draft paper. please do not cite. 09/07/2006 from no-party to...
TRANSCRIPT
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Draft paper. Please do not cite.
09/07/2006
From no-party to multiparty system: NRM and its competitors in Uganda’s 2006 elections1
Sabiti Makara,
Makerere University Kampala;
Lise Rakner and Lars Svåsand Chr. Michelsen Institute and University of Bergen
Paper for the International Political Science Association World Congress 2006, Panel: Political parties and society in new democracies and transitional regimes:
Electoral mobilization and the problem of effective representation
1 This paper is part of the research project “The institutional and legal context of the 2006 elections in Uganda”, a cooperation project between Department of Political Science, Makerere University, Kampala, the Chr. Michelsen’s Instittute, Bergen, Norway and the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway. This paper draws on another paper in the project: Julius Kiiza, Lars Svåsand and Robert Tabaro: Organizing parties for the 2006 elections
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Abstract:
On February 23, 2006 Uganda held its first multi-party election for president and
parliament since 1980. From 1986 until this year Uganda has been ruled by the
National Resistance Movement (NRM) which came to power in 1986 after a guerrilla
war. NRM introduced a hierarchical system of directly elected councils, from the
village level to the national, in which individuals competed on the basis of their
‘individual merit’. Political parties, as we know them from established democracies,
had no role in this system. The paper first summarizes the results of the 2006 elections
and provides a background for the main party alternatives. The second section places
Uganda in the comparative perspective of African democratization. The third section
outlines the political developments in Uganda under the Movement system, including
the official justification for returning to a multi-party system. Section four outlines
how the re-introduction of multi-party system was implemented and section five
covers how the NRM functioned in the 2006 election. In the final section we discuss
how we can understand the case of Uganda in the perspective of party theories: what
is Uganda an example of, and what kind of party system is re-emerging?
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1. Introduction.
Uganda has had a volatile and violent history as an independent state. Initially it was a
multi-party system, but became a one-party state in 1966, led by Milton Obote. In
1971 Obote was deposed by the army, which under the leadership of General Idi
Amin, established one of Africa's most brutal dictatorships. The economy collapsed as
a result of corruption and the forced emigration of the Indian business community. In
1979 Amin was overthrown by a rebel army, supported by Tanzania. Elections in
1980 returned Obote to power, but his rule triggered more armed resistance and he
was deposed in a military coup in 1985, which subsequently was defeated in 1986
when the National Resistance Army, led by Yoweri Museveni captured the capital.
Following the civil war Uganda has remained politically stable, although armed
conflicts persist in the Northern parts of the country. The elections held on February
23, 2006 - the first multiparty election since 1980 – represent a new stage in the
development of Uganda’s polity. For the first time since 1980 multi-party elections
were held for the presidency and for parliament. The constitution provides for a
parliament with 319 members. The MPs are elected in different ways. First, there are
two groups of directly elected MPs. The largest group, 215 MPs, are elected directly
in single-member constituencies by a plurality of the votes. Second, Uganda is
divided into districts, 69 for 2006. In each district voters vote for a district women
representatives, also elected by simple majority. In addition to these directly elected
members there are 25 members elected by special electoral colleges. The Uganda
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has 10 seats, while electoral colleges representing
youth organizations, women organizations and people with disabilities (PWD) each
elects five members of parliament. All members are elected for a five year term. Until
this year these elections took place under the so-called ‘individual merit system’.
Party competition was illegal.
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The president is elected in a nationwide vote and needs to have more than 50% to win
in the first round. Otherwise there will be a run-off between the two top running
candidates, but this situation has never materialized. Until July 2005 the president
could only be elected for two five-year terms, but this limitation was removed and
Pres. Museveni could run for his third term in 2006.
As tables 1 and 2 show, according to the official results Museveni was returned to
office for a third term with a comfortable majority and NRM retain a two-thirds
majority of MPs. Thus at least officially, the 2006 elections were unique in the sense
that a two decade long era without active political parties came to an end and was
replaced by party based contestation. It is, however, ambiguous what kind of change
that really took place. Interpretations of the extensiveness and the depth of the change
in 2006, range from transformation to adaptation. To speak of a transformation
refers to a fundamental change of the political system. This implies not only the
formal changes that took place, but also that the playing-field between the incumbent
and the opposition parties became more levelled, that the process affected several
political institutions and was penetrated throughout the territory. Adaptation, on the
other hand emphasises continuity rather than change. To speak of adaptation in 2006
is to emphasise the limited implications of the formal changes and in stead look at the
vastly more important informal factors, and realities outside of the constitutional
framework that reduced the chances of any fundamental change. In this perspective,
the 2006 elections were not a transformation as much as it was “business as usual”.
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Table 1 Number of seats for parties.2
NRM FDC UPC DP IND Others
Directly
Elected MPs 142 27 9 8 26 3
Distr.Women
mandates 49 10 9
Indirect
Seats 14 1
UPDF 10
Ex.Officio
Members 10
Total 205 37 9 8 37 2 20
Legend: NRM: National Resistance Movement, FDC: Forum for Democratic
Change, UPC: Uganda People’s Congress, DP: Democratic Party, IND.:
Independent candidates, Others: Conservative party (1), Justice Forum (1),
vacant (1), UPDF: Uganda People’s Defence Force
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Uganda Table 2 Percent votes for presidential candidates.
Candidate Votes
Abed Bwanika (independent) 0.95%
Besigye Kizza ( FDC) 37.36%
Obote Kalule Miria (UPC) 0.82%
Sebana Joseph Kizito (DP) 1.59%
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (NRM) 59.28%
Source: http://www.ec.or.ug/detail.php?p=14
2 It is not possible to provide data on percent of the votes for each party. The reason for this is that there are a number of constituencies where the Election Commission has not yet published the official votes for each candidate, although it has determined who has won the constituency.
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The re-introduction of multiparty politics led to several types of party formation
processes. First, the old parties, UPC and DP, were re-registered and tried to re-
establish their organizational network. Second, a new party, FDC was created as an
alliance between three already existing groups and third, several new parties emerged.
Altogether 32 parties were registered before the election, but most of these parties did
not even nominate a single candidate.
What is particularly noticeable about the 2006 elections is the poor performance of
the old parties, UPC and DP, partly caused by their own problems as they were ridden
by factionalized rivalries.
Uganda Peoples’ Congress
Established on 9 March 1960, UPC is one of the old parties in Uganda. It was the
dominant partner in the UPC/Kabaka Yekka (King’s Party) coalition that formed
government in 1962. When the coalition collapsed in 1964, the UPC remained in
government and ruled till Amin’s overthrow of Obote’s government in 1971. In 1980,
after the overthrow of two short-lived governments of Presidents Yusuf Lule and
Godfrey Binaisa, Obote was again elected President (although opposition parties
claimed that the elections had been rigged). Obote remained in power till his second
overthrow (1985) that forced him into exile in Lusaka, Zambia where he lived till
2005. At a time when the ruling NRM slapped a ban on political party activism, Dr
Obote urged his party faithfuls to defy the NRM “dictatorship.” He appointed a
Presidential Policy Commission (PPC), chaired by Dr. James Rwanyarare. The
purpose of the PPC was to spearhead the defiance against the NRM regime, organise
party activities, and keep the UPC spirit alive.
When the NRM government indicated its willingness to restore multiparty politics, Dr
Obote embarked on initiatives to reposition the UPC to suit the changing political
climate. The goal was to prepare the party for the run-up to 2006. On 01 April 2005,
Obote dissolved the PPC and replaced it with the “Constitutional Steering
Committee” (CSC), chaired by Badru Wegulo who was also the National party
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chairman.3 Dr Rwanyarare decided to challenge his dismissal. Through his lawyers
Rwanyarare filed a civil suit before the high court in Kampala. Obote was jointly sued
with the new UPC Secretary General, Peter Walubiri and other party officials, Okello
Okello and Adoko Nekyon. Dr. Rwanyarare contention was that the CSC is
inconsistent with the UPC constitution, the PPOA and the 1995 constitution.
However, while still in exile in Lusaka Obote passed away in October 2005, and the
court case between the Obote and the Rwanyarare was dropped.
