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DR. JASON RONEY MECHANICAL AND AEROSPACE ENGINEERING

1420 Austin Bluffs Parkway Colorado Springs, CO 80933

Phone: 719/262-3573 Fax: 719/262-3042

http://mae.uccs.edu/jroney/jroney.html _________________________________________________________________

Final Report: Meteorological Plume Analysis to Determine Potential

Casualties Due to Catastrophic Failure at Industrial Sites in Border Nations

By:

Jason A. Roney

Prepared for: Network Information and Space Security Center (NISSC)

University Hall, 3955 Cragwood Drive University of Colorado at Colorado Springs

Colorado Springs, CO 80933-7150

January 2005

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NISSC Research Final Report: Meteorological Plume Analysis to Determine Potential Casualties Due to

Catastrophic Failure at Industrial Sites in Border Nations

Prepared by Jason Roney, Assistant Professor

Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, 1420 Austin Bluffs Parkway, Colorado Springs, CO 80933

OVERVIEW

• Potential Nuclear Risks in Canada were identified • One Nuclear Site in Canada was chosen to model, Pickering Nuclear Power Plant • A unique modeling system was set-up to model the Pickering site • Software was developed to use both EDAS and Eta Weather Model Data • Approximately 20 days of simulations were run for the Pickering Nuclear Power Plant • Graphical output of dispersion and wind fields for each simulation were produced • Numerical Monitoring sites were set-up in the modeling domain in the cities • The highest concentrations over time and exposure times in three cities were reported • The plume spread showing impact with Hamilton and Toronto, Canada and Buffalo, New

York, U.S.A. is shown • A complete analysis of the Pickering site used the majority of the research time frame. • Students continue to work on the other sites as well as validate the models with

meteorological data. • Research finding will be disseminated via a conference paper to be presented at the

AWMA conference this summer.

LITERATURE REVIEW Relevant Literature In the aftermath of Chernobyl and Bhopal, there were many studies (Singh and Ghosher, 1987, Boybeyi and Raman, 1995, Pollanen et al., 1997, and others) done to understand what happened in those cases, but there have been very few proactive studies of potential risks in the U.S. border region. In Europe, where Chernobyl was a greater risk, several studies have been done with plume analysis for catastrophic nuclear releases. Studies in Norway have included investigating the potential risk of release from the Kola nuclear power plant in Russia (Figure 1). The Norwegian government foresees the possibility of Kola turning into another Chernobyl, and they are preparing projections for a worst-case scenario. Some of these methodologies can be used in the proposed study as well. In addition, the Swedish government has funded studies for a “real-time” model projection of nuclear fall-out, and they have calibrated their model against the Chernobyl observations (Langner et al., 1998). Similar studies have been done in the UK

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simulating a release from France (Maryon and Best, 1995). In the United States, the focus has been on historical cases, the fall-out from above–ground nuclear testing around the world (Simon et al., 2004). a) b) Figure 1. Trajectory analysis of plume dispersion from the Kola nuclear power plant in Russia and its potential effect on Norway: a) 12 hrs after release, and b) 48 hrs after release (Saltbones et al., 2000). Some of these sources are listed in bibliography below. Research Gaps Covered in this Study This study expands on current knowledge by using tools that are readily available, but have not been applied to the specific potential catastrophic scenarios at the U.S. borders. In addition, an advanced system was developed by combining several modeling systems in a novel way. The models components are described in Scire et al., 1999 and 2000 for CALMET and CALPUFF and at the National Center for Atmospheric Center for Reseach (NCAR) site’s description and archive of the EDAS model. When using these tools the knowledge possessed in the current literature was used to construct the most realistic scenarios that can lead to casualties in U.S. civilian populations. This study modeled one catastrophic nuclear failure. The methodology used in constructing this scenario is well documented in the rest of this paper and should lead to at least two publishable papers. In addition, an attempt to correlate plume spread with population databases such as the Gridded Population Database of the World (GPW) developed by Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) et al., 2000 was done. Bibliography 1. Wikipedia On-line. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_accident (accessed

December 2004).

