t
Section A: Articles and Topicality. p. A·1
THE SCOPE OF NEGATIVE FIAT AND THE LOGIC OF
DECISION MAKING
L. Pall! Sirait. George Mason University
Brett Wallace. George Washington University
"No one can make a decision exccpl me." - Presiden t Dwight
\).
The. Uniled Slul C:<I Jeuerol go)'enunenJ sub-
stantially increase its public healtlt assistance to Sub-Sohanm .4.f
rica. By consensus, aftirmative teams debating this resolution will ad-
vocate a plan during their first constructi ve speech which wi ll be an
exampJe of this resolution. The USFG, or some partictllar part of the
Ugfa will e.sta6I\$b. some QGli.c,{ of Q\.\bli.c health d;'1;I!<:.\ed loward somc identified area of Sub-Saharan Africa. What the negative
teams arc able to advocate in response is a little more controversial,
every year they seem to have more and more flexibility. While
<l.b'Tees that the negative has the right to defend the status quo,
fU'St negative constructives that lack either a counterplan or a kJitik are
becoming fa irly Wlcommon. Although it is certainly reasonable for the
negative to advocate that the USFG (or the specific agent identified in
the affimlativc plan) takc action as a competitive altenuuivc to the
affinnative. the positions most frequently advocated by the negative
these days, either in the form of a countcrplan or a kriti k altemative.
involve a dccision·maker separate from the one named in the plan. On
this topic, many negative strJ.tegies will center around counlerplanning
another country's taking <lction toward Africa instead of the United
States. Another perennial favorite ofncgative teams is \0 counterplan
tbat anotherageul within the USFG should take action (c. g., ifthe anir-
mative advocates Congress enacting legislation, the negative might ad·
vocate the prL--sidcnt issuing an executive order). Lastly, a[mostall kri tik
ahematives endorse someone besides the US FG taking some kind of
action.
In th is mticle, we will take issue with these kinds of negati ve
slr.ltegics by arguing thtH negative fiat should be constrained to the
actor employed in the affinnative plan. In order 10 do thi s, we will first
explain what we believe to be the primary benefits of participating in
policy debate. From there, we will succinctly summarize thinking about
negative fiat that has developed sillce the inception oflhe counterplan
and explain why alternative agent fiat is inconsistent with the logic of
decision-making that undergirds the justification for both affirm<ltive
and negative fiat. We will then explain how dlCSe argtuncnts work against
agent cowlterplans, against demands for plan speciflcation, and against
alternative frameworks. Finally, we will identify and answer somc ar-
guments made in defense of alternate agent fiat that have not been
explicitly answered. With this article in hand. you should be able to write
a fi'ontline for the second a ffinnative constructive, as well as exten·
sians for both rebunals.
We should note that while some portions of this rutide represent
entirely unique and creative applications orthe cenlralline of reasoning
that negative fiat should becotlstrained to agents who have the power
to enact the plan, we are in the intellectual debt of other debate theo·
rists, mosl notably M ich.ael Korcok. Throughout the article, we cite
various ilnportrult articles which helped infOlm our thinking on this sub-
ject, and we recommend you seek these articicsoli l if you areseriollsly
interested in this question. We try our best to summarize the arguments
of others when appropriate. Since the centml thesis of this arti cle has
been articulated extremely persuasively again and again, it is our hope
to make this thesis more palatable to current debaters and coaches by
explaining the relevance of this question to contemporary controversies
in me activity. At a minimum, we would like to do Ollr part to contribute
to the body ofliterature describing the scope of negative fiat, which Solt
(1996) described as "a Illora%. a swamp tilled with exotic species o f
flut ih.cOIyand no theon;::tical consensus."
'The value ot policy debate Since its inception, much oflhl! praise policy debate has received
for educating student" has foclised on the real-world skills adopted
throug.h the processes of research, argwnenlaliol1, crilical thinking. and
pol icy analysis. Studen ts take these skiJJs and apply them It) jobs. poJj.
> 1::>'1 \\"\t\'i \\\e. \"f\Qo;:.o;:.u,\"f\ o.o;:.C:)i,on wo;:.
make, including trivial question.') like where \ve should cm dinner as well
as non-trivial questions like what college we should attend or whom we
should malty. we evaluate all of the relevallt advantages and disadvan-
Tages, consider possiblc alternatives, and come to a conclusion.Apolo-
gists for policy debate oftcn champion the increased critical thinking
skills taught by the activity (hat are necessari ly used to \'lork. through
these kinds of choices. If this is tndy the desired goal of policy debate.
one would think that the way in which deba tes are framed, discllssed,
and adjudicated should closely resemble the logic behind ar/:"1.llnentation
and decision making that everyone. from the highest gOVCl1111lCl1l oft!·
cials to the most " inconsequential" members of sociery, uses when they
themselvcs think through a difliclIlt choicc.
The way in which decisions are made. in the real world always
tak.es into account the considcf3ti.on of who is making the decision.
Decision·makers can only chose from the available options open to
them, and not from all possible options they can think ot: Wltile deci·
sion-making would be a lot easil!r if we could assume the position ofa
universal decision maker. i.e .. sonleom: who is al l powerful and can
magically alter the course of action of anyone in the world they wanted,
reality doesn't ofTerus this option. There is no game genic for decision
making, no cheat code. and no abi lity to 1)lay god. Only oncc we realize
the limi ted power that hUmans possess can \ve develop u cogent basis
tor decision making.
Countless debate theorists have explained this arglllnentand ap·
plied it to the logic of policy debate. From Allan Lichtman and Daniel
Rohrer 's groundbreak ing 1975 artide "A General Theory of the
Counterplan:' we have the earliest observation that negative fiat should
have a limited scope, relatingtothc logic of who is making I.hcdccision:
11 is assumed. of course, that decision mak.ers being addressed
have the power to put a countcrplan into effect. An individual or gov-
emmental unit can reasonably be "sked to n:jccl a palticular policy if an
altemative promises greater net bcncfiUi. If, however, a counterplan
must be adopted by another individual or unit of government, the initial
decision maker Illllst consider the probabi lity tha.t the counterplan will
be accepted. Debate propositions often a.ffinn that a particular po licy
should be adopted by the federal government. Even if adoption 0[[hi5
policy by the indi.vidual Slate govc11lments would be more beneficial, a
reasonable critic would still affiml the resolution if st"1te adoption were
highly unlikely. The federal govemmemshould refT'din from acting only
when the net benefits of state and local action, discounted by the prob.
ability that sllch action will occur, are greater than the net beneflts of
federal action. (p. 74, footnote 13).
