophysicalphenomenaandpresupposetheideathatournatureisinpartmetaphysical(C.S.Lutz,2009,p.134).

173

settle the debate on human flourishing. The debate is ongoing and MacIntyre’s book

containsasheadmitsagooddealofunfinishedphilosophicalbusiness(MacIntyre,1999,

p.xii).GiventhelimitedspaceavailableforourpurposeshereIwillpresentaselectionof

important points put forth by MacIntyre that can contribute to our understanding of

human flourishing and wonder. More specifically I will in the following focus on (1)

animalityandhumannature,(2)vulnerabilityanddependenceand(3)theimportanceof

becominganindependentpracticalreasonerandhowthedevelopmentofvirtuesmakes

thispossible.FinallyIwillextendafewcommentsandashortcriticismofMacintyreand

suggesthowwemighttakehisworkfurther.

MacIntyre’s focus on animality and human nature is important to his

understandingofhumanflourishing.Hearguesthathumanbeingsoftenforgetthatwe

arebutanimalsamonganimalsandthatournature isprimarily ifnotexclusivelybodily

(MacIntyre,1999,p.8).Sincetheearliest16thcenturytheterm‘animal’hasbeenusedto

labelaclasswhosemembers includespiders,bees, chimpanzees,dolphinsandhumans

butnotplants,inanimatebeings,angelsandGod(MacIntyre,1999,p.11).Howeverithas

also been utilised in naming a class consisting only of nonhuman animals (MacIntyre,

1999,p.11). InMacIntyre’sviewthe latterusageof thewordhasbecomedominant in

westernsocietyandinitswakeaparticularhabitofmindhasemergedthatdistractsus

fromrecognisingjusthowmuchweshareandhaveincommonwithcertainotheranimal

species(MacIntyre,1999,p.11).Thisshared‘territory’isimportanttoMacIntyre’soverall

visionofflourishing,whichisinprinciplenotonlyapplicabletohumanbeings.MacIntyre

argues that just like humanbeings some animals such as dolphins have intentions and

reasonsforactionandthatthesehighlyintelligentanimalsareabletopursuegoodssuch

as learninghowto interactwithotherdolphins (andsometimeshumanbeings) inways

that contribute towards their flourishing (MacIntyre,1999,p. 22).Concerning the term

‘flourishing’ MacIntyre explains further that he is committed to give in some form a

naturalisticaccountofwhatisgoodforaparticularspecies.Howeverhedoesthisinthe

spiritofcautionashedoesnotthinkthemeaningof‘good’canbeproducedsolelyfroma

list identifying natural characteristics (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 78). FurthermoreMacIntyre

doesnotsupportthenotionthat ‘goodisapropertythatsupervenesuponsomesetof

naturalcharacteristics[which]istogiveanametotheproblemofhowtounderstandthe

relationshipbetweengoodnessandsuchcharacteristics,nottosolveit’(MacIntyre,1999,

p. 79). In this sense he seems sceptical towards an account of the good following an

investigationofnature,butatthesametimeheseemscriticaltowardspurelysubjective

174

accounts of the good and those accounts associatedwith a particular cultural outlook.

MacIntyreacknowledgesthatthis isasignificantphilosophicalproblemtowhichhehas

nosolutionandwherephilosophystillhasworktodo.

NeverthelessMacIntyreenrichesourunderstandingof thehumanconditionand

whatmakesusflourishbyfurtherinvestigatingourhumannatureandmakesusawareof

ouranimalnatureandthatwearevulnerableanddependentcreatures.Inordertobegin

toappreciatetheimportanceofvulnerabilityanddependencyinMacIntyre’saccountof

humanflourishingletusconsiderthefollowingentryfromhisopeningchapter:

Wehumanbeingsarevulnerabletomanykindsofafflictionsandmostofusareat

sometimeafflictedbyseriousills.Howwecopeisonlyinsmallpartuptous.Itis

most often to others thatwe owe our survival, let alone our flourishing, aswe

encounter bodily illness and injury, inadequate nutrition, mental defect and

disturbance,andhumanaggressionandneglect.

(MacIntyre,1999,p.1)

It seems quite clear from the quotation thatMacIntyre thinks human beings are both

vulnerableanddependent.Furthermorehebelievesthatitisoftentoothersweoweour

survivalandflourishing.Inadditionthequotationoffersalistof‘encounters’highlighting

what we may refer to as the bodily, the mental and the social dimension of human

vulnerability.Thebodilydimensionhighlightsnot surprisingly thatwearebodilybeings

andMacIntyreclearlypointstothisbystatingthatweencounter‘bodilyillnessandinjury’

duringourlives.Recognisingthatwearebodilycreaturesisimportantforourflourishing

becausebodilyillnessandinjurymaycauseeverythingfrommomentaryinconvenienceto

permanentdisabilityanduntimelydeath.

By stating that human beings may encounter ‘mental defect and disturbance’

MacIntyrealsopointstoavulnerablementaldimensionofhumanexistence.Recognising

that we are mental creatures and that this part is vulnerable is significant for our

flourishing.Toillustratejusthowwearevulnerableinamentalsenseonemightpointto

the symptoms people experience in relation to workplace stress. According to Work

Stress, the UK National Work Stress Network, stress at work cause everything from

irritability, aggressiveness, isolation and insomnia to raised blood pressure, stomach

disorders, anxiety and low self-esteem (WorkStress & Network, 2011). To experience

175

symptoms such as these clearly indicates a vulnerablemental dimension, which could

compromiseourflourishing.

ContinuingtodrawonthesocialdimensionofhumanlifeMacIntyrealsorefersto

human aggression and neglect as factors that expose our vulnerability. We flourish

amongstotherpeoplebutitisnotalwaysthatotherpeopleprovidethesupportweneed

in order to flourish. A child born into an abusive family where she faces inadequate

nutritionandviolencewouldtestifytothiseffect.Thisexampleshowshowhumanbeings

as social creatures are vulnerable and how neglect from fellow human beings may

influenceourflourishingnegatively.

I shall now turn to address a third point in MacIntyre’s philosophy, which is

concernedwiththeimportanceofbecominganindependentpracticalreasonerandhow

thedevelopmentofvirtuesmakesthispossible.

Humanbeings share their practical lives and inorder to flourish as the kindsof

beingswearewepursuegoods.MacIntyreexplainsthatwhatis‘good’iswhatweascribe

to what benefits humans as the kind of creatures they are and what benefits human

beingsinvirtueoftheirparticularroleswithinparticularcontextsofpractice(MacIntyre,

1999,p.65).Howeverastherearemanydifferentkindsofgoodsweareforcedtomake

choices, which (for better or worse) arises from the human capacity for evaluating

reasons for action (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 96). According to MacIntyre what helps bring

about‘goodchoice-making’isourcapacityforindependentpracticalreasoning.However

toexcelinthisrespectisanachievementthatrestsuponthedevelopmentofparticular

characteristics(MacIntyre,1999,p.82).Thesecharacteristicsincludefirstofallthatone

learnstodetachoneselffromimmediatedesires.Furthermoreitisimportanttobeable

toimaginealternativerealisticfuturesandlastlytohavetheabilityto‘recogniseandto

maketruepracticaljudgementsconcerningavarietyofkindsofgood’(MacIntyre,1999,

p.96).InadditionMacIntyreclaimsthatacquiringthesecharacteristicsispossibleonlyfor

thosewhohaveacquiredanassortmentofintellectualandmoralvirtuesastheyallowa

persontomakeupherownmindonthechoicesshefaces(MacIntyre,1999,p.96).

To appreciate better why MacIntyre thinks the development of virtues is

importantinbecominganindependentpracticalreasonerletusbrieflyfocusonwhathe

labelsthevirtueoftemperateness.InMacIntyre’sviewthisparticularvirtueisimportant

toflourishingandcentresonavoidingextremebehaviourandfindingthetemperatespot

ormiddlegroundbetweenforexampleextremeself-indulgenceandunappreciativeand

insensitive puritanism. Temperateness makes a person consider her particular

176

circumstancesbecauseitdoesnotdemandthesameofanathlete intrainingas itdoes

forarecuperatingpatientinneedofrebuildingherstrength(MacIntyre,1999,p.87-88).

There ismore tobe said about virtue and I shall address the topic further later in this

chapter.HoweverIthinkitisimportanttostressthatthereisamoraldimensioninherent

tothekindofflourishingadvocatedhereanditshowsitselfbypayingattentiontohuman

vulnerability, dependence and how our ability to function as independent practical

reasonersrisesfromthedevelopmentofvirtues.

Iwillnowraiseone lastpointaboutMacIntyre’sphilosophy,which isconcerned

withthepoliticalbecausehowweorganiseourselvesinfluencesourflourishing.Whatis

especiallynoteworthyaboutMacIntyre’saccountofhumanflourishing inthisrespect is

its criticality towards the influence of institutions. In particularMacIntyre is concerned

withtheroleof institutionalisednetworksofgivingandreceivingandhowstructuresof

unequaldistributionofpowerareinvolvedinvictimisationandexploitationandhowsuch

arecapableofmaskingandprotectingthedistributionsinquestion(MacIntyre,1999,p.

102). FurthermoreMacIntyre argues that if we are not aware of these structures the

qualityofourpracticaljudgementandreasoningareatrisk.Hewrites:

The virtues which we need in order to achieve both our own goods and the

goodsofothersthroughparticipation insuchnetworksonly functionasgenuine

virtues when their exercise is informed by an awareness of how power is

distributedandofthecorruptionstowhichitsuseisliable.

(MacIntyre,1999,p.102)

Thus,MacIntyre’sfocusongenuinevirtuesinrelationtonetworks,thenotionofpower

andcorruptionaddsyetanotherlayerofcomplexitytoourhumancondition.Inaddition

MacIntyreexplainsthatitischaracteristicofourhumanconditionthatweovertimefind

ourselves holding positions within some set of institutionalised relationship. These

relationshipsmaycovereverythingfrombeingamemberofafamilyorhousehold,going

toschool,undertakinganapprenticeshiporbecominginvolvedwithalocalcommunityor

largersocieties(MacIntyre,1999,p.102).This iscomplicatedfurtherbythenotionthat

some of these relationships promote human flourishing and others do not.Macintyre

explainsthatsomerelationshipsareconstitutiveinthesensethatwithoutthemitwould

be impossible to attain or be sustained in attaining goods (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 102).

Friendship for example qualifies as such.However different kinds of relationships exist

177

that merely voice established hierarchies of power and the uses of power, which as

dominating and depriving instruments often obstruct our movements toward goods

(MacIntyre, 1999, p. 102-103). MacIntyre is concerned with dominating and abusive

relationshipsanditcanbewellsaidthathedesiresforhumankindtoestablishasocial

order or an ‘ecosystem’ of human relationships that promotes the development of

people capable of living flourishing lives, understood as people who can reason

independentlyandpractically(MacIntyre,1999,p.105).Inotherwordsinordertobean

independentpracticalreasoneronemustbeabletogivetoothersanintelligibleaccount

ofone’s reasoning. In this respectMacIntyreadds that the intelligibleaccount required

need not be theoretical and one does not need to match the reasoning powers of a

logician to be an independent practical reasoner (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 106).MacIntyre

explainsfurtherthatindependentpracticalreasonersareconcernedwithmeansandnot

ends. Now does this mean that the logician is concerned with ends while practical

reasonersareengagedindeliberationsonmeansonly?Notquite,becauseaccordingto

Macintyretheindependentpracticalreasonercandeliberateaboutends;howeverwhen

shedoesshedeliberatesonapractical levelmeaning that she treatsendsasmeans to

still furtherends(MacIntyre,1999,p.106). Inthisrespectpracticalreasoninghelpsone

decidewhatactionistobetakentoachieveagivengoal.InadditionMacIntyreexplains

thatweareonlyabletoposequestionsandanswersinthisregardbecauseoftheextent

towhichweagreeaboutgoodsandaboutthegood(MacIntyre,1999,p.107).Inthislight

MacIntyre’s view of practical reasoning consists of reasoning togetherwith others and

generallywithinanestablishedsetofsocialrelationships.Fromthisperspectivethegood

oftheindividualispursuedalongsidethegoodofthosewhomakesuptheestablishedset

ofsocialrelationships(MacIntyre,1999,p.107).Apracticalandadequateunderstanding

ofwhatmakesusflourishencompassesthewholesetofsocialrelationshipsinwhichwe

have come to live out our lives. This brings us to an important passage inMacIntyre’s

book,whichreads:

If Iamto flourish to the fullextent that ispossible forahumanbeing, thenmy

whole life has to be of a certain kind, one in which I not only engage in and

achieve some measure of success in the activities of an independent practical

reasoner, but also receive and have a reasonable expectation of receiving the

attendedcareneededwhenIamveryyoung,oldandill,orinjured.Soeachofus

achieves our good only if and insofar as others make our good their good by

178

helpingus throughperiodsofdisability tobecomeourselves thekindofhuman

being–throughacquisitionandexerciseofthevirtues–whomakesthegoodof

othersherorhisgood,andthisnotbecausewehavecalculatedthat,only ifwe

helpothers,willtheyhelpus,insometradingofadvantageforadvantage.

(MacIntyre,1999,p.108)

Macintyrehighlights that for ahumanbeing to flourish to the fullest it is important to

recognise the importance of achieving a certain level of successwhen it comes to the

activityofindependentpracticalreasoning.Furthermoreourflourishingisdependenton

beingapartofasocialorderthatthroughtheexerciseofvirtuescomestovaluecarethat

supportsflourishingandisabletoprovidesuchcaretoitsmembersshouldtheyneedit.

Asocietyfunctioninginthiswayhassuccessfullyfusedthecommongoodwiththegood

oftheindividualwithoutrelyingonabusinessmodelofmutualreciprocity.OnthisnoteI

shall end my presentation on MacIntyre and continue to comment and criticise his

approachtohumanflourishinginsofarasitisrelevanttowonder.

Despite the advancements that MacIntyre offers his approach does not represent a

complete account of human flourishing and there is room for improvement. One area

thatmightrequiremoreattentionconcernstheproblemofgivinganaccountofthegood.

MacIntyreiscommittedtogivesomeformofanaturalisticaccountofwhatisgoodbutat

the same time he does not think that such an account can be purely naturalistic. In

addition he seems to be sceptical about individual accounts and accounts that are

produced fromwithin a particular culture or society. His scepticism is grounded in the

ideathatrelationshipscanbedisruptiveofourflourishing.Thisisanimportantpointbut

unfortunatelyMacIntyrealsobringstheinquiryintothehumangoodtoastalemateashe

offersnosolutionsastohowwecanfurtherourunderstandingofit.Thisisproblematic

andIwillexplorethisproblemmorefullyinthenextsectionwhereIshallengagewithan

altogether different approach to human flourishing. Meanwhile let us consider

MacIntyre’s commitment to the idea that our individual good is achieved insofar as

othersmaketheirgoodourgood.Atfirstglancethismaysoundquitereasonablebecause

ifwehaveradicallydifferentconceptionsofthegoodformingtherelationshipsnecessary

forourflourishingseemsdifficult.Howeveronemayattempttocriticisethisbypointing

out thatMacIntyre’s philosophy resembles in its outlookonmorality toomuch that of

small-scale communities found in Greece at the time of Aristotle. It is one thing to

179

establishamoralcommunityequippedwithasharedunderstandingofvirtueandhuman

flourishingwithinasmall-scalepoliscountingthousandsofpeople,andquiteanotherto

have the same aspirations for a complex modern multi-cultural city-state counting

millions of subjects. In such societies social institutions, as anthropologist George

Silberbauer explains, are highly elaborated, specialised and although integrated as

components of thewhole socio-cultural system they are relatively separated from and

impervioustooneanother(Silberbauer,2001,p.17).Thiscomplicatesmatterstosucha

degree that itmakes it unlikely that such relatively separated institutionswould begin

speakingthesamemorallanguageandmakeacommonconceptionofhumanflourishing

centraltotheiroperations.InthislightonecouldcriticiseMacIntyreforbeingutopianin

hisoutlook.Tostrengthenthispointconsiderforexampletheexistenceofmultinational

profit-orientatedcorporationswithlittleornocareforhumanflourishing.Isitrealisticto

think that such corporationswill change their attitudes to profit and human capital in

favour of approaches to those that incorporate the notion of human flourishing? This

seemshardtoimaginebecauseafterallbusinessisaneconomicpursuitandethicsisnot

the point of gravity in business operations (Silberbauer, 2001, p. 17). To counter the

accusationsofMacIntyre’soutlookbeingutopian in thiscaseonemightarguethat it is

possiblethatacompanyorfirmcanbesupportiveofhumanflourishingandatthesame

time make profit. Imagine if a group of human flourishing supporters successfully

campaigned against purely profit-orientated firms and start a trend amongst the

population of a large-scale society that made citizens boycott purely profit-orientated

businesses. It is perfectly possible that upon realising the loss of customers and

consequentlyprofitthepurelyprofit-orientatedbusinesseswouldquicklybeginchanging

theiroutlooksandpoliciesinfavourofhumanflourishing.Onecouldarguethatethically

speakingthechangeswouldcomeaboutforthewrongreasonsbutitdoesnotrefutethe

possibility that having a successful profit-orientated business can coincide with

advocatinghumanflourishing.InthissenseMacIntyre’s‘utopia’couldberealised,butit

demands that thepeopleof societywhom thebusinesses viewas customers value the

ideaofhumanflourishing,takeactionandbeginchallengingtherelationshipstheyarea

partofthatdonotsupporthumanflourishing.

IthinkthatMacIntyre’sapproachtohumanflourishingisimportantandadvances

the conception of human flourishing provided by Rasmussen. The reason for this rests

mainlyonthenotionthatMacIntyrereaddresseshumannatureandfocusesonwhatwe

haveincommonratherthanwherewediffer.Additionallybyexposingthecomplexityof

180

beingasocialcreaturewithoutabandoningourbiologicalanchoringMacIntyretakesus

beyondRasmussen’s‘individualflourishing’andsituatesusinalargercontextwherethe

relationships we are engaged in are crucial for our flourishing. Furthermore we must

acknowledge that not all of these, be they family relationships or relationships with

powerful large-scale institutions such as private corporations, religious communities or

political movements necessarily support our flourishing. In this sense MacIntyre

encourages us to evaluate howweorganise ourselves in society and to think about to

whatendourrelationshipsaspire.

ThisendsthecommentaryonMacIntyreandIwouldliketofinishbysayingthat

overall I think MacIntyre’s contribution to the human flourishing debate is estimable

because it is a fine example of bridge building where a serious attempt is made to

correlatea‘naturalisticview’ofhumanbeingsanda‘culturalisticview’ofhumanbeings

inordertopointoutwhatisimportantwhenwetalkabouthumanflourishing.Withthis

saidIshallnowpushonandfocusonthephilosophyofMarthaNussbaumwhichcanbe

seenasatoolthatmayhelpusassesstowhatextentparticularsocialpracticesorwaysof

lifecontributetohumanflourishing.

5.3MarthaNussbaumandHumanFlourishing

ThissectionisbasedontheworkofphilosopherMarthaNussbaumwhosecontributionto

theunderstandingofflourishingknownasthe‘HumanDevelopment’approachandalso

as the ‘Capability Approach’ or ‘Capabilities Approach’ has evolved into a theoretical

paradigm(Nussbaum,2011,p.ix).Provisionallytheapproachcanbeusedasameansto

comparative quality-of-life assessment and to theorising about basic social justice that

holds central the question ofwhat each person is able to do and to be. The approach

takeseachpersontobeanendandisnotmerelyconcernedwiththewellbeingofpeople

butalsowhatopportunitiesareavailabletoeachperson(Nussbaum,2011,p.18).Inthis

regard the approach offers an alternative to traditional quality of life models which

promotes the notion that the quality of life of a nationonly improveswhen theGross

DomesticProductpercapitaincreases(Nussbaum,1999,p.33;2011,p.x).

Sincethe1990’sTheCapabilitiesApproachhasenjoyedincreasedpopularityand

hashadan impacton internationalagenciesconcernedwithwelfaresuchas theWorld

BankandUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme.Mostnationsnowproducetheirown

capability-studiesofthewellbeingofpeopleindifferentregionsandgroupsintheirown

societies (Nussbaum, 2011, p. x). Testifying also to this increased popularity are the

181

numerousarticlesandbooksonthetopicandthelaunchoftheHumanDevelopmentand

Capability Association in 2004.63 The association has an annual meeting, publishes a

journallabelledtheJournalofHumanDevelopmentandCapabilitiesandsponsorsawide

rangeof seminars and activities all over theworld. EconomistAmartya Sen introduced

thenotionofcapabilitiesasanapproachtowelfareeconomics(Sen,1979,p.217)andhe

andNussbaumarefoundingpresidents.

AsaphilosopherNussbaumcanbetermedauniversalistthatfromanAristotelian

perspectivearguesforethicalprogression,humandevelopmentandtheimprovementof

thepositionofespeciallywomenaroundtheworldwhoareburdenedbyunreasonable

localtraditionsthatpreventthemfromflourishing.Furthermoreitcanbeventuredthat

herworkonhumanflourishing isdistinct fromthatofRasmussenandMacIntyre inthe

sensethatitisdesignedtoworkinpraxis.ThismeansthatNussbaum’sapproachcanbe

usedasatoolofmeasurementthatcanhelpusdeterminewhetheraparticularpractice

orviewiscommendablefromapointofflourishing.