2. Singh, M.P.; Ghosh, S. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1987, 17, 1-22.

3. Boybeyi, Z.; Raman, S. Atmospheric Environment, 1995, 29, No. 4, 479-496.

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4. Pollanen, R.; Valkama, I.; Toivonen, H. Atmospheric Environment, 1997, 31, No. 21, 3575-3590.

5. Saltbones, J.; Foss, A.; Bartnicki, J., Atmospheric Environment, 2000, 34, 407-418.

6. Langner, J.; Robertson, L.; Persson, C.; Ullerstig, A. Atmospheric Environment, 1998, 32, No. 24, 4325-4333.

7. Maryon, R.H.; Best, M.J. Atmospheric Environment, 1995, 29, No. 15, 1853-1869.

8. Simon S.L.; Bouville, A.; Beck, H.L. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 2004,74, 91 –105.

9. Scire, J.S. A User’s Guide for the CALMET Meteorological Model, Earth Tech, Inc. 1999.

10. Scire, J.S.; Strimaitis, G.S.; Yamartino, R.J. A User’s Guide for the CALPUFF Dispersion

Model, Earth Tech, Inc. 2000.

11. Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); and World Resources Institute (WRI). 2000. Gridded Population of the World (GPW), Version 2. Palisades, NY: CIESIN, Columbia University. Available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/plue/gpw.

12. National Center for Atmospheric Research, Scientific Computing Division, EDAS archives, 1850 Table Mesa Drive, Boulder, CO 80307-3000

RESEARCH BACKGROUND USNORTHCOM Research Question Addressed: “What potential health threats do border nations’ industrial infrastructure pose to CONUS if they have catastrophic failure?” Research Focus and Purpose1 Industrial facilities in bordering nations, Canada and Mexico, pose a potential security and health risk to the Continental United States (CONUS). These sites which include chemical facilities and nuclear power plants pose a health risk in the event of catastrophic failure due to their proximity to United States (US) civilian populations. For these reasons, these sites also provide a potential lure for terrorist attack. The study of nuclear power plants risks is part of a broader study undertaken by the author to directly addresses US Homeland Security by analyzing potential sources of catastrophic release due to terrorist attack or other industrial accidents at Mexico and Canada nuclear and chemical sites. This broader study is aimed looking at effects on border civilian populations in the United States through identification of facilities, plume

1--All superscripts in all the following sections refer to bibliography in the literature review.

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analysis, and estimation of casualties based on the modeling analysis. A dramatic example by analogy of how such catastrophic failure could affect U.S. populations at a chemical plant and a nuclear plant include the Union Carbide plant accidental gas release in Bhopal, India on December 3, 1984, and the Chernobyl Reactor 4 meltdown on April 26, 1986, respectively. Analogously, an accident or attack on a Canadien nuclear power plant could affect the Northeast United States in a similar fashion where there are five operational nuclear power plants, Bruce, Pickering, Point Lepreau, Gentilly, and Darlington. Bruce, Pickering, and Darlington have multiple nuclear reactors. Thus, the study presented in this paper hopes to expand on current knowledge of possible scenarios in the event of a US-Canada nuclear power plant disaster by using tools that are readily available, but have not been applied in the manner presented in this paper or to the situations described. RESEARCH APPROACH Site Identification The nuclear threats in Canada have been addressed primarily in this report. There are five operational nuclear power plants in Canada, Bruce, Pickering, Point Lepreau, Gentilly, and Darlington; Bruce, Pickering, and Darlington having multiple nuclear reactors. A map showing their location along the US-Canada Border is shown in Figure 2. Rolphton NPD is no longer operational nor is the Douglas Point reactor. Figure 2. Location of the five active nuclear power plants in Canada are marked with a red with a green star in the middle.

