dr – 18003 – 03 january 2017 · e: [email protected] dr-18003 page 1 iraq and syria open...
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Security Strategies for Humanitarian Operations
Providing advice and assistance to NGOs in safely and efficiently bringing aid to
those in need, where they need it.
DR – 18003 – 03 January 2017
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Iraq and Syria Open Source Report 03 January 2018 (Editor’s Note – The Iraq and Syria Daily Roll-Up of open source reporting is designed to provide a common understanding of the situation in Iraq and Syria for mid and senior decision makers within the humanitarian community in allocating resources and preparing for future operations in as safe and secure manner as possible. While important from a safety and security stand-point, the Roll-Up is not designed to be a format to discuss low-level informant activity. It is important to understand the geo-political, social, and military trends as well as hot button issues, and the emerging trends that are shaping challenges to security and humanitarian operations on the ground, where the need is most urgent.) Iraq ............................................................................................................................................. 5
Kurdish Parliamentary Elections – ......................................................................................... 5
Rudaw - Commission prepared to hold Kurdistan elections in April ................................. 5
Kurdistan/Nineweh – ............................................................................................................. 6
Rudaw - Rights group reports sectarian killings in post-ISIS Iraq By Rudaw ..................... 6
Rudaw - Abadi: We’ve agreed with KRG to hold technical talks, political dialogue later . 7
Iraqi Oil Report - KRG forced into dire measures, trimming Peshmerga salaries ............. 9
SINJAR - Bas News - International Expert Teams to Document Sinjar Mass Graves ....... 11
EYES ONLY - SINJAR – Iraqi News - Iraqi troops run into 12 mass graves of Yazidis in Sinjar ................................................................................................................................ 11
Kirkuk/Diyala/Salahuddin – ................................................................................................. 12
NRT - Displaced Kurdish Families from Tuz Khurmatu Call for Protection Guarantee .... 12
Iraqi News - PMF spox accuses U.S. of evacuating White Flags militants to safe havens.......................................................................................................................................... 13
Baghdad/Iraq Diplomatic & Economic – .............................................................................. 13
The Baghdad Post - Displaced persons center: All refugee camps in Iraq to be closed in March ............................................................................................................................... 13
LWJ - Top Iraqi-Shiite cleric endorses incorporation of PMF into the state .................... 14
Rudaw - Iraq faces 'new war' – on corruption ................................................................. 15
Anbar/Western Iraq – .......................................................................................................... 17
Iraqi News - IS members infiltrate from Anbar to Babylon to target security personnel: Source .............................................................................................................................. 17
Southern Iraq – .................................................................................................................... 17
TALOS - Tribal clashes north and south of Qurna, and demonstration events reported in Basra ................................................................................................................................. 17
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NRT - Exports from Iraq’s Southern Oilfields Hit Record 3.535 Million BPD In December.......................................................................................................................................... 18
Iraqi Reconciliation and Parliamentary Elections 2018 – .................................................... 18
Musings on Iraq - Maliki-KDP Reconciliation in Iraq ........................................................ 19
ICSR - ICSR Insight – Ruling with Hashd: The Good, the Badr and the Chameleon ......... 19
Humanitarian Concerns & IDPS – ............................................................................................ 21
HC&I Iraq – ........................................................................................................................... 21
UNHCR - Iraq Situation: UNHCR Flash Update - 27 December 2017 ............................... 21
HC&I Syria – ......................................................................................................................... 23
ICRC - Syrian Arab Red Crescent completes evacuation of 29 civilians in critical need of emergency medical care from Eastern Ghouta ............................................................... 23
Naharnet - Merhebi: Syrian Refugees Drop Below 1 Million .......................................... 23
EYES ONLY – HC&I Sahel – ................................................................................................... 24
MINUSMA - Bilan des 16 jours d’activisme contre les violences faites aux femmes et aux filles à Kidal ................................................................................................................ 24
Potential Impact on Europe/US – ............................................................................................ 25
CAR – WEAPONS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE A three-year investigation in Iraq and Syria December 2017 ................................................................................................................ 25
EYES ONLY - Islamic State/Jihadi Announcements – ........................................................... 26
The Syrian Intifada - Islamic State Claims its Switch to Insurgency and Terrorism is Working ........................................................................................................................ 26
SITE - AQ Insiders Distribute Letter from Hamza bin Laden Announcing Death of His Son.......................................................................................................................................... 28
SITE - Pro-IS Group Publishes Article in 5 Languages Inciting for Holiday Attacks, Urging to Attack Churches and Kill Women and Children ........................................................... 29
LWJ - Iran-based jihadist group claims attack on oil pipeline ......................................... 29
TRAC - (Video) al Hayat Media Center Islamic State Nasheed: O DISBELIEVERS OF THE WORLD - 31 December 2017 (featuring Trump, Assad, Putin, Netanyahu, & Macron) .. 30
Jihadology – New statement from Sarayyah Shaykh ‘Umar Ḥadīd – Bayt al-Maqdis: “Our Jihād Continues .. And the Spring Hill Is Like Jerusalem” ................................................ 31
Jihadology – New video nashīd album from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Ambassadors of Glory – ‘My Determination’ and ‘The Heart Wept'” ........................... 31
Jihadology – New video message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qāsim al-Raymī: “Explanation of the Book: ‘Summary of War Politics’ By al-Harthamī, Seventh Lesson” ............................................................................................................... 31
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Jihadology – New release from Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī: “The Heinous Fruits For the Invalidators of the Unicity of God Or Its Diluters” .................................... 31
Jihadology – New release from Hay’at Taḥrīr al-Shām: “If You Were Asked To Go Forth [To Battle], So Go Forth [To Battle]” ................................................................................ 31
Jihadology – New video message from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Jihādī Process in Badakhshan Province” .................................................................................... 31
EYES ONLY – Tracking Hezbollah/The Iraqi PMF – ............................................................... 31
Small Wars Journal – Shifts in the Demographic Profile of Hezbollah’s Combat Fatalities: What Do They Mean? ...................................................................................................... 32
Figure 1 – Demographic Trend of Hezbollah Martyrs in Syria ..................................... 32
Syria .......................................................................................................................................... 32
EYES ONLY - Syrian War Daily – 1st of January 2018 ....................................................... 32
Figure 2 - Approximate situation in the southern Idlib – northern Hama region ....... 33
Figure 3 - Approximate situation in Harasta, depicting Ahrar al-Sham’s siege on SAA-held parts of ‘Army Armored Vehicle Base’ and Technical Institute ........................... 34
SOHR - With 1939 casualties…December ends with the least monthly death toll during 2017 ................................................................................................................................. 35
Rojava – ................................................................................................................................ 36
Iraqi News - Syrian Interim government announces forming “National Army” .............. 36
Deir es Zor/Hasakah – .......................................................................................................... 36
SOHR - Airstrikes target east of Deir Ezzor and casualties in executions, mine explosions and by unknown gunmen ................................................................................................ 36
Idlib/Hama/Aleppo .............................................................................................................. 37
EYES ONLY - Al-Tamimi - Saraya al-Ra'ad: Idlib Local Defence Forces Affiliate ............... 37
The National - A new offensive on Idlib forces more to flee after tens of thousands have already gone; For tens of thousands on the move, the question is 'where to go?' ........ 39
The Syrian Intifada - The Continuing Syrian Efforts to Resist Jihadism ........................... 40
Homs – Nothing Significant to Report ................................................................................. 42
Rif Dimashq/Damascus Diplomatic & Economic – .............................................................. 42
The Syrian Intifada - Syria’s Rebels Reject the Russian-Organized “Peace” Conference in Sochi ............................................................................................................................. 42
Kurdistan 24 - Assad shuffles key cabinet positions as first move of the New Year ....... 44
SOHR - The factions’ attack continue violently in Vehicle Department and near Harasta city with the arrival of reinforcement to the factions and the death toll rises to at least 100 ................................................................................................................................... 45
Southern Syira – ................................................................................................................... 46
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EYES ONLY – al-Tamimi - Fawj al-Karbala'i: Republican Guard Affiliate .......................... 46
Gulf News - Syria rebels set to depart enclave in south .................................................. 49
Regional Conflicts – .................................................................................................................. 49
Saudi Arabia/Iran – .............................................................................................................. 49
MEMRI – Popular Uprising Against the Iranian Regime and Its Policy –2017 ................. 49
EYES ONLY – NCRI - Mullahs' Regime, Caught in Surprise and Confused, Admits to the Extent ............................................................................................................................... 51
EYES ONLY - Times of Israel - Kuwaiti report: US gives Israel go-ahead to kill powerful Iranian general ................................................................................................................. 52
Lebanon/Israel – .................................................................................................................. 53
EYES ONLY - MEMRI - Intensive Discussions in Resistance Axis Ahead Of Possible Joint Confrontation With Israel; Syrian Daily: A Confrontation is Inevitable ........................... 53
Other Areas of Potential Interest – .......................................................................................... 59
EYES ONLY - TRAC - Sharful Awal, Jama'at ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) Member, Arrested for Contacting International Jihadist Groups for Rohingya Cause border district of Ukhia, Bangladesh / Myanmar - 31 December 2017 .................................................. 59
This Space Left Intentionally Blank for Formatting Purposes
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Iraq Return to Top
Kurdish Parliamentary Elections –
Rudaw - Commission prepared to hold Kurdistan elections in April The Kurdish election commission is capable of holding general elections in the Kurdistan Region in mid-April, according to Rudaw sources. Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani is expected to hold a trilateral meeting with the commission and the Kurdish parliament this week to set a date for the parliamentary and presidential elections. Shwan Shekh Ahmad, a Kurdish MP, told Rudaw that the PM has the power to call for elections, in consultation with the Kurdish parliament. One of the main demands of Kurdish parties, especially from Kurdistan's largest opposition party of Gorran, is to demand the voter record be audited to ensure a fair and clean election. PM Barzani said in late December that his government is ready to help the election commission with this task, adding that it is the wish of every party including his ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Removing names of the dead or duplicates from the records of the commission may take about a month, Rudaw understands. Shirwan Zirar, spokesperson for the election body, told Rudaw that they will submit an official budget in their upcoming meeting with the parliament and the government officials. He said they had initially requested 23 billion Iraqi dinars ($19.3 million) when they met with the KRG last week, but that figure may change once the commission meets to calculate the spending associated with the process. Jutiyar Adil, a member of the commission, told Rudaw in August last year that the KRG had dedicated $31.8 million for the general elections in order to prepare for the now-delayed November 1 elections. On December 12, PM Barzani asked the Kurdish parliament to set a date for parliamentary and presidential elections within three months. Iraqi parliamentary and provincial elections are scheduled to take place on May 12. The Iraqi parliamentary election will also include the Kurdistan Region, but will be organized by the Iraqi election commission. The Kurdish parliament in late October decided to postpone the election that was initially scheduled for November 1, mainly because of the Iraqi military's incursion into disputed or Kurdistani areas claimed by both Erbil and Baghdad, such as oil-rich Kirkuk that fell to the Iraqi forces on October 16. Also in late October, the parliament extended its current term for eight months. (Editor’s Note – New election dates are now critical as both Gorran and Komal (the KIG) officially withdrew from the government on 20 December, and suspending an Alliance Agreement they had signed with the PUK in May 2016. Gorran and Komal withdrew from the government at least partly over their agreement with sometimes violent protests that have been ongoing in Sulaymaniyah since 18 December. The protests also led to the resignation of the speaker of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) parliament, Yousef Muhammed, a Gorran member, on 26 December as well. Gorran members currently serve as Ministers of Agriculture and Environment. It is unclear if either of the Ministers have also resigned. The political standoff in the KRG between the KDP, Gorran and Komal, and various factions within the PUK have served to give Baghdad cover in rejecting negotiations with Erbil because there is no unified voice in Kurdistan with whom to negotiate. While Baghdad has recently agreed to hold technical discussions with the KRG, it still refuses
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to hold political negotiations, and even if Erbil does accept Baghdad’s authority across Kurdistan, there would continue to be no unified party with whom to negotiate. This won’t likely change until new elections are held and a new government is formed. End Note)
Kurdistan/Nineweh –
Rudaw - Rights group reports sectarian killings in post-ISIS Iraq By Rudaw Reports of sectarian retribution and disputes are plaguing areas in Iraq more than half a year after they were declared free of ISIS. “As the ground fighting against ISIS winds down in Iraq, state security forces need to turn their focus to preventing retaliation and upholding the rule of law,” said Lama Fakih, deputy Middle East director at HRW in a report released Wednesday that documented an alleged act of revenge killings. “Past atrocities against the Yezidis don’t give its armed forces a free pass to commit abuses against other groups, whatever their past,” she stated. At least 52 members — mostly women and children — of the Sunni Arab Al-Jahaysh and Al-Metweti tribes were allegedly forcibly disappeared and killed south of Shingal by Yezidi Ezidikhan forces in June according to an investigation carried out by Human Rights Watch. As Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitary forces (PMF) like the Imam Ali Battalion took control of areas of Shingal, they worked with some Yezidi fighters like the Ezidikhan Brigades and the Lalish Brigades. Two Yezidi community leaders claimed that the abduction and execution of the 52 Metweti tribe members was carried out by the Ezidikhan Brigades in then-abandoned Qabusiye, according to HRW. HRW said that a legal adviser to the Ezidikhan Brigades told them in July that their unit was involved in the capture of 52 people and that “if any members of the Metweti tribes try to return to Sinjar, we will kill them.” Yezidis say that members of the Metweti tribe cooperated with ISIS in carrying out atrocities. Up to 10 armed groups were known to have operated in Shingal in early 2017. The dominate groups in the north were the Kurdish Peshmerga and PKK-affiliated Shingal Protection Units (YBS). In the south were Shiite Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitaries and those like the Yezidi Ezidikhan. In July, a spokesperson for Iraq’s Foreign Affairs Ministry told HRW that the Qabusiye incident had been investigated and that initial findings indicated that “Yezidi forces had abducted the Metweti civilians as revenge for abuses against Yezidi women,” and that those responsible would be held accountable. HRW said it "has received no responses to queries as to whether anyone has been held accountable for the apparent killings." Reports of fighting between groups in Shingal have continued. "After a young Ezidi farmer was killed near the village of Tel Benat in [southeastern] Shingal yesterday, armed clashes erupted between Ezidis and the Sunni Arab tribe of Metweti," wrote Ezidi Press in tweet on December 14, adding that the “young Ezidi was found shot dead.” The Yezidi activist media also claimed that "the Metwetis were mostly loyal to ISIS and involved in the genocide against the Ezidis in Sinjar,” while hyperlinking to October 2015 posts on Twitter claiming to show “former neighbors” from Shingal who joined ISIS along with their names. “Upcoming storming of Shingal city,” wrote the activist group in 2015. “Ezidi fighters swear to take revenge on their former neighbours who collaborated with ISIS.” Iraqi forces and the Iran-backed Hashd took complete control from KRG Peshmerga of Shingal in October, along with other Kurdistani or disputed areas claimed by Baghdad and Erbil. “Allowing the many armed forces involved in Iraq’s civil war to retaliate against any
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group they think was complicit with ISIS would shatter the rule of law,” Fakih of HRW said. “Baghdad needs to assert its authority over the criminal justice process and end armed group vigilantes.” Kurdish efforts to document ISIS atrocities against Yezidis have stopped since the Iraqi incursions. Judge Ayman Mostafa, head of the Kurdistan Region’s committee to investigate ISIS crimes, said in early December that "there is no way to go there and there is no local administration there to deal with." The Commission has some 2,000 cases filed by Yezidi victims their families. (Editor’s Note – The full text of the HRW report can be found here, HRW - Iraq: Yezidi Fighters Allegedly Execute Civilians; Investigate, Prosecute Armed Group Abuses. Surprisingly little shows up in the press about Haider Sasho and the Ezidikhan forces. What does, tends to show them in a positive light because of the atrocities faced by Yezidis under ISIS. What has been published in the last couple months has revolved around the expulsion of the Ezidikhan Protection Forces (HPE) from the Peshmerga for refusing to leave Sinjar when ordered to do so. Shasho has been identified as a “loyal” partner to the PKK and the Ezidikhan Forces tenure in Sinjar appears to have been without conflict with either Hashd al Shaabi or the PKK. While peaceful coexistence doesn’t necessarily mean that the Ezidikhan Forces would be willing to act as an executioner for Hashd al Shaabi, however, the Yezidis have plenty of reasons for seeking revenge against any local tribes that worked with ISIS to stamp out the Yezidi religion and its people. As a result, this report is plausible and warrants further investigation by the international community. What isn’t clear is which one of the Yezidi units was allegedly involved. We are currently aware of three primary Yezidi militias operating in the greater Sinjar area; the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) and Ezidikhan Women’s Units (YJE) are part of the Sinjar Alliance, and the Protection Force of Ezidikhan (HPE) while associated pursue their own agendas. All of them likely feel justified in targeting tribes who worked with ISIS, but they can’t all be indicted for the actions of a specific group. Sadly, if this occurred, the issue is not likely an isolated incident. Fortunately for western aid workers, as long as they don’t become involved in the power struggles of the Yezidi Militias, or Hashd al Shaabi for that matter, they will likely be isolated from these types of activities. Consequently, it’s important to be aware that the issue may be legitimate, but only so they can avoid becoming entangled in it inadvertently. End Note)
Rudaw - Abadi: We’ve agreed with KRG to hold technical talks, political dialogue later There is an agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to hold “technical and professional” meetings to discuss their outstanding issues, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said on Tuesday evening, adding that political dialogue will take place at a later stage. He said he has seen a “radical shift” in the KRG’s stance on contentious issues of the independence vote and the borders and there is now an agreement for initial “technical and professional” talks, Abadi told reporters as part of his weekly press conference. The KRG has stated that the “referendum is over” and has called for dialogue on the issue federal authority over the borders, Abadi said, describing this as a “radical shift” in the KRG’s stance. “But we want to confirm that referendum is illegal, that they will not go back to referendum again,” Abadi said. Abdullah Zaidi, in charge of Kurdish affairs for the ruling National Alliance, told Rudaw that it is not enough for the KRG to state they “respect” the rulings of the Iraqi Federal Court that canceled the independence vote and ruled the constitution does not allow secession. He said