TodepictwhatNussbaumthinksisimportantwithregardstoflourishingIshallin

the following focusonthe ‘thick,vagueconceptionof thegood’andwhatshecalls the

basic list of human functional capabilities formulated in her article ‘Aristotelian Social

Democracy’ (Nussbaum,1990). Inorder toappreciateNussbaum’sposition it is vital to

understand some key elements of Aristotle’s philosophy. In the Nichomachean Ethics

Aristotlestatesthathumanbeingshaveacapabilityforreason(Aristotle,2003,I.xiii.10)

andinThePoliticsAristotlestates‘Ingeneralallmenreallyseekwhatisgood,notwhat

wascustomarywiththeirforefathers’(Aristotle,1967,II.v.12).Itcanbearguedthatwe

useourrationalitytoseekoutwhatisgoodforusashumanbeingsinthesensethatwe

useaconceptionofthegoodtojustifyouractionsandourwaysoflife.Aconceptionof

the good provides ameasure for actions and viewpoints. However conceptions of the

good vary amonghumanbeings and there are different opinions aboutwhat the right

conception of the good is. In order to solve this problem philosophers have sought to

justifytheirconceptionofthegoodbyreferringtoabstractformulas,whichwouldleave

no room fordoubtor arbitrary subjective influences. Suchabstract formulas are found

embeddedinUtilitarianismandKantianism,buttheyhavesofarprovenproblematic,and

inpartresponsibleforthepopularturningtorelativism.Howeveritisimportanttonote

thattherelativisticstancedoesnotrefuteAristotle’sclaimthathumanbeingslookforthe

goodandnotforthewayoftheirancestors.Nordoesitrejectthepossibilitythatabroad63TheHumanDevelopmentandCapabilityAssociationhasawebsitelocatedat:https://hd-ca.org/

182

objectiveaccountof thehumangoodcanbeestablished. It ison thatbackground that

MarthaNussbaumadvocatesthisparticularideaandputsforthwhatshecalls‘thethick

vagueconceptionofthegood’(Nussbaum,1990,p.217).Nussbaumwrites:

TheAristotelianusesaconceptionofthegoodthatisnot“thin”,likeRawls’s“thin

theory”—thatis,confinedtotheenumerationofall-purposemeanstogoodliving,

but“thick”—dealing,thatis,withhumanendsacrossallareasofhumanlife.The

conceptionis,however,vagueandthisinagoodsense.Itadmits,thatis,ofmany

concretespecifications;andyetitdraws,asAristotleputsit,an“outlinesketch”of

thegoodlife.

(Nussbaum,1990,p.217)64

InotherwordsNussbaum’sapproachrefrainsfromdrawingonanysingularconception

ofwhatitistobeahumanbeingandatthesametimeherapproachasphilosopherJohn

M.Alexanderhas expressed it ‘couldbe compatiblewithdifferentmoral, religious and

philosophicaldoctrines’(Alexander,2008,p.66).Nussbaumexplainsthatherapproachis:

Both internal to human history and strongly evaluative and its aim is to be as

universalaspossible,tosetdownthebasisforourrecognitionofmembersofvery

different traditions as human across religious and metaphysical gulfs. […] The

account is the outcome of a process of self-interpretation and self-clarification

that makes use of the story-telling imagination far more than the scientific

intellect.Thebasicideaofthethickvaguetheoryisthatwetellourselvesstories

of the general outline or structure of the life of a human being. We ask and

answerthequestion,what is it to liveasabeingsituated,sotospeak,between

thebeastsandthegods,withcertainabilitiesthatsetusofffromtherestofthe

worldofnature,andyetwithcertainlimitsthatcomefromourmembershipinthe

worldofnature?Theideaisthatweshareavagueconception,havinganumber

ofdistinctparts,ofwhat it istobesituatedintheworldashuman,andofwhat

transitionseither“up”or“down”sotospeak,wouldturnusintobeingsnolonger

64Rawlsputsforwardhis‘thintheoryofthegood’inATheoryofJusticeanditaimstoexplainthe‘rationalpreferenceforprimarygoodsandtoexplicatethenotionofrationalityunderlyingthechoiceofprinciplesintheoriginalposition’(Rawls,2000,p.349).Understandingabouttheoriginalpositionemergesviaengaginginthethoughtexperimenttheveilofignorance.Seechapter4.

183

human – thus (since on the whole we conceive of species identity as at least

necessaryforpersonalidentity)intocreaturesdifferentfromourselves.

(Nussbaum,1990,p.217-218)

Nussbaumpresentstwostagesofthe‘thickvagueconceptionofthegood’.Thefirststage

is a first approximation towhat appears to be a part of any human being’s life and is

important because it brings forth a general outline of what it is to be human. The

approximationcountsthefollowingentries:

Mortality.

Allhumanbeingsfacedeathandlearnastheyprogressthroughlifethattheyaremortal

creatures.Howeverawarenessofone’smortalitydoesnotentailonelikingit.Apartfrom

certaincircumstancesinwhichdeathwillbedesirablegiventheavailablealternativesitis

truethathumanbeingsingeneralwishtoliveandhaveanaversiontowardsdeath.Toa

certainextentmortality iswhatdefinesand set the framework forhumans. Shouldwe

encounter an immortal anthropomorphic being (as Nussbaum calls it) ‘its way of life

wouldbesodifferentfromourownthatwehadtocategoriseitdifferently’(Nussbaum,

1990,p.219).Thesamewouldhappenifweencountered‘amortalbeingthatshowedno

tendency to avoid death or to seek to continue its life’ (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 219).We

would view it as a disturbed being or simply a being thatwas radically different from

ourselves.

Thehumanbody.

Nussbaumstatesthatallhumanbeingsarebodilycreaturesandthatthebodyitselfsets

limitsonwhatcanbeexperienced.Nussbaumwrites:

Thefactthatanygivenhumanbeingmighthavelivedanywhereand

belongedtoanycultureisagreatpartofwhatgroundsourmutual

recognition; this fact has a great deal to do with the general

humannessofthebody,itsgreatdistinctnessfromotherbodies.

(Nussbaum,1990,p.220)

Nussbaumcontinuesbypointingoutsomecommonfeaturesaboutourembodiment:

184

1. Hungerandthirst.Despitesmallvariations inthedietsbeingsituated inaparticular

culture all humanbeings are equally dependent on food anddrink in order to live.

Furthermore, all human beings have appetites that are indices of need. Nussbaum

remarks that appetitive experience might be shaped by culture and may not

corresponddirectlytowhatthebodyreallyneeds.However ‘wediscoverenormous

similaritiesandoverlap.Moreoverhumanbeingsingeneraldonotwishtobehungry

andthirsty(thoughtheymightchoosetofastforsomereason)’(Nussbaum,1990,p.

220).

2. Need for shelter. Thenakedhumanbody is fragileandwithoutprotection fromthe

elementsunlikesomanyofourfellowanimalswhosefurryorscalyexteriorprovides

protection. It isa fact that thenakedhumanbeingwouldnotsurvive for long inan

environmentwithout refuge from ‘excessiveheatof the sun, from rain, fromwind,

fromsnowandfrost’(Nussbaum,1990,p.220).

3. Sexual desire. Even though sexual desire comes short of eating and drinking it is a

feature in practically every human being’s life. To be asexual would be a sign of a

being thatwas far fromhumansince ‘sexualdesire isandhasallalongbeenavery

strongbasis fortherecognitionofothersdifferentfromourselvesashumanbeings’

(Nussbaum,1990,p.221).

4. Mobility.Humanbeings arepartly constitutedbyour ability tomove fromplace to

placeand thisnotmerelywith thehelpof thevastbodyof transportationwehave

inventedbutalsowiththeaidof‘ourveryownbodies’(Nussbaum,1990,221).Notto

beable tomoveorbeingprevented frommoving is a sourceofdiscontentand ‘an

anthropomorphic beingwhowithout disability, chose never tomove from birth to

deathwouldbehard to viewas human; and a life altogether cut off frommobility

seemsalifelessthanfullyhuman(Nussbaum,1990,p.221).

CapacityforPleasureandPain.

Ingeneralhumanbeingshavethecapacitytoexperiencepleasureandpain.Eventhough

suchexperiencesmight varyacross culturalbordersand theexperience itselfmayvary

fromindividualtoindividualthecapacitycanbeviewedasauniversalhumantrademark.

Furthermore Nussbaum argues that the aversion to pain is a part of being human.

Conclusively she states that ‘a societywhosemembers altogether lacked that aversion

wouldsurelybeconsideredtobeoutsidetheboundsofhumanness.’(Nussbaum,1990,

p.221).

185

CognitiveCapacities:Perceiving,Imagining,Thinking.

All humanbeingshave sense-perception, the ability to imagine and the ability to think

andmakingdistinctions.FurthermoreNussbaumwriteswithareferencetoAristotlethat

wehavetheabilitytoreachoutforunderstanding.Inrelationtothisifagroupofpeople

existed who were totally deprived of sense-perception, imagination or reasoning and

thinking‘wearenotinanyofthesecasesimagininga[group]ofhumanbeings,nomatter

whattheylooklike’(Nussbaum,1990,p.221).

EarlyInfantDevelopment.

Allhumanbeingsbegintheirlifeashelplesslydependentandvulnerablebabies.Abeing

insuchastateexperiencesclosenessanddistancefromthoseitsverylifedependson.65

Nussbaummentionsthat‘thiscommonstructuretoearlylifegivesrisetoagreatdealof

overlapping experience that is of great importance for the formation of emotions and

desires, and that is a major source of our ability to see ourselves in the emotional

experiencesofthosewhoselivesareotherwiseverydifferentfromourown’(Nussbaum,

1990, p. 221). She furthermore argues that shouldwe encounter a group of apparent

humansanddiscoverthattheyneverhadbeenbabiesordidnotknowoftheexperience

ofdependency,needandaffection,onecanarguethat‘theirformoflifewassufficiently

different from our own that they could not be considered part of the same kin’

(Nussbaum,1990,p.222).

PracticalReason.

All human beings participate or at least try to participate inmanaging their own lives.

They formoracquireaconceptionof thegoodand (moreor less) layouta strategy in

terms of how they should live. This involves being able ‘to choose, evaluate and to

functionaccordingly’ (Nussbaum,1990,p.222).Bearing inmindthediversityofhuman

life this has of course many concrete forms and ‘is related in complex ways to other

capabilities,emotional,imaginative,andintellectual’(Nussbaum,1990,p.222).

AffiliationwithOtherHumanBeings.

65OnecanarguewithreferencetoMacIntyrethatthisisalsoexperiencedlateroninanyindividual’slifewhenduetooldagethebodyisweakened,fragileandnolongerabletoregeneratesufficiently.Additionallytheveryillandhospitalisedhumanbeingexperiencesdependency.

186

Nussbaum writes: ‘Aristotle claimed that human beings recognise and feel a sense of

affiliationandconcernforotherhumanbeings’(Nussbaum,1990,p.222).Inthisrelation

shepointsoutthatwefindaclosenexusbetweentheconceptualandtheempirical.Itis

afactthat‘werecogniseotherhumanbeingsbutatthesametimeourconceptofhuman

beings is shaped (in anopenendedway) bywhatwe findourselves able to recognise’

(Nussbaum,1990,p.222).FurthermoreNussbaumpointsoutthat‘wevaluetheformof

lifethatisconstitutedbytheserecognitionsandaffiliations–welivetoandwithothers,

and regard a life not lived in affiliation with others to be a life not worth living’

(Nussbaum, 1990, p. 222). Aristotle claims that we define ourselves in terms of a

minimumoftwokindsofaffiliations,namely‘intimatefamilyrelationsandsocialorcivic

relations.’(Nussbaum,1990,p.222).Nussbaumagreeswiththispoint.

RelatednesstoOtherSpeciesandtoNature.

Human beings represent one species among many other different species including

plants.WeliveasNussbaumsaysinacomplexinterlockingordereduniverse(Nussbaum,

1990,p.222).Thisbothsupportsusandlimitsusinmanywaysbutwhatisimportantto

recognise is the fact thatwe are dependent on this particular order andmany human

beings find that we owe this order respect and concern. Nussbaum argues a creature

‘who treated animals exactly like stones and could not be brought to recognise some

problemwiththatwouldprobablyberegardedastoostrangetobehuman’(Nussbaum,

1990,p.222).Thesamethingwouldhappentoacreature,which‘didnotcareinanyway

forthewonderandbeautyofthenaturalworld’(Nussbaum,1990,p.222).Inrelationto

thisNussbaummakesanominouscommentinhertext.Sheaddsthatperhapswearein

theprocessofwitnessingapartofourkind‘becomeotherthanwhatahumanbeinghas

usuallybeentakentobe;perhapsweshallsomedaybecalleduponeithertochangeour

conceptionofhumannessor toacknowledgea fundamentalgulf in formsof lifeamong

humans’ (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 223). Nussbaum does not offer any details concerning

whomshehas inmindbut ifthetranshumanistmovement66shouldeversucceedinfor

example‘liberating’ahumanbeingfromher‘biologicalconstraints’orotherwisechange

herhumanconditionIsupposethisbeingwouldqualify.

HumourandPlay.

66Foranexcellentoverviewofthehistoryandaimoftranshumanismsee(Bostrom,2005).

187

Human beings regardless of their culture and place of living have a tendency tomake

roomforrecreationandlaughter.Humanbeingsarerecognisedastheanimalwholaughs

and Nussbaum states furthermore that ‘laughter and play are frequently among the

deepest andalso the firstmodesofourmutual recognition’ (Nussbaum,1990,p. 223).

ChildrenplayandlaughinAfricaaswellasinNorway.Itisnotafeatureconnectedtoa

specificcultureorrace.Shouldoneencounterachildunabletolaughandplaythensurely

itwouldbea signofadeepdisturbance.Should this situationbepermanent then ‘the

consequencemaybethatwewillproveunabletoconsiderthechildcapableofleadinga

fullyhumanlife’(Nussbaum,1990,p.223).Anentiresocietydeprivedofthisabilitywould

seemstrangeand frightening tous.Nussbaumargues: ‘Wecertainlydonotwanta life

that leaves thiselementout;andonthewholewewantmoreof it thancircumstances

permitustohave’(Nussbaum,1990,p.223).

Separateness.

Nussbauminformsusthathowevermuchweliveforandtowardsothers,weare,eachof

us,‘oneinnumber,proceedingonaseparatepaththroughtheworldfrombirthtodeath’

(Nussbaum,1990,p.223).Eachpersondiesaloneandthisissobecauseweareseparate

beings. ‘If a person walks across the room, no other follows automatically. When we

countthenumberofhumanbeings inaroom,wehavenodifficulty figuringoutwhere

onebeginsandtheotherends’(Nussbaum,1990,p.223).Nussbaumarguesthatthisisa

highlyrelevantpointsince individuality isabsentorunrecognised incertainsocietiesor

cultures.InrelationtothisNussbaumalsoremindsusthat‘eventhemostintenseforms

ofhumaninteraction,forexamplesexualexperience,areexperiencesofresponsiveness,

andnotoffusion’(Nussbaum,1990,p.223).Thisdemonstratesthatwhateverviewpoint

onehaswithregardtoloversoroffspringtheyareallseparatedandindividualcreatures.

StrongSeparateness.

Nussbaum writes ‘Due to separateness each human life has its own context and

surroundings’ (Nussbaum, 1990). Objects, places, a history, particular friendships,

locations,sexualtiesarelinkedtotheindividualandaccordingtoNussbaumthisishowa

persontosomeextentisabletoidentifyherself.Nussbaumacknowledgesthatsocieties

(or cultures) vary in the degree of strong separateness they advocate. However

Nussbaumfindsadisregardforstrongseparatenesssignificantlyproblematic.Sheargues:

188

There isno life, shortof a lifeof total imprisonment, andperhaps

noteventhatlife,thatreallydoesfailtosaythewords“mine”and

“not-mine”insomeidiosyncraticandnon-sharedway.WhatItouch,

use, love, respond to, I touch, use, love, respond to frommyown

separatepointof view.The items I call “mine”arenotexactly the

sameasthosecalledthatwaybyanyotherperson.

(Nussbaum,1990,p.224)

In Nussbaum’s view human beings see one another as beings thatwish to have some

separatenessofcontextoraprivatezonetomoveaboutin.Furthermoresheclaimsthat

theywishtohavesomespecialitemstouseandholdandcherish.

This concludes Nussbaum’s first approximation about what seemingly is a part of any

human life. From this vantage point Nussbaummoves on to the second stage of her

approach and sets out to ‘specify vaguely certain basic functionings that should, as

constitutive of human life concern us’ (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 224). The result is a list of

basichumanfunctionalcapabilities,whichiscentraltoNussbaums’sworkandbecauseof

its centrality to her outlook and because I will refer back to it later in this chapter in

connectionwithwonderIwillinwhatimmediatelyfollowscitebutnotcommentonthe

most up to date version from Nussbaum’s book Creating Capabilities67. It reads as

follows:

BasicHumanFunctionalCapabilities

1. Life.Beingabletolivetotheendofahumanlifeofnormallength;notdying

prematurely,orbeforeone’slifeissoreducedastobenotworthliving.

2. Bodilyhealth.Beingable tohavegoodhealth, includingreproductivehealth;

tobeadequatelynourished;tohaveadequateshelter.

3. Bodily integrity.Beingable tomove freely fromplace toplace; tobe secure

againstviolentassault,includingsexualassaultanddomesticviolence;having

opportunitiesforsexualsatisfactionandforchoiceinmattersofreproduction.

4. Senses, imagination, and thought.Being able to use the senses, to imagine,

think, and reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way

informedandcultivatedbyanadequateeducation,including,butbynomeans67Forearlierversionsofthelistsee(Nussbaum,1993,p.225)(Nussbaum,2001,p.77).

189

limitedto,literacyandbasicmathematicalandscientifictraining.Beingableto

use imaginationand thought in connectionwithexperiencing andproducing

worksandeventsofone’sownchoice,religious,literacy,musical,andsoforth.

Beingabletouseone’smindinwaysprotectedbyguaranteesoffreedomof

expressionwith respect tobothpoliticalandartistic speech,and freedomof

religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid

nonbeneficialpain.

5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside

ourselves;tolovethosewholoveandcareforus,togrieveattheirabsence;in

general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified

anger.Nothavingone’semotionaldevelopmentblightedbyfearandanxiety

(Supportingthiscapabilitymeanssupportingformsofhumanassociationthat

canbeshowntobecrucialintheirdevelopment).

6. Practicalreason.Beingabletoformaconceptionofthegoodandtoengagein

critical reflectionabout theplanningof one’s life (This entails protection for

thelibertyofconscienceandreligiousobservance).

7. Affiliation. (A) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognise and

show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social

interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting

institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also

protectingthefreedomofassemblyandpoliticalspeech.)(B)Havingthesocial

bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a

dignifiedbeingwhoseworthisequaltothatofothers.Thisentailsprovisions

of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity,

caste,religion,nationalorigin.

8. Other species.Beingable to livewithconcern forand in relation toanimals,

plants,andtheworldofnature.

9. Play.Beingabletolaugh,toplay,toenjoyrecreationalactivities.

10. Controloverone’senvironment. (A)Political.Beingabletoparticipateeffectively

inpoliticalchoicesthatgovernone’slife;havingtherightofpoliticalparticipation,

protection of free speech and association. (B) Material. Being able to hold

property(bothlandandmovablegoods),andhavingpropertyrightsonanequal

basiswith others; having the freedom fromunwarranted search and seizure. In

190

work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and

enteringintomeaningfulrelationshipsofmutualrecognitionwithotherworkers.

(Nussbaum,2011,p.33-34)

Thisconcludesthelistofbasichumanfunctionalcapabilities.

To fully appreciate Nussbaum’s work it is important to understand what she

meansbycapabilityandfunctioning.InNussbaum’sterm,capabilitiesrefertoaperson’s

abilities (internal capabilities) but also to ‘the freedoms or opportunities created by a

combination of personal abilities and the political, social and economic environment

(combined capabilities)(Nussbaum, 2011, p. 20,21). Functionings are different from

capabilitiesandshedescribesthemasactiverealisationsofoneormorecapabilities. In

otherwords functionings give capabilities their end (Nussbaum,2011,p. 20,25). This is

important to Nussbaum because a society might successfully promote internal

capabilitiesbut‘cutofftheavenuesthroughwhichpeopleactuallyhavetheopportunity

tofunctioninaccordancewiththosecapabilities(Nussbaum,2011,p.21).

ToappreciateNussbaum’sapproach tohuman flourishing it isalso important to

notethatherviewis:

Resolutelypluralistaboutvalue:itholdsthatthecapabilityachievementsthatare

central forpeoplearedifferent inquality,not just inquantity; that they cannot

withoutdistortionbereducedtoasinglenumericscale;andthata fundamental

partofunderstandingandproducingthemisunderstandingthespecificnatureof

eachwithoutdistortion.Finally,theapproachisconcernedwithentrenchedsocial

injusticeandinequality,especiallyfailuresthataretheresultofdiscriminationor

marginalization. It ascribes an urgent task to government and public policy—

namely,toimprovethequalityoflifeforallpeopleasdefinedbytheircapabilities.

(Nussbaum,2011,p.18-19)

Twothingsareimportanthere.FirstNussbaumputsforththatsheispluralistaboutvalue

which is to say she is for diversity of value but not relativistic about value.What this

meansisthatshedoesnotwantallofustobethesamebutatthesametimesheinsists

that there are certain kinds of lives that if measured against the list of basic human

functional capabilities simply do not flourish asmuch as others. SecondlyNussbaum is

concernedwithwhatshecallsentrenchedsocial injusticeand inequalitywhich istosay

191

that she is concernedwith the lives of peoplewho because of a particular cultural or

political environment are being ‘socialised or forced into a particular way of life that

compromises their flourishing’. Nussbaum’s work is very much concerned with social

justice and insists that for a life to beworthy of human dignity it demands ‘at a bare

minimum,anamplethreshold levelofthetenCentralCapabilities’ (Nussbaum,2011,p.

32).68InotherwordsNussbaumthinksthatinorderforanindividualtoflourishshemust

haveatleastadegreeofthetencapabilitiespresentinherlife.

Onemayseek tocriticiseNussbaum’sapproachbyventuring that it ismerelyahuman

rights approach in new clothing. This is an understandable criticism because both the

human rights approachandNussbaum’sposition accept thatby virtueof beinghuman

people have particular entitlements and that it is worthwhile respecting such

entitlements.Nevertheless therearedifferencesbetween the twoapproachesandone

significantdifferenceisthatNussbaum’sapproachacknowledgesthatnonhumananimals

have entitlementsmeaning that her approach is more encompassing than the Human

RightsApproach(Nussbaum,2011,p.62).To furtherpointoutdifferencesconsider the

wordingofpointCofarticle29oftheconventionoftherightsofthechild.Itreads:

The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural

identity,languageandvalues,forthenationalvaluesofthecountryinwhichthe

childisliving,thecountryfromwhichheorshemayoriginate,andforcivilizations

differentfromhisorherown.