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In addition, there are nuclear storage facilities and laboratories containing nuclear materials in similar locations according to Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) of Canada. A summary of these facilities, a description and the number of stored fuel bundles as of December 31, 2001, is shown in Table 1. This information was obtained from a NWMO document entitled, “How Nuclear Fuel Waste is Managed in Canada”. Table 1. Wet and dry storage of spent nuclear fuel bundles in Canada by number and site. Laboratory Description Wet Dry AECL Chalk River Laboratory 0 4853 AECL Douglas Point

Storage for shut down reactor 0 22,256

Point Lepreau Storage for reactor 40,814 48,600 AECL Whiteshell Storage for shut down reactor 0 360 AECL Gentilly-1 Storage for shut down reactor 0 3213 Pickering Storage for operational reactor 400,534 79,266 Bruce A & B Storage for operational reactor 692,204 0 Darlington Storage for operational reactor 191,522 0 Gentilly 2 Storage for operational reactor 32,525 48,000

Based on these preliminary findings, the Pickering Power Plant was chosen as the first nuclear site to model. There were several reasons for choosing the Pickering plant:

First, some evidence suggests terrorists have “targeted” this power plant in the past. In stories ran in the Toronto Star on August 23, 2003, the newspaper noted that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) arrested 19 people in the Toronto for possible links to terrorist groups. The Toronto Star reported that one of the men being investigated was enrolled in a Toronto flight school where training involved flying over the Pickering nuclear power plant. In addition, two of these suspects were once found loitering outside the facility before dawn according to the London Free Press.

Second, general safety has been a concern at the Pickering Nuclear Power Plant. On August 1, 1983, a pressure tube in Pickering Reactor #2 had a one meter rupture due to tube brittleness, dumping primary coolant into the reactor building. In August 1992, a tube-break in the moderator heat exchanger on Pickering Reactor #1 dumped 3,000 liters of heavy water contaminated with radioactive tritium into Lake Ontario. It was the largest tritium release in CANDU reactor history, forcing the shutdown of a nearby drinking water supply plant. In December 1994, a valve failure at Pickering Reactor #2 led to 140 tons of heavy water being dumped out of the reactor. For the first time in CANDU history, the Emergency Coolant Injection System was used to avoid a meltdown. There are also several generic concerns about safety at CANDU reactors. Drastic increases in the rate of the nuclear chain reaction can occur if coolant does not circulate properly in the core, leaving a void in the coolant that can lead to a loss of reactor control. This design flaw is shared by the Russian-designed RBMK reactor which some sources state played an important role in precipitating the 1987 Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine. Also, the flow of neutrons can vary beyond the specified limits in various regions of the reactor core, possibly leading to a loss of control and fuel melting. Steam explosions are to

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be expected if molten fuel contacts the moderator, and hydrogen gas explosions are also possible as well in CANDU reactors.

Third, Pickering Nuclear Power Plant is possibly the largest nuclear power plant in the world with 8 CANDU reactors as shown in Figure 3. Ontario Power Generation has been slowly bringing all 8 reactors back on-line to insure that incidents similar to the black-out in fall, 2003 have less of an impact

Fourth, the Pickering Nuclear Power Plant is not only close to U.S. borders but is near the major Canadian metropolitan area of Toronto. It is estimated that the possible local area that could be affected has a range of between 1.5 to 2.5 million people.

With Pickering Power Plant chosen as a site of interest for the reasons stated above. The modeling domain was chosen, and the land-use and the topography files were created for modeling in CALMET. The NCEP Eta model forecast was used to initialize a CALMET run for September 23, 2003 to test the model set-up. The processors and codes for this set-up had previously been written with previous NISSC funding that enabled importation of variables from Eta as “observations” to CALMET to provide realistic wind fields for the dispersion modeling. The codes interfacing Eta data to CALMET were then re-written to allow for archived EDAS data to be use from NCAR in this study. The data from NCAR will provide a more systematic analysis since there are nearly 10 years of data for use. In addition EDAS data includes data assimilation as the model is run, thus “real” observations were used to update the data providing the best estimates for the prognostics winds. With the codes written, a proof-of concept model was run using the EDAS data to initial and predict the micrometeorology (the CALMET winds).

Figure 3. Pickering Nuclear Power Plant on Lake Ontario with 8 CANDU nuclear reactors.

