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A Unified Theory of Attention
&
Petition to Rename Attention Deficit Disorder
In the DSM-V
Jonathan D. Boyer, M.A.
James Madison University
March, 2007
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Abstract
Attention is typically referred to in terms of what it is being paid to; as if anytime
attention is given there is a price to pay. Similar to a budget, where each transaction of paying
attention causes a re-structuring of ones mental finances, attention requires a psychological
balance of cost. The next question is where, or at what location points, can we say attention is
being given or paid? Attention remains in such constant flux that perhaps the only chance to
identify its ever-changing location is by analyzing its properties when lapses, or mental errors,
occur. By analyzing mental errors, this paper explores whether the function of attention is the
same across different cognitive processes. If it can be demonstrated that the function of attention
does in fact retain its structure across different cognitive tasks, there is evidence to support a
unified theory of attention. Implications of this theory in relation to what has been called
Attention Deficit Disorder are explored particularly why this term is both unnecessarily
negative and inaccurate.
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Background
Often in psychological theory we begin with a word or idea that has been known by
experience to exist, and we investigate that idea in order to more clearly define it conceptually.
Take memory, for example: no one doubts whether or not memory exists, yet it remains difficult
to define without referring to one of its synonyms (things I recall; all that I remember; all
my past recollections). Aside from the vagueness of its term, it is difficult to define memory
because it is always in use we use memory for everything we do: It is a pre-requisite sub-
function of every human function, so to define memory one would need to compile a list of
everything that requires its use (which is everything!). In psychological theory, it follows that
memory is hypothesized to be not just one thing or one idea but many ideas it is composed of
many types. Thus, the discovery of types whether they be types of memory or other types of
mental phenomena is the central focus of psychological theory.
So what are the different types of memory? A quick brainstorm might produce: short-
term, long-term, episodic, procedural, declarative, implicit, and explicit. Now, with such an
explicit list of memory types, it becomes easier for one to imagine the mental activity that each
different type involves and how each activity differs from one another in quality of cognitive
experience.
Even with this differentiation of memory types evident, there is still an uncertainty as to
whether some common memory-thread might exist neurologically, somehow linking all memory
types together, so that, in essence, memory is still just memory and not a scattered dispersion of
types. Although this question of where does the concept of memory begin and end, existentially,
opens itself up to philosophical debate, psychological theory adheres to a more concrete system
of ideas, as cognitive neuroscience often serves as the scientifically objective, theoretical jury.
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Essentially this means that our understanding of the differentiation of brain processes is used to
dissociate one process (e.g. type of memory) or set of processes from another i.e. are they
separate processes in the brain, or is the activity actually one, singularly integrated process? In
other words, if it is demonstrated that memory functions as two differentprocesses in separate
brain regions, these processes should then represent with two different concepts in psychological
theory. Neurocognitive processes, therefore, should have a direct, 1-to-1 correspondence to the
psychological concepts they inspire. Taken to the extreme, one might imagine the hypothetical
unification of cognitive neuroscience and psychological theory as the point where every, single
brain process corresponds to every, single concept in psychological theory.
Double Dissociation
The classic case-study of HM, a 27 year-old man with severe epileptic seizures, is a
hallmark of cognitive neuroscience, dating back to 1953, when for the first time neurological
evidence was found to support the differentiation between long-term and short-term memory as
well as declarative versus procedural memory. Neurological evidence, as the term is used,
generally refers to the results of brain injuries and the particularities of their effects on behavior
and cognition; although there are a number of ways, besides injury, the brain might become
dysfunctional. For the proper amount of experimental control, an isolated brain region needs to
be either damaged or removed so that the abnormalities observed in behavior can be attributed to
that location of brain damage.
In HMs case, a surgeon removed his amygdala (commonly associated with emotional
regulation) and most of his hippocampus, which are both part of the brains limbic system
(Dawson, 1998). The compelling result was that HM, while unable to construct new long-term
memories, was still able to utilize short-term memory functions: Although HM was able to hold
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conversations, the topics under discussion were severely restricted to the immediate present, as
anything already faded to the recent past, beyond short-term memory, was no longer accessible
to HM. The following is an example of a conversation recorded with H.M. following the
surgery:
SC: When youre not at MIT what do you do during a typical day?
HM: Uhh see thats . . . I dont remember things.
SC: Do you remember what you did yesterday?
HM: No I dont.
