draft opinion - api.ning.comapi.ning.com/files/r-fzx5d3ujpufbazv9udrkt9cbqn2pnuqgjkctbqmp… ·...

PA\1104115EN.docx PE589.228v01-00

EN United in diversity EN

European Parliament 2014-2019

Committee on International Trade

2016/0084(COD)

3.2.2017

DRAFT OPINION

of the Committee on International Trade

for the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

laying down rules on making available on the market of CE marked fertilising

products and amending Regulations (EC) No 1069/2009 and (EC) No

1107/2009

(COM(2016)0157 – C8-0123/2016 – 2016/0084(COD))

Rapporteur: Jarosław Wałęsa,

PE589.228v01-00 2/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

PA_Legam

PA\1104115EN.docx 3/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

SHORT JUSTIFICATION

While welcoming the stated aims of the Revision of the Fertilisers Regulation, endeavouring

to boost resource efficiency, to increase harmonisation, to reduce import dependency and to

incentivise fertiliser production in the EU, the rapporteur underscores flaws related to its

estimated wider impact. The rules, proposed without a strong scientific footing, can both

jeopardise European producers and be challenged by the EU’s trading partners. The proposal

could also be at odds with the principle of a better regulation, obliging to design EU policies

and laws so that they achieve their objectives in the most efficient and effective way possible.

International trade context

The European Union is almost entirely dependent on imports of phosphate rock. The proposal

for a revised Fertiliser Regulation, as adopted by the Commission in March 2016, will have a

profound impact on international trade. Foremost, the proposed unrealistic cadmium limit

could lead to a major disturbance of trade with a number of phosphate rock producing

countries and raises serious questions on the WTO compliance.

If adopted in their current form, the revised rules would seriously limit export flows of a

number of developing countries. Most countries exporting phosphate rock to the EU would be

unable to meet the limits proposed by the Commission. The proposed limits have a potential

to heighten bilateral trade tensions and could lead to the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

In addition, they can exacerbate a shortage of phosphate rock usable for production of EC-

marked fertilizers, which would have a detrimental impact on EU phosphate fertilizer

producers that are completely dependent on imported rock.

In this context, your rapporteur suggests introducing additional measures authorising

temporary derogations that would enable the industry to adapt to the changing regulatory

environment. A scientifically justified average cadmium limit of 80 mg Cd/kg in phosphate

rock would ensure WTO compliance, thus reducing trade tensions.

Conclusions

The updated rules must not undermine the efforts of the EU companies to break their import

dependence, to diversify their import supplies on international markets and to avoid being

dependent on a few price-distorting sources of raw material imports. Furthermore, it must not

undermine the coherence of the EU policies towards the countries in its Southern

neighbourhood.

The rapporteur regrets lack of engagement from the Commission in relation to concerns that

proposed measures can gravely distort trade patterns in international raw materials trade.

Your rapporteur considers that cadmium limits, put forward without a credible scientific

basis, can seriously damage EU credibility vis-à-vis its trading partners, undermine sourcing

of raw materials, divert international trade flows and have an irreparable impact on the EU

industry.

Specifically, third countries that have monopolized raw material deposits may seek to exploit

their privileged position and the limits imposed by the Regulation to further tighten the supply

PE589.228v01-00 4/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

of raw materials and increase their market share of finished fertilising products, making EU

dependent imports of finished fertilizer which has food security implications.

Consequently, the Commission should step up monitoring, reporting and action on negative

market and trade implications of the envisaged measures in order to safeguard stable and

affordable access to raw materials, ensuring effective competition and competitiveness of the

EU fertilizer industry. Special attention must be paid to distortions, such as dual pricing,

regulated domestic prices, export restrictions, export duties and monopolistic or oligopolistic

structures within the raw material industries of third countries. Finally, many of the limited

number of the global phosphate rock deposits are not available to EU producers, and the

Rapporteur would like the Commission to use the tools at its disposal to increase the fluidity

of raw material supplies.

