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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 1 Dr. Ron Ross Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory Defending the United States in the Digital Age A Risk Management Framework to Improve Information Security ISACA Denver Chapter Annual General Meeting April 19, 2012

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Defending the United States in the Digital Age A Risk Management Framework to Improve Information Security ISACA Denver Chapter Annual General Meeting April 19, 2012. Dr. Ron Ross Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory. Part 1 The Fundamentals. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Dr. Ron Ross Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 1

Dr. Ron RossComputer Security Division

Information Technology Laboratory

Defending the United Statesin the Digital Age

A Risk Management Framework to Improve Information Security

ISACA Denver Chapter Annual General Meeting

April 19, 2012

Page 2: Dr. Ron Ross Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 2

Part 1The Fundamentals

Page 3: Dr. Ron Ross Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

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Information technology is our greatest strength and at the same time, our

greatest weakness…

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The Perfect Storm Explosive growth and aggressive use of information

technology. Proliferation of information systems and networks with

virtually unlimited connectivity. Increasing sophistication of threat including

exponential growth rate in malware (malicious code).

Resulting in an increasing number of penetrations of information systems in the public and private sectors…

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The Threat SituationContinuing serious cyber attacks on public and privatesector information systems targeting key operations,assets, and individuals… Attacks are organized, disciplined, aggressive, and well

resourced; many are extremely sophisticated. Adversaries are nation states, terrorist groups, criminals,

hackers, and individuals or groups with hostile intentions. Effective deployment of malware causing significant exfiltration

of sensitive information (e.g., intellectual property). Potential for disruption of critical systems and services.

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Advanced Persistent ThreatAn adversary that — Possesses significant levels of expertise / resources. Creates opportunities to achieve its objectives by using

multiple attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical, deception). Establishes footholds within IT infrastructure of targeted

organizations— To exfiltrate information. Undermine / impede critical aspects of a mission, program, or

organization. Position itself to carry out these objectives in the future.

Page 7: Dr. Ron Ross Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

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Unconventional Threats to Security

Connectivity

Complexity Culture

Page 8: Dr. Ron Ross Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

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“Red Zone” Security

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We have our heads under the hood looking at every last detail in the engine compartment—that is, pursuing an endless number of information system vulnerabilities…

The Present

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Instead of trying to figure out what type of car we need— that is, what level of information system resiliency is

necessary to effectively support our core missions and business functions…

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Active Cyber Defenses – The Future Develop risk-aware mission and business processes.

Develop and implement enterprise architectures with embedded information security architectures that support organizational mission/business processes.

Use information technology wisely considering current threat landscape (capabilities, intent, and targeting).

Develop and implement robust continuous monitoring programs.

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Cyber Defense VisionCore Principles

Strong, resilient, penetration-resistant information systems supporting core missions / mission processes.

Ongoing monitoring of the security state of information systems and environments of operation.

Continuous improvement in security controls.

Flexibility and agility in cyber security and risk management activities.

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Core ConceptsIT Products and Systems

Modularity. Layering. Monitoring.

To achieve defense-in-depth and defense-in-breadth.

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Dual Protection Strategies

Boundary ProtectionPrimary Consideration: Penetration ResistanceAdversary Location: Outside the Defensive PerimeterObjective: Repelling the Attack

Agile DefensePrimary Consideration: Information System ResilienceAdversary Location: Inside the Defensive Perimeter

Objective: Operating while under Attack

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Agile Defense Boundary protection is a necessary but not sufficient

condition for Agile Defense Examples of Agile Defense measures:

Compartmentalization and segregation of critical assets Targeted allocation of security controls Virtualization and obfuscation techniques Encryption of data at rest Limiting of privileges Routine reconstitution to known secure state

Bottom Line: Limit damage of hostile attack while operating in a (potentially)degraded mode…

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 16

Enterprise-Wide Risk Management

TIER 3Information System(Environment of Operation)

TIER 2Mission / Business Process

(Information and Information Flows)

TIER 1Organization

(Governance)

STRATEGIC RISK FOCUS

TACTICAL RISK FOCUS

Multi-tiered Risk Management Approach Implemented by the Risk Executive

Function Enterprise Architecture and SDLC Focus Flexible and Agile Implementation

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Characteristics of Risk-Based Approaches(1 of 2)

Integrates information security more closely into the enterprise architecture and system life cycle.