Some interviewees suggested that Rwanyarare was dismissed after openly declaring
his intention to stand for party presidency at the delegates’ conference that had been
scheduled for September 2005. From this reading, Obote moved fast to trim
Rwanyarare’s “growing political wings” (Interviews, 2005). Interviews with top UPC
officials, however, suggest that Rwanyarare was sacked because of “inefficiency” in
running party affairs. He was “particularly slow at reviving party branches country-
wide” (UPC Interviews, 2005). Some alleged that he was bribed by the incumbent
regime to “kill” UPC. Other interviewees suggest that Dr Rwanyarare committed two
political sins. First, he “seems to have recruited Henry Mayega and Cecilia Ogwal
into his faction to challenge Obote’s leadership. Second, Rwanyarare allegedly
“lacked a vision of leading the party after the registration certificate was obtained”
(UPC Interviews, 2005).
In mid-April 2005, Obote’s son, Jimmy Akena and the chief of the UPC office in
London, Joseph Ochieno, returned from exile. Critics of Obote within the UPC
interpreted the return and the changes in the party as attempts by the party president to
position his son into the top echelons of UPC. Obote’s death in October created a
completely new scenario for the party. On the one hand his passing away solved a
problem for the party. The party could now face the electorate with a leader untainted
by the past. On the other hand it also meant a competition within the party for the
party presidency. In the end Obote’s wife, Miria Obote was nominated as the party’s
presidential candidate.
Notwithstanding the internal conflicts within UPC, the party embarked on a
mobilisation campaign throughout the country. By early May 2005 it claimed to have 3 The sacking of the PPC and the appointment of the CSC exposed a deep rift in the party. At least ten of the party’s key figures endorsed a letter to Obote calling for the disbandment of the CSC.
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spent more than Ush 100 million on opening new offices and registering members
(East African May 9, 2005). By mid-June 2005, it claimed to have registered more
than 20, 000 members (The Monitor June 15. 2005). In the end however, the UPC’s
organization and mobilization capacity turned out to be very limited. Ms. Obote
polled only 0.82 percent of the votes, fewer than independent candidate Abed
Bwanika and even in the best districts, Apac and Lira, less than eight percent of the
voters preferred her candidature.
Democratic Party
The DP has been more affected by internal rivalries than any other party. Two
separate groups, one led by Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere and another by Hajji Nasser
Sebeggala sought to register the party.4 On May 16 2005, the groups were reconciled
in order to have the party registered. The party was finally registered on 13 July 2005
and celebrated its registration at the constitutional square in Kampala on 21 July 2005.
Hundreds of party supporters and other member of opposition parties turned up. The
object of the crowd was apparently to send a clear political signal to the incumbent
regime, namely, that political parties were popular, contrary to the claims of the ruling
NRM.5
However, the registration of DP as a “united” party failed to resolve the “Ssebagala”
factor. On 30 August 2005, Ssebagala not only announced his intention to run in the
2006 presidential elections; he launched his manifesto as a presidential hopeful. After
loosing the bid to be the official DP candidate, he registered as an independent, but
later withdrew from the race.
On 01 September 2005, the DP President-General announced a national Task Force to
reorganize the party ahead of the delegates’ conference scheduled to take place later
in the year. Problems in getting the party re-organised forced the convention to be
postponed until late November. The convention was the first time that DP had met as
a party in more than 20 years. The dominant issue at the convention was the battle to
fill positions as a number of the veterans were resigning. The debate on the party
4 The significance being that the registration also had to document who the official office holders of the party are. Moreover, the office holders are the custodians of the official registration certificate, which allows the party to conduct its political activities. The certificate is equivalent to the title of a property 5 Inside the DP a faction called Forces for Change (FC) threatened to break off and form a new party.
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program was kept at a minimum and the party statutes were dealt with even more
summarily. In the end, the departing Kampala mayor, Sebana Joseph Kizito, was
nominated as the party’s presidential candidate. He was however, as unsuccessful as
Miria Obote was for the UPC; he polled only 1.6% of the votes. Even in his best
district, Moroto, only 4.4 percent voted for him.
The real challenger to NRM was the newly formed FDC. From the start of the
election campaign FDC was considered to be a front-runner because its de facto
leader, Kizza Bessigye, had contested the 2001 elections and won 29% of the votes.
Since then he had been in exile in South Africa. FDC is a coalition of three
organisations: Reform Agenda (RA)6, National Democratic Forum (NDF) and
Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO).
Most FDC members have defected from the NRM, largely based on the claim that the
NRM leader has departed from the ideology of patriotism and anti-corruption, the
principle of anti-sectarianism, and other values which the NRM had during the bush
war of 1981-1986 (FDC Interviews, 2005).
As a new party FDC faced several problems. One of these was to build a party
organisation throughout the country. Moreover, the executive director of the FDC
Interim Executive Committee cited lack of a sense of belonging to the FDC rather
than to its constituting parts as a major problem (New Vision 7 June 2005).
In March 2005, the party launched its official headquarters and appointed committees
and task forces in preparation for the 2006 elections and a campaign team was
charged with establishing party structures from the parish level to the district level7.
When Bessigye returned from his exile in South Africa, he received an enthusiastic
welcome. Although the FDC had difficulties with different factions, Bessigye’s
candidature was not seriously threatened by other candidates. Under the pressure of
time, internal divisions were temporarily dealt with. The overwhelming objective
uniting the new party was the aim of unseating the incumbent president. The FDC
nevertheless faced other serious difficulties, precisely because it was seen as a serious
challenger to the NRM. FDC claimed that at least 60 of its leaders and supporters
6 The decision of the RA to join FDC led to a split and the formation of the Reform Party 7 The party constitution and party platform is available at http://www.fdcuganda.org/
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were detained in periods and that some of its members had spent more than two years
in prison without trial (Monitor 10th May 2005).
Two of the party’s MPs were arrested for a period on murder charges, which the two
denied. The FDC saw this as part of the government’s attempt to undermine the
opposition. As discussed later in the paper Bessigye was accused of multiple crimes
which undoubtedly affected the election campaign.
The 2006 elections are interesting from several perspectives: Why did the ruling
movement, NRM, decide to move away from a no-party movement system to a multi-
party system? To what extent is it correct to say that the results were almost pre-
determined by the change process itself?
2. The change in Uganda: comparative perspectives and conceptual questions.
The political system that the National Resistance Army (NRA) introduced when it
came to power in Uganda in 1986 after the guerrilla war, was by many seen as a
unique way of organising a polity: democratic principles, including regular elections
for a wide range of offices with competition between candidates, a relatively free
press and civil society, but without a role for political parties. What came to be known
as “The Movement system” was presented as a fundamentally different way of
organising the Ugandan polity in order to escape from the governing problems of the
past which were seen to be caused by the conflicts created by, and channelled
through, the political parties, mainly the UPC and the DP. Political parties, NRM
alleged, had failed to provide political stability and national integration. Instead, they
had fuelled ethnic and regional conflicts. The idea behind the NRM was to create an
all-embracing organization for all Ugandans where the individual merit system, not
partisan backing, should be the basis for representation. Political parties were not
explicitly forbidden, but were subjected to such restrictions that they for all practical
purposes ceased to function. They could have a national headquarter in Kampala, but
could not have branches throughout the country. They could not organise
conventions, nor could they sponsor candidates running for elective offices. In short,
the very functions and nature of parties were forbidden.
The Movement system, or also characterized as a ‘no-party system’, has been praised
as well as criticised, by domestic as well as by international actors and observers. Dan
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Ottemoeller indicated that Uganda was “a case of informally institutionalized
polyarchy” (Ottemoeller 1998). Through surveys he found that Ugandan voters
associated democratic rights more with individual freedoms than with the right to
organize in different groups, thus exactly what the official Movement ideology
propagated. More recently, Salih, although refraining from explicitly endorsing the
Movement system, nevertheless considered Uganda as one of only two genuinely
African alternatives to organising a ‘standard’ party system (Salih 2003).8
Yet, the idea that the Ugandan polity developed as a no-party system has also been
challenged. Both national and international scholars have questioned to what extent
Uganda really has been a no-party system. Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango argued in
2000 that “the new” Movement….is simply a state-supported political organization –
a single-party in all but name” (Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango 2000). A similar view
was taken by Ssenkumba. He argued that “Uganda has, therefore, in reality operated
more or less as a three-party system with the NRM increasingly taking on most of the
characteristics of the other parties, namely the Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda
People’s Congress (UPC)” at the same time as the space for the opposition had been
severely restricted (Ssenkumba 2000). This view has been echoed by Tangri who in a
recent publication claimed that ”the NRM …… to all intents and purposes, has
operated as a political party supported by the state” (Tangri 2006). Thus, according to
these scholars NRM is in fact like a political party, rather than an all-embracing
movement.