AMENDMENTS

The Committee on International Trade calls on the Committee on the Internal Market and

Consumer Protection, as the committee responsible, to take into account the following

amendments:

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8a) Securing reliable and unhindered

access to raw materials is crucial to the

Union economy and essential to

maintaining and improving quality of life,

industry and employment. The European

Commission has created a list of Critical

Raw Materials (CRMs) in order to

identify raw materials with a high supply-

risk and a high economic importance to

the Union and secure their reliable and

unhindered access. In 2014, The

European Commission added phosphate

rock to this list. This Regulation should

not introduce any measures unduly

restricting the use, in EC marked

fertilising products, of raw materials on

which the import-dependency of the

Union or its Member State exceeds 70%,

or raw materials classified - due to import

dependency and risk of supply disruptions

- as CRMs under the EU Raw Materials

PA\1104115EN.docx 5/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

Initiative (COM(2008) 699 final).

Or. en

Justification

The sustainable and unhindered access to raw materials is one of the pillars of the EU’s

strategy for raw materials. The purpose of EU’s Raw Material Initiative is to ensure sufficient

supply of raw materials needed by the EU’s industry. It is therefore contradictory to this

policy to exclude certain sources of imports of raw materials and thereby exacerbate the EU’s

dependency on them. Consequently, such raw materials shall be allowed to be used without

restrictions for production of EC-marked fertilising products.

Amendment 2


Recital 8 b (new)


(8b) The Union production of fertilisers

depends on manufacturers’ ability to

procure raw materials that include

nutrients. Contaminant limits set out in

this Regulation should take due account

of the need to import such raw materials

from third countries in sufficient

quantities.

While maintaining high standards for

quality, health and environment, due care

should be taken that contaminant limits

set out in this Regulation:

(i) do not unduly restrict the

manufacturers’ ability to source and use

such raw materials in the production of

CE marked fertilising products;

(ii) do not, provide, by law or in fact,

raw material sourcing preferences to

individual companies;

(iii) do not unduly restrict export of

raw materials from third countries; and

(iv) comply with the Union’s bilateral

and multilateral international trade

obligations, are based on objective and

accurate scientific data and do not create

unnecessary obstacles to trade.

PE589.228v01-00 6/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

Or. en

Justification

Contaminant limits imposed by the Regulation would limit the availability of sources of raw

materials used by EU manufacturers of fertilising products. It is therefore necessary to fully

consider their impact on EU manufacturers, possible market distortion, suppliers based in

third countries and international trade compliance.

Amendment 3


Recital 8 c (new)


(8c) Contaminant limits set out by this

Regulation should not disqualify or give

preference to certain sources of raw

materials. Therefore market and trade

effects of such limits should be monitored

to ensure stable and affordable access to

raw materials, ensuring effective

competition and competitiveness of the

EU fertilizer industry. The Commission

should ensure that foreign suppliers

providing both raw materials and finished

fertilising products to the Union do not

abuse their market position by restricting

the Union industry’s access to raw

materials and rendering its finished

fertilizing products uncompetitive.

Or. en

Justification

Regardless of whether or not the limits proposed by the Commission are justified by health

concerns, they would disqualify certain sources of raw materials, while maintaining others,

providing a competitive advantage to certain exporters of raw materials. The market effects of

such limits must be monitored to prevent abuse. Given that exporters of raw materials are

often also exporters of finished fertilising products, it is paramount that contaminant limits

are not used by foreign exporters to the detriment of EU manufacturers, an equal access to

deposits is maintained and the Commission is equipped with means to combat such abuse.

PA\1104115EN.docx 7/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

Amendment 4


Chapter 5 a – Article 40 a (new)


Chapter 5a

International trade aspects of trade in

fertilizers and raw materials

Article 40a

Cadmium limit derogations

By way of derogation from Article 4(1), a

fertilising product that does not meet the

requirements of PFC 1(C)(I)2(a)(2) may

be CE- marked if it meets the conditions

set out in Articles 40b - 40d.

