dulffer - bonapartism fascism and nacional-socialism

8/8/2019 DULFFER - Bonapartism Fascism and Nacional-Socialism

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Bonapartism, Fascism and National SocialismAuthor(s): Jost DulfferSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No. 4, Special Issue: Theories of Fascism(Oct., 1976), pp. 109-128Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260193

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Journal of Contemporary History, 11 (1976), 109-128

Bonapartism,FascismandNationalSocialismJost Dulffer

Bonapartism has frequently been cited in recent years as an explanatorymodel for fascism. It does indeed seem to offer a means of relaxingthe inflexibility of a historical interpretation determined by a simpleclass-struggle pattern. However, inherent in the application of thisconcept, lies the danger of giving currency to a shallow slogan whichobscures more than it illuminates. At first sight, the use of a catchphrasewhich has its sources in a specific historical situation and which isthen applied to fascism, may appear surprising. The concept ofBonapartism derives, after all, from the family name of the two Frenchemperors, Napoleon I and Napoleon III. It was originally applied tonineteenth century phenomena at a time when the industrial revolutionwas taking place in France, whereas fascism is a twentieth centuryphenomenon. If, therefore, Bonapartism is used, as it were, to describea timeless form of government, there is the danger of obtaining animprecise, undifferentiated model which embraces too much - andat the same time too little.The earliest and most fruitful model of Bonapartism stems fromthe observations of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx did nothowever develop the theory of Bonapartism as such.1 But as a historianhe frequently dealt with contemporary political and socialdevelopments in France, and made fundamental observations - inthemselves not always coherent - which served as points of departurefor a later systematization. With ironic precision Marx saw NapoleonIII's character as a much diminished copy of his great uncle, thoughhe also pointed out the parallels in their paths to power.Marx's seminal essay, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonapartewas written immediately after the coup d'etat of 2 December 1851(the actual assumption of power of Louis Bonaparte) and describesthe inner logic of developments in France after the Revolution of

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Journal of Contemporary HistoryFebruary 1848. During the three years preceding the coup d'etat,Marx observed a progressive self-exclusion of the social classes inFrance in their battle for power. The proletariat, petit-bourgeoisdemocrats and big bourgeois Party of Order, one after the other,put themselves hors de concours, until Louis Bonaparte finallysucceeded in his coup d'etat. The latter depended directly for supporton the Lumpenproletariat and on the mass of the apoliticalsmall-holding peasants. Under his rule the executive authority 'madeitself an independent power', 'all classes were equally powerless' andFrance 'seems . . . to fall back beneath the despotism of anindividual . . .' Nevertheless, Bonaparte looked on himself, in Marx'swords, as 'the representative of the middle class and issues decreesin this sense. But he is somebody solely due to the fact that he hasbroken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks itanew.'2

In the following years Marx did not supply any detailed analysisof the political practice of Napoleon III in power, so that he can hardlybe considered a theorist of Bonapartism. However, in detailedcommentaries in newspaper articles and letters he followed thecontinuing development of the Second Empire. After 1856 it hadinitially seemed to him that the financial policy of the bank CreditMobilier, which was closely associated with Louis Napoleon, wouldbring about the speedy end of his 'imperial socialism' through sheerexploitation.3 Contrary to his expectations, however, the regimesurvived the collapse of the bank. After the attempted assassinationof the Emperor in 1858, Marx again interpreted the severe wave ofrepression as a sign of weakness and prophesied the collapse ofBonapartism in the foreseeable future. The power of the state wasin his view supported only by the army as its instrument of repression.This 'Rule of the Praetors' had already been hinted at in his earlierdiagnosis of an 'executive authority made independent' in 1852.It now became a fundamental aspect of Marx's interpretations. Purerule by force was designed to overcome Bonaparte's difficulties andwould serve in a war as an external instrument of aggression. Accordingto Marx, Napoleon III was thus hoping to re-establish some sort ofminimal inner stability by successes abroad: 'War is the conditionunder which he holds on to the throne.' Bonapartism became 'thecause of periodical war'.4 Marx comes close here to an interpretationwhich under the designation of 'social imperialism', has claimedconsiderable attention in recent years in the study of German history.5

According to this concept, the diversion of internal difficulties

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Dilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialisminto foreign policy by various means is considered a conspicuousfeature of the Prussian monarchy and the German Empire. With respectto social imperialism, the development of French 'imperial socialism'into a pure military dictatorship under Napoleon III can be regardedas an extreme special case. There seems little point in trying to derivea broad concept of Bonapartism from this interpretation, especiallyas Marx ignored the significant change in the character of LouisBonaparte's regime - from an authoritarian to a liberal empire.6

During the 1860s both Marx and Engels became increasinglysceptical of the pacemaking role of French developments for theinternational and proletarian revolution. We should not, therefore, besurprised that in 1865, when Engels first adapted the concept ofBonapartism to German conditions, he also attempted a new standarddefinition:7

Bonapartism s the necessaryform of government n a country in whichthe working classeshave reachedan advancedstage of development n thecities, but are outnumberedby the small peasantryand have been defeatedby the capitalist class, the petty bourgeoisie and the army in a greatrevolutionary attle.

