MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2019ME41Docket: And-17-553Argued: October25,2018Decided: March14,2019Revised: July16,2019Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Concurrence: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andMEAD,J.
STATEOFMAINEv.
DAVIDT.BROWNJABAR,J.
[¶1] David T. Brown appeals from a judgment of conviction of four
counts of aggravated trafficking in scheduleW drugs (Class A), 17-AM.R.S.
§1105-A(1)(E)(1)(2018)(Counts1-4),andonecountofunlawfulpossession
ofscheduleWdrugs(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(B)(3)(2018)(Count5),
enteredbythecourt(AndroscogginCounty,Delahanty,J.)followingajurytrial.1
Brown’sprimarycontentiononappealisthattherewasinsufficientevidence
1Brownwasalsoconvictedoffourcountsofviolatingaconditionofrelease(ClassE),15M.R.S.
§1092(1)(A)(2018)(Counts6-9),afterhewaivedhisrighttoajurytrialonthosechargespursuanttoM.R.U.Crim.P.23(a).BecauseBrowndoesnotassignerrortotheseconvictions,wedonotaddressthemfurther.
2
that he traffickedwithin 1,000 feet of a school.2 Because the State did not
present evidence from which a jury could rationally conclude beyond a
reasonabledoubtthatBrowntraffickedwithin1,000feetofaschool,wevacate
the aggravating factor that elevated the crime from Class B trafficking in
schedule drugs, 17-A M.R.S. §1103(1-A)(A) (2018), to Class A aggravated
trafficking in schedule W drugs, 17-AM.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(E)(1),3 and we
remandtotheUnifiedCriminalDocketforresentencing.
I.BACKGROUND
[¶2] By criminal complaint filed on February 21, 2017, and then by
indictment filed on May 5, 2017, Brown was charged with four counts of
aggravated trafficking in schedule W drugs (Class A). See 17-AM.R.S.
§1105-A(1)(E)(1).Viewedinthelightmostfavorabletothejury’sverdict,the
record supports the following facts. See State v. Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶2,
113A.3d583.
2Brownalsocontendsthattherewasinsufficientevidencethathepossessedtherequisiteamount
of cocaine base in order to invoke the permissible inference for trafficking under 17-A M.R.S.§1103(3)(B)(2018)andtosustainaconvictionunder17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(B)(3)(2018).InlightofourrecentandcontrollingholdinginStatev.McLaughlin,2018ME97,189A.3d262,weaffirmtheconvictionsonCount4andCount5anddonotdiscussCount5further.WediscussCount4onlywithregardtotheaggravatingfactoroftraffickingwithin1,000feetofaschool.
3Asrelevanttothiscase,17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)(2018)providesthatapersoncommitstheenhancedtraffickingoffenseifthatperson“violates[17-AM.R.S.§1103]”and“[a]tthetimeoftheoffense,thepersonisonaschoolbusorwithin1,000feetoftherealpropertycomprisingaprivateorpublicelementaryorsecondaryschoolorasafezone.”
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A. FourCountsofAggravatedTrafficking
[¶3] In December 2016, an agentwith the federalDrug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) began conducting a series of controlled purchases of crack
cocaine from Brown using a confidential informant. Brown resided on the
secondfloorofanapartmentbuildinglocatedat72WalnutStreetinLewiston,
inthevicinityoftheGovernorJamesB.LongleyElementarySchool,whichis
locatedonBirchStreet.Theapartmentbuildinghastwoentrances:oneatthe
front of the building onWalnut Street and another on the right side of the
buildingonPrinceStreet.TheentranceonthePrinceStreetsideproceedsupa
flightofstairstothesecondfloor.Onthesecondfloor,adooroffthestairsleads
intothekitchenareaoftheapartment.Thereisalivingroomtotheleftofthe
kitchenandoffofthelivingroomaretwobedrooms.Thebedroomclosestto
WalnutStreetbelongedtotheowneroftheapartmentbuilding,andtheother
bedroomwasBrown’s.4
[¶4] During the first day of trial, the confidential informant testified
about the three controlled buys from Brown, each of which took place
4Theevidenceconcerningthegenerallayoutoftheinteriorofthe72WalnutStreetapartment
wasprovidedthroughthetestimonyofvariouswitnesses.Additionally,therewasonephotographtakenfromthestreetthatdepictedthefrontoftheapartmentbuildingandataxmapshowingthelocation of Longley Elementary School and a portion of Walnut Street, but not the location of72WalnutStreetspecifically.Therewasnoevidencethatshowedordescribedtheentirelayoutoftheapartment,suchasaschematicdiagram.
