drove south to al-Khaii. He claimed"that there had been no air attack:' whenin fact an attack had taken place againstthe Iraqi column.11' But primarily theSaudi impatience arose from differingpriorities. The Americans viewed theIraqi occupation of al-Khafji as a minorinconvenience that would soon be recti-fied, but for the Saudi kingdom it was anassault on their own sacred soil.

Saudi impatience could explain theperception of lack of air support, as wellas inexperience in modern air-ground co-operation that the battle required. How-ever, the Marines working alongside JointForces Command-East also supportedthe Saudi belief. As Captain Braden laterwrote: "Little air support was available tothe [Joint Forces Command-Easti forcesas the priority of effort was with theMarines to the west in repulsing the at-tack of the Iraqi 1st Mechanized Divisionand elements of the 3dArrnored Division.The Marine fight had preceded the JFCEfight by a couple of hours and would re-main the focus of effort throughout thenight"'2

The fight at Observation Post 4 at-tracted the attention of Coalition aircraftright away. A later Air Force study found:"Marine and Air Force CAS [Close AirSupport] began to arrive in front of OP-4by 2130 local time. By 2300, three AC-130gunships, two F-l5Es, two ... F-l6Cs, andfour A-lOs had joined the battle at OP-4:" Despite the rapid response to thefighting at Observation Post 4, all sourcesagree that the tactical air control centerdid not respond promptly to the initialIraqi attacks. By most accounts, it was notuntil Brigadier General Buster C. Glos-son, the director of campaign plans, en-tered the center on a routine check ofcurrent operations that someone thoughtto wake up Lieutenant General Charles A.Homer, the Joint Force Air ComponentCommander. Prior to that time, althoughthe 3d Marine Aircraft Wing had re-sponded to Marine calls for air supportwith alacrity, the tactical air control cen-ter remained focused on the evening'sstrikes into Iraq. Once awakened, Gen-eral Homer realized that this was a majorIraqi offensive, and a wonderful opportu-nity to strike at Iraqi forces while theywere on the move and vulnerable. He re-focused the Coalition air effort intoKuwait accordingly."4

Much of the Marine air support for al-Khafji fell on the Cobras of Marine LightAttack Helicopter Squadron 369, com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel MichaelM. Kurth, and Marine Light Attack Heli-copter Squadron 367, commanded byLieutenant Colonel Terry J. Frerker."5 Be-cause the arrangement with Joint ForcesAir Component Command left Marinehelicopters totally in support of the Ma-rine air-ground task force, the Cobraswere able to respond rapidly to the Iraqioffensive. Eight AH-1W Cobras re-sponded to initial calls from the air-navalgunfire liaison Marines, ensuring that theIraqi advance into al-Khaiji was not un-opposed. Not long after 0100 on the 30th,a flight of four Cobras from Kurth'ssquadron, led by Major Michael L. Steele,engaged in a gun duel with six Iraqi ar-mored personnel carriers on the coastroad, reportedly pitting the helicopters'20mm Gatling guns and 2.75mm rocketsagainst the armored personnel carriers'73mm main guns."6

Two AH-lWs from Frerker'ssquadron, led by Major Gary D. Shaw,had an even more hair-raising experience.Launching from al-Mishab to provide airsupport at Observation Post 4, they foundthemselves circling and waiting for a for-ward air controller to provide them withtargets. Eager to support the Marines onthe ground, they over stayed their fuellimits and attempted to reach the logisticsbase at Kibrit, only to find themselves fly-ing over an Iraqi armored column whichfired on them. They then attempted to di-vert back to al-Mishab, but their naviga-tion equipment malfunctioned and theylanded instead at the al-Khafji oil refinery.This was a stroke of luck. They refueledtheir aircraft from the refinery's suppliesas the Iraqis marched into the city. Theunidentified fuel worked well and theywere able to return to base."7