The definition of the actual content of what constituted Bonapartismwas however left remarkably vague and was not taken any furtherby Marx in 1871 in his Civil War n France.8 He reiterated his previousanalysis in the Eighteenth Brumaire and took the Paris Communeto be the complete antithesis of Bonapartism. As in Engels' definition,Bonapartism was now endowed with the characteristic of being anecessary stage of historical development as 'the only possible formof government at a time when the bourgeoisie had already lost itscapacity to rule the nation and the working class had not yet acquiredthat capacity.' Here too, situations were presented out of whichsomething was supposed to develop, not the analysis of what hadactually happened. This assessment of Marx and Engels which placedBonapartism at a certain stage of social and economic developmentand of the class struggle, has become the subject of lively discussionin recent years. H.-U. Wehler, in particular, attempted to expandit into a comparative theory of European developments in thenineteenth century.9 But it is more than questionable whether recentintensive debates have made the prospects of a comprehensive theoryof Bonapartism seem any more tenable than in the past.10The theory of Bonapartism first became an explanatory vehiclein connection with fascism after the first world war. Though one

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Journal of Contemporary Historycan find elements of Marx's Bonapartist model in conservative andliberal interpretations, it was essentially identified with the emergingcommunist and socialist theory of fascism. For the CommunistInternational (Comintern) and consequently also for nationalcommunist parties the tendency in the 1920s to make fascism andcapitalism synonymous became increasingly important. This viewreached its climax at the Sixth World Congress of the ExecutiveCommittee of the Comintern in 1928.11 Fascism appeared as thenecessary form of bourgeois-capitalist rule and indeed as its last stagein time. All states would therefore have to pass through this stage.Social democracy, which was not prepared to wage the class warwith sufficient energy was deemed to have fascist tendencies. It wasto be fought just as intensely as were the fascists; indeed, it was viewedas even more dangerous, since it vied with the Communist Party forthe favour of the working class. However, the Stalinization of thecommunist line,12 which had a devastating effect on developmentsin Germany and the assumption of power by the National Socialists,did not remain unchallenged in the Communist Party and was thecause of numerous splits.August Thalheimer had been one of the leading theorists of theGerman communists and of the Comintern. His different judgmentof fascism led in 1928 to his exclusion from orthodox communism.13Since he continued to feel committed to Marx and still looked forapproval to his former colleagues, his use of the Bonapartist modelfor the purpose must be regarded as a skilful move. The theory wasthereby endowed with the function of breaking up Stalinist orthodoxyfrom within, in order to draw attention to the diversity of Marxistthought in face of the acute political danger. In early 193014 in anumber of shorter contributions on fascism in the KPD oppositionjournal, Gegen den Strom, he opposed an equation of Bonapartismwith fascism, but considered the particular class analysis in Marx'sinterpretation of Bonapartism as significant. For example, in his CivilWar n France (1871) Marx had written:

Imperialism is the most prostituted and at the same time the ultimate formof the state power which nascent middle-class society had commenced toelaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism, and whichfull-grown bourgeois society had transformed into a means for theenslavement of labour by capital.Precisely this interpretation of Bonapartism and thus also of fascismas the 'ultimate' form of bourgeois state power might, if interpreted

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Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialismliterally, be considered an argument for the Comintern thesis, withits theory of fixed phases.Thalheimer accordingly corrected his model, pointing out thatBonapartism in France was not followed by the proletarian revolution,but by the 'bourgeois-parliamentary republic.' Since fascism alsorepresented 'the most prostituted and the ultimate form of the statepower', it seemed possible that, here too, it might not be regardedsimply as a direct precursor of the proletarian revolution. This woulddepend on the stage of development of capitalism and bourgeois rulein a given country.In a concrete comparison, Thalheimer then cited examples ofBonapartism and fascism. Of course, in 1930, only Italy could strikehim as fascist in the narrow sense; other than this, above all, Poland,but also Bulgaria and Spain where, however, 'the nature of the classstructure is fundamentally different.' Thalheimer saw somecorrespondence between the France of Louis Bonaparte andcontemporary Italy under Mussolini, as far as the method of takingover power, the class structure, as well as the ideological aspect andthe personality of the leader were concerned. One cannot fail torecognise an almost mechanistic method here. National differencesrecede in spite of Thalheimer's efforts to the contrary.Thalheimer dealt only briefly with German conditions althoughthey form the actual background to his theoretical analysis. As inother parliamentary states, like England and France, developmentsin Germany were moving 'in the direction of fascism.' This mightlead to 'forms of the open rule of capital', which again did not 'haveto be identical with fascism.'15 It was one of the chief aims ofThalheimer's essay to prove that the political situation was, in principle,open to various developments and therefore to different possibilitiesof Communist Party action vis-a-vis fascism. Through his differentiatedrepresentation of fascism, he hoped to canvass opinion to direct themain force of the communists against the NSDAP.Leon Trotsky, though with a similar purpose in mind, criticizedThalheimer's conceptualizations on theoretical grounds. The latterwas looking at Bonapartism in isolation: but in just the same waythat the relationship of classes differed under Napoleon I and NapoleonIII in France, so 'Bonapartism' in Bismarck's Germany differed fromits predecessors. Trotsky's critique of Thalheimer contributed toan inflation of the Bonapartist model by emphasizing that nationaldifferences could give rise to entirely different phenomena.Bonapartism becomes in his interpretation a warning-signal for the