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the KRG has to state that it “commits” to the rulings. Baghdad does not have a “conflict” with Erbil, Abadi stated, explaining that there are “disagreements” with the Kurdish government regarding the KRG border with the rest of Iraq. He said the KRG has to withdraw to pre-2003 borders and the KRG’s international border strip has to be under “exclusive” Iraqi control. He conceded though that the Iraqi constitution allows for both governments to jointly run international entry points such as the airports, something the KRG has said they agree to. “There is a difference between the border strip and border entry points,” Abadi said. The first visits between Baghdad and Erbil have already taken place. A delegation from Iraq’s Interior Ministry recently visited the Kurdistan Region and discussed returning displaced Iraqis who have been sheltering in the Kurdistan Region. A KRG delegation from its Interior Ministry visited Baghdad on Monday and met with the Iraqi Interior Minister to discuss the flight ban, among other issues. A member of the delegation told reporters on Tuesday evening that the Iraqi Minister of the Interior Baha al-Araji is expected to visit the Kurdistan Region soon on the invitation from his Kurdish counterpart Karim Sinjari. Regarding the payment of state salaries in the Kurdistan Region, Abadi repeated that they are still conducting an audit of the payroll, a process that will “take some time.” He called on the KRG to cooperate with Baghdad on this, especially with the planning and finances ministries whom he said have a list of the KRG’s employees. Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, who recently returned from his Berlin visit where he met with Chancellor Angela Merkel, repeated last week that his government is ready to enter dialogue with the Government of Iraq on the basis of the Iraqi constitution. Erbil is now ready to allow for joint administration of the border crossings, he said at the time. “The Kurdistan Region is fully prepared from this day to form that joint administration at the airports, the border crossings, and solve that problem, according to the Iraqi constitution,” Barzani said. He also confirmed last week that they are ready to hand over their updated list of employees for Baghdad to audit. But he doubted that Abadi means what he says. Abadi claimed the KRG can pay the salaries itself on the basis of the reduced system with the current oil exports. He said Erbil exported 270,000 bpd of oil in November – an amount he said is “more than enough,” to pay the salaries on time. He blamed corruption for the KRG’s failure with the salaries. Erbil maintains that a continued budget cut by Iraq since 2014, as well as the loss of Kirkuk’s oil fields are the two primary reasons behind their failure to pay the salaries. The KRG has 1.249 million on its payroll. Abadi claimed that equals half of the people on Baghdad’s payroll. Regarding Kirkuk, which Iraqi forces took control of in mid-October, Abadi said he did not want to visit the city because he does not consider it a liberated area. He said he has visited every area liberated from ISIS by Iraqi forces. He said he does not want to visit Kirkuk because he believes what happened in Kirkuk was imposing federal authority and was not “a military victory.” In early December, Abadi was heavily criticized for saying that the military incursion into the disputed areas was no less than the victory over ISIS. (Editor’s Note – As part of these technical discussions, A joint committee from the Kurdish ministries of health and education will meet with the government of Iraq on Wednesday (03 January) regarding the payroll lists of both ministries. The two most important current issues in the standoff between Erbil and Baghdad are control of Iraq’s border crossing points, and Kurdistan’s budget share. Other than coordinating on technical matters between the two governments, however, neither Abadi nor the KRG have offered anything new in the standoff between Baghdad and Erbil. Abadi is still demanding sole control of over the border crossings,
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that Kurdish oil exports be coordinated by Baghdad, and KRG acknowledgement that the Referendum was illegal, and not simply cancelled. Erbil has continued to refuse to hand over the border crossing points, though the KRG has offered joint administration of the borders. Iraq appears ready to form a committee to conduct dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil, but it is unclear whether this committee will be empowered to discuss Erbil’s concerns over unfulfilled elements of the Iraqi constitution. In what appears to be a political move, Abadi has met with former Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq leader Ammar al Hakim and jointly agreed that constructive dialogue was needed with Erbil. As always in Iraqi politics, however, the challenge is in how each view the meaning of ‘constructive dialogue.’ As a result, the joint statement with Hakim was likely designed to counter a potential rapprochement between Maliki and the Kurds. For more information on the rapprochement, see the article below, titled Musings on Iraq - Maliki-KDP Reconciliation in Iraq. End Note)
Iraqi Oil Report - KRG forced into dire measures, trimming Peshmerga salaries Kurdistan's financial crisis forces additional public salary cuts as revenues fall short and protests continue, with Peshmerga now facing an additional burden. Kurdistan's Cabinet is enforcing new cuts to the salaries of its armed forces as part of the austerity measures to cope with the financial crisis that has recently deepened due to a loss in oil revenues. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) adopted a new payroll system in 2016 and introduced significant cuts in the salaries of government employees, as independent oil exports were not enough to offset the double hit from the drop in the global oil price and increased cost of providing services after the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) group's invasion in 2014. Such measures are catching up, however, with widespread and violent protests continuing for a third day on Wednesday and expected to continue. Kurdish armed forces who were on the frontlines pushing back IS militants were excluded from the pay cuts. But the Oct. 16 loss of two oil fields back to federal control, and a new risk of losing a third major field, is now forcing the KRG to expand its salary cut program to include the armed forces as well. The General Secretary of the KRG’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, Jabar Yawar, said the KRG is pushing ahead with additional fiscal measures that includes making cuts to the payments of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. “The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs has been informed by the KRG that the current generated revenue is roughly IQD 400 billion, hence, further cuts are necessary,” he said. “The proposed cut to the budget of the Ministry of Peshmerga reaches a rate of 38%. We will adhere to the implementation of KRG’s decision that will include all the armed forces." Following the redeployment of the Iraqi security forces to the disputed territories in October, the KRG lost grip of some key sources of its revenue. KRG’s oil exports plummeted by half after the Iraqi forces reasserted control over Avana Dome and Bai Hassan oilfields in Kirkuk province. The anticipated reduction of Peshmerga salaries, even prior to implementation, has already raised opposition among the ranks of Peshmerga forces, including using social media platforms to express their frustration against the payments cuts. Frankly speaking, the decision of making cuts to the salaries of the Peshmerga forces will not be welcomed by the Peshmerga forces but we are trying to come up with a sophisticated mechanism in the process of implementing the cuts,” said Halgurd Hikmat, the spokesman of the Ministry of Peshmerga. We oppose the idea of making cuts to payments of low-earning
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Peshmerga or ordinary Peshmerga elements," he said. "The practical and just solution is to make cuts to salaries of high-ranking officials and high-earning Peshmerga elements. And the rate of the cuts must be based on the amount of the salaries rather than having a fixed rate in place." Hikmat says the Ministry of Peshmerga will cooperate with the Parliament of Kurdistan and other relevant institutions in bring about an appropriate mechanism in the implementation of payment reduction in order to minimize the financial impact on the low-earning Peshmerga. A member of the Peshmerga Affairs Committee in Kurdistan’s Parliament, Qadir Watman, describes the KRG’s decision as "unjust and wrong." He said there should be reforms in the energy sector cuts to what he alleges are "illegal military retirees" earning more than 2 million Iraqi dinars per month, or roughly $1600, “instead of eyeing cuts to salaries of low-earning Peshmerga forces whose lives depend on these salaries.” Watman warned that security forces and the areas they are tasked to protect will be at risk. "The members of Peshmerga and security forces cannot perform their duties in their full capacity while struggling to feed their children," Watsman said. "We as the Peshmerga committee have expressed our opposition to decision and notified the government of our position." The commander in chief of the PUK’s 70 forces and the former Minister of Peshmerga, Sheikh Ja’afar Mustafa, said the Peshmerga forces will carry the burden of the crises as any other government institution, but admitted his concerns over making cuts on a random basis. “Our major concern is that there is no sophisticated plan in place as to how the KRG and the KRG’s Ministry of Finance will make the cuts and through what mechanism the Peshmerga forces will be compensated. The whole process is vague,” he said. “It’s not the first time the Peshmerga fall victim to such decisions. The Peshmerga forces are still enduring the frustration of payments delays. They are yet to receive September, October and November payments of 2017,” Mustafa said. The KRG and the parliament held an extensive discussion on Dec. 13 to address the KRG’s financial status in 2018, with federal 2018 budget negotiations delayed, and no agreement on Kurdistan's revenue share. The head of the Finance Committee in Kurdistan’s Parliament, Ezzat Sabir, said the KRG is taking additional compulsory fiscal measures to continue making payments to its employees in 2018 in case Baghdad and Erbil fail to strike a deal on the KRG’s share of Iraq’s 2018 budget. “KRG’s 2018 budget is estimated at IQD 500 billion. The KRG is willing to handover its exports to Baghdad if its share of the federal budget surpasses its estimated local budget,” Sabir said. The head of the Energy Committee in Kurdistan’s Parliament, Sherko Jawdat, said a parliamentary delegation from Kurdistan is expected to visit Baghdad in the near future. “During the Dec. 13 meeting, the KRG and the Parliament both emphasized that striking a deal with Baghdad is the priority,” Jawdat said. Compounding dissatisfaction. The cuts come at a perilous time for Kurdistan. Sarkawt Ahmad, the spokesperson of Sulaimaniya province police, said protestors on Wednesday burned offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and Gorran parties in the town of Qalladzeh and the PUK office in Hajiawa. Protests also took place in Halabja and Said Sadiq, Ahmad said, as well as a small protest in Sulaimaniya city. Meanwhile, in nearby Ranya, the house of Peshmerga commander Abdullah Bore was attacked, which activist Bakr Shawri said was revenge for an incident Tuesday when one of Bore's bodyguards shot a protestor. Security forces guarding Bore's house fired in the air in order to prevent the protestors from burning the house, Shawri said. In Chamchamal, protestors also clashed with KRG’s security forces, according to Jalal Mohammed, the
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spokesperson of Chamchamal police. The anti-government protests are compounding politics in Kurdistan which have been fragile for years, and even more so following the Sept. 25 independence referendum and the repercussions imposed by the federal government. The speaker of Kurdistan’s Parliament, Yousif Mohammed, said his Gorran party as well as the Komal Islamic party are withdrawing from the government. “Consequently, I will be issuing a statement later today to announce my resignation as the speaker of Parliament," he said. He said the government "is not only paralyzed in providing the needs of Kurdistan people, but they are an extra burden on the shoulders of our people.” (Editor’s Note – This article was published on 21 December, but included a significant impact of Baghdad’s budget cut for Kurdistan so we decided to include it. Additionally, the current wave of protests in Sulaymaniyah began around 18 December, and they are mentioned in the article. Consequently, the Peshmerga salary cuts serve as a micro-example of impact Baghdad’s budgetary decision regarding Kurdistan has had on the protests in Sulaymaniyah, which have morphed from solely economic concerns, to economic and governance concerns, as we’re currently seeing in Iran. End Note)
SINJAR - Bas News - International Expert Teams to Document Sinjar Mass Graves Expert teams of the UN and EU together with authorities from Baghdad have arrived in the Kurdish areas of Sinjar to investigate and document mass graves of Yezidi victims of Islamic State (IS) genocide. Sa’doun Shamir, a member of Snune local administration, told BasNews that the international delegations have already started the investigations in their district. He hopes that the findings would help the appeal to internationally designate the massacre of Yezidis as genocide. Farah Hassan, an official from the committee for documenting Yezidi mass graves in Duhok, told BasNews that 44 graves have so far been discovered in Sinjar and its surrounding areas with 21 others elsewhere which are yet to be documented. The IS militants overran the Yezidi populated areas in northern Iraq back in August 2014. They killed or abducted thousands from the religious minority while survivors were forced to flee their homes. (Editor’s Note – See consolidated note under the next article below. End Note)
EYES ONLY - SINJAR – Iraqi News - Iraqi troops run into 12 mass graves of Yazidis in Sinjar Iraqi troops have run into 12 mass graves in west of Nineveh, security source was quoted saying on Wednesday. “The graves were found in Kojar region, Sinjar. They include bodies of Yazidi civilians who were executed by Islamic State since its control on the town in 2014,” the source told Baghdad Today. “Specialized teams are removing the bodies to extradite them to forensic medicine department in Nineveh,” the source added. On Sunday, Fahd Hamed Omar, acting mayor of Sinjar, said the total number of mass graves of Yazidi victims have reached 62 in Sinjar, describing the execution of Yazidis as “the biggest genocide in the modern times”. On the same day, relics of 24 Yazidis were found in a mass grave in Kesra al-Mei’rab village in the town. Habitat of the Iraqi Yazidi religious minority, Sinjar came under the international spotlights after IS militants took over the region in 2014. Many Yazidis were persecuted and held in Mosul by Islamic State, which considered them devil-worshippers. A study on the number of Yazidis affected showed that at least 9,900 of Iraq’s Yazidis were killed or
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kidnapped in just days in an attack by the militants in 2014. Iraqi forces, backed by a U.S.-led coalition and paramilitary troops, have been fighting since October 2016 to retake territories Islamic State had occupied. (Consolidated Editor’s Note – The previous two reports came in over the break, on 27 December. The total for Yezidi mass graves in the Sinjar area now stands at 75 total, with 62 having been located as of 26 December, this one, and identification of a grave containing 80 women on 30 December. It appears that the international community is finally making its way to Sinjar. While this will improve reporting and information flow from the area, it will also likely result in many mass gravesites identified. End Note) (EYES ONLY – As a result of efforts to find and detect mass graves after the EU Police Mission and NATO’s SFOR entered Bosnia & Herzegovina, we determined that it was possible to detect specific electro-magnetic signatures of buried bodies, and those located under vegetation and forest canopies. Based on the sheer volume of terrain controlled by ISIS around Sinjar, this technique may be used across a wide area, based on source reporting to help narrow the amount of terrain that needs to be covered on the ground to identify and catalog these atrocities. End Note)
Kirkuk/Diyala/Salahuddin –
NRT - Displaced Kurdish Families from Tuz Khurmatu Call for Protection Guarantee Kurdish families displaced from Tuz Khurmatu refuse to return to the district without a guarantee that their lives will be protected. The displaced Kurdish families say they will not return to Tuz Khurmatu, which was retaken by the Iraqi forces and Hashid al-Shaabi in mid-October military operations, if the Peshmerga forces are not allowed to return to the district. A Kurdish resident displaced to Kifri told NRT on Monday (January 1) that there is no guarantee that their lives will be protected if they return to the district. The resident spoke to NRT under condition of anonymity in fear of destruction of his house by the Hashid al-Shaabi groups in Tuz Khurmatu. “I am not ready to return to Tuz Khurmatu in this situation. I think there are also others who are not ready to return,” the man told NRT. “Life is not normal in Tuz [Khurmatu].” At least 20 Kurdish families have returned to Tuz Khurmatu in the last three days. Besides Hashid al-Shaabi, police, federal police and the Iraqi army have also been stationed in and around the district. Hashid al-Shaabi spokesman in Tuz Khurmatu, Said Ali Hashim Al-Husseini said that the people who were displaced can return to the district as the security situation is stable. “I call upon them [displaced families] to return to their homes because the situation is very good,” Husseini added. In Mid-October, Iraqi forces along with Hashid al-Shaabi launched an operation to take control of the disputed areas from the Kurdistan forces in the wake of the Kurdish referendum on independence. The Mayor of Tuz Khurmatu, Shalal Abdul, said hundreds of houses, apartments and businesses were exploded, burned and looted by the armed groups in Tuz Khurmatu. Kurdistan Region’s Independent Commission for Human Rights said on October 19 that the crimes of Hashid al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Units) against people in Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu were “war crimes.” Amnesty International said lives of countless men, women and children were “devastated” in Tuz Khurmatu. Citing residents, Amnesty said hundreds of properties were looted, set on fire and
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destroyed in the district. (Editor’s Note – The situation in Tuz Khurmatu remains dangerous for anyone who’s not Turkmen. Until Baghdad is willing to send a disinterested and professional force to the town, it will remain dangerous. This is a challenge because if the Kurds haven’t returned by the May 2018 election date, they will effectively lose representation in the town for at least 6 years. End Note)
Iraqi News - PMF spox accuses U.S. of evacuating White Flags militants to safe havens A spokesman for the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has accused the United States of dispatching jet fighters to evacuate White Flags remnants from Tuz Khurmatu district in Salahuddin into safe havens. Speaking to Knooz Media on Monday, Ali al-Husseini, the PMF spokesman for the northern axis, said, “Kurdish residents have seen U.S. jet fighters landing behind a mountain chain in Tuz Khurmatu district and evacuating remnants of the White Flags group from there after the liberation of the district from this terrorist group.” Earlier, Husseini had announced the liberation of Tuz Khurmatu from the White Flags members, saying that Iraqi warplanes, backed by PMF artillery shells, managed to put an end to a threat posed by this terrorist group in the district. “A manhunt was launched in search for the remaining White Flags outlaws in areas surrounding Tuz Khurmatu,” he said, adding that the total elimination of this terrorist group will be announced soon. Last week, Spokesperson for the Joint Operations Command Brigadier General Yahya Rasool vowed to crush the recently-emerged White Flags group very soon. “The terrorist White Flags group does not pose a major threat to the security situation in Iraq since its members are estimated at dozens,” he said, adding that the Joint Operations Command has a complete database about the group and will launch an attack on it at the right time. Speaking about the White Flags’ main goal, Rasool said, “This unlawful group aims at fomenting sedition in Iraq through targeting innocent people in areas like Tuz Khurmatu to prove that terrorism still exists and was not defeated. Violence in the country has surged further with the emergence of Islamic State extremist militants who proclaimed an “Islamic Caliphate” in Iraq and Syria in 2014. (Editor’s Note – al Husseini has been a vocal opponent of US presence in Kirkuk since initial reports of US deployments to the area in the aftermath of Iraq’s reestablishment of control there. Further, al Husseini has gone as far as to say that Baghdadi is an American puppet on IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency. Consequently, he’s not particularly reliable in his statements about US activity in Iraq. It’s unclear which PMF unit al Husseini is affiliated with, as the same article identifies him as the commander of the al Hashd al Turkmani forces, but given proximity to identified PMF in the Kirkuk area, he is likely a prominent member of the PMF 53rd Brigade, Liwa al Hussein/Hussein Tal Afar Brigade. End Note)
Baghdad/Iraq Diplomatic & Economic –
The Baghdad Post - Displaced persons center: All refugee camps in Iraq to be closed in March All refugee camps in Iraq to be closed in March. The joint center for relief and shelter of displaced persons announced on Monday that all refugee camps in Iraq will be closed in the first quarter of 2018. In a press release, the center added that all refugee camps in Iraq will
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be closed by March, adding that there are only 200,000 refugees inside Iraq. The center noted that the money allocated to the refugees will be transferred to reconstruction efforts of the areas and cities namely in Mosul and Anbar that were destroyed during the war against terrorism. He added that most of the refugees do not want to return to their hometowns especially that their homes were destroyed in the military operations. (Editor’s Note – While Baghdad is trying to avoid an IDP situation where people remain in camps years after their homes have been recaptured from ISIS, it is likely too early to force repatriation as basic services such as water, gas, and electricity remain out in large parts of formerly ISIS-controlled areas. Additionally, efforts are still nascent in attempting to clear many of these areas from land mines, booby traps and battlefield detritus. Without a back-up plan, the March closure of these camps will result in the death of IDPs as they try to move back into their homes. End Note)
LWJ - Top Iraqi-Shiite cleric endorses incorporation of PMF into the state Iraqi-Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani announced his support of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and “requested that all weapons come under government’s control” in a statement earlier this month. He also urged Shiite armed groups to stay away from political participation. While it appears that Sistani scored a win for Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, the arbitrary restriction is not expected to rein in the Iranian-backed network’s formations and influence. Sistani is recognized as the top Shiite religious authority in Iraq and his words shape government policy. “The victory over Daesh [Islamic state] doesn’t mean the end of the battle with terrorism,” Sistani’s representative Sheikh Abdulmehdi al Karbalai proclaimed in Friday prayer, mentioning the existence of “sleeper cells lying in wait for opportunities to undermine the country’s security and stability.” “It is necessary to make continued use of this important energy within the constitutional and legal frameworks that restrict arms to the state,” Sistani’s representative said. He added that the PMF had earned a reputation that exceeded any political force in Iraq and using their popularity for political purposes would sully their “holy status.” The PMF is a conglomeration of Iraqi militias formed following Sistani’s 2014 fatwa to drive the Islamic State from the country, and was enshrined into law last year. Iranian-linked figures dominate the PMF Commission: its operations chief and de facto leader is Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, a US-designated terrorist who is the deputy of Qods Force chief Qassem Soleimani in Iraq. Iranian-backed forces constitute the majority of the approximately 60 militias in the PMF, which has included formations loyal to Sistani. Some earlier reports suggested that Sistani would disband the PMF. However, Sistani abstained from both overturning his religious edict and calling for the dissolution of the PMF. Sistani’s position is consistent with that of Abadi who issued a statement “welcoming the Shiite cleric’s call against exploiting PMF volunteers and fighters politically.” They both face a difficult dilemma: disbanding 60,000 – 100,000 militiamen without replacing the numbers leaves a security vacuum, as well as putting tens of thousands of fighters out of jobs. The Iranian-backed network exploits precisely that vacuum for its advantage. Iran has warned against disbanding the Shiite-dominated PMF. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who once – called the PMF a “blessed phenomenon,” seeks to keep Shiite militias powerful in Iraq possibly to use them as proxies to counter Western pressure. The Iran-backed Shiite militia forces is one of
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“the biggest challenges” in Iraq, as previously signaled out by Iraqi Sunni Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi. Iranian-backed figures are working around the latest restriction. Prominent groups including Badr Organization and Asaib Ahl al-Haq announced that their armed forces would remain in the PMF, “obey” the chain of command, and “cut” ties with political wings. These Iranian-backed groups are reportedly in talks form a coalition for the May 2018 parliamentary elections. For his part, Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr, who had asked the Mr. Abadi to prevent the paramilitary forces from participating in elections scheduled for May, urged his fighters within the Peace Brigades to hand state-issued weapons back to the government, but said his forces would continue to protect a holy Shiite shrine in Samarra, north of Baghdad. The Badr Organization itself is case and point of how Iranian-backed militias can undermine the state from within it. Following the US invasion of Iraq, Badr was invited into the Federal Police, and, over the years, has grown to dominate it and the Interior Ministry, which controls the police. These forces have often operated outside the law, for instance running death squads against Sunni civilians. The PMF has legalized extremist groups that answer to Tehran such as Kataib Hezbollah, a US-designated terrorist organization, and Harakat al Hezbollah al-Nujaba, whose leader has said he would overthrow the government in Baghdad if ordered to do so by Khamenei. Iranian-backed militias have previously killed and maimed hundred of coalition troops during the Iraq War and continue to threaten American forces. Their deployments to Syria at the Islamic Republic’s request to preserve Bashar al Assad against a Sunni uprising have fanned the flames of sectarian violence. Sunni and Sunni extremists feed into and benefit from this vicious cycle. Sistani’s endorsement to separate arms from politics will only help pave the way for the elections putting into consideration that he said that his fatwa is still effective because “its objective is still valid.” Thus, the recent move of the PMF leaders in putting their fighters and weapons under the Iraqi government’s control seems a preparation for the 2018 elections, while they will maintain the influence of their networks even if they are incorporated into the state’s security bodies. Without a sustained effort – such as removing Muhandis from his senior post in the PMF – Sistani’s fatwa is not expected to significantly hamper the Iranian-backed forces, which act as a Trojan horse in the Iraqi state. (Editor’s Note – We agree with the assessment that Sistani’s fatwa will not likely hamper Iranian-backed forces in Iraq. While many in Iraq and Iran have praised Sistani’s fatwa establishing Hashd al Shaabi, the organization is now too large, powerful and necessary to the continued security of Iraq against external actors to be disbanded. Consequently, only internal changes will likely be successful at shifting the Iranian-backed militia loyalty from Tehran to Baghdad. End Note)