Another flight of Cobras, led by Cap-tain Randal W. Hammond, destroyedfour T-62 tanks. When nine Iraqi soldierswaved white flags and indicated theywished to surrender, they used their heli-copters to "round 'em up like cattle" untilMarines on the ground could secure theprisoners. Iraqi artillery fire forced thesection to withdraw, but not before oneCobra destroyed a final T-62 with a wire-guided missile. The explosion caused "itsturret to flip upside down and land on the

open hole like a tiddlywinks," CaptainHammond later recalled."8

A little after noon on the 29th, theIraqis also dispatched 15 fast patrol boatsfrom Ras al-Qulayah, as a U.S. Marineraiding force was taking Maradim Island.Apparently intending to land comman-dos at al-Khalji in support of 5th Mecha-nized Division, the Iraqi boats wereintercepted by Royal Air Force SEPECATGR-1A Jaguar aircraft and Royal NavyWestland HMA.8 Lynx helicopters fromHMS Brazen, Cardfl and Gloucester.Other Coalition aircraft then continuedthe attack, destroying or severely damag-ing all of the Iraqi boats and landingforces."9

At Observation Post 7, Captain Klein-smith continued to call for fire whileforming a defensive perimeter with theU.S. Army Special Forces and Marine 3dForce Reconnaissance teams. An OV-10Bronco arrived over the battlefield andworked with Captain Kleinsmith as theairborne forward air controller. He foundit difficult to control airstrikes because thelocation of friendly forces was unclear.Looking north of the border, CaptainKleinsmith directed Intruder and Harriersections in a strike against Iraqi artillerypositions, while a flight of Cobras circledabove. He thought the Cobras would pre-vent his team from being overrun as Ob-servation Post 8 had been, and he was"trusting that their sheer intimidationwould keep the enemy away from his po-sition' But as the Cobras circled over-head, the soldiers and Marines listened asIraqi vehicles moved in the darknessaround their position.'2°

Captain Kleinsmith had been kept in-formed as the other air-naval gunfireteams withdrew through al-Khalji. Whenthe Cobras circling above his positionwere forced to return to base due to lowfuel, Captain Kleinsmith and the leadersof the other two teams at ObservationPost 7 decided there was little reason toremain in place. The Special Forces teamhad two escape and evasion routesplanned: one east to the coastal highwayand then south to al-Khafi; the othertraveling west to Observation Post 2 andthen south across the desert. Both routesappeared to be cut off by Iraqi forces, soCaptain Kleinsmith led the teams'humvees south, directly into the sabkhas.He hoped the heavier Iraqi armor would

The Battle of al-Khafji 23

not follow them into the salt marsh.'2'The teams departed at 0230 as Iraqi ar-

tillery fire briefly pursued them. They suf-fered no casualties. Kleinsmith's groupremained in radio contact with the OV-10, which was now free to call in airstrikesaround the observation post. As it drovesouth it discovered "the remnants of theSANG [Saudi Arabian National Guard]screening force camps, complete withboiling tea on the fires just outside theirtents?"22 At approximately 0330, Klein-smith ordered a halt, worried that theteams might come under friendly fire ifthey attempted to join up with a Saudiunit in the darkness. They remained deepin the salt marshes until daybreak.'23

At 1800 on 29 January, General SalahAboud shifted from his main headquar-ters to his mobile headquarters so hecould better control the upcoming battle.Despite Coalition air attacks, as night fellon the 29th the Iraqi offensive was pro-gressing according to plan. At 2000, thevarious brigades of the 5th Mechanized,1st Mechanized, and 3d Armored Divi-sions crossed their lines of departure and

began the attack. As General Salah Aboudlater observed: "The troops faced somedifficulties executing these missions. Theterritory of one mission faced the road,which was hard for all the mechanizedequipments to use, and for that reason,this mechanized brigade didn't have an-other choice, except to occupy their tar-gets by walking. Still, all the troopsreached the targets on time. And this ac-tually deceived the enemy."24