Promotes near real-time risk management and ongoing system authorization through the implementation of robust continuous monitoring processes.

Provides senior leaders with necessary information to make risk-based decisions regarding information systems supporting their core missions and business functions.

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Characteristics of Risk-Based Approaches(2 of 2)

Links risk management activities at the organization, mission, and information system levels through a risk executive (function).

Establishes responsibility and accountability for security controls deployed within information systems.

Encourages the use of automation to increase consistency, effectiveness, and timeliness of security control implementation.

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Risk Management Process

RiskRespond

Monitor

Assess

Risk

Framing

Risk

Framing

Risk

Framing

Risk

Framing

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Architectural and Engineering Approach

Environments of Operation

INFORMATION SYSTEM

INFORMATION SYSTEM

INFORMATION SYSTEM

Organizationrisk management strategy

Mission / Business Process

Mission / Business Process

Mission / Business Process

enterprise architecture(Reference Models, Segment Architecture, Solution Architecture)

information security architecture(Security Requirement and Control

Allocation)

informs

informs

informs

informs

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Enterprise Architecture

Consolidation.

Optimization.

Standardization.

Wise use of information technology…

Build a leaner, more streamlined IT infrastructure that facilitates more effective deployment of security controls to organizationalinformation systems and environments of operation.

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Risk Management Framework

Security Life Cycle

Determine security control effectiveness(i.e., controls implemented correctly,

operating as intended, meeting security requirements for information system).

ASSESSSecurity Controls

Define criticality/sensitivity of information system according to

potential worst-case, adverse impact to mission/business.

CATEGORIZE Information System

Starting Point

Continuously track changes to the information system that may affect

security controls and reassess control effectiveness.

MONITORSecurity Controls

AUTHORIZE Information System

Determine risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals,

other organizations, and the Nation;if acceptable, authorize operation.

Implement security controls within enterprise architecture using sound

systems engineering practices; apply security configuration settings.

IMPLEMENT Security Controls

SELECT Security Controls

Select baseline security controls; apply tailoring guidance and

supplement controls as needed based on risk assessment.

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Defense-in-Depth

Adversaries attack the weakest link…where is yours?

Risk assessment Security planning, policies, procedures Configuration management and control Contingency planning Incident response planning Security awareness and training Security in acquisitions Physical security Personnel security Security assessments and

authorization Continuous monitoring

Access control mechanisms Identification & authentication mechanisms (Biometrics, tokens, passwords) Audit mechanisms Encryption mechanisms Boundary and network protection devices (Firewalls, guards, routers, gateways) Intrusion protection/detection systems Security configuration settings Anti-viral, anti-spyware, anti-spam software Smart cards

Links in the Security Chain: Management, Operational, and Technical Controls

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Why Continuous Monitoring?

Determine effectiveness of risk mitigation measures.

Identify changes to information systems and environments of operation.

Verify compliance.

Bottom Line: Increase situational awareness to help determinerisk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation.

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 25

Assurance and TrustworthinessTRUSTWORTHINESS

Information Systems

Security CapabilityPrevent Attacks, Deter Attacks, Limit Harm from Attacks,

Respond to Attacks, Recover from Attacks

DevelopmentActions

OperationalActions

ASSURANCE Measures of Confidence

Security StrengthCorrectness, Completeness, Resistance

to Tamper and Bypass

FUNCTIONALITY Security Features, Functions, Services,

Mechanisms, Procedures

Enables Understanding of Security Capability

Security EvidenceDevelopment Artifacts, Test/Evaluation Results, Flaw Reports

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Unified Information Security Framework

The Generalized Model

Common Information Security Requirements

Unique Information Security RequirementsThe “Delta”

National security and non national security information systems

Foundational Set of Information Security Standards and Guidance• Risk management (organization, mission, information system)• Security categorization (information criticality/sensitivity)• Security controls (safeguards and countermeasures)• Security assessment procedures• Security authorization process

Intelligence Community

Department of Defense

Federal Civil Agencies

Private Sector State/Local Govt

CNSS

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Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative

A Broad-Based Partnership — National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense Intelligence Community

Office of the Director of National Intelligence 17 U.S. Intelligence Agencies

Committee on National Security Systems

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Joint Task Force Transformation InitiativeCore Risk Management Publications

NIST Special Publication 800-39Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View

NIST Special Publication 800-37, Revision 1Applying the Risk Management Framework to FederalInformation Systems: A Security Lifecycle Approach

NIST Special Publication 800-30, Revision 1Guide for Conducting Risk AssessmentsProjected September 2011 (Public Draft)

Completed

Completed

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Joint Task Force Transformation InitiativeCore Risk Management Publications

NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 3Recommended Security Controls for Federal InformationSystems and Organizations

NIST Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 1 Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Building EffectiveAssessment Plans

Completed

Completed

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Focus Areas — 2012 and Beyond Risk Assessment Guideline Systems and Security Engineering Guideline Update to NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4

Insider Threats Application Security Supply Chain Security Advanced Persistent Threats Industrial / Process Control Systems Mobile Devices, Cloud Computing Privacy Controls

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Part 2The Risk Management Framework

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Risk Management Framework

Security Life Cycle

Determine security control effectiveness(i.e., controls implemented correctly,

operating as intended, meeting security requirements for information system).

ASSESSSecurity Controls

Define criticality/sensitivity of information system according to

potential worst-case, adverse impact to mission/business.

CATEGORIZE Information System

Starting Point

Continuously track changes to the information system that may affect

security controls and reassess control effectiveness.

MONITORSecurity Controls

AUTHORIZE Information System

Determine risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals,

other organizations, and the Nation;if acceptable, authorize operation.

Implement security controls within enterprise architecture using sound

systems engineering practices; apply security configuration settings.

IMPLEMENT Security Controls

SELECT Security Controls

Select baseline security controls; apply tailoring guidance and

supplement controls as needed based on risk assessment.

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Security Categorization

FIPS 199 LOW MODERATE HIGH

ConfidentialityThe loss of confidentiality could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The loss of confidentiality could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The loss of confidentiality could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

IntegrityThe loss of integrity could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The loss of integrity could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The loss of integrity could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

AvailabilityThe loss of availability could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The loss of availability could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The loss of availability could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

Example: An Organizational Information System

Baseline Security Controls for High Impact Systems

Guidance for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to FIPS 199 Security Categories

SP 800-60

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Security Controls The management, operational, and technical

safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.

34

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Security Control Baselines(Appendix D)

Minimum Security ControlsLow Impact

Information Systems

Minimum Security ControlsHigh Impact

Information Systems

Minimum Security ControlsModerate Impact

Information Systems

Master Security Control CatalogComplete Set of Security Controls and Control Enhancements

Baseline #1Selection of a subset of security

controls from the master catalog—consisting of basic level controls

Baseline #2Builds on low baseline. Selection

of a subset of controls from the master catalog—basic level

controls, additional controls, and control enhancements

Baseline #3Builds on moderate baseline.

Selection of a subset of controls from the master catalog—basic

level controls, additional controls, and control enhancements

35

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Tailoring Security ControlsScoping, Parameterization, and Compensating Controls

Baseline Security ControlsLow Impact

Information Systems

Baseline Security ControlsHigh Impact

Information Systems

Baseline Security ControlsModerate Impact

Information Systems

Tailored Security Controls

Tailored Security Controls

Tailored Security Controls

Low Baseline Moderate Baseline High Baseline

Organization #1Operational Environment #1

Organization #2Operational Environment #2

Organization #3Operational Environment #3

Cost effective, risk-based approach to achieving adequate information security…

36

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Expanded Tailoring Guidance(1 of 2)

Identifying and designating common controls in initial security control baselines.

Applying scoping considerations to the remaining baseline security controls.

Selecting compensating security controls, if needed. Assigning specific values to organization-defined

security control parameters via explicit assignment and selection statements.

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Expanded Tailoring Guidance(2 of 2)

Supplementing baselines with additional security controls and control enhancements, if needed.

• Providing additional specification information for control implementation.

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Tailoring the Baseline

Document risk management decisions made during the tailoring process to provide information necessary for authorizing officials to make risk-based authorization decisions.