SC: How about this morning?
HM: I dont even remember that.
SC: Could you even tell me what you had for lunch today?
HM: I dont know to tell you the truth. (Dawson, 1998)
Although HM at least had the short-term memory capacity to understand the questions
being asked long enough to answer them, if those questions delved significantly into the past, his
recollection became a lost cause. HMs neurological case study revealed that after removing
specific regions of the brain, it is possible for long-term memory to become dysfunctional while
short-term memory remains in tact. In other words, the brain region that long-term memory
relies upon is not the same as that of short-term memory; therefore a neurological dissociation
can be established between the two processes.
In reference to the title of this section, this finding is only halfway to establishing a
double dissociation, which is the traditional standard in cognitive science for making a
conceptual distinction between cognitive processes. In HMs case, a single dissociation has
indeed been found, but to round out the memory-based hypothesis we must establish a double
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dissociation by demonstrating that the reverse is true. As soon as it can be demonstrated that a
regionally specific brain lesion that causes short-term memory dysfunction can leave long-term
memory in tact (the reverse), we can establish a double dissociation between the two processes
and make a strong case for a distinction between the two concepts in psychological theory.
Evidence of sub-division within the brain is theoretically compelling, but on some level it
remains clear that the brain is not simply a set of isolated systems. In some way, all sub-systems
worktogethertoward an integrative and adaptive form of all output that functions in the interest
of the organism similar to how a CPU (central processing unit) functions as the integrative
through-point of all sub-systems of a computer. Of course theorizing about a pervasive,
integrative thread that flows through an organism, and all its sub-systems, is again toward the
realm of philosophy or perhaps an entropy-related law of physics; nevertheless, if there is
evidence that something remains constant across brain processes that have been neurologically
dissociated, like attention for example, we have reason to speak of a common thread that bridges
the two, at least on some conceptual level.
Natural Errors
Reflecting on the cause of error has been the source of theoretical revelation in a number
of academic disciplines and life in general. In History, we learn not to repeat the mistakes of our
past. In computer science, we learn by correcting errors that occur in programming code. In
English class, we improve our writing by correcting and understanding our errors. In life, we
learn from our errors by retracing events and figuring out where we went wrong . . .
It seems no matter what type of activity I am engaged in walking, running writing,
keyboarding, listening, or just thinking I can somehow manage to make similar errors of
thought and movement. Not because of any brain damage or general dysfunction (I think), but
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because I sometimes fail to hold it all together mentally my focus, or attention, becomes lost or
somehow in the wrong spot. It is as if the part of my mind whose processes have become
automatic has plans of its own, and those automatic plans win out despite my own, more
conscious cognitive plans and intentions. This proves especially true when there is a
circumstantial lack of focus for whatever reason.
Perhaps error is not the proper term here, as these instances are more a discrepancy
between plans that have become automatic to my organism at an unconscious level and plans
that are currently, cognitively, consciously and intentionally derived. In fact, it would be
difficult to call anything an error without referring to a discrepancy between multiple
intentions because all organisms ultimately have a logical sequence that in retrospect can explain
outputs/decisions, whether these decisions were consciously intended or not.
All things considered, this paper proposes that natural errors are at least one example of
a phenomenon that remains constant across dissociated neurological processes. This is not to
discredit the double-dissociation(s) of processes, per se, but rather to point out the possibility of
an underlying common thread, leaving room for theoretical and experimental advances in
explaining the inter-connective and isotropic properties of the brain.
Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the function and structure
of attention remains constant across neurologically dissociated processes (e.g. speech and gross
motor output). Like most psychological theory with adequate external validity, this unified
theory of attention (UTA) is conceptually grounded in mental experiences that are commonly
recognized to occur in many people, which in this case is the occurrence of mental errors.
UTAs hypotheses begin with the proposition that these errors exhibit a direct structural
relationship to changes in location of attention, as pinpointed on a cognitive plan (or blueprint).
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Secondly, UTA hopes to facilitate communication about the concept of attention, particularly
with respect to understanding what has been labeled Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or
Attention-deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (AD/HD). It is contested that ADD is not a deficit but
rather a misallocation of attentional resources. It follows that a less negative and more
theoretically congruent name is proposed.