Several international students of Uganda’s polity have reached a similar conclusion.
According to Susan Dicklitch “the no-party system… is increasingly resembling a
one-party system” (Dicklitch 2000), while Carbone claimed that “Uganda’s political
system, as it is currently working, is best conceptualized as something closer to a
hegemonic party-state system” (Carbone 2003). Kasfir (1999) argues that the “no-
party system” started democratically enough: “The village council may turn out to
have been the NRM’s most important democratic initiative. So long as they remained
the institutional expression of popular participation, they supplied no-party democracy
with its most persuasive justification”(Kasfir 1999). But he nevertheless concluded
that: “But what is the NRM now? Without institutions, without an ideology, and 8 The other being Ethiopia post-1991; built explicitly on the ethnic divisions of the country, while in most African countries this is forbidden.
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finally without a rationale that can justify its no-party democracy, it no longer has any
justification apart from its leader” (Kasfir 1999).
In 2005 this model of governance came to an end, when it was decided to re-introduce
party competition, register political parties and in principle at least, separating the
NRM from the state. The” opening up of the political space” as it was officially
termed, thus brought Uganda in line with several other African countries which
during the 1990’s did the same. The circumstances surrounding the transitions and
their outcome obviously varied across political systems and scholars continue to
analyse and debate the relative impact of the international community vs domestic
forces, such as the cohesiveness of the regime’s leadership and the impact of civil
society organisations. The ‘mixture’ of these elements and the strategies of the
incumbents and the opposition differed from case to case (Bratton and Walle 1997).
The change to multiparty system in Uganda is not completely parallel to
developments in other states, but has similarities with two groups of countries.
In one group of countries the transition was ‘managed’ by the incumbent regime, such
as in
Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. In this group of countries the single party
regime decided under domestic and international pressure to introduce multi-party
system, but the outcomes of the transitions differed widely. Tanzania, and initially
Kenya, is an example of successfully managed transitions in which the incumbent
party was able to hold on to power, while in Malawi and Zambia the transitions led to
the collapse of the former ruling parties. To the extent that Uganda was like a single-
party system, the 2006 elections are reminiscent of Tanzania in 1995 and Kenya in
1997.
The change in Uganda has also similarities with another group of countries: Ethiopia,
Mozambique, Angola and Namibia. Just as in Uganda, today’s governing party in
these countries came to power via the bullet and not the ballot and have so far been
able to remain in power via the electoral mechanism.
Although there are similarities with other countries, the case of Uganda is also
somewhat unique because of the Movement system. The nature of this system is
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described below, but it is necessary to review a few central elements here in order to
discuss some alternative perspectives on the 2006 scenario. In the Movement system
individual candidates would run for elections based on their own individual merit, not
as party candidates. A pyramid of five levels of councils, from the village to the
national level was designed to ensure grass root participation, known as the LC
structure. A total of 951.345 offices were to be filled through general elections, out of
a population of ca. 25 million. At a formal level, in the 2006 elections party
competition was re-introduced, but the LC structure was retained and although parties
started to (re-)register in 2004, the Movement system persisted until the elections in
2006 were completed.
3. Main features of the Movement system 1986-2005
The changes implemented for the 2006 elections – whether they constitute a
transformation or an adaptation or something in between – must be seen against the
backdrop of the regime that has governed Uganda since 1986. The two decades can be
divided into three periods, each characterized by a different stage in the organization
of the regime. These three periods cover important legislations that over the years
came to provide the official framework of the 2006 elections. On the one hand there
were important legal and constitutional changes, but on the other the grip of NRM on
the Ugandan system remained unchanged.
- The first period covers the time from when NRM, or NRA (National Resistance
Army) as it was called, took power in 1986 until their reign became formalized
through the adoption of the 1995 constitution.
- The second period runs from 1995 until 2001. This period is distinct from the
following years because the 2001 election was the first in which the undisputed
leader, President Museveni, was challenged by one of his own allies.
- Period three, 2001-2005 sets the stage for the first multiparty elections. In this
period NRM makes a u-turn in favour of multiparty competition, but at same time
accompanies the change with several pieces of legislation aimed at maintaining its
control with the regime.
First period: From guerrilla movement to no-party system 1986-1995
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During the guerrilla war against the second Obote government, the NRA/M
established resistance councils (RC) in the villages under its control. When NRA/M
took power in 1986 it aimed to spread the institution nation wide as a basis of its
administration. There was no formal, legal basis for the RCs as the NRA/M as a self-
established governing relied on the legitimacy it had earned as the ouster of the hated
Obote regime. It was only after the RC structures had been established that a legal
basis for the NRA/M rule was created. Following elections to a Constitutional
Assembly in 1993 a constitution was adopted in 1995. The resistance councils were
renamed local councils in 1997. They start at the village level (LC1) and progress
through the parish (LC2) to the sub county (LC3), county (LC4) and district (LC5). At
the top of the system NRA’s supreme council was replaced by a parliament and a
directly elected president.
As later defined by the Odoki Constitutional Commission:
“The movement political system is a unique initiative introduced in Uganda by the
NRM administration since January 1986. It is based on democratically elected
resistance councils from the village level to the National Resistance Council
(parliament). It is founded on participatory democracy which enables every person to
participate in his or her own government at all levels of government…It is all-
embracing it its approach a vision. It has no manifesto of its own, apart from the
commonly agreed upon programme. It does not recruit members, since all people in
Uganda are presumed to be members of the village resistance councils. At all times it
aims to give expression to the people’s sovereignty. During elections people vote for
candidates based on their own merit and not on the basis of party affiliation”. (Uganda
Constitutional Commission, p. 197).
It is important to note that the period preceding the 1995 Constitution saw a different
kind of “Movement” – one, which though not entrenched in the Constitution was
fairly tolerant of divergent views, accommodated members of various political parties
and allowed multi-media political debate on almost every issue. A critical observer
would not that the Movement was possibly more democratic in the pre-1995 period
than after. In spite of the all-inclusive ambitions, it proved difficult to accept dissent,
partly from people who disagreed with the principle of the Movement system, party
from people that disagreed with the Movement on political grounds, and partly from
people who did not approve of Museveni’s leadership. According to a report from
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Human Rights Watch (1998): “the local council structures serve as partisan NRM
bodies during election times and target multipartyists and their supporters for abuse
during these periods” (p. 54) and IFES claimed that the local council system was used
to mobilise pro-movement support in the 1996 elections (IFES 1996).
The “individual merit system” did not operate in practice to allow anyone to run for
office. There was no room for example to stand as an independent. Moreover, internal
competition was highly restricted. Museveni has remained unchallenged as leader of
NRM since 1983. This has made the NRM appear as if it was a one-man organization.
A culmination of the personalization of NRM was the repeal of the two term
limitation on the presidency and the nomination and subsequent election of Janet
Museveni to parliament in 2006.
A significant clause in the constitution was article 269 which imposed a number of
restrictions on political activity which remained in force until 2005. Parties were
allowed to exist in name, but at the same time it prohibited parties from:
- opening and operating branch offices,
- holding delegate’s conferences,
- holding public rallies, and
- nomination of, or offering a platform or campaigning for, a candidate for any
public election.
In other words, the very functions of parties were made illegal. This regulation was
constantly challenged by the old parties and eventually also from within the
Movement system itself.
Museveni held that the movement system was an alternative to multiparty politics and
the necessary antidote to the perceived sectarianism of political parties in Uganda.
Political parties were viewed as divisive, and in their place, Museveni introduced the
idea of a no-party system, an all-inclusive movement in which individual candidates
would run for elections based on their individual merit.
Thus, two changes during this period are significant. First, the formalization of the
new system of governance, and second, a gradual change inside the Movement, with a
narrowing scope for divergent views.
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Second period:. 1995-2000: From movement to institutionalised party.
