due process in general

8/10/2019 Due Process in General

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C. D E CE I GE E AL

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169364 Petitioner,

Present:

Ynares-Santiago, J . (Chairperson) ,- versus - Chico-Nazario,

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, and Bersamin *, JJ.

EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y Promulgated: MEFANIA,

Respondents. September 18, 2009 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:

If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streetseven as Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven composed music, orShakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all thehosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great streetsweeper who did his job well.

Martin Luther King, Jr.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005Order [1] of Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No.30-500-2004 granting respondents Petition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.

Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged withvagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate


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Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Courtin Cities, Davao City. The Informations, read:

That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniouslywandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City,without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable

purpose. [2]

Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following arevagrants:

1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, whohas the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself orherself to some lawful calling;

2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-publicbuildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country orthe streets without visible means of support;

3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of illfame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with

prostitutes;

4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions ofother articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited oruninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable

purpose;

5. Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit,habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, aredeemed to be prostitutes.


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Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by thisarticles shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200

pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium periodto prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filedseparate Motions to Quash [3] on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutionalfor being vague and overbroad.

In an Order [4] dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied themotions and directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-

affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy wasenacted pursuant to the States police power and justified by the Latin maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex , which calls for the subordination of individual

benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:

Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power ofthe State. An authority on police power, Professor Freund describeslaconically police power as the power of promoting public welfare byrestraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. (Citationsomitted). In fact the persons acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the

police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin maxim,salus populi est supreme (sic) lex (the god of the people is the SupremeLaw). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to theinterests of the greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of thearresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex A lucidlyshows that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of thereports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where thetwo accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee hoursof night and soliciting male customer. Thus, on that basis the

prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in theinterest of substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must begiven their day in Court: the prosecution proof of the crime, and theauthor thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the accused in theindictment cant be categorized as a crime. [5]


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The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior surveillanceconducted on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and

prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the prosecution should be given theopportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.

Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition withthe Regional Trial Court of Davao City, [6] directly challenging the constitutionalityof the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancyunder Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitraryidentification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage

persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewiseclaimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under theConstitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus

permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuantto the Courts ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan ,[7] the overbreadth andvagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal statutes. Italso asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, sincethe respondents failed to overcome this presumption.

On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Ordergranting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, theinstant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the

Revised Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order ofthe court a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners Motion toQuash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss the subjectcriminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.

SO ORDERED. [8]


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In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that thelaw is vague and it violated the equal protection clause. It held that the void forvagueness doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penalstatutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville ,[9] where an anti vagrancyordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, the trial court ruled:

The U.S. Supreme Courts justifications for striking down theJacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance are equally applicable to paragraph 2of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.

Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for beingfound loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places ortramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visiblemeans of support offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinationsas to who should be arrested and who should not.

Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of recession when there are many who arewithout visible means of support not by reason of choice but by forceof circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment rate in the entirecountry.

To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone fornearly no other reason than the fact that he cannot find gainfulemployment would indeed be adding insult to injury. [10]

On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protectionclause of the Constitution, the trial court declared:

The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s,

to our situation at present runs afoul of the equal protection clause of theconstitution as it offers no reasonable classification between thosecovered by the law and those who are not.

Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to onewhich are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a moresevere penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.


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Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy

under Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or anyother reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visiblemeans of support by force of circumstance and those who choose toloiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancylegislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality. [11]

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of: WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AREVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONALARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE [12]

Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonabledoubts should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v.Sandiganbayan ,[13] the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have specialapplication to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validityof penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of thestatute, failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts;and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of publicwelfare in the exercise of its police power.

On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of theoverbreadth and vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its faceviolates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal

protection of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as distinguishedfrom the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2)unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the presumption of constitutionalitywas adequately overthrown.

The Court finds for petitioner.