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somewhereinBrown’sapartment.Theconfidentialinformanttestifiedthatshe
enteredtheapartmentfromthePrinceStreetsidedoorandwouldmeetBrown
ineitherhisbedroomorthelivingroom.Withregardtotheactuallocationof
thecontrolledbuys,shetestified:
Q And where would you meet when you go inside of72Walnut?
A Usually,ifitwasn’tthelivingroom,itwashisbedroom. ....Q Okay.Okay.Soyouwouldgointothat[bedroom]andyou...
A Iusuallywouldn’tgointotheroom.Iwouldn’tgo[nowhere]
pastthedoor.Iwouldstandatthedoorlike...outthedoor.Andhehadadresser,dohisthing,giveme--ifitwasn’tthere,itwasonthatendtableinthelivingroom.
[¶5]ThefirstcountofaggravatedtraffickinginscheduleWdrugsstems
from the first controlled purchase, which occurred on December 23, 2016.
Duringthiscontrolledbuy,Brownsoldtheconfidentialinformant2.8gramsof
crack cocaine in exchange for $400. Describing this buy, the confidential
informant testified that Brownwas “in the bedroom” and that she gave the
moneytohiminreturnforcrackcocaine.
5
[¶6]Thesecondcontrolledpurchase,whichwasthebasisofthesecond
count of aggravated trafficking in schedule W drugs, took place on
December29,2016. During thiscontrolledbuy,Brownsold theconfidential
informant1.737gramsofcrackcocaineinexchangefor$400.Theconfidential
informantdidnottestifyaboutpreciselywhereshewasinsidetheapartment
duringthisbuy.
[¶7] The third and final controlled purchase was conducted on
February10,2017,whenBrownsoldtheconfidentialinformant1.69gramsof
crackcocainefor$300.Thiscontrolledbuyledtothethirdcountofaggravated
trafficking in schedule W drugs. Again, the confidential informant did not
testifyaboutthepreciselocationofthisbuy.
[¶8] Following the three controlled buys, law enforcement officers
obtainedandexecutedasearchwarrantfortheapartmentat72WalnutStreet.
While searching Brown’s bedroom, a DEA agent discovered a bag of crack
cocaineweighingapproximately27grams.Thisformedthebasisforafourth
count of unlawful trafficking in scheduleWdrugs based on the permissible
inferenceprovidedin17-AM.R.S.§1103(3)(B)(2018)thatBrown’spossession
of fourteen grams or more of cocaine constituted unlawful trafficking in
scheduleddrugs.
6
[¶9]TheStatechargedallfourcountsasaggravatedtrafficking,alleging
that the drugs were discovered, and the controlled buys occurred, within
1,000feetoftherealpropertyofLongleyElementarySchool.See17-AM.R.S.
§1105-A(1)(E)(1).
B. EvidenceConcerningtheDistanceBetween72WalnutStreetandLongleyElementarySchool
[¶10] The court held a three-day jury trial from September 25 to
September27,2017.Onthefirstdayoftrial,aDEAagenttestifiedthatheused
a measuring wheel to measure the distance between the front entrance of
72Walnut Street and the property line of Longley Elementary School.
Specifically, the DEA agent started his measurement at the “front step” of
72WalnutStreet, tookadiagonalrouteacrossWalnutStreet,andproceeded
downHoweStreet inastraight linetoLongleyElementarySchool,wherehe
ended the measurement “four or five feet” onto school property. This
measurementtotaled958.9feet.