Within this period, two political milestones should be noted:
first, the implementation of the Movement act in 1997 which formalized the structure
of the Movement as, in principle, separate from the state’s structure, and second, the
referendum in 2000 which provided continued popular legitimacy for the ban on
political parties.
The Movement Act:
It was during the Constitutional Assembly debates in the early 1990’s that NRM was
formally declared a “Movement system” – as opposed to the party systems. This
became formalized with the Movement Act of 1997. This act created a second set of
structures, essentially duplicating the structures of the local councils (Human Rights
Watch 1998: 57). Like the local councils, the movement structure exist at the village
level, parish, sub-county, county and district in addition to the National Movement
Conference and its permanent secretariat (Movement Act 1997, article 4). It may
therefore be argued that with the Movement Act of 1997, NRM transformed itself
from a movement and became in a sense, a party. As argued by Human Rights Watch
(1998): “The Movement Act in effect replicates the structures of a political
organization that is a party in all but name, as structures of the Ugandan state, creating
a state sponsored political organization disguised as a ‘political system’. (p. 59).
The 2000 referendum.
In the face of a number of electoral set backs in the 1998 local government elections,
where many important positions were won by candidates associated with the old
political parties, DP and UPC, HRW (Human Rights Watch) argued that NRM moved
towards a more direct sponsorship of NRM candidates: “Indeed the 1998 movement
elections allowed the NRM to transform itself into a state-funded political party
without diluting its hold on power” (64). In the referendum in 2000 on whether or not
to continue with the movement system, more than 90 percent of the electorate
favoured retaining the existing system. According to Bratton and Lambrigth this result
was hardly surprising: “The NRM took full advantage of its incumbency in
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government to define the rules of the game and to influence the course of the
campaign” (Bratton and Lambright 2001).
Thus, the Movement act consolidated NRM as an organisation, formally on the side
of the state, but relying on the state structure, in which in practice it became
impossible to draw a line between state and organisation. This extensive
organisational network was an overwhelming resource for mobilization in the 2000
referendum reinforcing the legitimacy of the regime both internally and externally.
Third period:. Preparing for multiparty competition: 2001-2005.
During this third period three political developments triggered a range of legal and
constitutional changes that culminated in the 2006 multi-party elections: first, the
2001 election which exposed a deep rift within the Movement, second, the challenges
from the old parties about the unconstitutionality of the ban on parties, and third, the
process within the Movement tilting the balance in favour of the multiparty-faction,
2001 election
The Movement system had come under attack for many years and an important signal
was sent in the 2001 election when a former ally of Museveni, Kizza Besigye,
opposed him in the presidential election, winning 29 percent of the votes.
The 2001 elections were among the most controversial and contested elections in
Uganda’s political history. Rivalling with the 19809 multi-party elections, both
elections were violent, poorly managed and the outcomes were questioned by the
opposition. Unlike the 1980 elections, the 2001 elections were held under the
Movement system, where the state and the ruling Movement operated in a fused
manner. Thus, the management of elections was in a way perceived by the
government as a means of operationalizing the Movement and its objectives. Given
that elections were held under the principle of individual merit, where candidates
stand as individuals rather than members of political parties, the management of 9 Bwengye shows clearly that the 1980 elections were rigged (Bwengye, F. W. T. (1985). The Agony of Uganda: From Amin to Obote. London, Regency Press. The methods used included: gerrymandering constituencies, suspension of 14 Returning Officers/District Commissioners, lack of an accurate Voters’ Register, state intimidation of potential opposition candidates, use of multiple ballot boxes, and withdrawal of the Electoral Commission’s authority by decree issued by the Military Commission (which reserved to itself the powers to announce election results).
18
elections was originally perceived as if it would run like the one of 199610. However,
the 2001 elections were somehow different. Because this time round, a candidate from
within the Movement, Dr. Col. Kiiza Besigye, defied Movementists to stand against
Museveni. Besigye’s argument was that the ruling principle in elections was of
individual merit. This created controversy and uneasiness within the movement,
whereby Museveni wrote: Here again, in the matter of his candidature, Col. Besigye creates a minor problem for the
Movement. Assuming Col. Besigye is really serious in seeing his candidature through to the
end as a Movement candidate on “individual merit”, the Movement will have two options:
either to adopt Besigye as a sole candidate, having imposed himself on the Movement
following clandestine, conspiratorial consultations with some unknown personalities that
include “leading Movement persons” or field other Movement persons in the political field
where there are already two multiparty candidates. If the Movement fields other Movement
candidates, then the impact will be to divide the Movement vote. Why would a disciplined
Movementist do that? Why didn’t Col. Besigye and his “leading Movement personalities”
extend consultations to include everybody so that the Movement moves as a solid body with
either Besigye or anybody else that would be more “appropriate” than the incumbent?
(President Museveni’s Missive. The Monitor, November 2, 2000: p.3).
From the above quotation, it became clear that the principles of the Movement were
cast in doubt even by the President himself. The challenge therefore became whether
or not the Movement was a one-party system, requiring candidates to be vetted by the
organs of the ruling party.
The controversies surrounding the intra-Movement competition complicated the
management of the elections on two grounds: a) Museveni (the incumbent) had to
struggle to convince his supporters within the Movement that he was standing for the
last time in office. This was intended to rally them behind his candidature, and b) all
means was employed by the state apparatus to weaken Besigye’s campaign. The
means included: state-inspired violence meted out on Besigye’s supporters;
interfering with the work of the Electoral Commission; and issuing direct threats11.
10 Elections of 1996 (the very first direct presidential elections in Uganda and the very first ones to be held under the 1995 Constitution) were contested by Y. K. Museveni of the Movement, P.K. Ssemwogerere of DP, and Kibirige M. Mayanja of JEEMA. Although this was under the Movement system, the other two candidates other than Museveni were branded multipartista and Museveni, a Movementist. 11 Violence was widespread. It included: beatings and killing some of Besigye’s supporters allegedly by the Kalangala Action Plan (KAP), and the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU). Notable cases of violence included: the killing of a Besigye supporter (one Baronda Johnson) in Rukungiri on 3rd March, 2001. Maj. Okwir Rabwoni, a Member of Parliament and Besigye’s main Youth mobiliser, was arrested at Entebbe Airport by Security forces in dramatic circumstances, including severe beatings and
19
The 2001 violence went out of control because the army and other security forces
formed part of the campaign team for President Museveni12. Soldiers were
commanded to vote for the “Commander-In-Chief”. As voting was taking place in
barracks, election monitors were denied access.13 Besides, some of the army officers
issued veiled threats to the Besigye camp14. Museveni himself assented that he would
not hand over power to people who had no idea of managing state affairs. He said that
he had passed through the ‘furnace’ to get power. At another meting Museveni
warned that any one who interfered with the army would find himself six feet under!
These acts on the part of state apparatus affected the election results. In a landmark
case filed by Besigye in the Supreme Court of Uganda, 2001, all Judges on the bench
concurred that there were extensive election malpractices, but three of the five argued
that these malpractices were not substantial to cause annulment of the election
exercise. Thus although the petitioner lost the case, it revealed that the state of
election management in Uganda had not significantly improved since 1980.
The 2002 PPOAct
Article 72 of the Uganda 1995 constitution requires parliament to adopt legislation to
govern the financing and functioning of political parties (Article 271 (4). In 1998 the
Political Organizations Bill to regulate the organization of political parties was tabled
in parliament. Like Article 269 in the 1995 Constitution, the Bill would allow parties
to exist in name only. The movement political system was excluded from the Political
Organizations Bill However, the bill was withheld until June 2002 when a new
Political Parties and Organisations Act was passed by parliament. The act provided
that no party organisation could open branches below national level and that no
parties and political organisations could hold more than one national conference in a
year. The parties were also prohibited from holding public meetings except for
national conferences. Sections 18 and 19 of the PPOA, the sections which prohibit
bundling him on a truck, thus preventing him from taking a plane to Adjumani for campaigns. He was not charged for any offence. Several other cases of violence were investigated by the 7th Parliament and a Major Report was compiled, titled: “Parliamentary Select Committee Report on Election Violence, 2002”, which noted that violence was state-inspired and widespread during the elections. 12 They formed groups called Nyekundeire headed by Lt. Gen. Elly Tumwine and Kakuyege groups headed by Brig. Henry Tumukunde. 13 In Nakasongola barracks, it was widely reported that Col. Katagara, the Commanding Officer, was turning way the election monitors. 14 Brig. Henry Tumukunde is said to have told his supporters that Besigye should remember that “the guns we came with are still there”. The East African.