Expanding upon Lichtman and Rohrer's work, Michael Korcok
(200 I) keenly explained thaI advantages and disadvantages relating to
political l"t.m1iticutions, resources, policy effectiveness, enforcement, and
so on, all depend lIpon whose task it is to take the desired action. TItere·
fore, questions of the substantive desirability of the affirmative,
reso lutional edl1cation more broadly, and policymakillg in totality are
p.A-2
incoherel1t witbout first specifying who is making the decision.
On this year's resolution the affimmtive is asked to support a
United States federal govemment increase in public hea lth assistance
10 Africa. The affi nnative's job is dearly to cmft a nonnative argument
in favor of alL arpat1 of the United States federal govcmment's taking
aCTion. Arguments as to why other countries, international organiza-
tions, or other agents within the United States should take action are
irrelevant to the question ofthe aftimlative's plan because. as Lichtman
and Rohrer point out, they circunwcnl questions of probability. Thus it
on ly makes sense to analyze the desirabil ity of the affinnativc's action
from the lens of avai lable altcmatives open to the topical actor advo-
cated by the atlinnative. The fmthcr that we stray from this logic, the
less and less usefu l deh,lte becomes and the more and more a flawed
tiarnework for decision-making gets ingra ined in our minds.
Consider what it means when a judge votes aftinnati ve or nega-
tive. Supposing the affinnari vc has preSel1lL'<i a topical plan. tbe judge
voles aflinnative when the plan is shown to be net-advantageous when
compared to the status quo or a competitive alternative; and the judge
votes negative when the plan is shown 10 be less desirable Ihan Ibe
sraws quo or a competitive altemative. Ifgiving testimony to the Con-
gress, thc j udgc could reasonably say: "Based on the arguments ( have
heard over the last hour and a half, il would be bener for you to do X
than Y"' Tn other words, aftcr the dcbate is concluded, one entity could
make <l decision based on the infonnation presented. This not 10 say
that Congress (or anyone else) should make decisions based on the
outcomes of scholastic dc,bate rounds- what is important is that Ihe
debaters will have gone through the process of making ao infomled
decision. Th is is utterly impossible if the negative supports action from
some other 11gent besides the one identified in the plan. Since the enlire
point of fiat is to bracket off questions of'would" in order to focus
completely on questions of "should, " questions of probability never get
discussed. From the perspective orthe agent idcntifit.-d in the plan, the
probabili ty is 100%, since if they decide to adopt the mandates oCthe
plan, there is an absolute guarantee that they will in fact do so. Yet if the
plan is compared to a counterplau in which Japan carries oul public
health assistance rather than the United States. there is nevcr a situa-
tion where lhe United States could make a decision based on a 100%
probabil ity that JClpCln would take action if the United States did not.
Thus, ifthe Congrcss had to consider if they should take action or some
other decision-mt:lking body should take action, if they failed to consider
the chance that that otherdccisionwmaking body would not in tact take
the desired action, they would not have gone through any SOlt of logical
deliberation process. Yet this is exactly the way pl'Oponents of ahema-
tive agen t tiat encoumge judges and debaters to think.
More to the point, debate certainly helps tCflch a lot of skill s, yet
we believe that the way poucy debate participation encourages you to
think is the most valuable educational bene fit, because how someone
makes decisions dctcTITlincs how they will employ the rest of their abili-
ties. including the research and communication skills that debate builds.
Plenty of debate theo!)' articles have explained cither thc value of de-
bate, or th.;: way in which alternate actor strategies are detrimental to
rea l-world education, but none so far have attcmpted to lie tbese con-
cepts together. We will now explain how decision-making skill develop-
ment is the foremost value of policy debate and how this bencfit is the
decisiolHtde to resolving all thooretical discllssions about negative fiat.
Why debate? Some do it for scholarships. some do it for
purposes. and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant
considerations when making the decision to join the debate team, but as
debate theorists they aren'[ the focus of our concern. Our concern is
finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of
students wi th the highest quality of skills. while at the same time pre-
serving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from
discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. It is the one thing
every single one orus will do every day afour lives besides breathing.
Decision-making tmnscends bmll1daries between categories ofleal1l-
ing like "poliey education"' and "kririk education," il makes irrelevant
considerations of whether we will eventually be po licymakers, and it
transcends questions of what substantive content a debatc round should
The implication for this analysis is that the critical th inking and
argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making arc com-
pumtively greater than ,Illy educ<ltionaldbwdvantagc weighedag::lin. ... t
them. it is the skills we team, not the can lent of mIl' argumcnl';, that can
be.<;r improve all of our lives. While policycomparisol\skillsare going 10
be leamed through debate in one way or another, those ski lls are use-
less if they are not grounded in the kind oflogic actually used to make
decisions.
The academic srudies and rescarch supporting this position arc
numerous. Richard Fulkerson (1996) explains thai "argumentation ... IS
the chief cognit ive activity by which a dcrnocracy. a field of study, a
corporat ion, or a committee functions .. . And it is vitally important that
high school and college studenls learn both to argue well and lo critiquc
the arguments of others" (p. 16). Stuart Yeh (1 998) comes to the con-
clusion that deb,ue allows even cuI rural minority students 10 "idcnti fyan
issue, considerJitlcrent views, fonn and defend a vic\vpoint, ami con-
si.der and respond to COllnlcraq,Tumcnts ... Thc ability to write effective
arguments influences grades, academic success, and preparat ion ror
college and employment" (p. 49). CCl1ain ly, these are all reasons why
debate and argUlnent<ltion themsdves arc valuable, so why is real world
da..ision-makingcriricai to argumentative thinking? Although people might
occasionally think about problems trom the position of an ideal dccision-
maker (c.t: Ulrich. 198 1, quoted in Korcok. 200 1), in debate we should
be concemed with what type of Ilrgumentativc thinking is the most
relevant to real-world inte!! igence and tbe decisions that people make
every day in tbeir lives. not acadl!mic trivialitics. 11 is precisely lx.-cause
it is rooted in real-world logic that argumentative thinking has va lue.
Deanna Kuhn 's research in "Thinking as Argument" explains this by
staring that "no other kind of think ing maners morc--or contributes more-
to the quality and fu lfillmcntofpeople 's lives, both individually and col-
Icctively"(p. 156).