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Journal of Contemporary Historyapproach of fascism. As soon as this label has been applied to a politicalsystem, the working class ought to be very much on the alert and toprepare for revolutionary activity.After Hitler came to power, it appeared to Trotsky that Bonapartismhad achieved 'its purest form' in the person of the last Chancellorbefore Hitler, General von Schleicher.16 Trotsky now also designatedthe regimes of other states as Bonapartist: Austria as early as 1933;the French government of Doumergue in mid-1934; finally also theregime of Marshal Petain in France, which he distinguished fromfascism itself as 'a senile form of Bonapartism.' Trotsky did notconceptually deviate from earlier characterizations in his definitionof Bonapartism, namely, such characteristics included an antagonisticposition of two classes and a dictatorial regime. In mid-1933 he said:'It now makes sense to speak of a fundamental legitimacy of the"Bonapartist" transition period between parliamentarianism andfascism.17 By the time of his last article in 1940, Trotsky hadabandoned his confidence in the outcome of this transition.18 Henow distinguished qualitatively between the Bonapartism of bourgeoisascendancy, probably belonging to the nineteenth century, and thepresent Bonapartism of the 'imperialist decline.'A third writer, influenced by communism, who wrote about therelationship between Bonapartism and fascism was Franz Borkenau,a former official of the Comintern, who had cut loose from his origins.His essay, 'The Sociology of Fascism',19 appeared at the time ofHitler's accession to power. His most significant idea was that thestruggle of the working-class could be reactionary if it were fightingagainst a little developed capitalistic evolution. Borkenau criticizedThalheimer for believing, like the members of the KPD, to whomthey were both opposed, in too rapid a victory of the proletariat.He admitted that the fascist party in Italy had made itself independentand that it was supported by the petite-bourgeoisie, but objectedthat 'the analogy between Mussolini and Napoleon III is open tonumerous objections.' On the other hand he emphasized that thecorrespondence between (Italian) fascism and the 'first Bonapartism'is 'unambiguous'. In this category he included William of Orange,Cromwell, Bismarck, as well as contemporary Japan, Kemal Ataturkand Chiang Kai-shek. These counted as 'revolutionary dictators' ina line of development which could scarcely be distinguished fromfascism. Borkenau thereby interpreted fascism primarily as adevelopmental dictatorship and in relation to this considered the roleof a 'Caesar' as unimportant: 'True fascism is a transitional

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Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialismcondition . . . like any dictatorship for the creation of industrialcapitalism.'20 Hence, Borkenau anticipated some aspects of thepresent-day discussions of modernization. But he did not includeGerman National Socialism, whose rise to power he failed to anticipate,although, by the time of the publication of his essay, it had alreadybeen achieved.It is not difficult to explain the fact that the Bonapartist model offascism has been much less intensively discussed in the 'bourgeois'or pro-fascist camp, since both the Napoleonic regimes failed, makingit easy to draw analagous conclusions for fascist systems, howeverdifferent they might individually be. A second factor was thatreferences to the tradition of the 'hereditary enemy' (France) werenot exactly popular in inter-war Germany, as a result of the Versaillestreaty. There were, therefore, only isolated references to France inNazi publications, and.parallels between Napoleon and Hitler were ingeneral studiously avoided.21 Nevertheless, in 1928, the Berlinhistorian, Peter R. Rohden, investigated 'fascist motives in the Frenchstate ethos'22 and discovered a line of tradition which leads fromthe Jacobins of the French revolution 'through the plebiscitariancaesarism of Bonaparte', from the ' "Ultras" of the Restoration periodto the Patriotic League of Deroulede.' Ulrich Noack, on the otherhand, rejected the idea of Caesarism in the Second Empire, since'it lacked an ideological foundation' though he left it open as towhether the National Socialist regime contrasted positively with this.23Only Wolfgang Windelband, in a sketch, 'The Historical Figure ofNapoleon III' (1936) adopted 'a method of writing history whichviewed the past under the aegis of certain historical events whichstand in the foreground today.'24 Without drawing any specificparallels to Hitler, it was clear from Windelband's assessment that heregarded Napoleon III as a 'leader personality', (Fuhrerpersonlichkeit),both in the realm of domestic and in foreign policy. Positivecharacteristics of the Second Empire are described in such a wayas to be direct allusions to the Third Reich.In 1938, in the monthly journal, Die Tat, whose circle had beenthe chief support of von Schleicher but which had subsequentlyadapted itself to the Nazi regime, an article by Karl Heinz Bremerappeared, entitled 'The Socialist Emperor'.25 This expert on WesternEurope, who belonged to the younger generation, confirmed, likeWindelband, Napoleon III's failure; nevertheless he took him to be'the leading mind of his century.' The crux of the matter for Bremer

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Journal of Contemporary Historywas Napoleon's attempt to realize 'socialism and the principle ofnationalities.' He had 'established an authoritarian and totaldictatorship of the people's emperor' as the appropriate form of state,which alone had the capacity to 'bridge the class interests and hithertoexisting party-political ideas.' Bremer did not establish a direct linkwith the National Socialist regime, but, in view of his choice of words,the parallels lay exposed for any reader to see. Thanks, however,to the author's prudent style of expressing himself, it remains anopen question whether the causes cited by him which contributedto Napoleon II's failure, also contained a hidden admonition to Hitlerto avoid similar mistakes. According to Bremer, the Emperor wouldhave had to take to heart Proudhon's warning against an 'opportunisticcoalition with the capitalist forces and the church'; however, he didnot have

the courage o strikeout in a new direction in accordancewith his historicalprinciples,but wantedfirst to supportthe new dynastywith the 'old'pillars,with the liberalbourgeoisieand the reactionarychurch.He believedtherewasgreater ecurity o be foundhere han nthecreativeVolk.Hewasmistakenin this.If this was indeed an indirect criticism of the Nazi regime, thenBremer's assessment was a notable conservative attempt to remindHitler of his social promises and of domestic political instability,as well as to warn him not to seek a solution through the 'socialimperialistic' export of tensions by means of war.26For the Nazi self-image the problem of parallels with 'Bonapartism'was still more evident. The historian Walter Frank, who in 1935 tookover the Reichsinstitut fur Geschichte des neuen Deutscblands, venturedround the periphery of this sort of discussion while he was preparinghis major study on questions of the Third Republic in France.27At the same time, he was working as a journalist for the NSDAP.In 1931, in the polemical paper, Der Angriff, he had sharply rejectedthe parallel suggested by the Jewish journalist, Bruno Weil, betweenHitler and the French General Boulanger, whose plebiscitarian positionplaced him in the Napoleonic tradition.28With the onset of German military expansion from 1939 onwards,the idea of territorial acquisition and the formation of a new Empiregained ground in the ideological self-image of Nazism. Nevertheless,as already mentioned, comparisons with the efforts of Napoleon Iwere risky. But precisely because the parallels between the war wagedagainst Russia by Napoleon in 1812 and by Germany in 1941 were so