Rudaw - Iraq faces 'new war' – on corruption They have fled the country, their pockets full, or been released from prison under amnesties: despite Iraq's "war" on corruption, those guilty of embezzling state funds often evade justice. Even before he declared victory against ISIS in early December after a three-year battle, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said the country's next fight would be against graft, vowing to "surprise the corrupt." With billions of dollars in state money flowing into phantom projects used as vehicles for embezzlement, Iraq ranked as the 11th most corrupt country in the world in Transparency International's 2016 corruption perception index. But Abadi's fight against
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corruption is "still in the realm of theory" at this stage, according to Iraqi analyst Hisham al-Hashemi. "Nothing will change as long as those who protect corrupt actors in the economy, security and the military are still comfortable," he said. Member of parliament Majeda al-Tamimi said Iraq's corruption had grown "from the size of an ant to the size of a dinosaur" since the US-led invasion of 2003 toppled longtime dictator Saddam Hussein. Fighting it would be "difficult, fiercer than the fight against IS", she said. "There are corrupt people in every party," she added. "The war will be hard and it will need international and domestic support" – including from political parties which themselves have corrupt members. Some fear that little can be done to tackle the issue. One politician told journalists that stolen sums of less than $60 million "can be seen as honest; from there upwards we can speak of corruption." An official told AFP the government has sought help from Western organisations and the United Nations to track down missing funds. - $228 bn 'up in smoke' - Rahim al-Darraji, a member of the parliament's transparency commission, said some 6,000 "phantom contracts" had been signed to syphon off public money since 2003. Through front companies running construction sites and building infrastructure that only existed on paper, some $228 billion had "gone up in smoke," he said. That is equivalent to three times the annual budget and more than Iraq's GDP. Analysts say such massive corruption helps explain why Iraq is sorely lacking in infrastructure and industrial or agricultural development. Iraq, which is oil cartel OPEC's second largest producer, has been reduced to importing electricity and refined petroleum products. Some projects do reach completion, but bribes form a large part of the price paid by the state. Darraji said that Abadi's predecessor, Nuri al-Maliki, the defence ministry bought 12 aircraft from a Czech manufacturer for $11 million – and a further $144 million in bribes. The Supreme Council of the Judiciary said in a report that "many decisions of the justice department are never implemented." Iraqi newspapers often report on officials, collectively suspected of embezzling billions of dollars, fleeing the country. Former Basra governor Majid al-Nasrawi is among the wanted suspects on the run. A prominent Basra businessman later alleged in a television interview that Nasrawi had taken a 15 cut on every contract – five percent for his party and 10 percent for himself. The state's anti-corruption committee, overseen by the prime minister's office, has called for tougher laws. But first and foremost, it calls for an end to amnesties for the corrupt. Supreme Judicial Council spokesman Abdel Sattar Bayraqdar slammed a law which provides for the release of corrupt officials if they agree to return the money they embezzled, arguing that profits from stolen funds remain out of the state's reach. Another judicial official, speaking on condition of anonymity, also criticised the legislation. "For example, if someone a decade ago stole two billion dinars that have since earned twenty, they can just pay back the two billion and leave prison," the official said. "It's like a bank loan." (Editor’s Note – The scale of corruption in Iraq is astounding to the West, yet most Iraqis view it as good business. One of the major challenges with US-led operations in both Iraq and Syria is that money and equipment are not effectively monitored or audited by western officials and as a result, it gets diverted from intended cause, lost in paperwork shuffles, or simply stolen and the local government is tasked with investigating it. As a result, until the West changes its practices in monitoring expenditures, at the expense of national sovereignty, this will not change. End Note)
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Anbar/Western Iraq –
Iraqi News - IS members infiltrate from Anbar to Babylon to target security personnel: Source Islamic State militants infiltrated over the night into north of Babylon province, a security source was quoted saying on Monday. “IS members sneak over the night toward Jurf al-Sakhr region from Amiriyet al-Fallujah and al-Jazeera region in Anbar,” the source told Baghdad Today website. “The militants infiltrate in the night to carry out terrorist crimes, plant bombs and target mobilization forces and security personnel,” he added. Iraqi military, backed by al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) gained control on Jurf al-Sakhr and al-Rowiy’ia region, north of Babylon, in 2014. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced, in December, full liberation of Iraqi lands, declaring end of war against IS members. Thousands of IS militants as well as Iraqi civilians were killed since the government campaign, backed by paramilitary troops and the coalition was launched in October 2016 to fight the militant group, which declared a self-styled “caliphate” from Mosul in June 2014. Since then, forces took back the group’s former capital, Mosul, the town of Tal Afar, Kirkuk’s Hawija, and each of Annah, Rawa and Qaim in Anbar. The war against IS has displaced nearly five million people, with tens of thousands of civilians and militants killed since the launch of the offensives to recapture occupied cities. (Editor’s Note – Despite Baghdad’s announcement that ISIS has been defeated in Iraq, there remain three significant pockets of activity. One is well documented in the mountainous areas of eastern Salahuddin, northern Diyala, and southern Kirkuk. The other is in southwestern Nineweh, north of the Euphrates River, and one in Anbar, in the desert area south of Rawa and Anah. ISIS is using these areas to launch attacks into neighboring governorates, towns, and villages, and unless the ISF and Coalition get serious about sustained operations to root out and eliminate these remaining fighters, they will hold on until they have an opportunity to regroup, or change, but either way, they will continue destabilizing Iraq. End Note)
Southern Iraq –
TALOS - Tribal clashes north and south of Qurna, and demonstration events reported in Basra On the evening of 1 January, a security source reported that a tribal significant clash erupted between clan members of a tribe in the al-Shafi area of ad Dayr, resulting in the temporary closure of Highway 6 (Route Topeka) due to the violence. Basra North Electricity Distribution Directorate officials stated that the 33/11 KV secondary power station north of ad Dayr in al-Shafi was damaged due to small arms fire during the tribal clash, with subsequent violence initially preventing the directorate’s staff from repairing the damage. In response, a joint force of the Iraqi Army and Police were reportedly sent to the location to control the dispute, arrest those responsible and reopen the road, though as of the time of writing no arrests have been discussed. The Basra North Electricity Distribution Directorate deputy-manager Rafid Sabar stated that a number of high-pressure lines in the al-Thagar area north of Qurna were also shot by tribal members during conflicts which erupted on 31 December, resulting in damaged wires which cut off connections to the 11 KV electrical net and damaged the high-electricity
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insulators. The directorate’s staff went to the area and repaired the damage in cooperation with Qurna Electricity Repairing technical staff, subsequently returning all lines to service following the 31 December clashes. It is quite possible that these events are related to the same dispute, though this is currently unconfirmed. Tribal members will often intentionally target the electrical supply of other tribes during tribal fighting, with tit-for-tat attacks sometimes resulting in significant damage to electrical infrastructure which can subsequently impact multiple areas. On occasion this can lead to escalation and involvement by multiple tribes or clans, further exacerbating the initial issue. Operations should remain aware of the likelihood of search and arrest operations in these areas over the near term, and there is a potential for additional violence and further closures of Highway 6 should such clashes take place. Additional reporting has identified two demonstration events, with an unconfirmed gathering noted in Basra City at the Provincial Council building, which may be related to planned demonstrations regarding the release of thousands of municipal workers which is slated to take place tomorrow at the same location. Another demonstration has been reported in the Zubayr market, where tomato farmers have once again gathered to protest importation of tomatoes in direct competition to local tomato farmers who are marketing their tomatoes during the current growing season. As previously discussed tomato farmers demonstrate on a yearly basis over this issue, with destruction of foreign tomato shipments frequently resulting. (Editor’s Note – While these types of tribal clashes rarely impact western aid organizations, this report is a reminder to ensure local coordination to avoid areas where tribal hostilities could result collateral damage against western aid operations. End Note)
NRT - Exports from Iraq’s Southern Oilfields Hit Record 3.535 Million BPD In December Crude oil exports from Iraq’s southern Basra ports rose to a record high of 3.535 million barrels per day (bpd) in December, two oil officials said. Southern oil exports are on the rise as the government of Iraq seeks to offset the halting of the shipments from Kirkuk oilfields in mid-October after the Iraqi security forces retook control of fields from Kurdish forces. An oil official told Reuters on Monday (January 1) that rising output from small oilfields developed by the state-run Basra Oil Company helped push up exports in December. “Our plan is to keep boosting exports from the southern oilfields to make up for the lost Kirkuk shipments,” another oil official with the state-run Basra Oil Company told Reuters. The increase in December has not completely offset the halt of shipments from the north, Reuters reported. The last month’s figure for oil exports in the south beat the previous record of 3.51 million bpd set in December 2016. Iraq is a founding member of the OPEC cartel and its second largest producer after Saudi Arabia, but currently only exports about 4.8 million bpd. Baghdad aims to increase oil exports to 5 million bpd. (Editor’s Note - At about 280K bpd from the Avana Dome and Kirkuk field, while southern Iraq’s production has not replaced northern Iraq’s oil production, it is close. Revenues also continue to increase with the increasing price of oil, but there is concern that the increasing price could begin a new round of competition with US Shale producers. End Note)
Iraqi Reconciliation and Parliamentary Elections 2018 –
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Musings on Iraq - Maliki-KDP Reconciliation in Iraq Vice President Nouri al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) were once the worst of enemies, and now they are making up. They both are angry at Prime Minister Haidar Abadi, which is bringing the two sides together. This is another sign of the short sighted thinking of much of Iraq’s political class. The first sign of this reconciliation happened when Maliki gave a long interview to Rudaw, which is run by Kurdistan Regional Government Premier Nechirvan Barzani. Maliki said that Baghdad and Irbil had to start anew with relations and build trust and equality amongst all citizens. He advocated talks between the two sides before the 2018 elections. Premier Barzani then referred to that interview in a series of comments to the media saying that Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was punishing the Kurds and unwilling to compromise while Maliki was offering a positive message about relations between the central and regional governments. Al Mada took it even further suggesting that Maliki and the Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party might even form an alliance for next year’s vote. The friendly comments between the vice president and the KDP were a dramatic change in rhetoric. It was only a short while ago that Maliki was one of the most hated figures within the KDP, and the Kurds were a favorite target of the VP. Maliki for example, routinely blamed a conspiracy involving the Kurds for the fall of Mosul. While he was prime minister he attacked the Kurds independent oil deals, challenged them in the disputed territories, and even claimed they supported the Islamic State. The KDP in return pushed several no confidence votes against the premier starting in 2007, and generally blamed him for most of the problems in the country. Despite all these differences, the two are now talking as if this was water under the bridge. This is a perfect example of the limited worldviews of Iraq’s politicians. Too many of them think extremely short-term. In this case, both Maliki and the KDP are unhappy with PM Abadi. Maliki resents him for taking his job in 2014, and the KDP is angry that the premier took back most of the disputed areas including Kirkuk and has imposed sanctions on Kurdistan for its September independence referendum. For now, their shared hatred for the prime minister is fueling their rapprochement. (Editor’s Note – This is the strangest thing I’ve seen in Iraq since Moqtada Sadr began making sense last summer. Abadi’s hardline since the Kurdish Referendum appears to have allowed Maliki to court Kurdistan as a potential political ally in the upcoming elections. We don’t believe at this point that the Kurds will fully ally with Maliki because of the current political divide in Kurdistan. Instead, we expect that the Kurdish parties will ally with political blocks in Baghdad separately which could allow for some of the Kurdish parties to ally with Maliki. This would effectively split the Kurdish vote and would weaken front-runner Abadi at the expense of his opposition. End Note)
ICSR - ICSR Insight – Ruling with Hashd: The Good, the Badr and the Chameleon With the military defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government has to decide the fate of the controversial Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), a state-sponsored paramilitary force consisting of some 60 predominantly Shiite militias also known by their Arabic name as Hashd al-Sha’abi. Following recent calls for their gradual demilitarisation, speculations over the formation of a new PMU dominated
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electoral bloc started circulating across Iraqi, Lebanese and Kurdish media channels. According to the initial announcements by the Hezbollah aligned newspaper Al-Akhbar, the so-called Mujahideen alliance is to be headed by Badr’s leader Hadi Al-Ameri and is to include among others the following PMU actors: Badr, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Saraya Khorasani, the Imam Ali Brigades, as well as several Sunni tribal forces from western Iraq. In the midst of competing theories, Layth al-Adhari – spokesperson of Iraq’s Sadiqun bloc, affiliated with the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq militia, defended on Al Ahad TV the legitimacy of such coalition efforts confirming ongoing negotiations for the establishment of the Mujahideen alliance. Despite al-Abadi’s efforts to prevent paramilitary leaders from running in the May 2018 elections, the legislation still leaves a loophole opening way for all pre-existing political formations to capitalise on the combat glory of their PMU affiliated military wings. This utilisation of the fight against IS for electoral gains has raised concerns regarding the PMU’s ability to undermine the fragile legitimacy of the state challenging its role in providing security and rule of law. Despite their contribution to countering the territorial advances of IS, their autonomy and rapidly gained recognition could help them mutate into a parallel security apparatus exercising control over areas of limited statehood. A hashd coloured government coalition could push for the elimination of any legal impediments to such a scenario. Dealing with this uncertainty urgently calls for a comprehensive government strategy towards the PMU in a post-IS Iraq. Handing out the carrot of equal salary for PMU listed fighters is not enough for imposing equal responsibilities to resist foreign meddling, prioritise national security interests and abandon compromising allegiances. Their vocal affiliation with the transnational basij resistance movement as engineered by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatens to result in conflicting loyalties making the prospects of a PMU full integration within Iraqi Security Forces even grimmer. Established as an umbrella organisation, the PMU are plagued with a wide variety of internal tensions and ideological divisions. Understanding this clash of interests on the ground would require dissecting the paramilitary conglomerate. The Good. Units such as Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliyah (the al-Abbas Combat Division Model) belonging to the so-called “shrine” militias wing (Saraya al-Atabat) within the PMF, are already setting a good example as a reliable counterpart. Launched in response to the 2014 fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani calling for nationwide enlistment, the units led by Sheikh Maytham al-Zaydi have been abiding by the instructions of the Iraqi national commando authorities demonstrating a degree of military capability justifying their partial integration into the Iraqi army. According to PMU affiliated media channels citing al-Zaydi, already 1,000 of al-Abbas fighters have been registered by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. The Badr. Unlike the al-Abbas Combat Division avoiding any mingling with foreign actors as ordered by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Badr’s leadership has not shied away from parading its long-standing relationship with Quds Forces’ General Qassem Suleimani. This has not prevented Badr from filling the personnel vacuum by inserting 16,000 of its Shiite militiamen into the reinvented Iraqi Security Forcesbetween 2003 and 2005, most of whom have been trained by the IRGC in the 1980s and 1990s. Currently, Badr official Qassem al-Araji heads the Ministry of Interior in charge of the Federal Police brigades, including the Ministry of Interior Emergency Response Brigade. Further concentration of power within the hands of the Iranian backed combat veteran Hadi al-Ameri will only cement the leverage of his hybrid organisation. The Chameleon. An
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unpredictable variable remains Muqtada Sadr, whose skilfully staged thwarting of Iranian outreach efforts might cast a shadow over Badr’s parade. After attracting international attention as the first Iraqi Shi’ite leader to urge Assad to resign, he initiated a visit in July 2017 to Saudi Arabia, signalling his distancing from Iranian guardianship. Living up to the reputation of an opportunistic chameleon, he has committed to disbanding his Saraya al-Salam brigades, insisting upon the full demobilisation of the PMU following the defeat over IS. A marriage of convenience with Haider al-Abadi and Ammar al-Hakim – an Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) defector heading the newly founded National Wisdom Movement (Tayyar al-Hikma al-Watani), can thus empower him to balance the governance ambitions of Hadi al-Amiri and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Way forward? These limited illustrations reveal that any state strategies ranging from demobilisation to collusion and integration should consider the ideological fragmentation, varying organisational capacity and shifting power dynamics within the PMU. There is no one-size-fits-all approach for containing a heterogeneous paramilitary umbrella comprised of various militias with multiple allegiances, highly contested chain of command and conflicting political aspirations. Attempts to stop the militarisation of politics are not likely to block the PMU’s path to the ballot box – with or without the debated Mujahideen alliance. Only a cross-sectarian post-“axis-of-resistance” narrative can help curb the influence of foreign proxies and reduce Iraq’s vulnerability to subversive meddling in its internal affairs. (Editor’s Note – As indicated above, Hashd al Shaabi’s power has grown significantly because of its efforts to help the Iraqi Army and Air Forces defeat ISIS. It is too powerful to disband, and while the organization is far from monolithic in its support to Tehran, the organizations claiming allegiance to Iran are the ones who appear most willing to attempt entry into the political arena. As a result, we expect Hashd al Shaabi to have a significant effect on the upcoming election through the support of friendly politicians. Despite calls by Abadi or Sistani to refrain from political involvement. End Note)
Humanitarian Concerns & IDPS – Return to Top
HC&I Iraq –
UNHCR - Iraq Situation: UNHCR Flash Update - 27 December 2017 Key figures:
o 928,032 IDPs in Ninewa (including as a result of the Mosul military operation) o 103,608 IDPs currently displaced due to military operations in Hawiga (Kirkuk) and
Shirqat (Salah al-Din) o 65,940 IDPs currently displaced due to military operations in west Anbar o 566,902 Individuals (119,175 households) currently enrolled in ASSIST, UNHCR’s
assistance tracking tool o 2.78 million IDPs remain displaced since January 2014 o 262,758 Iraqi refugees hosted in countries in the region, with 33,412 Iraqis in camps
in Hassakeh, Syria
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Funding: o USD 578 million requested for IDPs and Iraqi refugees in the region in 2017 o Situation update. o Violent anti-government protests took place across Sulaymaniyah Governorate.
Protestors were reportedly shot at and party offices were set ablaze during demonstrations over unpaid civil servant salaries, improvement of basic services, and rising tensions with Baghdad. Reports indicate that there were a number of fatalities and some 200 people were injured. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) emphasized the urgency of de-escalating ongoing local tensions and stated that "people have the right to partake in peaceful demonstrations, and the authorities in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI) have the responsibility of protecting their citizens, including peaceful protestors’’.
o UNAMI published a report on 23 December outlining the impact of recent ethnic violence in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah al-Din Governorate). Mortar attacks reportedly resulted in civilian casualties and triggered a new wave of displacement, while forced evictions and destruction of property were also reported, notably after the transfer of security authority in the area in October. As of 14 December, according to figures provided by the UN Migration Agency (IOM), 8,694 individuals (1,440 families) from Tuz Khurmatu remained displaced following the events of mid-October, while 2,664 displaced individuals (444 families) had returned to their homes.
Population movements: o Around half of internally displaced Iraqis have returned home since the beginning of
the crisis in 2014. In a press release published on 13 December, IOM announced that more than 2.84 million displaced Iraqis have returned to their areas of origin, mostly to Anbar and Ninewa governorates.
o However, more than 2.78 million people remain displaced. While IOM findings indicate that 90 per cent of displaced Iraqis are determined to return home, an ongoing lack of security is cited by displaced people as the main obstacle to return to the place of origin, whether due to ongoing conflict, presence of unexploded ordnances, landmines, or militias. Concerns over economic security also persist, with 80 per cent of displaced people and 63 per cent of returnees citing access to employment as one of their top needs. Meanwhile, residential and infrastructure damage remains widespread, with nearly one third of returnees reportedly returning to houses that have suffered significant damage.
Response update: o UNHCR is working with its partners REACH and International Relief and Development
(IRD) to complete twelve Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to restore basic services in Al-Zab and Al-Abbassi sub-districts in Hawija Governorate. These projects, expected to be completed by 31 December, will rehabilitate public services such as courts, mayor offices, civil status departments, city councils and youth complexes in the area. Restoring essential services remain crucial to ensure sustainable and dignified returns in both locations.
o UNHCR is supporting its partner, Human Appeal, to install around 700 refugee housing units (RHUs) in west Mosul and surrounding areas. The beneficiaries are families who
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returned to their areas of origin after being displaced as part of the Mosul situation. The project is funded by the Government of Japan through its Emergency Grant Aid.