Given these pedagogical concerns, we agree with Korcok's (200 1)
conc lusion that " 'he appropriate scope of negati ve fiat is the scope of
the authority of the decision-maker choosing whether to adopt the aftir-
mative plan" (p. 253). Korcok clearly identified that [his interprt:cation
ofnegaf ive fiat was the on ly way to access thedccision-making logic
that is so valuable. He leaves as an open question, however, who ex-
actly constitutes the dccision-makcr wbo chooses to adopt the affinna-
tive plan. ls that decisionwmaker rhe en tire resolutional agent? Is it the
j udge deciding whcther or not to cndorse the plan academ.ically? Our
proposal is that the decision-maker shouTd be limj,ted to thc topical agenl
chosen by the aflirnultive, which we contend is the logica l extension of
Korcok's retL'>Oning, and has applications both in deal ing with plan speci-
fication issues and with kritik: theolY beyond fUl1herdarifying the limi ts
ofncgati\'c fiat.
Agent counterplans: Fair? The way in which theoretical disputes are handled in actual de-
bate rounds is often muddy and shallow. Frequently, the Second Aftir-
mative speaker will read a quick, hlippy list of complaints about the
counterplan or kritik in question. and then, in the negative block. an
equally quick and blippy list of defenses are read in response. Ra re ly is
a cohesive interpretation which ties all of the arguments togcther of--
fered and compared to a counter-interpretation. as topicality dcbates
are often treatcd. Standards are often debated i.n a vacuum and not
compared to an altenl<1tive vision of debate, which is usually merely
implied. We regard this as unfortunate, mld perhaps 1\ reason why neglltive
teams all [00 frequently win theoretical disputes, regardless of the is-
sue. Nevenheless, in an ideal debare, eacb team will defend competi-
tive visions of negative fiat power, and org;mize their ml,'1.lIuents in temlS
of offense and defense. TIlerc are two impacts to all of these argu-
ments: competitive equi ty and education. \Ve have already explained
tbe educational benefits of adopting our interpretation. Aflirmative teams
will have to be prepared to answer claims Like " But it is soeducationnl
to research about the Congress versus the President." but since these
kinds of arguments are not exclusively accessed by agent counterplans.
we do nor regard thcm as serious d mllcnges to our (lrgument presented
above. Therefore, we shall deal here with (he issue of competitive eq-
uity.
First. we must note that the tenninal impact to all qucst ions of
competici,vc equity is ultimately participation in itself, which is
good because debate is fun and, obviously, educational. Therefore, ifit
is the case thnt the single most valuable benetit one can gain from
participating in debate is that it improves decision-makingski!!s, then the
educational benefit of rejecting an illogical fiat scheme would outweigh
competitive cquity cOllcems that are not absolute. Therefore, un less the
negative Clln show that agent counterplans are absolutely critical to
preserve p3l1 icipalion in debate (fur example. if the affinnat ivc would
will almost every debate without agent cOlmterplans), claims that they
arc "not that bad" do nal get to the level needed to prove that they arc
necessary . It is the negative 'S burden to justify their use of alternate
actor fiat, not the aftimlative's burden to dejustify all agent counlcrplans.
Unfortunately, as we explain next, debates nomlally do not play out tbis
way.
The connection we have already identified between the log.ic of
dee-isioo making and the proper limit of negative fiat ha,<; implications for
competitive equity as well. which gives afftmlative {eams further of-
fense to convince judges to not consider alternate agent fiat. One method
used by negative teams to handle theoretical objections to their
counterplans or mtiks is to minimize their opponents' ability to win of-
fensive impac[S by cro fi ing clever counter-interpretations [hat simulta-
neously allo\,., the particular strategy chosen by thc negative but disal-
low similar, but perhaps more egregious. strategies. For example, sup-
pose the ncgativeadvoca{cs that the president, instcad orlhe congress,
should increase public health assistance. When the affirmati ve team
argues shou ld reject altemative agent fiat, the negative might
offer a counter-interpretation that they should be constrained to the
decision-makers in the resolution (i .e., some part of the USFG). or even
W OI1>C, that (he negative should only be allowed 10 fiat [he particular
decision-maker used in dleir cOUflterpJan, the president. The most egre-
giolls abusL'S of negative fiat would be avoided by this counter-interprc-
tation, the negative would claim, and the judge should certainly allow
their reasonable, predicw.ble countcrplan. j fthc counter-interpretat ion
chosen by the negative only allows the exact counterplan that they
chose to nm. it would cel1ainly be very easy for the atl'innative since
that is the only counterplan they WOllid ever have to deal with! Why on
earth should the judge vote against the countcrplan fo r theoretical rea-
sons if the negative has an interpretation that is very favorable for the
affimlati ve?
We believe that this kindofstra tcgy, while rhetorically strong, is
intellecrually banknlpt. Affinnative teams occasionally respond simi-
larly to topicality arguments by off cli ng that
only their plan is topical. and negative teams have figured out by now
that these kinds of counter-interpretations are highl y arbitrnry. We con-
tend that just like an interpretation of what is topical ought to be grounded
in some non-arbitrary literature, illterpretations of what the negative
ought to be allowed to fiat also should be non-:ubitrary. The cUlTem
repertoire of interpretations dlat debaters use mainly focuses· on d.is-
tinctions likc public vs. private actors, domestic vs. intematiol1a! deci-
sion-makers, multi-actor fiat and object fiat, but these categories miss
themark completely. because they have nothing to do with the founda-
tion of negative fiat, the logic of decision-making.
An examination of the question offiating "'the object" makes our
position even more clear. Except for those who believe in 'negative
flexibility' as a cult-like religion, everyone agrees that the negative should
not be able to fiat the object ofthe plan; otherwise their win percentage
would skyrocket at the expense of the affirmative. Imagine you are
Section A: Articles and Topicality, p. A-3
running an affinnati\'e which gives condoms and educational assistlmce
in order to solve an HIV/AIDS lldvanlage. Wh<lt substantive answer
would YO Ll have to a cOllntcrplan that had all peopJe infected wi th HIV
become celibate? Or suppose your plan was designed to solve a geno-
cide. The counterp lan to have chc culpable govcmment killing
people prob<lbly solves your affinllf1tfve better than you could ever hope
to with the plan. These are intuitively unfair, making it
for the affirmative to generate oftense. But what 111le would
we udopt to preclude their discussion? Perhaps tile negative should not
be able to fiat a decision-maker who is affected by the plan. Even if
thcre was some non-arbirnuy way 10 decide what and who the plan
affects. it is unclear if even that nile would be sufficient. Consider
affirmatives which uf<::l:ue that the World Health Oft,4mlization is making
somcthi ng worse. perhaps by offering defective medicine or equi pl11cnt,
and so the plan has the United States increase public health assistance
in order to offset the poor assistance in rhe status quo. The cOlJllterplao
to have the WHO change its policy solves the whole case, and the plan
does not actually affect the WHO (the object oflhe plan is still some-
where in sub-Saharan Africa), so our previous ly identified mle is insuf-
ficient forexduding this cownerplan, yec it is abo intuitively wl,air. When
alternative agent fiat is allowed, there really is no non-arbitrary method
of preventing object fiat. Sillce every harm area is a consequence Ofll0
onc's solving it, every alternative agent counterplan is at least a little bit
object fiat. While some counterplnns are clearly '"more unfa ir" than
others, if we can agree with the gcneral principle that objecL fiat hanns
competitive equity. the only true solution is to prevent all alteOlative
agent fiat.