Structure & Types of Errors
This Unified Theory of Attention outlines three types of errors that, while occurring via
different cognitive processes, are ultimately proposed to be structurally equivalent due to the
same fault in attention: Oral Language, Gross-Motor, and Graphomotoroutputare, in this case,
examples of neurologically dissociated processes that are yet still susceptible to identical mental
errors in terms of how their executions are disorderly structured.
Whether the process being executed is oral language (speech), gross motor output, or the
fine touch of writing, one always has a plan, or mental model, of the general sequence to be
followed when executing the action. When it comes to actions as routine as speech, the planning
phase is so automatized that the cognitive representation of that plan may only exist for a nearly
unconscious split second prior to it being executed, leaving a seamlessly unnoticeable flow
between cognitive planning and subsequent executive decisions.
Moving forward, a central premise of this paper is that most, if not all, of human life is
the re-enactment of a mental plan. Furthermore, our life plans exhibit the same structure,
regardless of the type of cognitive function, which seats planning at the highest, most evolved
level of cognition, superimposing its structure on all executive functions. Therefore, mental
errors occurring across dissociated brain processes will exhibit the same structure in terms of
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how that error misconstrues the plan misconstrues that are often for the sake ofconservation of
mental energy. Psychic energy conservation will be referred to in this paper as the CME
Principle, which for psychologists interested in intelligence theory might see the connection to g-
theory here. In other word, one might hypothesize that the conservation of mental energy
implies that each individual is working with his or her own energy capacity, or intelligence. Of
course this leaves room for any theory of multiple intelligences because the same energy
capacities have the potential to be allocated toward different cognitive avenues based on
personality differences or genetic strengths and weaknesses.
Lastly, there is a tentative, secondary hypothesis that language in some way guides the
structure of all cognitive plans, just as the grammar of ones native language organizes speech
and writing. Taking ideas from Chomsky (1967), the universal grammar that is the foundation
of all language acquisition can be seen as an organizing principle that gives structure to virtually
all human action.
Plan of Action
A plan of action, in this sense, is not necessarily as explicit as someone sitting down to
draft the contingency plans of a hostage negotiation. Day-to-day plans, on the other hand, require
much less thought, or cognitive resources, especially if that plan has been executed countless
times and is stiffly cemented in routine. Once plans have become such a routine, there is no
longer a need to mull over them cognitively or analyze them step-by-step. After all, doing so
would be a waste of time a waste of mental energy. It therefore makes sense that when action
plans are executed on a consistent basis, there is a natural drive to have that plan become implicit
so that one can conserve mental energy and ones attention can be allocated to tasks or ideas that
demand more explicit cognitive resources. As a general rule, cognitions or actions that require
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mental energy (or cognitive resources) are explicit or intentional, and those that require less
mental energy are more implicit or routine.
Often I roll out of bed, put on clothes, and brush my teeth without remembering the effort
it took to complete that sequence; but I can remember the time my zipper got stuck because it
threw a wrench in my routine and forced me to summon mental energy. At that point my actions
suddenly needed to be explicit and effortful, which made it possible to later recall what my plan
had been to get my zipper unstuck. In any case, just because a plan is implicit, subconscious, or
not remembered does not mean there was no plan; it may just have been done so many times that
it did not require much attention.
Like memory, we often talk about attention as if we understand what it refers to, but in
the reality of psychological theory attention is a concept not so easy to grasp. It is perhaps the
hardest to grasp because there is no observable proof of where ones attention is at any given
time here, there, or elsewhere. Although it is a common phrase to describe someones mind as
elsewhere, this expression only means that we are not exactly sure where or how far away that
is. We just know that it is somewhere else. There is even a symptomatic description of AD/HD,
according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), as the mind
appearing to be elsewhere, which begs the question: where exactly might elsewhere be? If its
definition is as general as anywhere else but here, one can imagine the great difficulty of trying
to locate attention because it is never constant its location is always changing. In light of this
quandary the best we can do, from the standpoint of UTA, is derive location points on a given
cognitive plan and locate attention in relation to those points.
To locate attention in relation to points on a cognitive plan, we must first break down and
understand the structure of that plan. Because many cognitive plans are largely implicit and
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nearly unconscious, the best way to understand their structure is through post-error analysis. In
this sense, we can learn from mental errors by indulging in the cognitive pauses they incite,
allowing insight into the implicit processes of planning and attention. The wordpause is
emphasized here because the objective of automatic and implicit planning processes are to
prevent pauses, i.e., there should no longer be a need to pause and allocate attentional resources
to cognitive planning because it has become routine. It should also be noted that mental errors
only give us the opportunity to pause and reflect on our implicit behaviors; meaning, of course,
that reflection does not happen automatically. In fact, the errors we make on a daily basis are
often discarded or laughed at, while the foundation of this paper is exactly the opposite.