HC&I Syria –
ICRC - Syrian Arab Red Crescent completes evacuation of 29 civilians in critical need of emergency medical care from Eastern Ghouta Syrian Arab Red Crescent volunteers and staff from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have successfully transferred 29 people with serious health conditions from eastern Ghouta near Damascus. The patients and their families were transferred to hospitals in Damascus where they will be treated for their illnesses. There were 17 children among those transferred during the three-day operation, along with six women and six men. All are suffering various life-threatening conditions that require advanced hospital care and treatment. "We've been planning for this operation and waiting to be given safe access," said Mr Khaled Hboubati, the President of Syrian Arab Red Crescent. "Now, our volunteers were able to transfer people with life-threatening chronic diseases and serious injuries to get medical help. We want to thank all parties involved, especially our Red Cross Red Crescent partners, ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)." In late December, IFRC President, Francesco Rocca, visited Syria and met with senior government officials. Mr Rocca stressed the need to increase regular, safe and secure access of Red Crescent volunteers to communities in need across Syria and to facilitate the transfer of people with serious health conditions to hospitals where they can receive medical attention. "I hope this evacuation will be followed by many more deliveries of relief items and medical assistance to people in need. I would like to thank all involved in this evacuation which is a signal of hope for the people in need, inside Ghouta and in all the hard-to-reach areas," said Mr. Rocca. "The evacuation was a positive step to end the immense suffering of some people in Eastern Ghouta, especially children who have limited access to life-saving medical care. But more needs to be done. The needs of civilians should come first, be it in Ghouta or elsewhere in Syria, and access to aid should be allowed on a more regular basis and without conditions," ICRC Syria head of delegation Marianne Gasser said. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement works together in Syria in support of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent which is the largest provider of humanitarian services in Syria. More than 7,800 active volunteers distribute relief to more than 5 million people each month. For further information, please contact: In Damascus: SARC, Rahaf Aboud, tel. +963 959 999 853, [email protected], IFRC, Paivi Hurttia, +963 958 005 848, [email protected]
Naharnet - Merhebi: Syrian Refugees Drop Below 1 Million State Minister for Affairs of the Displaced Moein Merhebi said on Tuesday that the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has dropped in the last two years, stressing that maintaining monitoring and registration data facilitates the return of the displaced in the future. In an interview with the pan-Arab al-Hayat daily, Merhebi said: “The latest Syrian refugees census has shown a drop from 1.210 million to 980,000 registered Syrian refugees in two years." The
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Minister noted that assistance provided for the displaced is notably diminishing because of the scarcity of donor contributions. He pointed out that “the assistance is not submitted to the Lebanese state, but to the United Nations and the relevant organizations that distribute them to the displaced. Merhebi added that refugee registration data can remarkably help the process of the return as it also falls in the "interest of Lebanon and the Lebanese." Lebanon hosts around 1.1 million Syrian refugees registered by the UNHCR, which is a high number for a country like Lebanon whose population does not exceed 4.4 million capita. The Syria refugee influx into Lebanon has strained the country's infrastructure, and has also sparked accusations that refugee camps are harboring militants from the war. The World Bank says the Syrian crisis has pushed an estimated 200,000 Lebanese into poverty, adding to the nation's one million poor.
EYES ONLY – HC&I Sahel –
MINUSMA - Bilan des 16 jours d’activisme contre les violences faites aux femmes et aux filles à Kidal Dans le cadre de la campagne de sensibilisation des « 16 jours d'activisme contre les violences faites aux femmes et aux filles », le bureau de la Division des Droits de l’Homme et de la Protection (DDHP) de la MINUSMA à Kidal, a organisé le 20 décembre 2017 une manifestation sur le thème « Ne laisser personne de côté: mettre fin à la violence à l'égard des femmes. » Plus de 300 femmes se sont déplacées pour assister à cet événement qui s’est déroulé à la Maison de la femme de Kidal. Chaque année, la campagne des « 16 jours d’activisme » vise à sensibiliser chaque année le grand public sur les violences basées sur le genre, phénomène malheureusement récurrent dans des pays en situation de post-conflit tel que le Mali. « Les victimes de violences sexuelles ont un grand rôle à jouer dans cette lutte, car ce sont bien elles qui doivent dénoncer ces actes afin de permettre aux organes compétents de poursuivre les auteurs, » a souligné d’entrée M. Armel Luhiriri Byamungu, Responsable de la DDHP du bureau régional de la MINUSMA à Kidal. « Ces actes répréhensibles, commis de manière systématique, aussi bien en période de paix qu’en temps de conflit, sont considérés comme des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre, et s’ils visent un groupe ethnique bien précis, on peut même parler de génocide, » ajoute M. Byamungu. Participant à l’évènement, la Chargée des Affaires Judiciaires et Pénitentiaires de la MINUSMA à Kidal, Mme Nancy Makulu Mutombo, a présenté un module sur « la justice et la lutte contre l’impunité et le recours à la justice traditionnelle. » Etant donné le contexte spécifique de Kidal où les autorités judiciaires sont absentes depuis mai 2014, plusieurs cas de violences sexuelles continuent d’être présentés aux juges traditionnels (appelés cadis). Parmi les défis majeurs qui restent à relever, on compte l’accompagnement psycho-social des victimes de violences sexuelles ainsi que la résistance culturelle, qui fait que la plupart des viols commis sur des femmes et les filles restent impunis et leurs auteurs non traduits en justice. Ceci reflète bien une situation qui révolte au plus haut point Mme Aminatou Walet Bibi, responsable politique et militante pour les droits de la femme. Elle a ainsi attiré l’attention des participants sur la nécessité de mettre fin à certains tabous. « Le viol constitue un sujet difficile, car les victimes, en plus du rejet par leurs proches, courent le risque de ne plus pouvoir se marier, » si jamais
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l’abus dont elles sont victimes est connu du public. Mme Bibi a ainsi exhorté la MINUSMA et les agences humanitaires à multiplier les campagnes de sensibilisation afin que les femmes soient mieux informées sur leurs droits et sachent les faire respecter.
Potential Impact on Europe/US – Return to Top
CAR – WEAPONS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE A three-year investigation in Iraq and Syria December 2017 IS forces, like most non-state armed groups, acquire significant quantities of weapons and ammunition on the battlefield. This materiel has numerous sources—ranging from weapons captured in bulk from Iraqi defence and security forces during initial advances by IS forces in 2014, to military materiel seized during offensives against Syrian government forces. If these acquisitions were restricted to old, ‘legacy’ weapons, which happened to be present in the arsenals of the two governments, there would arguably be few viable avenues available to restrict weapon acquisition by IS forces. Evidence presented in this report, however, confirms that many of the group’s weapons—and notably its ammunition—are newly manufactured, having been delivered to the region since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011. These weapons originate in transfers made by external parties, including Saudi Arabia and the United States, to disparate Syrian opposition forces arrayed against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Supplied into Syria through the territories of regional proxies—notably Jordan and Turkey—this materiel was rapidly captured by IS forces, only to be deployed by the group against international coalition forces. These dynamics are not new among the adverse effects associated with international intervention in civil wars. Support by Saudi Arabia and the United States to non-state forces in the 1980s Afghan conflict displayed similar patterns: weapons provided to non-state groups arrayed against a common enemy; a concentration of Salafist jihadist groups, which proved the most organised and the most effective at acquiring foreign-supplied weapons; a devolution to neighbouring states of the responsibility for deciding which groups received weapons (in the Afghanistan case, Pakistan, and in the Syria case, Jordan and Turkey); and a blowback effect, whereby weapon supplier states end up being targeted by the forces that they armed indirectly— and having to confront them militarily.170 Moreover, many of these transfers have violated the terms of sale and export agreed between weapon exporters—primarily EU Member States—and recipients in Saudi Arabia and the United States. These are clear cases of diversion, whereby government recipients have broken enduser agreements in which they undertook not to re-export weapons or ammunition without the prior consent of exporting governments. These non-retransfer clauses are explicitly designed to mitigate the risk of diversion and the subsequent use of weapons by insurgent and terrorist forces to the detriment of international peace and security. Their violation runs counter to a range of international and regional counter-diversion agreements, including specific aspects of the Arms Trade Treaty and the EU Common Position on Arms Exports. Such counter-diversion initiatives can only be effective if they are informed by systematic enduse monitoring, particularly with respect to unauthorised
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weapon re-exports or retransfers. In those cases, exporting states must be made aware of end-user agreement violations if they are to make a full assessment of the risks of diversion when deciding whether to continue exporting weapons to a party. Many—if not most—of the negative outcomes associated with the international trade in arms result from a long-held ‘fire and forget’ attitude, whereby exporting governments remain either unaware or unconcerned with what happens to weapons after export. The evidence presented in this report and initiatives such as CAR’s EU-funded iTrace® Global Weapon Reporting System provide a strong indication of the efficacy of enhanced end-use monitoring in redressing the persistent issue of diversion. The evidence presented in this report also speaks to ongoing problems involving non-state forces’ acquisition and weaponisation of civilian market products, particularly with respect to the construction of IEDs by terrorist groups. Indeed, IS forces have established an acquisition network that extends deep into neighbouring countries, as well as a sophisticated IED research, development, and construction programme that allows for the production of IEDs on an unprecedented scale. In the course of CAR’s investigation, Turkey emerged as the paramount source of chemical explosive precursors and a range of ancillary commercial material, which IS forces have used to manufacture IEDs and improvised weapons in a host of connected, centrally managed factories and workshops. As the group loses its territorial foothold in Iraq and Syria and moves from conventional war fighting towards a greater reliance on acts of terrorism and insurgency, these factors—unless addressed—will continue to provide the group with the resources to pursue its agenda well into the future. IS forces continue to pose a grave threat to regional and international security. Evidence presented in this report demonstrates that IS forces possess advanced weapon systems, which will pose a threat to regional and international forces in the years to come; are proficient at manufacturing improvised weapons and IEDs on a large and sophisticated scale; and are adept at tapping into regional and international commercial markets to acquire chemical precursors and off-the-shelf products for the development of these weapons. Combined with global reach, demonstrated logistical and organisational capacity, and willing recruits around the world, these factors translate into an exportable capacity to conduct insurgency and terrorism well beyond the region. (Editor’s Note – Extracted here is the conclusion of the CAR study. At 200 pages, the report is exhaustive and is roughly broken into four sections; conventional material, Islamic State weapons production, conclusion and appendices. The first section begins with baseline data on Islamic State weapons and ammunition. It is a very good, encyclopedic source of Jihadist-devised revolutions in military affairs that we can now expect to proliferate throughout Jihadist, insurgent and other terrorist organizations throughout the World now that ISIS fighters have lost control over much of their terrain in Iraq and Syria and many appear to be migrating elsewhere. End Note)
EYES ONLY - Islamic State/Jihadi Announcements –
The Syrian Intifada - Islamic State Claims its Switch to Insurgency and Terrorism is Working The 112th edition of the Islamic State’s newsletter, Al-Naba, released on 29 December 2017 contained an article on page 3, which reported that the reversion from statehood to insurgency was yielding results, particularly in the Diyala, Kirkuk, and Saladin provinces of
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Iraq. The article is reproduced below. The Islamic State claims in the Naba article—which is surrounded by field updates from those areas, particularly Diyala—that its terrorist strikes at the Iraqi state consist significantly of targeted assassinations. Such operations against those the Islamic State calls mushrikun (polytheists or idolaters), and the consequent destabilization in the named provinces, have been visible since the spring at the latest, well before Mosul had been cleared. As has been consistent for eighteen months, since the Islamic State began publicly ruminating on the loss of the caliphate, and continuing right down to the present, the Islamic State underlined that the tactics it has now turned to are a replay of those that brought it back from the dead last time, after the surge-and-sahwa of 2007-08. They are not being retrospective with this claim. Keep Watch on the Mushrikun and Kill Them God says: “prepare an ambush for each of them” [Tawbah (9): 5]. Imam Ibn Kathir said—may God have mercy on him—in his interpretation: “Monitor them on their ways and paths[1] until they have narrowed against them, and then force them [to accept] death or Islam.” The vocabulary of jihad must be made suitable for the stage of defense, where direct confrontation with the kufr [infidels, disbelievers] has declined in many areas, the interventions are to conduct monitoring and killing[2] against those who, in areas protected by the planes of the Crusader alliance, practice shirk [idolatry, polytheism] and apostasy, and where the aircraft have flown off but lurk in a place of ambush … Jihadist operations at this time are [dominated by] al-amaliyya al-amniyat [security operations], which begin with the monitoring of the infidels’ ways and paths and headquarters, then raiding and assassinating them. This is what terrifies the Crusaders and the apostates and disrupts their sleep because it weakens their morale, terrorizes their soldiers, and brings about the fall of the cities into the hands of the Mujahideen. Today—bi fadl Allah [by the grace of God]—from Wilayat Diyala, to Wilayat Kirkuk to Wilayat Saladin, represents muthalath al-mawt [the triangle of death], and tomorrow a square and rectangle of torment here and there, to infuriate the kufr and prepare again for their failed campaigns. This is what the mushrikun achieved after years of war that drained their blood and money. In Karbala and Najaf and the rest of the lands of mushrikun, it is necessary in this stage to intensify the work of commanded by God, in monitoring and killing of all those involved in leading people from religion [i.e. Shi’a clerics], and the most effective treatment for the rest of the masses involved is a request to [join in] fighting al-mulahideen [atheists, the godless] and a retreat to the cities to protect them from falling after abandoning the countryside. … The hukumat al-shirk [government of polytheism or government of idolatry] in Baghdad seeks to deceive people that they have tightened their grip on the security of this city and want to lift security barriers. This step reminds us of what they did after the emergence of the sahwat al-ridat wal-aar [the awakening of apostasy and shame or disgrace], when they thought they had won and could maintain control. And then they became the laughing stock of the world because of the repetition of lies to justify their security failure, after the Harvest of the Good[3] policy picked the heads of the apostate soldiers and their mushrikun officers. This plan was based on the principle of monitoring and killing which God has ordered. This policy bore fruit even at that time when the crusaders and apostates thought they were triumphant. The Commander of the Faithful,[4] Abu Umar al-Baghdadi[5]—may God accept him—said: “Praise be to you, O soldiers of God, for I reckon that you have suffered and yet shown patience, you have been shaken and you have been
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martyred and you have been rocked and dispersed, yet fought on and shall be congratulated with rewards in the hereafter and victory in al-dunya [the temporal world]. The enemy, in all its forms and varieties, recognized that the period following your plan for the Harvest of Good was the harshest for them for about a year, and it is not a coincidence that the number of American dead is now so large they can no longer say, ‘He was killed in a non-combat incident’! In a few months you will touch victory with your hands and see it with your eyes, as you have seen it before, but more pure, clear, and solid”.[6] Yes—by God—the State of Islam returned after the stage of scrutiny and woe to the stage of victory and empowerment. We have seen victory, and touched it, just as he said—may God accept him—where it extended into Syria and then returned stronger into Iraq and announced the Caliphate, glory be to God. Hopefully our Lord—Gloried and Exalted is He—will achieve a sincere victory soon through the truthfulness of the group chosen to carry this trust forward after years of war, and after this stage of hardship[7] and the selection and scrutiny of the mujahedeen. The soldiers of Islam and its righteous caliphate will continue monitoring and killing the mushrikun until they have been defeated. They have a lion’s fury, and their detachments will reach the kufr on bases in the cities, as well as in the countryside … Victory is patience before the Hour, and results from righteousness, praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds. (Editor’s Note - For prior parts See: #110, #109, #108, #107, #106, #105, #104, #103, #102, #101, #100, #99, #98, #97, #96, #95, #94, #93, #92, #91, #90, #89, #88, #87, #86, #85, #84, #83, #82, #81, #80, #79, #78, #77, #76, #75, #74, #73, #72, #71, #70, #69, #68, #67, #66, #65, #64, #63, #62, #61, #60, #59, #58, #57, #56, #55, #54, #53, #52, #51, #50, #49, #48, #47, #46, #45, #44, #43, #42, #41, #40, #39, #38, #37, #36, #35, #34, #33, #32, #31, #30, #29, #28, #27, #26, #25, #24, #23, #22, #21, #20, #19, #18, #17, #16, #15, #14, #13, #12, #11, #10, #9, #8, #7, #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1. Issues #111 can be found here. Issues #110, #111, and 112 were published during the break. Previous assessments have indicated that ISIS announcements have reverted from governance-oriented to insurgency-oriented and here the group appears to be attempting to declare victory in the face of defeat. While the Holiday season was surprisingly unsuccessful for Iraq in western attacks as many were discovered before they began, they still had some successes in the recent St. Petersburg attack in Russia and Shia Cultural Center in Kabul. Moreover, they’ve been able to survive and conduct attacks in Syria and Iraq despite official declaration of their defeat. Consequently, ISIS’s claim of success at insurgency and terrorist operations appears to be at least a bit accurate. End Note)
SITE - AQ Insiders Distribute Letter from Hamza bin Laden Announcing Death of His Son Al-Qaeda (AQ) insiders distributed a letter attributed to AQ official Hamza bin Laden announcing the death of his eldest son, 12-year-old Usama. The letter, which is dated Dhul-Qa'dah 1438 Hijra, corresponding to July-August 2017, was posted on Telegram channels on December 31, 2017. Prominent AQ insider al-Wathiq Billah posted a brief announcement of the news on his Telegram and Twitter accounts, as well as a photo of the child, Usama bin Hamza bin Usama bin Laden. He wrote:
“We announce to the Islamic Ummah... the Ummah of sacrifice and jihad, the news of the martyrdom of the brave cub, the memorizer of the Book of Allah, a grandson of the renovator imam - the noble emir, the conqueror of the Hobal
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of the era: Sheikh Abu Abdullah, Usama bin Laden, may Allah have mercy on him - whose age did not exceed twelve years, Usama ibn Hamza ibn Usama ibn Laden, may Allah have mercy on him and his grandfather.”
(Editor’s Note – We’ve been unable to find any family data for Hamza. It would be interesting to know how many sons or daughters Hamza has because they will be the next generation of charismatic leaders al Qaeda will try to use once Hamza has been killed as well. End Note)
SITE - Pro-IS Group Publishes Article in 5 Languages Inciting for Holiday Attacks, Urging to Attack Churches and Kill Women and Children The pro-Islamic State (IS) Ashhad Media Foundation published an article in five language inciting lone-wolf jihadists everywhere to attack Christians during the holiday season, and in particular, urging they strike churches and kill women and children. The article, entitled, "O Muslim: You Have the Opportunity to Revenge, so Take It," was published in Arabic, English, French, Pashto, and Turkish, and issued on December 2017. Its author, "Abu Moaaz al-Shammai," called on Muslims to avenge their brethren in Iraq, Myanmar, and Syria, and take whatever weapon is at their disposable to mount attacks. He wrote:
“Take your explosive belt, your machine gun, your knife or your car and go to the nearest church or gathering of those who worship the cross, in Iraq or either in Sham or in Egypt or America or wherever they are. The war is not a political war between nations states, the war is between crusaders and the Muslims.”