One possible answer to this lineofl1:aSoning is that while it is the
case that [here is no real world decision maker who would decide be-
tween the plan and the counterplan, debate is not the real world, and the
judge is the one Singular decision maker\vllO decides to accept the plan
or thc eountcrplan and endorse onc or the other as the "best idea."
Cel1ainly the j udge is a singular decisiml maker with respeCT to The
ballot (most of thc: ti me - but it should be noted that the University of
Louisville has counrerplanned other judges into theirdebatesj. and the
only rca l decision he or she must make is determ ining \-vhi ch team did
the beucr debating. This seriously begs the question, howeve: the judge
must have some criteria for making that decision, and the fact that he or
she is a unitary decision-maker when it comes time to si&,rn the ballot
does not obviate negative teams fro m justifying the particular policy
they are advocating vis-a.-vis the plan. For the most part, teams defend-
ing <lltemate agentcoumerplans still wouLd like the judge toevaluate the
debate with in a traditional policy framework, voting either for the IOpi-
cal plan, a competitive policy 0pfion, or the status quo. If they defend a
competitive policy option which docs not test the opportunity cost ofthe
agent ofthc plall. they still wallt (he judge to decide that the counterplan
is better than the plan. which means they still ha ve to come to grips with
the basic thesis of the single dec,isiol1-makcr argument. This is not the
only possibility, however. The negative team could pos it that the judge is
like an activist deciding which policy to cndorse. The real qucstion.
then, is not which policy is the besf in a Vdcuum. but rather which poLicy
is mOSt worthy of an activist's support. Unfortunately for defenders of
altemate agent eOl1nterplans, thi s argument offe rs [hem no security-
onc of the most critical questions an activist must consider is whether or
Dot they will be listened to, i.e., whether their activism will work. It
might be a worse policy for the Congress to pass legislation than for the
Court fO issue a ruling, but at the same time it might be nearly impossible
to successfhlly lobby the Cowt. Since alternate agent fiat intentionally
ignorcs quesfions ofprobabiJi ty. it is never a lIseful tool for infonning
activists in which organization they ought to place £heir tiust It is ironic
that most negative teams who make this counter-interpretati.on. as part
of a theory debate subsequently seem to ib'11ore the question of activism
when reading solvency evidence for their cOllnterplan or disadvantages
to the plan. Other possible itemtions of the role of the judge as a deci-
are discussed in more detail below when we tum to the
, I ,
I '
, ' , ' I , I I t'
p.A-4
application ofthis theOI)' to critical framework debates.
Separate from the question of the logic of fiating an alternate
agent, there are other serious faimess concems that the debate com-
munity seems to have overlooked. These concerns are not entirely sepa-
ratc, of course- fiat is adecision-making toot, not an exercise in imag-
ined omnipotence. When 1 decide if I am going to get up when my
alarm rings, orinstead hit snooze, it is totally reasonable forme to imag-
ine both waking up and hitting snooze at a probability of 100%, but in
neither case would it make any sense tor me to consider a possible
world in which my friend covered all of my daily duties so that there
would be no disadvantage to getting some extra sleep. In policy debate,
in order to debate topics thatevel),one can equally research, we debate
public actors rather than private ones, and we need to find literature to
support acting in one way or another. Just like it would be unreasonable
for me to consider things other people could (but probably wOllfdn
do, it is wlreasonable for rigorous policy analysts to write evidence
comparing equivalent action between two agents. To be sure, there is
some literature that compares different public actors, but what passes
for quality evidence here is terrihle most of the time. Negative teams
will read cards that say that "the COU1ts are good at making health
policy" or "Japan is decent at public health assistance to Africa" or
even "Japan is good at [insert specit"ic mandates of the plan)." In no
case, however, arc there cards which say "if one had to choose be-
tween Japan or the United States doing X, Japan would be better." The
reason should be obvious-no one would ever make this kind ofdeci-
sian, or anything close. Evidence which states that Japan is better than
the United States or visa-versa in the area of public health assistance
will not cut it, because it is not written ill the context of policy choice,
since there is no Emperor of the World. At best, comparative evidence
that is read misrepresents the comparison because there are implied
probability concems which are intentionally bracketed off with the magic
wand of fiat. That one agent is not likely to act is more often than not
the reason that another agent is "key."
Why is this important? Ifwe are willing to engage in the lunacy
of alternate agent fiat, perhaps the fact that the solvency evidence is
slightly out of context is not the biggest deal. Yet this cuts to the healt of
the matter-if evidence that compares two agents taking action on the
question of the plan is quoted out of context because probability issues
are ignored, the kind of evidenced-based, rigorous policy analysis that is
the mark of the best rounds of debate is impossible. No one rebuts the
claim that Japan, rather than the United States, should give condoms to
sub-Saharan Africa, because that initial claim is not a genuine opportu-
nity cost of the plan. People who write articles analyzing policies usu-
ally do so fora reason-they would like to encourage policy-makers to
behave in one way or another. This means that there is an examination
of possible courses of action with respect to a single agent-an ideal
policy and one or more altematives, all of which come at the cost of
enacting the first policy. Action by alternate agents fails to represent an
Opportlllllty cost to the agent of the plan, and therefore is never going to
be the subject of rational public policy discourse. Since a good literature
base is the sine qua non affair subject matter for policy debate, alter-
nate agent counterplans should be excluded.
We have mentioned that agent counterplans fail to test the op-
portunity cost ofthe plan, but what docs this mean and why is it impor-
tant? Opportunity cost is a concept important in the field of economics.