Or. en

Amendment 5


Article 40 b (new)


Article 40b

Derogation for average cadmium limit

A fertilising product that does not meet

the requirements of PFC 1(C)(I)2(a)(2)

may be CE- marked in case it:

(a) meets the remaining requirements

set out in Annex I for PFC 1(C)(I);

(b) meets the requirements set out in

Annex II for the relevant component

material category or categories;

(c) is labelled in accordance with the

labelling requirements set out in Annex

III; and

(d) meets the requirements of Annex

VI.

PE589.228v01-00 8/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

Or. en

Justification

There is a high likelihood that the cadmium limits proposed by the Commission are not in full

compliance with the WTO SPS and TBT agreements. This is confirmed by lack of proper risk

assessments and inability of Commission representatives to indicate the reduction of exposure

of humans to cadmium in food as a result of the cadmium limits on fertilizer proposed in this

Regulation. Also, the only study referred to in the Impact Assessment states that average

cadmium levels of 80 mg would not lead to accumulation of cadmium in soils. Yet the

proposal envisages much tougher reductions (60/40/20) as maximum (not average) limits.

Accordingly, the proposal on its face lacks proper scientific basis and is likely to lead to trade

tensions with third countries.

This amendment will reduce the trade tensions by allowing foreign exporters to ship

phosphate rock that would not otherwise be usable in fertilizer productions, but still

maintains the high health-protection standards. This amendment sets the only scientifically

justified limit of 80 mg (Smolders 2013).

Amendment 6


Article 40 c (new)


Article 40c

Derogation for compliance plan

1. Under the conditions set out in this

article, a Union producer of fertilizing

products (“applicant”) may request a

Member State to grant a temporary

derogation, for a period of up to 10 years,

from the requirements of Article 4(1), if

the applicant is unable to meet the

requirements of PFC 1(C)(I)2(a)(2)

because of difficulties with procuring

phosphate rock of sufficient quality, due

to dependency on importation of

phosphate rock.

2. Import dependency is deemed to

exist when the applicant sources more

than 70% of phosphate rock from outside

of the Union or when phosphate rock is

classified as a “critical raw material”

under the Raw Material Initiative.

PA\1104115EN.docx 9/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

3. The request for a temporary

derogation shall include:

(a) information on the location,

number, size and cadmium content of

phosphate rock deposits that the applicant

owns, controls, or has exclusive access to

by way of exclusive mining, exploration

licences, exclusive purchase relationship

or by any other means;

(b) information on the applicant’s

sourcing of phosphate rock for the last

five years, identifying specific deposits

from which phosphate rock has been

purchased, including the average

cadmium content in phosphate rock

purchased from such deposits;

(c) information on phosphate rock

import dependency for the last 5 years,

which shall compare the annual

production needs of the applicant with the

applicant’s purchases of phosphate rock

from outside of the Union and its

explanation for its inability to source

phosphate rock from within the Union;

(d) the applicant’s 10 year-plan to

comply with the requirements of Article

4(1) (“ Compliance Plan”), covering

planned:

(i) diversification of the sourcing of

phosphate rock to countries and deposits

with low cadmium;

(ii) investment in recovery and reuse

of phosphorus, which would decrease

reliance on imported phosphate rock, and

contribute to the circular economy of the

Union; and

(iii) investment in decadmiation

technologies so that they can be

introduced in the applicants regular

production process.

4. The applicant shall identify all

information in the request to be treated as

confidential and shall also provide a

public summary thereof.

PE589.228v01-00 10/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

5. The request shall be filed with the

competent authority of a Member State

where the producer is established. The

Member State shall notify the

Commission of the receipt of the request,

transmitting the public summary of the

request. The Commission shall then notify

and transfer the request and the public

summary to the Council.