In particular, the 15th Mechanized and26th Mechanized Brigades of the 5thMechanized Division passed through Ra-gawa at 2000. At this point, the Iraqi ar-tillery began firing flares that they coulduse to navigate through the desert. Whilemoving into position they observed thewithdrawal of Coalition forces from theborder observation posts.'25 Although theIraqi mechanized forces had difficulties inthe sabkhas, they reached their objectiveson time. A convoy from the 22d Mecha-nized Brigade met no resistance at Saudiborder stations, and its arrival along thebeach completed the encirclement of al-Khafji. The 26th Mechanized Brigade, en-countering no resistance, returned to itspositions in Kuwait after its role of de-

fending the Western flank of the 15thMechanized Brigade was complete. 126

General Salah Aboud kept his prom-ise, delivering the city of al-Khafji at 0200on the 30th as a present to Saddam Hus-sein. The supporting attacks had all runinto heavy resistance and been stoppedwith high loss of life, but al-Khafji was inIraqi hands. Now the Iraqis had to decidehow long they needed to hold the city inorder to accomplish their objective ofprovoking a major ground war.

The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff thencontacted General Salah Aboud andasked for his predictions and recommen-dations. The general replied that "whenthe enemy discovers the size of my force,he will focus his air effort on it," but that"the time we have until morning will notbe enough to pull back from al-Khafji."General Salah recommended that histroops pull back the next night, theevening of the 30-3 1 January, "after thisgreat victory we achieved without anydamage." He noted "the first night waspassed without any specific operationsfrom the enemy side?"27

Although the Iraqis occupied al-Kha!i, they were not alone. The 3d

24 The Battle of al-Khafji

Photo courtesy of LtCol Douglas R. Kleinsmith

Capt Douglas R. Kleinsmith poses with his air-ground liaison team. Capt Kleinsmith is on the left, and to the right are Cpl John D.Calhoun, Cpl Steve F Foss, and Cpl Edward E. Simons, Jr. On the night of 29-30 January 1991 Kleinsmith team was cut offfrom Coali-tion forces by the Iraqi advance. They evaded the enemy by maneuvering through the sabkhas and returned to Coalition lines.

Marines had a pair of reconnaissanceteams in the city on 29 January; they hadnot left with the air-naval gunfire and spe-cial operations forces. They were in con-tact with their platoon commander,Captain Daniel K. Baczkowski, at 3dMarines' headquarters, who had in-formed the 3d Marines commander,Colonel John Admire, of the teams' loca-tions. Colonel Admire ordered the teamsto remain in place.'28

Corporal Lawrence M. Lentz com-manded a seven-man team comprisingCorporals Scott A. Uskoski, Scott A. Wag-ner, Lance Corporals Marcus C. Slavenas,Alan L. Cooper, Jr., Jude A. Woodarek,and Hospital Mate Carlos Dayrit. Corpo-ral Charles H. Ingraham III commandeda six-man team consisting of CorporalJeffery D. Brown, Lance Corporals HaroldS. Boling, David S. McNamee, Patrick A.Sterling, and Hospital Mate 1st ClassKevin Callahan. The teams were part of3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnais-sance Battalion. Company A had been at-tached to 1st Reconnaissance Battalionfor Operations Desert Shield andStorm.'29

The intent of the 3d Marines' staff wasthat these teams, hidden within the town,would provide a valuable view of the cityduring a counterattack. However, in prac-tice they were a liability, as Captain Molof-sky later explained. Their presence

affected the "ability to conduct thecounter-attack, because we're not evensure where they're at," he said. "They didnot even have restricted fire areas aroundthem. Well, maybe they did, maybe theydidn't. But that wasn't translated to us, sothat when we want to do this counter at-tack and want to prep it with artillery; wedon't know where the Recon teams are"3°

The teams were not aware of these is-sues. They carefully prepared their obser-vation posts, set out claymore mines incase the Iraqis discovered their positions,and attempted to call artillery fire andairstrikes on the Iraqi forces they ob-served. They were not always successful;artillery support was sometimes refusedbecause the teams did not know whereSaudi or air-naval gunfire units were, andair support was still being sent primarilyto the fight at Observation Post 413