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Hybrid Modeling System The research focus of this project was to set-up a modeling system to use meteorological plume analysis that can do risk assessment for catastrophic industrial failures along United States’ Borders. The modeling system consists of the EDAS model data on a 40 km grid to provide an initial estimate of the weather and winds. The EDAS model data was extracted and formatted to fit the (Mesoscale Meteorological Model version 5) MM5 data format option in CALMET. Variables extracted from EDAS included, geopotential height, temperature, x and y velocity components, the specific humidity, the surface pressure, and elevation of the EDAS grids points. The specific humidity was converted to relative humidity with the use of the Clausius-Clapeyron equation. The EDAS data is only every 3 hours, so time interpolation of the wind fields was used to represent hourly values. The EDAS data only represents the synoptic scale weather (larger systems), but meteorological plume analysis requires more detailed winds, thus the EDAS data is used as “observations” to initialize the California Meteorological Model (CALMET)9, a micrometeorological model that produces wind fields suitable for plume analysis. The CALMET wind fields are then used in the California Puff Model (CALPUFF)10, a dispersion model, to determine the spread of a nuclear release. The nuclear release was estimated as catastrophic in that the release was designed to be comparable to a Chernobyl-type release. By correlating concentration exposures to populations within the Gridded Population Database of the World (GPW), a very precise population database, potential scenarios for exposure were investigated.11 To do a risk assessment of the potential exposure in such an event, archived EDAS model data from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR)12 was used by choosing 5 to 10 days of worst-case scenario weather patterns; prevailing winds towards population centers, no wet deposition, and catastrophic release of the substance. The wind roses of the EDAS data available from the Air Resources Laboratory were used to determine the days of meteorological interest for the site chosen. Pickering Nuclear Power Plant Case Study This research has focused on Pickering Nuclear Power Plant near the US-Canada border (Figure 1). Based on preliminary research, the Pickering Power Plant was chosen as the first nuclear site to model and the modeling results are presented in this paper. There were several reasons for choosing the Pickering plant: first, some evidence suggests terrorists have “targeted” this power plant in the past as reported in the Toronto Star on August 23, 2003; second, Pickering has a history of “minor” accidents, third, Pickering is possibly the largest nuclear power plant in the world with eight CANDU reactors; and finally, the Pickering Nuclear Power Plant is not only close to US borders but is near the major Canadian metropolitan area of Toronto where 1.5 to 2.5 million people reside and have the potential to be affected by a nuclear release. The modeling domain with 1 km x 1 km grid spacing was set-up for an approximate 300 x 300 km area domain as shown in Figure 4. The land-use and topography were obtained from the USGS databases for this modeling domain and are appropriately applied in the CALMET model. Approximately 11 start dates were modeled based on their perceived wind trajectory from all the windroses available for the year 2004 for the Pickering Nuclear Power Plant site. A sample

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windrose is shown in Figure 5. Winds that were considered were chosen out of the 365 days in the year 2004 and possess trajectories that are likely to impact urban areas. North and northwesterly winds were chosen such that Buffalo, New York, USA and Niagara Falls, US/Canada are in the direct path of the plume. In addition, easterly and northeasterly winds are likely to be hazardous to Toronto, Canada. Rochester, New York, USA is also a likely region impacted under a west-northwest wind condition, but these scenarios were not considered in the analysis. Winds displaying different wind regimes, different seasons, and with the above directions were simulated among the 11 start dates. The population database for the modeling domain was also used to determine the worst-case scenarios and is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 4. Modeling domain for Pickering catastrophic release study.

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Figure 5. A sample windrose representing a day of EDAS data for the Pickering site. The closest EDAS grid point to the Pickering site is chosen.

Figure 6. Population Density estimates from the Gridded Population Database of the World (GPW) for sites around Pickering.

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The dispersed pollutant is modeled as particles and similar sizes are chosen as presented in the literature.4 A worst-case scenario was modeled after the Chernobyl incident. It has been estimated that during the Chernobyl incident 6000-8000 kg of radioactive materials were released in the first 12 hours giving an average emission rate of 500-650 kg/hr.4 Thus, for a catastrophic release at Pickering, an even worse case scenario was estimated with emission rates of 1000 kg/hr. For a simplified analysis, the particles sizes were set as an equal portion of total emission rate, 200 kg/hr for the five particle sizes modeled. It is assumed that the particles range in size from 1 µm to 30 µm, the temperature of the fire or release is approximately 2000 K, the area of release is near the ground, and the equivalent area of release is a circular area with a diameter of 30 m. In this way the release was treated as a point source located at the approximate latitude and longitude of the Pickering nuclear power plant. The particle sizes of the dispersed particles are in the amounts shown in Table 2. In this way, the model is able to compare and contrast the different particle sizes that could be released. For the particle sizes of 1.0 µm, 2.5 µm, 5.0 µm, and 10.0 µm, the grouping is designated as the “small” particulate matter (PM), and for the particles sizes of 20.0 and 30 µm, the grouping is designated as ‘large” particulate matter. All the results reported in the next section will be either designated as “large” are “small” PM. Table 2. Particle sizes modeled in CALPUFF as well as how they were designated for the results. Particle Size (µµµµm)