It refers to the most valuable forgone alternative to an action. This is
very important to economists because of the flexibility of currency-
dollars may be used to purchase a great number of things, and so every-
thing that is pmchased ;costs' the other things that could have been
pmchased with the same money. For example, if a hotdog cost'> one
dollar and a hambmger costs two dollars, the opportunity cost of buying
a hambmger is two hotdogs, because every hamburger purchased is
two less hotdogs that could be purchased. In debate, we test policies
based on their direct costs (disadvantages that will result) and opportu-
nity costs (competitive counterplans or kritik alternatives which may
enjoy a comparative advantage). Acounterplan does not represent an
opportunity cost merely by being competitive, for competition is a nec-
essary but not sufticient condition to prove that one policy represents a
legitimate opportunity cost of another policy. It is critical that the two
policies be enacted by the same agent, because otherwise it is impos-
sible to say that the opportunity to exclusively enact one policy was lost
far any particular policy-making body. This is a key distinction because
everydecisian that people make involves measuring opportunity cost
which means that comparisons of policies which do not represent mu-
tual opportunity costs invoke a kind of thinking totally foreign to any
actual decision-making, and is therefore problematic for all ofthe rea-
sons we have outlined.
Plan specification 11 is impossible to get deeply involved in the debate sUlTounding
alternate agent fiat without addressing agent specification (A-spec) ar-
guments. Typically, the way these arguments are deployed goes some-
thing like this: A. the USFG is composed ofthree branches;B. their plan
specifies no further than the USFG; C. that is bad because it means we
cannot read agent specific disadvantages or establish textual competi-
tion for our agent coullterplans and agent considerations are 90% (!!)
of policy making (Elmore, 1980), which means D. it is a voting issue,
judge. Glancing down at the timer, l2 seconds have gone by. We are
t0111 on the demand for specific agent specification. Adrienne Brovero
(1994) made several solid arguments for requiring the atlinnative to
specify more than simply "the USFG" On the other hand, the most
common practical strategic purpose of the A-spec argument is to legiti-
mize counterplans whieh we tind deplorable. Neveltheless, we believe
that if the affirmative specifIes their agent, rather than establishing a
liability, it makes it easier to defend against altcmatc agent counterplans.
Ifthc negative team's A-strategy (no pun intended) is an alternate agent
cOtmterplan and you are good enough to beat them on "permute: do the
counterplan," you are also good enough to beat them on "agent
counterplans are i!legitimate.'· More to the point, some people have
argued that one possible defense of USFG-specific alternate agent
countcrplans on USFG topics is that the agent of the resolution is still
the USFG, and so if both the plan and the counterplan is under the
jurisdictional authority ofthe USFG. the counterplan is reasonable. Since
in the last two and a halfdeeades we have moved fim1ly past the notion
that the affinnative team is responsible forevery instance ofthe resolu-
tion (it now goes without saying thar the affirn1ative team must only
defend their plan), as long as the affirmative team specifies a topical
agent. there should be no question that the negative only may use that
agent in their counterplans.
In most A-spec debates, the negative team will quote Elmore's
claim that 90% of policy-making concerns the appropriate agent. We
will spare you this card, but we note that the only relevancc that this
evidence actually has is in tenns of deciding between agents over which
you have delegation power.lfl am going to assign one of my debaters
the politics DA llptlates for the next tournament, perhaps 90% of that
coaching decision is picking a student who is going to do a good, com-
prehensive job. Obviously the counterplan to have all the other teams
not update the politics DA solves the case better than the plan, regard-
less of which of my students gets the assignment, but the silliness of
that demonstrates why the legitimacy of altemate agent counte'1Jlans
does not follow from Elmore's claims, rightly understood. Additionally,
Elmore concludes his mticle by arguing that implementation literature is
overwhelmingly descriptive rather than prescriptive, which essentially
makes the argument we have made above - it is impossible to ground
these kinds of debates in the literature:
Richard F. Elmore, "Backward Mapping: implementation Re-
search and Policy Decision," Political Science Qumterly, 94, Number4
Winter 1979-1980, page 605
Students of implementation repeatedly argue that implementa-
tion problems should be considered when policies are made. Better
policies \vould result. we are told, ifpolicymakers would think about
whether their decisions could be implemented before they senle on a course of action. The argument is often made in an accusatOlY way, as
jf policymakers were somehow deficient for not routindy und system-
atically Ihinkingabour implementation problems. Yet when one looks to
the implementation literature for guidance, there is not much to be found.
Implementation research is long on description and shOltOI1 prescrip-
tion. Most implementation research is case· s tudies. nlis facl. by itself,
is nei thcr good nor bad. But it does presenr special prOblems when it
comes to translating research into useful guidance for policymakers.
Cases, ifthey arc well written, focus on a particular sequence of events
illld a specific set of causes and consequences. When drawing conclu-
sions from their data, case writers are characteristically and honesdy
cautious. They are typically carefulnoe to genemlize more than a step
or two beyond lheir data, and they do that very aJXllogelica lly. Thus,
w hen we look to the most intluential implementation studies for guid-
ance about how to anticipate implementation problems, we find advice
that is desultory and strategically vague.
Framework debates Decision-making logic has imJXlrtant repercussions for critical
debates as well, and since the kritik's evolution in debate is so nascent,
the theoretical literature's discussion of these issues in conjunction is
sparse. This is disappointing. because framework debates eire pruticu-
!arly fert ile grounds tor the application of decision-making theory. One
of the centra l questions addressed by uitica l debates is whether the
role of the ballot is to evltluate policymaking on the one hand or micro-
political action (or something else entirely) on the other. Even when
critical teams don 't root their links in an indictment of policy making,
their altemative usually entails some kind of change in the way individu-
als think. This sees up (\ d ichotomy between who should be taking ac-tion, and fundamental ly purs kritiks in the S<1me categolY ofaltematc
agem counlerp l<llls.
The theoretical legitimacy of critical frameworks is the second
area in which Korcok's (200 1) analysis is incomplete. Our view that the
,lppropriate scope of negative fiat is the topical agent chosen by the
affimlative would exclude all kritik alternatives, or at the very least
increase tbe level of specificity required in order to consider them legiti-
male. This is true because me affinnativc's agent, derived from the
r!;;:So lution, has to be an actor within the United States federal govern-
ment. The aftinnative's actor is not the debate critic. ClarifYing this
distinction m,lkes it obvious that for the negative'S criticism to have any
relevance, they have [0 ignore the constraints upon tbe decision maker's
Ilutoority. Alternatives that have the judge endorse a nebulous rejection,
I'ethinking. or criticism of a particular ;J..xiology, epistemolob'Y andlor on-
tology are the exact type of universal decision-making authority that
doesu'texist in the real world. It would bc great if every terrorist in the
world rejected violence, every criminal embmced love, or every hW1lal1
being ended their fetish with capitalism, but the probability that these
would ever occur is n il. This is object fiat al its best. and as explained
ellrlier, it is devastating for the affinnative's capacity 10 develol} of-
fense.