Automatic Transmissions
With implicit versus explicit types of cognition in mind, mental errors can be described
as occurring when there is a discrepancy between the two when the will of a planning principle
that is well seated in routine contradicts the demands of a situation that is novel enough to need
explicit cognitive re-structuring. One might reflect on the difficulty of driving an automatic
transmission after many years of driving a standard transmission. Breaking at a stoplight, ones
left foot might go for the clutch . . . . . . . but it isnt there! The manual clutch routine has
become so powerful that, despite the novel situation, cognitive re-structuring of the relevant
planning principle (driving in this case) does not occur. There is a discrepancy between a past
history of implicitness and the need to be explicit in the present.
Although the clutch example has its merits, this type of mental error is primarily the
result of a discrepancy between a history of routine and new cognitive planning requirements,
which is not always necessary to cause a mental error. In fact, routines that cannot be traced to
ones history can still intrude on cognitive intentions. It becomes an issue of attention when
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there is no history of routine that might conflict with the required plan of action, yet still there
occurs a curious mental error. These errors-without-history are hypothesized to be the result
of a dislocation of attention, which can happen for a number of reasons that fall into three main
categories 1) the cognitive task requires more attention than one is energized or willing to give,
or 2) the mis-location is abiding by the principle ofconservation of mental energy. A general
rule is that in some way it is usually both.
Errors in Gross-Motor Output
One evening, I was sitting in the passenger seat of a friends car as we pulled up to an
ATM. It didnt take too much thinking, but I was aware that I had two things to do before
exiting the car. I was needed to both unfasten my seatbelt, which was on my left, and take my
wallet out, which was in my back right pocket. Of course it would be difficult to reach for my
wallet with my seatbelt fastened, so the unfastening part of my plan was logically set to come
first in sequence. Interestingly, as my arm reached for the seatbelt, I found it was my left arm
not my right reaching across my body to unfasten my wallet? My mind had somehow
combined a plan that consisted of two main actions (seatbelt and wallet) into a single action by
incorporating a property of each. In this case, each of the two main actions within my original
plan consisted of two parts: plane-of-reach and endpoint-of-reach (e.g. arm-across-body and
seatbelt). As for the mental error, although the plane of reach was retained for unfastening my
seatbelt (arm across body), the endpoint was not. For the sake of conserving mental energy, my
attention was dislocated one step ahead of the plan to my wallet, removed in some type of plan
combination effort. It seems as if the conservation of mental energy principle was implicitly
aware that both actions involved arm movements and thus took advantage of this similarity by
restructuring my cognitive plan that was not being paid enough attention. In this sense, there can
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be said to be an implicit, logical compulsion that looks for ways to achieve the goals of both
action plans through more efficient combination efforts, all for the sake of conserving mental
energy.
Notice the presence of plans-within-plans: inside the two-part plan of unfastening seatbelt
and retrieving wallet, there is also an individual plan for each action, each consisting of
coordinating arm movements. The two-part macroplan is more oriented toward sequence, that
is, cognitively ordering the steps and execution of each microplan what comes first, next, and
so on. As the number of plans-within-plans increase in terms of their level of microcosm, the
sequence or brain process needed to execute that plan becomes further implicit and less
conscious. As the plan increases in terms of its level of macrocosm, the plan becomes further
explicit, more conscious, and of a higher order of cognition. The upper limit of macroplan order
seems only bound by short-term memory, long-term memory, and the cognitive pre-disposition
(personality) to macroplan.
Figure 1:
*1 = Unfasten; 2 = Get Wallet** a & b are only hypothesized to be plane of reach and endpoint of reach, as these
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microplans are difficult to break down and are verging on implicit. Certainly thecoordinating processes within a & b are implicit and thus not part of an intentional
cognitive plan.
Action 1a (plane-of-reach = across body) is combined with action 2b (endpoint = wallet)
to form the new CME action of (a1, b2). As compelled by the CME Principle, dislocations of
attention seem to be focused on the end-state or final action (2b) that completes all macroplans
and microplans therein: they are inherently forward looking. Ironically, what the CME principle
fails to realize is that these new efficient actions actually end up costing more energy, as we
often have to start over following error.
