duns scotus on singularity

8/13/2019 Duns Scotus on Singularity

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Duns Scotus

Ordinatio, Book 1

[Distinction 3

First Part:

On the Knowability of od

!uestion 1:

"hether od would be naturally knowable by the intellect of the wayfarer1#

1 $bout the third distinction % ask first of all concernin& the knowability of od' and % ask firstwhether od would be naturally knowable by the intellect of the wayfarer(

% ar&ue that not:

$ristotle says in Book %%% ofDe Anima: )Phantas*s are related to the intellect +ust as sensible to

sense-' but sense does not sense e.ce/t a sensible' therefore the intellect understands nothin&

e.ce/t whose /hantas* can [-# be a//rehended throu&h sense( od, howe0er, does not ha0e a

/hantas*, nor is so*ethin& i*a&inable,3therefore etc(

- $&ain, Book %% of theMetaphysics: )ust as the eyes of an owl are to the li&ht of the sun, so alsois our intellect to those which are *ost *anifest to nature2' but in the first case it is i*/ossible,

therefore also in the second(

3 $&ain, Book % of thePhysics: )%nfinite insofar as infinite is unknown' and Book %% of theMetaphysics: )%t does not ha//en that one knows infinite thin&s4'therefore neither infinity,

because it see*s that there is the sa*e dis/ro/ortion of the intellect to infinity and to infinite

thin&s, because the e.cess is e5ual, or not less(

2 $&ain, re&ory says in On Ezechiel: )6o whate0er e.tent our *ind would be /erfected in theconte*/lation of od, not to the e.tent that od is odself, but to the e.tent that it attains what

is under od(

1 $ wayfarer 7viator8 would be a hu*an who is li0in& between the fall of $da* and 90e and the second co*in& of esus(

Presu*ably, different conditions of knowled&e would obtain for either $da* and 90e or after the resurrection of the

dead(

- $ristotle,De Anima%%% c(, 231a 12;1(

3 Scotus3b >;11(

Physics%, ch( 2, 1?b ;?(

4 Metaphysics%%, ch( - >>2b--;-3(


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[3# $&ainst:

Book @% of theMetaphysics: )Aeta/hysics is theolo&y of od and concernin& /rinci/ally the

di0ine' therefore etc( $nd in the act of it, i(e(, in the actual consideration of se/arated

substances, he /osits hu*an ha//iness, in Book of theEthics(?

[!uestion -

"hether od would be the first known by us naturally in this state>#

4 $fter this % ask whether od would be the first known by us naturally in this state(

6hat od is the first known is ar&ued:

)$ny one thin& is related to esse+ust as to knowin& [cognitio#, fro* Book %% of theMetaphysics' but od is the first bein&' therefore the first known(

$&ain, nothin& is known /erfectly unless by that ha0in& been known /erfectly' thereforenothin& is known si*/ly e.ce/t by that ha0in& been known si*/ly( 6he conse5uence is

a//arent, because in those that areper se, C+ust as the *a.i*u* is to *a.i*u*, so si*/ly to

si*/lyC, and also the con0erse, fro* Book %% of the Topics(

? [2# $&ain, the *ost /erfect act of a /otency is about the si*/ly first ob+ect' the *ost /erfectact, howe0er, is about od, fro* Book of theEthics' therefore od is the si*/ly first

knowable ob+ect(

> $&ainst:

$ll of our knowled&e arises fro* sense, Book % of theMetaphysics1and Book %% ofPosterior

Analyticsat the end11' therefore od, who is *ost re*o0ed fro* the senses is not i**ediately

known by our intellect(

[%( Declaration of the first 5uestion#

1 %n the first 5uestion, it should not be distin&uished that od could be known ne&ati0ely oraffir*ati0ely, because ne&ation is not known e.ce/t throu&h affir*ation, accordin& to Book %%

ofPeri Hermeniasat the end and Book %@ of theMetaphysics(1-

Metaphysics@%, ch( 1, 1-4a -1;-3(

? Nichomachean Ethics, ch( ? 11a 1-;1(

> %(e(, in the state of bein& a wayfarer(

1 Metaphysics, >?b -?;>?1a 1-(

11 Posterior Analytics1a 3;1b (

1- Peri Hermenias-2b 3;2'Metaphysics1?a 1;1?(


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%t is also ob0ious that we know no ne&ations concernin& od unless throu&h affir*ation,

throu&h which we re*o0e other inco*/ossibles fro* those affir*ations(

[# $lso, we do not lo0e ne&ations in the &reatest way(

Si*ilarly, also, either ne&ation is concei0ed /recisely, or as said concernin& so*ethin&( %f a

ne&ation is concei0ed /recisely, as for e.a*/le non;stone, this e5ually belon&s to nothin& +ust

as to od, because /ure ne&ation is said of bein& and of non;bein&' therefore in this od is not

*ore understood than nothin& or a chi*era( %f it is understood as a ne&ation said of so*ethin&,

then % seek that concei0ed substratu* concernin& which it is understood that this ne&ation is

true, will it be either an affir*ati0e conce/t or a ne&ati0eE %f is is affir*ati0e, the /ro/osition is

had( %f ne&ati0e, % ask as before: is ne&ation concei0ed /recisely or as said of so*ethin&E %f in

the first way, this will belon& e5ually to nothin& as to od' if as said of so*ethin&, either od

would not be understood *ore than nothin&, or it will be sto//ed in so*e affir*ati0e conce/t

that is first(

11 [4# or, secondly, should knowled&e of Cwhat it isC and Cwhether it isC be distin&uished, because

in the /ro/osed % seek a si*/le conce/t, concernin& which esse is known throu&h that act of the

intellect co*/osin& and di0idin&( %ndeed, % ne0er know Cwhether it isC of so*ethin& unless %

would ha0e so*e conce/t of that e.tre*e concernin& which % know esse' and thus it is asked

here concernin& that conce/t(

1- or, thirdly, is it necessary to distin&uish Cwhether it isC as it is a 5uestion concernin& the truth ofa /ro/osition or as it is a 5uestion concernin& the esseof od, because if it can be a 5uestion of

the truth of a /ro/osition in which esseis as a /redicate of a sub+ect, for concei0in& the truth of

that 5uestion or /ro/osition it is necessary to /re;concei0e the ter*s of that 5uestion' and

concernin& a si*/le conce/t of that sub+ect, if it is /ossible, is now the 5uestion(

13 or, fourthly, is it 0alid to distin&uish a natural and a su/ernatural conce/t, because it is askedconcernin& a natural conce/t(

12 or, fifth, is it 0alid to distin&uish concernin& )naturally by s/eakin& of [# the natureabsolutely or of the nature in this state, because it is asked /recisely concernin& knowled&e in

this state(

1 or si.th, is it 0alid to distin&uish concernin& the knowled&e of od either in creatures or initself, because if knowled&e is had throu&h a creature such that discursi0e knowled&e would

be&in fro* creatures, % ask in which ter* does this knowled&e standE %f in od in itself, % ha0e

the /ro/osed, because % seek that conce/t of od in itself' if it does not stand in od in itself

but in creatures, then the sa*e will be the be&innin& and the end of the discourse, and thus no

knowled&e [notitia# will be had concernin& odGat least it has not been understood in the final

end of the discourse while it stands in so*e ob+ect that is the be&innin& of the discourse(

14 Honcernin& the co&nition of od Cwhether it isC and Cwhat it isC 7odfrey of Fontaines in!uodlibetal !uestion, @%%%, 5( 11 [?# dis/ro0es Ienricus of hent concernin& the distinction

Cwhether it isC, and that knowled&e of Cwhat it isC would be /ossible8 it should be known: CwhatC is


