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T H E TIB ET EACTOR IN INDIA-CHINA
RELATIONS
Rajiv Sikri
Tibet is a key factor in India-China reations. It is only after the 1950 Chinese
occupa-
tion of Tibet that India and China came to share the now disputed common border In
recentyears , China's military b uildup and infrastructure developm ent in Tibet, as
well
as
reported
plans to divert or dam rivers that rise in Tibet andfiow into India, have raised
India's anxieties. Conversely, China's insecurity about Tibet is an important driver of its
approach toward India. India has
been
unable to
assuage
C hina's fears about its
possible
use of thepresence of
the
Dalai Lam a in India and its large Tibetan refugeepopulation
of about 120,000 to create trouble for China in Tibet. TItepresence of
the
Dalai Lama
and a large com munity of Tibetan refugees in India has kept the Tibetan question
alive. G iven India's open democ ratic system and long tradition o f giving refuge to per-
secuted peoples, India will find it
politica y
impossible to m eet C hina's expectations on
the Tibet question without a significant qu id pro quo . Tlw breakdown of talks between
the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama does not augur well for
the future, and a post-Dalai Lam a situation cou ldbecome much more
compHcated
Of
ate, China's
aggressive
territorial claims on India, the
deepening
of the China-Pakistan
alliance and a shift in China's position on Kashmir has led to a hardening of India's
position on T ibet. India is now seeking satisfaction on w hat it considers to be the cor e
issues relating to India's sov ereignty and territorial integrity. India-China relations are
unlikey to be on an even
kee
untU this tangled knot is unraveled.
F
or thousa nds of
years
Tibe t was the buffer th at kep t India and Ch ina geograph-
ically apart and therefore at peace. It has only been for the last six decades or
so after China invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950 that India and China have
come to share a comm on border and with it the in here nt issues of border security
such as the delineation and demarcation of the border and the movement of people
and flow of trad e across it. However in the absence of any extensive historical
experience of relations with each other each country h as a poor un ders tand ing
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countries beganto interact after India's independencein1947 and the Communist
Revolution
in
China
in
1949. Bo th were the n governed by proud n atio nali st leaders
who were imbued with an exalted senseof thegreatness, d estinyandmissionof
their respective nations , bu t who alsohaddeeply in grained grievances arisingout
of the humiliations they suffered under colonial rule. Given the vanities, egos and
different waysofth ink ingofthe leadersofIndia and China ,thelikelihoodofmis-
perceptionsandm isunde rstanding s was built intothesituation.'
Before
th e
S I N O - I N D I A N R E L AT IO N S ANDT IB ET P R E - 1 9 5 0
mirl 90tii rpntnrv Before the mid-20th century, India-China rela-
_,.,
tions were minimal. There was some overland and
ll lQld-v^lUllc i seaborne trade, as well as occasional exchanges of
r e l a t i o n s w e r e pilgrimsandscholars.^ Th e experienceof the Indians
min ima l
^ Chineseof the outside world was completely
different. Indiadid notindeed could notkeepout
foreign influences andideas. M acedo nians, Turks, Afghans, Persians, Mongolsand
assorted tribes from theEurasian he artla nd who invaded Ind ia overthecenturies
made
a
profound
and
lasting impact
on the
country.
The old
order was
not
swept
away. Rather,
a
newcompo site culture and society emerged as, over time, the
invaders settled down
in the
hospitable climes
of the
plains
of
India. Here they
livedinpeaceandprospered, eventually becoming indistinguishab le from, indeed
a part of, the local population.^ That was not the experience of the Chinese,
who remained self-assured that they were
the
Middle Kingdom
and all
others
barbarians. This patronizing approach persisted when India and China became
independent in the mid-20th century. China's attitude toward Indiawas one of
an elder brotheroruncle who was well established in theworld, giving adviceto a
younger relative struggling tomakehisway. Ind epend ence ofIndia was welcome,
but China,
as the
recognized great power
in
Asia after
the
Second World
War,
expected India
to
know
its
place. *
However, the Chinese also hada complex about India. Instinctively, many
Chinese people, including the communist leaders, understood that India was a very
advanced civilization from which China had borrowed much, including Buddhism.
India's spiritual and philosophical traditions were admired. MaoZedong himself
admitted to the Indian ambassador that, in China, therewas an oldbelief th at
ifa manliveda good life hewouldbereborn in India. 5 Former Chinese premier
Zhou Enlai also acknowledged that Chinahadlearned much from India.* Yet,the
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The ibetEactor in India China Relations
British influence.' ' Even Indian leaders understood that the Chinese regarded them
as tools or stooges of Anglo-Am erican diplomacy or strategy and th at Ch ina did
not regard India as a friend.^
The thinking of independent India's leaders about China was somewhat dif-
ferent. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister who almost single-handedly
guided India's foreign policy both before and after India's Independence, harbored
a generally benign view of Chin a an d its intenti ons in Tibet, despite being aware of
the inimical attitude of China's communist leaders toward India and toward him
personally' As a well-educated, widely traveled politician and intellectual, Nehru
had great und erstandin g, sympathy and adm iration for China.' He harbored
romantic, idealistic and somewhat nave notions of India and China as two great
Asian civilizations who, as independent nations, would learn from each other's
experience, forging a common destiny and promoting world peace in the 20th
cent ury. However, during the Chinese civil war, the liberal-mind ed Neh ru's sym-
pathies were clearly with the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek rather than with
the communists, something that would have hardly endeared him to China's new
communist leaders. There was mutual admiration, as well as close contacts and
correspondence between the two men.'^ Although Chiang Kai-shek, during his visit
to India in 1942, could not get the leaders of the Indian Congress Party to support
the Allied war effort, the position changed as soon as Britain decided to give India
its indepen dence . In July 1947, just six weeks before India gained its indep enden ce,
the United States and India signed a secret agreement that permitted the United
States to continue, even expand, its aerial missions in Tibet in support of Chiang
Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) forces against Mao's Red Army. This India-U.S.