6. The Member State shall issue the

temporary derogation if it concludes that:

(a) the applicant is dependent on

imports of phosphate rock within the

meaning of paragraph 2;

(b) the applicant is not able to comply

with the requirement of Article 4(1), due

to the cadmium content of its phosphate

rock deposits specified in paragraph 3(a),

or – in view of import dependency – due to

the structure of its historical phosphate

rock purchases as specified in paragraph

3(b); and

(c) the applicant submitted a credible

plan that is likely to allow the applicant, at

the expiry of the temporary exemption, to

comply with the requirements specified in

Article 4(1), upon its completion.

7. If the Member State decides to

approve the request and issue the

temporary derogation it shall

communicate its decision to the

Commission and the Council.

8. Once the Member State issues the

temporary derogation, a fertilizing

product, produced by the applicant and

placed on the market during its validity ,

shall be deemed to be in full compliance

with PFC 1(C)(I)2(a)(2) for the purposes

of Article 4(1) and may be CE-marked.

9. The applicant whose request for a

temporary derogation has been approved

shall, within 30 days from each

anniversary of the date of the approval,

submit to the competent authority an

annual report, specifying:

PA\1104115EN.docx 11/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

(a) the location, number, size and

cadmium content of phosphate rock

deposits that the applicant owned,

controlled, or otherwise had exclusive

access to by way of exclusive mining,

exploration licences, exclusive purchase

relationship or by any other means, in the

Union and outside, during the past year;

(b) the applicant’s sourcing of

phosphate rock during the past year, from

within the Union and outside, identifying

countries and specific deposits from

which phosphate rock has been

purchased, including the average

cadmium content in such deposits;

(c) the applicant’s import dependency

referred to in paragraph 3(c);

(d) an update on the applicant’s

implementation of its Compliance Plan in

the past year, including progress on :

(i) diversification of sourcing of

phosphate rock to countries and deposits

with low cadmium that would allow the

applicant to meet the requirements of

Article 4(1);

(ii) reduction of its import

dependency;

(iii) investment in, and introduction of

recovery and reuse of phosphorus in the

production of fertilizing products; and

(iv) investment in, and introduction of,

decadmiation technologies in its regular

production process.

10. The applicant shall indicate the

information in its annual report to be

treated as confidential and shall also

provide a public summary thereof.

11. The Member State shall transfer

the public summary of the Annual report

to the Commission. The Commission shall

then transfer the public summary to the

Council.

12. The Member State may revoke the

approval of the request and shall notify

PE589.228v01-00 12/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

the Commission where the Member State

concludes that the review of the

applicant’s Annual Reports does not

show:

(a) a steady and persistent decrease of

cadmium content in purchased phosphate

rock;

(b) increasing diversification of

sources for phosphate rock purchases

towards low cadmium sources;

(c) steady progress in research and

implementation of phosphorus recovery

and reuse technologies, leading towards

increased use of recycled phosphorus in

production of the fertilizing products; and

(d) steady progress in research and

implementation of decadmiation

technologies, leading towards reduced

cadmium content of finished fertilizing

products;

13. Upon the expiry of the period for

which the temporary exemption has been

granted, the requirements of PFC

1(C)(I)2(a)(2) shall begin to apply in the

context of Article 4(1), as if the

Regulation came into force with respect to

the applicant on the date on which the

exemption has expired.

Or. en

Justification

The European Union is almost entirely dependent on imports of phosphate rock. Most

countries exporting phosphate rock to the EU are not able to supply phosphate rock of quality

that would meet the limits proposed by the Commission. The result of the proposed limits will

be a massive shortage of phosphate rock usable for production of EC-marked fertilizers,

which will have a very detrimental impact on EU phosphate fertilizer producers that are

completely dependent on imported rock.

This Amendment will, on the one hand, alleviate the import supply problems of EU industry,

by granting them a temporary relief from stringent limits while they adjust to them, and – on

the other, will contribute to reducing the Union’s import dependency on phosphate rock

imports by encouraging phosphorus recycling. In short, the Amendment will decrease

bilateral trade tensions and ensure steady supply of imported raw materials to EU industry in

the crucial transition phase.