From this long-winded example, there are a number of conclusions that might be reached
regarding the potential structure of mental error and its relation to planning and attention. First,
the mental error and accompanying dislocation of attention causing the error is always in
reference to the original cognitive plan that failed to be executed properly. The best we can do to
locate attention is to refer to its point on the cognitive plan. Second, the specific error that was
outlined involves a combination of elements from two separate actions; and because the two
actions occur in sequence, the combination must include an element from opposite parts of both
sequences. In other words, the combination could not involve both endpoints 1b and 2b (seatbelt
and wallet) because the sequence is not logically possible, and the action would not be capable of
performance. Third, one element of this combination corresponds to the point where attention
became dislocated, which generates another general rule that the element at the point where
attention is mislocated often becomes incorporated in the combination.
Errors in Speech
One of the first mental errors I logged in prelude to this paper occurred during a graduate
statistics class in which my professor was explaining the advantages and disadvantages of using
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multiple-choice tests as a form of assessment. At some point during the lecture my professor
accidentally said multiple chest and then corrected the mistake by snickering and saying
excuse me multiple choice test. In the time that was taken to say excuse me and make the
correction, the mental error had raised the professors awareness to the need for increased
attention to the action sequence at hand; otherwise the same mistake would be made again.
Like the seatbelt/wallet example, the cognitive plan in this case can be broken into two
parts1 saying the words 1)choice and 2)test. Of course if we refer to the entire sentence
being spoken as the macroplan (although the upper limit of the macroplan would still be
unclear), these two words are simply isolated microplans that came to be combined. Both
microplans are further decomposable into phoneme structure (e.g. ch - oice and t - est), as there
is evidence that this is the functional level at which speech is planned and executed. For
example, I once misspoke the word responsibility by saying, responsilibity. By transposing the
L and B sounds, my error occurred at the level of the phoneme, giving evidence that in terms
of cognitive planning, speech and therefore attention to speech is sequenced by phoneme. In
light of this attention structure, the choice-test error can be diagramed as follows:
Figure 2:
1 The word multiple is disregarded because it is not part of the mental error.
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The most outstanding feature of the diagram is that it contains the same structure as that
of the gross-motor planning example. Particularly the combination style, of substituting 2b for
1b, is evidence that the structure and dislocation of attention in relation to cognitive planning
remains constant across cognitive processes that are neurologically dissociated, i.e. speech and
gross motor movement. Furthermore, there is a natural drive acting as a common thread
amongst these errors, which is the winning out of the compulsory CME Principle over the more
explicit intentions of a cognitive plan.
Besides the CME Principle, there are other factors that may contribute to errors of this
nature, particularly thefluidity or ease of pronunciation when speaking. Perhaps best illustrated
by so-called tongue twisters, we are more prone to speech errors when there is a lack of
fluidity about what is being spoken. A skunk sat on a stump. The stump thought the skunk
stunk, and the skunk thought the stump stunk. In the case of the skunk, the stump, and who
stunk, there is a constant recoiling of the tongue so that the position of the tongue after speaking
each word or syllable is not well set up for ease of speaking the following word or syllable.
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Again, it all reverts back to the CME Principle, as a marked lack of fluidity requires more
intentional restructuring2 of tongue movements, which in turn necessitate increased mental
energy. Although not to the degree of the skunk example, the choice-test error still suffers from
this same lack of fluidity: The position the tongue is left in after saying OICE does not lend
itself to the subsequent T-sound and ST-sound in the word test. Examine yourself and notice
your tongue and lip movements when moving from OICE to TEST: not only does the tongue
have to fully recoil to touch the roof of the mouth for the T-sound, but the upper lip is awkwardly
tensed for the duration. At this point it is important to note that the CME Principle is not so
concerned with the muscular requirements of tongue and lip movements but the attention
required to successfully execute those movements. Different muscular sequences may in fact
consume similar amounts ofphysical energy yet differ in sequential fluidity; therefore the crucial
difference remains the amount ofmental energy required for a successfully executed sequence.
Errors in Writing
The physical act of writing involves a combination of skills and neurological processes.
All at once, there occurs an integration of what one is planning to write, ones knowledge of
spelling, and the fine motor skills required to coordinate pen/pencil movements. Given the
foundation already established by this paper in regard to speech and gross-motor errors, I will
bypass the use of a diagram and give a quick example of how writing errors can be of similar
structure in both purpose and combination style.