(UNGA,1989,Article29)

Whilethehumanrightsapproachonthe issueofeducationemphasisesthe importance

ofculturalidentityandvaluesNussbaum’sapproachprovidesaplatformfromwheresuch

canbecriticised(Nussbaum,2011,p.63).Thisisimportantbecauseitisnotagiventhat

allparents, culturesandnationalvaluesandso forthpromotehuman flourishingand if

theydonotwemustaskourselveswhytheyshouldberespected.

AnotherpotentialproblemwithNussbaum’scontributiontoourunderstandingof

human flourishing lies in the commentary she has made to the basic list of human

68Nussbaum’sapproachtoherlisthasgrownmorenuancedsincethelistwasfirstpublished.Forexample,inherbookSexandSocialJusticefrom1999shestatesthat‘thecapabilitiesapproach,asIconceiveit,claimsthatalifethatlacksanyoneofthesecapabilities,nomatterwhatelseithas,willfallshortofbeingagoodhumanlife’(Nussbaum,1999,p.42).

192

functionalcapabilities.Sheholdsthatinorderforapersontoflourishinaminimalsense

thatpersonhastohaveanamplethresholdlevelofthecapabilitiesbutthephrase‘ample

threshold’ is ambiguous. This could be problematic because unless Nussbaum’s list of

capabilities clearly communicates what it takes for an individual to flourish it loses its

potencyasatoolforpromotingit.

OnemightalsoobjecttoNussbaum’sapproachbyclaimingthatitispaternalistic

andeffectivelyrobspeopleofthefreedomtomaketheirownchoicesaboutwhatisgood

forthem.Nussbaum’sresponsetothisobjectionisthattheargumentfrompaternalismis

important and if one advocates the capability approach one should be mindful about

paternalism.Howeverindefenceofherpositionshestates:

Acommitmenttorespectingpeople’schoiceshardlyseemsincompatiblewiththe

endorsementofuniversalvalues. Indeed, itappearstoendorseexplicitlyat least

oneuniversalvalue,thevalueofhavingtheopportunitytothinkandchoosefor

oneself.Thinkingaboutpaternalismgivesastrongreasontorespectthevarietyof

ways citizens actually choose to lead their lives in a pluralistic society, and

therefore toprefer a formof universalism that is compatiblewith freedomand

choiceofmostsignificantsorts.Butreligioustoleration,associativefreedom,and

the other major liberties are themselves universal values. They require a

universalistaccount for their recognitionandtheirprotectionagainst thosewho

don’twantotherpeopletomakechoicesforthemselves.

(Nussbaum,2001,p.51)

Nussbaum’s defence points out something important about her approach and the

pluralistic society she advocates, which is that a pluralistic society depends on the

recognitionthatwewishtomakechoices forourselvesandthatwedonotwantother

people tomake choices forus,which spells out auniversal value important to allwho

embracepluralism.

Further criticism of Nussbaum’s approach has been brought forward by

philosopherPhilipMcReynoldswhothinksthat it isproblematicthatNussbaumfocuses

onwhathecallspublicchoices inordertohelp individualsachievetheirown individual

goodswithoutofferinganystrategyforhowtoactuallyachievethosegoods.McReynolds

elaborates by saying that once we have established capabilities individuals are left to

theirowndevicesintermsofevaluatingtheirownspecificendsandprojects.McReynolds

193

thinksthisconsistsinmoreorlessarbitraryactsofwill.HealsocriticisesthatNussbaum’s

approachsignalstobeasortoflibertarianismwithoutmoralsandthatthisisaproblem

(McReynolds, 2002, p. 148). In defence of Nussbaum one might point out that her

approachissimplynotdesignedtosolveindividualmoraldilemmasbutithelpsusrealise

ourcommonhumanityandhowwemayflourishashumanbeings.Onecouldofcourse

see this as a shortcoming and there ismorework to be done in terms ofNussbaum’s

approach.AlternativelyonemightpointoutthateventhoughNussbaumdoesnotoffer

KantianprinciplesorUtilitarianalgorithmsshestillthinksthatethicaltruthisimportant.

Infactshethinksthatsomewaysoflifeandindeedmoralityarebetterthanothersand

that someways canbe rightly criticisedandcategorisedas stupid,perniciousand false

(Nussbaum, 1993, p. 261). This is grounded in Nussbaum’s acknowledgement of

Aristotle’sworkandtheimportanceofpracticalreasonandvirtuesinhumanflourishing

(Nussbaum, 1993, p. 264). It may be that such a position does not offer the kind of

rationalethatMcReynoldsclaimstobemissinginrespecttomakingthecorrectchoices

butgiventhatnosuchrationaleexistsitisinmatterssuchastheseasNussbaumwrites

‘bettertobevaguelyrightthanpreciselywrong’(Nussbaum,1990,p.217).

This concludes the presentation of Nussbaum’s approach to human flourishing and

becauseherapproachalsorepresents the lastcontemporaryviewofhumanflourishing

presented in this chapter this gives me an opportunity to summarise the picture of

human flourishing that has emerged. We started by looking at Rasmussen’s view of

flourishingandherewewere introducedtosix importantfeaturesofhumanflourishing

informingusthathumanflourishingisobjective, inclusive, individualised,agent-relative,

self-directed, social and emphasises practical wisdom, virtue and an appeal to human

nature in its formulation.MacIntyre added to our understanding of human flourishing

given his attention to animality, vulnerability and dependency and advanced our

understanding of human flourishing by pointing out the complexity of being a social

creature and the significance of being involved in relationships that are supportive of

human flourishing. FurthermoreMacIntyre emphasises the importanceof becoming an

independentpracticalreasonerandhowvirtuesmakethispossible.Healsopresentedus

with somedifficultiesabouthuman flourishing including theproblemofgaininga clear

viewofwhathumanflourishingis.AccordingtoMacIntyreitisimportanttobesceptical

about appeals to nature, the subjective or culture with respect to portraying human

flourishing.Macintyre’s scepticism is aptbutunfortunately it leads towhat I labelleda

194

stalemateandthechallengeofhowto furtherourunderstandingofhumanflourishing.

Lastly we looked at Nussbaum’s approach to human flourishing, which involves the

formulationofa‘thickvagueconceptionofthegood’anda‘basiclistofhumanfunctional

capabilities’. Nussbaum’s approach is refreshing and although it does not dismiss the

problemofthe‘MacIntyrianstalemate’ itrepresentsaremarkablysturdyandopenway

ofaddressinghumanflourishing.Itissturdyinthesensethatitishardtochallengeanyof

theentriesonthelistofcapabilitiesanditisopeninthesensethatthelistinquestionis

changeable and can be improved. I think that from the examination of the three

contemporaryviewsofhumanflourishingapicturehasemergedthatcansufficientlyaid

us in determining whether cultivating a balanced sense of wonder can be a strong

contributortolivingaflourishinghumanlife.Flourishingissomethingthatnooneupon

reflectionwouldchoosetolivewithout.It isanactivitythatdemandsourattentionand

inviteswonderbecauseeachdimensionofflourishingi.e.,theindividual(Rasmussen),the

social(MacIntyre)andthepolitical(Nussbaum)ispartlyclouded.Inotherwordswonder

iscalledforinrelationtothecontinuingexplorationofthesedimensions.

The next step in this chapter is to examine what elements in our lives contribute to

humanflourishing,andtodetermineifwondercanalsobeasourceofhumanflourishing.

5.4SourcesofHumanFlourishing

Broadlyspeakingforsomethingtocountasasourceofflourishingitmustinsomewayor

anothercontributetoourflourishingashumanbeingsandtoillustratethisIshallinthe

followinglookatfourexamples:literacy,friendship,humourandphysicalexercise.

Literacy canbe considered a sourceof human flourishingbecause the ability to

read and write is empowering. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural

Organisation(UNESCO)informsusthatliteracy‘isthefoundationoflifelonglearning’and

helps‘eradicatepoverty,reducechildmortality,curbpopulationgrowth,achievegender

equalityandensuresustainabledevelopment,peaceanddemocracy’(UNESCO,2013).In

addition the independent charity organisation The National Literacy Trust states that

literacyhasa significant impactonaperson’shappinessand successand if aperson is

equippedwithgood literacy skills she isnotonlybetterequipped to takeadvantageof

opportunities that life offers but also ‘more likely to have higher self-esteem, better

health, better jobs and higher wages than those with poor literacy skills’

195

(NationalLiteracyTrust,2013).Furthermoreonemightarguethat beingable to readand

writeenablesonetoengage,understandandperhapschallengebiasedinterpretationsor

readingsofparticular laws,politicalmanifestosorreligiousscriptureswhichthreatento

orperhapsalreadyeffectivelydampentheflourishingofparticulargroupsorindividuals.

Friendshipisalsoasourceofflourishingwhichrepresentativesofthepositivepsychology

movementsuchaspsychologistsWilliamComptonandEdwardHoffmanpointout.They

argue that there ismounting evidence from psychology andmedicine stating that our

attitudestowardsfriendshipareimportantandinfluenceindividualwellness,vitalityand

longevity (Compton & Hoffman, 2013, p. 132). Founder of the positive psychology

movementPsychologistMartinSeligmanisofasimilarattitudeashethinksfriendshipto

be a strong asset to health (Seligman, 2011, p. 209). However as contemporary

philosopher Mark Vernon argues in his book The Philosophy of Friendship the term

‘friendship’ is complex and ambiguous (Vernon, 2005, p. 2) and thuswemust exercise

caution in our appraisal. Aristotle recognises three kinds of friendship based on utility,

pleasureandvirtue in theNicomacheanEthics andargues that friendship isoneof the

most indispensiblerequirementsof lifefornoonewouldchooseto livewithoutfriends

even if they had all other goods ready at their disposal (Aristotle, 2003, VIII 1). Yet he

acknowledges thatwhat constitutes friendship is amatter of controversy and ‘there is

muchdifferenceofopinionastothenatureoffriendship’(Aristotle,2003,VIII.i.6).Given

theframeworkofthisthesisIdonothavethelibertytoengageinadetaileddiscussionon

what friendshipconsistsofbut forourpresentpurposes itwillalsosuffice topointout

that viewing friendship as a source of flourishing from a Neo-Aristotelian angle is

definitelyapossibility.Given thatwearesocial creatures (whichRasmussen,Macintyre

andNussbaumadvocate)thereisapointinseeingfriendshipregardlessofthedifferent

wayswemayconceiveitas‘overlappingexpressionsofthesamefamilyofsharedhuman

needs and desires’ (Nussbaum, 1993, 264) which is to say that when we look to our

friendswemightdiscoversomethingaboutourselves.This isan importantpointandto

elaborateletusturntophilosopherMetteLebechandherengagementwiththeancient

Greeks’notionthat‘afriendisanotherself’(Aristotle,2003,p.IX.Iv.5).Lebechexplains

that to view a friend as another self is to flag that one is able to see the other as an

interpretationorperhapsanexplanationofthe‘firstself’inthesamewayamirrorimage

does for theoriginal self (Lebech,1995,p.147-148).Naturally such interpretationsand

explanationscanbedeceivingjustlikethemirrorsinafunhousemaydistortourshape

196

andthewaywelookbutifweseektounderstandourselvesthroughourfriendswewill

findcommunalitiesthatwemightnotfindifweforexampleweretoseekunderstanding

ofourselvesintheimageofacomputerorawolf.Thisdoesnotmeanthatwecannotin

some aspects resemble computers or wolves or that there are overlaps but what is

importanthereistheideathatfromlookingtoourhumanfriendswecandiscoverthat

we are creatures of a particular kindwhich is important for our flourishing. From this

position it seems quite clear that friendship can be a source of flourishing because

besides promoting individual wellness, vitality, longevity and health friendship clearly

helpsusunderstandourselves.

I will argue that humour or to have a sense of humour is likewise a source of human

flourishingseenfromaNeo-Aristotelianperspective.ComptonandHoffmanwritethatin

generalhavingagoodsenseofhumour isbeneficialandcanhelppeople ‘recover from

illness, cope with life stresses and anxiety about death, enhance immune system

functioning, reduce the psychological experience of pain, and increase the chances of

successful infertility treatments’ (Compton & Hoffman, 2013, p. 137). It has also been

arguedthatshouldonerequiretheserviceofhealthcareworkershumourcontinuestobe

important. The American nursing pioneer Virginia Henderson points out that ‘laughter

andhumourbetweenpatientsandhealthcareworkerscanbeasgoodas,orbetterthan,

amedication. Itcancreateawarm‘climate’,promotegood interpersonal relationships,

and relieve feelings of frustration, anxiety or hostility’ (V. Henderson & Nite, 1978, p.

945).FurthermorepsychologistsWilliamVineyandBretKinginformusthatHippocrates

thefatherofGreekmedicineisknownforprescribinglaughtertohispatientsasearlyas

thefourthcenturyBCE(Compton&Hoffman,2013,p.136).Inthislighthumourseemsto

beasourceofflourishingasitclearlyhaspositiveeffectsonourgeneralhealthandsense

ofwellbeing.Additionallyhavingasenseofhumourcanhelpusdiscoverwhatgoodsare

important to us in relation to our flourishing because as anthropologistMary Douglas

pointsout ‘A Joke isaplayupon form, thataffordsanopportunity for realising thatan

acceptedpatternhasnonecessity’(Douglas,1975,p.96).Ahumorousspeechcanalsobe

aplayuponformandhelpusrealisethatanacceptedpatternhasnonecessity.Consider

anexcerpt from theeulogydeliveredbyBritish comedian JohnCleeseat thememorial

serviceoffellowMontyPythonGrahamChapman:

GrahamChapman,co-authorofthe‘ParrotSketch,’isnomore.

197

Hehas ceased tobe,bereftof life,he rests inpeace,hehaskicked thebucket,

hoppedthetwig,bitthedust,snuffedit,breathedhislast,andgonetomeetthe

GreatHeadofLightEntertainment inthesky,and Iguessthatwe’reall thinking

how sad it is that amanof such talent, of such capability for kindness, of such

unusual intelligenceshouldnowsosuddenlybespiritedawayat theageofonly

forty-eight,beforehe’dachievedmanyofthethingsofwhichhewascapable,and

beforehe’dhadenoughfun.

Well, I feel that I should say, “Nonsense.Good riddance tohim, the freeloading

bastard!Ihopehefries.”

AndthereasonIfeelIshouldsaythisis,hewouldneverforgivemeifIdidn’t,ifI

threwawaythisgloriousopportunitytoshockyouallonhisbehalf.Anythingfor

himbutmindlessgoodtaste.IcouldhearhimwhisperinginmyearlastnightasI

waswritingthis:"Alright,Cleese,you'reveryproudofbeingtheveryfirstperson

to ever say 'shit' on British television. If this service is really for me, just for

starters,IwantyoutobecomethefirstpersoneverataBritishmemorialservice

tosay'fuck'!

(Cleese,1989)

Theeulogyisaplayuponformasitbreaksawayfromtheformalitythatmostpeoplein

Britainpresumablywouldexpectfromamemorialspeech.Astherecordingsofthisnow

famous speech show Cleese manages to bring laughter to his fellow mourners who

probably never expected to be laughing at Chapman’s funeral. The humorous eulogy

bringsacertaincatharsis to themournersand it reminds themthatdespiteChapman’s

departuretheyarestillverymuchalive, thatmourningcanbecarriedout inacheerful

wayandthatdespitethedeathofalovedonethereisabrightsidetolife.InthislightI

thinkwehaveestablishedthathavingasenseofhumourcanhelpapersonidentifyand

questionhabitsorparticularpracticesinthesocietysheisapartofwhichconsequently

canhaveapositiveeffectonherflourishing.AsMacIntyrewouldsayasignificantpartof

flourishing is finding out how one actually flourishes and sometimes this involves

questioningtheenvironmentyouareinandthewayoflifeyouareleading.Inthisrespect

achievingthisthroughhumourunderstoodasaplayuponformcanbeveryeffective.

Physicalexercisecanalsobeviewedasasourceofflourishingandparticularlybecauseof

its positive impact on our health andwellbeing. According to ‘The Benefits of Physical

198

Activity for Health and Well-being’ issued by C3 Collaborating for Health69 exercise

reducesbloodpressure, improvesblood cholesterol levels and lowersbodymass index

(BMI).Furthermore figures showthatphysical inactivity is the fourth-leading risk factor

forglobalmortalityandaccountsforanestimateof5.2milliondeathseveryyear(C3&

Health, 2012, p. 4). Exercise also benefitsmental health including the improvement of

mood and the reduction of symptoms of stress, anger and depression. Furthermore it

alleviatesanxietyandpreventscognitivedecline(C3&Health,2012,p.6).AdditionallyI

wouldclaimthatphysicalexercisecanalsocontributetothedevelopmentofanethical

outlookandspiritualityand insupportof thisstandstheJapanesemartialartofaikido,

whichwemighttranslateintothewayofpeaceorharmony.Nowaikidoischaracterised

byphysicalandquitetechnicaltrainingthroughwhichthestudentlearnshowtodefend

herself against a variety of attacks, but it also has an ethical and spiritual dimension,

whichthestudentgainsinsightintothroughthephysicaltraining.PhilosopherBarryKroll

writesthat:

Aikidoaffordsaframeworkforunderstandingargumentasharmonizationrather

thanconfrontation.Twomovements,circlingaway(tenkan)andenteringin(irimi)

suggests tactics for arguing with adversaries. The ethical imperative of aikido

involves protecting one’s adversary from harm, using the least force necessary,

andwhenpossibletransformingaggressionintocooperation.

(Kroll,2008,p.451)

Important to the practitioner of aikido is the protection of one’s adversary and in this

sensetheartisaboutcontrollingtheangerandaggressionoftheopponentinsuchaway

thatsheisharmedaslittleaspossibleasmuchasitisaboutexercisingself-control.Now

thereareseveralwaysofillustratinginwhatcapacityaikidohasaspiritualdimensionand

one could for example examine the rituals and etiquette involved in aikido or the

influenceoftheOmotoreligion70ontheartforguidance(Young,1988,p.281).However

in the following I shall focus on a quotation of the founder of aikidoMoriheiUeshiba,

which bears witness to the spiritual dimension of aikido. Ueshibawrites ‘In Aikidowe

69C3CollaboratingforHealthisanon-profitorientatedNonGovernmentalOrganisationbasedinLondon,whichraisesawarenessaboutthenegativehealtheffectsoftobaccouse,physicalinactivityandpoordiet.Formoreinformationseewww.c3health.org.70TheOmotoreligionisbasedonShinto(WayoftheGods)indigenoustoJapanandwasfoundedbyNaoDeguchiandOnisaburoDeguchiinthelate19thcentury(Young,1988,p.263).

199

neverinitiateanattack.Thedesiretoattackisproofthatonelacksconfidencetoemerge

victorious. That is, onehasalreadybeendefeated in spirit’ (Ueshiba,2010,p. 16). This

attitudeorspiritwhichisincorporatedintothephysicaltrainingofaikidoinconjunction

withthefactthattheartisbereftofcompetitionmakesitIshouldthinkaspiritualartas

muchasitisamartialart.

We have now looked at four different possible sources of flourishing. Literacy seems

important, as it is the basis of education and it improves people’s wellbeing in many

aspectsoflifeincludinghealth,incomeandabilitytocontributetopeaceanddemocracy.

Friendshipcountstowardsflourishingbecauseassocialcreaturesitinfluencesindividual

wellness, vitality, longevity and health. Humour can also be a source of flourishing

becauseofitspositiveeffectsonourgeneralhealthandsenseofwellbeing.Inaddition,

havinga senseofhumour canhelpushold critical attitudes towardswhatwe take for

grantedandaidusinfindingourownflourishing.Physicalexercisecanalsobeviewedas

a source of flourishing because it benefits physical and mental health and can also

contributetothedevelopmentofmoralsensitivityandspirituality.Ishallnowmoveonto

examinewhetherwondercanbeasourceofflourishing.

5.5.WonderasaSourceofFlourishing

This section attempts to give a preliminary account of why wonder can be seen as a

sourceofflourishing.Quiteintunewiththemythologicaloriginofwonderwemightview

wonder as a courier, meaning that it is a state of mind that can deliver or introduce

somethingofgreat value intoour lives. In this respect I shall look tohowwondermay

facilitate other states of mind such as gratitude, reverence, an imaginative attitude,

openness and humility all of which I shall argue can contribute to human flourishing.

These candidates have been chosen not because they are the only possible effects of

wonder that may contribute to our flourishing but because we have throughout this

thesisalreadytouchedoneachoftheminsomeformorotherinrelationtowonderand

flourishing.SecondlyandimportanttothespecificfocusofthisthesisIshallarguethatto

wonder virtuously or in a balanced way contributes to human flourishing in a strong

sense.

200

Tounderstandhowwondermayhelpfostergratitudeandhowthismaybeasourceof

flourishing let us begin by taking a closer look at what gratitude is. Keen holds that

gratitudeis‘joy’stwin’andanemotionthatcanhealbitterness(Keen,2010,p.91)andby

recalling Nussbaum’s work we find that under point five on her list of basic human

capabilities she presents gratitude as a human emotion, which alongside love, grief,

longingandjustifiedangerenablesustohaveattachmentstothingsandpeople,whichis

crucialtoourflourishing.

Additionally wemay highlight that positive psychologists such as Compton and

Hoffmanpraisetheimportanceofgratitudeinconnectionwithflourishingandstatethat

gratitude at its corehas thepower tobring about ‘positive connections amongpeople

andallowustoexpressourhighestvaluesandpotential’(Compton&Hoffman,2013,p.

236) and that grateful people have a tendency to be happy and that gratitude is

important for healthy personality functions (Compton & Hoffman, 2013, p. 237).

PsychologistsRobertA. EmmonsandCharlesM. Sheldonexpandon thisby stating the

following:

Grateful people may have more psychic manoeuvrability than the ungrateful,

enabling them to be less defensive and open to life. [Gratitude is] a source of

humanstrength,andan integralelementpromoting thecivility requisite for the

flourishingoffamiliesandcommunities.