(Editor’s Note – While the Holidays are primarily over, the threat remains. Any potential attacks that were thwarted, but not stopped, over the Holidays could be in the process of reschedule in order to use the resources and fulfill the opportunity lost during the Holidays. End Note)
LWJ - Iran-based jihadist group claims attack on oil pipeline Ansar al Furqan, an Iran-based jihadist group, claims to have targeted an oil pipeline in Iran’s Khuzestan province. The group’s report has been shared on many al Qaeda-linked Telegram channels, including the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). FDD’s Long War Journal could not independently verify the claim, which is plausible but unconfirmed. Ansar al Furqan states that “a major oil pipeline was blown up in Omidiyeh region of occupied Ahvaz, Iran.” The group added that it had established a new unit, the Ahwaz Martyrs Brigade. The area of Ahvaz has historically had a large Arab population. However, it is unclear if this purported brigade is comprised of Iranian Arabs or Baluchis, as most of its members are thought to be Baluch. The jihadists say the “operation was conducted to inflict losses on the economy of criminal Iranian regime.” A video of the purported operation was also released, showing surveillance of the pipeline beforehand and the actual explosion itself. However, no independent reporting of the incident appears to exist, making it impossible to confirm Ansar al Furqan’s images. In addition, no date was given for the alleged operation. That said, videos of oil pipelines on fire in the general area circulated on social media in April and again in
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October. In April, the military wing of the Arab Liberation Movement of Ahwaz claimed responsibility for a blast. In October, a group calling itself Kata’ib Ahrar al Ahwaz (the Free Ahwaz Battalions) claimed credit. It is unclear what the relationship is, if any, between Ansar al Furqan and the two Ahvaz-based groups. Ansar al Furqan is an al Qaeda-linked jihadist group that has launched sporadic attacks inside Iran, largely in Sistan and Baluchestan Province. It was formed when two Baluch jihadist groups, Harakat al Ansar and Hizb al Furqan, merged in 2013. Its media is largely shared on al Qaeda-linked channels, including GIMF, a key distributor of al Qaeda-related propaganda. In recent weeks, Ansar al Furqan has stepped up its propaganda by releasing several videos and photo sets, including photos from one of its training camps (seen at link). (Editor’s Note – We’d be very surprised if these organizations are not currently receiving support from a western group, but this is an area where we expect the new US Administration to begin working to apply pressure internal to Iran. End Note)
TRAC - (Video) al Hayat Media Center Islamic State Nasheed: O DISBELIEVERS OF THE WORLD - 31 December 2017 (featuring Trump, Assad, Putin, Netanyahu, & Macron) The following "Nasheed" is not as much of a hymn as it is a series of messages displayed across the screen. Addressing all major religions from Hindu to Christian to Jewish to even Atheist. The message is of punishment flashing across images of either popular IS videos of the past (mainly execution videos) interspersed with news reels of Trump, Assad, Putin, Netanyahu, and Macron. Note the poster is written in both French and English but the bold messages are displayed in English with Arabic subtitles. The overreaching concept of the Nasheed is: War is Eternal. It is also interesting to note that at least twice in the video the Islamic State refers to the "ISA" returning. This would be the first time the Islamic State has referred it itself as the "ISA". The video also reinforces the concepts put forth by Abu Kassem in his manifesto: Manifesto of the Caliphate: Islamic State’s 100-Year Plan for The Islamic Sunni States. (Editor’s Note – The chapters in Abu Kassem’s manifesto are:
o The General Leadership and the nature of the relationship between the military and political wings
o The Ideological Leadership of the movement, its relationship with the General Leadership and society
o Economic Institutions – Resources and Industries o The Economic Assets of the Sunni Entity o We are the Campaign of the Banners and we are the new Umayyads o The great Safavid enterprise... The challenges of war and the tools of Arab defence
(The 100 Year Plan) o How we will establish our war against the great Safavid enterprise o The obstacles of establishing the project. End Note)
(Editor’s Note – The following are announcements Jihadology, are the most current ones posted. The site’s curator, Aaron Zellin, took a holiday break from 16 December until present. We’ll continue to track and post when he’s back on line. End Note)
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Jihadology – New statement from Sarayyah Shaykh ‘Umar Ḥadīd – Bayt al-Maqdis: “Our Jihād Continues .. And the Spring Hill Is Like Jerusalem” (Editor’s Note – This message was posted on 15 December 2017. Source: Telegram. We have no further context for this statement. End Note)
Jihadology – New video nashīd album from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Ambassadors of Glory – ‘My Determination’ and ‘The Heart Wept'” (Editor’s Note – This message was posted on 15 December 2017. Sources: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hkJkTNX2I5E; and, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRIgGjCobWY. We have no further context for this message. End Note)
Jihadology – New video message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Shaykh Qāsim al-Raymī: “Explanation of the Book: ‘Summary of War Politics’ By al-Harthamī, Seventh Lesson” (Editor’s Note – This message was posted on 14 December 2017. For prior parts in this video
series see: #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1. Source: http://risala.ga/mkwl. We have no further context for this message. End Note)
Jihadology – New release from Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī: “The Heinous Fruits For the Invalidators of the Unicity of God Or Its Diluters” (Editor’s Note – This message was posted on 14 December 2017. Source: Telegram. We have no further context for this release. End Note)
Jihadology – New release from Hay’at Taḥrīr al-Shām: “If You Were Asked To Go Forth [To Battle], So Go Forth [To Battle]” (Editor’s Note – This message was posted on 14 December 2017. Source: Telegram. We have no further context for this release. End Note)
Jihadology – New video message from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Jihādī Process in Badakhshan Province” (Editor’s Note – This message was posted on 14 December 2017. Source: http://www.alemarahvideo.com/wp-content/uploads/Video/Alemarah-Studio/Report/176/Badukhshan-176-mob.mp4. We have no further context for this message. End Note)
EYES ONLY – Tracking Hezbollah/The Iraqi PMF –
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Small Wars Journal – Shifts in the Demographic Profile of Hezbollah’s Combat Fatalities: What Do They Mean? The Future of Hezbollah. Whether the trends revealed by the data reflect party policies, recruit motivations, or some combination of both, changes in the demographic profile of Hezbollah’s combat fatalities may have adverse consequences for the organization. For one, the ostensible uptick the number of martyrs from socioeconomically deprived regions may further institutionalize socioeconomic hierarchies within the party, and prompt resentment against perceived or real party policies. Moreover, Hezbollah is unlikely to leave Syria in the foreseeable future, so these casualties will likely continue to mount. And if Hezbollah goes to war with Israel, these hierarchies may result in further inequities in the distribution of casualties among the organization’s supporters. Finally, geographical disparities in threat perception may further divide the organization. A renewed Israeli threat from the southern front would likely draw the attention of residents of the south; but it is possible that residents of Baalbek-Hermel may remain more focused on the proximate takfiri menace. At present, the shifting geographic distribution of Hezbollah’s martyrs seems to have benefited the group’s ability to wage war in Syria. Whether or not these shifts will bear unintended consequences in the long run, however, remains to be seen. (Editor’s Note – This extract is the conclusion to the larger report. The other sections in the article include geographical shifts, social-economic factors, fear in the Bekaa Valley, and social trends and sectarianism. As with most extremist organizations, as initial idealistic, committed fighters are killed or wounded and removed from the battlefield, their replacements gradually become more opportunistic and violent as they are increasingly pulled form less educated sections of society. We saw this phenomenon in Afghanistan from 2006 until 2010. This doesn’t mean these forces are any less capable, but it typically signifies an increased reliance on violence to bring about organizational goals. End Note)
Syria Return to Top
EYES ONLY - Syrian War Daily – 1st of January 2018
Figure 1 – Demographic Trend of Hezbollah Martyrs in Syria, As downloaded from the associated article link 02 January 2018 at 16:01 (GMT+1)
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Idlib: o Rebel factions reportedly agreed to form a new joint operations room in the southern
Idlib, in an attempt to stop Syrian Arab Army’s advances in the region. The operations room will reportedly consist of; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, Turkistan Islamic Party, Jund al-Malahim, Jaysh al-Ahrar, Jaysh al-Izza, Jaysh al-Nasr, Free Idlib Army, Harakat Nour al-Deen al-Zenki, Jaysh al-Nukhba, Al-Jaysh al-Thani, and Ajnad al-Kavkat. For now, formation of the operations room wasn’t officially announced. (Editor’s Note – Apparently conflict between HDNZ and HTS was resolved over the break, but it remains unclear how effective this operaitons room will actually be as these organizations tend to fight battles individually since no one group is willing to cede authority of its fighters to any other. Additionally, it’s unclear what relationship it will have with the FSA or the newly announced intent to create a National Army of FSA organizations, see below for more details. End Note)
o VBIED exploded near the Idlib Central Prison on the road between Idlib and Salqin. Three guards of the prison belonging to the Syrian Salvation Government were wounded by the explosion.
Deir al-Zour:
o Syrian Democratic Forces announced in a statement killing of the Islamic State’s Hussein Abu al-Walid, who is responsible for the planning of the twin bombing of Qamishli on the 27 of July 2016, which killed at least 65 individuals and wounded dozens more. Islamic State’s Amaq Agency claimed responsibility for the bombings by announcing that the explosions targeted Asayish (security forces) headquarters.
o SDF‘s statement states that Abu al-Walid initially joined Jabhat al-Nusra (now Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), before defecting to the Islamic State in 2013. After defecting, Al-Walid received leadership position as an official of Al-Hisbah forces for several regions. Al-Walid then moved to Al-Raqqa, as one of the Islamic State’s “princes” and he was in charge of planning suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices’ attacks against civilians, according to the SDF‘s statement. After SDF took control of Al-Raqqa, Al-Walid fled to Deir al-Zour governorate. SDF located Al-Walid in Al-Basira village and conducted an operation on the 10th of October 2017, which led to the killing of Al-Walid.
Damascus:
Figure 2 - Approximate situation in the southern Idlib – northern Hama region, HD version of this map can be found here. Source: Qasioun News Agency. As downloaded from the associated article link 02 January 2018 at 10:44 (GMT+1)
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o Syrian Arab Air Force targeted Madyara, Harasta, Arbeen, and Mesraba in the East Ghouta.
o Ahrar al-Sham launched a new attack against Syrian Arab Army’s positions in ‘Army Armored Vehicle Base’ (Vehicle Department/Management) and Technical Institute in Harasta. The attack started with a tunnel bomb in the vicinity of the ‘Army Armored Vehicle Base’ on Arbeen axis. During today’s clashes, Ahrar al-Sham allegedly killed more than 20 elements of mostly the Syrian Republican Guard, as well as of the Syrian Arab Army. Director of the Vehicle Department and Syrian Arab Army’s Major General Hassan al-Kurdi was wounded in today’s clashes, along with Brigadier General Mohsen Baiti.
o Reports suggest that Ahrar al-Sham is in control of the majority of the ‘Army Armored Vehicle Base’ (Vehicle Department/Management), while the SAA‘s elements are besieged in Rahba 446 and Technical Institute areas. According to the reports, around 350 elements of the Syrian Republican Guard and Syrian Arab Army are currently besieged, as the SAA is attempting to lift the siege through the tunnels and by sending reinforcements to the city of Harasta.
o Rebel Police Command of Damascus and its countryside reported death of one of its elements in the East Ghouta. (Editor’s Note – See below for more detail on the situation in East Ghout. End Note)
o Evacuation agreement between the rebel faction in Beit Jinn pocket and Syrian Arab Army was frozen due to rebel factions not complying with it. Rebel factions still hold their position in Al-Talawul al-Humur area, from where they agreed to withdraw in the agreement. Rebels also reportedly refuse to withdraw from Sheikh Abdullah shrine, which has significance to the Druze community. According to the agreement between the two parties, the last batch of rebels was supposed to be evacuated after the rebels handed over Al-Talawul al-Humur and withdrew from Sheikh Abdullah shrine.
(Editor’s Note - Additional reporting suggests that HTS was behind efforts to upset the agreement and delay evacuation. There is more detail below, but the status of the evacuation remains unclear. End Note) Daraa:
o Two Free Syrian Army’s factions, Liwa Shuhada Inkhil and Al-Wiyat Mujahidi Hawran clashed in the city of Simlin, near Inkhil. The clashes erupted when Liwa Shuhada Inkhil entered Simlin in search of Yasser al-Badieah, leader of Al-Wiyat Mujahidi Hawran, who is accused of executing Liwa Shuhada Inkhil’s leader Zahir al-Zamil yesterday.
Figure 3 - Approximate situation in Harasta, depicting Ahrar al-Sham’s siege on SAA-held parts of ‘Army Armored Vehicle Base’ and Technical Institute, HD version of this map can be found here. Source: Qasioun News Agency. As downloaded from the associated article link 02 January 2018 at 10:44 (GMT+1)
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Liwa Shuhada Inkhil declared Simlin as a military zone and asked civilians to leave it. Curfew was announced in the nearby Inkhil, as the clashes between the two factions continue.
o Islamic State-linked Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid attempted to infiltrate positions of the Free Syrian Army’s Liwa al-Karama in the city of Al-Muzayrib. However, elements of Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid were targeted by Liwa al-Karama’s improvised explosive device, which killed six and wounded 10 fighters.
SOHR - With 1939 casualties…December ends with the least monthly death toll during 2017 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented the death of 1939 persons in December 2017, and the death toll is as follows:
o Civilian casualties: 700 people including 178 children under the age of eighteen, and 130 women over the age of eighteen, and they were killed as follows:
456 including 132 children and 92 citizen women were killed in raids by Syrian and Russian warplanes and by regime’s helicopters on several areas of Syria.
66 including 13 children and 8 citizen women were killed in shelling by the regime forces using rocket and artillery shells, missiles believed to be ground-to-ground, targeting and sniper bullets.
3 citizens were killed under torture in Syrian security prisons. 13 including 2 children and 3 citizen woman were killed in targeting and the
fall of mortar shells launched by the rebel and Islamic factions. 2 citizens were killed by the fire of the Turkish border guards. 5 citizens were executed by the “Islamic State” organization. 47 including 12 children and 10 citizen women were killed in airstrikes by the
warplanes of the International Coalition. 22 citizens including 4 children and 8 women were killed in the detonating of
cars and booby trapped vehicles. 1 citizen was killed by the factions. 55 including 3 children and 6 citizen women were killed in landmine
explosions. 25 including 10 children and a citizen woman were killed in unknown
circumstances. 5 citizens including 2 children and 2 citizen women died due to bad healthy
conditions and the absence of necessary treatment. o Syrian fighters of Islamic and repel factions and the SDF and other movement s and
organizations: 406 o The regime forces: 191 o Members of the Popular Committees, and the National Defense Forces, and
militiamen loyal to the regime forces of Syrian nationalities: 235 o Fighters of the Lebanese Hezbollah: 13 o Fighters of militiamen loyal to the regime of non-Syrian nationalities mostly of Shiite
people: 79 o Unknown people: 8
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o Fighters of Islamic and repel factions and ISIS and Nusra Front (Qaeda organization of the Levant), and Mujahedeen and al-Ansar Army and Islamic Turkestan Party of non-Syrian nationalities: 307
We in the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, reiterates our calls for the international parties to do their utmost efforts to stop the bloodshed of the Syrian people, who faced tyranny and injustice to reach a state of justice, democracy, freedom and equality, as we the Syrian Observatory pledge to continue to monitor and document the massacres, violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against the Syrian people., in addition to the publication of statistics about them in order to stop the perpetration of these crimes, violations and atrocities against the Syrian people, and to refer the perpetrators of these violations to the concerned courts of the state, so as not to escape their punishment for the crimes they committed against the people who was and still dream of having a state of democracy, freedom, justice and equality for all the people of Syria. (Editor’s Note – The current death toll is in contrast to September 2017 at 3055, the highest death toll count when operations to recapture both Raqqa and Deir es Zor were ongoing. Unfortunately, as theSyrian Regime begins to contest for Idlib, these number will likely increase again, though overall, we’d expect a general decrease now that ISIS has lost most of its territory in the country. End Note)
Rojava –
Iraqi News - Syrian Interim government announces forming “National Army” The Syrian Interim Government, which has been formed by the Syrian opposition, announced forming the Syrian National Army, after many calls to unify the fragmented factions of the Free Syrian Army. Syria News reported, today, that the Syrian Interim Government – the alternative government of the Syrian opposition – announced forming the “Syrian National Army” that gathers all factions of the Free Syrian Army. (Editor’s Note – Like most similar initiatives before it, this one will likely fail as the Syrian Interim Government doesn’t have the authority that many of the local and regional factions do in establishing their militias and Free Army Factions. End Note)
Deir es Zor/Hasakah –
SOHR - Airstrikes target east of Deir Ezzor and casualties in executions, mine explosions and by unknown gunmen Deir Ezzor Province, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights learned that the “Islamic State” organization executed a woman from Shaqra village in the western Deir Ezzor, following her arrest months ago on charges of “insulting the god”, she was executed in one of the villages of the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor earlier, while 2 persons were killed by a mine explosion in Abu Hamam area in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, also a person was killed by unknown gunmen in al-Sh’aytat Desert , where they stole his money and then they killed him, while the International Coalition warplanes carried
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out airstrikes on areas at the outskirts of Gharanij town on the east bank of Euphrates River, amid information about the withdrawal of the Syria Democratic Forces from Hawi Hajin area, in order to make a room for the Organization’s members to withdraw from Gharanij town towards the villages remaining under the control of the organization on the east bank of the river. And the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights published yesterday that it monitored the daily military and field developments, in the east of the Euphrates River, in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, where the organization fights desperately to defense its presence in the area, and there are 5 villages and towns are fully controlled by the organization they are: Abu al-Hassan, Sha’afah, Susah, Al-Baghuz, Al-Bobadran and their districts, while there are 3 towns and villages are out of ISIS full control and they are: al-Bahra, Hajin and Gharanij, as the SDF control different parts in these 3 villages and towns, thus there are entire 5 villages and towns as well as parts of other 3 villages and towns still remaining under ISIS control, and the clashes are accompanied by exchange targeting and shelling on the clash areas, through which the SDF are trying to end the presence of the organization in the area, while it is noteworthy that this fighting and shelling which started again in early December 2017, due to a new attack carried out by the forces of “Al-Jazeera Storm” Operation, resulted in a new displacement towards the SDF-held areas and other areas far from the violent shelling and killing, and the SOHR monitored that the displaced people set up camps where they can stay until the end of the fighting or the control of the organization over their areas and towns- from which they have fled- ends. (Editor’s Note – As with Iraq, there appears to be three areas where ISIS still enjoys relative freedom of movement. The first is along a narrow tract of line lying on the Euphrates River from al Qaim in Iraq, northwest to Hajin. The second is along the Iraqi border between Deir es Zor and Hasakah Governorates. The last one is the mountainous terrain of southwestern Deir es Zor and eastern Homs Governorate. Also like in Iraq, ISIS maintains the ability to launch attacks from these areas into SDF and SAA-controlled areas of Syria. End Note)
Idlib/Hama/Aleppo
EYES ONLY - Al-Tamimi - Saraya al-Ra'ad: Idlib Local Defence Forces Affiliate Previously on this blog I have sought to explore the Iranian-backed Local Defence Forces (LDF) networks beyond Aleppo province (where it is most prominent), such as the Damascus LDF affiliate Saraya al-Wa'ad. There are also LDF affiliates with visible profiles in Hama province, such as Quwat al-Ghadab based in the Christian town of Suqaylabiyah. When I first wrote about Quwat al-Ghadab, I had not quite appreciated the LDF connection, though the description of it as part of 'Quwat al-Asdiqa" ('Forces of the Friends') became clearer to me over time in alluding to the Iranian role (more specifically, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- IRGC) in backing this group and other LDF units. Saraya al-Ra'ad is another LDF affiliate currently based in Hama but in fact is affiliated with the LDF Idlib sector. Although this point may seem confusing at first sight considering that Idlib is almost entirely in the hands of insurgents, an Idlib sector for the LDF was specified in legislation earlier this year regarding the LDF and military services. That is, that the government presence in a particular province may be/may have been limited does not mean no LDF sector was specified for it. A similar
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point has applied to Deir az-Zor province, where no LDF branch had been operating on the ground when I last inquired but an LDF sector was specified for it in the legislation. Currently, the LDF Idlib sector is led by an Iranian known by the name of al-Hajj Asghar. This should come as no surprise, considering that the head of the LDF Aleppo sector is Sayyid Jawad, a known figure in the IRGC. In fact, every sector of the LDF is led by an Iranian, though the exact names of these individuals are largely unknown at the present time. As is the case with Saraya al-Wa'ad, the group's name can be seen as a double entendre. For Saraya al-Ra'ad can be rendered as 'Brigades of Thunder', but the Ra'ad part can also refer to the group's leader, who goes by the name of Ra'ad Abu Ja'afar, originally from Hama but among the inhabitants of Latakia. Before the formation of Saraya al-Ra'ad, Ra'ad Abu Ja'afar was serving in the Syrian army, leading a contingent that was stationed in the northwest Idlib town of Jisr al-Shughur prior to its fall to the rebels in April 2015. This contingent had also fought in Aleppo, Zabadani, the al-Sha'er field in the Homs desert, and the Hama, Latakia and Idlib countrysides. During the battle of Jisr al-Shughur, Ra'ad Abu Ja'afar was wounded and lost his own car. As is often the case with formations in the Syrian civil war on all sides, personal connections play a role in determining the composition of Saraya al-Ra'ad. Many if not most of those in Saraya al-Ra'ad had previously served with Ra'ad Abu Ja'afar in the contingent that was stationed in Jisr al-Shughur. The groups that would come to form Saraya al-Ra'ad were first brought together on 12 December 2016 in the Slenfeh area of the Latakia countryside, after Ra'ad Abu Ja'afar had recovered from his injuries. Originally these groups under his military command came under Fawj Qamr Bani Hashim (aka Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thiqfi) as part of the Idlib LDF. Ra'ad Abu Ja'afar and his groups then split off from Fawj Qamr Bani Hashim to operate under the name of Saraya al-Ra'ad while still being a part of the Idlib LDF. Besides Ra'ad Abu Ja'afar, another figure of note in the group is Mazen Tahan who directs administrative affairs. As always when it comes to LDF groups, I inquired about the distinction between the LDF and the more familiar National Defence Forces (NDF). In this case, one answer was given as follows: "The difference is that the NDF are fighters on civilian contracts: that is, voluntary. As for LDF fighters, they are military personnel in the Syrian Arab Army undertaking military service and the national obligation." Thus, while the LDF has an affiliation with the IRGC, the NDF does not have this affiliation: "It [the NDF] has not been with the Revolutionary Guard [IRGC]. The Revolutionary Guard gave support only." A similar explanation offered here described the NDF as a "civilian" and "auxiliary" formation but not on the registers of the Syrian armed forces. It was explained that while the Iranians offered some financial support and training in Iran for some NDF units, the NDF is not affiliated with the IRGC. The LDF however has an affiliation with the IRGC while also being on the registers of the Syrian armed forces. As far as the areas of operations go, Saraya al-Ra'ad has fought in a number of places, including the Hama countryside, Palmyra, the desert border areas with Jordan and Iraq, and the key Deir az-Zor towns of Albukamal and al-Mayadeen. The next target is supposed to be Idlib. For members of Saraya al-Ra'ad, monthly salaries start at 50,000 Syrian pounds but may rise up to 100,000 Syrian pounds depending on type of assignment. In sum, the case of Saraya al-Ra'ad is important in illustrating how many of these 'Syrian Hezbollah/IRGC' groups have developed over time and originated. Instead of thinking of these groups as atomised entities, it is important to consider how they are being fitted or intended to be fitted into wider networks, above all the LDF. In the case of Idlib, what we see at least in part (as illustrated in