Emission Rate (kg/hr)

Designation Temperature (ºK)

1.0 200.0 Small_PM 2000 2.5 200.0 Small_PM 2000 5.0 200.0 Small_PM 2000 10.0 200.0 Small_PM 2000 20.0 200.0 Large_PM 2000 30.0 200.0 Large_PM 2000 RESEARCH FINDINGS Results Using the wind-rose analysis for the year 2004 at the Pickering site, the following days were chosen January 10, and 26-27, 2004, April 4, 2004, May 7, 2004, May 22-23, 2004, August 24-25, 2004, September 8-9, and October 12, 19-20, 21-22, 2004. These days had either N, NE or E winds for some part of those days. Within these days the wind velocity data varied from near calm to 20 m/s. In addition, the dates were chosen such that there were seasonal variations in the weather. Precipitation was not modeled, but stability of the atmosphere was taken into account in the analysis as well as local terrain affects. Suitable wind fields were established before dispersion analysis was done for each of 11 test cases ranging from 24-40 hours. A sample wind field with every 11th wind vector is shown in Figure 4.

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Figure 7. Sample CALMET wind fields for the modeling domain created by using EDAS 40 km winds as observations. Once the wind fields were established for each day, the CALPUFF model was run for each of the days mentioned above. A catastrophic release at Pickering Nuclear Power Plant occurred at the first hour of the simulation and continued at the same rate every hour thereafter. Direct impacts on Toronto, Hamilton, and Buffalo were sought in each of these analyses. An example showing one hour of impact is shown for Buffalo, N.Y., U.S.A. in Figure 8 as the plume reaches across Lake Ontario and impacts the city with concentrations as high as 3.75 µg/m3. A similar plume impact is shown in Figures 9-13. Plumes impact Toronto, Canada in Figures 14-18, and Hamilton, Canada in Figures 19 and 20.

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Figure 8: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 01-10-2004 for one hour of the simulation that impacts Buffalo, New York, U.S.A. Figure 9: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 04-04-2004 for one hour of the simulation that impacts Buffalo, New York, U.S.A.

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Figure 14: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 1-26-2004 for two different hours of the simulation that impacts Toronto, Canada.

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Figure 15: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 5-22-2004 for one hour of the simulation that impacts Toronto, Canada. Figure 16: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 8-24-2004 for one hour of the simulation that impacts Toronto, Canada.

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Figure 17: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 10-19-2004 for two hours of the simulation that impacts Toronto, Canada.

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Figure 18: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 10-21-2004 for two hours of the simulation that impacts Toronto, Canada.

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Figure 19: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 09-08-2004 for one hour of the simulation that impacts Hamilton, Canada. Figure 20: Hybrid Model particle plume impact on 10-21-2004 for one hour of the simulation that impacts Hamilton, Canada.

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Since the main focus of this paper was to assess the feasibility of those releases directly impacting population centers, numerical monitoring sites were set-up in each city: five monitoring sites in Toronto, Canada, three in Buffalo, New York, U.S.A. and three in Hamilton, Canada. The monitoring sites are show in Figures 21a, 21b, and 21c.

Figure 21a. Numerical monitoring sites at Toronto, Canada.