(RobertAEmmons&Shelton,2002,p.468)

Key to Emmons and Sheldon’s view of gratitude as a source of flourishing is that it

facilitates a certain mental flexibility, which leaves us open to what life has to offer.

Additionallytheyholdthatgratitudepromotesthecivilityorcourtesy,whichisimportant

totheflourishingoflargergroupsofpeople.

Intheliteraturegratitudeisoftenpresentedasanemotionthatisassociatedwith

religionorreligiouspractice.EmmonsandSheltonobservethat:

Therootsofgratitudecanbeseen inmanyoftheworld’sreligioustraditions. In

thegreatmonotheisticreligionsoftheworldtheconceptofgratitudepermeates

texts, prayers, and teachings. […]Worshipwitha gratitude toGod forhismany

giftsandmercieshaveacommontheme,andbelieversareurgedtodevelopthis

quality.Assuchgratitudeisoneofthemostcommonemotionsthatreligionsseek

201

topromoteandsustaininbelievers.Thusformanypeople,gratitudeisatthecore

ofspiritualityandreligiousexperience.

(RobertAEmmons&Shelton,2002,p.460)

Althoughonecanappreciatethelinkbetweengratitudeandthereligiousdimensionitis

importanttorecognisethatfeelinggratitudetosomethinggreaterthanoneselfcanalso

manifestinasecularcontext.EmmonsandSheltonexplainthatprofoundexperiencesof

gratitude canbe ‘associatedwith reverentwonder towardanacknowledgementof the

universe’(RobertAEmmons&Shelton,2002,p.460).Thusgratitudelinkstotheabilityto

wonder and the recognition that the universe and our existence are a tremendous

mystery.Keenseemstosupportthisideaashewrites:

Forthosewithaninclinationtowardreligion,gratitudeisexpressedaspraisetoG-

dfromWhomAllBlessingsFlow.Butthereisnoneedtomakealeapoffaithtoa

transcendentcreatorwhoisresponsibleforourexistence.Gratitudemayleadto

worship or it may remain a simple acknowledgment that our existence is an

inexplicablegift.

(Keen,2010,p.92)71

Tosomethismayseemoddordissatisfyingbecauseextendinggratitudeusually implies

that one extends it to some sort of sentient being be it a fellow human being, a non-

humananimal72or apresumeddeity. Likewisewhenwe thinkof somethingas a gift it

usuallyimpliesthatitisgivenbyortosomebody.Fromthisstandpointonemightsaythat

feeling gratitude in relation to reverent wonder toward an acknowledgement of the

universeortofeelgratitudeassociatedwithanacknowledgementofourexistenceasan

inexplicable gift is peculiar because in doing so we are expressing gratitude without

havingaclear ideaofwhowearegrateful to. Indefenceonecansaythatalthoughwe

71InsomeJewishcirclesitisasignofrespecttoomitthe‘o’inGodandthusithasbecomeincreasinglypopularforphilosophersofreligionandforwriterscontributingtomultifaithforumsorwebsitessuchasbeliefnet.comtowriteG-dinsteadofGod.72Nothingpreventsusfromfeelingorexpressinggratitudetowardsnon-humananimals.SwimmerAdamWalkerforexamplefeltgratitudetoagroupofdolphinswhosavedhimfromanimpendingsharkattackduringhiseight-hourswimacrosstheCookStraitin2014(Radulova,2014).Ontheothersideitmayalsobearguedthatcertainnon-humananimalsmayfeelgratitudetowardshumanbeings.MichaelFishback,co-founderofTheGreatWhaleConservancy(GWC)explainsthatwhenheencounteredayounghumpbackwhalecaughtupinlocalfishingnetsandmanagedtofreeit,itrewardedhimandhiscrewwithmanymagnificentfull-bodybreechesandtailflips.Fishbacktookthisas‘ashowofpurejoyifnotthanks’(Fishback,2011).

202

maynotknowwhomwearegrateful towecangiveutterancetowhatwearegrateful

for. One could be grateful for being able to fathom that we are a part of a world of

fantasticproportionofwhichwesofarhaveonlycaughtaglimpseandwecanbegrateful

forourparticularexistencebecauseafterallasphilosopherBlaisePascalwouldsaythere

isnoreasonwhyweshouldbehereandnotthereorexistinacompletelydifferenttime

(Pascal,1961,p.57). InthissenseIthinkwecandefendthenotionofseculargratitude

withoutcompromisingthegravityofwhatwearegratefulfor.

To exemplify inwhat sense gratitude can spring from an experience ofwonder

andhowitcanbeasourceofflourishingwemightrecallthatintheintroductionwonder

andgratitudewerebroughttogether intheexample involvingKeenandhisrecollection

ofbeinghandedamysteriousknifeattheageofsix.Theexamplerevealedthatforweeks

aftertheeventKeenexperiencedwhathedescribesasa‘pervasivesenseofgratitudeto

thestranger’whohandedhimtheknife(Keen,1969,p.211).Toelaborateitseemsthat

his gratitude in this respectwaswell placed because the event brought forth in him a

sense of wonder or made him wonder in a particular way which contributed to the

developing of an inquisitive mind and fostered attitudes central to his flourishing

including ‘openness, availability, epistemological humility in the face of themystery of

being,andtheabilitytoadmireandbegrateful’(Keen,1969,p.211-212).

It can also be argued that wonder, gratitude and flourishing were brought

togetherinRobertGleaves’andPamGlemmer’s1998reportstoLeonidMACconcerning

their experiences of the 1966 Leonidmeteor showerwhich Imentioned in the second

chapter. Both Gleaves and Glemmer indicate in their reports that their individual

experiences areofwonderbut itmight alsobe suggested that their reports reveal the

gratitudetheyharbourforhavingexperiencedthemeteorshower.NowbothGleavesand

Glemmerdonotusetheword‘gratitude’directlyintheirreports,whichnaturallyspeaks

against the idea of such an effect. However if we focus on Glemmer’s report I should

thinkitreasonablytosaythatitisindicativeofhergratitudebecausesheemphasisesthat

thesightofthemeteorshowerwasunique,unforgettableandspectacularandproduced

inherthefeelingthatshehadwitnessedsomethingthatnootherpersonontheplanet

hadseenorwouldeverbeholdagain.InthislightitseemstomethatGlemmerindirectly

isexpressinggratitudeforhavingwitnessedthemeteorshower.

Likewisewemight say that Gleaves indirectly is expressing gratitude for having

experiencedtheeventbecausehethinksofitasawonderfulbirthdaygiftandclaimsthat

recallingwhathappenedthatparticularmorningin1966almostbringstearstohiseyes.

203

ThefactthatGleavesisalmostmovedtotearsisimportantbecauseitcanbeinterpreted

asasignofgratitude forhavingwitnessedthis singularandmostextraordinarymeteor

shower. In support of this claim stands the phenomenon of wonder-joy-tears which

psychologistWilliamBrauddescribesastearsthatare:

Accompanied by feelings of wonder, joy, gratitude, awe, yearning, poignancy,

intensity, love, and compassion. They are an opening up of the heart to the

personsorprofoundcircumstancesbeingwitnessed.[…]Thesekindsoftearsalso

indicatefeelingsofprofoundgratitudeforsuchconfrontations.Additionallythey

canindicatemomentsofprofoundinsight.

(Braud,2001,p.99)

Wonder-joy-tears linkswonder and gratitude and ifwe viewGleaves’ report in light of

thisphenomenonitcanbearguedthatheisexperiencingperhapsamildcaseofwonder-

joy-tears that almostbutnot actuallyproduces tears.Naturally this is pure speculation

butgiventhemagnitudeoftheeventGleavesisrecalling,thefactthathestilltreasuresit

asawonderful17thyearbirthdaygiftsomanyyearsaftertheeventandthathefindsit

importantenoughtofileareport/testimonytoLeonidMAConthematterspeaktowards

it.

Inwhat sensedoesGlemmerandGleaves’wonder inducedgratitudecontribute

toflourishing?Ifwefocusmorespecificallyonthenaturalwondertheyexperiencedand

askhowonecouldbegratefulforhavingexperiencedsuchaneventitmightbesuggested

thatwitnessingarareandbeautifulspectaclelikeamassivemeteorshowercontributes

toaperson’sflourishingbecauseitmakestheworldwonder-filled,newlypresentandre-

orientates the spectator towards a larger and far more mysterious world than she

perhapspreviously realised.This isedifyingandcanbeseenasagoodthatcontributes

toward flourishing and thus to feel grateful for such a lesson courtesy of the universe

seemsentirelyappropriate.Wecanalsoconjecturethattofeelgratefulforwitnessinga

massivemeteorshowercontributestoaperson’sflourishinginthesensethatitcanspark

wonderinginterest inspaceorsimplythenaturalworld.RachelCarson,whofocuseson

retainingchildren’sinbornsenseofwonderbyhighlightingwhattheoutdoorsornature

hastoofferexpressedconcernsaboutpeoplehavingdifficultyleavingtheirwelllithouses

andentertainingobliviousnesstothebeautyofthestarryskyoverheaddespitethefact

thatonmostnightsmostpeoplecanbehold itsbeautyand ‘wonderat themeaningof

204

what[they]see’(Carson,1984,p.55).GleavesandGlemmerprobablydonotbelongto

the group of people Carson is concerned about but are likely to belong to a group of

gratefulstargazingwonderers readytosharetheirexperienceswithothers. If thiswere

indeedsoIwouldsaythattheyviathemonumentaleventtheywitnessedintheiryouth

havediscovered a good that aids them in their flourishingbecause tobe awareof the

magnificenceandbeautyoftheuniverseistobeawarethatweresideinitandareapart

ofsomethingbeyondourcomprehension.

Keeping this in mind I think we have established that entertaining a sense of

gratitudepromptedbyanexperienceofwondercanbeasourceofflourishing.

Movingonletusnowexamineifasenseofwondermayhelpfosterreverence,whichin

turn can promote human flourishing. To appreciate why this may be the case it is

importanttounderstandmoreaboutwhatreverenceis,itsrelationtowonderandhowit

contributestoflourishing.

TobegintoanswerthiswemightturntoSolomonwhothinksthatreverenceisan

emotion that ‘presumes something greater than yourself, something awesome,

wondrous, marvellous [yet] something less than worship but considerably more than

eitheraffection, respect,oradmiration’ (Solomon,2002b,p.32).He furthermoreholds

thatreverenceisinherenttospirituality,highlightsourlimitationsandpromptsasenseof

responsibility(Solomon,2002b,p.39-40).Wheredoesthis leaveus?Onecouldventure

thatSolomon’sviewofreverenceseemstosaythatreverenceisanemotionthatqualifies

asaneffectofwonderoras itwere is subordinate to itbecausewithout theability to

wonder and to presume there is something greater than oneself it is unlikely that

reverencewouldevenemerge.

Additionally we can say that because reverence prompts awareness of our

limitationsandresponsibilityitisfairtoinsistthatwonderinducedreverencecontributes

tohumanflourishing.Tobeawareofforexamplehumanvulnerabilityanddependence

(which we might label as limitations) is to harbour an important understanding of

creature-hood73andthuswhatgoodstobemindfulaboutandtolookoutforasweare

living out our lives as the creatures we are. Having a sense of responsibility likewise

contributestohumanflourishingbecausetofeelresponsibleforoneselfandotherstiesin

withour dependency and vulnerability andhelp us form flourishing societies. In away

73Thetermcreature-hoodistakenfromHelenOppenheimer’sarticle‘ChristianFlourishing’(Oppenheimer,1969,p.163).

205

reverenceisacureagainsthubrisandasKeenhasexpresseditactsasabulwarkagainst

‘narcissism, nihilism, and anarchy’ and helps us put the ‘”civil” in “civilization”’ (Keen,

2010,p.98).

To continue itmight also be argued that wonder can prompt an imaginative attitude,

which can be seen as a source of flourishing because in some cases itmight enrich a

person’sperceptionormoralscope.InsupportofthisIarguedearlierthatengagingwith

Arcimboldo’sRudolfIIasVertumnus;seeingtheEarthfromspace;utilisingartefactssuch

as themicroscopeand the telescope;engagingwithphilosophical thoughtexperiments

such as Nozick’s experience machine, Rawls’ veil of ignorance and the concept of

speciesism may give way to wonder and ignite the imagination in such a way that it

enrichesperceptionandpresentsuswithanentirelydifferentperspectiverevealingthe

worldanew.Suchenrichmentmightcontributetohumanflourishingbecauseitmakesus

appreciatetheworldandourplacethereininasophisticatedandnuancedway,whichin

turncanempowerus to take responsibility forourselvesandour livesandgiveserious

thoughttowhatgenericandindividualgoodsareneededinorderforeachoneofusto

flourishasthecreaturesweare.

ThecaseofdePasqualestandsinsupportofthiseffect.Hisexperienceofwonder

andconsequentrealisationofhumanmortalityencouragedhimtotakeownershipofhis

lifeandseriouslyengagewiththeancientquestionofhowoneshouldlive.Hisexperience

mighthavefosteredalonglastingdisplacingmoodorattitudethateventuallyledhimto

the study of philosophy and later on in his professional career enabled him to give

utterancetohisownideasaboutwhatisimportantwhenitcomestolivingagoodhuman

life.DePasqualewrites:

Iamnodifferentfromanyothermiddle-agetenuredprofessor.Ienjoymastering

esotericfieldsofknowledge, Iwould loveforthecollegetoawardmeachairof

philosophy,andIcouldsurelyuseandwouldlovetohaveaLincolnNavigatorto

take my four kids camping. I do not doubt the value of scientific knowledge,

worldlysuccessormaterialpleasure; Ionlyquestionthe importance thatpeople

givetothesevalues.

(Pasquale,2003)

206

The case of Keen follows a similar pattern. It can be said that Keen’s experience of

wonderasa childgave rise toawondrousafterglow that later turned intoaparticular

imaginativeattitude thathasendured inhim to thisday.Wemight suggest that this is

whatenabledhimtoquestionwhatgoodswereneededinorderforhimtoflourishand

discoverthatthey includedstudyingtheologyandphilosophyofreligionand inthe late

1960’sgivinguphispermanentpositionasprofessoroftheologyinexchangeforalifein

California working as a Freelance writer for magazines such as Psychology Today and

eventually becoming a celebrated author and trapeze artist (London, 1999). This

particular imaginative attitude might have helped him formulate his own wonder

provokingideasonwhatmakesupthegoodhumanlife,whichwemayfindaglimpseof

inthefollowingextractwhichspeaksforitself:

I think you have to keep asking, "What is unfulfilled in me?" "What haven't I

done?"It'stheideaofacalling:what is itthatappealstoyou,thatcallstoyou?

Lookforthevacuuminyourlifeandmoveintothoseareas.Ittakessomecourage,

buttherecomesapointwhereyouhavetomakethatleap.

(London,1999)

With this inmind I believewe can say that an imaginative attitude,whichmay

springfromanexperienceofwonder,canbeasourceofhumanflourishing.

Can an experience of wonder lead to openness of mind and does this contribute to

humanflourishing?Toanswerthisquestionweneedtoknowwhatismeantbyopenness,

howitlinkstowonderandinwhatsenseitworkstowardsflourishing.

Iunderstandopennessofmindastobefreefromtheconstraintsofdogma.It is

theabilityandwillingnesstotakenewideasseriously,toexaminethembeforeaccepting

or rejecting them. It is to understand the possible dangers of ideology, fundamentalist

beliefsorparadigmsandthatonemightentertainsuchconsciouslyorunconsciously.

Theliteratureonwondersuggeststhatthereisaconnectionbetweenwonderand

openness.Fullerwritesthat‘wonderimbuestheworldwithanalluringquality,fostering

increased openness and receptivity rather than immediate utilitarian action’ (R. Fuller,

2006,p.370).Thispointstothenotionthatinwonderweareinvitedtoseethingsfroma

different perspective and so might become aware of other and hitherto hidden

possibilities. To get additional hold on the link betweenwonder and opennesswe can

207

recallthatthelinkbetweenthetwowasmentionedbrieflyinchapter1whenIarguedfor

theideaof‘sharedwonder’whereImentionedtheclimbtothetopofMtFuji inJapan

thatmywifeandIundertooksomeyearsagoandwatchedthesunrisefromthesummit.

Aswewatchedthesuncomeupwejoyfullyexperiencedaparticularopennesstowards

theworldand readiness for change togetherwithwhat I calledbafflementaboutwhat

theworldis.Additionallyopennesswashighlightedinconnectionwithourdealingswith

Scruton’s approach to imagination and the notion of continuity between intense

experiencesandsubsequentlivinginrelationtowonder.InthisrespectIsuggestedthatif

apersonisexperiencingwonderinatruesensesheexperiencesbeinginastateofmind

that embraces perhaps a sort of subtle or beginning reverence, gratitude or openness

thatconsequentlymay influenceherbehaviourovertime.Thecommondenominator is

the widening of understanding and the increased sensitivity that wonder induced

opennessbringstothetable.ToexplainonecouldsaythattheopennessmywifeandI

experiencedontopofMtFujibroughtforthanexpandedunderstandingoftheworldand

indeedofourverylivesasfluidoreverchangingtogetherwithanincreasedsensitivityto

thepossibilitiesthatlifehastooffer.

Withthisinmindcanwesaythatopennesscontributestoflourishing?Yeswecan,

becausebeing closedminded is surelyoneof the thingswewouldoptnot tobe ifwe

weregivenachoice.Opennessenablesus toexploredifferent ideasandgoodsoutside

what is known to us and in doing so we may discover goods that we never believed

existedorthatsomeofthegoodswealreadyhavemaynotreallydousanygoodinthe

sensethattheydonotcontributetoourflourishing.

MovingonIbelieveitisdefensibletosaythatanexperienceofwondermakesushumble

orproduceshumilitywhichcontributestohumanflourishing.Tomakethecasewemust

understandwhathumilityis;howitcanbeaneffectofwonderandhowhumilityworks

towardsourflourishing.

Humilityisaratherunderstudiedsubject(Compton&Hoffman,2013,p.241)and

becauseitissurroundedbycontroversyitisdifficulttoaddress.Thisbecomesapparentif

wefollowthepopularnotionofthinkingabouthumilityasavirtue(Keen,2010,p.126-

127;Kellenberger,2010,p.321;Richards,1988).Toelaboratewemightsaythatalthough

Aristotleacknowledgesthatbeingvirtuouscontributestoaperson’sflourishinghedoes

208

notviewhumilityasavirtuebutequalsitwithbeingsmall-souled74whichhedefinesasa

viceinthesensethatitistoclaimlessthanonedeserves(Aristotle,2003,IV.Iii.).Instead

ofseeinghumilityasavirtueAristotlespeaksofpride inthesensethat it isvirtuousto

entertain pride as long as it is proper or in accord with one’s own excellence. By

Aristotle’smeasurethisenablesustosaythatitisvirtuousforacraftsmanwhoexcelsat

his craft to be proud and mutatis mutandis vice-full (deficient pride/humble) if he

refrainedfrombeingproudofhisexcellentskills.

Aristotle’s ideaofhumilityasavicecontraststheviewupheldbymostChristian

ethicistswhere thebelittlingofoneself75 in the faceofGodandhiswork, ‘lovingone’s

enemies’ and the practice of ‘turning the other cheek’ (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 78) is

consideredvirtuouswhileentertainingprideasin(vice).76Thatprideisconsideredasinin

Christianity complicatesmattersbecause it illuminates theparadoxofhumility and the

difficultywefaceinaddressingittoday.IfweaccepttheChristianviewthathumilityisa

virtueit istemptingtoaskif it ispossibletobeproudofbeinghumble.Iftheansweris

yes then it looks like we are not harbouring the humility we are proud of, but if we

answer no we acknowledge that one cannot be proud of being humble, which is

problematic because to do so signals a disregard of a good, praiseworthy quality or

featurethatoneharbours,whichisirrational(Kellenberger,2010,p.338).

The discrepancy between the two outlooks is obvious and brings to our attention a

significantchallengeintermsofunderstandinghumilityasavirtue.Howeverweneednot

bediscouragedbecauseitisnottheobjectiveofthissectiontoacceptandovercomethis

challenge. A viable way forward that will help us in our present endeavour is to

acknowledgetheimportanceofthechallengebuttomovearounditandaddresshumility

fromadifferentangle.Inthislightitmightbeprudenttothinkofhumilityasanemotion

that may arise in us due to a particular event or realisation. Two questions present

74Tobesmall-souledcontraststhatofbeinggreat-souled(megalopsuchos)involvingclaimingmuchanddeservingmuch(Aristotle,2003,IV.Iii.3).75TheologianandmysticEckhartvonHockheimbetterknownasMeisterEckhartgoesevenfurtherandtalksaboutperfecthumilitywhichhebelieves‘proceedsfromannihilationofself’(Eckhart,1981,p.286).ThiscontrastswiththeviewofAristotletowhomMeisterEckhart’sperfecthumilitywouldbeasignofbeingsmall-souled.AccordingtoAristotleapersonwhoissmall-souled‘wouldseemtobethemanwhoclaimslessthanhedeserveswhenhisdesertsaregreat;forwhatwouldhehavedonehadhenotdeservedsomuch?‘(Aristotle,2003,IV.Iii.7).76ThatprideisasinisobvioustotheChristianwhenshereadsthebibleandinparticulartheProverbs.Herewefindentriessuchas‘whenpridecometh,thencomethshame’(Bible,1994,Proverbs11.2)and‘Pridegoethbeforedestruction,andanhauntingspiritbeforeafall’(Bible,1994,Proverbs16.18).AdditionallywecansaythatDante’sPurgatorywherethepridefulispunishedbycarryingtheweightofheavystonesspeakstowardspridebeingasininChristianity(Dante,1995,Purg.CantoX,p.259).