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the case of Saraya al-Ra'ad) is an Iranian reorganization of pro-government forces that had been based in the province and collapsed in the rebel offensive in spring 2015. For the longer term, the rise of the LDF shows the futility of calls to remove 'Iranian-backed militias' from Syria. Even if the Iranian-backed foreign formations like Lebanon's Hezbollah leave entirely, the LDF will remain in place, with many of its units aligned with Iran ideologically. The only real way to counter this development would be to remove the government in Damascus, which no one is seriously countenancing at this point. (Editor’s Note – Please see consolidated note under the article below, titled, EYES ONLY – al-Tamimi - Fawj al-Karbala'i: Republican Guard Affiliate. End Note)
The National - A new offensive on Idlib forces more to flee after tens of thousands have already gone; For tens of thousands on the move, the question is 'where to go?' An ongoing offensive by the Syrian government targeting the largest remaining piece of rebel-held territory in the country has displaced tens of thousands of people in recent weeks as winter weather sets in, and local officials say aid is scarcer than ever. Many of those on the move in northern Syria’s Idlib province have already moved multiple times to escape violence during the country's nearly seven-year-old civil war. They say intense Syrian and Russian airstrikes have caused much of the recent wave of displacement. Russia has been supporting the government of Syrian president Bashar Al Assad since 2015, and after largely defeating ISIL in eastern Syria in recent months, Mr Al Assad and his allies have turned their attention towards the rebels that control most of Idlib. Largely rural, Idlib borders Turkey to its north and was one of the first places where rebels took over significant swathes of territory. Most local aid groups estimate that there are more than 200,000 displaced people in the province. “People are very afraid the regime with the help of Russia might storm Idlib, which contains huge numbers of civilians,” said Ali Abu Hussein, a refugee living in a camp called Al Qatra that he said houses about 700 families. “Were shall we go? We can't think of going to Turkey; the border is closed.” Read more: Syrian government forces claim victories in Idlib offensive. Mr Abu Hussein is from Qasr Shawi, a village in eastern Hama province near the border with Idlib. He said all of the approximately 100 families from his village had left in mid-November, when the government captured the area. The 37-year-old farmer and father of three children said his family had moved multiple times since then. “Every time we flee to one area, the regime advances to that area and then we move again,” he said. Near-freezing temperature are common in Idlib during the winter. Local groups provide aid on an ad hoc basis. On Tuesday, Mr Abu Hussein said a local aid group had delivered food, mattresses and clothes, while another had brought some food and coal. “We are in danger of moving again at any moment. There are already some families in this camp who are leaving towards other camps at the border, even as others arrive at this camp.” Rayyan Al Ahmad, a representative of local governing councils in eastern Hama, said that while he was visiting Qatra Camp on Monday, 15 new families arrived from other areas. Mr Al Ahmad said that after delivering some medicine to families in Qatra, he continued on to Atmeh, a camp that sits directly on the Turkish border. Established in 2012, it is Idlib’s largest camp, with the lowest estimates putting its population at more than 50,000 people. “People told me, ‘We want to go to Turkey. We will throw ourselves at the border and let them kill us. We won’t stay if the regime advances',”
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Mr Al Ahmad said. “Others told me, ‘We will continue to fight until we die, rather than surrender'.” “Many people have started to move from the southern part of Idlib province to the city of Idlib,” said Mohammed Katoub, a spokesman for the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), which helps run dozens of medical facilities in the area. Katoub said SAMS staff estimated at least 30,000 people had moved since the offensive began two weeks ago, with the trend accelerating in recent days. “The main issue, as usual, is shelter. The governorate is already overloaded with IDPs [internally displaced people],” Mr Katoub said, though he also noted that the bombardment made the work of doctors more difficult and that some basic medical services had been suspended, including a vaccination campaign. “We have had two attacks on health facilities in the north in the last 48 hours,” he said. Because of its border with Turkey, whose government has provided military and political support to the rebellion, international aid has regularly reached Idlib. But Muhammed Jafa, a local co-ordinator for aid efforts, said the amount of available supplies had dropped off in recent months. “Some Qatari organisation have stopped their activity after the Gulf Crisis,” Mr Jafa said, noting that the prolonged nature of the conflict had left many people unable to support themselves. “There are large numbers of orphans and the handicapped who don’t have anyone to help them.” Mr Jafa said that the presence of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, a rebel umbrella organisation that is the strongest faction in Idlib, has also affected aid. Some groups within Tahrir Al Sham have links to Al Qaeda. “Some organisations have restricted their activities to the minimum while others have stopped completely,” Mr Jafa said. He said that despite the fighting, people fleeing the Syrian government were still arriving in Idlib from other parts of the country as well, either to join family in Idlib or because of fear of retribution by government forces. “Every day, about 150 families reach the north of Syria coming from the east,” Mr Jafa said, referring to areas that were recently recaptured by the government. “We are also receiving Iraqis. We have about 8,000 Iraqi refugees in our areas. They say they are escaping [militias] due to the sectarian conflict in Iraq.” (Editor’s Note – The Regime is still effectively fighting ISIS in Deir es Zor, so this doesn’t appear to be the final offensive for Idlib, but this article indicates that when it occurs, there it will cause a major humanitarian disaster given the manner in which the Regime and Russian-led Coalition ahs been fighting elsewhere in Syria. End Note)
The Syrian Intifada - The Continuing Syrian Efforts to Resist Jihadism A recording was leaked on 28 November of a Syrian cleric, Abdul Halim al-Atwan, giving a lecture to Syrians in Idlib, condemning the current leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the descendant of al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusra, for having distorted and destroyed the Syrian rebellion by infecting it with extremism and intra-insurgent fighting. Al-Atwan, the uncle of HTS leading shar’i Abdurraheem Atun (Abu Abdallah al-Shami), notes that al-Nusra intruded into Syria as a wing of the Islamic State in 2011. This is only a small demonstration of the continued resistance among Syria’s armed opposition to being co-opted by the HTS jihadists. Al-Atwan was a member of HTS after its announcement in February, but left in March 2017. In his resignation notification, al-Atwan said it was haram (forbidden) to join HTS, though he was simultaneously very critical of Ahrar al-Sham. In his November statement, al-Atwan says:
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“Who brought us to this cramped pass that we are in? Who brought us to this? Who? The Khawarij and the extremists. Okay. The Khawarij and the extremists. Represented by whom? The Dawaesh. Who else? A part of [Jabhat] al-Nusra. A part of al-Hay’at and al-Nusra. Oh youths, the day Jabhat al-Nusra was formed, [its leader, Ahmad al-Shara, better known as Abu Muhammad] al-Jolani had a bay’a [pledge of allegiance] on his neck to [Ibrahim al-Badri, the so-called caliph of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr] al-Baghdadi, making al-Baghdadi the emir of al-Jolani. There is no doubt about this; this is a fact. The son of my brother, Abdurraheem [Atun], has on his neck a bay’a to al-Baghdadi through [the late spokesman of the Islamic State, Taha Falaha, a.k.a. Abu Muhammad] al-Adnani. Let them try to refute these words. The son of my brother, Abdurraheem Atun, he has a bay’a to al-Baghdadi, and through whom? Through al-Adnani. Al-Baghdadi sent al-Jolani into Syria with a very, very dirty task.”
Exactly two weeks before, Syrian opposition activists produced a video, documenting eleven rebel groups that al-Nusra/HTS has attacked and/or destroyed, which include some of the most formidable units, as well as those that were most attractive to international actors looking to assist the rebel cause. The eleven groups were: 1. Jabhat Thuwar al-Suriya (The Syrian Revolutionaries’ Front) 2. Jabhat Haq al-Muqatila [a U.S.-backed unit from Hama] 3. Jabhat Thabat al-Muqaatala 4. Alwiya Abu al-Almeen 5. Liwa Assabi Quwwat al-Khasa 6. Harakat Hazm (The Steadfastness Movement) 7. Division Thirty (a.k.a. The New Syrian Army) 8. Jaysh al-Mujahideen 9. Tajamu Fastaqim Kamr Umrat 10. Kataib Thuwar al-Sham 11. Harakat Nooradeen al-Zengi The list could also have included Kataib al-Safwa al-Islamiyya, Division Thirteen, and a number of others. The above is a partial demonstration that, in political terms, there has probably never been so much rebel antagonism toward HTS. Alongside this in the “Greater Idlib” area, as Haid Haid explained recently, a civil society continues to exist, a daily act of resistance to HTS’s attempts to subsume a rebellion against autocracy into its dark program for theocracy and tyranny. With Turkey’s intervention in Idlib, there is the potential to weaponize this discontent. However, the broader dynamic of a de facto acceptance by the “international community” that Bashar al-Asad, propped up by Iran’s Shi’a jihadists and sectarian militias, will remain in Syria, leaves the anti-regime struggle in the hands of al-Qaeda and its offshoots, a lifeline they are only too aware of. The expulsion of the Islamic State from most of eastern Syria and the attempt to replace it with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which might yet result in the return of the regime, is also providing new opportunities for HTS and other Islamist militants in areas that were previously inaccessible to them. (Editor’s Note – This article provides excellent insight into the various factions fighting in Idlib and their relationship
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with HTS, who is the lead extremist group there. It’s also important to note that other Muslims in Idlib have condemned HTS’s actions and are working to mitigate their power in the Governorate. It’s unclear why al Atwan resigned but with statements like this, he was probably in danger from HTS. End Note)
Homs – Nothing Significant to Report
Rif Dimashq/Damascus Diplomatic & Economic –
The Syrian Intifada - Syria’s Rebels Reject the Russian-Organized “Peace” Conference in Sochi The Syrian opposition released a statement on 25 December 2017 making official its rejection of the upcoming Sochi conference, which, overseen by the Russian government, is intended to continue shaping the terms of a settlement in Syria. A translation of the statement was made by TNT and is reproduced below.
“In the name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful, After its first failed attempt to convene the Sochi Conference to circumvent the Geneva process and international decisions, Russia stated at the recent Astana conference that it would convene the Sochi Conference and invite the opposition and the regime, and added that that it is necessary to give up the demand for the departure of the criminal [Bashar] al-Asad regime. We reject this, and affirm that Russia is an aggressor country that has committed war crimes against the Syrians, as recognized by many international bodies and organizations, including the crime of using chemical weapons. The international community must hold Russia accountable. It has stood with the regime militarily and defended it politically throughout the seven years [of the uprising], and played the role of crippling the [United Nations] Security Council, opposing decisions to condemn al-Asad and his regime by using its veto more than ten times. Likewise, [Russia] falsely claims to be fighting terrorism in Syria, but in fact it fought the Syrian people, destroyed their cities, killed their women and children, expelled millions of our sons, and supported the criminal regime in [its campaign of] bombing, besieging, killing, and expulsion. Russia did not contribute a single step to easing the suffering of the Syrians. It did not exert even a fingertip of pressure on the regime that it claims to be a guarantor for to press toward any real course for a solution. Based on the above, we confirm the following: First, our commitment to the path of a political solution, according to the [30 June 2012] Geneva One Declaration [that calls for the formation of an interim government based on “mutual consent” between the opposition and regime], [U.N. Security Council] Resolutions 2118 and 2254, and related international resolutions. Second, our total rejection of Russia’s attempts to circumvent the Geneva process and the international resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.
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Third, our absolute rejection of the conference that Russia seeks to convene in Sochi [in January 2018] and the invitees for which it is setting preconditions. Fourth, we affirm that the release of detainees, the lifting of the sieges on the besieged areas, and articles 12, 13, and 14 of Resolution 2254 are due obligations, not issues of negotiation or extortion. Fifth, we call on the international community, international organizations, and the Security Council to protect the Syrian people from their executioners and to stop this massacre that has been going on for more than six years. Finally, in light of what our people are subjected to by way of injustice, targeting, and weakness, we call on all revolutionary forces and actors to stand united in the face of these surrounding threats and to be responsible and carry the trust that the heroes of this revolution—from among our martyrs, detainees, and the general public of our great people—have left for us. May we live free and dignified, Ahrar al-Sham Al-Firqa al-Awal al-Sahiliya Al-Firqa al-Shamaliya Al-Majlis al-Askari fi al-Rastan Tajamu Ahrar al-Sharqiya Tajami Quwwat al-Shahid Ahmad al-Abdo Jaysh Usud al-Sharqiya Harakat Nooradeen al-Zengi Firqat Usud al-Sunna Liwa Ansar al-Sunna Liwa Sultan Sulayman Shah Jaysh al-Thani Fawj al-Awal (The First Battalion) Firqat al-Tasiah Tajamu Adl Jaysh Idlib al-Hur (Free Idlib Army) Jaysh al-Islam Liwa Fursan Horan Liwa al-Huriya al-Islamiyya Liwa Tahrir Deir Ezzor Jabhat al-Shamiya (The Levant Front) Liwa 51 Tajamu al-Quwa 21 Jaysh al-Izza Jaysh al-Nukhba (The Elite Army) Jaysh Homs Faylaq al-Rahman Liwa Ansar al-Umari Liwa al-Mutassem Saiqa al-Janub
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Firqat 23 Liwa al-Khamis Tajamu Fastaqim Jaysh al-Nasr Jaysh al-Sharqiya Jund al-Malahim Fawj al-Mustafa Liwa Suqur al-Shamal Mughawir al-Thawra Quwaat al-Hazm”
(Editor’s Note – While many thought that the reconfigured Syrian opposition would be more amenable to a peace process, even sponsored by Moscow, that opinion has quickly been proven wrong. This announcement comes after the Regime negotiating party left Geneva after 1 day last month when the Opposition demanded that Assad have nothing to do with the reconstruction of Syria. Unfortunately, Putin has already declared victory in Syria and consequently, the Astana process will likely continue as it has before with Russia, Turkey and Iran making unilateral declarations, and then enforcing them on the ground in Syria. End Note)
Kurdistan 24 - Assad shuffles key cabinet positions as first move of the New Year Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on Monday appointed new ministers to the defense, industry, and information portfolios, according to state television. The new appointees are more in line with Assad and his regime, including General Ali Abdullah Ayub, the new defense minister who was previously a chief of staff in the army and is a member of Assad’s Alawite sect. The new information minister previously headed Syria radio and television, another move indicating Assad is preparing for the post-Islamic State (IS) transition period as the military campaign slows down. The shake-up of senior government positions comes as peace talks are ramping up and the regime’s battlefield victories anti-Assad rebels and the jihadist group consolidate. The Syrian President, however, is increasingly having to deal with the Kurdish question in the northeast of the country. The commander of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria last week said that Moscow had promised Kurds in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan) that they would be represented at peace talks on Syria to be held next month in Russia. Gen. Sipan Hemo explained that Russia had said that 155 representatives from that area would be invited to attend the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, scheduled for Jan. 29-30 in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. Plans to hold the conference were announced on Dec. 22 as the eighth round of talks on Syria ended in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Astana negotiations have been sponsored by Russia, Iran, and Turkey over the past year. The Turkish President, since then, seems to have changed his position on helping the embattled Syrian government. Earlier in December, Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations, had also declared that the US and Turkish troops should pull out of his country “immediately and unconditionally.” (Editor’s Note – It appears that Assad removed the Minsiters of defense and Informaiton for specific reasons. SOHR reports that Defense Minister Fahd Jassim Al-Farij, was forced to leave office after he failed to restore control of his hometown in the countryside of
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Hama. Assad fired Mohammed Tourjeman, Minister of Information, for the apparently accidental inclusion of Jonathan Spyer, who holds dual British and Israeli citizenship on the tour, Haaretz - Report: Assad Fires Minister for Allowing Israeli Journalist to Tour Syria; Jonathan Spyer, a British-Israeli dual citizen, went on government sponsored tour of government held areas of the country last spring. Though it’s unclear why he fired the Minister of Industry, these firings appear to have been done with purpose beyond a simple consolidation of power. End Note)
SOHR - The factions’ attack continue violently in Vehicle Department and near Harasta city with the arrival of reinforcement to the factions and the death toll rises to at least 100 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights:: the regime forces continue their artillery and missile shelling targeting the Eastern Ghouta of Damascus, where they fired missiles believed to be ground-to-ground and artillery shells on areas in Harasta city and other areas in its vicinity, in conjunction with violent battles between the regime forces and their allied militiamen against fighters of Hayyaat Tahrir Al-Sham and Ahrar Islamic Movement and Al-Rahman Corps in the vicinity of Vehicle Department and near the governorate building near Harasta city, where the factions seek to expand their control in the area and control the Vehicle Department and the governorate building in order to further secure the Eastern Ghouta and Harasta and let the fighters become free for new operations against the regime forces. This control will allow the factions to open new fronts near the vicinity of the capital Damascus, amid information obtained by the SOHR about the arrival of reinforcement of the regime forces to the area to back up the operations against the violent attacks of the factions, in an attempt to begin rebel attack to restore what they have lost and break the siege of the Vehicle Department. The SOHR monitored heavy targeting and violent battles between the regime forces backed by their allied militiamen against Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar Al-Sham and Al-Rahman Corps in the fronts of the province building and Vehicle Department , while the explosions are still rocking the area resulting from heavy and ongoing shelling. The clashes and shelling left more human losses of civilians and fighters and members of the regime forces, where it rose to at least 30, the number of the regime forces and their allied militiamen who took part in these clashes since the beginning of the attack on the 29th of December 2017 including a brigadier and other officers, while it rose to 34, the number of fighters of the factions including fighter of Gulf nationality who blew himself up in a booby trapped vehicle, also tens of both parties were injured with varying severity including officers of the regime forces, while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitored in the same period the death of 36 citizens including 9 children and 3 citizen women, who were killed due to the aerial, artillery and rocket shelling on cities and town in the Eastern Ghouta since the day before yesterday, and the casualties are 22 citizens including 6 children, 2 citizen women and a male nurse, they were killed in raids by the warplanes on areas in Harasta city controlled by the Islamic movement of Ahrar Al-Sham and raids on Madyara town, and 14 citizens including 3 children and a citizen woman were killed by artillery and rocket shelling targeted areas in Harasta and Hamuriya cities as well as the towns of Kafr Batna, Mesraba, Al-Nashabiyah and Otaya, and the aerial and artillery shelling left tens of casualties and wounded included a large number of children and citizen women, and the number of casualties may increase because
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of the presence of serious injuries. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights yesterday that it monitored the factions being enable to besiege the Vehicle Department, amid continuous violent attack in an attempt by Hayyaat Tahrir al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham and Rahman Corps to achieve more advancement, following the advancement of Rahman Corps in Arbin area, while both of Hayyaat Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham have advanced in al-Ajami area and surrounded the regime forces inside the Vehicle Department, after closing by firearm the remaining distance between the advancement of both parties; to prevent the regime forces from entering supplies or withdrawing of it. (Editor’s Note - Fortunately, the 29 critical medical cases have been evacuated from East Ghouta, but fighting has resumed, in particular around the Vehicle Department. As previously assessed, source reporting indicates that the Vehicle Department served as a major storage area for food and supplies that the Rebels had sought to control in an effort to gain needed supplies. It’s unclear if those supplies are still there or have been removed at this point, but the location continues to be high value terrain for both sides. End Note)
Southern Syira –