PA\1104115EN.docx 13/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

Amendment 7


Article 40 d (new)


Article 40d

Derogation for international trade dispute

1. Subject to paragraph 4, if a third

country initiates dispute settlement

proceedings against the Union under the

Understanding on Rules and Procedures

Governing the Settlement of Disputes

(‘DSU’), part of the Marrakesh

Agreement establishing the World Trade

Organization, or under any international

trade agreement, questioning the legality,

under international law, of the limit set

out in Annex I for PFC 1(C)(I), the

application of that limit, in the context of

Article 4(1), shall be suspended for the

duration of such proceeding.

2. For purposes of paragraph 1, and

subject to paragraph 3, the suspension

shall begin three months after the third

country files a request for any

consultation under the agreement

concerned and shall continue until a final

ruling is issued by the relevant dispute

settlement body provided for by the

agreement to adjudicate the dispute or, if

no such body has been created by the

agreement, by the WTO Dispute

Settlement Body. Where no mutually

acceptable solution is found within the

timeframe prescribed by the agreement or,

if no such timeframe is prescribed, within

6 months from the beginning of the

suspension, the request for consultations

must be followed by the launch of

arbitration proceedings at the earliest

possible date, if the agreement provides

for arbitration and if not, recourse must

be taken to the dispute settlement

proceedings under the WTO. If no

recourse is taken at the earliest possible

date, to arbitration proceedings or the

PE589.228v01-00 14/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

WTO DSU, respectively, then the

suspension referred to in paragraph 1

shall be lifted. For purposes of this

paragraph, arbitration proceedings

consist of the phase of the proceeding that

is normally concluded with a ruling of the

relevant dispute settlement body

adjudicating the merits of the dispute

3. When proceedings referred to in

paragraph 1,are initiated, the Commission

may propose to the Council to stop the

suspension. In such case, the suspension

referred to in paragraph 1 is delayed until

the Council takes a decision, by qualified

majority. If the Council approves the

Commission proposal, within 3 months

from the initiation of such dispute

settlement proceedings, the suspension

does not come into force. In all other

cases, the suspension comes into force.

4. The Commission shall publish a

notification in the Official Journal of the

European Union, once the suspension

becomes effective, stating the nature of

the proceeding and informing of the

suspension of the application of the

relevant provisions.

5. The suspension shall remain in

force until the dispute settlement

proceedings are concluded by the final

ruling of the relevant dispute settlement

body. If the decision establishes that the

Union violated its obligations under

international law, the suspension referred

to in paragraph 1 shall continue to be in

force until compliance. If the decision

establishes that the Union did not violate

its obligations under international law,

the suspension referred to in paragraph 1

shall be immediately revoked and the

Commission shall publish a notification to

this effect in the Official Journal of the

European Union.

Or. en

PA\1104115EN.docx 15/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

Justification

There is a likelihood that the limits proposed by the Commission are not in full compliance

with the WTO SPS and TBT agreements. This is confirmed by lack of proper risk assessments

and inability of Commission representatives to indicate the reduction of exposure of humans

to cadmium in food as a result of the cadmium limits on fertilizer proposed in this Regulation.

Also, the only study referred to in the Impact Assessment suggests that average cadmium

levels of 80 mg would not lead to accumulation of cadmium in soils. Yet the proposal

envisages much tougher reductions (60/40/20) as maximum (not average) limits.

Accordingly, the proposal on its face lack proper scientific basis and is therefore likely to

raise international trade tensions with third countries supplying phosphate rock and may be

challenged in international trade dispute settlement proceedings.

This amendment – which suspends the limits pending resolution of the dispute - will reduce

the trade tensions and ensure steady supply of phosphate rock to EU industry during the

dispute.