Negative claims that excluding critical alternatives is detrimental
to education fail to be persuasive when decision-making logic is taken
into account. Critical intellectuals and po licymakers both take imoac-
count the probability that their actions will be sllccessful. Fialing that
individuals alter the ir method ofthlnking circwnvents these questions of
probability and thus not only destroys education aboutpolicymaking, but
offers a flawed approach to activi sm (or any other pLUview of actioni
philosophy the negative is advocating), Intellectuals and activists have
many impOItant cons iderations relating 10 resources, press coverage,
political clout and method. These questions all a re directly related to
Il ... ho is taking action. Alternative debates tbusoften become frustmting
because they do a poor job of explaining who the subject is. Consider
the popular Nietzschcan alternative, "do noihing." Who is it that the
negative to do nothing? Does the USFG do nothing? Is it the
deb..1ters? Is it thejudge w ho does nothing? Is it evcry individua l, or just
individuals in Africa that have to do w ith the affinllatives harm area?
A ll of these questions directly implica te the desirabi lity of the alrema-
tive, and thus the education that we Cl1n receive from this mode of
Altematives like "votc negati ve to reject capitalism," "detach
truth from power," or "embrace an intinite responsibility to lhc other"
fall prey 10 similar conce ms. This inability to pin the negative down lOa
course of action allows (hem 10 be sllifty in their second rebutta l, and
sculpt their altemative in a way that nvoids the affirmative's offense.
R,lther than increasing education, clitical frameworks are often a msc
that a llows the negative to intlate their imp0l1ance and ignore crucial
decision-making considemtions.
Several othcroffcnsivearguments can be leveraged by [he affi r-
mative in order to insulnte them from negative claillls that critical de-
bate is a unique and impotiant type of education that the affirmative
excludes. The tirst is discussed above, that the most important benefit
to patticipation in policy debate is not the content of our arguments, but
the skills we learn from debating. As was just explained. since the abil-
ity 10 make decisions is a skill activis ts and in tellectuals must use as
wel l, decision-making is a prerequis ite to effective education about any
subject. nle strength of this argument is enhanced when we realize
that debate is a game. Since debaters are forced to "switch sides" they
go into each debate knowing that a nOll-personal mindset wi!! be neces-
sary at some point because they will inevicably be forced to argue against
their own convictions. Members of the acti vity are aU smart enough to
realize that a votc for an argument in a debate docs no t reflect an
absolute tlUth, but merely that a team making [hat argulll ent did the
better debating. When it comes to educ!Jtion about content, the number
of times someone will change their personal convictions because of
something that happens in a debate round is extremely low, because
everyone know$ it is a game. On the other hand, with cognitive skills
like the da:ision-mHking process which is taught through argument and
debate, repetition is viUli. The best way to strengthen decision-making's
cognitive thinking sk ills is to have smdents practice them ill social set-
tin /:,"S like debate rounds. Moreover, a lot of the decision-making process
happens in strategy sessions and during research periods - debaters
hear about a particular a ffimmtive plan find are tasked with developing
the best rcsponse.lfthey are conditioned to believe lhataltcmate agent
countcrp lans or utopian philosophical alternatives are legitimate re-
sponses, a vital teaching oppottunity will have becn lost.
Much of the in-round ar.b'Ument.ntion and theory literature on
framework debates has rocused on the subject of"affirrnative choice"
over [he last few years, most notably by O'Donnell (2004). As ex-
pla ined in the discussion above about agent specification, the affinlla-
tive clearly gets to chose theirplruvcasc, and thus \vithout also
gets to chose their agent. Champions of"affinnative choice" contend
that just as affilmati ve reams get to choose a (topical) plan , they get to
choose [he u ltimate criteria used by the judge to decide how to vote.
The way in which "atlinna(ivechoicc" gets deployed in tbe Slams quo
is correct, but irreleva nt, for two reasons. first of all , the fact that {he
afiinnarive chooses to answer the question of '\vhether the affinnativc's
policy option is superior to the status quo or competitive policy option" is
not a reason why the negative's framework is not compctifivc. Each
side disagrees about the question that is be ing asked in the debatc,just
Like eaeh s ide disagrees about w hat branch should be acting. S ince the
negative w ill still w in links as to why the framework the affinnativc
chooses has a disadvantage. they are able to disprove why tJ1at choice
is desirable. The majority of all critical debaters incorporate links that
apply not just to the plan but to the logic of policy making, framework
choice, and fairness as well. This makes i[ easy for the negative to win
that aftinnati ve c ho ice isn' t a reason tor the affirmative to win .. be-
cause they indict the log ic of the assumptions behind what the aft-inTUl-
rive chooses, and offer a competitive framework. Currently, "afli nna-
tive choice" as a2Ae response to a kritik is no different than making a
,
p. A-6
Iheol)' argument against the congress counrerplan by saying "well , we
chose the Supreme Coutt, so action by Congress is an irrelevant con-
sideration." The real reason why "aftlnnative choice" is a devastating
response to the negative's framework is because their framework wil l
necesstlTily entail an altcmative that involves action bya differcntaclor.
Tllis is the logical underpUullng behind "affinnative choice" arguments
thai has been missing so far from the literature base. As exp lained
,.\bove. action by actors besides the USFG may be C(Jlllpetilh.le, but
since they do not test the opportunity cost of the plan 's agent. they are
not cogent responses to the speech act presented in the fi rst a tlimlati ve
constructive.
Things get tricky when the negative attempts to explain their
ti-amework as H reason why Ihe judge's intellectual endorsement of the
resolution is a separate consideration from whether the decision-maker
should be acting. This is the Slance Korcok (200 1) takes. saying that
separating the judge from the decision-maker opens up a discursive
space for critical arguments. Clearly the judge then has authority to
choose to endorse an idea that distinct from, and competitive with, an
illtel lecrual a.;tion. UnfOltullately for the nega-
ti ve, this is a separate question than the one the resolution aSKs, and
does not provide a reason to reject the aflinnative. The reason why this
is t11.1e is resolved by a discussion of what the jurisdiclionallimits ofthe
resolution arc and relates to the next problem with current ways 01'
looking at aftinnativc choice.