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said throu&h a na*e, it is the CwhatC that is of the thin&, and is includin& Cwhether it isC, because

accordin& to Book %@ of theMetaphysicsa ratiowhose Cna*eC is a si&n is a definition(13

e0ertheless, the to be what [esse-!i"# of the na*e is *ore co**on than Jesse


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theolo&y finally and /rinci/ally, because +ust as it is *ore /rinci/ally of substance than of

accident, Book @%% of theMetaphysics,1thusGby further analo&yG*ore /rinci/ally

concernin& od, because always /rior, by order of /erfection, the /art of the dis+uncti0e

attribute [passio# that is si*/ly *ore /erfect is always included in the ratioof the first sub+ect

/articularly(

1? $&ainst: no si*/ly *ore /erfect knowled&e is 0irtually included in the less /erfect, but alwaysthe con0erse' therefore no knowled&e naturally /ossible for a wayfarer concernin& od is *ore

/erfect than the conce/t of bein&' therefore in the s/eculation of this there is ha//iness(

%f this ar&u*ent concludes, therefore, what those ar&u*ents for the first /art [n( 1;1-# su//ose

concernin& a non;si*/le conce/t follows( %t is ne&ated accordin& to Ienricus of hent, rather a

/ro/er and si*/le conce/t of od throu&h the *otion of effects( But then bein& not co**on

but analo&ical, [11# and thus the first science of bein& will be of the first to which all are

attributed(

1> 6he intention of the 5uestion, therefore, is this, whether the intellect of the wayfarer cannaturally ha0e so*e si*/le conce/t in which si*/le conce/t od would be concei0ed(

[%%( 6I9OP%%OOFO6I9S6O9$HI!L9S6%O#

- 6o this a certain doctor says this: by s/eakin& of the knowled&e of so*ethin& it can bedistin&uished, on the /art of the ob+ect, that it can be known eitherper seorper acci"ens, in

/articular or in uni0ersal(

eally, od is not knownper acci"ens, because whate0er is known of od is odself'

ne0ertheless, by knowin& so*e attribute of od, we know as ifper acci"enswhat od is(

Fro* this ohn Da*ascene says of attributes: )6hey do not say the nature of od, but

so*ethin& about the nature(14

[1-# %n a uni0ersal also, for e.a*/le in a &eneral attribute, od is known: not certainly in a

uni0ersal accordin& to /redication that is said of odGin which nothin& is uni0ersal, because

that 5uiddity is of itself sin&ularGbut in a uni0ersal that is only analo&ically co**on to od

and creature, on account of the /ro.i*ity of the conce/ts, althou&h they are di0erse conce/ts(

%n /articular, od is not known fro* creatures, because a creature is an alien [peregrina#

si*ilitude of od, thus because it only confor*s to od accordin& to so*e attribute, which are

not that nature in /articular( 6herefore, since nothin& would lead into knowled&e of another

unless under a si*ilar ratio, it follows etc(

-1 $&ain, in a uni0ersal, od is known in three ways: *ost &enerally, *ore &enerally, and&enerally(

1 Metaphysics@%%, ch( 1, 1-?a 1?;1>(

14 De #i"e orth$, %, ch( 2(


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CAost &enerallyC has three &rades( %ndeed by knowin& any bein& as it is this bein&, *ost

indistinctly, bein& is concei0ed as it were as /art of the conce/t, and it is the first &rade( $nd by

re*o0in& CthisC and by concei0in& Cbein&C this is the second &rade' for already as conce/t not as

/art, an analo&ate co**on to od and creatures is concei0ed( Because if [13# the conce/t of

bein& that belon&s to od is distin&uished, for e.a*/le by concei0in& indeter*inate bein&

ne&ati0ely, that is, not deter*inable by a conce/t of bein& that belon&s analo&ically, which is

bein& that is indeter*inate /ri0ati0ely, already this is the third &rade( %n the first way,

Cindeter*inateC is abstracted as a for* fro* *atter, as subsistin& in itself and able to be

/artici/ated' in the second way, Cindeter*inateC is a uni0ersal abstracted fro* /articulars, which

is actually /artici/ated in the*(

$fter these three *ost &eneral &rades of concei0in&, od is concei0ed *ore &enerally by

concei0in& any attributeGnot si*/ly, as before, but with the &reatest /re;e*inence(

enerally, howe0er, od is concei0ed by concei0in& any attribute that is the sa*e as odCs

/ri*ary attribute, i(e(, CesseC, on account of si*/licity(

or is od known throu&h a /ro/er s/ecies, because nothin& is in od *ore si*/ly, but in theway of esti*ation, throu&h so*e s/ecies alien fro* creatures, and this in the afore*entioned

three ways(

-- [12# %nsofar as to the second 5uestion [n( 4#, accordin& to this o/inion, concernin& the *ode ofconcei0in&, naturally should be distin&uished fro* rationally(

%n the first way, od is the first ob+ect intelli&ible for us fro* creatures, because natural

knowled&e /roceeds fro* the indeter*inate to the deter*inate( 6he Cne&ati0e indeter*inateC is

*ore indeter*inate than the C/ri0ati0e indeter*inateC, therefore it is concei0ed before that' and

that C/ri0ati0e indeter*inateC is /rior to the deter*inate accordin& to our knowled&e, because

)bein& and thin& are i*/ressed on our intellect by a first i*/ression, accordin& to $0icenna,

Book % of theMetaphysics, ch( ( 6herefore, Cne&ati0e indeter*inateC is the entirely first ob+ect

of our intellect accordin& to the *ode of concei0in& naturally(

ationally, howe0er, it is known afterward, by a creature ha0in& been known, accordin& to three

&radesG*ost &enerally, then *ore &enerally, and finally [1# &enerally,Mbecause at first Cthis

&oodC is concei0ed, then the &ood uni0ersally abstracted by a second abstraction, for e.a*/le

that it is /ri0ati0ely indeter*inate, then the &ood abstracted by the first abstraction, e0idently

that it is ne&ati0ely indeter*inate, because by the way of ratiocinati0e deduction it is first

necessary to know that fro* which abstraction co*es to be before the abstracted(

-3 Iow the first *e*ber [of the dis+unction#, i(e(, Jnaturally


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intellect is e.e*/lified: +ust as the eye first of all sees li&ht, althou&h it does not discern, on

account of subtlety, as it discerns concernin& color throu&h li&ht(

[%%%( POP99SPOS96O6I9!L9S6%O#

-2 % res/ond otherwise to the first 5uestion 7/ara&ra/h 18, and in certainGi(e(, in the fi0e7/ara&ra/hs -, -4, 4, ?, 418M% will contradict the afore*entioned /osition( 6he ar&u*ents

for *y /osition show the o//osite of this /osition(

[14# [$( $ !L%DD%6$6%@9HOH9P6H$B9I$DOFOD#

- % say first, therefore, that not only can a conce/t be had naturally in which od is concei0ed asit wereper acci"ens, e(&(, in so*e attribute, but also so*e conce/t in which od is concei0ed

per seand 5uidditati0ely( [1#M% /ro0e, because by concei0in& CwiseC, a /ro/erty is concei0ed,

accordin& to hi*, or a 5uasi /ro/erty, in a second act /erfectin& the nature' therefore by

understandin& CwiseC it is necessary to /re;understand so*e CwhatC in which % understand that

5uasi /ro/erty to inhere, and thus before the conce/t of e0ery attribute [passio# or 5uasi

attribute [passio# it is necessary to seek a 5uidditati0e conce/t to which that is understood to beattributed: and this other conce/t will be 5uidditati0e of od, because in nothin& else can it

stand(

[1?# [B( HOH9%$HOH9P6L%@OH$=6OOD$DH9$6L9S#

-4 % say secondly that od is concei0ed not only in a conce/t analo&ous to the conce/t of acreature, e0idently what would be entirely other than that which is said of creatures, but in so*e

conce/t uni0ocal to od and creatures(M$nd lest a contention arise concernin& the na*e