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Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialismobvious, they were made in the press. In the leading political andcultural weekly, Das Reich, Eugen Miindler on 12.7.41 celebratedthe 'Campaign without Parallel'.29 Anticipating a certain militaryvictory, he considered all the mistakes and weaknesses of Napoleon'scampaign of 1812 as having been overcome, although he gavepredominantly military reasons for this. He did not, however, considereither the political system or the personality of the two dictators.Hitler also made a remark at this time to the effect that not hebut Stalin would suffer Napoleon's fate. After the failure of theGerman Blitzkrieg plan outside Moscow in 1941, he found itnecessary to emphasize in public speeches the invalidity of any parallelbetween the historical situations of 1812 and 1942: 'Wehave masteredthe fate which broke another man 130 years ago.'30 Hitler acceptedthe parallel with Napoleon I's personality in so far as it was a questionof a 'unique military genius', who was in a position to achieve 'world-historical victories', but saw the reason for the latter's failure in thepetit-bourgeois tendencies (Spiessertum) of most Frenchmen.Hitler was probably familiar with the popular psychological levelof interpretation through a book by the NSDAP Reichsleiter, PhilippBouhler, Napoleon - Kometenbahn eines Genies, on which he hadshortly beforehand commented favourably.31 This work, surprisingin its choice of theme for a leading member of the party, was laterwithdrawn from circulation in order to avoid any embarassingcomparisons between the defeats of Napoleon I and Hitler. Bouhlerhad sought to understand Napoleon from the point of view of thevictories of the present; he endowed him, as well as Hitler, with thehalo of genius in accordance with the slogan: 'All great deeds arethe achievement of one individual', whose greatness manifested itselfin a fusion of comprehensive capacities uniting diverse vocations.The differences between the history of the development of theNapoleonic Empire and of the National Socialist Reich seemed tohim to be rather peripheral. In the end, he did discover a structuraldifference between the 'iron foundation' of National Socialism andNapoleon's regime in the fact that now provision had been madefor 'the unconditional execution of the commands of a leader, forthe penetration of his will to the very last cells.'32 This ideologicalpostulate which had little to do with social and political reality becamethe ultimate criterion.Heinrich Berl's attempt to combine 'political biography' and the'historical novel' in the person of Napoleon III forms a counterpartto Bouhler's biography of Napoleon I.33 Written during the second

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Journal of Contemporary Historyworld war by a writer excluded from the official authors' union,the book was intended to be a 'settling of accounts' with Hitler from'the democratic point of view.' Berl juxtaposed a number of structuralresemblances with the similarity of personality of the two dictators:'Bonapartism is dictatorship as an end in itself.' Plebiscitarian approval,censorship, centralism, finance capitalism, the terror of the state aswell as the appeal to workers and peasants along with the simultaneousextension of the army as an instrument of power are among his topics.They appear side by side without connection and then added to themare the teleological considerations of war and defeat. The differenceswere of 'degree rather than method.' Although it was rather out ofcontext, Berl also dealt with the relationship between Bonapartismand capitalism. 'Louis Napoleon' - and thus Hitler too - 'leavesthe facade of capitalism intact but its foundations are beingundermined . . . until a strong blast from outside will make the scenerycollapse.' Because its attack was indirect, Bonapartism - and NationalSocialism too - was more successful than communism: 'It was a kindof state communism with capitalist means.' Berl was approaching aconservative interpretation of fascism, which, on the scale fromcapitalism to communism, placed Nazi rule in the proximity of thelatter, and which brought into the foreground the revolutionaryfeatures of the 'movement.'34

Like other interpretations of fascism and National Socialismdiscussed in this section, Berl's views contrast sharply with thesocialist-communist model of Bonapartism indebted to Marx. Socialand economic factors as well as political events are overshadowedby ideological and national considerations and by the significanceof the transcendent historical personality or genius.After the second world war a connection with the structurally basedinterpretation of Bonapartism became improbable for the time being,since there were new factors, i.e. the politics of expansion and thegenocidal activities of the National Socialists, which invalidatedprevious criteria. To regard fascism from the perspective of a nineteenthcentury phenomenon and make comparisons with the history ofanother state, meant rendering it comparatively harmless. GerhardRitter, to support his view that Hitler was a revolutionary, had createdan ancestry for him which included Napoleon I but it was not until1960 that another historian, Gustav Adolf Rein, made a directstructural comparison of Bonapartism and fascism:35 'Just asBonapartism belongs to the first phase of the bourgeois-liberal