Figure 21b. Monitoring sites at Buffalo. Figure 21c. Monitoring sites at Hamilton. For each of these monitoring sites, a time series of concentration was plotted for each category of radioactive particulate, PM_Large and PM_Small. Sample time series for the Buffalo monitoring sites for all sites for simulation are shown in Figures 22-27. Similar time series are shown for Toronto in Figures 28-32 and for Hamilton in Figures 33 and 34. These types of time series plots for each simulation were used to determine when each of the three cites were exposed to substantial doses of radioactive material. The time of exposure of substantial doses of measurable radioactive particulate matter were also recorded as well as the maximum

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concentration, Cmax, during the simulation. These results are shown in Table 3. In Table 3 the simulation, the start date, the number of hours in the simulation, the impacted city, and the monitoring site with the greatest impact in that city are listed as well as the number of hours of exposure during the simulation. Figure 22. Time series for a monitoring site in Buffalo for the simulation on 1/10/2004. Figure 12. Time series for a monitoring site in Toronto for the simulation on 10/21/2004. Figure 23. Time series for a monitoring site in Buffalo for the simulation on 04/04/2004.

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Figure 24. Time series for a monitoring site in Buffalo for the simulation on 05/07/2004. Figure 25. Time series for a monitoring site in Buffalo for the simulation on 08/05/2004.

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Figure 26. Time series for a monitoring site in Buffalo for the simulation on 09/08/2004. Figure 27. Time series for a monitoring site in Buffalo for the simulation on 10/12/2004.

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Figure 28. Time series for a monitoring site in Toronto for the simulation on 01/26/2004. Figure 29. Time series for a monitoring site in Toronto for the simulation on 05/22/2004.

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Figure 30. Time series for a monitoring site in Toronto for the simulation on 08/24/2004. Figure 31. Time series for a monitoring site in Toronto for the simulation on 10/19/2004.

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Figure 32. Time series for a monitoring site in Toronto for the simulation on 10/21/2004. Figure 33. Time series for a monitoring site in Hamilton for the simulation on 09/08/2004.

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Figure 34. Time series for a monitoring site in Hamilton for the simulation on 10/21/2004. Table 3. For each of 11 simulations, the maximum concentration experienced during the simulation at one of the monitoring site is shown as well as the number of exposure hours. Start_Date Hrs Approx.

Wind Locations Mon.

# Exp. Hrs.

Cmax (µµµµg/m3) Small

Cmax (µµµµg/m3)Large

1 01-10-2004 24 N Buffalo, NY, U.S.A 2 14 3.75 1.5 2 01-26-2004 40 E, NE Toronto, Canada 1 22 16.5 10.3 3 04-04-2004 24 N Buffalo, NY, U.S.A 2 1 2.5 1.6 4 05-07-2004 24 N Buffalo, NY, U.S.A 2 11 0.8 0.45 5 05-22-2004 40 E, NE Toronto, Canada 1 9 6.0 3.75 6 08-05-2004 24 N Buffalo, NY, U.S.A 3 8 1.25 0.6 7 08-24-2004 40 E, NE Toronto, Canada 5 7 6.5 4.5 8 09-08-2004 40 N Buffalo, NY, U.S.A 2 3 0.75 0.45 NE Hamilton, Canada 3 4 0.8 0.3 9 10-12-2004 24 N Buffalo, NY, U.S.A 2 17 1.35 0.8 10 10-19-2004 40 E, NE Toronto, Canada 5 29 2.4 1.5 11 10-21-2004 40 E, NE Toronto, Canada 2 14 6.75 3.5 E, NE Hamilton, Canada 3 12 2.1 1.0

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Discussion In these simulations, all three cities were exposed to substantial doses of radioactive material. Toronto, being closest to the source, was exposed to the greatest concentrations while weather conditions in winter months allowed greater build-up of concentrations likely due to winter-time inversions in both Toronto and Buffalo.