Cuni0ocationC, % call a conce/t uni0ocal which is thus one that its unity suffices for contradiction,

by affir*in& and ne&atin& it of the sa*e thin&' it suffices also for the syllo&istic *iddle [ter*#,

as the e.tre*es united in the *iddle [ter* that is# one in this way can be concluded, withoutfallacy of e5ui0ocation, to be united a*on& the*sel0es(

- [$LA96SFOL%@OH$6%O# $nd % /ro0e uni0ocation understood in this way in fi0e ways( First inthis way: e0ery intellect, certain concernin& one conce/t and doubtful concernin& di0erse

[conce/ts#, has a conce/t concernin& which it is certain other than the conce/ts concernin&

which it is doubtful [that# the sub+ect includes the /redicate( But the intellect of the wayfarer

can be certain concernin& od that od is a bein&, while doubtin& concernin& finite or infinite

bein&' therefore, the conce/t of bein& concernin& od is other than this or that conce/t, and

thus neither fro* itself is included in either of those' therefore it is uni0ocal(

-? Proof of the *a+or [/re*ise#, because no identical [i"em# conce/t is certain and doubtful'therefore either one of the*, which is what is /ro/osed, or noneGand then there will not be

certitude of so*e conce/t(

-> Proof of the *inor [/re*ise#: any /hiloso/her had been certain that what [1># sNhe /osited asthe first /rinci/le is a bein&Gfor e.a*/le one [/osited# fire and another water, it was certain

that it was a bein&' howe0er, it was not certain that that bein& would ha0e been created or


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uncreated, first or not first, because then a /hiloso/her would ha0e been certain concernin&

[what is# false, and the false is not knowable' nor that it was not the first bein&, because then he

would not ha0e /osited the o//osite( 6his is confir*ed also, for so*eone seein& that

/hiloso/hers disa&ree could ha0e been certain concernin& so*ethin& that so*eone /osited as a

first /rinci/le, that it is a bein&, and ne0ertheless on account of the contrariety of their o/inions

could ha0e doubted whether it would be this bein& or that( $nd for such a doubter, if a

de*onstration concludin& or destroyin& so*e inferior conce/t would be *ade, e(&(, that fire

will not be the first bein& but so*e bein& /osterior to the first bein&, that first certain conce/t,

which was had of bein&, would not be destroyed, but would be sa0ed in that /articular conce/t

/ro0ed of fire, and throu&h this the /ro/osed is /ro0ed, su//osed in the final conse5uence of

this ar&u*ent, which was that that certain conce/t, which is fro* itself neither of the doubtful

[ones#, is sa0ed in either of the*(

3 [-# "hat if you do not care about that authority acce/ted concernin& the di0ersity of o/inionsof the /hiloso/hiers, but you say that any of the* has two close conce/ts in their intellect,

which, on account of the closeness of analo&y see*s to be one conce/t, a&ainst this it see*s

to be that then fro* this e0asion is seen the destruction of e0ery way of /ro0in& the uni0ocal

unity of so*e conce/t: for if you say that hu*an has one conce/t for Socrates and Plato, it is

ne&ated by you, and it would be said that there are two, but they Csee* oneC on account of a

&reat si*ilarity(

31 Further*ore, those two conce/ts are si*/ly si*/le' therefore not intelli&ible unless distinctlyand totally( 6herefore if now they do not Csee*C to be two, neither later(

3- [-1# $&ain, either they are concei0ed as entirely dis/arate, and it see*s re*arkable how theywould see* [to be# one, or as co*/ared accordin& to analo&y, or accordin& to si*ilitude, or

distinction, and then at the sa*e ti*e or before they would be concei0ed as distinct( 6herefore,they do not see* [to be# one(

33 $&ain, by /ositin& two conce/ts, you /osit two for*al, known ob+ects( Iow are two for*alob+ects known and not as distinctE

32 Further*ore, if the intellect would understand sin&ulars under /ro/er rationes, althou&h theconce/ts of two of the sa*e s/ecies would ha0e been si*ilar 7there is no doubt, ne0ertheless,

that *ore si*ilar [thin&s# than these two in what is /ro/osed, because those two differ by

s/ecies8 yet the intellect well distin&uishes a*on& such conce/ts of sin&ulars( 6his res/onse is

also dis/ro0ed in Distinction ?, 5uestion 3, and one other res/onse that ne&ates the *a+or/re*ise(

3 Second % /rinci/ally ar&ue in this way: no real conce/t is caused in the intellect of the wayfarernaturally unless by those that are naturally *oti0e of our intellect' but those are /hantas*s, or

an ob+ect showin& forth [rel!cens# in /hatas*s, and the a&ent intellect' therefore no si*/le

conce/t co*es to be naturally in our intellect e.ce/t what can be *ade by 0irtue of the*( But a

conce/t that would not ha0e been uni0ocal to an ob+ect [--# showin& forth [rel!cens# in


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/hantas*s, but entirely other, /rior, to which that has analo&y, cannot be *ade by the /ower of

the a&ent intellect and /hantas*s' therefore such other conce/t, which is /osited as analo&ous,

will ne0er be naturally in the intellect of the wayfarer, and thus so*e conce/t of od will not

be able to be had naturally, which is false(

Proof of what is assu*ed: any ob+ect, either showin& forth [rel!cens# in /hantas*s or in

intelli&ible s/ecies, with the a&ent or /ossible intellect coo/eratin&, accordin& to the hei&ht ofits /ower, *akes, as an effect ade5uate to it, a /ro/er conce/t and the conce/t of e0erythin&

included in it essentially or 0irtually' but that other conce/t that is /osited as analo&ous is

neither essentially nor 0irtually contained in this, nor also is it this' therefore this would not

co*e to be fro* so*e such *o0er(

[-3# $nd the ar&u*ent is confir*ed, because Cob+ectC: outside of its /ro/er, ade5uate conce/t,

and included in one of the two afore*entioned *odes [i(e(, essentially or 0irtually#, nothin& can

be known fro* that ob+ect unless throu&h discourse' but discourse /resu//oses knowled&e of

that si*/le to which it is discoursed(1? 6herefore the ar&u*ent is for*ed in this way, because

no ob+ect *akes a si*/le, /ro/er conce/t, in that intellect, of another ob+ect unless it would

contain that other ob+ect essentially or 0irtually' a created ob+ect, howe0er, does not contain an

uncreated [one# essentially or 0irtually, and this [-2# under that ratiounder which it is attributed

to it, as Cessentially /osteriorC is attributed to Cessentially /riorC, because it is a&ainst the ratio

Cessentially /osteriorC to include its /rior 0irtually, and it is ob0ious that a created ob+ect does not

contain an uncreated [ob+ect# accordin& to so*ethin& entirely /ro/er to it and not co**on'

therefore it does not *ake a si*/le conce/t /ro/er to uncreated bein&(

34 6hird it is ar&ued in this way: the /ro/er conce/t of so*e sub+ect is a sufficient reason forconcludin& of that sub+ect e0erythin& concei0able that necessarily inheres in it' howe0er, we

ha0e no conce/t of od throu&h which we can sufficiently know e0erythin& concei0ed by us

that necessarily inheres in od this is ob0ious concernin& the 6rinity and other necessary,

belie0ed thin&s' therefore etc(

3 6he *a+or [/re*ise# is /ro0ed, because we know any i**ediate [/ro/osition# insofar as weknow the ter*s' therefore the *a+or [/re*ise# is ob0ious concernin& all those concei0able that

i**ediately inhere in the conce/t of the sub+ect( Because if it would inhere *ediately, the

sa*e ar&u*ent would arise concernin& the *iddle [ter*# co*/ared to the sa*e [-# sub+ect,

and where0er it will stand, the /ro/osed would be had concernin& i**ediates, and further

throu&h those the *ediated [thin&s# would be known(

3? $&ain, fourth, it can be ar&ued in this way: either so*e C/erfection si*/lyC has a ratioco**onto od and creature, and the /ro/osed is had, or not but only /ro/er to a creature, and its ratio

does not belon& for*ally to od, which is /roble*atic [inconveniens#' or it has a ratioentirely