EYES ONLY – al-Tamimi - Fawj al-Karbala'i: Republican Guard Affiliate The elite Republican Guard is one of the main actors on the government side in the Syrian civil war that set up auxiliary formations. Prominent examples include the Popular Defense Forces (Quwat al-Difa' al-Sha'abi) primarily based in the Qalamoun area near the border with Lebanon and Liwa Sayf al-Haq, whose base is in the Sayyida Zainab area but has operated in the Qalamoun area. The Republican Guard has also aimed to extend its reach into towns where it might compete with other formations for influence, such as the 'reconciled' Damascus countryside town of al-Tal. Fawj al-Karbala'i (The Karbala'i Regiment), named for its leader who goes by the name of al-Hajj Abu Ali al-Karbala'i, is a group that has most recently come under the Republican Guard umbrella of 'Ittihad Jaysh al-Asha'ir (Union of the Army of the Tribes). It should be noted that a Jaysh al-Asha'ir (Army of the Tribes) was also set up by the Republican Guard for the southern province of Dera'a in December 2017. According to a source from Fawj al-Karbala'i, the group was established in 2014. Its engagements have so far included the areas of Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Deir az-Zor. Although the name of al-Karbala'i (of Karbala', the Shi'i holy city in Iraq) may be taken to suggest that the group's leader is from Iraq, he is in fact Syrian. Based on the name he has assumed and various photos of him, he is likely Syrian Shi'i. Prior to the existence of a meaningful profile of Fawj al-Karbala'i on social media, some references to the group turn up on pro-government pages that feature posts alleging corruption and criminal behavior. One of the figures these posts focus on is Wahib Saqr, a Syrian army general originally from Jableh who was killed fighting the Islamic State in east Aleppo countryside and earned the nickname 'Saqr Halab' (Hawk of Aleppo) for his role in the fighting there. One of these posts from January 2017, for example, denounces Wahib Saqr as the "hero of fictional battles...and the king of plundering and acts of theft," alleging that he engaged in such actions in Aleppo, Khan al-'Assal (west Aleppo countryside) and Deir az-Zor. The post mentions his alleged "dealing in sugar, cigarettes, rice and flour," which appears to refer to the war profiteering that
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developed out of the extended Islamic State siege of government-held areas of Deir az-Zor. These actions are said to have been carried out to the detriment of the "heroes of the air college" in Aleppo who "have been continuing day and night in working on strengthening the lines of defense with the minimum means and available individual weapons." For context, "the air college" refers to the area of Kweiris airbase to the east of Aleppo city, about which more below. Among the alleged thieves working for Wahib Saqr, the post alleges, is the "leader of a so-called group, al-Hajj Abu Ali al-Karbala'i, the one called Abu Firas (Muhammad al-Meqdad): for he and his group are responsible for cutting up olive trees and stealing the property of citizens in the villages that have been liberated." A similar post from December 2016 calls him Abu Firas al-Der'awi (suggesting he is originally from Dera'a), describing him as "leader of the al-Karbala'i group, and it is a group comprising many thieves...and the greatest calamity is that this group is located within the points of protecting Kweiris military airbase," which was besieged by the Islamic State until November 2015, when Syrian government forces backed by Iranian and Russian allies broke the siege. Wahib Saqr is said to have been one of the leaders of the campaign to break the siege, meeting his son Ala' who had been among the besieged personnel in the airbase. However, operations after breaking the siege were primarily confined to protecting the periphery of the airbase, as the focus shifted to retaking Aleppo city in its entirety. Once that had been completed by December 2016, attention turned towards recapturing the remaining eastern Aleppo countryside from the declining Islamic State, partly aiming to block further advances by the Turkish-backed 'Euphrates Shield' group of rebels. In relation to the campaign pushing into the eastern Aleppo countryside, a post from February 2017 mentions acts of plundering by some groups linked to Wahib Saqr and other groups claiming affiliation with Suhail al-Hasan's Tiger Forces. Among the former is the "al-Karbala'i group led by a person from Dera'a, a traitor to the homeland." The result of the plundering is that "people have begun raising their hands and saying: if only they had not been liberated" in reference to the countryside areas east of Aleppo. It is difficult to come by information on Wahib Saqr's involvement in operations prior to the Aleppo theatre in 2015-2017, where it appears he was particularly close to the Arab Nationalist Guard. While Fawj al-Karbala'i's deployment to the periphery of Kweiris airbase is corroborated, the source from Fawj al-Karbala'i denied that Abu Ali al-Karbala'i is from Dera'a. Rather, he is a doctor from Homs. The source also affirmed that Fawj al-Karbala'i had been working with the Republican Guard from the outset of its formation. From one post, it is evident that Fawj al-Karbala'i has been linked with the Popular Defence Forces. 'Ittihad Jaysh al-Asha'ir was formed in October 2017. Under Republican Guard leadership, the conglomeration most notably includes Fawj al-Karbala'i and a group led by Sheikh Tamam al-Tarkawi, who appears to have been involved with air intelligence. Posts on the establishment of 'Ittihad Jaysh al-Asha'ir also mention a leadership role for one al-Hajj Khalid (Abu Hussein), who is better known as the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked group called Liwa al-Baqir. Included as part of these posts are photos that include Abu Ali al-Karbala'i and al-Hajj Khalid as well as Jum'a al-Ahmad, another prominent figure in Liwa al-Baqir. All that said, the source from Fawj al-Karbala'i said that "al-Baqir has no relation with Jaysh al-Asha'ir," presumably referring to Liwa al-Baqir as a formation. 'Ittihad Jaysh al-Asha'ir offers a monthly salary of 50,000 Syrian pounds, with recruitment open for people from ages 18-42, including those wanted for military and reserve service and those who evaded the draft or
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deserted, for whom there is the possibility of taswiyat al-wad' if they have not committed a crime of murder. 'Ittihad Jaysh al-Asha'ir does not accept military personnel on active duty. The schedule operates according to 15 days of work and 15 days of rest each month. The group's base is in Damascus at Governorate Square. Since its inception, 'Ittihad Jaysh al-Asha'ir's most notable campaign has been in the eastern region, including the Albukamal area. At the present time though, focus has shifted towards the Hama-Idlib front where intense fighting is taking place, reflecting a wider withdrawal of forces (including foreign militias) that participated in the campaign to retake the eastern regions from the Islamic State. Indeed, there has been an extensive mobilization of forces for the Hama and Idlib countryside campaigns. Meanwhile, the Syrian army and local militias seeking new recruits have mostly been left to hold ground in Deir az-Zor, with a small Hezbollah presence remaining as well. The turn of many forces back towards the west has created problems as the Islamic State has not fully lost territorial control in the province. As the leader of Liwa al-Imam Zain al-Abidin who is currently in Deir az-Zor put it to me: "In the Albukamal countryside, we have martyrs daily in the areas [we] control, especially after the withdrawal of the Nimr [Suhail al-Hassan] and his forces and the withdrawal of Liwa al-Quds who have headed towards Idlib...there is only a small number [of the allied forces: Hezbollah, Iraqi factions etc.]. Currently the goal is to preserve the areas the army has seized." As Hassan Hassan has argued, much of the eastern campaign on both sides (i.e. government and allies on one hand and Syrian Democratic Forces with U.S. coalition on the other) has focused on flag placing and claiming seizure of territory before proper control was asserted. The result is that we still have an active Islamic State insurgency in the border areas. By now there are multiple auxiliary formations that focus on recruitment of tribesmen, such as the Forces of the Fighters of the Tribes and the Sha'itat Brigade that are affiliated with the military intelligence. Fawj al-Nabi al-Akram, which originated in the Syrian Hezbollah Liwa al-Imam al-Mahdi and developed links with the 'Da'esh Hunters,' also featured tribal fighters among its 'martyrs' in the push towards the east. The group even took an alternative name of Kata'ib al-Hashd al-Asha'ir [al-Bakara] 313 (Battalions of the Mobilization of the Tribes: [al-Bakara] 313) in addition to the old name of Kata'ib al-Imam al-Ali. Indeed, the group's commander- Ayub Abd al-Sheikh, aka Abu Azzam- was killed in Deir az-Zor in autumn 2017. He was originally from the al-Zuhur neighborhood of al-Hasakah city, and had the nickname of 'Jaguar of the al-Bakara,' in reference to the al-Bakara tribe that dwells in al-Hasakah and Aleppo provinces (in the latter case forming the foundation of Liwa al-Baqir). In a similar vein, leader of Liwa al-Imam Zain al-Abidin tells me that in coordination with al-Hajj Azra'il of Lions of the Eternal Leader, he would like to set up an initiative called Quwat Abna' al-Furat (Forces of the Sons of the Euphrates), focusing on tribal recruitment. The initiative may end up being supported by Hezbollah or the military intelligence. For his part, the source from Fawj al-Karbala'i says his group has recruited in particular from the tribes of the central and eastern regions of Syria. The concept of tribal dynamics does not of course play a central role in every part of Syria, but it is clear the government and its allies considers tribes to be potentially useful for creating local holding and offensive forces in areas of Syria where they matter. (Editor’s Note – In an attempt to gain clarity into the various militia operating in Syria and determine their areas of operations and allegiances, we’ve reached out to the author to see if he can recommend any articles or has a consolidated document which may facilitate understanding of these groups and their
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motivations. He’s already responded to our initial email which shows that he’s seen the request. While we’ve received positive responses from him in the past, this is a we’ve asked a hell of a question, so we don’t know what, if any response we’ll get. Of course, we’ll pass it along if/when we receive something. End Note)
Gulf News - Syria rebels set to depart enclave in south Syrian rebels prepared to evacuate an enclave in southwestern Syria on Friday in a surrender deal with the government, state media said, as the army thrust into the northwest — the insurgents’ main remaining stronghold. Regime forces and allied Shiite militias have forced numerous rebel pockets to surrender since Russia brought in heavy air power to help them in 2015, pushing the insurgents into an ever smaller number of enclaves. Fighters and their families started to leave Beit Jin, 40 kilometres southwest of Damascus, on Friday after losing nearby areas to the army and its allies in heavy fighting earlier this month, state television reported. Some were heading to Idlib in the northwest, others to rebel territory in the southwest held by nationalist insurgents. Beit Jin’s location near Israeli-occupied territory made it a strategic flashpoint given the role of Hezbollah — Israel’s sworn enemy — in fighting the rebels there. (Editor’s Note – It appears that there has been a delay in the evacuation as fighting has caused Syrian forces to temporarily suspend it. More to follow as it develops. End Note)
Regional Conflicts – Return to Top
Saudi Arabia/Iran –
MEMRI – Popular Uprising Against the Iranian Regime and Its Policy –2017 The current popular unrest in Iran against the regime began in Tehran on December 27, 2017 in the form of economic protests against the high cost of living, but rapidly spread throughout the country while acquiring a political dimension of protest against the Islamic Revolution regime and especially against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, against the regime's policy in Syria, Gaza and Lebanon, against the religious establishment and in favor of political and social freedom. For a MEMRI TV clip of the protests, click here. The most striking feature of the protests is that they are taking place throughout the country. Young people are demonstrating in the streets, in universities, and in front of police stations and regime institutions, while calling out anti-regime slogans such as "death to the dictator" "death to Khamenei" and burning pictures of Khamenei and of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' (IRGC) Qods Force, who is in charge of implementing Iran's policy outside the country, in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Gaza. The protestors are also chanting slogans in favor of freedom and social and political rights. It should be noted that their protest is also directed at the reformist camp, which they accuse of playing along with the regime. On Friday December 29, the regime deployed armed forces in the capital
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Tehran to prevent protests on the day of prayer, but prominent protests took place elsewhere, mainly in Kermanshah and other cities, and were violently dispersed by the regime. According to official reports, on Saturday, December 30, three protesters were killed in the city of Dorud in the west of the country (unauthorized sources put the figure at six killed); the regime claimed that protesters had not been killed by its forces but rather by "agents." Reports claimed that anti-regime protests in Ahwaz in southwestern Iran, a region populated by a large Arab minority, were attended by 50,000 people. The demonstrations across Iran, which have taken place at all hours but especially in the afternoons and evenings, have no known leadership, which makes it more difficult for the regime to fight them. Notices announcing the place and time of the protests in each city are posted on social media - https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DSVPnRXV4AAjGhO.jpg. In an attempt to check the popular uprising's continuation, the Iranian regime blocked access to the Internet for a few hours and shut down the Amadnews Telegram channel claiming that Amadnews had urged demonstrators to hurl Molotov cocktails. Social media activity reveals the huge extent of the uprising. In but a single hashtag out of many # رسارسى_تظاهرات there are about 10,000 clips, pictures and other responses. The regime also warned the demonstrators that it would wield an "iron fist" against them. Clips showing members of the security forces beating passersby with clubs to disperse assemblies, an order to the Basij to use a stern hand in suppressing the protest, and the dispersal of protests using teargas and live ammunition were posted on the web. Also circulated on the web was an announcement that "in the event that the Internet and Telegram are blocked the assemblies will begin every day in every city at the very same hour as the previous day "until final victory is obtained" - https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DSX4MCaXcAApeSE.jpg (Source: /twitter.com/Pensylvani/status/947436222892437504, December 31, 2017) The Regime's Response To The Popular Uprising: On December 27, 2017, the Supreme Leader Khamenei assailed those criticizing the regime: on the one hand, he attacked former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his associates for the campaign that they waged in recent months to besmirch the Larijani family and primarily the head of the judicial branch, Ayatollah Amoli Larijani. On the other hand, he criticized Kayhan and the other ideological circles for their exaggerated criticism against President Rohani and his government. Khamenei also criticized President Rohani himself, accusing him of acting against the regime. [1] Iranian Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri, who belongs to the reformist camp, implied on December 29 that members of the ideological camp were responsible for the spread of the protests against Rohani and his government, which quickly became protests against Khamenei and the regime itself: "Those who exploit these issues [i.e., the economic difficulties] as an excuse, and who triggered events that have other dimensions and aspects, must understand that they themselves will be harmed by these events, because when a social movement emerges and takes to the streets, those who gave rise to it will surely be unable to control it and others will jump on the bandwagon." [2] The regime mouthpiece Kayhan chose to devote the front page of its December 31 issue to the pro-regime demonstrations organized by the regime itself on the anniversary of the suppression of the fitna, i.e., the popular protests of 2009. As for the anti-regime protests, it claimed that "because of the Rohani government," a few protests took place which Western opportunists tried to exploit in order to agitate against the regime. The daily's December 31 editorial likewise claimed that Rohani's mistaken economic and
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budgetary policy was responsible for the wave of protests- https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DSWuaQEWAAA5aMJ.jpg. In the picture a young woman protests while in the background Iranian security forces disperse the crowd with teargas. Assessment. It seems that, so far, the regime has not managed to suppress the protests, which have developed into a large-scale uprising against it, due to its reluctance to use drastic measures such as live gunfire, as was done in 2009. But given the increasing intensity of the protests, their occurrence all over the country and the lack of any readily identifiable leadership, the regime will eventually have to employ considerable force in order to quell them. A development that is currently taking place. The crisis currently afflicting the regime is rooted in economic factors and the regime's inability to improve the economic situation, due to political reasons. Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that Iran must implement a "resistance economy," and blocked the option of Western cooperation in Iran's economic development. At the same time, the billions of Iranian dollars that were frozen by the West and unblocked following the nuclear deal by the United States, were channeled into Iran's involvement in the regional war zones in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Gaza and into the continued development of its military capabilities, for instance by constructing new underground cities to house ballistic missiles, by advancing its military industry, etc. Even if this popular uprising is suppressed by the Iranian regime in the short term, given the absence of any solution to the Iranians' economic woes it is eventually bound to resurface. One option the regime may resort to in order to rekindle the people's solidarity with the regime despite the absence of any economic improvement is to spark crises or a war in one or more of the regional arenas in which Iran is involved – Israel, Bahrain or Yemen – by means of its proxies in these countries. (Editor’s Note – On 01 January, the head of the Iranian regime’s Judiciary, Sadegh Amoli Larijani said he had ordered a crackdown on protestors during an interview on News Network, State TV, according to NCRI. STRATFOR has reported the death toll as of 01 December is 12, but there are difficulties in accurately assessing this as past Regime policies have forbidden hospitals and clinics from registering dead and wounded protestors. The crackdown, however, will likely lead to a strong increase in violence over the next few days though it is unclear how the Regime will proceed given increased attention and the lessons learned from the June 2009 protests. It’s also possible that Khamenei will sacrifice Rouhani if he thinks it will appease protestors. In an extremely rare occurrence Iranian media has revealed differences between "Rowhani" and "Khamenei" and explain why. This may indicate positioning by Khameini to dismiss Rouhani as part of any agreement with opposition forces. End Note)
EYES ONLY – NCRI - Mullahs' Regime, Caught in Surprise and Confused, Admits to the Extent On the fourth day (31 December) of the nationwide uprising of the Iranian people to overthrow the mullahs’ regime, the regime’s officials were compelled to acknowledge the anger and disgust of the people against the regime and the extent of the uprising. The mullahs’ interior minister said today, "The events of the last few days have caused concern, sadness and discomfort for our dear people, and ... the created atmosphere .... Has damaged the security of the country." Everyone knows that the meaning of "dear people" and "the country" is nothing but the criminal gangs and corrupt mullahs of this regime who have
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destroyed Iran's assets and have killed the people for 39 years. The mullahs’ interior minister, whose fear of the uprising could be seen in his every single words, said: "Those who attempt to destroy public property, and create unrest and lawlessness, and undermine the people’s security, are responsible before the law and should be held accountable for their behavior and pay its cost.” He added, "Those who misused the cyberspace and used it for the purpose of destroying security, irregularity, law-breaking and destruction of the people’s property, have shown that it was just an excuse to use this capacity (cyberspace)." Meanwhile, Mehr, the state news agency, wrote today that the PMOI /MEK"is behind the recent turmoil and manages it." Ali Asghar Nasser, the security and law enforcement deputy of Tehran governorate, said "A few individuals yesterday disrupted the people's comfort, and they were arrested quickly." He added these few people! Threw "stones at the police force, damaged police vehicles, and broke windows of the banks and ...". Meanwhile, more fear and confusion can be seen within the regime than ever before regarding the uprising of the Iranian people. Khamenei remains silent on the fourth day of the uprising. Rouhani, the regime's president, also canceled his speech today. Iran daily, associated with Rouhani, announced this morning, “in light of recent events and several days of conflict in different cities of the country, the president will speak on these incidents in a couple of hours". However, two hours later, one of Rouhani’s spokesmen said, "There is no speech in Rouhani’s program today.” Meanwhile, the mullahs’ regime shut down schools in Tehran and many cities under the pretext of "air pollution" for today and tomorrow. (Editor’s Note – We’ve included this report because concerns expressed by the regime are finally starting to enter the western Press, so there may be questions on it. Fox News ran an exclusive 02 January where translated reports, provided by NCRI included quotes from Regime officials such as this, “Religious leaders and the leadership must come to the scene as soon as possible and prevent the situation (from) deteriorating further.” It continued, “God help us, this is a very complex situation and is different from previous occasions,” Fox News - Leaked meeting notes show how panicked Iranian regime considered stopping deadly protests: 'God help us.' This, coupled with the preceding report that the Judiciary ordered a crackdown, indicate that the current level of violence is about to significantly increase across the country and begin a new wave of oppression which will see the arrest of anyone accused of being a dissident. Additionally, Reuters reports that Iranian protesters attacked police stations late into the night on Monday. This is a significant escalation of the protests in Iran and has caused Supreme Leader Khamenei to formally declare on 02 December, that Iran’s enemies, not Iran’s internal policies and economic woes, as the cause of the current unrest. Of note, estimates of casualties during the June 2009 protests are just guesswork. Hospitals were reportedly not allowed to register the dead or wounded and the dead were removed via truck before hospital workers could get identification. While it is unlikely these protests will lead to any significant change in the policies of Iran’s ruling class, the wild card remains Trump. Unlike Obama who remained mostly silent in 2009, Trump is not likely to do so. While we don’t expect him to use military force in Iran, but he will certainly not be silent. End Note)
EYES ONLY - Times of Israel - Kuwaiti report: US gives Israel go-ahead to kill powerful Iranian general
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US intelligence agencies have given Israel the green light to assassinate the senior Iranian responsible for coordinating military activity on behalf of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, according to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Jarida. For the past 20 years or so, Qassem Soleimani has commanded the Quds Force — the branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards responsible for military and clandestine operations outside of the Islamic Republic. Soleimani is a key figure in efforts to prop up Syrian President Bashar Assad and to enable him to retake cities and towns from rebel groups during his country’s ongoing civil war. He is also responsible for providing military aid to the Lebanese terror group Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas in Gaza — both of which are committed to the destruction of Israel — as well as to Shia and Kurdish groups in Iraq. Thursday’s report by al-Jarida, which has been known to publish improbable-sounding stories about Israel, was widely picked up by Israeli media. There was no immediate reaction to the report from Jerusalem or Washington. Three years ago, Israel came close to assassinating Soleimani near Damascus, al-Jarida quoted unnamed source as saying, but the Americans tipped off the Iranians against the background of intense disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem. That was during the Obama administration, which, according to reports at the time, was so focused on securing the 2015 Iran nuclear accord that it chose to overlook and even obstruct efforts to clamp down on Iranian-backed terror organizations. It’s not clear if the reported tip-off was related to efforts to secure the Iran deal. Today, the Trump and Netanyahu administrations see eye to eye on Iran. Just four days ago, the two countries signed a joint memorandum of understanding laying the groundwork for full cooperation to deal with Iran’s nuclear drive, its missile programs and its other threatening activities, an Israeli TV report said recently. The source was quoted by the paper as saying that Soleimani’s assassination would serve both countries’ interests and that US authorities have given Israel the go-ahead to carry it out. (Editor’s Note – While it is unclear how legitimate this report is, we assess that it is a decision Trump would make as he takes advantage of the current situation in Iran to begin limiting Iranian freedom of movement across Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Moreover, the protests in Iran will likely impact Hezbollah, the Quds Force, and the IRGC in general since it is a main demonstration point. Regime leadership, while proud of the IRGC’s efforts with Hezbollah against both Israel and ISIS, will likely attempt to limit visibility of Iranian military forces in the northern Levant, opting instead to act through local proxies. Additionally, while it’s an internal vigilante-style force, Ansar e-Hezbollah and other militias were active in policing cities and towns in Iran after the 2009 protests, so it’s possible they’ll do so again. End Note)