209

themselves in this respect and one of them involves what the emotion of humility

signifies and the other asks us to clarifywhatwe have inmindwhenwe say that the

emotionofhumilitymayarisefromaparticulareventorrealisation.Tobeginanswering

thefirstquestionitseemstomethatifwethinkofhumilityasanemotionitfitswhatwe

cancallthegeneralintuitionofwhathumilityconsistsofinourtime.TheintuitionsIhave

inmindcanbefoundinthewritingsofphilosopherHenrySidgwickwhopointsoutthat

generallywethinkofhumilityasthatwhich‘prescribesalowopinionofourownmerits’

(Sidgwick, 1874, p. 334-335). If we were to accept this view we must attempt to

understandwhatmaygiverisetosuchanemotionbecauserefrainingfromdoingsoisto

invite Aristotle’s criticism and stand accused of being irrational. I believe that the

experienceofwondercanatleastmomentarilygiverisetotheemotionofhumilityandto

provemy pointwemight recall Gerald Kuiper’s report of his students’ reaction to the

1966 Leonid meteor shower from Chapter 2. The scientific minded students who had

made an effort to record the number ofmeteors literally gave up their project and as

Kuiperwritessimplystoodandgazedinwonderoncethemeteorsbeganfallingatarate

of approximately 40 a second. Ifwe take this into account it is reasonable to say that

courtesy of the meteor shower the students besides experiencing wonder also

experiencedasenseofhumilityasaneffectofwonderandthisnotmerelybecausethey

had togiveup their studybutbecause they in theirwonder realised thehumbling fact

that we are part of something huge, something vast and seemingly endless which is

beyondourcomprehension.Wouldfeelingbelittledorhumbledinthefaceofamassive

meteorshowerortheuniverseasweknowitinviteAristotle’scriticism?Idonotthinkso

becauseunlikeAristotlewhooperatedwiththegeocentricmodeloftheuniverse,which

puts our planet (and him) at the centre of it and in effect allows a sense of pride our

modernconceptionoftheuniverseisonethatmostlyinstallshumility.Thereasonforthis

isthatforallweknowwearebuttheinhabitantsofasmallplanetorbitingabrightstar,

which in all likelihoodwill not shine forever.WhereAristotlemay have found pride in

being from somewhere centralwe can seemingly onlymuster humility becausewe are

really fromnowhere remotely central givenourplanet is butoneamongst amyriadof

otherplanets,solarsystemsandgalaxies.IfAristotleknewwhatweknowaboutourplace

in the whole and the clouds of unknowing that surrounds this whole and our very

existenceitisnotunthinkablethathewouldhaveacknowledgedthatthereisameritto

beinghumble.This leadsustoourfinalquestionconcerning inwhatsensehumilitycan

contributetoflourishing.ComptonandHoffmanspeakofthepositiveeffectofhumility

210

andpointout thathumility ‘enhancessocial relationships [and is] important for livinga

lifeofquiet joy,satisfaction,wisdom,andcontentment’ (Compton&Hoffman,2013,p.

241).Thisringstruebecausefirstofallnotmanyseemtofavourthearrogantpersonality.

Secondwemight say that being humble and entertaining a low opinion of one’s own

meritscancontributetolivingalifeofjoy,satisfaction,wisdomandcontentmentbecause

humility may spring from a deep felt realisation of the vastness and beauty of the

universe,themysteryofourexistenceandthewonderthatweconceptuallyareableto

graspthatitisso.

InthissenseIthinkwehaveestablishedatleastpreliminarilythathumility,which

mayspringfromanexperienceofwonder,cancontributetohumanflourishing.

Moving on I would now like to put forward an argument for the conclusion that

cultivating virtuouswonder or entertaining a balanced sense ofwonder contributes to

humanflourishinginastrongsense.Tomakethecasewemustunderstandwhatvirtuous

wonderorabalancedsenseofwonder isandwhat isatplaywhenweevoketheword

‘strong’inconnectionwithflourishing.Startingwiththelatteronemightventurethatfor

something tocontribute tohumanflourishing inastrongsense itmustbeofparticular

importancetoitorevencrucialinthesensethatwithoutitaperson’sflourishingwillbe

compromised. Virtue understood as excellence that has to manifest in all activities

(MacIntyre, 1998, p. 63) qualifies as such and is a crucial and specific part of theNeo-

Aristotelian conception of flourishing. It is so because virtue is a good that cannot be

purchased,foundorinanywaybegivenandisaqualitythatonehastodevelop.Virtueis

asMacIntyredescribesit‘notinborn,butaconsequenceoftraining’(MacIntyre,1998,p.

64). From our dealings with Rasmussen, MacIntyre and Nussbaum it is clear that the

development of virtues is an important part of human flourishing and especially in

relation towhatRasmussen termspracticalwisdom,whatMacIntyre calls independent

practical reasoning and what Nussbaum refers to as practical reason. In addition

MacIntyre informsus that the development of virtue is crucial for an individual as she

otherwisewouldnotbeabletodetachherselffromimmediatedesires,whichhelpsbring

aboutgoodchoice-making.MacIntyrealsohelpsustoabetterunderstandingofvirtueby

focussing on the virtue of temperance. In his view this particular virtue centres on

avoidingextremebehaviourandseestheeyeofthestormbetweenself-indulgenceand

unappreciative and insensitive puritanism. One could argue that when we talk about

wonderasavirtueitreferstowondermentlocatedbetweentheScyllaofexcessandthe

211

Charybdis of deficiency. In other words to wonder in a virtuous way is to harbour a

balancedsenseofwonderthattranscendsanextremeformofwonderment.Virtuousor

balancedwonderneitheraccommodatestheimmediatewondermentsofafoolorachild

nordisplaystheoutrighthostilitytowonderattributedtothevulgar,crudeandreductive

adult.Toharbourabalancedsenseofwonderinvolvesbeingableatleasttosomedegree

to harness or control wonder. It is a product of refinement where one’s wonderment

turnsouttobejustright.

ThisparticularlineofthinkingmighttosomeevokeAristotelianideasofvirtueand

rightly so.ForAristotlevirtue is connected to thenotionof themean,which is located

between excess and deficiency. Experiencing a sense of wonder while pondering that

bachelorsarenotmarriediswonderinginexcess.77Itistowonderfoolishlyorimmaturely

andsuchwonderwouldrestuneasilywithanysensibleperson.Toassumethatthereisan

answer to every question and avoiding wonderment by blindly consulting experts or

authorities to obtain answerswould be to harbour a deficient sense ofwonderwhich

wouldequallysitillwithanytemperateperson.Inadditionwemightsaythattheperson

whoneverwondersbecauseshebelieves there isnothing towonderaboutorbecause

she advocates a strict ‘nil admirari’ attitude is equally unbalanced because it is simply

wrongthatthereisnothingtowonderabout.OnthisaccountTallisremindsusthatitisa

wonderthatheexistsandthefactthatthereisanentitycalled‘RaymondTallis’isentirely

unexplained(Tallis,2012,p.1).AlongthesamelinesKeenarguesthatwonderiselicited

‘overandoveragainbythestartlingrealisationthatthereisnoreasonfortheworldor

anythingtoexist’ (Keen,2010,p.85).Togive furtherweight to the levelofdifficulty in

fostering abalanced senseofwonder it isworthwhile taking a closer lookat a famous

passage fromAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics.Thepassageengageswiththeemotionof

angerandaimsatmakingthereaderunderstandthatgettingangryiseasybuttoremain

virtuouswhilebeingangryonemustconsiderifoneisangrytowardstherightperson,to

therightamount,attherighttime,fortherightpurposeandintherightway(Aristotle,

2003,II.Ix.2).Forthepurposeofthisthesiswemightsaythatitiseasybothtowonder

andtodismisswonderaltogetherbuttoreachabalancedsenseofwonderwhereone’s

wondermentisdirectedattherightperson,objectorsituationintherightamount,andin

theright time,andfor therightpurpose,and in therightway is themoredifficult task

and not within everybody’s immediate reach. To illustrate that wonderment, when

applied appropriately and in a well-balanced manner, can contribute strongly to our77IowethispointtoR.W.Hepburn(Hepburn,1980,p.6).

212

flourishingIshallnowpresentthreeexampleswherethefirstdepictswonderinexcess,

the second illustrates lack of wonderment and the third is concerned with a case of

virtuouswonder.

Onepossiblewayofdescribinghowwonderinexcessisnotasourceofflourishing

istotakealookatpsychedelicexperiences.Apsychedelicexperienceispromptedbythe

ingestionofwhatisreferredtoashallucinogenicdrugs,whichcouldinvolveforexample

lysergicaciddiethylamide(LSD),N,N-dimethyltryptamine(DMT)ormescaline.According

to Keenwhat characterises the psychedelic experience is that the distinction between

objectsandmoments intimebecomesblurred.Things flowtogether, timeslowsdown,

andthestaticanddistinctoutlinesoftheworldofexperiencenolongerapply.Itinvolves

abreakdownoftheboundariesbetweenthesensesandconsequentlymakingitpossible

to, for example, see music, hear colours and see smells. Furthermore with time

suspendeditbecomespossibletoenjoyprolongedvoyages ‘intothetasteofbreadand

wine,orintoaphraseofmusic,orlovedface.’(Keen,1969,p.185).Keenexplainsfurther

thatthisradicalchangeinperceptionleavesoneinastateofpureawarenesswherethe

‘I’orthe‘ego’isleftbehindandthatinsuchastateofmind:‘abeautifulobjectlikearose

maybeintuitedinpurewonderbecausethereisnolongeran‘I’lookingatmyselflooking

attherose’(Keen,1969,p.186).InrelationtothepsychedelicexperienceKeenhighlights

the ideaoftoomuchwonder(orwonder inexcess)andarguesthatdespitethe infinite

and wonderful possibilities such an experience offers it leads to a state of mind that

removes us from human agency, individuality, concern and commitment to social

relations such as parents and friends. Furthermore it seduces us into the illusion that

theremaybeanauthenticexistencewithoutdecisionsandtheriskoffailureandsuchan

existenceKeenargues ‘belongstothegods,andthemanwhoseeks it loses the feelof

theearthuponwhichhestands’(Keen,1969,p.190).

I am sympathetic to Keen’s take on the psychedelic experience and I think his

reasons for shunning it are understandable. It is not so much what the psychedelic

experiencerendersuscapableof,butmorewhichofourpowersittakesaway.Onecould

venturethatwhatKeenisbringingforthistheideathatthepsychedelicmindcapableof

enjoyingwondersinaccessibletousinoureverydaylivesisincapableoffunctioningasan

independentpracticalreasonertouseMacIntyre’sterminology.Ifwemirrorthisagainst

MacIntyre’sviewofflourishingitwouldseemthatthepsychedelicvoyagerpaysaheavy

priceforherextraordinaryperception.Nottobeabletoactasanindependentpractical

reasoner ishighlyproblematicandtobebereftofthisabilitywouldfromaMacIntyrian

213

viewpoint seriously dampen a person’s prospects of flourishing. Keen’s point that the

psychedelicexperienceremovesthevoyagerfromcommitmentandconcernforothersis

likewiseproblematic for flourishing.Thisbecomesclear ifweconsultNussbaum’sentry

number 7 about affiliation on her list of capabilities. Here Nussbaum notes that an

essentialpartofflourishingistobeabletolivewithandtowardothersandtorecognise

and show concern for other human beings. Finally onemight point out that since the

psychedelicexperienceuprootsapersonandinducesego-losstheveryideaofflourishing

whichfindsmeaningintheintimaterelationshipbetweentheagencyofapersonandthe

timeandplacesheissituatedinisderailed.Itsimplydoesnotmakesensetotalkabout

‘psychedelic flourishing’.Tobeclear Iamnotstating that thepsychedelicexperience is

worthlessor thatpsychedelicscannothavetherapeuticpropertiesandbeedifying.All I

am stating is that while under the influence of psychedelic substances a voyager’s

capability of minding her flourishing is compromised to a smaller or lager degree

dependingonthelevelof‘intoxication’.InthislightIthinkwehaveestablishedastrong

casefortheclaimthatwonderinexcesscannotactasasourceofflourishingatleastina

strongsense.

Thenextexampleisconcernedwiththelackofwondermentandthequestionof

whether this can lead to flourishing. Let us consider the following scene from Samuel

Beckett’sMolloywheretheanti-heroMorandebatesFatherAmbroseontheideathatif

laughterisessentiallyahumanpropertythequestionconcerningwhetherJesuslaughed

seemsimportantwithregardstothedoctrinedepictingJesusasthesecondpersonofthe

trinity.Theconversationgoesasfollows:

LikeJobhaha,hesaid.Itoosaidhaha.Whatjoyitistolaugh,fromtimetotime,

hesaid.Isitnot?Isaid.Itispeculiartoman,hesaid.SoIhavenoticed,I said. A

brief silence ensued […] Animals never laugh, he said. It takes us to find that

funny,Isaid.What?Hesaid.Ittakesustofindthatfunny,Isaidloudly.Hemused.

Christneverlaughedeither,hesaid,sofarasweknow.Helookedatme.Canyou

wonder?Isaid.

(Beckett,1979,p.93)

Judging from the situation the difference in character between Moran and Father

Ambrose isobvious.Morancomesacrossas thequestioning,humorousandwondering

manandFatherAmbrosedisplaysthecharacterofapersonwhoisdisciplined,somewhat

214

doctrinalandlackswonderment.Nowisthislackofwondermentregrettableifwemirror

itagainstourunderstandingofwonderandhumanflourishing?Ishallargueyes,because

as Fuller remarks a life thatharboursno senseofwonder is not attuned to thewidest

possibleworldofpersonalfulfilment78(R.C.Fuller,2006,p.158). Inadditiononemight

pointoutthatgivenFatherAmbrose’sinterestinreligionhiswonder-deprivedsituationis

lamentable because wonder and religion are quite compatible. According to Fuller

wonderpavesthewayforspiritualitywithoutreducingourbasicbeliefintheexistenceof

something ‘more’ to narrow doctrines or creeds (R. C. Fuller, 2006, p. 2). Poet and

playwrightD.H.LawrencewouldremindFatherAmbrosethatthesenseofwonderisthe

natural religious sense (Lawrence, 1959, p. 382) and Keen would say that if Father

Ambrosecouldallowmorewonderintohislifehewoulddiscoverarenewedsenseofthe

sacred(Keen,2010,p.85).OnecouldspeculatethatifFatherAmbrosecouldexperiencea

senseofwonderhewouldgainadeeperunderstandingofhis religiouspath (whichhe

mustalreadyseeasagoodorapartofhisconceptionofthegood).

NowitistruethatbesidesthereferencetoFullernoneofthethreephilosophers

wehaveengagedwithconcerninghumanflourishingdirectlyflagwonderasasourceof

flourishing.HoweverIshallarguethatwonder inthisrespectcanbelookeduponasan

add-on and indeed perfectly compatible with the ideas put forward by these

philosophers. If we think of Rasmussen’s point about flourishing being a self-directed

activitywondermentcanhelppromptan individualtotakechargeofher lifeandaid in

thediscovery,developmentandmaintenanceofthosevirtuesthatcouldhelpherattain

thegoodsherliferequires.WondercouldeasilygohandinhandwithMacIntyre’sideaof

theindependentpracticalreasonerandthesearchforthegoodsthatmakesoneflourish.

Ifoneharboursdeficientwonderment itwouldseemhard foran independentpractical

reasonertolocatethegoodsthatwouldcontributetowardsherflourishing.Withregard

to Nussbaum’s account wonder could be added to her list of basic capabilities. For

example,herentrynumber4couldnotonlyaddresssenses,imaginationandthoughtbut

also wonder, because a sense of wonder ‘pushes’ and can help us become informed,

educatedandaidusinproducingworksandeventsofourownchoicebetheyreligious,

literaryormusicalinnature.Likewisewondercouldbeaddedtoentrynumber6,labelled

practicalreason.Whenonewondersaboutsomethingitsharpensourcognitivefocusand

awareness of ignorance. Thus I would argue that it could play a significant role in

formulatingaconceptionofthegood,fuelcriticalreflectionandassistintheplanningof78Fulfilmentcanbeseenassynonymouswithflourishing.See(Heybron,2008,p.193).

215

one’slifeasithasinthelifeofdePasquale.BasedonthisIthinkwehaveastrongcase

for claiming that a life lacking in wonder could compromise the flourishing of an

individual.

Movingon letusnowfocusonvirtuouswonderorabalancedsenseofwonder,

whichIshallarguecontributestohumanflourishinginastrongsense.Recalltheexample

ofwonderinvolvingElderSamuelRogers’accountofthe1833meteorshowermentioned

in the beginning of the first chapter. Rogers informs us that the heavenly display was

wonderfulandhecategorisesitasthegrandestandmostbeautifulsceneheeverbeheld.

Wealsoknowthatsomeofhisfellowstargazersdidnotsharehisviewofthespectacle

andinterpretedtheeventasforeshadowingtheendoftheworld.Othersconcludedthat

themanymeteorsrepresentedthefirstofaseriesofcalamitiessentbyGodbecausehe

wasdispleasedwiththem.

Rogers’wondermentcontributestohisflourishingbecauseitdealswithtwobasic

goodsnamelybeautyandknowledge,whichaccordingtoRasmussenqualifyasvaluable

intheirownrightandarepartialexpressionsofhumanflourishing.

To elaborate we can say that Rogers owes a part of his flourishing to the event he

experiencedbecauseitbroughthimbeautyintheformofaspectacularmeteorshower

andknowledgeintheformoftherealisationthattheworldheinhabitsoccasionallygives

away displays of cosmic grandeur and beauty, which one might be lucky enough to

witness.IfwelooktoNussbaum’sentrynumberfouronherlistofcapabilitieswecansee

thatmakinguseofone’s senses, imaginationand thought is a vital partofher viewof

flourishing.Rogersmakesgooduseoftheseprecisequalitiesbecauseheuseshisvisual

sensetoappreciatethemeteorshowerandlikewisehemakesuseofhisimaginationand

capability for thought. We know this because if he did not he would not be able to

categorisetheeventaswonderful,grandandbeautifulandneitherwouldhebeableto

recallandappreciateityearslaterwhenhewrotehisautobiography.

InadditionIwouldarguethatRogersiswonderinginavirtuousorbalancedway

and that this contributes to his flourishing in a strong sense. Rogers appropriately

recognises the wonderfulness, grandness and beauty of the event without drawing

unreasonable or hasty conclusions about its significance and meaning. Amidst the

extraordinarymeteor shower, the various dramatic responses from the people around

him,his ownemotional upheaval in faceof the cosmic fireworkshewalkson a knife’s

edgebutremainscentredandshowsnosignofeitherlackofwondermentortoomuchof

it.Despitehisknowledgeofmeteorshowershedoesnotdismisstheeventastrivialor

216

insignificant,nordoeshedespitehisbelief inGodinterprettheeventasasignthatthe

endofdayshasarrivedorthatGodsomehowisdispleasedwithhim.Hemanagestosteer

betweentheScyllaofexcessand theCharybdisofdeficiencyand thushewonders ina

virtuous,excellentorbalancedway,whichisdifficultandthuspraiseworthy.Tobalance

wonder is ademandingactivity and it doesnothappenautomatically. Bybalancinghis

wondermentRogersshowshischaracter,trainingandabilitytoreasonindependentlyand

practically. Upon seeing the spectacular meteor shower he quickly harnesses his

metaphysicalimagination,andalignshisemotionstofitwhatishappeningconsequently

balancing hiswonder,which subsequently enabled him to quite appropriately describe

themeteorshoweraswonderful.

BasedonthisIthinkwehaveastrongcaseforclaimingthatabalancedsenseof

wondercontributesstronglytohumanflourishing.

5.6Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to show how wonder can contribute to human

flourishingorinshortflourishing.Todothiswestartedbyengagingwiththreedifferent

approachestohumanflourishingrepresentedbyDouglasRasmussen,AlasdairMacIntyre

and Martha Nussbaum. Rasmussen’s Neo-Aristotelian approach to human flourishing

revealedaviewofthehumangoodthatis1)objective,2)inclusive,(3)individualised,(4)

agent-relative, (5) self-directed, and (6) social. In addition Rasmussen highlighted that

practical wisdom and human nature are significant to human flourishing. My main

criticismofRasmussen’sapproachwasthattheremightbemorethatcanbeuncovered

abouthumanflourishingbyinvestigatinghumannature,whichledtoaninvestigationof

MacIntyre’s approach to the subject. MacIntyre’s approach to human flourishing

advances our understanding of human flourishing by pointing out our animality,

vulnerabilityanddependencyonothers.Healsoemphasisesthat it iscrucial foroneto

becomeanindependentpracticalreasonerinordertoliveaflourishinglife.Furthermore

MacIntyre highlights the importance of paying attention to the complexity of being a

socialcreature. In this regardMacIntyre isparticularlyattentive to therelationshipswe

engagewithandhowcrucialtheseareforourflourishing.Inthissenseitisimportantto

acknowledge thatnotall relationshipsmaynecessarilybesupportiveofour flourishing.

AccordingtoMacIntyrethisdependsonthedevelopmentofvirtues,whichenablesusto

recognisewhatisgoodandmakegoodchoices.MymaincriticismofMacIntyreconcerns

217

thestalematesituationhebroughtaboutbyhisscepticismofnaturalistic,subjectiveand

culturalaccountsof thegood.AfterhavingdealtwithMacIntyre’sapproach I lookedto

Nussbaumbecausesheoffersaplatformthatclarifiedsomeofthe‘grey’areasadvocated

byMacIntyre.ThisbroughttoourattentiontheThickVagueConceptionoftheGoodand

theopen-endedlistofbasichumanfunctionalcapabilitiesthatmayhelppromotehuman

development.MymaincriticismofNussbaum’sapproachwasthattheamplethreshold

levelofthetencapabilitiesrequiredisambiguousandweakenstheapplicationalvalueof

thelistofcapabilities.

After gaining some understanding about what human flourishing involves and

whatmightqualifyasa sourceof flourishing I turned to investigate ifwondercouldbe

viewedassuch.Thesubsequent inquiry intohowwonder inducedgratitude,reverence,

openness,humility;imaginativeattitudeandfinallyvirtuouswonder,confirmedthatitis

indeed possible that wonder promotes human flourishing. The section on virtuous

wonder deserves to be highlighted because it demonstrates the problemswith lacking

wonder,withwonderinginexcessandhowwondermentworksifpractisedinavirtuous

way.Additionallyitclarifiedthatabalancedsenseofwonder,whichissynonymouswith

virtuouswonder, contributes tohuman flourishing in a strong sensebecause striking a

balance in one’s wonderment does not happen automatically but depends on our

engagement.