/ro/er to od, and then it follows that nothin& should be attributed to od, because od is

C/erfection si*/lyC, for this is to say nothin& other e.ce/t that because its ratio as it belon&s to

od na*es C/erfection si*/lyC, therefore it is /osited in od' and thus the teachin& of $nsel*Cs

Monologionis lost, where he says that )lea0in& aside relations, in all others, whate0er is si*/ly

1? Scotus here uses the /assi0e of )discourse( 9n&lish does not use a /assi0e for* of this word(


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better than not should be attributed to od, +ust as any that is not such should be re*o0ed fro*

od(1> First, therefore, accordin& to hi*, so*ethin& is known to be such, and secondly it is

attributed to od' therefore it is not such /recisely as it is in od( 6his also is confir*ed,

because then no C/erfection si*/lyC would be in creatures' the conse5uence is ob0ious, because

so*e conce/t of no such /erfection belon&s to creature unless an anolo&ical conce/t 7fro* the

hy/othesis8 CsuchC accordin& [-4# to itself, because the analo&ical is i*/erfect and in nothin&

is its ratiobetter than not, because otherwise it would be /osited in od accordin& to that

analo&ical ratio(

3> 6his fourth ar&u*ent is also confir*ed in this way: e0ery *eta/hysical in5uiry concernin& od/roceeds in this way, by considerin& the for*al ratioof so*ethin& and by re*o0in& fro* that

for*al ratiothe i*/erfection that it has in creatures, and by reser0in& that for*al ratioand

attributin& entirely the hi&hest /erfection, and thus by attributin& that to od( $n e.a*/le

concernin& the for*al ratioof wisdo* 7or intellect8 or of the will: indeed it is considered in

itself and for itself' and because this ratiodoes not for*ally include so*e i*/erfection or

li*itation, i*/erfections are re*o0ed fro* it that are conco*itant with it in creatures, and the

sa*e ratioof wisdo* or of the will ha0in& been /reser0ed, these are attributed to od *ost

/erfectly( 6herefore e0ery in5uiry [-# concernin& od su//oses that the intellect has the sa*e,

uni0ocal conce/t that it acce/ts fro* creatures(

2 Because if you say the for*al ratioof those that belon& to od is otherGfro* this follows[so*ethin /roble*atic, that fro* no /ro/er ratioof those accordin& as they are in creatures

can it be concluded of od, because the ratioof those and of these is entirely different' or rather

it would no *ore be concluded that od is for*ally wise than that od is for*ally a stone' for

co*e conce/t, other than the conce/t of created stone, can be for*ed, to which the conce/t of

stone as it is an idea in od has this attribution of stone, and thus it would be said for*ally Cod

is stoneC, accordin& to this analo&ical conce/t, +ust as CwiseC, accordin& to that analo&ical

conce/t(

21 6o this it is also ar&ued, fifth, in this way: a *ore /erfect creature is able to *o0e to a *ore/erfect conce/t of od( 6herefore, since so*e 0ision of od, for e.a*/le the lowest, not only

differs fro* so*e &i0en abstracti0e intellection of it insofar as the su/re*e creature is distant

fro* the lowest, [-?# it see*s to follow that if the lowest can *o0e to so*e abstracti0e

[intellection#, which the su/re*e creature, or so*ethin& below it, will be able to *o0e to an

intuiti0e intellection, which is i*/ossible(

2- Because if you say, that howe0er *any &rades there are in the abstracti0e intellection of od,there are that *any created s/ecies, althou&h the e.tre*e intellections-are not as distant as

e.tre*e s/ecies, which is well /ossible, because any &rade in intellections is less distant fro*

its /ro.i*ate than a created created s/ecies *o0in& to that is distant fro* a s/ecies *o0in& to

another,Ma&ainst: the difference of abstracti0e intellections is not only nu*erical, because those

are caused by causes of another s/ecies, and throu&h their /ro/er rationes, not insofar as they

1> $nsel*,Monologion, cha/ter 1(

- %(e(, the hi&hest and the lowest(


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12/43

2> %t see*s that it should be absolutely conceded that no conce/t of od can be *ade in us throu&hthe action of a created ob+ect that would be *ore /erfect than the /erfect, /ro/er conce/t of that

ob+ect, nor, by conse5uence, to [33# which this /ro/er conce/t of the *o0in& ob+ect is

attributed, rather *ore, that conce/t of od is *ore i*/erfect than this word, because [it is# an

e5ui0ocal effect *ore dissi*ilar to the cause( %t is necessary to ste/ back fro* the o/inion of

Ienricus of hent, if he would /osit that the conce/t of stone is attributed to the conce/t ofod that the stone causes( %t can be /recisely sa0ed that the concei0ed ob+ect is attributed to the

ob+ect, not ne0ertheless the conce/t to the conce/t' and this is well /ossible, because a conce/t

*ore i*/erfect conce/t is had of a *ore /erfect conce/t than of a *ore i*/erfect conce/t( $nd

how is it reasonable that in the sa*e intellect there is a /ro/er conce/t of od si*/ly *ore

i*/erfect than the conce/t of stone or of white, and how will there be natural ha//iness in the

knowled&e [cognitio# of od 7fro* Book 1 of theEthics8E

But there see* to be the sa*e difficulties a&ainst uni0ocation [as a&ainst analo&y#, becausee0ery conce/t of od will be less /erfect than the /erfect conce/t /ro/er [32# to white, because

e0ery such would be contained in whiteness as a co**on conce/t in a s/ecific, and theco**on is si*/ly less /erfect, because /otential and /art with res/ect to the s/ecific conce/t(

Iow, therefore, accordin& to that will there be ha//iness in the natural knowled&e of odE

1 es/onse( $ny si*/ly si*/le conce/t [n( 1 below#, na*ely of uni0ocation, is /ositi0ely *orei*/erfect than the word of white, that is, it /osits a not so &reat /erfection' ne0ertheless it is

/er*issi0ely *ore /erfect, because it abstracts fro* li*itation, and thus it is concei0able under

infinity: and then that conce/tGsi*/le certainly, ne0ertheless not si*/ly si*/leGna*ely

Jinfinite bein&


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*any such can be con+oined, and one [34# will de*onstrate the other, and that whole conce/t

will be *ore /erfect( or is there *ore difficulty [in the way of analo&y# than [in the way of

uni0ocation# e.ce/t in two: first, that here [in the way of analo&y# any conce/t, either

deter*inin& or deter*inable, is /osited as /ro/er to od, there [in the way of uni0ocation# one

[is /osited# as co**on and the other /ro/er-3' second, that [in the way of analo&y# so*ethin&

/ro/er to od is conceded [to be# *ore i*/erfect than the word of a creature, [in the way of

uni0ocation# nothin&( 6he first of these, howe0er, is not /roble*atic [inconveniens#, because an

attribute deter*ines well the sub+ect: risibile hu*an,-2and ne0ertheless each is e5ually

co**on( 6he second should be entirely conceded on account of the second ar&u*ent [n( 38,

by s/eakin& of the conce/t, that is of the act of concei0in&, not, howe0er, of the concei0ed

ob+ect(

2 $s to these counter ar&u*ents, it see*s sufficient to be suitably res/onded that each o/inion/osits a non;si*/ly si*/le conce/t *ore /erfect than the word of that which *o0es in /art(