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Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialismrevolution, so fascism is connected with the second phase, theproletarian-social revolution.' Both forms of rule are an expressionof the counter-revolution, i.e. 'they destroy the (jacobin or socialist)revolution, while they allow their (own brand of) revolution totriumph.' Until quite recently Rein did not adopt a differentiationof content out of this general dictum about laws of social development;he then indicated certain national peculiarities and saw a commonfactor in the irrationality of the cult of the personality.36 Rein'soriginal interpretation of fascism was taken further by Ernst Nolte,but he did not include Bonapartism among his philosophicalcategories.37Reference to Marx's criteria continues to be essential for anyinterpretation made by historians in the GDR. But the direct useof the 'Bonapartist' model is nevertheless impossible since theComintern theory of the inter-war years still has validity as a guideline,according to which fascism is to be regarded as the agent of monopolycapitalism. In 1956 Ernst Engelberg did attempt to make theBonapartist interpretation fruitful for a study of Bismarckian Germanyand was able to refer to Marx and Engels in this context, thoughhe avoided any reference to National Socialism.38 Right up to thepresent time, interpretations of fascism in the GDR sometimes concedeempirically, as does Dietrich Eichholtz,the scope of action of 'fascist'leaders, but finally retreat behind the cover of the 'agent' theory.In West Germany, however, a number of writers, generally incliningmore towards a Marxist interpretation, felt themselves drawn backto Bonapartism. Karl Heinz Tjaden and Riidiger Griepenburg revivedthe debate about Thalheimer's model of fascism towards the end of1966. In the following year, his 1930 text was reprinted for the firsttime.39 In narrowing down Marx's assessment as well as Thalheimer'sinterpretation, they brought out three central categories: firstly,the concept of 'the apparent yet existing independence of the stateexecutive power in relation to social strata and classes; secondly,the principle of the gradual form of the process' of transformation;and finally, the assumption that 'the structural change . . . was afunction of a shift in the balance of forces among the classes inbourgeois society.'They expressly underlined that Thalheimer had given the bestprognosis for actual developments but at the same time they criticizedhis assessment. They reproached him for not having 'made atheoretically convincing connection' concerning the constants ofclass relationships between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and,

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Journal of Contemporary Historyon the other hand, between the 'variable characteristics', accordingto which the structure and function of public powers change. WhereMarx had given a provisional analysis without any theoreticalpretensions, Thalheimer was simply transferring his categories to adifferent era. This, no doubt, justified criticism of every scholasticMarxist interpretation of later historical phenomena might haveresulted in the abandonment of this theory or else in the effort toachieve a more far-reaching compartmentalization both in theoryand practice. Numerous writers influenced by Marx attempted thelatter in recent years.It must be stressed that only a part of the discussion of therelationship between economic and political factors in fascismdeveloped with the aid of the 'Bonapartist' thesis. This discussion,opened by Tim Mason in one of the most widely quoted essays ofthe past decade about the primacy of politics over economics,40took the independence of political decisions as its point of departureand thus touched on Thalheimer's theory of Bonapartism withoutusing the concept.41 Since then, in numerous essays of thenon-orthodox left, the Bonapartist model, or at least the inclusionof Bonapartist features as characteristic of fascism, has been widelyused. Sometimes only the independence of the executive is meant,sometimes the difference between social basis and social function.Since the social basis of fascism can be easily discovered by researchinto elections, the stress on an 'objective' social function within theframework of a capitalist society offers a favourable opportunityto make the empirical situation coincide with the a priori assumptionsabout bourgeois class rule.Thus the theory of Bonapartism42 fulfils for a second time, as it hadalready done in 1930, the function of overcoming and refining an officialinterpretation of Marx with a claim to be binding, through a more flexibleassessment. The part once played by the Comintern line and that of theKPD is now played by historiography in the GDR and by a few lessimportant offshoots in West Germany. In this regardit is no longer only aquestion of the relationship between economics and politics but also aquestion of achieving a comprehensive theory of fascism. This attempt ischiefly motivated by the idea of obtaining a working model which willprovide criteria of orientation for the present, if not preclude the possi-bility of a new trend towards fascism. What is being sought are cha-racteristics which either by themselves or in specific connections willmake possible the identification of fascism; or, beyond this, which makepossible the recognition of trends towards fascism at an embryonic state,

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Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialismwhose further development could be prevented by counter-strategies.

Since capitalism and fascism are usually closely juxtaposed here,there is evidence that the concept is being expanded into a politicalbattle-cry. The centre of gravity of the investigation tends usuallyto focus on the process of 'fascist' seizure of power - and in thisrespect coincides with Marx's interpretation of Bonapartism. Fascismin power is, on the other hand, regarded as a largely unchangingphenomenon. Axel Kuhn's contribution leans the most heavily on themodel of Bonapartism.43 According to him, the four crucial pointsof this 'theory of counter-revolution in bourgeois society' concernstatements about the origin, social basis, class structure and foreignpolicy of fascism. It is particularly to the credit of the author thathe has shown foreign policy to be part of the area of an 'independentexecutive.' But, above all, his theory of fascism has taken from themodel of Bonapartism, its distinction between 'social basis' and 'socialfunction.' With this formula he solves the (apparent) contradictionbetween the part played by electoral decisions and mass support inthe success of fascism and assumptions about its constant 'classcharacter', and the 'economic dominion of the bourgeoisie'. In otherwords, fascism is interpreted as the coming together of a middle-classmass movement and the big bourgeoisie to reinforce the monopolycapitalist system through the forcible exclusion of workers'organisations.The model of Bonapartism has above all been fruitful for theelucidation of the rise of power of fascism. However, 'fascism' onlyrose to power in a few states. An analysis of the fascist movementssolely in the light of the theory of Bonapartism is not enough, evenif it reflects some important features. It might be thought that thefascist movements resemble 'the Society of the 10th December', thedeclasse Lumpenproletariat,the petty bourgeoisie and the small-holdingpeasants as described in Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire. But researchto date into different fascist groupings has shown that Marx'sinterpretation is hardly adequate and that its 'functional equivalents'cast little light on the typology of fascist movements.44 But thoughresearch in the direction of a comparative social history of fascistmovements has gone beyond the theory of Bonapartism, this is nottrue of the other elucidatory factors of the model: the most neutralway of restating them would be the postulation of a comparativesocial history of all states which have been brought into contact withfascism. There have been few attempts to do this for the important