By the morning of the 3 0th, the fiercebattles of the night before had ended. Itbecame clear that the Iraqis had halted,and while the fighting had been intensefor those at the front, for the I Marine Ex-peditionary Force staff the Iraqi offensiveleft a feeling of bemusement. At themorning briefing on the 30th, GeneralBoomer observed: "Other than our losses,I am not unhappy with last night. It pro-ceeded as it should.... My only concern is

that we get something out to kifi [the Iraqiforce] before it gets back up intoKuwait:"32 "I believe that my feeling:' hesaid later, "was that if they're trying thatnow, they're going to play right into ourhands.... Then as it became clear that theywere trying to do something of signifi-cance we began to react. I think by thatpoint the MEF staff was at the point whereit could handle this kind of thing withoutit being some huge crisis:"33

General Khaled had a less sanguineview of the invasion. The Saudis under-stood how easily Saddam could turn evena battlefield disaster into a propagandavictory. They simply could not accept theloss of Saudi territory, even for a shortwhile. When he received the news of theattack he "felt a great deal of anxiety:"34King Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Ara-bia was often in contact. "King Fahdwanted quick results, and rightly so. Hewanted the enemy force expelled at once.He wished to deny Saddam the chance ofshowing the world that he could invadeSaudi Arabia and get away with it. Hetelephoned me a number of times, callingfor action:"35 Faced with such pressureGeneral Khaled did not consider al-KhafJia minor skirmish.

As dawn broke in the sabkha west of al-Khafji, Captain Kleinsmith's small caravanspotted unidentified tanks in the distance.His men mounted up and proceeded

Cpl Charles H. Ingraham's reconnaissance team used this building in al-Khafji throughout the battle as their observation post. Althoughthe team was not discovered by the Iraqis, the building was hit by fire from Iraqis and Saudis during the night engagements, as well asshrapnelfrom American air and artillery strikes.

Photo courtesy of Cpl Charles H. Ingraham III

The Battle of al-Khafji 25

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, 1991, Modified byw Stephen Hill

south to Saudi Arabian lines. At thispoint, the Special Forces and 3d Force Re-connaissance teams departed for al-Mishab, while Captain Kleinsmith and hisMarines moved to the 2d Saudi ArabianNational Guard Brigade headquarters,joining the main body of 1st ANGLICO.136

Meanwhile, other 1st ANGLICO teamswere spread among the Saudi and Qatariforces that were preparing to retake thecity and push the Iraqis back into Kuwait.Captain Mark S. Gentil's Supporting ArmsLiaison Team 5, First Lieutenant Bruce D.Mcllvried's Fire Control Team 13, and

First Lieutenant Kurtis E. Lang's Fire Con-trol Team 9 were assigned to the QatariBrigade, commanded by LieutenantColonel Ali Saeed. Each of the fire controlteams joined with one of the brigade's bat-talions, while the supporting arms liaisonteam acted as the fire support coordinator.Each battalion had a company of AMX-30tanks attached as well.'37

Captain James R. Braden's SupportingLiaison Team 6 was attached to ColonelTurki al-Firmi's 2d Saudi Arabian Na-tional Guard Brigade. Captain Braden'steam acted as a central clearing house for

all supporting fire and allowed ColonelTurki to use the Marine communicationsnet to keep track of his battalions, FireControl Team 12, commanded by CaptainJohn C. Bley II, was assigned to the 8thBattalion, 2d Saudi National GuardBrigade, along with Captain Mark V. Dii-lard's team from Supporting Arms LiaisonTeam 2. Dillard's team originally was as-signed to a Moroccan unit south of al-Mishab but was called forward to assist inthe battle.'38