Amendment 8


Article 40 e (new)


Article 40e

Reports on security of raw material

supplies and combating unfair trade

practices

1. By ... [6 months after the date of

entry into force of this Regulation], and

annually thereafter, the Commission shall

draw up a report, identifying:

(a) the main countries exporting to the

Union the main raw materials used for

production of fertilising products,

including natural gas, phosphate

rock/apatite, phosphoric acid and potash;

(b) the annual volume, value and

average export price of such raw

materials;

(c) any involvement of state-owned or

state-controlled, legally or through other

means, enterprises in the export of such

raw materials from such third countries;

(d) the existence of any distortions,

such as dual pricing, regulated domestic

PE589.228v01-00 16/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

prices, export bans, export duties,

restrictions on foreign ownership or

investment in the raw material industry in

such third countries, or monopolistic or

oligopolistic structure of that industry;

(e) the volume and value of such

countries’ exports of fertilising products

to the Union.

2. The report shall also specify, by

comparing data from previous years,

whether any country restricts its exports

of any of the raw materials used for

production of fertilising products,

including by limiting export quantities or

imposing higher prices, and instead

increases its exports of fertilising products

produced from such raw materials, and if

so, the report shall also determine the

circumstances of such a shift in trade

patterns, in particular whether it may be

the result of actions of:

(a) the government of the exporting

country;

(b) an exporting third country

monopolistic or oligopolistic exporters;

(c) any other governmental or quasi-

governmental entity enjoying a dominant

position in exporting raw materials from

the exporting countries, or a group of

such entities; or

(d) vertically integrated producer of

fertilising products that also controls a

significant part of the exporting country’s

capacities in production or exportation of

raw materials, or a group of such

producers.

3. The Commission shall present the

report to the European Parliament and

the Council.

4. Where the report concludes that

the circumstances described in paragraph

2 occur, and that the effect of such

actions is, on one hand, a limited supply

of raw materials to the EU, and, on the

other, increased market share of the third

PA\1104115EN.docx 17/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

countries’ finished fertilising products,

the Commission shall take appropriate

action, including:

(a) where the trade distortion causing

the limited supply of raw material may be

a violation of any international trade

agreement, entering into consultations

with the third country, and, if required,

initiating a trade dispute to eliminate the

violation;

(b) initiating consultations, and, if

warranted, a Community examination

procedure pursuant to Regulation (EU)

2015/1843 of the European Parliament

and of the Council1a in order to ensure

the exercise of the Union’s rights under

international trade rules, in particular

those established under the auspices of

the World Trade Organization;

(c) where a country in question

benefits from autonomous tariff

preferences, including under Regulation

(EU) No 978/2012 of the European

Parliament and of the Council1b, taking

action to withdraw such preferences for

the third country or fertilising products

originating in such third country,

including by taking any action under

Article 3(2), 5(3), 6(2), 8(2)&(3), 10(5),

11(2), 19(3), 21(3) and 36 of Regulation

(EU) No 978/2012; in circumstances

described in this point, the substantive

requirements for Commission delegated

acts set out in Articles 3(2), 4, 6(2), 8(1),

10(5), 11(2), 19(1)(d) and 21(1) of

Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 are deemed

to have been met;

(d) where the third country in

question benefits from tariff preferences

under a free trade agreement, considering

imposing safeguard measures under that

agreement, if conditions set out under the

regulation implementing such safeguard

are met or taking actions to withdraw

concession and reimpose the regular

WTO bound Common Customs Tariff on

fertilizing products originating in that

PE589.228v01-00 18/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

third country, pursuant to procedures

established by free trade agreement

concerned;

(e) where fertilising products

originating in the third country do not

benefit from any tariff preferences and

are subject to regular WTO-bound

Common Customs Tariff,

consideringwithdrawing concessions

under the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade and other WTO agreements, in

line with procedures set out in such

agreements

(f) adopting a delegated act to deny

products originating in the third country

the CE-marking;

(g) any other action that it deems to be

appropriate.