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Journal of Contemporary Historyperiod between the late twenties and early forties of this century.Attempts to co-ordinate research for the preceding period underthe headings 'Organised Capitalism' (Jurgen Kocka and others) or'Corporatism' (Charles Maier),45 have exposed its limitations. Theformulated abstract concept either evaporates when applied toparticular societies or itself remains vague; the investigation, however,produces numerous new isolated results.A comparative social history of states with fascist movementswould have to deal with the different characteristics of social classesin a comparative way. It would have to bring out the different roleof those groups which today are considered as the threatened middleand lower classes. In particular, their relationship to fascist movementsseems important. Furthermore, such a history would have todifferentiate more forcibly between agrarian/traditional andpredominantly industrial regions, and to include, in relation to this,the different social origins, homogeneity and aims of thenon-capitalistically orientated upper classes. Long-standing traditionsand structures of political behaviour would also require independentif not greater attention in assessing the effective possibilities of fascism.While the investigation of fascist movements may produce a widerframework, a narrower theoretical structure would have to beconceived for those states in which fascism actually came to power.Only the Italian and German examples are ones that would fallunambiguously within this category. How far Spain, Portugal, Poland,Bulgaria, Turkey or Japan could be included in the period betweenthe two world wars has been, and still is, a matter for disagreementas it was for earlier writers. This applies also to the inflated use of theterm fascism for post-1945 phenomena, especially in Soviet communisthistoriography. Equally problematical, on account of war-timeconditions, is the extension of the concept to the dictatorial regimesof west and especially east and south-east Europe, that came intoexistence with the extension of German power during the war.Moreover, a more detailed consideration of the increased part playedby physical and psychological terror, as well as bureaucratisation inrelation to the Marxist concept, would become necessary before clearercriteria could be established about the fascist character of differentpolitical systems.But even for the German and Italian models, the use of the sameconcept of fascism seems to obscure distinctive features of governmentin its actual exercise of power; only National Socialism was in aposition to unleash an ever-increasing war. Italian fascism found itself,

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Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialismat this stage of development, entirely dependent on German power.Equally, only the National Socialist regime was so inflexibly directedtowards the alternatives of world domination or defeat that the collapseof the state was the inevitable consequence, once victory was outof the question. Furthermore, only Nazi Germany carried outextermination policies in occupied European states and had millionsof Jews murdered.Even if these phenomena could at a pinch be regarded simply asan escalation of 'normal' fascism, the goals of National Socialismcan hardly be grasped by comparative categories and it thus appearsas a unique phenomenon.46 World domination based on racialdiscrimination, the breeding of a new type of man and the apocalypticsuspension of the traditional historical process are characteristic ofthis. Although its utopian character is obvious, the actual policiesof National Socialism derived in their basic decisions and measuresfrom such goals. This differing Telos, with its concrete effect onmillions of lives as a result of the second world war and genocide,makes National Socialism qualitatively different in its substance fromItalian fascism.In using the model of Bonapartism in relation to National Socialism,one would therefore have to supplement it by reference to aspectsof governmental practice. For the social history of the 'Third Reich'(as of other fascist regimes), Marxist theory points above all to theinvestigation of the role played by industrial elites. The followingdistinctions might be made: if the big bourgeoisie is not too rigidlyconceived within a schema of homogeneous class activity, then,aboveall in the first phase of Nazi rule until 1936, one can perceive afar-reaching satisfaction of influential industrial groups with generalpolitical developments, since their interests were well served by thesuppression of the whole of the 'left' political spectrum. After thisperiod of partial fascism (Arthur Schweitzer) one can observe alimitation of power not only in politics but also in the economicsphere. The war policy did lead to a wide expansion of activity forindividual enterprises like IG Farben and Krupp; but seen as a whole,industry had to adapt to the existing political orientation as wellas occasionally to long-term policies which ran counter to profits(for instance in export). In the third phase, under Albert Speer(194244), it partly won back its freedom to make decisions, butthe establishing of general aims within the framework of warproduction remained outside its power as before. In other words, thesurrender of political power by industry, implicit in the theory of

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Journal of Contemporary HistoryBonapartism, has to be differentiated in time. The maintenance ofsocial power, the destruction of the 'organized working class', althoughit must be recognized as one of the basic facts of the Nazi system,needs modification, bearing in mind the limited tightening up ofworking conditions, achieved by Nazi organizations like 'GermanWorkers' Front', which correspond to the expediency of socialstabilization.4 7