agreement, initially valid for two years, was extended for an indefinite period in
Nehru's views on Tibet contributed to the deepening of Chinese mistrust, as
N eh ru believed Tibet should be an ind epen den t country.' * A separate invitation
was extended by India to Tibet for the Asian Relations Conference convened by
India in New Delhi in March 1947. Nevertheless, Nehru rejected any suggestion
that India should consider establishing an independent Tibet. He realized that if
the communists were to come to power, they would establish control over Tibet.'^
Although this would bring China's borders right up to India, Nehru did not convey
any concerns. O the r Indian leaders, however, held a somew hat darker view of
China's intentions.'^ Unlike them, Nehru was prudently hedging his bets. While
rejecting Anglo-American overtures to be more active in supporting the Tibetans,
Nehru cautiously approved giving a modest quantity of arms and ammunition to
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wanting toassume allBritish rights andresponsibilities in regard to Tibet arising
outofthe 1904 Lhasa Convention. Under the agreement,theBritish secured rights
to establish trade marts atGyantse, YatungandGartok, andvirtually established
a British protectorate
on
Tibet. Nehru therefore accepted China's suzerainty over
Tibet. A tthe same time, hethought that Tibet should remain autonomousand
that any communist liberation ofTibet shouldbepeaceful. Clearly, Nehrudid not
want theissueofTibet to poison relations between India andChina. ^
Nehru did not
THE CHANGING
TIDE
want the issue of Historically, Tibet and China had fought with
rr-i.T ^ ^ each other. O ne of thefirst priorities of China's
1
lbet
to
poison
. u
^ u .
A
.u
^
communist leaders wasto bring lib et under their
re la t ions etWeen
control. From china's perspective, Tibet was vitally
India and China important
for
strategic
and
security considerations.^
Tibet isChina's backdoor, onethat has never been
totally secure.
In the
early 20th century,
at a
time when China
was
weak
and
the Manchu empire indecline, the British established their presence in Tibet.I t
seemed toChina that independent India under Nehru wascontinuing Britain's
policies toward Tibet. The Chinese communists imagined that there was
a
sinister
Anglo-American-Indian plot tocontrol Tibet.^^
China wasacutely aware that ifTibet remained outside China's control it
would inevitably drift closer to India, with which it
had
geographical proximity,
a deep religious and cultural affinity, andnohistory ofhostility.^^ Indeed there
has always been a two-way intensive religious andcultural interaction between
India andTibet. Tibetans regard India, from where Buddhism originated, as
their spiritual mentorandasAryahhumi the Landofthe Holy. Similarly, Mount
Kailash
and
Lake Mansarovar
in
Tibet are
the
holiest mountain and lake
of
Hindu
folklore and tradition, asthey areregarded as theabode ofLord Shiva. .''The
Tibetan variant ofMahayana Buddhism prevailsallacross thehigh rangesofthe
Himalayas in India.TheDalai Lama iswidely venerated in India.^ jjifact, India
has historically served asaplaceofrefuge forTibetanshalf acentury beforethe
present Dalai Lama fled toIndia,hispredecessor, thethir teen th Dalai Lama,had
sought
the
protection
of
British India when
the
Chinese army reached Lhasa
in
1910.^''
This is hardly surprising, sincetheoutside world's accesstoTibetand the
latter's principal economic links with
the
rest
of
the world have traditionally been
via India, as wellasNepal. The present Dalai Lama has goneso far as tostate that
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772e ibetFactor in India Ch ina Relations
Tibet. Tbe roads from Szecbuan via Kbam and from Gansu and Qingbai to Tibet
were completed by 1954.2^ In addition, Cbinese surveys showed tbat a relatively
easy access route to Tibet was from Xinjiang across tbe desolate and uninhabited
Aksai Cbin plateau. As tbis was a region to wbich India also bad a claim, the
Cbinese government adopted dilatory and obfuscatory tactics on tbe border issue
to lull India into a sense of complacency, wbile it simultaneously took steps to
establisb its position on tbe ground and made preparations to construct a road
across Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang with Tibet.29
India watcbed witb outward philosophic acquiescence as the Cbinese
imposed tbe Seventeen-Point Agreement on a young and hapless Dalai Lama in
May 1951.- Meanwhile, Nebru was taking out insurance policies to deal witb tbe
implications and consequences of a Cbinese occupation of Tibet. Cbina, Nebru
tbougbt, was bardly likely to launch an armed attack against India. However, he
realistically recognized tbat Chinese troops may well try to infiltrate or occupy
disputed areas.^' Thus, tbe Indian government set about taking steps to establisb