5. For purposes of this article,

“oligopolistic” shall include situations

where four or less entities or corporate

groups control more than 80% of the third

country’s deposits, production or exports

of a given raw material.

__________________

1a Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the

European Parliament and of the Council

of 6 October 2015 laying down Union

procedures in the field of the common

commercial policy (OJ L 272, 16.10.2015,

p. 1).

1b Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the

European Parliament and of the Council

of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of

generalised tariff preferences (GSP

Regulation) (OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1).

Or. en

Justification

There is a very high likelihood that countries exporting raw materials used for production of

fertilising products will use the Regulation to restrict exports to the EU of raw materials

necessary for production of fertilizers, and seek to export instead finished fertilising products.

This is very likely due to oligopolisic position of many raw material exporters, that are

vertically integrated and also produce fertilising products, and are often government owned

PA\1104115EN.docx 19/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

or with close ties to the exporting country’s government. The Commission shall have

meaningful measures at hand to deal with such abuse.

Amendment 9


Article 40 f (new)


Article 40f

Availability of Phosphate Rock

1. By...[6 months after the date of

entry into force of this Regulation], and

every five years thereafter, the

Commission shall draw up a report,

identifying:

(a) the main countries with significant

phosphate rock deposits, the projected size

of such deposits; production of phosphate

rock from such deposits; and the levels of

contaminants regulated in Annex I, in

particular cadmium and chromium;

(b) ownership or control of such

deposits, with an indication of whether

any foreign investment or foreign

ownership restrictions apply to such

deposits and, if deposits are already

exploited, the involvement of state-owned

or state-controlled enterprises in their

exploitation;

(c) exports of phosphate rock from

such countries, with an indication of

volume and value of exports to the Union

for the last 5 years;

(d) where there are no or insignificant

exports of phosphate rock from the third

country, in general or to the Union, an

indication of whether the third country

applies any export restrictions and if not,

a plausible explanation for that situation

of the exports concerned;

(e) known production of fertilising

products in such countries.

PE589.228v01-00 20/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

2. Where the report identifies the

existence of phosphate rock deposits and

no exports or insignificant exports, in

general or to the Union, of phosphate

rock from the countries referred to in

point (a) of paragraph 1, which may be

the result of any export, foreign

ownership or foreign investment

restrictions imposed by the government of

the third country concerned, or is the

result of the practices of monopolist or

oligopolistic exporters including entities

with a dominant position; or any other

governmental or quasi-governmental

entity or a group of such entities; or of a

vertically integrated producer of

fertilising products that also controls a

significant part of the exporting country’s

capacities in production or exportation of

phosphate rock, or a group of such

producers, the Commission shall enter

into negotiations and use all tools at its

disposal, including those mentioned in

Article 40e (4) to make such deposits

available for exports to the Union.

3. For purpose of this article,

insignificance of exports may be

determined in relation to the size of

deposits or production from such deposits

in the third country. Insignificance of

exports to the Union may also be

determined in relation to exports to other

third countries.

Or. en

Justification

One of the main criticism of contaminant limits in Annex I is that these limits deprive

European industry from sources of phosphate rock meeting these requirements. This is

because contaminants in phosphate rock generally are passed through to the fertiliser. Ability

to secure access to clean phosphate rock deposits determines producers’ ability to produce

fertilising products complaint with Annex I and therefore the survival of such producers. The

Impact Assessment has not at all analysed the availability of clean phosphate rock and

therefore, it has not been established that sufficient phosphate rock deposits, meeting

requirements in Annex I, exist and are accessible to enable EU producers to maintain

production of sufficiently clean fertilizers. Therefore, this key deficiency of the Impact

Assessment has to be corrected. Moreover, to the extent that phosphate rock deposits exist,

PA\1104115EN.docx 21/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

but are not available to EU producers due to actions of third country governments or non-

transparent market structure or other distortions, the European Commission shall seek to

redress the situation and shall have the necessary means at its disposal.