218

Conclusion:WonderingaboutWonder

Thisthesishasdefendedtheideathatcultivatingabalancedsenseofwonderisastrong

contributortolivingaflourishinghumanlife.Itrepresentsadetailedstudyofwonderand

contributestotherehabilitationofwonderasasubjectworthyofphilosophicalattention

despiteitslowprestige.Intheverybeginningweestablishedthatwonderisadifficult

subjecttostudyandnaildownprimarilybecauseasaphenomenonitisaboutas

intangibleandairyasanythingcanbe.Thusinchapter1:TheLureofWonderanattempt

wasmadetosketchapictureofwonderbyfirstofallpresentingandinterpretinga

selectionofdifferentexperiencesofwondergatheredfromliteratureandreallife

experiences.Thisanchoredthephenomenonofwonderinhumanexperienceand

suggestedthatwonderisastateofmindcomprisedofsevenconstituents(figure6.1).

Figure6.1.TheCoreConstituentsofthe

Experienceofwonder.

219

Theexperienceofwonderissudden,extraordinaryandpersonal.Itintensifiesthe

cognitivefocusandtheworkoftheimaginationbecausetheobjectorsourceofwonder

remainselusiveorunknownandthusdisturbsthewonderer’sorderofthings.The

imaginationseekstocorrectthisdisturbancebutfailstoprovideafittingcognitive

schema,makingthewondererawareofherignoranceorlackofknowledgeandsothe

experienceofwonderbecomesatleastatemporarydisplacingmatterinvolvinga

diminishingofself.Thispermitsustosaythatwondermakestheworldnewlypresentor

toputitdifferently,itconnectsthewondererwithahithertounknownlargerworld.All

thiscausesjoyfulemotionalupheavalandonlyrarelytheopposite.

Chapter1alsofocussedontheetymologyof‘wonder’whichuncoveredtheroot

oftheword‘wonder’andhow‘wonder’canbeseenasanoun(theghostinHamletisa

wondertobehold),averb(Iwonderhowthekingcamebackfromthedead),anadjective

(Horatioisawonderingman)andanadverb(Horatiowonderinglyapproachedtheghost).

Ofthefourkindofwaystousetheword‘wonder’,theadverbialisthemostinteresting

becausewhenwearedoingsomethingwonderinglyweindicatethatwewonderina

particularway.Thishintstousthatwondercanbeinfluencedormoderatedbythe

wonderer.

Addressingthehistoryofwonderenrichedourpreliminaryunderstandingofthe

subjectbecauseitilluminatedhowconceptionsofwonderchangedovertimeandhow

wonderwiththeadvancementofsciencelostitsstatusandslippedintoobscurity.

Becausewonderissometimesseenasinterchangeablewithotheralteredstates

ofmindthiswasfollowedbyapreliminarytaxonomyofalteredstatessimilartowonder

throughwhichIsoughttodistinguishwonderfromawe,horror,thesublime,curiosity,

astonishment,admirationandamazement.

Finallytoclosethechaptersomepossibleenemiesofwonderwereconsidered

andthroughthecategoriesofnaturalandelectiveenemiesofwonderIhighlightedwhy

wonderissometimesshunnedorsimplymissingfromourlives.

Fromtheseinitialinvestigationsitbecameclearthatemotionandimaginationare

somehowinvolvedintheexperienceofwonderandbylookingattheworkonwonderby

contemporaryphilosophersRobertC.FullerandPhiloHovethiswasgivenadditional

support.Howeverinwhatcapacitywonderqualifiesasanemotionandifwondercould

beviewedasexclusivelysoremainedunclear.Likewisetheroleofimaginationinwonder

wasshroudedandcalledoutforfurtherexploration.FullerandHoverespectivelyalso

broughtthenotionofdeepwonderandtheconnectionbetweenwonderandfulfilment

220

tothetableleavinguswithadditionalquestionsaboutthenatureofwonderandhow

wondermayhelpusbecomefulfilledorflourish.

Thefollowingchapter(chapter2:WonderandEmotion)dealtwithoneofthe

researchquestionsnamelyinwhatsensewondercanbeviewedasanemotionandifitis

possibletoclassifyitexclusivelyso.Toilluminatethepossibilitythatwonderisan

emotionintherichestpossiblewayIcommittedtoexaminingwonderthroughthelensof

thecognitiveapproachtoemotionleaningontheworkofphilosophersAaronBen-Ze’ev

andAdamMorton.ThroughBen-Ze’ev’sworkanditsapplicationtoaselectionof

examplesofwonderwefoundthattheexperienceofwondersharesthesame

characteristics,componentsanddependenciesasanemotion.Forexample,allemotions

haveacognitivecomponentandarecharacterisedbybeingintensetosomedegreeor

other,theintensityofwhichdependsontherealityofaparticularevent.Thisfitswonder

wellbecauseduringwondermentwearetryingtofigureoutwhatisgoingonbutbecause

wefailourexperiencebecomesintense.Wonderingamidstanextraordinarymeteor

showerliketheonedescribedbyKuiperinNewYorkTimesisthusintensebecauseitwas

notmerelyararesightbutalsoveryreal.Inaddition,upontheexaminationofthe

interestingnotionofepistemicemotionsadvocatedbyAdamMortonitbecameclearthat

wondercanalsobeviewedassuch.Howevertosaythatwonderisexclusivelyan

emotionisanoverstatement,whichbecomesevidentuponrealisingthatwondercanalso

beviewedasamood,avalueandanattitude.Thusweconcludedthatwonderisbest

viewedasmultifaceted.

Inchapter3:WonderandImaginationIinvestigatedtheroleofimaginationin

wonder.LikethefieldofemotionimaginationisavastandcomplexsubjectandthusI

optedtofocusontheworkofcontemporaryphilosophersofimaginationMaryWarnock,

RonaldHepburnandRogerScrutontogainbetterunderstandingofthesubjectandhow

imaginationworksinwonderment.

Warnock’scontributiontothephilosophyofimaginationenabledusto

comprehendwhythewonder-filledexperiencecancomeacrossasanimating,intense

andtheconveyeroftheuniversal.Wonderanimatesusbecauseduringwondermentwe

usetheimaginationtogobeyondwhatisdirectlyinfrontofusandtoseeksatisfying

cognitiveschemataofwhatweexperience.Howeverinwonderweneverobtaina

completeunderstandingofwhatisgoingonandthusthewonder-filledexperienceis

intensebecauseacompletelysatisfyingpictureoftheobjectofwonderneverarrives.

Warnock’sapproachalsopromptedustothinkaboutwonderasaconveyerofthe

221

universalinthesensethattheuseofimaginationinwondercangiverisetotheideathat

theobjectofwonderhasageneralsignificancebeyonditself.Inthisrespectwelookedto

ideasemergingfromwondermentsuchasthatwearemortalcreaturesandthatwelive

inaworldthatisgrandandbeautiful.

Theroleofimaginationinwonderwasexploredfurtherbypayingattentionto

Hepburn’sideathatourimaginationworksonthreelevels.Thispromptedustoexplore

wonderasathree-layeredexperiencewherethefirstlayerenablesustogatherdataand

appreciatesomethingaswonderful;thesecondlayerenablesustoseetheobjectof

wonderassignificantandthethirdlayerallowsforindividualinterpretationsoftheobject

ofwonderinformingusabouthowtheworldisfundamentallystructured.Thethirdlayer

involvingmetaphysicalimaginationisofparticularinterestbecauseitexplainswhy

wondermighthavearevelatoryornoeticquality.Likewiseithighlightswhywemustbe

criticalaboutwondermentbecauseawonder-filledeventcancourtesyofthe

metaphysicalimaginationgiverisetoincompatibleviewsofhowtheworldfundamentally

isdependingonthewonderer.

Scruton’sapproachtoimaginationtookourunderstandingofwondermenttoyet

anotherlevelasithelpedusestablishaconnectionbetweenwhatisabsentin

imaginationunderstoodasunassertedthoughtandwhatweinwonderexperienceas

newlypresent.Inwonderweseetheworldanewandwedothisbecauseourframeof

referenceisdisplacedallowingusforperhapsmerelyamomenttoassertwhatis

normallyunassertedandthusexperienceourselvesaschanged.Scruton’sapproachalso

allowedustoconsiderwhatittakestowonderappropriatelyandinthisrespecta

preliminaryacceptancecriterionforwondermentwasproposedstatingthatforsomeone

towonderappropriatelyshehastowonderatwhatisextraordinary,vividandsignificant

andthatherwondermentcanbeacceptedbyothers.Iamsympathetictotheacceptance

criterionbutwhatif‘others’aroundthewondererresembledAlexanderPopeandhis

followersandwerecompletelyhostiletowonder?Insuchasituationthewondererwill

alwayswonderinappropriatelybecausetowonderisfoolishfromtheirpointofviewand

shouldbeshunned.Itisthereforeimportanttonotethatifone’swonderhastobe

acceptedbyothersinordertopassthetestitleavesthewondererasitweretothe

tyrannyofothers.Scruton’sapproachtoimaginationlikewisepromptedthoughtsabout

thecontinuitybetweenintenseexperiencesandsubsequentlivinginrelationtowonder

anditwasbroughtforththatifsomeoneisexperiencingwonderinatruesenseshe

222

experiencesbeinginastateofmindthatembracesperhapsakindofsubtlereverence,

gratitudeoropennessthatinfluenceherbehaviourandmaycontinuetodosoovertime.

Furthermorewelookedtothenotionofcultivatingahabitofwondervia

educatingtheimaginationanditwasventuredthatbytrainingourabilitytoimaginewe

canbecomeaccustomedtoseekfortherichestpossibleaccountofsomethingand

developadispositionforseeingtheordinaryasconveyeroftheextraordinary.In

connectionwithScruton’sapproachwelikewisefocussedonthejoyofwonderand

exploredifthejoywefeelduringanepisodeofwondercanbeexclusivelylinkedtothe

objectofwonder.Iconcludedthatthiswasnotnecessarilysobecausealthoughone

mightfindjoyintheobjectofwonderapartofthejoymightalsoconsistof1)being

displaced/experiencingadiminishingofself,2)thereverence,opennessandgratitude

onemightexperienceand3)theawarenessofignoranceabouttheobjectofwonderand

theinvitationtoundertakefurtherenquiries.

Imaginationhasanimportantroletoplayinwonderanditsinvolvementexplains

whywondercanberevelatory,presentustruths,provokemetaphysicalspeculationand

haveusseewhatinastrictsenseisnotthere.Imaginationunderliestheintensityof

wonderandhowweinwonderseetheworldasnewlypresentbutwealsoneedtobe

mindfulabouttheconclusionswedrawduringwonderment.Wondermentneedstobe

balancedbecauseasmuchasonemightliketothinkofwonderassomethingjoyfuland

positivetherearepotentiallynegativeeffectstowonder.Wonderasitweremayletus

astraybecausethroughwondermentwemaybecomeconvincedthatwehaveuncovered

thetruthaboutthefundamentalstructureoftheworld(whichisabigandpotentially

doubtfulclaim)orthatagivenobjectofwonderwasliterallytherewhileitinfactwas

nothingbutaproductofourimagination.

Toincreaseourunderstandingofhowimaginationworksinwonderandto

foreshadowhowwonderisimportanttohumanflourishingchapter4(“Implicationsof

theRoleofImaginationinWonder”)examinedhowtheintenseuseofimaginationin

wondermayresultinavarietyofeffects,asdepictedinfigure6.2.

223

OnepossibleoutcomeofwonderisthewideningofperceptionandIdemonstratedthis

effectbylookingat:1)thewonder-filledmanneristpaintingRudolfIIasVertumnusby

GuiseppeArcimboldo,2)descriptionsofwhatitisliketoseeEarthfromspacebyauthor

FrankWhite,astronautEdgarMitchellandphilosopherDavidLoytakenfromGuyRead’s

filmOverviewandfinally3)themicroscopeandthetelescope,bothofwhichIargue

qualifyaswonder-filledartefactsthatwhenputtousemayexpandourperception.The

Figure6.2.Possibleeffectsofwonder

224

wideningofperceptionultimatelyhelpsusincreaseourunderstandingofwhatandwho

weareandourconceptionoftheworldwelivein.

Theexperienceofwondermightalsoextendour‘moralscopeandsensitivity’,

whichIhavesoughttodemonstratebyengagingwith1)politicalphilosopherRobert

Nozick’sthoughtexperiment‘TheExperienceMachine’,2)politicalphilosopherJohn

Rawls’thoughtexperimentthe‘VeilofIgnorance’and3)theconceptofSpeciesism

advocatedbymoralphilosopherPeterSinger.Theseexamplesdemonstratedthatsuch

‘philosophicalwonders’areimportantnotmerelybecausetheyboostourimagination

andencourageustothinkabouthowwelivebutalsobecauseoftheirusefulnessas

educationaldevicessinceallofthemcaninducewonderandmaypromptinthe

wondererthedesireforfurtherinquiry.

Thechapteralsocaughtupwiththenotionofawondrousafterglowandthe

experienceofdeepwonderordeep-levelledwonderpromotedbyphilosophersPhilo

HoveandIanKidd.Animportantcommonfactorbetweentheseeffectsofwonderisthat

theyareenduringandinvolvetheintenseworkoftheimaginationbecauseitisthe

imaginationthatgivespeoplesuchstatesofmind,thepowertoventurebeyondthe

given.Havingsaidthatthementalstatesinquestionarenotidenticalbecausedeep

wondercomeswithanethicalimperative(henceitisgroupedtogetherwithanincrease

inmoralscope/sensitivityinfigure6.2)andseemstobeanattitude,dispositionorthe

outcomeofphilosophicalreflectionwhereasawondrousafterglowneednotinvolvethe

ethicalandappearstobeamood.Otherimportanteffectsofwonderareopenness,

humility,animaginativeattitude,reverenceandgratitude,whichwereexplored

superficiallyinchapter4andingreaterdetailinthefollowingchapter(chapter5:

Wonder,HumanFlourishing&Virtue).

Buildingonfromthecomplexpictureofwonderestablishedintheprevious

chapters,chapter5broughtwonderintothedimensionofhumanflourishing.To

understandthisnewsettingforwonderitwasessentialtounderstandwhatthekey

constitutionsofhumanflourishingare,andviatheworkofNeo-Aristotelianphilosophers

DouglasRasmussen,AlasdairMacIntyreandMarthaNussbaumaguidetohuman

flourishingwasestablished.Rasmussenrevealedaviewofthehumangoodthatis1)

objective,2)inclusive,(3)individualised,(4)agent-relative,(5)self-directed,and(6)

social.AdditionallyRasmussenbroughtforththatpracticalwisdomandhumannatureare

significanttohumanflourishing.MacIntyre’sapproachtohumanflourishingadvanced

ourunderstandingofhumanflourishingbyhighlightingouranimality,vulnerabilityand

225

dependencyonothers.Furthermorehebroughttoourattentionthattheprocessof

flourishingdemandswebecomeindependentpracticalreasonersanddevelopvirtues

thatwouldenableustomakegoodchoicesandallowustofindoutwhatisgoodforus

(e.g.,questioningiftherelationshipsweareengagedinpromotesourflourishing).

Nussbaum’sapproachtohumanflourishingbroughtforththeThickVagueConceptionof

theGoodandtheopen-endedlistofbasichumanfunctionalcapabilitiesthatmayhelp

promotehumanbeingslivingflourishinglives.Thelatterhasprovidedusapotential

measuringtoolagainstwhichwecanassesswhetheragivenenvironment(understood

notonlyasourimmediatephysicalsurroundingsbutalsothesocialrelationsandculture

wearesituatedin)providesthegroundforhumanflourishing.

BasedontheconceptofhumanflourishingIarguedthateffectsofwondersuchas

gratitude,reverence,openness,humilityandanimaginativeattitudemightcontributeto

humanflourishing.Opennessforexamplecontributestoflourishingbecausenotonlyisit

somethingthateveryonegivenachoicewouldopttohave,itistheantithesisofdogma

andhelpsusdiscovergoodsthatweperhapsneverthoughtexisted.Conversely,itwould

allowustocriticallyassesswhetherthegoodswealreadyhaveorvaluemayormaynot

contributetoourflourishing.Humilitythatmayspringfromadeepfeltrealisationofthe

vastness and beauty of the universe and the mystery of our existence can likewise

contributetoourflourishingasthiscouldprompta lifeof joy,satisfaction,wisdomand

contentment.

LastlyandimportantforthedefenceofmythesisIarguedthatvirtuouswonderor

balancedwonderpromoteshumanflourishinginastrongsense.IndoingsoI

demonstratedtheproblemswiththelackofwonderandwithwondermentinexcess,

whilewonderworkstowardsourflourishinginastrongsenseifpractisedinavirtuousor

balancedway.HavingestablishedthisIalsoacknowledgedthatobtainingabalanced

senseofwonderisnotaneasytaskpartlybecausethereisnoconcretetoolthatcould

guideoneinhowtoachievethis.Howeverthroughin-depthexaminationofthe

contributionofbothemotionandimaginationintheexperienceofwonderwedid

managetoreachapreliminaryunderstandingofhowabalancedsenseofwondermaybe

obtained.Muchisatplayinwonderincludingemotionalupheavalandtheintenseuseof

theimaginationandthuswemustdoourbestnottojumptoconclusionsaboutthe

importanceandsignificanceoftheobjectofwonderweperceiveandalwaysseekthe

richestpossibleaccountofwhatweareexperiencing.Importantlywemustalsobe

226

mindfulofthefactthatasbeingscapableofwonderwemaycolourourexperiencesand

partlyberesponsibleforwhatweperceive.

Insummary,thisworkhasuncoveredafascinatingsubjectofwonderandbyin-

depthexaminationofthecontributionofbothemotionandimaginationintheexperience

ofwonderthroughaNeo-Aristotelianlensitwaspossibletodemonstratethatwonder

maycontributetohumanflourishingviaanumberofeffects(figure6.2)including(but

notrestrictedto)wideningofperception,extensionofmoralscopeorsensitivityand

promptingdeepwonder,awondrousafterglow,openness,humility,animaginative

attitude,reverenceandgratitude.Afurtherexplorationofwonderrevealedthat

experienceofone’swondermentisnotan“all-or-none”processandthatforwonderto

actasastrongcontributortohumanflourishingoneneedstowonderattheright(or

appropriate)thing,intherightamount,intherighttime,intherightwayandfortheright

purpose.Cultivatingabalancedsenseofwonderisthusbynomeansaneasytaskbut

havingacriticalattitudetowardsone’swondermentwouldaidonetowonderina

virtuousway.

EverypieceofacademicworksufferslimitationsandIwouldlikenowtoaddresssome

sourcesofepistemicworrythatonemightreasonablyentertainwithregardstoathesis

ofthiskind.Firstly,philosophyas‘method’ofinquiry.OriginallytitledtheCynic’sWord

BookAmbroseBierce’sTheDevil’sDictionarydefinesphilosophyas‘arouteofmany

roadsleadingfromnowheretonothing’(Bierce,1996).

Thehumorousdefinitioncaptureswelltheconcernsonemighthavetowards

philosophicalinquiryingeneral.Indeed,accordingtophilosopherBertrandRussellthe

valueofphilosophyistobesoughtinitsuncertainty(B.Russell,2010,p.128).However,

philosophydoesleadtosomething.Whenwephilosophiseaboutagivensubjectwe

liberateourselvesfromthetyrannyofcertaintyanddogmatism.Weenlargeandexpand

ourthinkingandalthoughwemightloseourfeelingofbeingsafelyrootedwealsogain

somethingaswegettotravel‘intotheregionofliberatingthought[which]keepsalive

oursenseofwonderbyshowingfamiliarthingsinanunfamiliaraspect’(B.Russell,2010,

p.128).Inthissensetheuseofphilosophyinastudyonwonderhaspromptedusto

wonderaboutwonder,andalloweddeeperunderstandingofthesubjectmatter.Inthe

introductionIpresentedapreliminarydefinitionofwonderwherethesubjectwas

definedas‘asuddenexperiencethatintensifiesthecognitivefocusandawarenessof

ignoranceaboutagivenobject’.FurthermoreIhighlightedthatitistypicallyanunsettling

227

yetdelightfulexperiencewherewebecomeawarethattheremightbemoretothe

perceivedobjectthanmeetstheeye.Hereattheendofthestudythisstillringstruebut

wearenowabletoaddsomethingtothepreliminarydefinition.Wehaveestablished

thatwondercanbeanemotionbutnotexclusivelysoandthatimaginationplaysa

significantpartinwonder.LikewisebylookingatwonderthroughaNeo-Aristotelianlens

wenowknowthatwondermaycontributetohumanflourishingandifwonderis

balanceditqualifiesasanactivitythatcontributesstronglytoourflourishing.Thus

philosophisingaboutwonderhascomplicatedmattersbutasaresultwehavelearned

moreaboutthesubjectmatter.Additionallywehaveeffectivelyopeneduptospeculation

aboutwonder,whichcanleadtofurtherstudiesandmoredetailedwonderingsabout

wonder.

ThecriticmayalsopointoutthatIamguiltyofeclecticismbecauseIhave

handpickedthetheoriesusedtoilluminateinparticulartheareasofemotion,

imaginationandflourishing.Thisisafaircritiquebutinmydefenceeachoftheseareas

connectedtowonderareworthyofadoctoralstudyinitselfbecausetheyareallvastand

complex.Handpickingtheoriesandexampleswasthusanecessitytogetthestudyof

wonderunderwaybecauseitisimpossiblewithintheframeworkofadoctoralthesisto

coverallaspectsandapproachestosuchfields.Onemightarguethatthethesiswould

havebeendifferentandperhapsmoreconvincingifIhadchosendifferenttheoriesand

examples.Forexampleitwouldbeinterestingtoseewhatlightcouldbecastonwonder

ifviewedthroughthelensofWilliamJames’approachtoemotions.AJamesianapproach

totheemotionofwonderwouldentailthatafterperceivingawondersuchasamassive

meteorshoweraparticularbodilystatewouldfollowwhichthenwouldgiverisetothe

emotionofwonder.Whatthisbodilystateconsistsofisinterestingforthestudentof

wonderbecauseitconnectstohumanembodimentandhumanflourishing.Howeverdue

totherestrictionIfacedwithintheframeworkofthedoctoralstudyIchosetofocuson

thecognitiveapproachtoemotionsbecauseithelpedusbuildarichconceptionof

wonder,includingthenotionthatwondercanalsobeviewedassomethingotherthanan

emotion.