administrative control over tbe remote, sparsely populated Himalayan regions of
Ladakb and tbe Nortb-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)tbe present day state of
Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang. Wbile India did not want to openly side
witb tbe United States and Britain in tbeir plans to destabilize Cbina's position
in Tibet, tbere was apparently connivance tbougb perbaps not collusion witb the
United States in the latter's efforts to undermine the Cbinese hold on Tibet.^2 Por
instance, in Marcb 1951, India and tbe United States signed a confidential mutual
defense assistance agreement.^^
India bad no other option but to diplomatically engage tbe Cbinese govern-
ment in order to fix an agreed border between India and Tibet. Altbough China's
unsatisfactory and evasive responses to Indian dm rches caused considerable
unease within Indian official circles, including at times for Nehru himself, India's
approach remained confused and weak. India's ambassador to China deliberately
ignored instructions from Delbi, and seems to bave unduly influenced Nebru's
tbinking in tbe direction of glossing over inconvenient facts and appeasing
Cbina.^'' Nebru insisted tbat tbe border was firm, well-known and undisputed and
tbat there was no room for controversy, map or no map. ^5 Decisions to publish
official maps were taken between 1953 and 1954, showing a clearly delimited
boundary between India and Tibet in all sectors.^^ Tbis was putting a gloss on
matters. The sections of tbe boundary in tbe western and middle sectors were
previously defined by custom, usage and tradition, not by treaty. In tbe eastern
sector, Nehru insisted that tbe McMahon Line, covering tbe area from just short
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Chinese government
had not
ratified
it and
China's leaders
had
made it clear th at
they would never recognize thevalidity ofthe McMahon Line, which they said
had been imposed
by
imperialists. ^^ Th ere
was an
important reason
for
China's
obduracyon this matter. Chinese leaders understood very well that, were theyto
recognize the validity
of
the McM ahon Line,
it
would imply that Tibet
at
that t ime
wasan independent state with treaty-making powers. Fromapolitical perspective,
this
was
impossible
for
China
to
accept, since, unless Tibet was recognized
as an
inalienable part of China notonly in 1951 buthistorically aswell, the Chinese
takeover
of
Tibet lacked legitimacy
and
would always
be
considered
an
imperial
conquest.^^
Having forced
the
Dalai Lama into submission
forced the
^ ^
initiating road-building projects
to
improve
con-
D a
lili
Tamil intn
nectivity with Tibet, China then turned
its
attention
., . . _ ,. . toward weak ening Tibet's tradition al economic links
Submission ^nina
^j^j jj^^j^^
Nepal, eliminating India's extraterri-
turned its
torial rights inTibet and securing India's legitimiza-
toward ^^
^
china's takeover
of
Tibet.^^ These objectives
1 n r - i - ^ were achieved through
the
Agreement
on
Trade
and
w e a k e n i n g l i b e t s
, u r J- J ^ U- , ,nc.
o Intercourse between India
and
China
in
A pril
1954
traltlOnai andan
exchange
of
notes.''
In
keeping with Nehru's
economic links
ostrich-like approach to
the
matter, Indian nego-
AA ith T nH ia an
tiators
had
been specifically instruc ted
not to
raise
^ y I border issues in
the
negotiations.
At
a time whenit
r
* had
some strategic leverage, India m issed the opportu-
nity
to
gain
a
clear
and
explicit reco gnition
of
India's
borders with Tibet from China. Although thishascometo bepopularly know nas
the Panchsheel Agreement,
it
is
noteworthy that
the
so-called Five Principles
of
Peaceful Coexistence
are
only mentioned
in the
preamble,
not in the
main text
as
India
had
wan ted.'
In
fact,
the
Chinese preference was
for
these
to be
included
in
a mere joint press statement.
It
was
an
idealistic Nehru who deliberately exagger-
atedthepolitical significance ofthe Agreementasheraldinganewera inrelations
between IndiaandCh ina, w iththeFive Principlestoserve asamantra onthebasis
of which
not
only Sino-Indian relations,
but
relations among
all
countries
in
Asia
would develop.
The
Chinese w ent along with this charad e because it suited them ,
but it
is
noteworthy tha t whereas India
had
wanted
the
Agreement
to be
valid
for
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The ibetEactor in India Ch ina Relations
help the Tibetans. In late 1956, on the occasion of the 2,500th birth anniversary
celebrations of Lord Buddha, the Dalai Lama managed to pay a visit to India after
receiving last-minute clearance from the Chinese authorities following Nehru's per-
sonal intervention. He explored the possibility of getting political asylum in India,
but was politely rebuffed by Nehru who was reluctant to antagonize the Chinese.