Tailoring Guidance

Identifying and Designating Common Controls Applying Scoping Considerations Selecting Compensating Controls Assigning Security Control Parameter Values Supplementing Baseline Security Controls Providing Additional Specification Information

for Implementation

Assessment of Organizational Risk

DOCUMENT SECURITY CONTROL DECISIONS Rationale that the agreed-upon set of security controls for the information system provide adequate protection of organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

INITIAL SECURITY CONTROL BASELINE

(Low, Mod, High)

Before Tailoring

TAILORED SECURITY CONTROL BASELINE

(Low, Mod, High)

After Tailoring

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Common Risk Management Process NIST Special Publication 800-37, Revision 1

Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach

Developed by Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Working Group Office of the Director of National Intelligence Department of Defense Committee on National Security Systems National Institute of Standards and Technology

Final Public Draft (November 2009) Final Publication (February 2010)

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Purpose Provide guidelines for applying the Risk Management

Framework to federal information systems— To ensure that managing risk from information systems is consistent with

mission/business objectives and the overall risk strategy established by the senior leadership through the risk executive (function).

To ensure that information security requirements, including necessary security controls, are integrated into the organization’s enterprise architecture and system development life cycle processes.

To support consistent, well-informed, and ongoing security authorization decisions (through continuous monitoring), transparency of security and risk-related information, and reciprocity of authorization results.

To achieve more secure information and information systems through the implementation of appropriate risk mitigation strategies.

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Applicability Federal information systems other than those systems

designated as national security systems as defined in 44 U.S.C., Section 3542.

National security systems with the approval of federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems.

State, local, and tribal governments, as well as private sector organizations are encouraged to consider using these guidelines, as appropriate.

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Target Audience Individuals with mission/business ownership responsibilities or

fiduciary responsibilities. Individuals with information system development and integration

responsibilities. Individuals with information system and/or security

management/oversight responsibilities. Individuals with information system and security control

assessment and monitoring responsibilities. Individuals with information security implementation and

operational responsibilities.

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Mainstreaming Information Security Information security requirements must be considered

first order requirements and are critical to mission and business success.

An effective organization-wide information security program helps to ensure that security considerations are specifically addressed in the enterprise architecture for the organization and are integrated early into the system development life cycle.

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System Development Life Cycle(1 of 2)

RMF steps are carried out within the five phases of the SDLC. System Initiation Phase System Development / Acquisition Phase System Implementation Phase System Operation / Maintenance Phase System Disposal Phase

Flexibility on types of SDLC models employed by the organization (e.g., spiral, waterfall, agile development).

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System Development Life Cycle(2 of 2)

Integrating information security requirements into the SDLC provides the most efficient and cost-effective method for an organization to ensure that: Cost, schedule, and performance requirements are satisfied. Missions and business operations supported by the information

system are adequately protected. Security-related activities are carried out as early as possible and

not repeated unnecessarily. Risk management activities are not isolated or decoupled from the

management processes employed to develop, implement, operate, and maintain the information system.

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Applying the Risk Management Framework to Information Systems

Risk ManagementFramework

Near Real Time Security Status Information

Output from Automated Support Tools

AuthorizationPackage

SECURITY PLANincluding updated Risk Assessment

SECURITY ASSESSMENT

REPORT

PLAN OF ACTION AND

MILESTONES

INFORMATION SYSTEM

CATEGORIZEInformation System

ASSESSSecurity Controls

AUTHORIZEInformation System

IMPLEMENTSecurity Controls

MONITORSecurity Controls

SELECTSecurity Controls

Risk Executive(Function) Inputs

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Information System Boundaries Define the scope of protection for information systems

(i.e., what the organization agrees to protect under its direct control or within the scope of its responsibilities).

Include the people, processes, and technologies that are part of the systems supporting the organization’s missions and business processes.

Need to be established before information system security categorization and the development of security plans.

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Large and Complex Systems From a centralized development, implementation, and

operations perspective— The organization examines the purpose of the information system and

considers the feasibility of decomposing the complex system into more manageable components, or subsystems.