The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties islegislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain


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social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that noconstitutional rights have been abridged. [14] However, in exercising its power todeclare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen withreasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certainunderstandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. [15] Thisrequirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine whichstates that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms sovague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning anddiffer as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. [16]

In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC ,[17]

the Court recognized theapplication of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriatecases. The Court therein held:

At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions ofthe dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of along list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as afacial challenge. An appropriate as applied challenge in the instantPetition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10

(g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic tothe rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be anexisting case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,and not conjectural or anticipatory. [18]

The first statute punishing vagrancy Act No. 519 was modeled afterAmerican vagrancy statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up toDecember 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy. [19] While historicallyan Anglo-American concept of crime prevention, the law on vagrancy wasincluded by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised PenalCode in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:


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ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty . The following are

vagrants:

1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, whohas the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself orherself to some lawful calling;

2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or thestreets without visible means of support;

3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with

prostitutes;

4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions ofother articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited oruninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable

purpose;

5. Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit,habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, aredeemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by thisarticle shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200

pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium periodto prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines avagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or

places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visiblemeans of support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 ofAct No. 519 which defined vagrant as every person found loitering about


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saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through thecountry without visible means of support . The second clause was essentiallyretained with the modification that the places under which the offense might becommitted is now expressed in general terms public or semi-public places.

The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202(2), take support mainly from the U.S. Supreme Courts opinion inthe Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville [20] case, which in essence declares:

Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one ofwhich is that [all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what theState commands or forbids. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451,306 U. S. 453.

Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting thatthe law give fair notice of the offending conduct. See Connally v.General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. FrinkDairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S.81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, wherethe acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed.Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v.

National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo,332 U. S. 1.

The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, arenot in business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancylaws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaningand impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caughtin the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent to commitan unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce MotorLines, Inc. v. United States, supra.

The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, bymodern standards, are normally innocent. Nightwalking isone. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night'swandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the habitualwanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, common night walkers. Weknow, however, from experience that sleepless people often walk atnight, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.


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Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented

once that loafing was a national virtue in his Commonwealth, and thatit should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.

x x x x

Persons wandering or strolling from place to place have beenextolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualificationwithout any lawful purpose or object may be a trap for innocent acts.Persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending theirtime by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold orserved would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and cityclubs.

Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or comingfrom a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be casing a place for aholdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, andnormally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the settingfor numerous crimes.

The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of theamenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in theConstitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have

been, in part, responsible for giving our people the feeling ofindependence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. Theseamenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the rightto be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They haveencouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.

x x x x

Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as theone in this ordinance, those convicted may be punished for no more than

vindicating affronts to police authority:

The common ground which brings such a motleyassortment of human troubles before the magistrates invagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which

permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and theexistence of the House of Correction as an easy and


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convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear tohave no other immediate solution. Foote, Vagrancy-TypeLaw and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.

x x x x

Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when wefocus not on the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on theeffect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands ofthe Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, hascalled the vagrancy-type law as offering punishment by analogy. Suchcrimes, though long common in Russia, are not compatible with ourconstitutional system.

x x x x

A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter orstroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported bytheir wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become futurecriminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption inthese generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in the

bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course,vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are netsmaking easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law

implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws ofthe Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped thateven-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law,evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well asthe rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together. [21]

The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) theassailed Jacksonville ordinance fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fairnotice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute; and 2) it

encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory lawenforcement.

The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonvilleordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of what


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constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legalsystem, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. [22] This

principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conductin this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely atraditional rule that admits of exceptions. [23]

Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional onaccount of specific provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202(2) . The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code 257) provided, as follows:

Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawfulgames or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves,

pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton andlascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and

brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to placewithout any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly

persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spendingtheir time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or placeswhere alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work buthabitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall

be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinanceunconstitutional, because such activities or habits as nightwalking , wandering orstrolling around without any lawful purpose or object ,habitualloafing , habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages are soldor served , and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children , which areotherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific actsor activities not found in Article 202 (2) . The closest to Article 202 (2) any

person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, ortramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of

support from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object . But


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these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by without visiblemeans of support while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering orstrolling without any lawful purpose or object, which was held by the U.S.Supreme Court to constitute a trap for innocent acts.

Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure intheir persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrantof arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the

judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and

the persons or things to be seized.[24]

Thus, as with any other act or offense, therequirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executiveauthority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of personsfound to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents,echoing Jacksonville , that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the policeto make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirementof probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but more thansuspicion or possibility. [25]

Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away witharbitrarily without pain of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authoritiesare necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, inthe absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to

be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actualfacts, i.e. , supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create

the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspiciontherefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peaceofficers making the arrest. [26]

The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizensas well as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision


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sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonablesearches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himselfagainst unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from beingirreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the mostunhappy in some measure agreeable. [27]

As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have beenconducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to theirarrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under ourConstitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents trepidation thatArticle 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their case.

Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead,throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerousand unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing watch-your-car boys, petty thievesand robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performingacts that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and

parks have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate intohardened and battle-scarred criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports ofinnocent and hardworking people being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled ifnot killed by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straightfrom withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated tellermachines); students are held up for having to use and thus exhibit publicly theirmobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent

passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the streets; fair-

looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not abducted, raped and thenkilled; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for

possible victims; the old are swindled of their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-abiding drivers


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and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets and in public places, day or night.

The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to plythem each day, or else we can never say that we have performed our task to our

brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity, andrestore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.

This is exactly why we have public order laws , to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency,morality and civility in human society . These laws may be traced all the way

back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated with thestruggle to improve the citizens quality of life, which is guaranteed by ourConstitution. [28] Civilly , they are covered by the abuse of rights doctrineembodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning HumanRelations, to the end, in part, that any person who willfully causes loss or injury toanother in a manner that is contrary to morals , good customs or publicpolicy shall compensate the latter for the damage. [29] This provision is, togetherwith the succeeding articles on human relations, intended to embody certain basic

principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order. [30]

In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to forcerather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims. [31] Any

private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him byremoving, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same,without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. [32]

Criminally , public order laws encompass a whole range of acts from publicindecencies and immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts


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punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to societys basic sensibilities andtheir adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society. For example, theissuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crimeagainst public order that must be abated. [33] As a matter of public policy, thefailure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receiptor to return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by theimposition of penal sanctions. [34] Thus, public nuisances must be abated becausethey have the effect of interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or

property by members of a community.

Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it

discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order lawsare punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but forconducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peaceor cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed isnot a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.

Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionallyoffensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conductingthemselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, undersuch conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards andnorms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as wouldengender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of thecommunity.

Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws

unconstitutional, the State should train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties. Red light districtsabound, gangs work the streets in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbersand thieves ply their trade in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abidingcitizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes


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public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. [38] As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Decision of Branch 11 ofthe Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal CodeUNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE .

Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDEDELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO andJAMES YAP, petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as PresidingJudge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHEREDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVINAGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTOVALDES, JR., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J. :

NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante nanasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isangpamantasan.

PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente andRoberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by theDe La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) 1 Joint Discipline Board


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because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yapand three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of thecontroversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis theUniversity's right to academic freedom.

ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari , Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of theRules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30,1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari against respondent Judge and privaterespondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.; 2 (2) Resolution of the CAdated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration; 3 (3) Order dated January 7,1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent

Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction; 4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating privaterespondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private respondents fromexpulsion to exclusion. 5

Factual Antecedents

Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, twoviolent incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:

x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one weekprior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang'sRestaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparentlyangry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at hisboarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watchingtelevision. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang's.Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang's andconfronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondentBungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma PhiFraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.

After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternitythrough the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity wasasking for an apology. " Kailangan ng apology" in the words of respondent Aguilar.But no apology was made.

Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of theDomino Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung,Reverente and Papio. They were looking for a person whose description matchedJames Yap. According to them, this person supposedly " nambastos ng brod ." Asthey could not find Mr. Yap, one of them remarked " Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya nalang ."

Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.

Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of thecampus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was


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about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to tenguys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then,respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands

" parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punchinghim. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were alsopunching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. Peopleshouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left.

Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. Withrespect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said " hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi konakita sumuntok siya ." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running withthe group.

Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascualwas at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic;reported the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods attheir tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity

said: " Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang ."

Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw himunder the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home.With a certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy Streetbecause Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from anotherfriend who lives somewhere in the area.