Amendment 10


Article 42 – paragraph 1 a (new)


1a. The Commission shall amend

Annex I only on the basis of one of the

following grounds:

(a) new scientific studies, reviewed by

SCHER;

(b) a comprehensive risk assessment;

(c) further EFSA studies , covering all

aspects of the food chain that identify

clear link between contaminant in

fertilising products and food safety.

Or. en

Justification

Any limits on contaminants in fertilizers must be based on solid scientific basis.

Amendment 11


Article 43 – paragraph 2


2. The power to adopt delegated acts

referred to in Article 42 shall be conferred

on the Commission for five years from

[Publications office, please insert the date

of entry into force of this Regulation]. The

Commission shall draw up a report in

respect of the delegation of power not later

than nine months before the end of the

five-year period. The delegation of power

2. The power to adopt delegated acts

referred to in point (f) of Article 40e(4)

and Article 42 shall be conferred on the

Commission for five years from

[Publications office, please insert the date

of entry into force of this Regulation]. The

Commission shall draw up a report in

respect of the delegation of power not later

than nine months before the end of the

PE589.228v01-00 22/23 PA\1104115EN.docx

EN

shall be tacitly extended for periods of an

identical duration, unless the European

Parliament or the Council opposes such

extension not later than three months

before the end of each period.

five-year period. The delegation of power

shall be tacitly extended for periods of an

identical duration, unless the European

Parliament or the Council opposes such

extension not later than three months

before the end of each period.

Or. en

Justification

Any limits on contaminants in fertilizers must be based on solid scientific basis.

Amendment 12


Article 49 – paragraph 2


It shall apply from 1 January 2018. It shall apply from 1 January 2018, except

for provisions of Annex I for

PFC1(C)(I)2(a), (b) and (d), which shall

come in force only once phosphate rock is

removed from the list of Critical Raw

Materials

Or. en

Justification

Given that the issue of availability of sufficiently clean phosphate rock that would enable

compliance with Annex I limits has not been studied or analysed by the European

Commission in the Impact Assessment, and that phosphate rock is a Critical Raw Material,

the limits on certain contaminants should be delayed until supplies of phosphate rock are no

longer marked by high supply risk.

Amendment 13


Annex V a (new)


Annex Va

WTO Compatible Limit of Cadmium in

PA\1104115EN.docx 23/23 PE589.228v01-00

EN

Fertilizers

Any producer of fertilizing products that

is able to prove - to the satisfaction of the

competent authority - that the average Cd

level in its CE market fertilising product

placed on the market is not higher than

80 mg/1 kg P2O5 will be deemed to satisfy

– with respect to its fertilizing products -

the requirement of Article 4(1)(a) of the

Regulation with respect to any of its EC-

marked fertilising products as the limit of

cadmium in , PFC1(C)(I) 2(a) is

concerned.

For EU producers, the competent

authority is the relevant authority in the

Member State where it is established.

For non-EU producers, the competent

authority is the Commission.

Or. en

Justification

Given the lack of clear scientific basis for the specific limit of cadmium in Annex I and its

probable WTO incompatibility, it is important to create a WTO- compatible route for

imposing a cadmium limit in Annex VI. According to the Smolders & Six 2013 study, as

verified by SCHER in 2015, an average cadmium level in fertilizers of less than 80 mg Cd in 1

kg P2O5 would lead to decrease of soil Cd concentration. It therefore shows that an average

Cd content of 80 mg does not contribute to cadmium increase.

As, according to the Commission, all other aspects of cadmium contamination of food (plant

uptake and food contamination) are too complex to study, the Smolders/SCHER study is the

only scientific document potentially giving scientific backing to the specific Cd limits in

fertilizers in the Regulation.

draft opinion - api.ning.comapi.ning.com/files/r-fzx5d3ujpufbazv9udrkt9cbqn2pnuqgjkctbqmp… ·...

Documents