From a distributed development, implementation, and operations perspective— The organization recognizes that multiple entities, possibly operating

under different policies, may be contributing to the development, implementation, and/or operations of the subsystems that comprise the overall information system.

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Large and Complex Systems(Including System of Systems)

- Security plan reflects information system decomposition with security controls assigned to each subsystem component.- Security assessment procedures tailored for the security controls in each subsystem component and for the combined system level.- Security control assessment performed on each subsystem component and on system-level controls not covered by subsystem security control assessments.- Security authorization conducted on the information system as a whole.

ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

DYNAMIC EXTERNAL

SUBSYSTEM

SUBSYSTEM

LAN ONE

SUBSYSTEM

LAN TWO

SUBSYSTEM

GUARD

SUBSYSTEM GUARD / GATEWAY

DYNAMIC SUBSYSTEM

STATIC EXTERNAL

SUBSYSTEM

DYNAMIC SUBSYSTEM

(Sub) System Boundary

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Security Control Allocation Security controls are defined to be system-specific,

hybrid, or common. Security controls are allocated to specific components

of organizational information systems as system-specific, hybrid, or common controls.

Security control allocations are consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture and information security architecture.

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Security Control Accountability

Strategic Risk Management

Focus

Tactical Risk Management

Focus

Top Level Risk Management

Strategy Informs

Operational Elements

Enterprise-Wide

Security Assessment

Report

SecurityPlan

Plan of Action and Milestones

Security Assessment

Report

Plan of Action and Milestones

SecurityPlan

Core Missions / Business ProcessesSecurity Requirements

Policy Guidance

RISK EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONOrganization-wide Risk Governance and Oversight

Security Assessment

Report

SecurityPlan

Plan of Action and Milestones

INFORMATION SYSTEM

System-specific Controls

Ongo

ing

Auth

oriza

tion

Deci

sion

s

Ongo

ing

Auth

oriza

tion

Deci

sion

s

Ongoing Authorization Decisions

RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

(RMF)

COMMON CONTROLSSecurity Controls Inherited by Organizational Information Systems

Hybr

id C

ontro

ls

INFORMATION SYSTEM

System-specific Controls

Hybr

id C

ontro

ls

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The Process

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RMF Task Structure(1 of 2)

Task Section Describes the specific RMF task within the appropriate step in the Risk

Management Framework.

Primary Responsibility Section Lists the individual or group within the organization having primary responsibility for

executing the RMF task.

Supporting Roles Section Lists the supporting roles within the organization that may be necessary to help the

individual or group with primary responsibility for executing the RMF task.

SDLC Phase Section Lists the particular phase of the SDLC when the RMF task is typically executed.

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RMF Task Structure(2 of 2)

Supplemental Guidance Section Provides supplemental guidance for executing the RMF task including additional

information from relevant supporting security policies, instructions, standards, and guidelines.

References Section Provides general references to NIST security standards and guidelines that should

be consulted for additional information with regard to executing the RMF task. Provides specific national security system references to CNSS policies and

instructions that should be consulted for additional information with regard to executing the RMF task when the general references are either insufficient or inappropriate for national security application.

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RMF Step 1 TasksCategorize Information System

Security Categorization Task 1-1: Categorize the information system and document the results of the

security categorization in the security plan.

Information System Description Task 1-2: Describe the information system (including system boundary) and

document the description in the security plan.

Information System Registration Task 1-3: Register the information system with appropriate organizational

program/management offices.

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Milestone Checkpoint #1 Has the organization completed a security categorization of the information

system including the information to be processed, stored, and transmitted by the system?

Are the results of the security categorization process for the information system consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture and commitment to protecting organizational mission/business processes?

Do the results of the security categorization process reflect the organization’s risk management strategy?

Has the organization adequately described the characteristics of the information system?

Has the organization registered the information system for purposes of management, accountability, and oversight?

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RMF Step 2 TasksSelect Security Controls

Common Control Identification Task 2-1: Identify the security controls that are provided by the organization as

common controls for organizational information systems and document the controls in a security plan (or equivalent document).

Security Control Selection Task 2-2: Select the security controls for the information system and document the

controls in the security plan.

Monitoring Strategy Task 2-3: Develop a strategy for the continuous monitoring of security control

effectiveness and any proposed/actual changes to the information system and its environment of operation.