Responsible for the defense of al-Khai and the coastal region, Saudi

26 The Battle of al-Khaf)i

Major General Sultan 'Adi al-Matiri's ini-tial plan of action was to cut off the Iraqiforces in al-Khaiji and convince them tosurrender. His intention was to avoid apotentially costly battle within the city. 139To this end he dispatched the 5th Battal-ion, 2d Saudi Arabian National GuardBrigade, north of al-Khafji as a blockingforce, supported by a company from the8th Ministry of Defense and AviationBrigade, equipped with M60 Pattontanks. He placed the Qatari Brigade, sup-ported by the 7th Battalion, 2d Saudi Ara-bian National Guard Brigade, in positionsto block the road south from al-Khaiji.'4°

Once established just south of the city,the Qatari Brigade began to engage tar-gets of opportunity within the city. A pla-toon of Iraqi T-55 tanks emerged andengaged the Qatari AMX-30s, resulting inthe destruction of three T-55s and thecapture of a fourth. Iraqi prisoners re-vealed that there was close to an enemy"brigade in the city and another brigadewas to join it"4' In response, General SW-tan bolstered the northern blocking forceby committing the balance of the 8thMinistry of Defense and AviationBrigade's armored battalion. The south-ern force was reinforced with the 8th Bat-talion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard,in addition to M113 armored personnelcarriers equipped with antitank missilelaunchers from the 8th Ministry of Avia-tion and Defense Brigade.'42

At 1152 on 30 January, 1st Battalion,12th Marines, the Marine artillery battal-ion assigned to support the Saudi attackon al-KhaIji, reported it had already ex-pended 136 rounds of dual purpose im-proved conventional munitions and eightrounds of high explosive munitions.'43The Cobra attack helicopters of MarineLight Attack Helicopter Squadron 367continued to support the Marines alongthe frontier and in al-Khafji. For the sameperiod, the squadron reported one tank,seven armored personnel carriers, onejeep, and one truck destroyed.'44

At noon, Colonel Turki al-Firmi metwith Colonel Admire. Colonel Turki wasin command of the Saudi force specifi-cally tasked with retaking al-Khafi. Cap-tain Braden, the 1st ANGLICO officerassigned to Colonel Turki's brigade, ob-served the meeting. Colonel Admire toldColonel Turki that Marine reconnais-sance teams were still in al-Khafji and

briefed him on the 3d Marine plan to re-move them from the city. Captain Bradenrecalled that "Col Turki stated that thecity was his and that he had a taskingfrom 'Riyadh' to rescue the Marine Reconteams.... Col Turki asked if the Marineslacked trust in the Saudi abilities to per-form their mission of defending their sec-tor? The question of sector defenseseemed moot at this point as the Iraqiswere in control of al-Khafi, but the mat-ter of trust between Coalition partnerswas in question." "s Admire agreed andoffered support.

Battery C, and later Battery A, 1st Bat-talion, 12th Marines, provided artilleryfire, and a combined antiarmor teamfrom 3d Marines moved to the gas stationfour kilometers south of al-Khalji.'46 De-spite Saudi desires to fight the battle ontheir own, Marine air-naval gunfire liai-son teams provided critical communica-tions to the Saudis and coordinatedartillery and air support. In addition, U.S.Army advisors from the Office of Pro-gram Manager for Modernization of theSaudi Arabian National Guard and civil-ian advisors from the Vinnell Corpora-tion fought throughout the battlealongside their assigned Saudi units.

Colonel Admire said that acting as thesupporting force was "one of the most dif-ficult decisions I've ever had to make."47The decision to have the Saudis lead theattack to free al-Khafi shaped the rest ofthe battle. Marines would observe andaid their Coalition partners, but the