But the counter;ar&u*ent *ade by ar&uin& [for analo&y# see*s a&ainst either o/inion, because

to whate0er e.tent they are con+oined, any of those conce/ts will be i*/ressed [3# by a

*o0in& creature( 6herefore, it is *ore i*/erfect than the word of that creature( Iow would an

a&&re&ation of i*/erfect [conce/ts# *ake an intensi0ely *ore /erfect conce/tE 6he

confir*ation [of the counter;ar&u*ent# also ar&ues well a&ainst that concernin& the finite( 6he

o/inion [concernin& uni0ocation# is not, therefore, dis*issed on account of that ar&u*ent,

because the difficulty is co**on to both, and e5ually, if the analo&y of conce/ts is e./osited

concernin& [what is# concei0ed(

Perha/s the counter;ar&u*ents /ro0e well that the act concernin& od would not be intensi0ely*ost /erfect' this is not re5uired, such that there would be there natural ha//iness, but it

con+oins to a *ost /erfect ob+ect, Book %% of On the Parts o& Animals: )6hat few know-etc(

$nd /erha/s so*ethin& created is *ore lo0ed than od, ne0ertheless that belo0ed does not now

*ake [one# ha//y as does od 7concernin& this, see in Book %@, )how we would be *ade

ha//y in an ob+ect-48( [6he act concernin& od would not be intensi0ely *ost /erfect# would

be true concernin& an infinite bein&, if Jinfinite< were /recisely that *ode under which the

ob+ect would ha0e been concei0ed, and not /art of the conce/t, or the *ode such that the

conce/t in itself 7as it is distin&uished in the 5uestion [3?# on the unity of od, on sin&ularity as

concei0ed and as the *ode /recisely under which-8 in which *anner also a certain &rade of

intension is /recisely the *ode under which this whiteness is seen( %n this way, howe0er, we do

not understand infinite bein&, but as includin& two conce/ts, althou&h Jone would deter*ine the

other


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neither necessary nor eternal e.ce/t [as# a ne&ation of i*/erfection, as for e.a*/le of the

/otency of relatin& otherwise or of what can be in flu., be it of the be&innin& or of the end(

9ternal na*es a Jcertain< infinite, because in less duration infinity is *ore /erfect than in a

5uantity of /erfection, +ust as an infinite *a&nitude would be *ore /erfect than an infinite ti*e(

[H( ODH$O6B9KO"LD9$POP9'AT(O#

4 6hird, % say that od is not known naturally by the wayfarer in /articular and /ro/erly, that isunder the ratioof this essence as this and in itself( But that ar&u*ent /osited for this in the

/recedin& o/inion does not conclude( %ndeed, when it is ar&ued that Jso*ethin& is not known

unless throu&h a si*ilar# of uni0ocation accordin& to

that way [of Ienricus#( %f in the second way, and creatures do not i*itate so *uch that essence

under the ratioof a &eneral attribute but also this essence as it is this essence 7or as it is e.istin&

Jnaked< in itself, accordin& to hi*8 for in this way the idea or e.e*/lar is *ore than under the

ratioof a &eneral attributeGtherefore, on account of such a si*ilitude, a creature could be the

/rinci/le of knowin& the di0ine essence in itself and in /articular(

6here is, therefore, another ar&u*ent for this conclusion, e0idently that od as this essence initself is not known naturally by us, because it is an ob+ect of the will under the ratioof such a

knowable, not natural, e.ce/t with res/ect to od


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intrinsic &rade of whiteness in itself( $nd thus the si*/licity of this conce/t Jinfinite bein&< is

ob0ious(

> 6he /erfection of this conce/t is /ro0ed, both because this conce/t, a*on& all conce/tsconcei0able by us, 0irtually includes *any [21# +ust as, indeed, bein& 0irtually includes true

and &ood in itself, so also infinite bein& includes infinite true and infinite &ood, and e0ery

J/erfection si*/ly< under the ratioof the infinite, and because by a de*onstration J!ia 6o the second 5uestion [n( 4# % say that the order of intelli&ibles in what is /ro/osed is threefold:one is the order of ori&in or accordin& to &eneration, another is the order of /erfection, the third

is the order of ade5uation or of /recise causality(

Honcernin& the first two it is discussed in Book % of theMetaphysics, ch( b: )6hose whichare /rior accordin& to &eneration are /osterior [2># accordin& to substance(31 Honcernin& the

third /riority, it is discussed in Book % ofPosterior Analyticsin the definition of Juni0ersal


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said to be concei0ed confusedly when it is concei0ed +ust as it is e./ressed throu&h the ter*

[nomen#, distinctly when it is concei0ed +ust as is e./ressed throu&h the definition(

3 6hese thin&s ha0in& been understood, % will first /osit the order of ori&in in actual knowled&eof those that are concei0ed confusedly, and within this % say that the first actually known

confusedly is the *ost s/ecific s/ecies, of which the sin&ular *ore efficaciously and *ore

stron&ly /ri*arily *o0es sense, and this, by ha0in& been su//osed that it be /resent to sense inthe re5uisite ["ebita# /ro/ortion( Fro* which it follows that if you /osit so*e cause in which

sense does not /ri*arily sense [1# the s/ecific nature such that it is not i**ediately ob0ious

if it is red or &reen color and by conse5uence the intellect throu&h that sensation does not

i**ediately a//rehend the s/ecific nature, % /osit always a unfittin& /ro/ortion of the sin&ular

to sense: either on account of an i*/erfection of /ower, which e.ceeds this 0isibility of such a

nature as a nature, or on account of a defect in the *ediu*, of li&ht or so*ethin& of this kind,

or on account of too &reat a distance(

2 6hrou&h this [the res/onse# is ob0ious to this counter;ar&u*ent: )two eyes at the sa*e distanceto red, one i**ediately /ercei0es redness, the other confusedly, therefore in the re5uisite

/ro/ortion the s/ecific nature is not i**ediately sensed, res/onse: what is re5uisite to one is

not re5uisite to the other, on account of a dis/ro/ortion in that distance(

$&ainst: if all the way to $ it /roduces the s/ecies of red, and beyond $ the s/ecies of color orre/resentin& confusedly, were those eyes beyond $, neither will see redness distinctly(

es/onse: whate0er would be concernin& the *ediu*, either e0erywhere [there would be# the

/ro/er s/ecies or beyond so*e distance a confused s/ecies, at least in an eye less dis/osedG

other thin&s bein& e5ualGit will be *ore confused, at least beyond a deter*inate distance(

4 [-# % /ro0e the /ro/osed conclusion in this way: a natural cause acts u/on its effect accordin&to the hei&ht of its /ower [potentia#, when it is not i*/eded' therefore, to the *ost /erfect effect

that it can /ri*arily /roduce, it /ri*arily acts( $ll concurrences u/on this first act of the

intellect are *erely natural causes, because they /recede e0ery act of the will, and not ha0in&

been i*/eded, as is ob0ious' therefore they /ri*arily /roduce the *ost /erfect conce/t in

which they are able: that, howe0er, is nothin& e.ce/t the conce/t of the /roduced *ost s/ecific

s/ecies( %f, howe0er, so*ethin& else, like the conce/t of so*ethin& *ore co**on, would be

the *ost /erfect in which those were able, since the conce/t of the *ore co**on would be

*ore i*/erfect than the conce/t of the *ost s/ecific s/ecies 7+ust as the /art is *ore i*/erfect