[¶11] The followingmorning, after being informed that the “vertical
distance” to the location where the drug transaction occurred should be
accountedfor inthemeasurement,theDEAagentreturnedtotheapartment
andconductedadditionalmeasurements.Whenhetestifiedabouthissecond
set ofmeasurements, the DEA agent explained that he entered the building
7
usingtheWalnutStreetentranceandthen“measuredfromthelivingroomto
theexteriorofthebuilding,whichwas16.9feet. Andfromthatsecond-floor
exteriorofthebuildingtotheground,whichwas,Ibelieve12.4feet.”Hethen
addedinthedistancefromthespotonthegroundouttothelocationonthe
platformwherehehadbegunhisinitialmeasurements.Allfourmeasurements,
added together, totaled 996.2 feet. On cross-examination, the agent
acknowledgedthat,intakinghis interiormeasurements,hehadbegunatthe
doorwaytoBrown’slivingroom,andthatitwas“unlikely”thatthebuyshad
occurredinthatdoorway.5
C. JuryInstructionsandVerdict
[¶12]Duringjurydeliberations,thejurysentanotetothecourtasking
whetherverticaldistancemustbeincludedinmeasuringthedistancefromthe
traffickingtotheschoolandrequesting“[c]larificationonthelawonwhatis
1,000feet:astraight-linedistance,awalkingpath,aradius?”Despitedefense
counsel’s objection—that there was no evidence presented about what a
straight-linemeasurementwouldbe—thecourtgave the jury anewwritten
5AftertheStatepresenteditscase-in-chief,defensecounselmovedforajudgmentofacquittalon
the aggravating trafficking charge, which the court denied, stating, “I do acknowledge that theevidencewith respect to thedistance from the school, there is conflicting evidence, but that isamatterforthejurytosortout.”
8
instruction, stating, “The 1,000 feet is a straight-linemeasurement from the
locationwheretheoffenseoccurredtothepropertylineoftheschool.Maine
law is silent as to vertical feet. If there is a reasonable doubt or ambiguity
because of a vertical measurement, it must be resolved in favor of the
defendant.”
[¶13]Thejuryreturnedaguiltyverdictonallfourcountsofaggravated
traffickinginscheduleWdrugs.OnDecember4,2017,Brownwassentenced
to ten years in prison on the four convictions of aggravated trafficking in
scheduleWdrugs. Brown timely appealed the judgment of conviction. See
15M.R.S.§2115(2018);M.R.AppP.2B(b)(1).
II.DISCUSSION
[¶14]Brownarguesthattherewasinsufficientevidenceforthejuryto
findthathisdrugtraffickingoccurredwithin1,000feetoftherealpropertyof
LongleyElementarySchool. “Whenadefendantchallengesthesufficiencyof
theevidencesupportingaconviction,wedetermine,viewingtheevidence in
thelightmostfavorabletotheState,whetheratrieroffactrationallycouldfind
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged.” State v.
Anderson,2016ME183,¶30,152A.3d623(quotationmarksomitted).The
juryispermittedtodrawallreasonableinferencesfromtheevidencepresented
9
attrial.Statev.Hopkins,2018ME100,¶51,189A.3d741.“Theinterpretation
ofastatuteisalegalissuewereviewdenovo.”Statev.Cannady,2018ME106,
¶7,190A.3d1019(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶15]Thenarrowquestionpresentediswhether,basedontheevidence
presented,ajuryrationallycouldhavefound,beyondareasonabledoubt,that
Browntraffickedwithin1,000feetofschoolproperty.Althoughweconsidered
asimilarissueinStatev.Barnard,2003ME79,828A.2d216,wehaveyetto
explicitlydeterminehowthedistanceoughttobemeasuredinordertosustain
aconvictionunder17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)(1)-(6)(2018).Wedosotoday
by determining (1) what two points must be measured, (2) whether the
straight-line or the pedestrian-route approach applies, and (3)whether the
1,000-footdistanceincludesanydifferenceinelevationbetweenthetwopoints
tobemeasured.
A. MeasuringtheDistanceBetweentheRealPropertyoftheSchoolandtheLocationoftheOffense
[¶16]Inordertoconductameasurement,onemustknowthetwopoints
thatmark thedistance tobemeasured. InBarnard, “weassume[d],without
deciding, that interior distances from the entrance closest to the school
property to the site of the transaction should be counted in calculating the
1,000-footdistance.”2003ME79,¶24n.7,828A.2d216.Today,weexplicitly
10
hold that, in order to sustain a conviction under 17-A M.R.S.
§1105-A(1)(E)(1)-(6),thedistancetobemeasuredisthedistancebetweenthe
realpropertyoftheschoolandthelocationofthedrugtraffickeratthetimeof
theoffense.
[¶17]Pursuantto17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E):
1.Apersonisguiltyofaggravatedtraffickinginascheduleddrugifthepersonviolatessection1103and:
....