Saudis and Qataris did the heavy fightingfrom this point on.'48

As plans were being made to liberateal-Khaiji, another strange event in thebattle occurred. Two U.S. Army tractor-trailer heavy equipment transportersfrom the 233d Transportation Companydrove into the city. The drivers were lost,unaware that they were in al-Khaiji, andthat an Iraqi offensive had occurred. Oneof the reconnaissance teams watched inhorror as the two tractor-trailers droveinto town, only to be met by a hail of firefrom the Iraqis. The first of the twotrucks was disabled and crashed, Iraqi firehaving wounded its driver and assistantdriver as well as disabling the steering.The second truck performed "the fastestU-turn in history, like he was a VW bug"and fled.'49 The Iraqis quickly over-whelmed and captured the two woundedsoldiers, Specialist David Lockett andSpecialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, whomwere quickly transported back to Kuwait.Specialist Rathbun-Nealy was the firstAmerican female soldier captured sinceWorld War II. The two were not freeduntil after the war)5°

Soon after the Army trucks disap-peared into al-KhaIJi, Major Craig S.Huddleston was informed of their disap-pearance. On Colonel Admire's orders,3d Battalion, 3d Marines, established anoutpost, Check Point 67, south of the cityto coordinate with the Saudis. MajorHuddleston, the battalion's executive offi-cer, was given command of the outpost.

The Battle of al-Khafji 27

The Saudi National Guard battalions, which freed al-Khafji from the Iraqis, employedCadillac Gage V-150 Commando light armored vehicles, some of which were equippedwith a M220 launcher for the BGM-71 TOW antitank missile.

DVIC DF-ST-91-04523

Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

The water tower in southern al-Khafji washeavily damaged during the battle. It wasa favorite target for both Iraqi and Sauditroops, and was strafed at least once by US.Marine Cobra helicopters.

He quickly formed a patrol to enter thetown and recover the two soldiers; everyone of the 128 Marines at the outpost vol-unteered to go, but he only took about 30Marines. Huddleston mounted the patrolin humvees, including antitank missileand heavy machine gun vehicles, andheaded for the city)5'

Al-Kha!Ji was still in a state of confu-sion. As the patrol raced into the town,they encountered some Iraqis but had nomajor fire fights. The Marines found thedisabled tractor-trailer, but not the miss-ing soldiers despite shouts of "U.S.Marines, U.S. Marines!" There was ashort engagement with Iraqi armoredpersonnel carriers, which Major Huddle-ston directed a pair of Cobras against.The patrol also found a destroyed QatariAMX-30 tank and its dead crew. Disap-pointed, the Marines returned to the out-post. "We wanted to get them [themissing soldiers] pretty bad:' Major Hud-dieston later said.'52

Journalists, prevented by the prevail-ing press system and Saudi prohibitionsagainst observing the battle in al-KhafJi,began to congregate south of the town.Several spoke with Major Huddleston andothers from the patrol, which led to a

misunderstanding. The Coalition ex-plained in press conferences that Saudiand Qatari forces were freeing al-Khafji,but the journalists who spoke with MajorHuddleston mistook his brief patrol for amajor Marine assault. They concludedthat the Marines were doing the majorfighting at al-KhalJi, but that the Coali-tion was, for political reasons, givingcredit for the battle to the Saudis. Thismyth was to persist; the belief that themilitary had lied to the press concerningal-Khaf5i would sour military-media rela-tions long after the Gulf War ended.'53

Meanwhile, General Khaled arrived atthe Joint Forces Command-East head-quarters south of al-Khafi. He was agi-tated, since King Fahd was pressuringhim to liberate the city as quickly as pos-sible. He also was upset about what heconsidered a lack of promised air fromthe Marine Corps. He contacted GeneralHomer. "I told him I wanted air supportas well as strikes by B-52s to break upIraqi concentrations and prevent rein-forcements reaching al-Khafi, even if itmeant diverting air assets from the aircampaign against strategic targets insideIraq. Minimize raids on strategic targetsand maximize them at al-Khafi, I urgedhim"54

General Homer saw the developingbattle as an opportunity to inflict maxi-mum losses on the Iraqis, but he did notconsider the B-52 to be the properweapon to use in this situation. He toldGeneral Khaled the same thing he rou-tinely told ground commanders: "Don'ttell me how to do the job. Tell me whatyou want done"55