When major populations are not impacted during Northerly winds, it is because Lake Ontario acts as a barrier; however, there is considerable deposition and concentrations of radioactive material over and in Lake Ontario. This deposition likely will lead to long term affects in the watershed and would likely affect the health of the communities around the lake as well. Hamilton and Buffalo are considerable distance from the initial plume release, thus, by the time the radioactive plume reaches these locations, it is fairly homogenous. At the three monitoring sites in these cities, there were typically very similar concentration levels. The exception to this rule was when the plume grazed either side of the city. In Toronto, the locations in the city that experienced considerable concentrations can vary greatly. In fact, at times 2 of 5 monitoring sites had no radioactive particles while the other sites were being impacted fairly intensely. This close to Pickering, the plume is in a fairly tight band and misses some of the sites; however, where it does hit, the concentrations are the highest among those seen in all the simulations. In addition, a slight fluctuation in the wind on those days from E to NE, or E to SE can immediately impact new areas in the city that had been previously been protected. On 10/21/2004, we see a fanning effect where the plume hits most of the city over the simulation period. In considering deposition, we know that radioactive particles will be a long term problem for the local area, and though the concentrations may initially be low at some parts of the city, winds are likely to re-entrain the deposited particles and spread the contamination. Thus, new areas where particles are deposited have the potential to become sources of resuspension eventually affecting the other parts of the city. Lastly, the long-term objective of this project is to obtain a more quantitative effect on the populations of the area with the ultimate goal to assess health effects to populations in each area impacted by the plume. Combining the plume area with the population map can lead to some conclusions about total populations affected and to the extent of these effects; however, thus far, I have only established that these population centers near Pickering will be affected and the doses will be substantial in parts of Hamilton, Toronto, and Buffalo.

Conclusions A Hybrid Modeling tool for determing the impacts of a catastrophic release from nuclear power plants was developed to assess potential real impacts on the surrouding communities. The Pickering Nuclear Power Plant in Canada was used as a case study for testing the model. Realistic wind patterns were developed by using EDAS data introduced as observations in CALMET to produce diagnostic wind fields suitable for dispersion analyis in the CALPUFF system. Winds were produced on 1 km grids by using the EDAS data and adjusting for topography and land-use. Using EDAS model data from 2004, winds were pre-selected such that the perceived trajectory of that day would have a direct impact on a major population center. 11

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simulations were run, and the impact for a catastrophic release from Pickering on Buffalo, Hamilton, and Toronto were modeled with CALPUFF. Using these realistic wind patterns, the simulation shows that a catastrophic release has the potential to severly impact populations in the United States and Canada. Toronto is impacted with the highest concentration while Buffalo, and Hamilton see similar impacts at reduced concentration levels for Northerly, Northeasterly, and Easterly wind patterns. FUTURE DIRECTIONS The potential applications of this work is to do an expanded risk assessment of all the nuclear power plants in Canada and Mexico as well as sites within the United States. UCCS students continue to work on these additional scenarios. In addition once all of these sites are identified, each region could run a “real-time” models giving a daily prediction of sites that may be impacted by a realease on that day. In addition, a more precise accounting of the population database within the impact region needs to be addressed. It is envisioned that more software development for ease of interface could be developed so that emergency response agencies may use the product. These original scenarios will be used to leverage additional funding for a more comprehensive plume analysis of additional sites of concern constructing a more comprehensive database. Agencies that will be approached include the NSF, DOE, DOD, and the EPA. A student grant application for an additional $10,000 has already been solicited for continuation of this work as a graduate student project from the Institute of Hazardous Materials Management (IHMM). This project has the potential to benefit government, industry and military. The benefit to the government is that there will be a better inventory of possible scenarios helping guide improvement of the existing infrastructure in the U.S. that would deal with such catastrophic U.S. border events (emergency first responders, hospital, police and security). In addition, the public availability of this information could help influence better storage practices and the infrastructure security along the U.S. border at these plants. Industry would benefit from knowledge of the potential risks that certain agents may pose to civilian populations, and may be able to tighten security or find safer alternatives eliminating the threat and the possibility of mass law suits in the event of a catastrophic failure, i.e., Union Carbide/Dow have been sued multiple times because of the Bhopal, India release. Lastly, the military would benefit from this knowledge as well, since there are several military facilities within the plume range of some of these U.S. border sites. For these reasons, all of the above are considered as potential sources of future funding and research topics related to this study. DISSEMINATION STRATEGY The targeted journals are the Journal of Hazardous Materials, the Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, and Atmospheric Environment. A conference paper that has already been submitted on the topic presented is this report will be presented at the annual Air and Waste Management Association (AWMA) in Minneapolis, Minnesota this summer. In addition, this report will be disseminated to interested agencies will the hope of follow on funding.

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