While taking notes in class a few days ago, I was in the midst of writing the word
discussion when I found myself subject to error. It happened during the curving motion of
writing the letter c, when instead of finishing the letter properly and continuing to the letter u
2 Intentional restructuring is simply the awareness or attention to the direction of what is next in sequence, so in
general where there is intention there is attention.
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in the word discussion, I finished the c as if I were finishing the u. The CME Principle is so
cleverly aware of similarities between components of ones current plan (e.g. the curving
motions in both letters c and u), that it assumed my curving around the bottom of the c
was a sufficient and efficient segway into finishing the u. So then, both individual letter-
plans were combinedto form a single, mutated letter that looked more like a d without the
extended chimney top. It is as if the underlying principle was purporting, lets get this done
quickly and conserve energy by any means possible. Once again we can describe this fault of
attention as forward-looking and being dislocated one step ahead of the current plan onto the
letter u. Ironically, the CME Principle was imploring me to conserve energy, but I still ended
up having to erase my error and expend more energy.
Semantics and Associations in Mental Errors
Much of the discussion surrounding the preceding diagrams and analyses have been
focused on the sequence of cognitive plans. Although this might imply a linear or serial model
of cognition, this is certainly not the case or the absolute contention of this paper. It is clear that
sequence plays a role and is an important component in how cognitive plans are organized;
however, ones decision or arrival at the proper sequence of action is not always linear or
narrow-minded i.e. there can be more than one cognitive storyline. I liken this to either a game
of connect-the-dots or completing a pencil maze, in which the picture or sequential solution is
not immediately clear. First, one must cognitively appraise the situation and possibly mix-and-
match solutions. The ultimate goal is still the discovery of sequence, but the cognitive
workbench, so to speak, used to make such a discovery is multi-dimensional and has an array of
tools at its disposal. The various mental faculties having influence over the construction of
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cognitive plans can seemingly arise from any associative direction; in other words, the process is
inherently spatial.
To give a more concrete example, I once observed a colleague of mine use of the phrase
let on to believe. After noticing the phrase was a bit odd sounding, it became clear to me that
there were originally two phrases in mind that were being considered for mental execution both
equivalent in logic and meaning and both of which could have fulfilled the semantic intention of
what was trying to be expressed. The two original phrases being considered were let on and
led to believe, both implying some degree of deceit or incidental misunderstanding, depending
on the context. It seemed my colleague, when constructing his speech plan, was faced with two
semantic equivalents to choose between, and instead of mulling over (losing mental energy) such
an ambivalent choice, the CME Principle took precedence and conjured up a healthy / clever
combination. It would appear this is evidence that there exists a semantic gestalt in the human
model of cognition that comes into play when planning/choosing words and phrases for speech.
The semantic gestalt, as a kind of two-part schema, comprised of the two phrases
equivalent in semantic content, is attempted to be retrieved for inclusion in the speech plan, only
at this point there are still two different directions one could go in let on or led to believe.
Going beyond semantics to any type of cognitive planning, we begin with some type of
schematic3 gestalt of what is thought to be relevant to or near a solution to a situation that
requires a plan whether it be the proper sentence, the proper arm movements, or the proper
letters to write and we analyze the components of that gestalt in order to pick-and-choose, mix-
and-match what best fits the situation both sequentially and meaningfully.
3 The gestalt is the schema in the sense that we retrieve it as a whole; however, there may be different types based on
different content and different situations.
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A strikingly similar example of note is my witnessing the use of the quasi-word
pervading when trying to describe a pervasive and invading feeling. The feeling in need of
description was simultaneously felt to be both pervasive and invading, yet the feeling still had a
single essence or quality that was compelled to be expressed as a single word, as motivated by
either the CME Principle, the individual, or both. Saying one word, of course, takes less energy
than saying two.
The purpose of the preceding examples was to illustrate the spatial nature of attention in
relation to cognitive planning and the gradual construction of action sequence. The consequence
of this spatial quality of how a mental plan is represented is that the construction of ones plan
can be influenced by a variety of linguistic elements from all associative corners of the mind.