The second concelll with "affirmative choicc" is that the COIl -
straints on possible affirmative choices are not explained. They do not
get to choose simply any way of looking at the resolution; they get to
ehoose a topical action. This is the crucial diffen:nce that Korcok's
proposal ignores, because it leaves open the possibility that an actor
besides the USFG could be thedee-ision-maker. This isn't [0 say that his
proposal endorses non- topical action, but raking into ,ICColint the fact·
that the aftirmat ivc's actor bas to be topical allows us to narrow down
the range of possible decision-makers and to make a conclusive an-
swer about whm question ihe affirmative is attempting to answer in
order to win the debate. ObviolL';ly, in a policy debate, the congress. the
cxecufive, and Ihe judiciary are all possible decisiolHnakel"s that arc
examples ofthc resolution. But in the context offramework debates,
the resolution gives us only one question to answer. Every year. the
contains the introductory word "rL'Solvcd,·' fo!1O\ved by a course
of action by the USFG. The colon separates the two parts of the reso-
lution trom each other. indicating that we as a community in each round
have to "express an opinion by resolution or vote" about the nOlTIlative
que!:i tion ofUSFG action (Words and Phrases, 1964, p. 478). Individual
panicipallls in the debate round are 110t the agents of the resolurion, but
the one coming to an aflinnative or negative conclusion about the ques-
tion of if it w(Juld he good/or the United States j ederal government
as a decision-Illuker to acr. Each debate critic and individual debater
is clea rly sepamted from thcdccision-maker by the resolution.
tive interpre tations that tum the judge or the debaters into a second
decision-maker are thus attempting to change fhe question that me res0-
lution is asking in order to evaluate the opportunity cost of their localized
action.
the topica l agent identified in the plan the decision-
maker with respect 10 the debate. rather than the judge or the debaters.
has three additional benefits. First., ethical questions rel ating to intellec-
tually endorsing the affirmative and other areas ofJitemture that are not
rrndit iotlally discussed in the context of policy making ean stil l be dis-
CLlSSed under this decision-making fi"amework. but in a more productive
manner. A negative strategy that includes a counterplan that uses dif-
ferent assumptions to solve the affiImative and says the affinnative's
apprmlch is morally bankrupt is a reason why the affinnativc should be
ethically rej ected. Even absentacounrerplan, ignOling implications for
the judge and excluding their ability to individually endorse alternative
moral frameworks forces negative teams to make their criticisms more
specific to the plan. lf thcy are going to say the affinnative is unethica l.
--- --- .
they should be forced to engage the traditional l:lrguments in the utility
vs. deontolob'Y literature like "moral pluity has unint(...'tldcd conS'-""qucnces."
This would mean that the negative's altemative (for the judge to reject
the affirmative's unethical course Ofacti Oll). would have to be much
more specific and engaging on the question ofwhclher it is possiblc to
predict consequences or embl1lce moral absolutism in the context of
the affilmative's advantages. Second. it prevents debate from being
about role-playing. Many critical teams' to policymaking is
that we are not the fedL'Tal government and we should nOl pretend that
we are. Since we are merely saying that the judge's range of fiat is
constrained by the authori ty of::1 single decision-maker. rather than that
the judge should be the decision-maker, debatel,!,; or judges do not have
to accept uncritically the USFG's authority or way ofthinking.lllird, it
is the only way to set a limit upon an unlimited nwnber of afJinnmive or
negative frnmeworks. Just as it is unfair for the negative to change the
question of the debate, the affi rmative should have a prediclable way of
proving the resolution is a good idea.
Other objections The most common objection nt!g.utive teams will make to the line
of reasoning presented in this article is that agent coulltcrpians are the
only way to test the agent. and the affirmative must be prepared to
defend all parts ofthcirplan, including 1'he agent. We tind this argument
disingenuous-disadvantages, not counterp lans. are how P31ts of the
plan are tested. A cOllnterpian will always lose unless it has a net ben-
efit, and it is the net benefit itselfthallests the agent. None of the net
benefit literature, however, will have been written with the pecuIiar
choice of the plan vs. the cOllnterplan in mind. More fO the point. an
Hltemate agent counterplan and a nel bene1it li nked 10 the agent oflhe
plan is less ofa test of the agent than simply the disadvantage presented
by ilSelf This is because. as explained above. one the mosr basic
ccms an agent should evaLuate when dec iding whether or not to take an
action is the probability Ihat othl:r agcnts will do anything. We caillhis
inhcrcncy. Advoca tes of ahem ate agent coun terplans askus to ignore
this impol1ant consideratioll. Rather than being key to testing dle agent,
agcm countcrplans make testi ng the ag.ent impossible.
Another creative objection to the tlotioll ihat the scope of neg a-
live fiat should be limited by the logic ofdec ision-m,lking is that it would
aIlO\lo' for non-intrinsicness arguments to be made against disadvan-
tages. A non-intrinsicness argument is simply an old-school way of ex-
cluding disadvantages that are not intrinsically linked to the desirability
ofthe plan. Consider the situation where the negalive contends that the
plan will result in the USFG passing icgislation which orders drill ing in
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). 1l1eANWR politics
advantage is not something that a poticymaker would consider when
deciding iffamily planning aid should go loAfiica. lfjudges therefore
allow teams to say things like "ok, do the plan, and also
don't drill inANWR," the negative teams' disadvamage ground is
maticallycurtailed. We will assume for the purposes of discussion that
allowing non-intrinsicness arguments is probably a bad thing, since rhe
line between what is intrinsic and what is not is a blurry one and it
draws into Question whether any disadvantage that is nol an impacr rum is to theaffinnative.
When analyzed closely, the des ire to Hvoid non-illlrinsicnessal"-
guments actually becomes an argument why alternat ive actor
counterplans should be disallowed. The central Unk that the negative
uses when making this argtunent is that if the judge is constrained to
only considerations of action by the appropriate actor then 110 rational
person would decide to not do the plan because it would result in that
same decision-maker deciding to drill inANWR. The more logical thing
to do, as the negative would S<'lY, is to have the dec,isioo-maker do the
plan and also pass ANWR (and thus, ns an mgumenfufll ad ahsur-
dum, alternate agent counterplans should be ullowed). Three mguments
make this objection a poor one. First, this at worsl would eliminate
disadvantages that have an impact based off of actions by the same
decision-maker. which does not nix all wsadvantages.lnternational re-
lations disadvantages, perception based disadvantages and inter·branch
disadvantages could all still be mn.