In fact, Nehru had invited Zhou Enlai to India at the same time, an invitation that
Zhou willingly accepted as this gave him an opportunity to keep an eye on the
activities of the Dalai Lama. During several weeks between November 1956 and
January 1957, there were extensive bilateral discussions centering on the situation
in Tibet between the Dalai Lama, Nehru and Zhou Enlai.' '^
TEN SIO N S R ISE
Mutual suspicions and distrust between India and China mounted in the fol-
lowing years. In September 1957, the Aksai Chin road connecting Xinjiang with
Tibet was completed. India was naturally concerned and alert, but it did not reg-
ister a protest until the following year.''' ' However, China's attitude became increas-
ingly unfriendly There had been an invitation from the Dalai Lama to Nehru,
forwarded by Zhou Enlai in January 1958 to visit Tibet, but the Chinese began
dragging their feet over Nehru's visit. Incidents of infiltration by Chinese troops in
territory claimed by India began to take place more frequently, and China started
publishing maps that claimed large sections of the NEFA. A distinct deterioration
in Sino-Indian relations had set in.''5 It was evident that the steps being taken
by China to tighten its grip on Tibet led it to occupy and claim territory that
India also claimed or controlled. This naturally upset India.' ' For its part, China
resented India's complicity in U.S. efforts, as well as India's own actions to support
the Tibetan resistance movement in India.''' ' As the authorities tried to enforce
collectivization, there were large-scale uprisings in Kham and Amdo, where many
monasteries were destroyed and monks murdered. Hundreds of refugees streamed
into central Tibet and many fled to India as well. The steadily deteriorating situa-
tion in Tibet culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in March 1959.
In the face of widespread public sympathy and support for the Dalai Lama,
the Indian government had no option but to give asylum to the Dalai Lama. This
was regarded by Ch ina as a grave act of provocation. Vituperative prop aganda was
let loose against India in the Chinese press and relations with India continued
to deteriorate.''^ A number of serious border incidents and incursions took place
shortly thereafter. As Zhou Enlai was to later adm it, there was a clear link between
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1959. They might have been worried about the kind of support that India, in col-
laboration with the United States, was suspected of giving the Dalai Lama to try to
fan the flames of rebellion in Tibet.^' Uncertain about India's attitude and fearing
that India could become a platform to launch attacks on Tibet, Zhou visited India
in April 1960. It is noteworthy that Zhou's discussions with all of his Indian inter-
locutors focused on Tibet. It would appear that the Indian side got caught up in
legal and historical arguments and missed Zhou's willingness to settle the border
problem within a broader political framework that, while finding a solution on
the basis of the status quo, would legitimize China's takeover of Tibet.^^ Although
Nehru was inclined to work out a compromise deal with China, his colleagues,
senior officials and the intense political pressure he faced in parliament tied his
hands and he felt that he had no option but to take a rigid stand.^^
Zhou, Mao and the other Chinese leaders must have certainly realized that
India had no intention of handing the Dalai Lama back to them. Their concerns
about the activities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exiles in India, which had
already been conveyed by Zhou to Indian leaders during his visit to India in April
1960, intensified. Their fears were not groundless. As relations between India and
China deteriorated in the months and years that followed Zhou's failed visit to
India in April 1960, and especially after the India-China border conflict of 1962,
India's support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in exile underwent a dramatic
change. The Tibetans were allowed to set up a so-called government-in-exile in
Dharamsala, even though India has never acknowledged this. Over the last five
decades, considerable assistance has been given by India to the Tibetan com-
munity in exile, including allocation of land for the rehabilitation of the refugees
and funding for schools and Tibetan cultural establishments.^ * The official Ind ian
position has been that the Dalai Lama is regarded and respected by Indians as a
spiritual and religious leader who, as an honored guest, is welcome to stay in India
as long as he desires, and that the government of India does not allow Tibetan
refugees in India to engage in any anti-China political activity from Indian soil.
THAW IN RELATIONS
After the 1962 border conflict, India-China relations went into a freeze. The
thaw was very gradual, starting with the exchange of ambassadors in 1976, the
visit of the Chinese foreign minister to India in 1981 and exchanges at the level of
senior officials and special envoys, leading up to the visit of Indian prime minister
Rajiv Candhi to China in December 1988the first visit at this level since Nehru's
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The ibetFactor in India China Relations
had lapsed in 1962, China used the occasion of the Indian prime minister's visit to
get India to commit itself to recognizing Tibet as a part of China and to rein in the
Tibetans living in exile in India. Thus, in the joint press communiqu issued at the
en d ofRajiv G and hi's visit, Chin a flagged itsconcern over anti-C hin a activities
by some Tibetan elements
in
India, and India reiterated itslong-standing and
consistent policy that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China
political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil. ^^
In subsequent years, asIndia-C hina relations norm alized th roug h regular
exchange of high-level visits thesalience ofTibet in theIndia-C hina discourse
diminished.^'' China itself resumed
in
September
2002 aserious dialogue on Tib et wi th the envoys of
the Dalai Lama, after it was somewhat reassured that
A^PQ
r e
c
c
the Dalai Lama was
not
seeking
the
independence -
of Tibet
but
only genuine autonomy. Perhaps
the
improved atmosphere in Sino-Indian relations also normalized the
influenced th e Chinese decision. From th e Chinese Salience
of
Tihet
perspective, theIndia n position onTib et was reas- . i T I
/ ^^
. . .
. .r n . m theIndia-China
suring, though notentirely satisfactory. Chin agot
a little more comfort from
the
nex t shift
in
India's
QlS OUrSe
Tibet position, which took place during the visitof
diminished.