As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ngMalate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He saidnot to mind them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of therestaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr.Lee: " Ayaw namin ng gulo ." But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation.Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual.Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run from the mauling and they were chased byrespondent Lee and two others.

Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr.Pascual was ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able tocatch up with him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with alead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr.Pascual.

Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him. Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identifiedrespondent Valdez ( sic ) as also one of the members of the group.

In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near thecorner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to runwas stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdesshouted: " Mga putang-ina niyo ." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last


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time. Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims,Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited for almost twohours, or at around 8:00 in the evening before they returned to the campus to havetheir wounds treated. Apparently, there were three cars roaming the vicinity. 6

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitionerJames Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the"Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar,James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "TauGamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint 7 with the Discipline Boardof DLSU charging private respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints 8 were alsofiled by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondentsValdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled " De La Salle University and College of St.Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403),Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente

(AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227) " were docketed as DisciplineCase No. 9495-3-25121.

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints andrequiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers. 9

As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB 10 were involved in the mauling incidents,a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board 11 was formed to investigate the incidents. Thus,petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing 12 to private respondentson April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constitutedto hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y.Cano.

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimonyand present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when yougive your testimony or those of your witnesses.

On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, throughthe Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement oftheir proposed testimony.

Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list ofwitnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered awaiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal actcomplained of.


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For your strict compliance. 13

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondentsinterposed the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint DisciplineBoard as follows:

First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the fewinstances when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most ofthe time, respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this particulardate, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to use the carand thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not afamily driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authoritywhere the elder Bungubung is also employed.

Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo saidthat he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took theRoxas Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Paraaque (on a Wednesday

in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung wasdropped-off in his house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at theSouth Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the SouthHarbor. 14

x x x x

Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m.together to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He saidthat he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of

3 or even 4 minutes.Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, acertain Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi. 15

x x x x

Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be thepaymaster of the construction workers who were doing some works in the apartmentof his parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to himwould wait for him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. Theworkers get paid everyday.

Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there,supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time inquestion. 16

x x x x


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Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. forCamp Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing." 17

On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution 18 finding privaterespondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automaticexpulsion, 19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4. 20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837)guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automaticexpulsion.

In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquitshim of the charge.

SO ORDERED. 21

Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration 22 before the Office of the SeniorVice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution 23 dated June 1, 1995.

On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitionersa petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer fortemporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed asCivil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petitionessentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint DisciplineBoard and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for

Internal Affairs.

The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO 24 directing DLSU, itssubordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf torefrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolutiondated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for thesecond term of school year (SY) 1995.

Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition tocorrect an allegation in paragraph 3.21 25 of his original petition. Respondent Judgeamended the TRO 26 to conform to the correction made in the amended petition. 27

On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records ofDiscipline Case No. 9495-3-25121, 28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).

On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filedpetitions-in-intervention 29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issuedcorresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said privaterespondents.


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On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss 30 in behalf of all petitioners,except James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion todismiss 31 the petitions-in-intervention.

On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order 32 denying petitioners'(respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents'(petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Orderreads:

For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all otherpersons acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from

1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering theautomatic expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from theDe La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirmingthe Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and

2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in thecourses offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediatelyallow them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until theirgraduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter.

WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents,representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are herebyrestrained and enjoyed from:

1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering theautomatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the

Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and

2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in thecourses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allowall said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete theirrespective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed infavor of respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will payto respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if theCourt will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitledthereto.

The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit.Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15)days from receipt thereof.

SO ORDERED. 33


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Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitionerDLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motionto cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court. 34 Aguilar also prayed thatpetitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge'sOrder dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued 35 awrit of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFMANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well asyour subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other personassisting or acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing theResolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and theintervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the saidResolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment ofpetitioner and intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enrolland complete their degree courses until their graduation from said school. 36

On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari 37 (CA-G.R.SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin theenforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminaryinjunction dated September 25, 1995.

On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarilydisapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, hewas to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded .38 TheResolution states:

RESOLUTION 181-96

RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU),TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OFEXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS ITIS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.

RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TOIMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THELOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBERR. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROMEXPULSION TO EXCLUSION. 39

Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilarfrom enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demandletters 40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll privaterespondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner


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Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending hisclasses pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96.However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Orderdated September 23, 1996 which states:

Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining DeLa Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 ( Re: ExpulsionCase of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU ) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar andfinding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedyremedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this currentTRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student ofthe institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed toallow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the Commission's Resolutionof the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.

SO ORDERED. 41

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, stillrefused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar'scounsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU. 42

Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss 43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96rendered the CA case moot and academic.

On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion todismiss of private respondent Aguilar , disposing thus:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed.

SO ORDERED. 44

On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion forreconsideration , as follows:

It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory incharacter, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.

After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsiderationis hereby denied.

SO ORDERED. 45

On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department ofEducation, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED. 46 Petitioners claimed that it is theDECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating thetransfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.


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On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SPNo. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent

Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25,1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila. 47

On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting privaterespondent Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction . The pertinentportion of the order reads:

In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ ofpreliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss isdenied.

The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be inforce and effect.

Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff uponthe respondents at petitioners' expense.

SO ORDERED. 48

Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitionerDLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction datedSeptember 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.

On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO 49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance

of a TRO50

dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge fromimplementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in CivilCase No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.

On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation 51 stating that he haslong completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolledsubjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript ofrecords 52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academicrequirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation inhis favor.

Issues

We are tasked to resolve the following issues:

1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisionsof institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their studentsfound violating disciplinary rules.

2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.


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2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?

2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?

2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?

3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents isproportionate to their misdeed.

Our Ruling

Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners 53 that while CHED Resolution No.181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorizedtheir exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case,petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from theCHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondentsBungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allowthem to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation.

This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing asidetechnicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power totake cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature andimportance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction. 54 This isin consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence that rules ofprocedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when itsrigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has theduty to suspend their operation. 55

I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review overdisciplinary cases decided by institutionsof higher learning.

Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepasosa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.

Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even thoseinvolving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED.In support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4, 56 15(2) & (3), 57 54, 58 57(3) 59 and 70 60 ofBatas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982."

According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS'power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and dutyof learning institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its students.The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., theformulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs andstandards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and


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functions under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in studentdisciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of institutions of highereducation is limited to the powers and functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau ofHigher Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose functions and responsibilities ithas taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary cases.

We cannot agree.

On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creatingthe Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for otherpurposes."

Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:

Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education . In pursuance of theabovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created,hereinafter referred to as Commission.

The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department ofEducation, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President foradministrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and privateinstitutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all postsecondary educational institutions, public and private.

The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. Theyinclude the following:

Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission . The Commission shall have the

following powers and functions:

x x x x

n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers andfunctions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives ofthis Act; and

o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations andfor the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education.

Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transferto the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involvinginstitutions of higher learning.

First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing . They make no reservations of powers tothe DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that theauthority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as wellas degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public andprivate, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.


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Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involvingstudents on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is"both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programsin all post secondary educational institutions, public and private." That would be absurd.

It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offerstertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.

Third , the policy of R.A. No. 7722 61 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion ofthe right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking ofappropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The lawis likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promotingits exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, theadvancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effectiveleadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the enrichmentof our historical and cultural heritage.

It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members wereaware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arisein the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higherlearning of their right to academic freedom.

Fourth , petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of HigherEducation, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. Infact, the responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to those of theCHED were transferred to the CHED. 62

Section 77 of the MRPS 63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should

therefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS- supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocationaland tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On HigherEducation]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred tothe CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development ofacademic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as whatpetitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex nondistinguit nec nos distinguere debemus : Where the law does not distinguish, neither shouldwe.

To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to theCHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECSmight have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.

IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.

Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.