Unsatisfied, General Khaled phonedBrigadier General Ahmad al-Sudairy,Saudi Director of Air Operations, an hourafter he spoke to General Homer. "Forgetabout the Joint Forces. If the U.S. AirForce or the Marines don't come at once,I want you to take our air assets out of theCoalition and send them all to me! I needthe Tornados, the F-5s, everything you'vegot!"56 A few moments later the air as-sets General Homer had already desig-nated for al-Khai began to arrive.General Khaled was convinced his threathad worked and as General Boomer latersaid: "Ultimately, it was our air supportthat turned the tide for them."57

In addition to his distress over the lackof air, the two Marine teams in the city

also presented General Khaled with aproblem. "I was extremely worried thatSchwartzkopf might use Americantroops, either U.S. Marines in an am-phibious attack or a heliborne U.S. Armyunit, to free my town in my sector. Theshame would have been difficult to bear."Consequently, he ordered Major GeneralSultan's plan to talk the Iraqi's into sur-rendering be abandoned, and an imme-diate assault launched against the city.'58

Given orders from General Khaled toattack at once, General Sultan passed theorder to Colonel Turki, who in turn as-signed the task of assaulting al-Khafji toLieutenant Colonel Hamid Matar's 7thBattalion, 2d Saudi Arabian NationalGuard Brigade, supported by two Qataritank companies.'59

Captain Molofsky, the 3d Marines li-aison officer, observed the Saudi prepara-tions for battle. "Matar's Battalion is justreally lined up on the road, you know —out into the desert a little bit, into CheckPoint 67. It's a beehive.... And, Matar'sorders are to attack. And, that's it, youknow—nothing else. Attack." Matar'sbattalion had received the order to attackat 1600, but it was not in position until2000. Captain Molofsky observed thatMatar was "really nervous; smoking ciga-rettes, pacing back and forth."6°

There was a 15 minute preparatory fireby 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, and thenthe 7th Battalion literally charged forwardagainst al-Kha!ji. "Out of nowhere, vehi-cles start up and people start driving for-ward:' observed Captain Molofsky, whojoined the 7th Battalion for the attack.The Saudi battalion drove straight up themiddle of the road, but the Qatari tankspulled to the side as the force approachedal-KhaIji. As the first couple Saudi vehi-cles entered under the arches of the city,"the whole place lights up:' Molofsky said."I mean a whole lot of directed fire,straight down the road ... just a firestormof tracers, and tank main gun. And I no-tice a V-150 blow up, or it looked like itblew up, about 30 meters off to the side ofthe road."6'

The Saudi attack was disorganized andundisciplined; they expended massiveamounts of ammunition fired wildly intothe city, as 1st ANGLICO reported after-wards. At one point, Qatari tanks firedon their Saudi allies although quick ac-tion by Captains Dillard and Gentil

28 The Battle of al-Khaf)i

ended the fire before any casualties weretaken. Still, the undisciplined fire andscattered assault was suspected to havecaused two Saudi deaths. 162

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Taylorwas the U.S. Army advisor to the 7th Bat-talion and he aided Lieutenant ColonelMatar throughout the battle.163 Through-out the night Saudi and Qatari soldiersfought against the Iraqi forces, sufferingfire so heavy that Taylor, a Vietnam Warveteran, described it as "flabbergasting?"TMBut the Saudis and Qataris did not hesi-tate to return fire, as Captain Molofskynoted: "Qatari tanks came back up theroad and were shooting up from behindand, at one point, the volume of fire gotso heavy that we all got out of the truckand took cover in a ditch and you knowthe Saudis were shooting TOW missilesup in the air. Once they started shooting,they were shooting. I mean everybodywas shooting at the max rate.'165