When retrieving words, phrases, or ideas from memory and attempting to incorporate them into a
cognitive plan, one becomes vulnerable to the erroneous intrusion of random associations and
semantic congruencies related to these ideas. In other words, one might have the intention to
retrieve a word/idea/element from a schema and accidentally incorporate an element associated
with the one intended into the cognitive plan. For example, I once was in the midst of retrieving
the name of a UConn (University of Connecticut) basketball player named Rudy Gay when I
erroneously said Udy Gay. During the retrieval process, my attention was located around the
schema, or gestalt, that shares the common characteristic of being associated with UConn (See
Figure 3). Because my attention remained stuck and located (at least partially) on the UConn
quality of the schema, I became vulnerable to the error that occurred. This dislocation was also
convenient for the CME Principle because of its tendency to notice intra-cognitive similarities
and the obvious/easy substitution of the U in UConn for the u in Rudy (See Figure 4). The
shared quality of the schema acting as its elemental thread was the elements relation to UConn,
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so my error appears to be evidencing a compulsion to express the entire gestalt (UConn) on
which ones attention is located or at least the common thread that defines it. Because it takes
mental energy to break the gestalt down into the elements of planning that should also abide by
the laws of language, it is more likely that ones attention will remain dislocated outside the
elements onto the shared quality.
As a concluding general rule in regards to the spatial nature of planning and attention, the
presence of a gestalt, of whatever type, always precedes its decomposition and subsequent
organization into planning the sequence of a cognitive task.
Figure 3 The UConn Schema/Gestalt:
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parties. In this way, the name of a mental disorder is essential for effective communication
between parents, teachers, administrators, and psychologists.
After thinking about the name Attention Location Dysfunction (ALD) for some time, it
began to appear too general for my liking. Perhaps being overly ambitious and psychologically
minded, I attempted to derive a name that would encompass something more complex and paint
a clearer picture of how the dysfunction is structured. I location element I thought was essential,
but I felt there was something more that needed to be illustrated about how ones attention is
specifically managed an allocated to different stimuli. With this in mind, I began entertaining
the names: Attention Location Dysfunction, Attention Management Dysfunction, and Attention
Allocation Dysfunction. Again, the problem is not that one lacks the attentional resources;
rather, those resources are mismanaged or misallocated relation to societal and educational
demands. In fact, some cases of Attention Deficit Disorder might be more properly named
Attention OverloadDisorder, as an overload would seem capable of disrupting the allocation
process.
Subtypes & the DSM-IV
Every subtype of ADHD in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV) is laden with symptomatic descriptions that ultimately amount to dislocations of
attention, yet somehow the disorder insists on being called a deficit. The inattentive type lacks
close attention to detail, makes careless mistakes, and appears as if his or her mind is
elsewhere. What these descriptions fail to qualify is the type of tasks during which this is true
(at home versus at school is far too vague). When there is a lack of close attention to detail, is
there close attention to something else, or is the child in some kind of comatose state? This
question is essentially answered by another quality of the inattentive type, that is, his or her mind
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is often elsewhere. In other words, the child is paying attention to something, just not what is
demanded of them by whoever would like to direct their attention.
Even the hyperactive-impulsive type displays these dislocations through their typical
physical manifestations, as this type of child is described as often blurting out answers and
having difficulty waiting their turn. Once might also call this impatience, as the child can be
described as rushing to be one step aheadof the current task: their attention is dislocated
forward, that is, forward looking in the same sense of as the CME Principles demonstrated
tendency. Still, it is important not to disregard to role of impulsivity in the context of this
subtype because impulse control is a distinct neurological process at play that may be one of the
causes of dislocation. For this reason, the hyperactive-impulsive subtype is a helpful descriptor
and is recommended to be unchanged in the DSM-V. On the other hand, the inattentive type is
in need of clarification because it is narrowly defined in terms of what is educationally and
developmentally adaptive. In this way, the childs problem can be better described as
disorganization rather than a lack of attention. At this time, this paper awaits further input from
petition responses to conclude what best represents the attention dysfunction called AD/HD;
however, at this time, the working title of Attention Management Dysfunction will be used,
along with the three emerging types:
1) Attention Management Dysfunction Disorganized Type2) Attention Management Dysfunction Hyperactive/Impulsive Type3) Attention Management Dysfunction Combined Type
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References
Chomsky, N. (1967). Transformational grammar and linguistic universals. Bobbs-Merrill
Dawson, M. (1998). Understanding Cognitive Science. Blackswell Publishers: Oxford.