20
parties from providing a platform for political candidates in elections, were judged
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2004. The court ruling in effect made
the existence of the movement system and NRM illegal. The bill was subsequently
replaced by a new PPOAct enacted in November 2005 which regulated the
registration of political parties.
The 2002 party committee
The experience of the 2001 elections and its aftermath re-ignited the discussion of a
return to multiparty politics. An ad-hoc Committee was appointed by NEC on Dec.
18, 2001 to examine whether or not to allow for a multi-party system. The
committee’s mandate was to:
”to examine the performance of the Movement system in light of current
political trends/developments, including the calls to open up to political party
pluralism, with a view to guide the political future of this country”, (Ex.Sum.
iii)
The committee submitted its report in April 2002.15 After reviewing the Movement’s
strength and weaknesses, the arguments in favour of, and in opposition to, changing
the current system, the Committee summed up its deliberations in three possible
choices (Ex. Sum. Xiii):
a) the continuation of the Movement in governance, but with improvements on as
pointed out by the committee, and continuation of restrictions on political
parties,
b) the continuation of the Movement in governance, continuation of restrictions
on political parties, but the NRM organisation should become the organ of the
Movement political system,
c) political pluralism, those who believe in the Movement should organise
themselves into a political organisation.
Alternative C was considered as the best option.
15 Report of the ad-hoc Committee set up by the 6th Meeting of the National Executive Committee.
21
Although the committee praised the achievements of the Movement since its capture
of power in 1986, there were also weaknesses. The criticism against the Movement
system emanating from the old political parties was nothing more than could be
expected, and calls for a multi-party system from NGO’s were seen as arguments
fronted on behalf of the NGO’s external donors. However, the Movement system also
had internal weaknesses. The role of the ideology had declined and there were
examples of corrupt behaviour. The all-inclusive nature of the Movement provided
space for opponents bent on destroying the movement system from within. Legal
developments had not taken into consideration the need to strengthen NRM as an
organisation separate from the state. Four main reasons led the committee to prefer
the C option:
- transformation of NRM into a party would provide “the opportunity to purify
itself of those people that are in the system because of the concept of
broadbasedness”,
- opponents would be deprived of “the weapon they have been using to malign
the Movement accusing it of being undemocratic”,
- the change would “enhance Uganda’s relationship with our developing
partners and facilitate our access to world markets and international aid”, and
- “political pluralism is the current world trend and Uganda can ill afford to
detach herself from the rest of the world”. (Report 114-115).
Thus, internal NRM factors, relationship to domestic competitors, and the impact of
the international community combined to convince the committee and ultimately the
leadership of the need to dispose with the Movement system.
4. Organizational, constitutional and legal consequences of re-introducing multi
party competition.
The decision to re-introduce a multi-party system had a number of consequences for
NRM. First, NRM had to become a party in formal terms, and second, the
constitutional and legal basis for multi party elections had to be established.
22
NRM as a party.
When the Movement became a party it adopted a constitution, a comprehensive
document of 75 pages.16 Previously all Ugandans were seen as members of the
‘Movement’. Now, NRM assumed that all persons subscribing to the ideals and
principles of the Movement would “automatically be a member of NRM unless that
person opts out” (para 8. (2). Thus, while other parties had to recruit members, NRM
started will the whole electorate, except for those that explicitly opted out.
The organizational structure of NRM consists of five separate, but interconnected,
types of organs:
- policy organs, encompassing eight levels of party organizations, from the
lowest level – the cell – to the highest; the national conference,
- six levels of administrative organs, each connected to a policy organ, but only
partly identical to the structure of the party organization,
- eight special organs, where membership is defined according to specified
criteria, such as for women and youth, historical leaders, veterans, people with
disabilities, elders, workers and entrepreneurs, and
- NRM caucuses in legislative organs.
The National Conference (NC) is designated as the officially ‘supreme organ’ (para.
11.1). It is composed of the members of the various executive committees of the party
and its special organs, the MPs and office holders from the districts and sub-country
conferences. Five top national officers are elected by the NC and the NC also
nominates the presidential candidate for NRM. The National Executive Council
(NEC) is a committee under the NC; its composition is like a miniature NC but with
relative less representation from lower level units in the party. Within the NEC there
is a Central Executive Committee (CEC) and under CEC several commissions. CEC,
NEC and NC are interlocking organs where the smaller organizational unit develops
proposals for the larger organ, as in the case of nominating candidates to be elected
for various party offices.
16 The Constitution of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), May 2003
23
At the District level there is similar set of institutions. However, the District
conference does not have any reserved functions and although it is partly consisting of
lower level delegates the District conferences is accountable upwards in the party
(para. 17 (3) (e).
The special organs are supposed to have a structure similar to the NRM but it is only
at the national level that the special organs are linked formally to the NRM structure.
Only the Historical leaders’ forum is connected also at the District level.
The web of the NRM organization does stretches from the smallest unit, the cell
consisting of 10 households and at least 5 members (para. 28. (2)), to the NC with
several thousand delegates.
The structure of the party is identical to the structure of the Ugandan state. The pre-
party NRM structure was in practice inseparable from the structures of the Ugandan
state, with a pyramid of movement structures from the village level to the national
level. These NRM movement structures were state funded and administered at the
national level by a National Political Commissar responsible for political mobilisation
and education of the population. As a party a separation between the Movement and
the State became necessary, in legal terms, but how far this separation was
implemented through the whole party hierarchy in time before the 2006 is difficult to
assess.
Providing the legal basis for multiparty elections.
The constitutional and legal consequences of returning to multiparty competition were
enormous.
Three issues were important: what constitutional changes would be necessary, by
what procedure should the changes be introduced, what other legal consequences
would the proposed constitutional changes have?
The constitutional changes:
The 2006 transition began with the Constitutional Review Commission (2003) and
culminated with the 2005 referendum on multiparty politics, the constitutional
amendment that lifted the two term limits to the presidency, the 2005 Political
24
Organisations and Parties Act and finally the 2006 presidential and parliamentary
elections. Through these processes Uganda officially transformed from a Movement
system to a multiparty system. However, the protracted transition enabled the NRM to
control the process. While the 2006 elections were competitive from a legal
perspective, the weak distinctions between the NRM structures and the state structures
and the resources enjoyed by NRM suggest that the hegemony of NRM continued
into the 2006 multiparty era.
A so-called omnibus bill was presented to Parliament on 15 February 2005. The bill
was intended to amend an array of articles of the 1995 Uganda Constitution. It
resulted from the report and recommendations of the Constitutional Review
Commission, which was submitted to the government on 10 December 2003. In one
go the government proposed to amend 114 articles and schedules in the
Constitution17. Among the many amendments proposed by the government, two
generated controversy. First, the amendment of Article 74 of the Constitution seeks to
change the political system to a multi-party form of democracy from the current
Movement-One-Umbrella system. Second, the repeal of Article 105 (2) of the
Constitution would lift the limit of two five-year terms of office for the President.
The attempt by the government to amend the 114 articles of the Constitution at a go,
however, met with resistance from the opposition, civil society organisations and
academics. The opposition parliamentarians resisted the Bill arguing that the Bill was
inconsistent with constitutional provisions and the three constitutional procedures of
amending the Constitution, as stated above, were not being followed. Further, it was
held that the Bill contravened Article 1 of the Constitution because it proposed to
amend, in an omnibus manner, specific articles of the Constitution without the
required two-thirds majority vote in Parliament and subjecting the entire Bill to an
omnibus District Council vote and national referendum.
On 7 April 2005, the government decided to withdraw the controversial Constitutional
Amendment Bill from the House. Instead the government tabled two separate Bills
17 The Bill was meant to forestall a repeat of the Constitutional Amendment Act of 2000, which the Constitutional Court nullified on the grounds that it indirectly amended certain entrenched articles of the Constitution (New Vision 14.03.2005).
25
before Parliament on 5 April: Bill no. 2 and Bill no. 3. Amendment Bill no. 2 dealt
with amendments that required approval by the District Councils, while Amendment
Bill no. 3 concerned amendments that required approval by Parliament only.