Security Plan Approval Task 2-4: Review and approve the security plan.

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Milestone Checkpoint #2(1 of 3)

Has the organization allocated all security controls to the information system as system-specific, hybrid, or common controls?

Has the organization used its risk assessment (either formal or informal) to inform and guide the security control selection process?

Has the organization identified authorizing officials for the information system and all common controls inherited by the system?

Has the organization tailored and supplemented the baseline security controls to ensure that the controls, if implemented, adequately mitigate risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation?

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Milestone Checkpoint #2(2 of 3)

Has the organization addressed minimum assurance requirements for the security controls employed within and inherited by the information system?

Has the organization consulted information system owners when identifying common controls to ensure that the security capability provided by the inherited controls is sufficient to deliver adequate protection?

Has the organization supplemented the common controls with system-specific or hybrid controls when the security control baselines of the common controls are less than those of the information system inheriting the controls?

Has the organization documented the common controls inherited from external providers?

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Milestone Checkpoint #2(3 of 3)

Has the organization developed a continuous monitoring strategy for the information system that reflects the organizational risk management strategy and commitment to protecting critical missions and business functions?

Have appropriate organizational officials approved security plans containing system-specific, hybrid, and common controls?

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RMF Step 3 TasksImplement Security Controls

Security Control Implementation Task 3-1: Implement the security controls specified in the security plan.

Security Control Documentation Task 3-2: Document the security control implementation, as appropriate, in the

security plan, providing a functional description of the control implementation (including planned inputs, expected behavior, and expected outputs).

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Milestone Checkpoint #3(1 of 2)

Has the organization allocated security controls as system-specific, hybrid, or common controls consistent with the enterprise architecture and information security architecture?

Has the organization demonstrated the use of sound information system and security engineering methodologies in integrating information technology products into the information system and in implementing the security controls contained in the security plan?

Has the organization documented how common controls inherited by organizational information systems have been implemented?

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Milestone Checkpoint #3(2 of 2)

Has the organization documented how system-specific and hybrid security controls have been implemented within the information system taking into account specific technologies and platform dependencies?

Has the organization taken into account the minimum assurance requirements when implementing security controls?

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RMF Step 4 TasksAssess Security Controls

Assessment Preparation Task 4-1: Develop, review, and approve a plan to assess the security controls.

Security Control Assessment Task 4-2: Assess the security controls in accordance with the assessment

procedures defined in the security assessment plan.

Security Assessment Report Task 4-3: Prepare the security assessment report documenting the issues,

findings, and recommendations from the security control assessment.

Remediation Actions Task 4-4: Conduct initial remediation actions on security controls based on the

findings and recommendations of the security assessment report and reassess remediated control(s), as appropriate..

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Milestone Checkpoint #4(1 of 2)

Has the organization developed a comprehensive plan to assess the security controls employed within or inherited by the information system?

Was the assessment plan reviewed and approved by appropriate organizational officials?

Has the organization considered the appropriate level of assessor independence for the security control assessment?

Has the organization provided all of the essential supporting assessment-related materials needed by the assessor(s) to conduct an effective security control assessment?

Has the organization examined opportunities for reusing assessment results from previous assessments or from other sources?

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Milestone Checkpoint #4(2 of 2)

Did the assessor(s) complete the security control assessment in accordance with the stated assessment plan?

Did the organization receive the completed security assessment report with appropriate findings and recommendations from the assessors)?

Did the organization take the necessary remediation actions to address the most important weaknesses and deficiencies in the information system and its environment of operation based on the findings and recommendations in the security assessment report?

Did the organization update appropriate security plans based on the findings and recommendations in the security assessment report and any subsequent changes to the information system and its environment of operation?

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RMF Step 5 TasksAuthorize Information System

Plan of Action and Milestones Task 5-1: Prepare the plan of action and milestones based on the findings and

recommendations of the security assessment report excluding any remediation actions taken.

Security Authorization Package Task 5-2: Assemble the security authorization package and submit the package to

the authorizing official for adjudication.

Risk Determination Task 5-3: Determine the risk to organizational operations (including mission,

functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation.