Prime Minister Vajpayee toChina in2003. On that
occasion, inretur n for China implicitly recognizing Sikkim asanintegral pa rt of
India, India accepted tha t the Tibetan Autonomous Region ispart of the terri-
toryof the People's Republicof China. ^'' China expressed its appreciation for the
Indian position firmly opposing any attempt and action aimed atsplitting Chin a
and bringing about independence
of
Tibet. The twocountries also decidedto
fast-track border talks by appointing special representatives tasked with exploring
from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of
a boundary settlement.^^
The high point ofSino-Indian bilateral relations was reached d uring Chine se
prime minister Wen Jiaobao's visit toIndia inApril 200 5, when thetwo coun-
tries agreed to establish
an
India-C hina Strategic andCooperative Partne rship
for Peace andProsperity based on theprinciples
of
Panchsheel andsignedan
Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement
of the India-China Boundary Question. From the Indian perspective, one
of
the
mo st imp orta nt clauses was Article VII, which states that in reaching a bo und ary
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ments along tbe Line of Actual Control may be done wbile finalizing tbe border
in tbis sector.^
REVIVAL OF SUSPICION AND MISTRUST
Unfortunately, from tbe end of 2006 onwards, tbe relationship again began to
deteriorate. On tbe eve of President Hu Jintao's visit to India, tbe Chinese ambas-
sador to India made a statement to an Indian TV news cbannel claiming tbe whole
of Arunachal Pradesh asapart of Cb ina. Tb is was not acasual rem ark an d w as
confirmed wben Cbinese foreign minister Yang Jiecbi told bis Indian counterpart
in May 2007 tbat, contrary to tbeIndian under-
T h e h i n e s e h a v e
standing of tbe 2005 Agreement on tbePolitical
PfsistpH in thp ir
Param eters and Gu iding Principles for the Settlem ent
I .
p I of
tbe Ind ia-China Bound ary Q uestion,
the
mere
p o l i c y
o t
k e e p i n g presence of settled pop ulations did not affect Cbinese
under claims in A runa cbal Pradesb. To furtber em phasize
^^^
point, Cbina refused to giveavisa to an Indian
official from Arunacbal Pradesb on the grounds tbat,
as tbe state was a part of Cbina, the official did not need a
visa.*^'
Tbe Cbinese bave
persisted in tb eir policy of keeping India und er pressure. For example, tbe Cbinese
used periodic military provocations along tbe border including, unprecedentedly,
on tbe Sikkim-Tibet border, and blocked a loan from tbe Asian Development Bank
for a project in Arunachal Pradesb.^^ Meanwhile, China's rapid development of its
infrastructure in Tibet, wbicb would enable Cbina to have amuch stronger m ili-
tary presence in Tibet, and reports of Cbina's plans to dam or divert rivers rising
in Tibet and flowing into Soutb Asia, bave added to India's worries.*^^ Tbe water
issue is now a prominent one in India's higb-level interactions with Cbina as well
as in its public discourse.^''
Althougb tbe Chinese actions evoked considerable public outrage witbin India,
official Indian responses were initially low-key and bave gradually hardened over
tbe last tbree years. In January 2008, tbe document signed at tbe end of Indian
prime minister Manmoban Singh's visit carried no mention of
Tibet. 5
India's reac-
tion to tbe Marcb 2 008 troubles in Tibet confirmed tba t India bad subtly changed
its policy on Tibet. Contradicting tbe official Cbinese line, India's official statement
of 15 M arch 200 8 pointed ly talked of inno cent people having died in Lbasa. Tb e
statement drew attention to Tibet's autonomy, suggested that tbere was merit in
tbe demands of tbe Tibetans and went on to imply tbat it was for Beijing to find
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The TibetFactor nIndia China Relations
In the face of tremendous Chinese pressure not to let the Dalai Lama visit Tawang
monastery in Arunachal Pradesh, India did not flinch and, much
to
China's
annoyance, the Dalai Lama was allowed to visit Tawang in November 2009. '''' In
August 2010, Manmohan Singh had a meeting with the Dalai Lama.''^ Following
the practice established during the Indian prime minister's visit to China in 2008,
the joint communiqu issued at the end of Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao's
visit to India in December 2010 also carried no mention of Tibet. Nor, for the first
time in recent years, is there any explicit mention of India's one China policy. ^
CONCLUSION
T J - x-
ndia s
reaction to
Where will matters go from here? Tibet is far from
. ^ . ^ Vi
pacified,
a
fact that the sudden and dramatic 2008 M arcn
revolt supports. This has revived China's dormant
trOUDleS
m
fears about Tibet. From a Chinese perspective, Tibet onfirmed th at
remains the single most important factor driving India had
Sino-Indian relations; that was Mao Zedong's view,
.
and seems to reflect contemporary Chinese thinking CliclllgcCI
lLi
too.'' The Chinese are aware that it is only because
O n
the Dalai Lama lives
in
India that he
is in
close
proximity to and can keep in touch with the Tibetan community inside Tibet.
The facilities that India has given the Tibetan community have enabled them to
preserve their distinct language, culture, history and traditions and to keep the
fire of Tibetan nationalism burning. Any political activity that the Tibetan groups
conduct around the world is possible only because they have a secure base in India.
Without India, Tibet cannot be kept alive as an international issue. Therefore what
India thinks about Tibet does matter. Given India's open and democratic system
and a long tradition of giving refuge to persecuted peoples, India will find it politi-
cally impossible to meet China's expectations on the Tibet question. At the same
time, India realizes that there is no way that China can be made to give up its
control of Tibet.