AsmentionedearlierthisthesisinvitesfurtherstudiesintowonderandinwhatfollowsI

willbrieflydescribeanumberofareaswherefutureworkmaybeconducted.

FirstIthinkthereisaninterestingresearchquestionabouttheconnection

betweenwonderandcosmopolitanism.Thisconnectionwasmentionedinchapter1:The

228

LureofWonderviaRobertFullerwhoarguesthatwondermayalterourperceptionsto

theextentthatwebecometruecosmopolitans.Acosmopolitanisapersonwhoviews

herselfnotmerelyasamemberofaparticularcityornationstatebutasacitizenofthe

cosmos.IthinkFullerisrightthatwondercanhelpusbecometruecosmopolitans

becauseitmaygivebirthtothoughtsabouthowlifecanbedifferentandhowwebest

flourishashumanbeings.Furthermoreawonder-filledexperiencesuchasencounteringa

culturedifferentfromone’sownmayalsobringforthacosmopolitanattitudebecause

onemightbegintoquestionthedefiningpowersofcultureandtheimportanceof

overlappingvalues.Wemaybecomeawareofoursharedhumanity,thatweallliveunder

thesamesunandthathavingaconversationaboutitisworthwhile.79

NextIthinkitcouldbeinterestingtoinvestigatewonderfurtherinrelationtothe

therapeuticuseofpsychedelicdrugsandentheogeniceducation.InmythesisIhave

arguedthattheuseofpsychedelicdrugsisproblematicbecausealthoughthepsychedelic

experienceiswonder-filleditcanpotentiallyrenderusincapableofindependentpractical

reasoningandthusseriouslydampenourflourishing.Howeverwhatifitwaspossibleto

administerpsychedelicdrugsinacontrolledandsafeenvironment?Itispossiblethata

psychedelictripundersuchconditionscouldhelpthedevelopmentofwonderasan

attitudeorintroduceasenseofwonderintosomeone’slife.Ithinkthisisworthwhile

investigatingbecauseitispossiblethatthepsychedelicvoyagermightreturnfromher

tripwithvaluableinsightorarenewedsenseofpurposethatmaycontributetoher

flourishing.InsupportofthisstandseducationalistKennethTupperwhoarguesthat:

‘Theeducationalvalueofentheogensandpsychedelicsmaybetheir

capacity—whenusedrespectfullyandcircumspectly—toreliablyevoke

experiencesofwonderandawe,tostimulatetranscendentalormystical

experiences,andtocatalyzeasenseoflifemeaningorpurpose.

(Tupper,2014)

Tupperclearlypointstothelinkbetweenwonderandpsychedelicsandifatripcan

catalyzeasenseoflifemeaningandpurposesurelythiscontributestohumanflourishing.

Additionalsupportofthelinkbetweenpsychedelicstakenincontrolledandsafe

conditionsandflourishingcanbefoundinpsychologistsKrebsandJohansen’sstudyon79Iexploredthisconnectiontosomeextentinapaperentitled‘CanWonderleadtoCosmopolitanism:APhilosophicalEnquiry’presentedattheGlobalMedicalHumanities2013AssociationforMedicalHumanitiesConferenceattheUniversityofAberdeen,July2013.

229

LSDandalcoholism.KrebsandJohansenfoundthat‘asingledoseofLSD,inthecontextof

variousalcoholismtreatmentprograms,isassociatedwithadecreaseinalcoholmisuse’

(Krebs&Johansen,2012).Theirstudydoesnotreportanythingaboutwonderbutit

wouldbeinterestingtoseeifanyoftheparticipantsinthestudymightretainasenseof

wonderandifsohowtheyarticulatethis.

Finally,continuingintheareaofmedicalscienceandhealthcare,wonderand

flourishingmayhaveanimportantroletoplayintheareaofrehabilitation.Forexamplea

patientorclientmightbeenrolledinrehabilitationtoescapefromaseriousaddictionto

alcoholordrugs,ortobeabletolearntowalkagainafteraseriousinjuryorsurgical

operation(suchasahipreplacement).Someinstitutionsworkingwithrehabilitationare

entirelyknowledge-basedintheirmethodologyorapproachtotheirclients

(Marselisborgcentret,2004),butIwouldarguethatatleastinsomecasesasuccessful

rehabilitationreliesnotpurelyonscientificknowledgebutalsoontheactiveuseof

philosophy.Whenweconsiderthepossibledifferencebetweenhappinessandflourishing

(asmentionedintheintroductionchapter)fourpossibilitiesemergeandtheyareas

follows:1)onemightbehappyandflourishingatthesametime;2)onemightbehappy

butnotflourishing;3)onemightnotbehappybutflourishing;and4)onemightnotbe

happynorflourishing.Thebest-casescenarioisobviouslynumber1andtheworstcase

scenarioisnumber4.Inthisrespectifapatientorclientwerepromptedtounderstand

thedifferenceandtherelationshipbetweenhappinessandflourishingitcouldhelp

developawonderingattitudethatmaysupportthemthroughthedifficulttimesthe

processofrehabilitationoftenencompasses:toappreciatethatitmightbenecessaryto

gothroughdifficultperiodswhereonemightnotbehappybutflourishinginorderto

reachthegoal(i.e.,tobehappyandflourish)andthiscouldprovecrucialtothesuccess

ofaperson’srehabilitation.

Iwouldliketoendthisconclusionbygivingonelastexampleofwonderinorderto

recapitulatetheessenceofthewonder-filledexperience.In1999Iwasworkingasanurse

intheemergencydepartmentatwhatisnowcalledSygehusVendsyssel,whichisa

hospitalinthecityofHjørring,NorthernJutland,Denmark.Iwasonthenightshiftand

around10o’clockafteranaltogethermerryeveningatmyparents’houseIpreparedto

gotowork.AsIapproachedthefrontdoorInoticedthatthetreesandbushesoutside

wereengulfedinastrangeredandslightlyflickeringlight.AsIlookedcloserInoticedthat

thelightextendedtothestreetandthehousesontheoppositesideofthestreet.I

230

pausedponderingwhatcouldbethecauseofsuchilluminationanddeducedthat

somethingbigperhapsahouseoracaroutsidemyfieldofvisionmustbeonfireandthat

thelightwasinfacttheredlightofflames.Iquicklyopenedthedoortoinvestigatethe

mattercloserbuttomysurpriseIsawnofireandheardnosound.Itwasaperfectlycalm

autumneveningbutIbecameincreasinguneasybecauseInowrealisedthateverything

aroundmeincludingmyownclothingandhandswereengulfedintheredlight.Ideduced

thatthesourceofthelighthadtocomefromsomewheretomyleftbuttherewas

nothingtoseeexceptmoreilluminatedtreesandhouses.Somethingthencompelledme

tolookupintothesouthwesternskyandwhatIsawtoputitmildlyisstillburnedinto

mymemoryandmakesmesmile.Insteadofthenormalnightskywithitsusual

constellationsofstarsonlyablackholethesizeofthemid-daysunwasvisibleandfrom

itsedgesgiganticarmsofswirlinglightpaintedthewholeskybeforemeintranslucent

red.ThesightwasutterlysurprisingandIthinkIstoodsomewhatparalysedforafew

secondsbeforeIrealisedwhatwasgoingon.AbovemewastheAuroraBorealisinthe

formofacoronaoffantasticproportion,whichIatthetimehadneverseenbeforeand

haveneverseensince.FullofjoyIquicklyIranbackintothehouseandusheredmy

parentsoutintothegardenbecauseIwantedthemtoseethespectacleandtoconfirm

thatwhatIhadseenwasactuallyreal.Myparentsacknowledgedtherealityofthe

phenomenonandasweallbeheldtheextraordinarybeautifuldisplayofswirlinglightsI

couldnotcontainmyexcitementanylonger.Ithrewmyarmsupintheairincelebration

andshoutedoutloud‘Itisfantastic’wheretomymotherwithhereyesstillfixeduponthe

spectaclecalmlyreplied‘hushson…theneighbours’.Thespectacledisappearedafter

approximately10minutesandasImountedmybicycleheadingforworkIfeltacalm

senseofgratitudebecauseIfeltthatIhadseensomethingspecial.

Iliketothinkofthisexperiencenotonlyaswitnessingofawell-knownnatural

phenomenonbutalsoanexperienceofwonder.Witnessingtheblackholeandthe

swirlingredlightsintheskywasunexpectedandquiteunlikeanythingIhadeverseen

before(extraordinary,suddenandpersonal).ForamomentIstruggledtocapture

(intensificationofcognitivefocus)andunderstand(intensificationofimagination,

awarenessofignorance)thephenomenon,whichhadchangedthesouthwesternskyand

senseofnormalityinadramaticyetbeautifulway,butfailed(displacement/diminishing

ofself,worldappearsnewlypresent,causedemotionalupheaval).Additionallyitcanbe

saidthattheexperienceofwondercontributedtomyflourishingbypresentingme

231

somethingbeautifulandbypromptingasenseofgratitudewhichItothisdaydonotfully

understandbutregardasimmenselypositive.

Canwesaythattheexperiencecontributedtomyflourishinginastrongsense?

Well,attheriskofcomingacrossasself-glorifyingIwouldargueyes,becausethe

spectaclewasutterlybeautifulandIappreciatehavingseeniteventodaybutIhavenot

attachedaspecialmeaningtotheeventthatisunreasonable.Theeventwasan

extraordinarycaseoftheAuroraBorealisandlikethedramaticmeteorshowerreported

inElderSamuelRogers’autobiographyithasservedmeasareminderofthefactthatwe

liveavulnerableplanetaryexistenceinaworldoffantasticproportionandthatwecan

wonderatsuchthingsastheAuroraisawonderinitself.

ToendthisthesisIcanthinkofnobetterwaythandrawingattentiontophilosopher

AlfredNorthWhiteheadwhowrites:

Philosophybeginsinwonder.And,attheend,whenphilosophicthoughthas

doneitsbest,thewonderremains.Therehavebeenadded,however,some

graspoftheimmensityofthings,somepurificationofemotionbyunderstanding.

(Whitehead,1934,p.96)

Thankyouforyourattention.

232

Bibliography

(IONS),InstituteofNoeticSciences.(2014).WhataretheNoeticSciences?Retrieved31stMay,2014,from

http://www.noetic.org/about/what-are-noetic-sciences/

Alexander, John,M. (2008). Capabilities and Social Justice: The Political Philosophy of Amartya Sen and

MarthaNussbaum:AshgatePublishingLtd.

Anscombe,Gertrude.(1958).ModernMoralPhilosophy.Philosophy,33,1-19.

Aquinas,Thomas.(1947).SummaTheologica(Vol.1):OxfordUniversityPress.

Aquinas,Thomas.(1976).SummaContraGentiles(A.C.Pegis,Trans.):UniversityofNotraDamePress.

Aquinas, Thomas. (2006).TheogicaPart 1 (PrimaPars) (F. o. t. E.D. Province, Trans.): BenzigerBrothers

NewYork.

Arellano, Jeronimo. (2010). From the Space of the Wunderkammer to Macondo's Wonder Rooms: The

CollectionofMarvelsinCienanosdesolodad.HispanicReview,78(3),369-386.

Aristotle.(1926).The"Art"ofRhetoric(J.H.Freese,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Aristotle.(1941).NichomacheanEthics(W.D.Ross,Trans.).InR.Mckeon(Ed.),TheBasicWorksofAristotle:

RandomHouse.

Aristotle.(1951).Meteorologica(H.D.P.Lee,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Aristotle.(1957).OntheSoul,ParvaNaturalia.OnBreath(W.S.Hett,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Aristotle.(1967).Politics(H.Rackham,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Aristotle.(1989).TheMetaphysics(T.H.,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Aristotle.(1995).Poetics(S.Halliwell,Trans.S.HalliwellEd.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Aristotle.(2003).NicomacheanEthics(H.Rackham,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Aristotle.(2006).Poetics(J.Sachs,Trans.):FocusPublishing.

Augustin.(2002).OmGudsStad:AarhusUniversitetesforlag.

Augustine.(2006).Confessions(W.Watts,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Bacon,Francis.(1971).TheAdvancementofLearning:ProjectGutenberg

Bæksted,Anders.(1990).NordiskeGuderogHelte:PolitikkensForlag.

Baltzly, Dirk. (2014). Stoicism. Stanford Enclyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2014. Retrieved 01.12.2015,

2015,fromhttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/stoicism/

Beckett,Samuel.(1979).MolloyTheBeckettTrilogy:PicadorBooks.

233

Ben-Ze'ev,Aaron.(2010).TheThingCalledEmotion.InP.Goldie(Ed.),TheOxfordHandbookofPhilosophy

ofEmotion(pp.41-62):OxfordUniversityPress.

Bentham, Jeremy. (1879).An Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation: Oxford University

Press.

Bentham,Jeremy.(1988).AFragmentonGovernment:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Berlin,Isaiah.(2001).TheRootsofRomanticism(H.HardyEd.Vol.45):PrincetonUniversityPress.

Bible.(1994).TheHolyBible:TophiBooks.

Bierce,Ambrose.(1996).TheDevil'sDictionary:WordsworthEditionsLtd.

Blackburn,Simon.(1998).RulingPassions:OxfordUniversityPress.

Blackburn, Simon. (2002). Precis of Ruling Passions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV(1),

122-135.

Blum,Elisabeth,&Blum,PaulRichard(2011).WonderandWonderingintheRenaissance.InM.F.Deckard

&P.Losonczi(Eds.),PhilosophyBeginsinWonder:AnIntroductiontoEarlyModernPhilosophy,Theology,

andScience(pp.1-42):JamesClarke&Co.

Bollert,D.W..(2010).TheWonderofHumanityinPlato'sDialogues.kritike4(1),174-198.

Bostrom,Nick.(2005).AHistoryofTranshumanistThought.JournalofEvolutionandTechnology,14(1),1-

25.

Boyle,Robert. (1672).SomeObservationsAboutShiningFlesh,BothofVealandPullet,andThatWithout

anySensiblePutrefactioninthoseBodies.InT.Birch(Ed.),TheWorksoftheHonourableRobertBoyle(Vol.

3,pp.651-655):Hildesheim:GeorgOlms.

Brann,EvaT.H.(1991).TheWorldoftheImagination:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishersInc.

Braud, William. (2001). Experiencing Tears of Wonder-Joy: Seeing with the Heart's Eye. The Journal of

TranspersonalPsychology,33(2).

Brock,Dan.(1993).QualityofLifeinHealthCareandMedicalEthics.InM.Nussbaum&A.Sen(Eds.),The

QualityofLife:OxfordUniversityPress.

Burke, E. A. (1990).APhilosophical Enquiry into theOrigin ofOur Ideas of the SublimeandBeautiful (A.

PhilipsEd.):OxfordUniversityPress

Burr,Vivien.(2003).SocialConstructionism:Routledge.

Burrell,DavidB. (2012).WondermentToday in theAbrahamicTraditions. InS.Vasalou (Ed.),Practicesof

WonderCross-DisciplinaryPerspectives:PickwickPublications.

234

Byron. (1833). Don Juan. In T.M. Esq. (Ed.), TheWorks of Lord Byron: London, JohnMurray, Albemarle

Street.

C3,&Health,Collaboratingfor. (2012).TheBenefitsofPhysicalActivity forHealthandWell-being(pp.1-

31).

Caldwell,DavidF.,&Moberg,Dennis.(2007).AnExploratoryInvestigationoftheEffectofEthicalCulturein

ActivatingMoralImagination.JournalofBusinessEthics,73(2),193-204.

Carson,Rachel.(1984).TheSenseofWonder:Harpercollins.

Cartledge,Paul.(2001).SpartanReflection:London:Duckworth.

Chen, Jianhong. (2011).On ThomasHobbes's Concept ofWonder. InM. F.Deckard&P. Losonczi (Eds.),

Philosophy begins inWonder: An Introduction to EarlyModern Philosophy, Theology, and Science: James

Clarke&Co.

Chrysakopoulou, Sylvana. (2012).Wonder and the Beginning of Philosophy in Plato. In S. Vasalou (Ed.),

PracticesofWonder,Cross-DisciplinaryPerspectives:PickwickPublications.

Cicero.(1989).DeInventione(H.M.Hubbell,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Cicero.(2001).TusculanDispotations(J.E.King,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Cleese,John.(1989).GrahamChapman'sMemorialServiceDecember1989.

Coen,Ethan,&Coen,Joel(Writers).(2009).ASeriousMan.InE.Coen&J.Coen(Producer):FocusFeatures.

Coleridge,SamuelTaylor.(2004).BiographiaLiteraria(T.Riikonen&D.WidgerEds.):ProjectGutenberg.

Compton, William C. , & Hoffman, Edward. (2013). Positive Psychology, The Science of Happiness and

Flourishing:WadsworthCengageLearning.

Connolly,Peter.(2006).GreeceandRomeatWar:GreenhillBooks.

Crassous, Philippe. (2010). Hydrothermal worm. Retrieved Friday 14th March, 2014, from

http://www.fei.com/image-gallery/the-hydrothermal-worm/

Crosby,Eric.(2007).AnAestheticofWonderment:IMAXandAffect.journalofMovingImageStudies,6.

Cunningham, J. V. (1964). Woe or Wonder, The Emotional Effect of Shakespearean Tragedy: Swallow

Paperbooks.

Cusa,Nicholasof.(2001).CompletePhilosophicalandTheologicalTreatisesofNicholasofCusa(J.Hopkins,

Trans.Vol.1):TheArthurBanningPressMinneapolis,Minnesota.

Dante,Alighieri.(1995).TheDivineComedy(A.Mandelbaum,Trans.):Everyman'sLibrary.

Darwin,Charles.(1999).TheExpressionofEmotionsinManandAnimals:HarperCollins.

Daston,Lorraine,&Park,Katharine.(1998).WondersandtheOrderofNature:ZoneBooks.

235

Dawkins, Richard. (2006). Unweaving the Rainbow - Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder:

Penguin.

Deane-Drummond,Celia.(2006).WonderandWisdom:Darton,LongmanandToddLtd.

Deigh, John. (2010). Concepts of Emotion inModern Philosophy and Psychology. In P. Goldie (Ed.), The

OxfordHandbookofPhilosophyofEmotion:OxfordUniversityPress.

Delanty,Gerad. (2008). TheCosmopolitan Imagination.RevistaCIDOBd'Afers Internacionals(82/83), 217-

230.

Descartes, Rene. (1986). The Passions of the Soul (W. R.Haldane,G., Trans.)ThePhilosophicalWorks of

Descartes(Vol.1):CambridgeUniversityPress.

Descartes,Rene.(2008).ADiscourseonMethod:ProjectGutenberg.

Deutch,Babette.(1957).PoetryHandbook:ADictionaryofTerms:GrossetandDunlap.

Dore,Gustave.(1976).TheDoreIllustrationsforDante'sDivineComedy:DoverPublications,Inc.

Doron, Claude-Olivier. (2012). The Microscopic Glanse: Spiritual Excercises, The Microscope, and the

Practice ofWonder in Early Modern Science. In S. Vasalou (Ed.), Practices ofWonder Cross-Disciplinary

Perspectives(pp.179-200):PickwichPublications.

Douglas,Mary.(1975).ImplicitMeaning.EssaysinAnthropology:Routledge.

Dresser, Sam. (2014). Anna Bertha Ludwig's hand. Retrieved from Ideas.aeon.co website:

http://ideas.aeon.co/viewpoints/1839

Dunsany,Lord.(2004).WonderTales:DoverPublicationsInc.

Eckhart,Meister. (1981).OnDetachment(E.Colledge&B.McGinn,Trans.)MeisterEckhart:TheEssential

Sermons,Commentaries,Treatises,andDefence:NewYork:PaulistPress.

Emmons,RobertA,&Shelton,CharlesM.(2002).GratitudeandtheScienceofPositivePsychology.InC.R.

Snyder&S.J.Lopez(Eds.),HandbookofPositivePsychology:OxfordUniversityPress.

Emmons,RobertA.(2005).EmotionandReligion.InR.F.Paloutzian,Park,CrystalL.(Ed.),TheHandbookof

thePsychologyofReligionandSpirituality:GuilfordPress.

Evans, H. Martyn. (2002). Medicine, philosophy, and the medical humanities. British Journal of General

Practice.

Evans, H.Martyn. (2012).Wonder and the Clinical Encounter.TheoreticalMedicine and Bioethics, 33(2),

123-136.

Fishback,Michael.(2011,16thJuly).HumpbackWhaleShowsAmazingAppreciationAfterbeingFreedFrom

Nets.fromhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tcXU7G6zhjU

236

Fisher, Philip. (2003).Wonder, the Rainbow and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences: Harvard University

Press.

Fitzgerald,F.Scott.(2012).TheGreatGatsby:WalterMediaOpenBookInitiative.

Fleischman,PaulR.(2013).Wonder:SmallBatchBooks.

Frank,Jason.(2009).PubliusandPoliticalImagination.PoliticalTheory,37(1),69-98.

Fuller,Robert.(2006).WonderandReligiousSensibility.JournalofReligion.

Fuller,Robert.(2012).FromBiologytoSpirituality:TheEmotionalDynamicsofWonder.InS.Vasalou(Ed.),

PracticesofWonderCross-DisciplinaryPerspectives(pp.64-87):PickwickPublications.

Fuller,Robert.C.(2006).Wonder-fromEmotiontoSpirituality:TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaPress.

Gleaves,Robert.(2002).17thbirthdayonNov17,1966.LeonidMAC:NASA.

Glemmer,Pam.(1998).TheWizardofOz.LeonidMAC:NASA.