[3# than the whole8, it would follow that those would not ha0e been able in the conce/t of that

s/ecies, and thus would ne0er cause that conce/t(

Secondly in this way, because 7accordin& to $0icenna, Book % ofMetaphysics, ch( 38*eta/hysics is the last in the order of teachin&( 6herefore, the /rinci/les of all the other

sciences can be concei0ed, and the ter*s of the*, before the /rinci/les of *eta/hysics( But

this would not be if it were necessary to /ri*arily concei0e actually the conce/t *ore co**on

than the conce/t of the *ost s/ecific s/ecies' for then it would be necessary that bein&, and


20/43

others like it, be concei0ed /ri*arily, and thus it would follow *ore that *eta/hysics is the first

in the order of teachin&, therefore etc(

? 6hird, because if it were necessary to /reconcei0e *ore uni0ersal conce/ts before the conce/tof such a s/ecies, then, sense ha0in& been /osited in act concernin& a sin&ular *o0in& sense

and intellect e.istin& unfettered, it would be necessary to /osit a &reater ti*e before it would

concei0e the s/ecies of this kind of sin&ular /ri*arily sensed, because it would be necessary tounderstand the afore*entioned co**on [conce/ts# all said in J5uid< of that s/ecies before,

accordin& to order(33

> "ithin the first of these three ar&u*ents [n( 4#, it should be known that order, in &enerationsthrou&h the Ji*/erfect< such as the *ediu*, corres/onds to this, otherwise a definiti0e conce/t

would be /ri*arily caused by the ob+ect 7because it is able in that ob+ect8, or it will ne0er cause(

"hy is the definiti0e conce/t not /ri*arily caused, what /erfection is ac5uired for so*ethin&

of that conce/t throu&h discourse, by di0idin&, etc(E es/onse: the definiti0e conce/t is an

un/acked [e,plicit!s# conce/t of *any /artial [conce/ts#, therefore it is necessary that each be/re;understood, at least /rior by natureGand in us /rior te*/orallyGbecause one conce/t is

*ade known by us fro* /arts(

? Second % s/eak of actual knowled&e of those distinctly concei0ed, and % say that it is thecon0erse, concernin& a &eneral conce/t, because the first, thus concei0ed, is the *ost

co**on, and those that are nearer to it are /rior, those which are *ore re*ote are /osterior(

6his % /ro0e in this way, because fro* the second /refatory re*ark [n( -# nothin& is concei0ed

distinctly unless when all that are in its essential ratioare concei0ed' bein& is included in all

inferior, 5uidditati0e conce/ts' therefore no inferior conce/t is concei0ed distinctly unless bein&

has been concei0ed( Bein&, howe0er, cannot be concei0ed e.ce/t distinctly, because [# it has

a si*/ly si*/le conce/t( %t can be concei0ed, therefore, distinctly without others, and others

not without it ha0in& been distinctly concei0ed( 6herefore bein& is the first conce/t distinctly

concei0able( Fro* this it follows that those that are nearer to it are /rior because to know

Jdistinctly< is had throu&h the definition, which is sou&ht throu&h the way of di0ision, by

be&innin& fro* bein& all the way to the conce/t of the defined( %n di0ision, howe0er, the /rior

concei0ed, such as &enus and difference, occur before, in which a *ore co**on conce/t is

distinctly concei0ed(

?1 Second, % /ro0e that *eta/hysics, accordin& to $0icenna in the /lace cited abo0e, is firstaccordin& to the order of knowin& distinctly, because it has Jto ensure [certi&icare# the

/rinci/les of other sciences


21/43

throu&h itself32the /rinci/les of the other sciences are known throu&h the*sel0es fro* the

confused conce/t of the ter*s, but, fro* *eta/hysics bein& known, afterwards there is the

/ossibility of seekin& the 5uiddity of the ter*s distinctly' and in this way the ter*s of the

s/ecial sciences [4# are not concei0ed, nor are their /rinci/les understood, before *eta/hysics(

%n this way also *any can be ob0ious to *eta/hysico;&eo*etry that were not known before to

&eo*etry fro* a confused conce/t( 9.a*/le: a &eo*eter insofar as &eo*eter does not use that

which is known throu&h itself for /rinci/les e.ce/t those that are i**ediately e0ident fro* a

confused conce/t of the ter*s, such occurs /ri*arily fro* sensibles, like Ja line is a len&th2 $&ainst: why not si*ilarly in actual knowled&eE es/onse: here [in habitual knowled&e# suchare accordin& to nature ordered in *o0in& 7at the sa*e ti*e, howe0er, by duration8, not so [in

actual knowled&e# but successi0ely, and what is *ore /owerful [potenti!s# *ore stron&ly

*o0es and i*/edes that others then *o0e [in actual knowled&e#, not [in habitual#(

[B( On the order of Perfection and $de5uation of %ntelli&ibiles#

> [4-# ow on the order of /erfection, and % distin&uish that J*ore /erfectly intelli&ible< by uscan be understood in two ways: either si*/ly or accordin& to /ro/ortion( 9.a*/le: the 0ision

of an ea&le of the sun is si*/ly *ore /erfect with res/ect to the sun than *y 0ision with res/ect

to a candle, ne0ertheless *y 0ision is *ore /erfect /ro/ortionally, that is, it has *ore of the

ratioof 0ision accordin& to /ro/ortion to the 0isibility of the candle that the 0ision of the ea&le

with res/ect to the 0isibility of the sun(

>4 6his distinction is taken fro* $ristotle, Book %% of The Parts o& Animals, where he says thatalthou&h we would ha0e *ini*al knowled&e of i**aterial [thin&s#Mwhich should be


24/43

understood J/ro/ortionally "hen s/eakin&, therefore, of the order of knowled&e Jof the si*/ly *ore /erfect> Honcernin& the third /ri*acy, 0i(, ade5uation, it will be discussed in the followin& 5uestion [n(1?;-1# or elsewhere(

[@%( 6O6I9$LA96SOF6I9S9HOD!L9S6%O#

1 [6o the /rinci/al ar&u*ents# 6o the ar&u*ents [n( 4;?# of this 5uestion( 6o the first [n( 4# % say thatthe conse5uence is not 0alid, Jthere is a first bein&, therefore there is a first known


25/43

such a nature to &enerate its knowled&e( e0ertheless, a thin& is not so /erfectly known

throu&h its *otion as throu&h the di0ine essence( %t does not follow, therefore, fro* effect to

cause, by ar&uin&: )if *ost /erfectly, *ost /erfectly, therefore if si*/ly, si*/ly, because that

*ost /erfectly taken can be the /recise cause, J*ost /erfectly< in its kind' taken, ne0ertheless,

si*/ly, it is not the /recise cause of the effect in its kind(

13 6o the third n( ?# % say that the *a+or [/re*ise# is true when s/eakin& of the /ri*acy of/erfection, but not of the /ri*acy of ade5uation( 9.a*/le: there is ne0er 0ision aboutso*ethin& under the ratioof color /recisely, such that not under the ratioof this or that color,

like white or black, unless that would be seen fro* afar or i*/erfectly( Iowe0er, the 0ision of

so*ethin& under the ratioof color /recisely is not the *ost /erfect, but the *ost i*/erfect(

)6herefore the *ost /erfect o/eration of a /ower [potentia# is about its first ob+ect, is trueG

not )first by ade5uation, but )first by /erfection, [44# because e0idently it is the *ost /erfect

of those contained under the first ade5uate ob+ect( $nd therefore $ristotle says in Book of

theEthicsthat )/erfect deli&ht is in the o/eration about the best ob+ect of those that are under

the /ower [potentia#, that is about the best contained under the ade5uate ob+ect of that /ower