The Tibet issue has bedeviled Sino-Indian relations for sixty years. Both sides
sense that the endgame is near. Possibly in preparation for that, India has made a
significant hard-line shift in its Tibet policy in recent months. Essentially, India
has signaled to China that it is not prepared to give satisfaction to China on Tibet,
considered by China as
a
core issue, as long as China does not give satisfaction
to India on what India considers its own core issues. At a meeting in Wuhan in
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Rajiv Sikri
Kashmirthe first time suchalinkage has been made by India. ' This position was
formally reiteratedinapolicy speechby theIndian foreign secretaryinDecember
2010, wherein itwasclearly spelled outindetail that China's role inPakistan-
occupied Kashmir, China's Jammu and Kashmir policy, and the China-Pakistan
security andnuclear relationshipare forIndia core issues that impingeonIndia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also mentioned were India's concerns about
China's plan
todam
rivers rising
in
Tibet which would adversely affect India
asa
lower riparian.''^ Thejoint communiqu issuedatthe endofChinese primemin-
ister Wen Jiaobao's December 2010 visit
to
India also talks about mutual respect
and sensitivity foreach other's concerns andaspira-
os C h i n e s e tions. ''^
Had the
new policy simply been conveyed
to
rPT
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The
ibet
Eactor in India C hina Relations
articulated
in
the past th at he may retire
in
the near future.'^ Th is would be the
first time since the communists took power in 1949 that they would have to deal
with such
a
situation. As
it
is, China's ruling elite has
a
negative perception of the
Dalai Lama. Matters could get more complicated if the Tibetan community selects
someone living outside China and Tibet as the new Dalai Lama. There
isa
high
likelihood
of
this happen ing. Tibe tans believe th at
a
new Dalai Lama
is
reincar-
nated
in
order
to
continue the w ork
of
his predecessor. Since the present Dalai
Lama is arefugee living o utside Tib et, it islogical
to assume that his successor should be born outside J
w i ll
be
Tibet to carry forward the unfinished work during his r)o lit icallv SUCdal
previous incarnation.''^ This will undoubtedly create a
^ T T
tricky situation for India since the Dalai Lama lives in
^ ^ ^ally lllQ ldll
India and there is a high probability that his successor
POVemment tO
will be reincarnated in India, perhaps in Dharamsala
p ivP C h in a
or even Tawang. Even if it is not in India that the next .
^ , . . . . ^ u s a t i s f a c t i o no n
Dalai Lama
is
reincarnated, India remains the main
base
of
active followers
of
the Dalai L ama w ho con-
J
l et W ltllOllt
stitute his main bodyofsupp ort. T he present D alai g e t t i n g a id
VTO
Lama has also said that he may well be the last Dalai
n jn
frnm
^\\
ina
Lama^ As opposed to this, the Chinese government
in
a
biza rre move has arroga ted to itself the absurd right to approve all reincarna -
tions
of
Tibetan lamas Thu s
a
post-Dalai Lama scenario
is
fraught w ith serious
misunderstanding and tension.
Is China likely tochange its presen t Tib et policy? One straw inthe windis
the convening of the Fifth Tibet Work Forum in January 2010. This rare strategy
meeting on Tibet, convened only four times
in
the last thir ty y ears (1980, 1984,
1994 and 2001), was attended
by
more than 300 ofCh ina's mo st senior party,
government and military leaders.Itwas made ab un dan tly clear th at T ibet is, for
the Party, acore issue, not one ofmarginal concern, not least because ofwater
and security issues. Although the meeting did not indicate any policy shift,
the
tone and approach were different, with
a
notable lack of virulent rhetoric against
the Dalai Lama and an unusual reference to "the material and intangible cultural
heritage of Tibet." Inaddition, itdealt with all Tibetan areas, not just the T ibet
Autonomous Region.^'
It
is extremely unlikely th at any fundam ental change will
be made as long as Hu Jintao holds the reins
of
power. It wo uld be unrea listic
to
expect him
to
adm it th at his Tibet policy, including th e ha ndlin g
of
the 2008
uprising in Tibet, isflawed. B ut the new C hinese leaders who come topower
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Rajiv Sikri
next president, may change China's Tibet policy in the direction of giving Tibet
genuine autonomy.^^ Qne hopes so. Otherwise, the Tibet question, now linked
by India to China's position on Kashm ir and its relations with its all-weather
friend Pakistan, could dangerously spiral downward. It will require deft diplomacy,
political courage and enorm ous patience on bo th sides to unravel this tangled kn ot.
Without resolving the Tibetan question, the prospects of putting bilateral India-
China relations on an even keel look dim. ^
NOTES
' Ne hru himself recognized this when India-C hina relations soured in the late fifties. Th e Chin ese,
he said, had a one-track mind . See speech in Lok Sabha, 25 November 1959 in Jawaharlal N ehr u,
India s
Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September
1946-Aprit 1961 (New Delhi: Publications Divis
M inis try of Information and Broadc asting, Go vernm ent of India, 1961), 362 . See also T. N. Kaul, A
Diplomat s Diary (1947-1999): Chitia, Indiaand USA (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2000), 71.
2 Jawaharlal Ne hru,
Discovery
of hidia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 192-200.
^ Rajiv Sikr i, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India s Foreign Poliey(New Delhi: SAGE, 200 9
245-46 .