Risk Acceptance Task 5-4: Determine if the risk to organizational operations, organizational assets,

individuals, other organizations, or the Nation is acceptable.

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Milestone Checkpoint #5(1 of 2)

Did the organization take the necessary remediation actions to address the most important weaknesses and deficiencies in the information system and its environment of operation based on the findings and recommendations in the security assessment report?

Did the organization develop an appropriate authorization package with all key documents including the security plan, security assessment report, and plan of action and milestones (if applicable)?

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Milestone Checkpoint #5(2 of 2)

Did the final risk determination and risk acceptance by the authorizing official reflect the risk management strategy developed by the organization and conveyed by the risk executive (function)?

• Was the authorization decision conveyed to appropriate organizational personnel including information system owners and common control providers?

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RMF Step 6 TasksMonitor Security Controls

Information System and Environment Changes Task 6-1: Determine the security impact of proposed or actual changes to the

information system and its environment of operation.

Ongoing Security Control Assessments Task 6-2: Assess a selected subset of the technical, management, and operational

security controls employed within and inherited by the information system in accordance with the organization-defined monitoring strategy.

Ongoing Remediation Actions Task 6-3: Conduct selected remediation actions based on the results of ongoing

monitoring activities, assessment of risk, and the outstanding items in the plan of action and milestones.

Key Updates Task 6-4: Update the security plan, security assessment report, and plan of action

and milestones based on the results of the continuous monitoring process.

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RMF Step 6 TasksMonitor Security Controls

Security Status Reporting Task 6-5: Report the security status of the information system (including the

effectiveness of security controls employed within and inherited by the system) to appropriate organizational officials on an ongoing basis in accordance with the organization-defined monitoring strategy.

Ongoing Risk Determination and Acceptance Task 6-6: Review the reported security status of the information system (including

the effectiveness of security controls employed within and inherited by the system) on an ongoing basis in accordance with the monitoring strategy to determine whether the risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation remains acceptable.

Information System Removal and Decommissioning Task 6-7: Implement an information system decommissioning strategy, when

needed, which executes required actions when a system is removed from service.

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Milestone Checkpoint #6(1 of 2)

Is the organization effectively monitoring changes to the information system and its environment of operation including the effectiveness of deployed security controls in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy?

Is the organization effectively analyzing the security impacts of identified changes to the information system and its environment of operation?

Is the organization conducting ongoing assessments of security controls in accordance with the monitoring strategy?

Is the organization taking the necessary remediation actions on an ongoing basis to address identified weaknesses and deficiencies in the information system and its environment of operation?

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Milestone Checkpoint #6(2 of 2)

Does the organization have an effective process in place to report the security status of the information system and its environment of operation to the authorizing officials and other designated senior leaders within the organization on an ongoing basis?

Is the organization updating critical risk management documents based on ongoing monitoring activities?

Are authorizing officials conducting ongoing security authorizations by employing effective continuous monitoring activities and communicating updated risk determination and acceptance decisions to information system owners and common control providers?

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Recognition of Authorization Results

Determining risk to the organization’s operations and assets, individuals, other

organizations, and the Nation; and the acceptability of such risk.

The objective is to achieve transparency of prospective partner’s information security authorization processes…establishing trust relationships based on common, shared risk management principles.

Organization OneINFORMATION

SYSTEM

Plan of Action and Milestones

Security Assessment Report

Security Plan

Business / MissionInformation Flow

Security Authorization Information

Plan of Action and Milestones

Security Assessment Report

Security Plan

Organization TwoINFORMATION

SYSTEM

Determining risk to the organization’s operations and assets, individuals, other

organizations, and the Nation; and the acceptability of such risk.

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Contact Information100 Bureau Drive Mailstop 8930

Gaithersburg, MD USA 20899-8930

Project Leader Administrative SupportDr. Ron Ross Peggy Himes(301) 975-5390 (301) [email protected] [email protected]

Senior Information Security Researchers and Technical SupportMarianne Swanson Kelley Dempsey (301) 975-3293 (301) [email protected] [email protected]

Pat Toth Arnold Johnson(301) 975-5140 (301) 975-3247 [email protected] [email protected]

Web: csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert Comments: [email protected]