Lebanon/Israel –
EYES ONLY - MEMRI - Intensive Discussions in Resistance Axis Ahead Of Possible Joint Confrontation With Israel; Syrian Daily: A Confrontation is Inevitable Recently, and especially since the announcement by U.S. President Donald Trump recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital, elements in the resistance axis, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Iran and Hizbullah, have been holding intensive discussions regarding the struggle against Israel. In these talks, officials from Iran, Hizbullah and the Palestinian factions have stressed the need for joint
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action to escalate the intifada and mobilize forces "in defense of Jerusalem." According to a report in a Lebanese daily, these elements are currently forming a war room to coordinate a joint reaction against Israel and against Trump's announcement. The Iranian officials, headed by President Hassan Rohani and Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' [IRGC] Qods Force, clarified to Hamas and to the other Palestinian factions that Iran is at their side and will place all its capabilities at their disposal, and that all the resistance forces in the region are ready to defend the Al-Aqsa mosque. In addition, two commanders of Shi'ite militias – Qais Al-Khaz'ali, the commander of the Iraqi 'Asaib Aal Al-Haqq militia, which is part of the Iran-affiliated Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), and Hamza Abu Al-'Abbas, the commander of the Liwa Al-Imam Al-Baqr militia – took the provocative step of visiting the Lebanon-Israel border and making threats against Israel.[1] Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah stressed that the resistance axis, which has attained many victories against its enemies in Syria and Iraq, is now ready to join the fight against Israel. Statements about the need to join forces against Israel also appeared in articles in the pro-regime Syrian press, some of which stated that a confrontation with Israel has become inevitable. As mentioned, tighter cooperation between these elements has been apparent for several months now, and reportedly has to do with Iran's efforts to unite the resistance axis and bridge differences between its various components, after a long period of tension between Hamas and Iran and a disconnect between Hamas and the Assad regime. This discourse continued to be heard after Trump's Jerusalem announcement. In a December 11, 2017 speech, Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah called on all the resistance forces in the region to unite after the difficult years they have experienced, and to formulate a joint strategy and uniform action plan for the region with the aim of regaining Jerusalem.[2] Nawaf Al-Moussawi, a Lebanese MP on behalf of Hizbullah, said that the movement had begun to "take measures on the ground towards uniting the resistance [axis] on all fronts and in all arenas."[3] In a December 14 speech, the head of Hamas's political bureau, Isma'il Haniya, called on "all the forces and components of the ummah to establish joint [war] rooms for strategic thinking."[4] This report reviews the intensive contacts between the forces of the resistance axis in the last few weeks, both before and after Trump's declaration; Iran's efforts to reunite this axis, and the calls for this axis to step up the struggle against Israel and even initiate a confrontation with it. Qassem Soleimani To Hamas, PIJ Commanders: The Resistance Forces In The Region Are Ready To Defend Al-Aqsa. According to December 11 reports in the Iranian media and the media identified with the resistance axis, IRGC Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani spoke on the phone with the commanders of Hamas's and the PIJ's military wings, and clarified that Iran would be willing to support the Palestinian resistance forces and that all the resistance forces in the region were ready to defend Al-Aqsa.[5] On December 13, the Kuwaiti daily Al-Jarida, known for its anti-Iran positions, reported that in this phone call Soleimani asked the Hamas and PIJ military chiefs to start recruiting operatives in the West Bank, and promised them weapons for armed action against Israel from the West Bank. He added that Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had clarified that arming the West Bank was a top priority for Iran and that Trump's Jerusalem announcement must be leveraged to ignite the struggle against Israel.[6] Hamas Leader, PIJ Spokesman: Soleimani Placed Iran's Capabilities At Our Disposal. Yahya Al-Sinwar, Hamas's leader in Gaza, confirmed in a December 25 speech that Soleimani had "contacted [Hamas's military wing], the '[Izz Al-Din] Al-Qassam Brigades, and
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[the PIJ's military wing], the Al-Quds Brigades, to stress that Iran and the IRGC, with all their capabilities, would stand alongside the Palestinian resistance." Soleimani, he added, had offered to extend every assistance in defending Jerusalem, "while presenting no conditions to the Palestinian resistance for receiving [Iran's] full support." PIJ Spokesman Daoud Shihab likewise told the Al-Mayadin television channel that Iran had placed all its capabilities at the disposal of the Palestinian resistance, without any conditions.[7] Iranian President Rohani To Hamas Leader Haniya: Iran, With All Its Capabilities, Will Stand Alongside The Palestinian People. On December 11, 2017, the day Soleimani reportedly spoke with the PIJ and Hamas commanders, it was also reported that Hamas political bureau head Isma'il Haniya had spoken on the phone with Iranian President Hassan Rohani and discussed the implications of Trump's decision on Jerusalem, which he called an act of "aggression against the Palestinian people and the Islamic ummah." Haniya thanked Iran for its support of the Palestinian people and its resistance. Rohani, for his part, called Trump's decision "the pinnacle of aggression by the countries of global arrogance," and emphasized that "Iran, with all its capabilities, will stand with the Palestinian people so that it [attains] its whole state, with Jerusalem as its capital."[8] Commanders Of Shi'ite Iraqi Militias Touring Lebanon-Israel Border: We Will Help Hizbullah In Confrontation With Israel. On December 9, Qais Al-Khaz'ali, commander of the Iraqi 'Asaib Aal Al-Haqq militia, which is part of the Iran-affiliated Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), toured the village of Kafr Kila in South Lebanon, near the Israeli border. Footage of his visit was shown on the Al-Ahd channel, which Al-Khaz'ali owns. Al-Khaz'ali, dressed in uniform, declared on this occasion that his militia "is on full alert, [ready] to help the jihad fighters of the resistance [i.e., Hizbullah]… and to stand in the same trench with the Lebanese people and with the Palestinian cause, opposing the oppressive Israeli occupation that is hostile to Islam, to the Arabs and to humanity."[9] On December 26, 2017, the Shi'ite Liwa Al-Imam Al-Baqr militia, which is fighting in Syria alongside the Assad regime, also published photos of its commander, Hamza Abu Al-'Abbas, touring the Lebanon-Israel border and scoping out the Israeli side. The photos were captioned, "Israel should know that we are on its borders, and one day we will breach them."[10] Meetings, Contacts Between Hizbullah, Hamas, PIJ And PFLP Leaders. On December 7, 2017, a Hamas delegation headed by the movement's political chief in Lebanon, Al-Hajj Ahmad 'Abd Al-Hadi, met in Beirut with Hizbullah political bureau member Hassan Huballah. In the meeting the two condemned Trump's Jerusalem declaration, claiming that it exposed "the U.S. support for terrorism which is aimed at tearing apart the Arab and Islamic nation." They stressed that Jerusalem was the eternal capital of Palestine, and underscored their commitment to "the option of resistance, which is the only way to liberate the land, the prisoners and the holy places." They called to "support the Al-Quds intifada and supply the Palestinian people with everything they need to stand fast against the Zionist enemy."[11] On December 8, a Hamas delegation headed by political bureau member Moussa Abu Marzouq met in Beirut with PIJ secretary-general Ramadan 'Abdallah Shalah, to discuss Trump's "oppressive decision" and the ways to oppose it. They called to "activate the Al-Quds intifada against the Zionist occupation, as a natural reaction to Trump's decision," emphasizing that "intifada and resistance are the only way to liberate our land and our holy places."[12] Nasrallah To PFLP Delegation: Resistance Axis Should Turn To Struggle Against Occupation. On December 20, 2017, a PFLP delegation headed by the movement's deputy secretary-general, Abu Ahmad Fuad, met with Hizbullah secretary-
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general Hassan Nasrallah to discuss the situation in the region and Trump's decision about Jerusalem. During the meeting, Nasrallah emphasized that "the resistance axis has attained great achievements against terrorism and now has plenty of time to turn to the Arab struggle with the [Israeli] occupation and mobilize all its forces and energy toward a future confrontation with the enemy." He also expressed hope that the Palestinian intifada would continue. The PFLP representatives expressed their "readiness to participate in any type of action against the occupation and in the consolidation of a joint plan for resistance to the occupation."[13] Two days after the meeting, the PFLP's armed wing issued a statement saying that it considered all headquarters of the American enemy across historic Palestine legitimate targets for attack. The spokesman for the military wing underscored that the movement would also employ armed resistance against the Zionist occupation and that "all options are open and there are no red lines following the crime committed by the terrorist Trump against Jerusalem…" The spokesman emphasized the close relations between the PFLP and Hizbullah and added that the movement saw itself as part of the resistance axis and as an ally of Iran.[14] Article In Lebanese Daily: Hizbullah, PMU And Palestinian Organizations, Including Hamas, Are Forming Joint War Room. In a December 27, 2017 article, The Daily Star, a Lebanese English-language paper, reported that Hizbullah, Iraqi PMU militias, Hamas, and five other Palestinian armed organizations in Gaza and the West Bank (that were not named) are currently acting to form a joint war room to coordinate their military action in response to Trump's Jerusalem announcement. A security source cited by the paper said that the resistance axis may soon issue an official statement that it is uniting to confront Israel and Trump's decision.[15] Several days before this, Nawaf Al-Moussawi, a Lebanese MP on behalf of Hizbullah, said that the movement had begun to "take measures on the ground towards uniting the resistance [axis] on all fronts and in all arenas."[16] Numerous contacts between the leaders of Hizbullah, Hamas, and PIJ also took place in the weeks preceding Trump's announcement on Jerusalem. On October 31, 2017, Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah met with the deputy head of Hamas's political bureau, Saleh al-'Arouri, to discuss "ways to strengthen the resistance and unite the efforts to oppose the Israeli occupation." The two stressed that "it is important that the resistance movements meet, unite, and join forces against the Zionist attacks." On the same day, Nasrallah phoned the PIJ secretary-general Ramadan 'Abdallah Shalah to condemn Israel's bombing of one of the movement's tunnels and offer condolences for the death of the movement's fighters. He stressed that Hizbullah supports the Palestinian resistance in their joint campaign.[17] On the following day, November 1, 2017, a Hamas delegation led by Saleh Al-'Arouri met with Ramadan Shalah and his deputy, Ziad Al-Nakhla. A Hamas source reported that they discussed the escalation of Israeli measures and "stressed the unity of the people and its resistance movements against the Israeli crimes and aggression, and the necessity to work together to defeat the occupation."[18] Hamas, Iran Renew Relations; Hamas Official: We Have Military Cooperation With Hizbullah, Iran. In this context it should be mentioned that, in recent months, there has been a significant improvement in the relations between Hamas and Iran, which had been strained for several years. The warming of relations took place following the election of a new leadership of the Hamas movement in Gaza, headed by Yahya Al-Sinwar. During October 2017, senior Hamas officials made statements in favor of renewing relations with Iran. Al-Sinwar himself said, "Anyone who thinks that we will cut off our relations with
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any country suffers from delusions, for Iran is the greatest supporter of [the Hamas military wing, the 'Izz Al-Din] Al-Qassam Brigades." In addition, a delegation of senior Hamas officials headed by Saleh Al-'Arouri visited Tehran, where Hamas Spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri announced that "the differences between Iran and Hamas are a thing of the past and their relations are back on track."[19] The improvement in Hamas-Iran relations is also expressed in the tightening of relations between Hamas and Hizbullah, a prominent reflection of which was the aforementioned meeting between Nasrallah and Al-'Arouri in early November. A few weeks later, on November 24, 2017, in an interview with the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Hamas political bureau member Salah Al-Bardawil said that, despite Hamas's past differences of opinion with Iran and Hizbullah on the matter of Syria, today "there is cooperation between Hizbullah, Hamas, the [other] elements of the resistance, and Iran."[20] Iran Working To Reunite Resistance axis, Promote Reconciliation Between Hamas, Assad Regime. In recent months, there have also been multiple reports in the Arab press that Iran and Hizbullah are trying to mediate the renewal of relations between Hamas and the Assad regime, which ran aground in 2011 after Hamas took a stand against Assad's regime and its armed suppression of the Syrian revolution. The Syrian daily Al-Watan, which is close to the Assad regime, reported on September 25 that Iran was interested in "reviving the relations that had previously existed among the members of the resistance axis, which comprises Iran, Syria, Lebanese Hizbullah, and the factions of the Palestinian resistance, including Hamas."[21] Later it was reported that, as part of efforts to restore the relations between the sides, a senior Hamas official visited Damascus with Hizbullah mediation, and that Yahya Al-Sinwar himself supports the idea of renewing the relations.[22] However, other reports have it that no breakthrough has so far been achieved and that Hamas still refuses to change its attitude towards the Assad regime.[23] On November 2, 2017, the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is closely identified with Hizbullah, reported that "the resistance axis has declared, in more ways than one, that it has restored its vitality, now that its members have readjusted their mutual relationships and set their priorities." The paper added that, "excluding one step – the renewal of Hamas-Syrian relations – it may be said that the camp is back [on track]."[24] Despite the reports that Hamas is still not prepared to change its stance on the Syrian regime, some prominent positive statements about Syria were made recently by senior members of the movement. For example, Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahhar told the Iranian news agency Tasnim that "relations between Hamas, Syria and Iran must develop and return to what they were." [25] In addition, in a speech he delivered at a conference in Beirut on November 1, 2017, Hamas political bureau head Isma'il Haniya expressed hope that "stability will return to Syria and that Syria will resume its historic role with respect to Palestine.[26] On December 31, 2017, the online daily Raialyoum.com reported, citing a senior Hamas source, that Hamas regards the renewal of relations with Syria as a top priority and that Salah Al-'Arouri recently visited Damascus and met with Syrian officials. The source stressed, however, that Hamas is still waiting for the regime to agree to a visit by a Hamas delegation in Damascus.[27] Articles In Syrian, Pro-Hizbullah Lebanese Press: Following Trump's Announcement, The Resistance Axis Is Prepared For Confrontation. Alongside the many meetings and contacts between the Palestinian factions, Hizbullah and Iran, and their threats to escalate the resistance and the struggle against Israel, the Syrian pro-regime daily Al-Watan and the pro-Hizbullah Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar published articles claiming that the resistance axis regards Trump's
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announcement on Jerusalem as to a declaration of war, and that it is prepared for a military confrontation with Israel and the U.S., a confrontation that has become inevitable. Journalist In Syrian Daily: The Trump Announcement Is A Declaration Of War Against The Resistance Axis; The Defense Of Jerusalem Starts In Syria. Younis Akhras, a columnist with the Syrian Al-Watan daily, wrote: "Since Jerusalem is one of the most important issues in the Arab-Zionist conflict, Trump's announcement that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel is a declaration of war from the gate of Jerusalem against the resistance axis, [which stretches] from Tehran to Gaza. Iran… has stressed that it is willing to provide assistance and support to the Palestinian resistance movements, as Qassem Soleimani announced. Syria and Russia also understand the significance of [Trump's] announcement and its implications, namely that the battle is not over, and that the region remains in a state where all options are still open, for numerous fronts are still burning. It is no coincidence that President Assad and President Putin met twice in a single month. The media and the commentators have noted that these meetings are part [of the efforts to consolidate] a political solution in Syria and to clear away the obstacles to such a solution, but the military issue was prominent at both meetings... The defense of Jerusalem begins in Syria, since, from a geographical perspective Jerusalem is south Syria, and from the perspective of conscience, it is in the heart of Damascus."[28] Article In Syrian Daily: Confrontation Between Resistance Axis and Israel Has Become Inevitable. In another Al-Watan article, journalist Rif'at Al-Badawi defined Trump's announcement "a provocative move that disregarded the Arab people's sensibilities" and "could trigger an ongoing military explosion between the resistance axis, which has triumphed in Syria and Iraq, and Israel." He added that "preserving the achievements of the resistance axis and Syria's victory [over the terrorists], and leveraging this victory against the U.S. decision [about Jerusalem]... will be possible only through a military confrontation with the Israeli enemy, a confrontation that has become inevitable, beyond any doubt... The outcome of this campaign will spell the downfall of the Arab regimes that are conspiring [against Palestine], enabling the resistance axis to take back the reigns of the conflict with the Israeli enemy and of the [campaign to] decide the fate of Palestine, Jerusalem and the region, and the fate of our future generations."[29] Article In Lebanese Daily Close To Hizbullah: Resistance Axis Is Mobilizing In Defense Of Jerusalem, Preparing For Confrontation. An article in the pro-Hizbullah Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, titled "The Resistance Axis Is Mobilizing in Palestine and Declaring a General Call-Up," stated that "there is a clear and declared decision by the resistance axis... to ignite the Third Intifada."[30] Another article in the daily stated: "The last thing that the Trump administration expected is that the declaration of Jerusalem as Israel's capital would prompt coordination and integration among [all the components of] the resistance axis and the resistance forces in Palestine, headed by Hamas." The article added that, if things continue to develop in this direction, "the main thrust of the campaign will return to Palestine, but this time [Palestine] will have the help of an axis that has won a campaign in a regional arena stretching from Tehran to Lebanon, through Syria and Iraq, a campaign that is still ongoing in Yemen. The speech by Hamas political bureau head Isma'il Haniya[31] was not just another speech delivered on the occasion [of the anniversary of Hamas's founding]. It was another brick in the foundation that is being laid for a future direct confrontation with the Israeli occupation and the U.S. administration..."[32] (Editor’s Note – These are concrete actions which indicate wide-scale coordination, but we still don’t know the impact of the
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current wave of protests across Iran. As indicated above, there is internal pressure on the Iranian regime to focus funding on domestic issues as opposed to external ones. Moreover, the public statements being issued by Iran and affiliates are nothing new, the increase in coordination is also likely to develop a unified position or understanding on Iran and Hezbollah’s response to the US announcement on Jerusalem. Many pundits have previously assessed that Iran is too stretched to act against Israel after fighting for Assad. They say that Iran will need to recuperate and consolidate its gains, but there have been four things which have energized Iran and the IRGC over the past few years. First is the success Iran has had in supporting Assad in Syria. Second is the success Iran has had in supporting Iraq against ISIS. Third is the increase in pressure being applied to Iran by Saudi Arabia. Fifth is the nearly USD$1BN cash provided to Iran by the Obama Administration to secure the 2015 Nuclear Agreement. As stated above, we still don’t know how big a distraction the current wave of protests in Iran will be to Regime efforts across the northern Levant, but Tehran may be mulling an increase in kinetic activity aimed at Israel as a means of attempting to consolidate Islamic support for their action, which would distract from other efforts across the region. End Note)
Other Areas of Potential Interest – Return to Top
EYES ONLY - TRAC - Sharful Awal, Jama'at ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) Member, Arrested for Contacting International Jihadist Groups for Rohingya Cause border district of Ukhia, Bangladesh / Myanmar - 31 December 2017 Bangladesh police on Sunday (Dec 31) arrested a suspected Islamist militant from the border district of Ukhia, near camps where thousands of Rohingya Muslims fleeing a military crackdown in Myanmar have taken shelter. The Rapid Action Battalion (Rab), an elite police tasked with tackling Islamist extremism in the Muslim-majority country, said it detained 30-year-old Sharful Awal for allegedly communicating with international militant groups. Awal was freed on bail in January after he was charged with anti-terrorism and explosives-related offences in the Chittagong region, Rab local chief Ruhul Amin said in a statement. But after his release, Awal "communicated with various international militant groups through social media in an effort to establish Khilafat (a caliphate) through so-called Jihad", Amin said. Police allege Awal is a member of a new faction of the Jamayetul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), a homegrown militant group, and was involved in organising local extremists. The new JMB faction has been blamed for a wave of attacks on foreigners and religious minorities, including the deadly attack on a posh Dhaka cafe last year in which 18 foreigners were shot and hacked to death. But the Rab's Amin said the authorities have not found any connections so far between Awal and Rohingya refugees. An estimated 655,000 Rohingya have left Myanmar since late August to escape what UN officials have termed ethnic cleansing with possible "elements of genocide". Most of the refugees have settled in Bangladesh's south-eastern border areas like Ukhia. Bangladeshi authorities have stepped up security and surveillance efforts in the Rohingya camps over fears the squalid settlements could be perfect recruitment
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grounds for homegrown and international extremist groups. The country's border forces have also tightened patrols to prevent Rohingya militants - who have carried out a series of attacks on Myanmar security posts since October last year - from entering Bangladesh territory. (Editor’s Note – For the complete original text, see, Straitstimes - Bangladesh arrests suspected Islamist militant near Rohingya camps. We continue to be concerned about Islamic Extremists attempting to exploit the Rohingya crisis to establish a foothold in southeast Asia, but to date, it doesn’t appear that they’ve been able to do so in any significant fashion. Other than the Turkistan Islamic Party, heavily involved in Syria, it doesn’t appear that they’ve been able to establish a foothold in Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia or Viet Nam. This is significant because if Islamic extremists could bridge the gap between Pakistan and Malaysia, it would signal a significant capability that could threaten the stability of every country in the region. End Note)