Second. most inslillu:es where a nOIl-intrinsicness afb>U1Tlcnt could
made are merely reasons why the d isadvaJlfage is weak and C<"ln be
beaten by simple analytical "no intemal link" argument,. Jfthe execu-
Li ve is the aftinnative's actor, the fact thtilt assistance to A fr icu would
callse Bush to no longer have the necessary political capital [0 veto an
Iraq withdrawal bill may not be intrin:sic to [he-desirability ot'executive
action, but that's because it is unlikely tbat Bush would actually c·hange
his mind about an Iraq velO because of political consideralions. lfpoli-
tics did matter, then it is intlinsic to the aftinnative because an individual
would have to consider the probability that a politically impotent Bush
would want to pick a tight with the Congress by vetoing.
Lastly, intnnsicness arguments on ly matter from the perspective
of the age-nt oflhcattiml<ltive's plan. not the judge. TIle judge isn't role-
playing l:L.<; any particul ar individual: he or she is a tbird party who brack-
ets off the status-quo decision-making process of the USFG in order to
be illl impartial intell ectual. At the end of the round, it is the judge, and
110t the USFG, who decides whether (and how) the USFG should act.
This is why separating the judge. from [he decision-maker is vital to
avoiding consider.uionsofintrinsicness. therefore should be
designed to be persuasive to the judge. rarher me USFG The judge
could eas ily be persuaded that an altemate agent counterpJan which
docsn 't test the opportunity cost of the plan's decision-maker is not a
reason to reject the plan, and at the same time not evaluate arguments
with the srune political viewpoints a collgrc:isperson or other poticymaker
would use to eva luate them. If th is is tlUe, there is no reason the judge
ought to consider non·ulUlnsicness link answers.
Conclusion We hope thaI. we have convinced you to rethink reliance all alter-
nate agent tiat as a viable component to l:I strong nega£iw strategy.
Even if we have fa iled in Ihis task, we arc eonfidelll £hat you arc now in
a good position to write powerful blocks that will make teams think
twice about nmning alternate agent countel'Plans or alternatives against
you. In any event. we hope that as you enjoy your debate careers, you
Icarn to set and follow the bestpersona! policies for yourself. If you do
that, you will have gained as much from this activity as you could have
from anyUling in Life.
Tips I . Control the role ofthe ballot. If the negative has not offered a
coherent counter·interprctation to the fr"J,mcwork that "the judge's au-
thority should be restricted to that oflhe atlimlalivc's dl."'Cision·maker,"
then their counterplan is not a reason why the plan should be rejected.
In the 2aryou should know exactly what thcircountcr-inte!'PTCtation is.
explain the disadvantages to it, and explain whichofits advantages your
interpretation captures, If you win that your interpretation oftbe role of
the b.1 11 ot is superior to their.;, you can point out which 2nr arguments
become irrelevant because rheypresume an illogical framework for lhe
judge's amhoriry.
2. Know when you' re losing. Very rarely will you be winning
every argument on the flow, so sometimes you have to acknowledge
that you might lose all argwnent, aud make impact calculus to compare
standards. This is best done by mak ing "even iF statements. and will
increase the likelihood you will both win the debate and improve your
speaker points. For example, "even ifthey win agent counterplans are
fair, we are winning thatreal-worid education outweighs f.1 imess".
3. Slow down! Judges hate when debaters make blippy, incom-
prehensible thcory arguments at top speed because they are bard to
tlow and not fun to listen to.
Section A: Arlicles and Topicality, p. A-7
4. Read evidence for the real world standards and the value of
debate. We recommend you cut cards from this article, other old
Debater's Research Guideat1icles. and the sourccs listed in the bibliog-
raphy of this article to strengthen the persuasiveness of yow' tllcoretical
claims.
5. Be aware of the status of the countc:rplan. If the
isn' t unconditional. you have to win that conditionality is bad in addi-
lio!1 (0 agenl couLlterplans bad in order to win that they are a voting
issue. In mher words, don '( spend yow· whole 2ar on the agents dt:batc
if the ultimate consequence isjust going to be that the eounrerplan goes
away and the negative has a disadvantage that outweighs your
advantage(s).
5. lastly. and most importantly, be aware of judgc's personal
bia,es. The debate community seems to be emnnored with agcnt
counterplans, so much so that when having an argument with II friend
at the TOe this year about their legitimacy, he had to resort ro asking
mndom people who were walking by if they agreed with him that agent
counterplans were good or not. h's obvious thar the position of this
paper would not win a popularity contest. As a result, it is cri(ica l that
when you have a judge who may not be crazy about voting on agent
countcrplans you must make a connection with them during your 2ar.
Saying something like " I know in yOllr hca\t of hearts you may not
3f,'l"ee with us, but the 2nr bas merely made arguments why altemate
actor counterplans are ok. but has 1101 made a single argument why
they are necesSOly . If you real ly think we are wrong about the legiti -
macy of agent countcrplans, {hen punish them for doing such a poor job
of explaining why they should be allowed." This \vill go a long way
towards getting stubborn and obstinale judges to ignore their personal
predispositions.
References Brovero, A. ( 1994 ). ·'SO P, there it is," in Immigmtion t"egufOlil)f7: Bor-
derline policies Research Guide), (cd!). R. E. Soil &. R, K. Smith).
Winston Salem, NC: W3ke Forest Uni versity Press.
Elmore, R. F. (1979). Backward mapping: Impll.'IDcnlation rCSl."'arch and
policy decision, Po/ilic:al Science 94,60 1-616.
Fulkcrson. R. (1996). Teaching the argument Urbana. IL:
The Nat ional Council ofTeachers of English .
Koreok, M. M. (2001). "The decision-maker:' in Per5pecth'es ill eon-
Imvcrs.\': Selec1eJ }i"O/1/ Contempora,.y Argumentation and Debate.
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Kuhn. D. (1 992). Thinking as argument. Harvard Educational
62, 155-178.
Lichtman,A. & Rohrer. D. (1975). "'Agcncra] lheoryorthccolllllerplan:'
JOllrnal nf the Americal/ Fonm.<;ic,v Associ(Jlion. 12. 70-79.
0' Donnell, T. (2004). "And thc twain shall meet: Affimmtive framework
cll(lice and the 11ltlirC of debate." in Blue hdmet hflles· Uniled Nal iolls
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