The political power of the independent executive does not appearmoreover to be valid only for the transition period of the rise to power,as in the original theory of Bonapartism but - and here is a veryimportant divergence from the history of the Second Empire - it seemsto have extended further and further. The 'Bonapartist' executivepower may perhaps have lost some of the active support of the middleclasses in the course of its rule, but through the variety of its specificNational Socialist institutions - from Gauleiters to the SS - it wasable to build up an alternative state apparatus and, by means of terror,to compensate for a lack of mass enthusiasm. The individualconstituents of the 'dual state' (E. Fraenkel) were by no means basedon a monolithic structure, but were marked by confusion overcompetence and authority, which even Hitler as a 'Bonaparte' couldnot and would not get rid of. But these constituents of power canhardly be formulated as class categories. Hitler's support by theWehrmacht, unlike the part played by the SA before 1934, cannotbe interpreted in the sense of a Prdtorianerregiment - this instrumentof power from the beginning served predominantly for externaldemonstrations of power and aggression. It might most easily besubsumed under the category of the old ruling strata who had beenrobbed of their political power.Most surprising and most difficult to account for in terms of socialhistory is the extraordinary part which Hitler played in the key pointsof the system and how it fitted in with the aims set by him. Thoughhe was also influenced by social imperatives in his armaments andwar policy, his unswerving tenacity in the service of an historicalutopia went far beyond this. Although he was always able to extendhis position of power with the partial consent of the old power elitesand never altogether lost this support, his gamble for world dominationor downfall was not in their interest. The theory of Bonapartismcan do little to explain the paralysis of the old power centres duringthe course of the Third Reich in favour of bureaucratic and terroristNational Socialist elites, which were in turn opposed to each other.On the other hand, the historical analysis of Marx in the Eighteenth

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Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism 125Brumaire is a useful pointer as to how Hitler, partly through brutalityand also through patience and the seizing of favourable opportunities,knew how to influence internal policies on a long term basis. By skilfultactics he was able to evade all concerted efforts against him andtranslate his efforts to achieve political supremacy of a new apocalyptickind, into a grim reality inextricably bound up with genocide andworld war.

NOTES

1. M. Rubel, Karl Marx devant le Bonapartisme (Paris 1960), 149 f. Theauthor would like to thank K. Hildebrand, A. Hillgruber, K. J. Miiller, E. Vollrathand G. Wollstein for their stimulating criticisms of his first draft.2. Marx-Engels Werke,Vol. 8 (Berlin 1972), 192, 196, 204.3. Rubel, op. cit., 31-36. Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 12, 20 ff, 31 ff, 202 ff.4. Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 13, 447 ff; W. Wette, Kriegstheorien deutscberSozialisten (Stuttgart 1971), 44 ff.5. Above all in the works of H.-U. Wehler, especially Bismarck und derImperialismus (Cologne 1969).6. T. Zeldin, The political system of Napoleon III (Oxford 1958), alsohis Ambition, Love and Politics, France 1848-1945 (Oxford 1973), 504-69.M. Blanchard, Le Second Empire (Paris 1950).7. 'Die preussische Militarfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei',Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 16, 71.8. 'Der Biirgerkrieg in Frankreich', Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 17, 313-65,especially 337 f.9. Wehler, Bismarck, op. cit. See also his Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs1871-1914 (Gottingen 1970), 12 ff.; M. Stiirmer, Regierung und Reichstag imBismarckreich 1871-1880. Casarismus oder Parlamentarismus (Diisseldorf 1974).10. Conference in Cologne on the 65th birthday of Th. Schieder, 12.4.1973(unpublished contributions by Wehler, E. Fehrenbach, W. J. Mommsen, H.-J.Steinberg).11. A. Kuhn, Das faschistische Herrscbaftssystem und die modemeGesellschaft (Hamburg 1973), 31 ff.12. H. Weber, Die Wandlungen des deutschen Kommunismus. DieStalinisierung der KPD in der WeimarerRepublik (Frankfurt a.M. 1969).13. K. H. Tjaden, Struktur und Funktion der KPD (0). Eineorganisationssoziologische Untersuchung des 'Rechtskommunismus' in der


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Journal of Contemporary HistoryWeimarerRepublik (Meisenheim 1964).14. Reprinted in W. Abendroth, ed., Faschismus und Kapitalismus. Theorienuber die sozialen Ursprunge und die Funktion des Faschismus (Frankfurt a.M.,Vienna 1967), 19-38, abridged; R. Kuhnl, ed., Texte zur Faschismusdiskussion,I (Reinbek 1974), 14-29 abridged; Der Fascbismus in Deutschland. Analysender KPD-Opposition aus den Jahren 1928-1933, edited by the Arbeiterpolitikgroup (Frankfurt a.M. 1973), 28-46 (complete, quoted as follows).15. Ibid., 29, 34, 36, 43, 45. Passages from Diilffer's discussion ofThalheimer and Trotsky have been cut here to avoid overlapping with thecontributions by Robert Wistrich and Wolfgang Wippermann(ed.).16. L. Trotzki, Schriften uber Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M. 1971), 439(Gesammelte Werke, I).17. Ibid., 568.18. Ibid., 732.19. Originally published in Archiv fur Sozialwissenscbaften und Sozialpolitik(February 1933). Quoted from E. Nolte, Theorien uber den Faschismus (Cologne1970), 156-81. Another theory influenced by the concept of Bonapartism wasdeveloped by Otto Bauer and is the subject of a separate article by GerhardBotz. See also Richard Saage, Faschismustheorien. Eine Einfuhrung (Munich1976).20. Ibid., (Nolte), 158, 165, 166 f., 178.21. This is evident from a cursory review of the 'NationalsozialistischenBibliographie' 1 (1936) ff. and the holdings of 'NS-Drucksachen' in theBundesarchiv Koblenz.22. P. R. Rohden, 'Faschistische Motive im franzosischen Staatsethos'in C. Landauer and H. Honegger, eds., Internationaler Faschismus (Karlsruhe1928), 94-110. Rohden discussed in Aufstieg und Niedergang der franzosischenRepublik (Berlin 1940), 72 ff. the ambiguous 'Modernitat' of Napoleon IIIwithout any topical references. J. Hartmann, Die Wirtschaftspolitik NapoleonsIII, Diss. (Berlin 1938).23. In a review in Historische Zeitschrift 161 (1939-40), 144 ff.24. In Deutsche Rundschau, 248 (1936), 97-103.25. In Die Tat. Deutsche Monatschrift, 30 (1938), 160-71; compare K.Sontheimer, 'Der Tatkreis', Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, VII (1959),229-60; H. Hecker, 'Die Tat' und ihr Osteuropabild 1909-1949 (Cologne 1974).26. The temptations of such a course are made clear in Tim Mason,Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft (Opladen 1975).27. H. Heiber, Walter Frank und sein Reichsinstitut fur Geschichte desneuen Deutschlands (Stuttgart 1966). See also Historische Zeitschrift, 153 (1936),6-23.28. W. Frank, 'Hitler-Boulanger?' in Der Angriff, 23 November 1931; Seealso his article under the pseudonym, Werner Fiedler, 'Um Napoleon' inDeutsches Volkstum XIII (1931), 432 ff.29. E. Miindler, 'Feldzug ohne Beispiel' in Das Reich, II (1941), No. 28,12 July 1941, 6 f.30. Hitler to the Japanese ambassador, Oshima, 14 July 1941, in A.Hillgruber, ed. Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler (Frankfurt a.M. 1970),Vol. 2: 1942-44; cf. Hitler to Kvaternik, 21 July 1941, ibid., 552; Reichstagspeech of 26 April 1942, in M. Domarus, Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen

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Diilffer: Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism1932-1945 (Munich 1965). Also H. Picker, Hitlers Tischgesprdche, edited byP. E. Schramm, A. Hillgruber, M. Vogt (Frankfurt a.M. 1965), No. 136, 29 May1942. A. Speer, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt a.M. 1969), 187,378 and SpandauerTagebuch (Frankfurt a.M. 1975), 86, 100, 258 - mentions that Hitler alsocompared himself with Napoleon, especially with respect to his plans for globaldomination.31. Picker, op. cit., 23 March 1942.32. Ibid., 319, 320, 332 f., 402 f.33. H. Berl, Napoleon III. Demokratie und Diktatur (Munich n.d.) (1946),11, 14; quotations 7 f., 234.34. Cf. Kuhn, op. cit. Note 11, 17 ff.35. G. A. Rein, Bonapartismus und Faschismus in der deutschen Geschichte(Gottingen 1960). See also his book Der Deutsche und die Politik. Betrachtungenzur deutschen Geschichte von der Reichsgrundung bis zum Reicbsuntergang1848-1945 (Gottingen 1974).36. Rein, Bonapartismus, ibid., 1, 7, 24; Der Deutsche, ibid., 559, 447,544, 615.37. E. Nolte, DerFascbismus in seinerEpoche (Munich 1963).38. E. Engelberg, 'Zur Entstehung und historischen Stellung des preussisch-deutschen Bonapartismus' in Beitrage zum neuen Gescbichtsbild, Festschriftf.A. Meusel (Berlin (East) 1956), 236-51. The GDR editions of Marx and Engels'works refer of course to the significance of the '18th Brumaire of LouisBonaparte' but avoid discussion ot specific traits in the Marxian interpretationof Bonapartism, Marx-Engels Werke,Vol. 8, 617 f. See, however, 'Kollquium zumpreussich- deutschen Bonapartismus' in Zeitschrift fiir Geschichts wissenschaftXXIV (1976) 713 f.39. R. Griepenburg and K. H. Tjaden, 'Faschismus und Bonapartismus'in Das Argument, VIII (1966), 461-72, especially 463, 471 ff., Faschismus undKapitalismus, op. cit. (See Note 14).40. T. Mason, 'Der Primat der Politik - Politik und Wirtschaft' in DasArgument, VIII (1966), 473-94; see the adjacent discussion, ibid., 10 (1968)(contributions from Czichon, Mason, Eichholtz/Gossweiler).41. E. Hennig, 'Industrie, Aufriistung und Kreigsvorbereitung im deutschenFaschismus. Anmerkungen zum Stand der neuen Faschismus diskussion' in F.Forstmeier and H. E. Volkmann, Wirtschaft und Rustung am Vorabend desZweiten Weltkrieges (Diisseldorf 1974), 388-415, especially 405.42. Without entering into details see the compilation by R. Kiihnl (Note14), especially the controversy between G. Schafer and R. Opitz. Also H. C. F.Mansilla, Faschismus und eindimensionale Gesellschaft (;icuwied 1971). J.Schissler, 'Faschismus und Bonapartismus' in Neue Politische Literatur, XX(1975), 23641. (Attempt at a synthesis of Trotsky and Thalheimer).43. Kuhn (Note 11), 102, 104, 117 f.44. See E. Nolte, Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischenBewegungen (Munich 1968); Journal of Contemporary History, I (1966), No.1;F. L. Carsten, Der Aufstieg des Faschismus in Europa (Frankfurt a.M. 1968);S. J. Woolf, ed., European Fascism (London 1968).45. H. A. Winkler, ed., Organisierter Kapitalismus (Gottingen 1974); C. S.Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton 1975).46. K. Hildebrand, 'Weltmacht oder Untergang: Hitlers Deutschland

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Journal of Contemporary History1941-1945' in Weltpolitik 1939-1945, edited by O. Hauser (Gottingen 1975),286-322, especially 319 ff.; A. Hillgruber, 'Die"Endl6sung"und das deutscheOstimperium als Kernstick des rassenideologischen Programms desNationalsozialismus' in Vierteljahrshefte fir Zeitgeschichte, XX (1972), 133-53.Also J. Thies, Architektur der Weltherrschaft. Die 'Endziele' Hitlers (Disseldorf1976).47. Mason, op. cit.

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