However, the government noted that Article 74 on changing the political system from
Movement to multi-party would not be amended. Instead, the government would
move a motion calling for a referendum on that matter. Thus, against the initial vote
of parliament, civil society, the donors and the opposition the NRM government
conducted a referendum to decide on the issue of a return to multiparty politics. Other,
more controversial issues of the constitutional amendment process were left for a
decision by parliament.
The referendum on multiparty politics
Some MPs, the opposition parties, civil society and donors argued that a referendum
was an unnecessary and costly procedure to decide the issue of a return to multiparty
politics in a context where both the opposition and the government supported the
change. The opposition parties argued against the referendum arguing that a
referendum was not necessary on the right of the people to associate. Second, as the
constitution provided for other means of amending the constitution to change the
political system, it was not necessary to hold a referendum at a cost of 22 billion
Uganda Shillings (or US$11 million) in an impoverished country like Uganda. The
opposition parties also saw the referendum as a means for the incumbent to distribute
patronage money and thus, begin the election campaigning for the March 2006
elections. However, the NRM government pressed ahead with the issue. The
argument voiced most explicitly by President Museveni was that the referendum was
a ‘house cleaning exercise’ through which the NRM would rid itself of the
undesirable elements that have become a liability to the party as was noted by
President Museveni during a press conference in July 2005.
On 28th July 2005, a referendum was conducted. The referendum question posed to
the Ugandan voters was: “Do you agree to open up the political space to allow those
willing to join other political parties/organizations to do so to compete for political
power?” The options presented the voters were “Yes” and “No”, with a “Tree”
symbolising “Yes” and a “House” symbolising “No”. The “Yes” vote emerged
victorious in all the 56 districts of the country. After the exercise, the “yes” side was
26
declared the winner with 92.5% of the votes. The “no” side received 7.5% of the vote.
However, the voter turn out was low with 47% of the registered voters (8.5 million)
voting. In Kampala it was observed that only 16 % of the registered voters
participated in the referendum exercise. The low voter turn out may, in part, be
attributed to the boycott campaign of the opposition political parties. But poor voter
education, heavy rain in the morning at the polling day in some areas, and general
confusion as to the purpose of the referendum exercise also attributed to the low voter
turnout.
The confusion about to the referendum exercise is related to the fact that Museveni as
the Head of State and leader of NRM was campaigning for a ‘yes’ vote. For nearly
two decades President Museveni has been emphasising the virtues of the Movement
system and dismissed political parties for being divisive. During the referendum
campaign, the President did not adequately explain his change of mind. Instead, he
continued to criticise the political parties. The Referendum Act called for the
organisation of two groups, one arguing for and another against the introduction of the
multiparty system. All together thirty groups registered to participate in the
referendum with 19 groups on the “yes” side and 11 groups on the ‘no’ side. The pro-
multiparty group was the National Civic Committee (NCC) while the National
Campaign Team for the Movement System (NCTMS) argued against the transition.
NRM was represented in both the pro-change camp and in the camp advocating the
status quo.
Thus, voters were faced with a situation where the executive, and parts of the NRM
together with the opposition parties, campaigned for a return to multiparty politics,
whereas other parts of the NRM system campaigned against an opening of political
space for political parties.
Observations indicate that NRM used the referendum campaign to distribute party
cards, which confused voters who were led to believe that an NRM membership card
was a requirement for voting in the 2005 referendum (see CMI-Mak referendum
report).
The 2005 referendum should also be seen in relation to the proposal to remove the
constitutional clause on the presidential term limits.
27
The lifting of presidential term limits
The Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee on 21 May 2005 voted 11 to 1 in
favour of lifting the presidential term limit. Before adjourning for a two-week recess
on 26 May 2005, Bill no. 3 was tabled by the Speaker of Parliament. Clause 37 of this
bill seeks to amend Article 105 of the Constitution to make clear that a person elected
President under the Constitution may hold office for one or more terms. The stated
reason for lifting the term limit is to enable a person who is favoured by the electorate
to hold office for more than two terms as prescribed at present in Article 105 (2),
which limits the term of office to only two five-year terms. On September 26 2005,
the President assented to the Constitutional Amendment Bill 2005, in which Article
105 (2) lifts the limit on presidential terms in office.
While strongly supporting the return to multiparty politics, the donor community did
not find a referendum the most sensible method of changing the political system. It
was widely thought that a costly exercise such as a referendum would be wasteful,
given the country’s meagre resources. The donors rather preferred the cheaper option
that the constitution allows, through the local councils and Parliament. As a result,
once Parliament had made the decision that a referendum would be held on the
political system, the donor community appeared ambivalent. On the one hand, it
would like to see a ‘yes’ majority to a multi-party system. On the other hand, a
number of donor agencies expressed that they did not like to be seen to lend
legitimacy to a referendum exercise widely perceived to be wasteful and part of a
larger political game of the NRM government. Consequently, the international
observation efforts were kept at a low level.
5. NRM in the 2006 elections
The outcome of the 2006 elections, as displayed in tables 1 and 2, must be seen
against the backdrop of these constitutional and legal changes. But the time
dimension, the many legal obstacles facing the main opposition and the advantages of
the incumbent party combined to limit the chance of a political transformation in
Uganda.
28
The run-up to the elections
In March 2005 NRM launched its parliamentary caucus and in May, NRMO’s interim
national executive committee established district committees charged with the task of
mobilising and registering party members. By July 2005 the party claimed to have
recruited more than 12 million supporters, country wide (New Vision July 18, 2005).
NRMO Membership cards where distributed free of charge.
Although The Political Parties and Organizations Bill granted all political parties a
level ground to contest for political power, however, at the same time it was made
clear that the Movement system would remain until after the 2006 elections based in
Article 74 (a) of the constitution. According to a statement by the National Political
Commissar (NPC) Dr. Crispus Kiyonga, the Movement political system would
continue to exist until after the 2006 general elections. The NPC argued that the
winding up of the movement system should be done in an orderly manner and that the
Movement secretariat had employment obligations (The Monitor August 24 2005).
There were problems in registration of parties. The Registrar General’s Office
claimed lack of resources which prevented it from verifying the signatures for the
opposition parties. Internal factions in the parties, particularly the DP further delayed
the registration.
Originally, the election was scheduled for March 13, 2006, but was moved forward to
February 23. This narrowed the time span between the formal registration of the
opposition parties, their organisation, and the nomination deadline for candidates. One
implication was that the opposition parties found it hard to recruit candidates among
civil servants because they could not meet the resignation deadline (90 days) before
they were nominated.
Thus, a vital element in the whole process was the time perspective. The
comprehensive legal and constitutional changes were rushed through in a short time,
while the obstacles in party registration and moving the elections forward, all
impacted on the opposition parties’ problems.
There were also difficulties inside the NRM. The seclection of candidates to run for
parliament took place in primaries, conducted in special electoral colleges, consisting
29
of “members of the sub-county, the town council, municipal division and parish
conferences within the constituency” (NRM statutes para. 39, 2(b). The outcome of a
number of these primaries was contested by those who lost and protested to the
internal NRM election committee. Even after the committee had made its decision,
several of them challenged the party leadership and ignored the personal appeal of the
president and decided to run as independents and 21 succeeded in being elected. Most
of these are apparently re-integrated into the NRM caucus.
The election campaigns
There are several aspects of the election campaign that illustrate the dominating
position of NRM: the media coverage, the regulation of party finance and the legal
obstacles facing the most important opponent; FDC.
Although NRM repositioned itself to a situation where the NRM would be separate
from the government and state, unlike the other political parties, NRM had a claim on
the national budget throughout the financial year 2005/06. The Movement system was
supposed to be in place until after the elections.
However, also otherwise money played an important role in the elections.
According to section 68 (1) of the Parliamentary elections act it is an offence to
influence another person to vote or refrain from voting through the provision of
money or gifts. Nevertheless, instances of candidates and parties offering gifts and
food at centres of worship and other social functions were reported in the Ugandan
press and by the civil society organisations monitoring the elections, the DEMGroup.