' ' K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas: Metnoirs of a Diplomat(London: George Allen & U nwin, 1955)
26-27. See also Nehru quoted in S.Copa\,JawaharlalNehru: A Biography,Volume Two 1947-1956 (Del
Oxford University Press, 1979), 229.
5 Ibid., 80.
T. N. Kaul,Diplomacy in Peaceand War (Ghaziabad, India: Vikas Publishers, 1979), 51.
'' K. M. Pa nikk ar (1955), 100-101.See also Girilal Jain,Patiehsheela andAfter
A
Re-Appraisal
ofSino-
Ittdian Relations
in
the Context
of
the Tibetan Insurreetion
(Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), 7-9.
^ Indian H ome Minister Vallabhai Patel's Note of 7 November 1950 to Indian Prime M inister
Nehru, reproduced in Subramanian Swamy,hidia s China Perspective (New Delhi: Konark Publishers,
2001), 165-66.
' Neville Maxw ell,India s China War (Dehradun, India: Natraj Publishers, 1997), 259-63.
' Speech at ban que t held in honor of Zhou Enlai on June 26, 1954, in Nehr u (1961), 30 6- 12 ; See
alsoGopal (1979a), 230.
No te on Ch ina and Tibe t date d 18 Novem ber 1950, reproduced in Swamy, 173. See also Gopal
(1979a), 139.
'^ Ma ulana Azad, India Wins
Freedom
(Madras: Orient Longman, 1988), 41-45. See also Jawaharlal
Nehru,
An
Autobiography (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1982), 608; and Jawaharlal Nehru,
A
Butieh of Old Letters (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1958), 440-45, 466-68, 484-86.
'3 S. M ahm ud AH, Gold War in the High Hitnalayas: The U SA, Ghina and South Asia in the 1950s
(Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1999), 185, 190-96.
' * Jawaharlal Ne hru,
Glimpses
of
World History
(New De lhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 842 .
'5 Gopal (1979a), 105.
'^ Claude Arpi, The Fate of T ibet: Wlien Big Insects Eat Small bisects (New D elhi: H ar-Anand
Publications, 1999), 274.
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The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations
War ren W. Smit h, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations
( N ew
Delhi: Harper Collins India, 1997), 161.
2 Speeches in Parliament, December 6 and 7, 1950 reproduced in Nehru (1961),
3 0 2 - 0 3 .
See also
N o t e
on Ch in a and Tib et dat ed 18 Nov embe r 1950, repr oduc ed in Swamy (2001), 170-74.
2 ' Pan ikka r, 105. See also Maxwe ll, 70.
22 Jain, II , 18 ,2 0.
23
Sikri 95-6.
2'* Mo ha n Gur usw amy and Zorawar Daulet Singh, India China Relations: TIte Border Isstie and Beyond
(New Delhi: Viva Books, 2009), 39.
25 Ne hr u (1961), 313.
2^ Tenzin Gyatso, My Land and My
People
Memoirs of His Holiness, the Dalai Lama (New Delhi: Shristi,
1997) , 76.
2' ' Tenzin Gyatso,Freedom in Exile: Tite Autobiography of the Dalai Lama of Tibet (London: Abacus, 1992)
113, 123, 165.
28 Sm ith , Jr., 375 .
29 Maxwell , 87- 9.
Tser ing Shaky a, TIte Dragon in the Land of the Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (London:
P im l i c o , Ran dom House , 1999), 44 9- 52 , Appe ndix I.
3 ' Gop al (1979a), 176.
32
Shakya , 75.
33
AH, 187, 19 9- 20 0.
3 Gopal (1979a), 1 7 6 - 8 1 . See also. Maxwell, 74-86.
35
C. V. Ran gana than and Vinod C. Kh ann a, India and China: TIte Way Ahead after Mao's India War
(New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000), 28.
36 Ibid., 28 -3 0.
. 37 Swamy, 41 -4 3; K. Nat war Singh,
My China Diary 1956-88
(New Delhi : Rupa & Co., 200 9), 100.
38 Sikri , 96.
39 Shak ya, 1 33- 35 ; See also Smith , Jr., 133 -3 5, 378 .
'' Lok Sabha Secre tariat , Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha
Secretariat, 1959), 103-09.
' Thes e are I. Mut ual respect for each other's territo rial integrit y and sovereignty; 2. Mut ual n on-
aggression; 3. Mu tua l non-inte rference in each other's intern al affairs; 4. Equal ity and mutu al benefit;
and 5. Peaceful coexistence.
''2 Kaul (1979), 99 -1 03 , 106; See also, Shak ya, 119-2 1.
'^^ Gyats o (1992), 113-34 . See also Gyats o (1997), 139-54 ; and Shak ya, 151-56.
'*'' Nehr u's state men t in Rajya Sabha, on 31 Aug ust 1959 in Ne hr u (1961), 33 1- 34 .
5 S. Go pa l, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Volume Three 1956-1964 (New Delh i: Oxford University
Pre s s ,
1979),
7 8 - 8 1 .
' ^ Gopa l (1979b), 82 -8 3.
''7 AH, 64, 91 -92 , 93 -9 6, 239 -4 4; See also Nehr u's stat eme nt in th e Lok Sabh a on March 30 1959,
reproduced in Nehru (1961), 313-17.