[potentia#( 6his ar&u*ent /ro0es that od is the first known, that is, *ost /erfect, which %concede, but not the first ade5uate [ob+ect#concernin& which in the followin& 5uestion [n( 1?;

-1#(

12 [6o the other ar&u*ents# "hat that o/inion says, in the first /art of the second 5uestion [n( --#,concernin& the ne&ati0ely and /ri0ati0ely indeter*inate, if it understands this concernin& the

/ri*acy of ori&in, % ha0e contradicted this in the first /art of the second 5uestion [n( 3#(

1 $nd when it is ar&ued that )Jthe ne&ati0ely indeter*inate< is *ore indeter*inate than theJ/ri0ati0ely indeter*inate


26/43

-3#, in this he see*s to contradict hi*self( [4?# Ie had said before that od is the first known

naturally by the intellect as od is Jne&ati0ely indeter*inate< [n( --#, and he says that in the

conce/t od is distin&uished fro* creature, because that does not belon& to a creature(

[!L9S6%O3:

"I96I9OD"OL=DB96I9F%S6, $6L$=, $D9!L$69OB9H6"%6I9SP9H66O6I9%69==9H6OF6I9"$QF$9#

1? $ccordin& to that which was held in the third article of the second 5uestion on the first ob+ect ofthe intellect, that is, the ade5uate and /recise ob+ect, it is asked whether od would be the first,

natural, ade5uate ob+ect with res/ect to the intellect of the wayfarer(

%t is ar&ued that yes:

BecauseGfro* the /recedin& 5uestionGod is the first, that is the *ost /erfect a*on& all

knowables' )the first, howe0er, in any kind is the cause of bein& such of others in that kind,

fro* Book %% of theMetaphysics,3such that it is ob0ious: Jthe first hot [thin is the cause of

heat in all others


27/43

5uiddity of the *aterial thin&, which, e0en if it would be in *atter, ne0ertheless is not knowable

as it is in the sin&ular *atter(

113 $&ainst: that cannot be sustained by the theolo&ian because an intellect, e.istin& naturally bythe sa*e /ower, would knowper sethe 5uiddity of an i**aterial substance, as is ob0ious

accordin& to the faith concernin& the blessed soul( Iowe0er, a /ower re*ainin& the sa*e cann

ha0e an act about so*ethin& that is not contained under its first ob+ect(112 "hat if you say it will be ele0ated by the li&ht of &lory to this: that it would know those

i**aterial substances, a&ainst: the first ob+ect of a habit is contained under the first ob+ect of

a /ower, or at least does not e.ceed it, because if a habit re&ards so*e ob+ect that is not

contained under the first ob+ect of the /ower, but would e.ceed it, then that habit would not

ha0e been a habit of that /ower, but would *ake it not to be that /ower but another( 6he

ar&u*ent is confir*ed, because since a /ower, in the first si&n of nature in which it is a /ower,

would ha0e such a first ob+ect, the nature /resu//osin& the ratioof the /ower throu&h nothin&

/osterior can be *ade its first ob+ect( 90ery habit, howe0er, naturally /resu//oses a /ower(

11%f this o/inion is also /osited by $ristotle, as if he would /osit that our intellect, on account of

its lowness a*on& other intellects, 0i(, the di0ine and an&elic, and on account of it con+unction

with the fantastic /ower [virt!s# has an i**ediate order to the /hantas* +ust as /hantas*s ha0e

an i**ediate order [-# to co**on sense, and therefore +ust as fantasy is not *o0ed by

so*ethin& unless what is the ob+ect of the co**on sense, althou&h by another way it would

know the sa*e ob+ect, so too he would say that our intellect, not only on account of so*e

state but fro* the nature of the /ower, would not understand so*ethin& unless abstractable

fro* /hantas*(

114 $&ainst this it is ar&ued in three ways( First, because a natural desire for knowin& the cause isin the intellect knowin& the effect, and in knowin& the cause in the uni0ersal there is a natural

desire for knowin& that in /articular and distinctly' natural desire, howe0er, is not for the

i*/ossible fro* the nature of desirin&, because then it would be in 0ain' therefore it is not

i*/ossible that the intellect, on the /art of the intellect, knows i**aterial substance in

/articular fro* which it knows *aterial [substance#, which is its effect, and thus the first

ob+ect of the intellect does not e.ceed that i**aterial [substance#(

11 Further*ore, no /ower can know so*e ob+ect under a ratio*ore co**on than would be theratioof its first ob+ect, which is ob0ious first throu&h reason, because then that ratioof the

first ob+ect would not be ade5uate' and is ob0ious throu&h an e.a*/le: for 0ision does not know

so*ethin& throu&h a ratio*ore co**on than would be the ratioof color or of li&ht, [3#

which is its first ob+ect' but the intellect knows so*ethin& under a ratio*ore co**on thanwould be the ratioof the i*a&inable, because it knows so*ethin& under the ratioof bein& in

co**on, otherwise *eta/hysics would not be a science for our intellect, therefore etc(

11? Further*ore, third, and returnin& as it were into the sa*e as the second: whate0er is knownperseby a co&niti0e /ower either is its first ob+ect or is contained under its first ob+ect' bein& as

bein& is *ore co**on than sensible, is understoodper seby us, otherwise *eta/hysics would

not be a transcendin& science *ore than /hysics' therefore so*ethin& cannot be the first ob+ect


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of our intellect that would be *ore /articular than bein&, because then bein& in itself in no way

would be understood by us(

11> %t see*s, therefore, that so*ethin& false is su//osed in the said o/inion concernin& the firstob+ect, and this when s/eakin& of /ower fro* the nature of /ower( Fro* this it a//ears that if

the first 5uestion [n( 1# were sol0ed throu&h the way of this o/inion, by sayin& that that sensible

5uiddity is the first ob+ect of the intellectGnot od or bein&Gthe solution is be&un fro* a false&round(

1- [2# $lso the con&ruence [n( 11-# that is adduced for that o/inion is nothin&( %t is notnecessary to assi*ilate the /ower and the ob+ect in the *ode of bein&: for they are related as

*oti0e and *obile, and these are related as dissi*ilars, because as act and /otency' they are,

ne0ertheless, /ro/ortioned, because that /ro/ortion re5uires a dissi*ilarity of the thin&s

/ro/ortioned, as is co**only in /ro/ortion, as is ob0ious concernin& *atter and for*, /art

and whole, cause and caused, and other /ro/ortions( 6herefore, fro* the *ode of bein& of such

a /ower, a si*ilar *ode of bein& in the ob+ect cannot be concluded(

1-1$&ainst this it is ob+ected, because althou&h the facti0e a&ent could be dissi*ilar to the ob+ect,

which is there under&one,3?ne0ertheless the o/erator in a co&niti0e o/eration *ust be

assi*ilated to the ob+ect about which it o/erates, which is not there under&one but *ore a&ent

and assi*ilator( %ndeed all a&ree in this, that knowled&e co*es to be throu&h assi*ilation, nor

did $ristotle contradict the* in this( 6herefore, here not only is /ro/ortion re5uired but also

si*ilitude(

1-- es/onse: %t is one thin& to s/eak of the *ode of bein& of the /ower [potentia# itself in itself,and another to s/eak of it insofar as it is under a second act, or a dis/osition close to the second

act, which would be other than the nature [# of the /ower [potentia#( ow, howe0er, it is that

the knowin& /ower is assi*ilated to the known( %t it true, throu&h its act of knowin&, which is a

certain si*ilitude of the ob+ect, or throu&h a s/ecies, dis/osin& fro* the /ro.i*ate for knowin&,

but fro* this to conclude that the intellect itself, in itself naturally, has a *ode of bein&

si*ilar to the *ode of bein& of the ob+ect, or the con0erse, is to *ake a fallacy of accident and a

fi&ure of s/eech' +ust as it does not follow )air is assi*ilated to Haesar because it is

assi*ilated throu&h an induced fi&ure, therefore air in itself has a si*ilar *ode of bein& to