The Coalition for Election Finance Monitoring (CEFIM), a joint entity by the Anti
corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU) and Transparency International on Feb. 14
2006 gave a public statement expressing concern about the unfettered use of public
resources by or on behalf of the incumbent presidential candidate. It is clear that the
NRM candidates had more financial and material resources than the opposition parties
and candidates.18
According to the Director of Economic Affairs in the Office of the President, Mr.
Cheeye, NRM spent 50 billion shilling on the 2006 elections (Monitor April 26,
2006). NRM’s main rival disclosed that they had spent 740 million shilling. As the
18 Our observations of the 2006 elections suggest that NRM took advantage of the Local Council (LC) structure to recruit support and to finance the elections.
30
NRM relied on government funding through the Movement Secretariat, the NRM had
a substantial advantage over its rivals in the 2006 electoral race. As argued by the
Human Rights Watch Report released February 14, 2006: The Uganda elections are in
effect a multiparty contest in a single party state. When the ruling party has
unhindered access to government funds and government assets and receive six times
as much TV coverage, there is no level playing field” (HRW 2006). The Coalition for
Election Finance Monitoring (CEFIM) also expressed concerns about the unfettered
use of public resources on behalf of the incumbent.
Media coverage.
Media exposure, both in terms of quantity of coverage as well as in positive or
negative orientation, is important for the outcome of elections. Documentation by the
DEMGroup, Uganda Journalists Safety Committee (UJSC 2006) shows clear
differences between various media channels in how much and in what way they
covered the candidates. According to that study Besigye and Museveni were given
about equal coverage in all print media taken together. However, radio is by far the
most important media as it is available through the whole country. Private radio
stations varied somewhat with regard to whom they gave the most coverage, but state
radio and state television were overwhelmingly dominated by NRM.
Obstacles facing the opponents.
We have already noted the problems in the registration process. However the main
obstacles were put in the way of FDC and its presidential candidate, Dr. Kizza
Besigye. He returned from exile in South Africa in late October 2005. on 14
November, four weeks before the nomination of presidential candidates, Besigye is
arrested, sparking two days of political violence, and charged with treason,
concealment of treason and rape to have taken place in 1997. The case carries a death
sentence which means that bail is normally not granted until after six months – thus
after the 2006 elections. On December 12 the opposition wins an important battle
when the EC declares that Besigye is eligible for nomination and that he can be
nominated in absentia, despite the stated opinion of the Attorney General (Kiddu
Makubuya) who had advicd the EC to reject Besigye’s nominations (The Monitor,
December 13 and 14, 2005). Although Besigye was in the end released on bail, the
31
court case proceeded during the election campaign, forcing him to break off from the
campaign trail.
During the campaign instances of party agents and candidates using language that
could instigate violence and intimidation was reported in the Uganda press. Instances
of violence were reported between NRM and FDC supporters throughout Uganda in
the weeks leading up to the February 23 elections. FDC had also problems in fielding
parliamentary candidates in rural areas where opposition sympathizers feared for
violence instigated by groups affiliated with NRM.
However, while the intimidation through the use of the military, and the deaths of
participants in rallies are serious incidences, it should be noted that the level of
violence and intimidation was significantly lower in the 2006 campaigns than in the
2001 elections.
Although not a foregone conclusion, the multi-party elections were hardly fought on a
level playing field. The legal and constitutional changes, as well the procedures for
the changes, prepared the ground for continuous NRM rule. The compressed time
span for organisation and mobilization limited the effectiveness of the opposition
parties, and to some extent their own internal factionalism contributed to this.
A deep mistrust between individual politicians and between parties permeates the
Ugandan polity. The opposition had zero confidence that the playing field would be
level. The Electoral commission was seen as an arm of the government; the inter-
party dialogue forum as mere window-dressing and a feeling that complaining to the
police of violence perpetrated by NRM supporters a waste of time.19 In the election
campaign itself, NRM enjoyed significant financial, logistical and communication
advantages.
The problem of organising the parties is affected by this lack of trust. When new
parties formed in part by recruiting members defecting from the movement, it is seen
not exclusively as a strengthening of the opposition. The motives for the defections
are questioned: is he or she a spy for NRM? There were also conflicts between the
19 “You would go to the police station and report the violence. They would merely look at you and not bother to enter the complaint in the book. Thus, there are no reports of violence” (Interview with opposition politician, Kampala 020606).
32
veterans and the younger generation in DP and UPC. For the veterans this was their
last chance of becoming president.
The organisational challenge for the opposition parties is well illustrated by their
inability to penetrate the Ugandan territory with candidates (table 3).
Table 3. No. of candidates nominated20 NRM 214 FDC 127 UPC 74 DP 68
Only NRM had a candidate in all but one constituencies, FDC in more than half, but
UPC and DP in only a third or less.
Compared with the total number of candidates FDC won a seat for every fourth
candidate it had. DP and UPC won a seat for every eight candidate. Thus, for the old
parties the 2006 elections were a triple catastrophe:
- their presidential candidates were ignored by the voters,
- they were not able to nominate parliamentary candidates in more than a
minority of the constituencies, and
- few of their candidates were successful.
It is of course difficult to claim that the results would have very different with
younger candidates. The problems might have been worse. All presidential candidates
were given 20 mill. Sh. for their campaign, but this is marginal to the overall cost.
Only people with money or with easy access to money could start a campaign. The
parties themselves were almost broke and had nothing to offer their parliamentary
candidates.21
The parties’ support also exposed the regional divisions in Uganda. Both Besigye and
Museveni come from the West, where NRM dominated, while FDC was strong in the
North and in parts of the East. Also, the opposition in general did much better in
urban areas, particularly in Kampala, than in the rural areas. A real challenge for the 20 Source:MonitorOnline 27.02.06 http://www.monitor.co.ug/scripts/printage.php. These figures are temporary and must be checked against the Electoral Commission’s data. 21 “All of what we had went into the presidential campaign” (Interview with opposition leader, Kampala 020606).
33
opposition parties is to be able to establish a stronger national network to match that
of NRM.
6. Fundamental party change in theory and in Uganda.
In the start of the paper we reflected on Uganda in a comparative perspective and
discussed what kind of change the 2006 elections represent: a fundamental
transformation of the political system or a case of organizational adaptation of NRM
to new domestic and international contexts. Transformation implies the possibility of
a new party coming to power. That scenario did not materialise and it is not clear
what would have happened if NRM had lost. Whether a transformation or an
adaptation, three perspectives in the literature on party change may illuminate the case
of why NRM decided to abandon the no-party system: 22
- The ‘institutionalisation’ hypothesis: parties are conservative and complex
organisations composed of different fractions. Change in the ‘dominant
coalition’ leads to party change (Panebianco 1988).
- The ‘office seeking hypothesis’: parties are instruments for elites to win and to
remain in political offices. Changes are introduced to the extent they
contribute to these goals (Muller and Strøm 1999).
- The ‘decline hypothesis’: Building on Hirschman’s theory of ‘exit, voice and
loyalty’ (Hirschman 1970) change can be seen as a response to internal dissent
and a strategy to pre-empt future competition.
These perspectives are not mutually exclusive. They overlap, but differ with respect to
which factors they emphasise.
The institutionalisation hypothesis.
According to Panebianco political parties are complex organisations heavily
influenced by the circumstances of their genesis. The way a party originates leaves its
22 A fourth perspective, the ‘shock’ hypothesis, argues that parties - as conservative organisations - are only likely to change when they are exposed to dramatic events with an impact on their organisation Harmel, R. and K. Janda (1994). "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change." Journal of Theoretical Politics 6(3). This is the most comprehensive attempt to formulate a theory of party change. However, it is of less relevance in Uganda since none of the factors leading to party change according to this theory were present.
34
mark on it future organisation. All organisations are also characterised by a gap
between their formal and their informal organisation. Should the gap become too
wide, the leadership will experience pressures for change. All organisations are also to
some extent ‘coalitions’. This is even more the case for broad based social movements
which are loosely organised and less focused ideologically. As a consequence, when a
broad movement is transformed into a political party, the different streams in the party
will battle for control of the organisation. As the party becomes stabilised and the
circumstances for its origin fade as a raison d’etre for its existence, various groups
will have different ideas of which way to move forward. In this perspective, change
will occur when new constellations of factions and/or leaders inside the party win
power and put the party on a different path. Thus, in this perspective the decision to
move towards a multi-party system may be seen the culmination of a struggle
between different streams within the NRM in which the pro-party faction emerged
victorious.