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The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system ofrights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of ourpeople as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entirehistory. 64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty orproperty without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. 65

In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline,"[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands ofprocedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing ofthe nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answerthe charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall beinformed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence intheir own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigatingcommittee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case." 66

Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to doso, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. 67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of

administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must berespected even in administrative proceedings. 68 The essence of due process is simply anopportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity toexplain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of. 69 So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause ordefend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. 70

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain theirrespective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fairdecision can be based. 71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonialevidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity tobe heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 72

Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by theDLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunityto answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers.They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all thehearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduceevidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the piecesof evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in DisciplineCase No. 9495-3-25121.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were notallowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejectedin Guzman v. National University 73 where this Court held that "x x x the imposition ofdisciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bearsstressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entailproceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courtsof justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and crossexamination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."


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IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academicfreedom which includes determination of who to admit for study.

Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglayng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learningacademic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school orcollege to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free fromoutside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls forsome restraint. 74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses theindependence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) whatmay be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. 75

It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, anecessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, theschool teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis

in the freedom "what to teach." 76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject toexisting curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," 77 such right issubject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academicinstitution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, whichincludes its free choice of students for admission to its school.

IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.

Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes,

Jr. ay napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal. As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish byclear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of theperpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene ofthe crime." 78

On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identityof the assailant has been established by witnesses. 79 Positive identification of accusedwhere categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of theeyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whosetestimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 80 Well-settled is therule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies ofthe offended parties. 81

Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positivelyidentify the accused. 82 Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it withcaution because one can easily fabricate an alibi. 83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, likealibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses


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who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the crime and werethe victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one handand a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail. 84 Alibi is the weakest of all defensesfor it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannotprevail over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses. 85

The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neitherproof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantialevidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations ,86 it means "suchreasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion."

Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, ValdesJr., and Reverente. 1awphi1They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the sceneof the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there.Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.

We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several studentsfound guilty of hazing:

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement ofrespondent students who have been investigated and found guilty by the DisciplinaryBoard to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards willcertainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we wouldbe most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedomwhich has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution. 87

Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve toclaim a venerable institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolentinfluence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. 88 It mustbe borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect andskills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, thedevelopment, or flowering if you will, of the total man. 89

As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi thathe was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March 29,1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the certification that he submitted before theDLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certificationthat sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp


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Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our class knownas Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary discussing on theproposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 affair.

That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilarhad asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his carwith the driver.

April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City. 90

The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized CrimeCIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto(Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it isamply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. 91 It is true that alibi is a weakdefense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where theprosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to the identification of

defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent with thepresumption of innocence in favor of accused. 92

Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no otherpossible defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time,and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor. 93

III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents isdisproportionate to their misdeed.

Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi

angkop sa kanilang pagkakasala.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed intheir academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-studentrelations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, notmerely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." 94 Thispower, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty whichis not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionalitybetween the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element ofarbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. 95

We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion isgrossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondentsBungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only forfew seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measuresespecially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into thefuture of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardlyredeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious toprotect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should betreated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure. 96


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Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion 97 only, not expulsion, 98 imposed on them bythe CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may excludeor drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, andtransfer credentials immediately issued.

WHEREFORE , the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED . The Court of Appeals Resolutionsdated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila,Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE , while CHEDResolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED .

Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of privaterespondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of privaterespondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfercredentials immediately issued.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATIONAND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORALREFORMS, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,vs.THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THESENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON,PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, andANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

D E C I S I O N


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NACHURA, J. :

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversationpurportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented publicattention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the presentadministration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. Thetapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidentsinstructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favorresults of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject ofheated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses ofCongress. 1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor LeaderFrancis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion acongressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information,Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications

Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). Duringthe inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005,National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia andthe lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent HouseCommittees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour tapedconversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on theadmissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in thechambers of the House. 2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearingsindefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the saidrecordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. 3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with thisCourt a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Orderand/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that therespondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the"illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any otherpurpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be orderedstricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed todesist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. 5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes"abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumberingissue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse,Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats,whens, wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into theperceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefariouswiretapping activities.


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On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to theSenate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon,who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use ofwiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) fromperforming electoral duties. 7

In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when SenatorRichard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No.4200 8 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007,Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her consideredview that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication ofthe contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislativeinvestigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the PhilippineNational Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of publicofficials. 9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices

of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for theIssuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketedas G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislativeinquiry. They argued in the main that the intended leg

due process in general

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