Goldie,Peter.(2000).TheEmotions:OxfordUniversityPress.

Goldie, Peter. (2010). Introduction. InP.Goldie (Ed.),TheOxfordHandbookof thePhilosohyof Emotion:

OxfordUniversityPress.

Greenblatt, Stephen. (1990). Resonance and Wonder. Bulletin og the American Academy of Arts and

Sciences,43(4),11-34.

Hackford,Taylor(Writer).(1997).TheDevil'sAdvocate.InW.Bros.(Producer):WarnerBros.Pictures.

Hacking,Ian.(2001).TheSocialConstructionofWhat?:HarvardUniversityPress.

Hajos, Elizabeth M. (1958). The Concept of an Engravings Collection in the year 1565: Quicchelberg,

InscriptionsvelTituliTheatriAmplissimi.TheArtBullitin,40(2),151-156.

Hamilton,William.(1859).LecturesonMetaphysicsandLogic(H.L.M.a.J.VeitchEd.):Boston:Couldand

Linwin,1859.

Hare, Rom. (1988). An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint. In R. Harre (Ed.), The Social

ConstructionofEmotions:BasilBlackwellLtd.

Harris,AnnSutherland.(2004).Seventeenth-CenturyArtandArchitecture:LaurenceKingPublishing.

Harris,PaulL.(2000).TheWorkoftheImagination:Blackwell.

Harrison,Andrew.(1978).Imagination.byMaryWarnock.Mind,NewSeries,87(347),453-457.

Hays,J.N.(2005).EpidemicsandPandemics:TheirImpactsonHumanHistory:SantaBarbara.

Heidegger, Martin. (1994). Basic Questions of Philosophy (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.): Indiana

UniversityPress,Bloomington&Indianapolis.

Henderson,Casper.(2012).TheBookofBarelyImaginedBeings:Granta.

237

Henderson,Virginia,&Nite,Gladys. (1978).Principles andPracticeofNursing (6th ed.):MacMillan,New

York.

Hepburn, Ronald. W. (1980). The Inagural Address: Wonder. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,

SupplementaryVolume,54,1-23.

Hepburn,Ronald.W.(1996).LandscapeandtheMetaphysicalImagination.EnvironmentalValues,5(3),191-

204.

Hesiod. (2006). Theogony Works and Days Testimonia (G. Most, W., Trans. G. Most, W. Ed.): Harvard

UniversityPress.

Heybron,DanielM.(2008).ThePursuitofUnhappiness:OxfordUniversityPress.

Hobbes,Thomas.(1992).Leviathan(R.TuckEd.):CambridgeUniversityPress.

Hodgson,WilliamHope.(2006).Introduction.InD.S.Davis(Ed.),CarnackiTheGhost-Finder:Wordsworth.

Holmqvist, Kenneth, & Pluciennik, Jaroslaw. (2002). A Short Guide to the Theory of the Sublime. Style,

RessorcesinStylisticsandLiteraryAnalysis,36(4),718-736.

Horace.(1955).Satires,Epistles,ArsPoetica(H.R.Fairclough,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Hove,PhiloH.(1996).TheFaceofWonder.JournalofCurriculumStudies,28(4),437-462.

Hughes,Aaron.(2002).ImaginingtheDivine:GhazalionImagination,Dreams,andDreaming.Journalofthe

AmericanAcademyofReligion,70(1),33-53.

Hume,David.(1985).ATreatiseofHumanNature:Penguin.

James,William.(1884).WhatisanEmotion?Mind,9(34),188-205.

James,William.(1985).TheVarietiesofReligiousExperience:Penguin.

Kant,Immanuel.(1963).LecturesonEthics(L.Infield,Trans.):HarperandRow.

Kant,Immanuel.(1987).TheCritigueofJudgement(W.S.Pluhar,Trans.):HackettPublishingCompany,Inc.

Kant, Immanuel. (1996).Critiqueof PureReason (W. S. Pluhar, Trans.):Hackett PublishingCompany, Inc.

Indianapolis/Cambridge.

Keats,John.(1978).ThePoemsofJohnKeats:HarvardUniversityPress.

Keats,John.(1988).Lamia.InJ.Barnard(Ed.),TheCompletePoemsofJohnKeats(3ed.):PenguinBooks.

Keen,Sam.(1969).ApologyforWonder:Harper&Row.

Keen,Sam.(2010).IntheAbsenceofGod:DwellinginthePresenceoftheSacred:HarmonyBooks.

Kellenberger,James.(2010).Humility.AmericanPhilosophocalQuaterly,47(4),321-336.

Keltner,D.&Haidt,J.(2003).ApproachingAwe,aMoral,Spiritual ,andAestheticEmotion.Cognitionand

Emotion,17(2),297-314.

238

Kidd, Ian. (2014,19March2014).DeepandShallowWonder. Paperpresentedat theCentre forMedical

Humanities(CMH),StMary'sCollege,Durham,UK.

Kierman,V.(1999).Horace:PoeticsandPolitics:StMartin'sPress.

King,H.C.(1955).TheHistoryoftheTelescope:CharlesGriffin&CompanyLimitedLondon.

Krebs,TeriS.,&Johansen,Pål-Ørjan.(2012).LysericAcidDiethylamide(LSD)forAlcoholism:Meta-analysis

ofRandomizedControlledTrials.JournalofPsychopharmacology,994-1002.

Kroll,Barry. (2008).ArguingwithAdversaries:Aikido,Rhetoric,andtheArtofPeace.CollegeComposition

andCommunication,59(3),451-472.

Kuper,Adam.(2000).Culture:TheAnthropologists'Account:HarvardUniversityPress.

LaCaze,Marguerite.(2013).Wonder&Generosity,TheirRoleinEthicsandPolitics:SunnyPress.

Lawrence,D.H.(1959).TheLaterD.HLawrence:NewYorkAlfredA.Knopf.

Layard,Richard.(2011).HappinessLessonsfromaNewScience(2nded.):Penguin.

Lebech,Mette.(1995).VenskabDyderoglaster(Vol.24):Philosophia-Tidskriftforfilosofi.

London,Scott. (1999).RenewingOurSenseofWonder:An InterviewwithSamKeen. Retrieved22. july,

2013,fromhttp://www.scottlondon.com/interviews/keen.html

Longinus.(1965).'Longinus'OnSublimity(D.A.Russell,Trans.):OxfordClaridonPress.

Longinus.(1995).OntheSublime(W.H.Fyfe,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Lopez,DonaldS.(2004).BuddhistScriptures(D.S.LopezEd.):Penguin.

Lovecraft,H.P.(2008).Dagon.InS.Jones(Ed.),Necronomecon:Gollancz.

Lovecraft,H.P.(2011).Celephais.InS.Jones(Ed.),EldritchTales:Gollancz.

Lutz,Catherine.(1988).UnnaturalEmotions:UniversityofChicagoPress.

Lutz,ChristopherStephen. (2009).Tradition intheEthicsofAlasdairMacIntyre:Relativism,Thomism,and

Philosophy:LexiconBooks.

Lytton,EdwardBulwer.(2010).PaulClifford:KessingerPublishing.

MacIntyre,Alasdair.(1998).AShortHistoryofEthics:Routledge.

MacIntyre,Alasdair.(1999).DependentRationalAnimals:Duckworth.

Mann,Thomas.(1927).TheMagicMountain(H.T.Lowe-Porter,Trans.):Vintage.

Marselisborgcentret. (2004). Rehabilitation in Denmark (White paper).

http://www.marselisborgcentret.dk/fileadmin/filer/Publikationer/PDF_er/Brochure_om_rehabiliteringsbeg

rebet.pdf

239

Matravers,Derek.(2012).WonderandCognition.InS.Vasalou(Ed.),PracticesofWonderCross-Disciplinary

Perspectives(pp.166-178):PickwickPublications.

McGinn,Colin.(2006).Mindsight:HarvardUniversityPress.

McMullen,Ernan.(1996).EnlargingImagination.TijdschriftvoorFilosofie,58steJaarg(2),227-260.

McReynolds, Philip. (2002). Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach: A Pracmatic Critique. The Journal of

SpeculativePhilosophy,NewSeries,16(2),142-150.

Megan, Boler. (1997). Taming the Labile Other. In S. Laird (Ed.), Philosophical of Education Yearbook:

PhilosophyofEducationSociety.

Middlecamp,CatherineHurt.(2009).TheOldWomanandtheRug:TheWonderandPainofTeaching(and

Learning)Chemistry.FeministTeacher,19(2),134-149.

Mill, John Stuart. (1865). An Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of The Principal

PhilosophicalQuestionsDiscussedinhisWritings:Longmans,Green,Longman,Roberts&Green.

Miller, Jerome. (1992). In theThroeofWonder - Intimationsof theSacred inaPost-modernWorld:State

UniversityofNewYorkPress.

Milton,John.(1998).ParadiseLost(2ed.):Longman.

Mirandola, Giovanni Pico della. (1956). Oration on the Dignity of Man (A. R. Caponigri, Trans.): Henry

RegneryCompany,Chicago.

Montaigne,Michelde.(2012).EssaysofMicheldeMontaigne(C.Cotton,Trans.W.C.HazlittEd.):Project

Gutenberg.

Moore,Mary B. (2006).Wonder, Imagination, and theMatter of Theater in the Tempest.Philosohy and

Literature,30(2),496-511.

Morsbach,H,&Tyler,W.J.(1998).AJapaneseEmotion:Amae.InR.Harre(Ed.),TheSocialConstructionof

Emotions:BasilBlackwellLtd.

Morton, Adam. (2010). Epistemic Emotions. In P. Goldie (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of

Emotion:OxfordUniversityPress.

Muchembled,Robert.(2003).AHistoryoftheDevil(J.Birrell,Trans.):PolityPress.

Murray,C.J.(2004).EncyclopediaoftheRomanticEra:1760-1850(Vol.1):FritzroyDearborn.

Nadis,Fred.(2005).WonderShows,PerformingScience,MagicandReligioninAmerica:RutgersUniversity

Press.

NationalLiteracyTrust. (2013). National Literacy Trust Website. from

http://www.literacytrust.org.uk/about/faqs/filter/about%20literacy%20in%20the%20uk#q283

240

Neisser,Ulric.(2014).CognitivePsychology:PsychologyPress.

Norman,Ron.(2000).CultivatingImaginationinAdultEducation.PaperpresentedattheProceedingsofthe

41stAnnualAdultEducationResearch(AERC).

Norris,Trevor.(2001).TheRefusalofWonder.PhilosophyofEducationYearbook,221-223.

Nozick,Robert.(1974).Anarchy,StateandUtopia:BasicBooks.

Nussbaum,Martha.(1990).AristotelianSocialDemocracy.InR.B.Douglass,G.M.Mara&H.S.Richardson

(Eds.),LiberalismandtheGood(pp.203-252):Routledge.

Nussbaum,Martha.(1993).Non-relativeVirtues. InM.Nussbaum,Sen,Amartya(Ed.),TheQualityofLife:

OxfordUniversityPress.

Nussbaum,Martha.(1999).SexandSocialJustice:OxfordUniversityPress.

Nussbaum,Martha.(2001).WomenandHumanDevelopment:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Nussbaum,Martha.(2008).UpheavalsofThought(8thed.):CambridgeUniversityPress.

Nussbaum,Martha.(2011).CreatingCapabilities:HarvardUniversityPress.

O'Keefe,Tim.Epicurus.fromInternetEnclyclopediaofPhilosophy(IEP)http://www.iep.utm.edu/epicur/

Onians,John.(1994).'IWonder:AShortHistoryofAmazement.InJ.Onians(Ed.),Sight&Insight:Essayson

ArtandCultureinHonourofE.H.Gombrichat85:PhaidonPressLimited.

Opdal,PaulMartin.(2001).Curiosity,WonderandEducationseenasPerspectiveDevelopment.Studies in

PhilosophyandEducation,20,331-344.

Oppenheimer,Helen.(1969).ChristianFlourishing.ReligiousStudies,5(2),163-171.

Otto,Rudolf.(2010).TheIdeaoftheHoly(J.W.Harvey,Trans.):MertinoPublishing.

Pare,Ambrose.(1982).OnMonstersandMarvels(J.L.Pallister,Trans.):TheUniversityofChicagoPress.

Park,Katharine,&Daston,Lorraine J. (1981).UnnaturalConceptions:TheStudyofMonsters inSixeenth-

andSeventeenth-CenturyFranceandEngland.Past&Present,92,20-54.

Parsons,HowardL.(1969).APhilosophyofWonder.PhilosophyandPhenomenogicalResearch,30(1),84-

101.

Partridge,Eric.(1966).Origins:AShortEtymologicalDictionaryofModernEnglish(4ed.):Macmillan.

Pascal,Blaise.(1961).ThePensees(J.M.Cohen,Trans.):PenguinBooks.

Pasquale,Juan.(2003).AWonderFullLifeSocietyandCultureBlog(Vol.2012):NotreDameMagazine.

Plato.(1926).Plato,Cratylus(H.N.Fowler,Trans.E.CappsEd.Vol.VI):HarvardUniversityPress.

Plato.(1989).Theaetetus(H.N.Fowler,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

Plato.(2013).TheRepublic(C.Emlyn-Jones&P.William,Trans.):HarvardUniversityPress.

241

Pliny.(1938).NaturalHistory(R.H.,Trans.Vol.1-10):HarvardUniversityPress.

Plutchik, Robert. (2003). Emotions and Life: Perspectives from Psychology, Biology and Evolution:

Washington,DC.:AmericanPsychologicalAssociation.

Pope, Alexander. (1885a). Essay on Criticism. In A.W.Ward (Ed.), The PoeticWorks of Alexander Pope:

MacmillanandCo.

Pope,Alexander. (1885b).TheSixthEpistleof theFirstBookofHorace. InA.W.Ward (Ed.),ThePoetical

WorksofAlexanderPope:MacmillanandCo.

Prinz, Jesse. (2013). How Wonder Works. Retrieved 05.1202015, 2015, from

http://aeon.co/magazine/psychology/why-wonder-is-the-most-human-of-all-emotions/

Quinn,Dennis.(2002).IrisExiled-ASynopticHistoryofWonder:UniversityPressofAmerica.

Radulova, Lillian. (2014). British man saved from shark by pod of DOLPINS who joined him for part of

marathon eight hour swim, The Daily Mail. Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-

2611777/Dolphins-scare-shark-British-swimmers-8-hour-challenge.html

Rasmussen, Douglas. (1999). Human Flourishing and the Appeal to Human Nature. Social Philosophy &

Policy,16(16).

Ratcliffe, Matthew. (2005). William James on Emotion and Intentionality. International Journal of

PhilosophicalStudies,13(2),179-202.

Rawls,John.(2000).ATheoryofJustice:OxfordUniversityPress.

Reid,Guy(Writer).(2012).Overview.InS.Kennedy(Producer):PlanetaryCollective.

Richard,J.A.Talbert.(2005).Plutarch-OnSparta:PenguinBooks.

Richards,Norvin.(1988).IsHumilityaVirtue.AmericanPhilosophicalQuaterly,25(3),253-259.

Rogers, Samuel. (1880). Autobiography of Eldar Samuel Rogers (E. J. I. Rogers Ed.): Cincinnati Standard

PublishingCompany.

Rubenstein, Mary-Jane. (2008). Strange Wonder, The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe:

ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork.

Russell,Bertrand.(2010).TheProblemsofPhilosophy:Bibliobazaar.

Russell,J.(1991).CultureandtheCategorizationofEmotions.PsychologicalBulletin,110,426-450.

Scruton,Roger.(1974).ArtandImagination:Harper&RowPublishing.

Sedley,David.(2013).Plato'sCratylus.fromhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-cratylus/

Seligman,Martin.(2011).Flourish:NicholasBrealeyPublishing.

242

Sen, Amartya. (1979). Equality of what? Tanner Lecture on Human Values. Tanner Lectures, Stanford

University.

Seneca.(1997).OntheShortnessofLife(C.D.N.Costa,Trans.):Penguin.

Shakespeare,William.(1992).HamletTragedies(Vol.1):Everyman'sLibrary.

Shakespeare,William.(1996).MuchAdoaboutNothingComedies(Vol.2):Everyman'sLibrary.

Shaw,Philip.(2006).TheSublime:Routledge.

Shweder,R.A.,&Haidt,J.(2000).TheCulturalPsychologyoftheEmotions:AncientandNew.InM.Lewis&

J.M.Haviland-Jones(Eds.),HandbookofEmotions(2ed.,pp.397-414):TheGuilfordPress.

Sidgwick,Henry.(1874).TheMethodsofEthics:Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

Silberbauer,George.(2001).EthicsinSmall-ScaleSocieties.InP.Singer(Ed.),ACompaniontoEthics(pp.14-

28):Blackwell.

Singer,Peter.(1990).AnimalLiberationSecondEdition:SOSFreeStock.

Singer,Peter.(1993).PracticalEthics:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Smith,Adam.(1980a).EssayonPhilosophicalSubjects(W.B.Wightman,J.Ed.):OxfordUniversityPress.

Smith, Adam. (1980b). The History of Astronomy. In W. P. D. Wightman, Bryce, J. C (Ed.), Essays on

PhilosophicalSubjects:OxfordUniversityPress.

Smith,NormanR.(2002).PortentousBirthsandtheMonstrousImaginationinRenaissanceCulture.InT.S.

Jones&D.A.Sprunger(Eds.),Marvels,Monsters,andMiracles:StudiesintheMedievalandEarlyModern

Imaginations(pp.267-283):MedievalInstitute,Kalamazoo,Michigan,USA.

Solomon,RobertC.(2002a).BacktoBasics:OntheVeryIdeaof"BasicEmotions".JournalfortheTheoryof

SocialBehaviour,32(2).

Solomon,RobertC.(2002b).SpiritualityfortheSkeptic:ThoughtfulLoveofLife:OxfordUniversityPress.

Solomon,RobertC.(2007).TruetoOurFeelings:OxfordUniversityPress.

Speak,Daniel.(2014).TheProblemofEvil:JohnWiley&Sons.

Spinoza,B.(1989).Ethics(R.Elwes,Trans.):J.M.Dent,London.

Stone,BradElliot.(2006).CuriosityastheThiefofWonder,AnEssayonHeidegger'sCritiqueoftheOrdinary

ConceptionofTime.Kronoscope,6(2).

Sumner,L.W.(1996).WelfareHappiness&Ethics:OxfordUniversityPress.

Szeintuch, Yechiel, Tourgeman, Daniella, & Zigdon,Maayan. (2005). TheMyth of the Salamander in the

WorkofKa-Tzetnik.PartialAnswers:JournalofLiteratureandtheHistoryofIdeas,3(1),101-132.

Tallis,Raymond.(2012).InDefenceofWonderandOtherPhilosophicalReflections:Acumen.

243

Tanner, Tony. (1965). The Reign ofWonder, Naivety and Reality on the American Literature: Cambridge

UniversityPress.

Theobald, Robert M. (1901). Shakesphere Studies in Baconian Light: Gay and Bird / Kessinger Legacy

Reprints.

Tupper, Kenneth W. (2014). Entheogenic Education: Psychedelics as Tools of Wonder and Awe.MAPS

BuletinSpecialEdition.

Turpin, Adriana. (2006). The New World Collections of Duke Coismo I de'Medici and Their Role in the

CreationofaKunst-andWunderkammerinthePalazzoVecchio.InR.J.W.Evans&A.Marr(Eds.),Curiosity

andWonderfromtheRenaissancetotheEnlightenment:Ashgate.

Ueshiba, Morihei. (2010). The Heart of Aikido: The Philosophy of Takemusu Aiki (J. Stevens, Trans. H.

TakahashiEd.):KodanshaInternational.

Ullman,HarlanK.,&Wade,JamesP.Jr. (1996).ShockandAwe:AchievingRapidDomminance Retrieved

from http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/nduedu/www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-

%201996/Shock%20and%20Awe%20-%20Dec%2096/

UNESCO.(2013).LiteracyforAll.Retrieved15.July,2013,fromhttp://en.unesco.org/themes/literacy-all

UNGA. (1989). Convention on the rights of the child. Retrieved 14th April, 2015, from

http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx

Vasalou, Sophia. (2012). Practices of Wonder Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (V. Sophia Ed.): Pickwick

Publications.

Verhoeven,Conelis.(1972).ThePhilosophyofWonder:TheMacmillanCompany.

Vernon,Mark.(2005).ThePhilosophyofFriendship:PalgraveMacmillan.

Waldau,Paul.(2001).TheSpectreofSpeciesism:BuddhistandChristianViewsofAnimals:OxfordUniversity

Press.

Warnock,Mary.(1976).Imagination:FaberandFaberLimited.

Warnock,Mary.(1992).TheUsesofPhilosophy:BlackwellPublishers.

Warnock,Mary.(1994).ImaginationandTime:Blackwell.

White, Frank. (1987). The Overview Effect, Space Exploration and Human Evolution: Houghton Mifflin

Company.

Whitehead,AlfredNorth.(1934).NatureandLife:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1963). Philosophical Investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). In G. E. M.

Anscombe&G.H.vonWright(Eds.),PhilosophicalInvestigations:Oxford:Blackwell.

244

Woods,Angela. (2011).TheSublimeObjectofPhychiatry:Schizophrenia inClinicalandCulturalTheory (1

ed.):OxfordUniversityPress.

Wordsworth.(1896).Wordsworth'sPoeticalWorks(W.KnightEd.Vol.2):ProjectGutenberg.

Wordsworth,William.(1850).Poems,inTwoVolumesVol.2.Retrievedfromhttps://itun.es/gb/wDVkE.l

WorkStress, &Network, TheUKNationalWork-stress. (2011).Work Stress TheUKNationalWork-stress

NetworkRetrieved14thNovember2013,fromhttp://www.workstress.net/identify.htm

Wotton,HenrySir.(1907).TheLifeandLettersofSirHenryWotton (L.P.SmithEd. Vol.1):Oxfordatthe

ClarendonPress.

Young, Richard Fox. (1988). "Gokyō-dōgen" to "Bankyō-dōkon": A Study in the Self-Universalization of

Ōmoto.JapaneseJournalofReligiousStudies,15(4),263-286.