The office seeking strategy.
The literature on what the goals of political parties are emphasises that although
parties have multiple goals (Harmel and Janda 1994), Muller and Strom 2000), the
‘office seeking hypothesis’ argues that politicians are primarily motivated by the
attractions of political office (Schlesinger 1991). Thus, their choice of strategy seeks
to maximise the probability of winning, respectively to remain in, office. The
literature on African parties underlines this argument. One of the most common
claims in this literature is that African political parties are vehicles for party leaders
(ex. (Walle 2003) and that the internal organisation of the parties leaves little room for
internal democracy. The party leader dominates over the organisation in what
(Ihonvbere 1998) calls “the leadership fixation of African parties”. In the African
context it has also been pointed out that the blurring of the boundary between party
and state, gives rise to corruption. Access to the state therefore involves more that the
prestige of winning office. Of all offices, the presidency is the supreme because of its
dominance in the political system. Thus, the combination of ‘African party
organisation’, the desire for access to state resources, and the importance of the
presidential office result, in strategic calculation to maximise an electoral wining
strategy. Strategy in this context means both the choice of issues to attract voters,
maximising resources for election purposes and manipulating the rules of the game to
35
disadvantage the opposition, attempts to undermine opposition by encouraging
defections.
The decline hypothesis.
The sub-title of Hirschman’s book “Exit, voice and loyalty” is “Responses to decline
in firms, organisations and states”. It’ is an attempt to understand under what
circumstances actors choose among different strategies when they experience a
decline in quality ‘delivered’ by an institution. The type of responses that actors
choose among is connected with the sanctions involve, the resources that are needed
and the likelihood of succeeding with various strategies. Hirschman’s emphasis is on
those experiencing decline: voters, customers, members, citizens etc. The reverse coin
of this is the leadership’s perception of what kind of problem they are facing. One
argument in the party literature focus on the difference between the self-interest of the
individuals in leadership positions and those committed to the organisation for
ideological reasons. For the latter group, the priority is not winning office, but
maintaining the organisation. Organizational survival is the most important goal and
party splits the greatest ‘horror scenario’. Reform may become necessary when the
party is not able to ‘deliver’. Indicators of decline could be economic slowdown,
unfulfilled electoral promises, increasing gaps between expectations of new age
cohorts of voters and the original legitimacy of the regime, and relative decline due to
increased awareness of developments elsewhere. Several institutional mechanisms
exist for preventing exits and if they occur to reduce the chance of future competition:
Cooptation of critics to party organs, spoils and patronage, and institutional rules
regulating party formation, candidate nomination and campaign restrictions. Thus, the
performance of Besigye in 2001, and the defection of parts of NRM following him,
may have triggered the search for a solution which in the long run might be more
preferable than continuing with the movement system.
Domestic vs. international factors.
A fundamental problem with these explanations is that they are emphasising events
and factors either inside the parties themselves or within the party’s immediate
national environment. However, this is an inadequate perspective in this context. In
the context of Uganda’s political transition the international donor community has, as
a matter of principle, all along favoured a multi-party system that would allow for
36
meaningful political contestation between parties with clearly distinguishable profiles
and programmers. This notwithstanding, during the ‘Movement’ era Uganda has
enjoyed a good relationship to the international donor community, displayed by
constant high levels of development assistance since the early 1990 owing to its
comparatively good development performance. Uganda heavy dependence on foreign
economic assistance was one of the reasons NRM itself used to justify the need for a
change. Panebianco argues that institutionalisation of parties depend on control of
‘zones of uncertainties’(Panebianco 1988). Finance and environmental relations are
two such zones. When control of these zones passes from the party to actors outside
of the party, the pressure for change increases. The impact of the donor community
may be seen in this light.
But the international environment was wider. Uganda was left as the only country in
Eastern Africa without an opening of the political space. Thus, increasingly the no-
party systems looked like an anomaly in the wider regional context. Also the decision
to remove the term limitations on the presidency was met with criticism, not only
from donor countries, but also from states in the region.
Conclusion
The change to multiparty system in Uganda has been heavily influenced by the
incumbent NRMO and President Museveni. The strictly controlled political transition,
in which the movement system remained in tact until the February 2006 elections,
coupled with Museveni being granted a third term in office, suggest that Uganda has
not experienced a fundamental shift from the Movement System of governance to a
new democratic order. Successful adaptation to changing domestic and international
circumstances is a more appropriate interpretation. The playing field in these elections
was hardly level. Against this backdrop what is amazing about the results, is not
NRM’s victory but the strength of the FDC in face of numerous problems: a leader
just home from exile, problems in registration and organization, serious criminal
charges against him, and continuous interruption of the campaign in order to appear in
court and various instances of intimidation and violence.
For the 2006 elections to be more of a transformation than adaptation in the long run,
much depend on a) whether the opposition is able to build a more powerful
organisation, and b) the extent to which internal competition in the NRM between the
37
Museveni and the anti-Museveni streams will affect the cohesiveness of the
Movement.
Also, within the NRM there seems to have been centralization around the president
and his supporters. NRM has over the years become less of a broad movement and
allegedly more dominated by the central leadership. An example of this is the
president’s involvement in the affairs of the parliament. Kasfir and Twebaze note that
the 6th parliament (1996-2001) was more aggressive in asserting its political influence
and a consequence of this was that the President intervened in the election of the 7th
parliament in 2001. Only 43% of the MPs were returned and a reason for this was the
financial support offered by the president’s supporters to newcomers (Kasfir and
Twebaze 2005: 18) 23. The elections were more focused on Museveni than on NRM
as a party or a movement, but this personalization did also characterize the other
parties. The referendum campaign and the change to multiparty system were
motivated in part by a need a separate the true NRM-supporters from its enemies.
What kind of party system has emerged after the 2006 elections? The presidential
election resulted in a two party system, with five candidates running but where only
the FDC posed a serious challenge to NRM.
The parliamentary election has more the characteristics of a dominant party system
(Bogaards 2004).
At a formal level Uganda has become a fragmented multi-party system with more
than 30 parties registered, but what we can call competitive fragmentation is more
muted. Competitive fragmentation refers to the parties’ ability to compete with NRM
in the parliamentary election. Parties must be able to field candidates across the
country. This is a prerequisite for winning votes. None of the parties were much of
match for the NRM in this respect. First, in fourteen constituencies the NRM
candidate was elected by default. There were no competitors. Second, even the FDC 23 See f.i. the strong criticism by Supreme Court Judge George Kanyeihamba, cited in New Vision June 19., 2006 (http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200606200882.html).
38
was only able to run candidates in 127 of the 215 constituencies, out of which 37 won
seats. Third, the poor performance of the UPC and DP presidential candidates was
reflected in the weakness of their parliamentary candidates.
The combination of NRM’s absolute majority in parliament, absolute majority of
votes in the presidential election and the fact that the president was re-elected for a
third term have all the characteristics of an emerging dominant party system. This is
also the way the NRM would like it to be: “I would like the NRM to become Chama
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) cha Uganda like CCM of Tanzania”24
The power of incumbency may result in such an outcome.
Are there any challenges that may prevent a dominant party system from emerging?
One possibility is a fragmentation of the NRM. The transformation from movement to
party met with internal dissent in the party, and the selection of MP candidates was in
many cases controversial. A number of the independent candidates running in the
election were NRM candidates who did not accept to be defeated. With the
constitutional change removing the two-term limit, it is possible that Museveni would
prefer a forth term in office, which could lead to ruptures in the party.
A second scenario would be a re-invigoration of the old parties. As we have shown
they have suffered partly from internal rivalries, partly facing hurdles in preparation
for the 2006 elections. The old guard has demonstrated they are unsuccessful as
candidates for the party and a new leadership with time to rebuild the parties could
lead to come-back in the future.
A third scenario is the establishment of FDC as a permanent party. It now has the
characteristics of a coalition hastily put together for the purpose of defeating
Museveni. Although a fragile construction, showing post-election frictions over
positions and strategies, it constitutes the official Opposition in parliament from
which it may launch an alternative to NRM.
References. 24 Prof. Gilbert Bukenya, Vice-president of Uganda in interview with New Vision May 15.2006, (http://allafrica.com/stories/200605151295.html)
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