Despite their efforts, the 7th Battalionwas not able to retake al-Khaf5i nor was itable to relieve the reconnaissance teamsstill trapped within the city.'66 CaptainMolofsky later recalled the engagement'ssurreal conclusion: "We pulled back intodefilade in a small depression, just south

of the city; and they [the Saudis] got out ofthe vehicles and they put their cloaks on,built fires and brewed up coffee, and thenthey prayed. I think my sense then wasthat the team couldn't have been muchdifferent than if they were riding withLawrence except that they were mecha-nized vehicles instead of horses. Reallyextraordinary. "167

At nightfall, Lieutenant Colonel Naif's5th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian NationalGuard Brigade, moved into position toblock Iraqi movement in and out of al-KhafJi from the north. The battalion wassoon reinforced by a battalion of the 8thMinistry of Defense and AviationBrigade, companies of which driftednorth throughout the night. Iraqi forcesattempted several times to reinforce al-Kha1i, but Coalition air support was nowavailable in copious amounts, and the air-naval gunfire teams attached to the 5thBattalion were able to call F/A-18s, AV-8s, and A-lOs down on the Iraqi forces,inflicting a large number of casualties andforcing an even larger number of Iraqitroops to surrender to the Saudis.'68 TheSaudis claimed 5 Iraqi vehicles destroyed,

6 captured, and 116 prisoners taken.169The engagements were not without

problems. The lack of joint training be-tween the Saudi Arabian National Guardand Ministry of Defense and Aviationforces led the 8th Ministry of Defense andAviation Battalion's commander to fearthat the two Saudi forces might fire oneach other, so in the morning he pulledback to refuel and rearm. This kept theSaudis from completely sealing al-Khal5iat the end of the first night of battle, al-lowing a few Iraqi units to escape backinto Kuwait.17°

Coalition airpower was now focusedon the al-Kha!ji area, taking advantage ofthe Iraqi offensive to strike at their forceswhich had previously remained hidden.The E-8C Joint Surveillance and TargetAcquisition Radar System aircraft wereused to track Iraqi movements in Kuwait."The new JSTARS system proved a vitalasset in beating back the Iraqi attacks," anAir Force study noted. "An airborne radarthat could monitor enemy vehicle trafficat night with impressive clarity, JSTARSwas an indispensable element in ensuringthe efficient and effective use of Coalitionaircraft?"7' The tactical air control centerwas focusing aircraft on al-Khaii and in-

Marines of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, prepare an M198 155mm howitzer. The battalion fired numerous missions in support of Saudiand US. Marine forces during the Battle of al-Khafji.

History Division Photo

The Battle of al-Khaf)i 29

terdiction missions in southern Kuwait.But the success of the air interdiction

was not without loss. A U.S. Air ForceAC-130, call sign "Spirit Zero Three:' re-mained over its targets as the sun came updespite the policy that AC-130s only beemployed at night. An Iraqi surface-to-air missile struck the aircraft, killing its14-man crew.172

The massive effort had an effect on theIraqi forces. General Salah Aboud had al-ready begun requesting permission towithdraw. Although the offensive wastermed "The Mother of Battles" by Sad-dam, General Salah radioed that "The

mother was killing her children."173

Early in the morning on 31 January,Batteries A and C, 1st Battalion, 12thMarines, attached to the 3d Marines, firedan improved conventional munitionsmission into al-Khai under the controlof the Marine reconnaissance teams in-side the town.'74 Corporals Ingrahamand Lentz, the team leaders, requested theartillery strike on a large Iraqi column be-tween their positions at 0645. Initially,clearance was denied by 3d Marines firesupport control center, but the mission

was approved at 0701. At 0705, BatteriesA and C responded to the call for fire. At0740, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, wastold by the fire support control center thatall future fire missions had to be approvedby the air-naval gunfire teams attached tothe Saudi forces.'75

The barrage was a success from theperspective of the Marines inside al-Khafji, as it landed a solid blow againstthe Iraqis and essentially eliminated theIraqi column. But it was placed danger-ously close to their positions; CorporalJeffrey Brown received a wound from theshrapnel.'76

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdon, 1991, Modified by W. Slephen Hill

30 The Battle of al-Khafji