Haesar


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1-3 [4# $ristotle and the )article a&ree on this, that the 5uiddity of a sensible thin& is now [in thislife# the ade5uate ob+ect, by understandin& Jsensible< /ro/erly, either to be included essentially

or 0irtually in the sensible( Otherwise, by understandin& the Js/ecific< 5uiddity 7either re*o0ed

or 0irtually included, each returns to the sa*e8( 6herefore, now [the intellect

3> $u&ustine,De Trinitate@%%%, ch( >( 6ranslated by $rthur "est Iaddan( Fro* icene and Post;icene Fathers, First

Series, @ol( 3( 9dited by Phili/ Schaff 7Buffalo, Q: Hhristian =iterature Publishin& Ho(, 1??(8 e0ised and edited for

ew $d0ent by Ke0in Kni&ht(Rhtt/:NNwww(newad0ent(or&NfathersN131(ht* (
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10321a.htmhttp://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09397a.htmhttp://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09397a.htmhttp://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10321a.htm


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1-4 [># $&ainst this o/inion % ar&ue in this way: the first natural ob+ect of so*e /ower [potentia#has a natural order to that /ower' od does not ha0e a natural order to our intellect under a

*oti0e ratio, unless /erha/s under the ratioof so*e *ore &eneral attribute, as that o/inion

/osits' therefore od is not the first ob+ect unless under the ratioof that attribute, and such that

that &eneral attribute will be the first ob+ect, or accordin& to that o/inion that % held before, that

od is not understood unless under the ratioof bein&, od will not ha0e a natural order e.ce/tunder such a uni0ersal conce/t( But the /articular that is not understood e.ce/t in so*ethin&

co**on it not the first ob+ect of the intellect, but that *ore co**on( 6herefore etc(

1- Further*ore, it is certain that od does not ha0e /ri*acy of ade5uation on account ofco**onness [comm!nitas#, such that it is said of e0ery ob+ect intelli&ibleper seby us(

6herefore, if od has so*e /ri*acy of ade5uation, this will be on account of 0irtuality, because

e0idently od contains 0irtually in odself allper seintelli&ibles( But not on account of this

will od be the ob+ect ade5uate to our intellect, because other bein&s *o0e [?# our intellect by

a /ro/er /ower [virt!s#, such that the di0ine essence does not *o0e our intellect for knowin&

itself and for knowin& all other knowables( ust as, howe0er, has been said already in the

5uestion on the sub+ect of theolo&y, the essence of od is therefore the first ob+ect of the di0ine

intellect, because it alone *o0es the di0ine intellect for knowin& itself and all other thin&s

knowable by that intellect(

1-? 6hrou&h the sa*e ar&u*ents [n( 1-4 T 1-# it is /ro0en that substance cannot be /osited to bethe first ob+ect of our intellect on account of the attribution of all accidents to substance,

because accidents ha0e a /ro/er /ower [virt!s# *oti0e of our intellects( 6herefore substance

does not *o0e for itself and for all others(

[%%( 6O6I9!L9S6%O#

1-> 6o the 5uestion, therefore, % say briefly that nothin& can be /osited as the natural ob+ect of ourintellect on account of such 0irtual ade5uation, because of the reason held a&ainst the /ri*acy

of the 0irtual ob+ect in od [n( 1-# or in substance [n( 1-?#( 6herefore either nothin& would be

/osited to be first or it is necessary to see the Jfirst ade5uate [ob+ect#< on account of a

co**onness [comm!nitas# in it( $nd if bein& is /osited to be e5ui0ocal to created and

uncreated, to substance and accident, since all these are intelli&ibleper seby us, nothin& see*s

to be able to be /osited as the first ob+ect of our intellect, neither on account of 0irtuality nor on

account of co**onness [comm!nitas#( But by /ositin& that /osition that % /osited in the first

5uestion of this distinction [?1#, on the uni0ocation of bein&, it can be sa0ed in so*e way thatso*ethin& is the first ob+ect of our intellect(

13 For understandin& which, % will first declare how there is a uni0ocation of bein& and to what,and secondly, fro* this, to the /oint(

[$( IO"6I99"OL=DB9L%@OH$6%O$D6O"I$6#


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131 "ithin the first, % say that bein& is not said uni0ocally in J5uid< of allper seintelli&ibles,because it is not said of the ulti*ate differences nor of the attributes [passiones# /ro/er to

bein&( %t is called an Julti*ate difference< because it does not ha0e a difference, because it is

not resol0ed into a 5uidditati0e and 5ualitati0e conce/t, deter*inable and deter*inin&, but is

only the the 5ualitati0e conce/t of it, as the ulti*ate &enus only has a 5uidditati0e conce/t(

13- 6he first, na*ely concernin& the ulti*ate difference, % /ro0e in two ways( First in this way: ifdifferences include bein& uni0ocally said of the*, and they are not entirely the sa*e, therefore

they are di0erse so*ethin&;sa*e bein&s( Such are /ro/erly differences, fro* Books @ and of

theMetaphysics(2 6herefore those ulti*ate differences [?-# were not /ro/erly different:

therefore they differ by other differences( Because if those others include bein& 5uidditati0ely,

it follows fro* the* +ust fro* /riorsGand thus there would be a /rocess into infinity in

differences, or it will sto/ at so*ethin& not includin& bein& 5uidditati0ely, which is the /oint,

because only those will be ulti*ate(

133 Secondly in this way: +ust as co*/osite bein& is co*/osed fro* act and /otency in the thin&, so

theper se one, co*/osite conce/t is co*/osed fro* a /otential and actual conce/t, or ratherfro* a deter*inable and and deter*inin& conce/t( 6herefore, +ust as the resolution of bein&

sto/s ulti*ately at si*/ly si*/les, i(e(, at the ulti*ate act and the ulti*ate /otency, which are

i**ediately di0erse, such that nothin& of one includes so*ethin& of the other otherwise this

would not be /ri*arily an act, nor would that be /ri*arily a /otency 7for what includes so*e

/otentiality is not /ri*arily an act8 so too, it is necessary that in conce/ts e0ery non;si*/ly

si*/le conce/t, and ne0erthelessper seone, be resol0ed into a deter*inable and a deter*inin&

conce/t, such that the resolution would sto/ at a si*/ly si*/le conce/t, i(e(, at a deter*inable

conce/t only, such that it includes nothin& deter*inin&, and at a deter*inin& conce/t only,

which does not include so*e deter*inable conce/t( 6hat conce/t Jonly deter*inable< is the

conce/t of bein&, and Jonly deter*inin&< is the conce/t of the ulti*ate [?3# difference(6herefore those will be i**ediately di0erse, such that one would include nothin& of the other(

132 Second, i(e(, the /oint concernin& the attributes [passiones# of bein&, % /ro0e in two ways( Firstin this way: an attribute [passio# is /redicated Jper sein the second way< of the sub+ect,

accordin& to Book % ofPosterior Analytics21Mtherefore the sub+ect is /osited in the definition of

the attribute [passio# as [so*ethin added, fro* Book % of thePosterior Analyticsand fro*

Book @%% of theMetaphysics, ch( 3,2-where he says that +ust as a line insofar as line has

attributes, and nu*ber insofar as nu*ber, so also are there so*e attributes of bein& insofar as

bein&: but bein& falls in the ratioof those as addedGtherefore it is not Jper sein the first way

duns scotus on singularity

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