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Rajiv Sikri
Kaul (2000), 70.
^' Shakya, 20 5-0 6.
52
S i n g h , 8 9 - 1 1 0 .
53
K a u l ( 2 0 0 0 ) , 6 8 - 6 9 ; Se e a l so M a xw e l l (1 9 9 7 ) ,
1 5 6 - 6 3 .
5' '
S e e I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f or S u s t a i n a b l e D e v e l o p m e n t w e b s i t e a t h t t p : / / w w v v . i i s d . o r g / 5 0 c o m m /
c o m m d b / d e s c / d 4 6 . h t m .
G u r u s w a m y
a nd S ingh , 143 .
J. N.
Dixit,
My
South Bloek Years Memoirs
of a
Foreign Secretary
(New
Delhi:
UBS
Publishers
Distributors, 1996), 233-234.
5^ See text of De claration on Principles for Relations and Com prehensive Coope ration between th e
People's Republic of China and the Republic of India , 23 June 2003, reproduced in Guruswamy and
Singh, 160.
5^ Dec laration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Coope ration between the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of India , in Guruswamy and Singh, 160.
59 Ibid., 164-7 8.
Sujit Dut ta, Revisiting China's Territorial Claims on Arunac hal, Strategic Analysis 32:4 (July
2008), 551; former C hinese Ambassador to India Cheng Ruisheng quoted in Guruswa my and Singh,
160.
' ' Du tta (2008), 55 5-5 6.
^2 P. Stob dan, Revisiting Sino-Indian Relations,
Strategic Analysis
32:5 (September 2008): 704-07
and Is China Desperate to Teach India Another Lesson? Strategic Analysis 34:1 (January 2010), 15;
Na mrata G oswami, China's Territorial Claim on Aruna chal Pradesh: Crafting an Indian Response,
IDSA IssueBrief 25 October 2010.
''^ Monika Chansoria, Trendlines in China's Infrastructure Development in Tibet, GLAWSJournal
(Summer 2010), 173-87, and Water Security for India: The E xternal Dynamics, IDSA
Task Force
Report 3 (September 2010),
44-51.
M inist ry of External Affairs, India. Niru pam a Rao, Indian Foreign Secretary address on India-
China relations at ORF on China, 3 December 2010, http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=530116760,
and Joint Co mm uniq ue of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of Chin a, Dece mber 2010,
http://mea .gov.in/m ystart.php? id=10 00168 79& pid=1 921 (accessed 11 Februay 2011).
Indian Ministry of External Affairs website at http://mea.gov.in/meaxpsite/
declarestatement/2008/01/l4js01.pdf.
^^
Sikri, 100.
See Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh's response to questions at press conference after
meeting with Chinese prime minister on 25 October 2009 available on Indian Ministry of External
Affairs website at http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id= 5101152 63&.flg=l.
Report of Ma nmo han Singh's meeting with Dalai Lama, http://w\vw.dnaindia.com/india/report_
dalai-lama-s-meeting-with-pm-manmohan-singh-was-nothing-unusual-aide_ 1426535.
^ Text of com mu niqu . Available on Indian M inis try of External Affairs website at http://mea.gov.
in/mystart.php?id=190016879.
^ Gu rusw amy and Singh, 84; See also Che n Jidong,The Tibet Issue and Gurrent Sino Indian Relations i
Isabelle Saint-Mezard a n d James K. Chin eds . ,China
an d
India Political anil Strategic Perspectives Centre
of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2005) xvii-xviii, 113-24.
''' Sidd har th Varadarajan, India Tells Ch ina: Ka shm ir is to Us W ha t Tibe t, Taiwan are to You, Th e
Hinduof 15 November 2010, http://ww w.hindu.com/2010 /ll/15/stories/2010111562471200.htm.
2 See text of India n foreign sec retary N irupam a Rao's address on India -Ch ina relations at ORF on
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TheTibetEactor in India-China Relations
' '' ' See state me nt by Lodi Gya ri, Special Envoy of the D alai Lama at the In stitu te of South A sian
Studies, Singapore on 24 N ovember 2010, available at http://www .tibet.net/en/index.php? txtSearch=
talks-Hwith-l-Chinese4-government#.
^5 For a deta iled discussion of possible scena rios, see Sikri , 98 -9 9.
^'' Rep ort on special meeting of Tib etan s in exile held in Dhara msa la, India from 17-22 Novemb er
2008, http://wwvv.mcllo.com/Reportage.%5BMcllo.com%5D.html.
' '' ' Aba nti Bhattacharya , Chinese Nationalism and the Fate of Tibet,
Strategic ttalysis
31, no. 2
(March 2007), 258-61.
''8 Report in Asian Age 22 November, 2010, http://www.asianage.com/india/dalai-lama-says-he-
contemplating-retirement-vvithin-months-399.
^9 Gyatso (1992), 23 7-3 8.
8 Rep ort on special mee ting of Tib eta ns in exile held in Dh aram sala, India from N ovembe r 17-22,
2008,
http://www .mcllo.com/Reportage.%5BMcllo.com% 5D.html.
8' Internation al Tibet Network Report (29 January 2010), http://www.tibetnetwork.org/node/826.
82 W illy Lam, Hope for a Better Tibet Policy,
Ear Eastern Economic Review
(April 2008), 13-16.
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