E.Atthetimeoftheoffense,thepersonisonaschoolbusorwithin1,000feetoftherealpropertycomprisingaprivateorpublicelementaryorsecondaryschoolorasafezone........
Readcarefully,thelanguageofthestatuteprovidesakeydistinctionbetween
the two points betweenwhich the distance is to bemeasured. The statute
requiresthatameasurementbemadebetweenapointon“therealproperty”of
the school or safe zone and the point at which “the person” is trafficking.
17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)(emphasisadded).
[¶18]TheLegislature’suseoftheterms“realproperty”and“person”in
section1105-A(1)(E)iscriticalbecause,hadtheLegislatureintendedtohave
jurorsandcourtsdeterminethedistancebetweentheschoolpropertyandthe
propertywherethetraffickingoccurred,itwouldhaveuseddifferentlanguage.
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Instead,theLegislaturechosetofocusonthelocationofthetraffickeratthe
timeofthedrugtransaction.Forustodisregardthisdistinctionwouldbeto
rendertheterm“theperson”meresurplusage,and“becausenolanguageisto
be treated as surplusage if it can be reasonably construed, we must give
meaning to this language.” McLaughlin, 2018 ME 97, ¶ 16, 189 A.3d 262
(alterationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶19]Althoughtheplainlanguageofsection1105-A(1)(E)isdispositive
inouranalysis,wenotethatfederalcourtshaveinterpretedcomparablefederal
statutesthesameway.SeeUnitedStatesv.Applewhite,72F.3d140,144(D.C.
Cir.1995)(holdingthatthegovernmentmustprovethatthedistancebetween
theschoolandthe“locusofthedrugoffense” is lessthan1,000feet);United
States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he government
inexplicablyofferedevidencenotofthedistancefromaschooltothepointin
thehousewhere[thedefendant]possessedthedrugs,butonly...toapointfive
feet up the walkway to [the defendant’s] house.”). Thus, for purposes of
measuringthe1,000-footdistanceunder17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E),theState
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance between the real
propertyoftheschoolandthelocationoftheallegeddrugtraffickeratthetime
oftheoffenseiswithin1,000feet.
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B. Straight-LineMeasurementversusPedestrian-RouteMeasurement
[¶20] InBarnard,2003ME79,¶¶5,24,828A.2d216,weaffirmeda
defendant’sconvictionofaggravatedtraffickingaftertheStateestablishedthat
thetraffickingoccurredwithin757feet,4inchesofaschool.Indoingso,we
reliedonprecedentfromtheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFirstCircuit
and determined that a straight-line measurement rather than a
pedestrian-route measurement should be applied. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24 n.7 (citing
UnitedStatesv.Soler,275F.3d146,154-55&n.6(1stCir.2002)).
[¶21] Because the reasoning behind employing a straight-line
measurementismostpersuasive,wereaffirmourholdinginBarnardthatthe
1,000-footmeasurementmustbecalculatedusingastraight-linemeasurement.
SeeUnitedStatesv.Clavis,956F.2d1079,1088(11thCir.1992)(statingthatif
apedestrian-routemeasurementwererequired,“[a]traffickercouldoperate
free of the statute by placing his operation within tossing distance of the
schoolyardfenceifhecouldfind—orcreate—alongenoughfootpathleading
to it”);United States v. Watson, 887 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Only a
straightlinemeasurementcreatesareadilyascertainablezoneofprotection.”);
United States v. Ofarril, 779 F.2d 791, 792 (2d Cir. 1985) (reasoning that a
pedestrian-routemeasurement“wouldviolatetheplainmeaningofthestatute”
13
and“generateneedlessandtime-consumingdebate,andultimatelyhamperthe
statute’senforcement.”).
C. DifferenceinElevationBetweentheTwoPointstobeMeasured
[¶22] Next, we address whether, for purposes of measuring the
1,000-foot distance under 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(E), the difference in
elevationbetween the twopoints—theboundaryof theschoolpropertyand
thelocationofthetraffickeratthetimeoftheoffense—shouldbeaccountedfor
inthecalculation.Weconcludethatitshould.
[¶23]Althoughsection1105-A(1)(E)doesnotexpresslystatethatany
differenceinelevationmustbeconsidered,wefindcriticalguidanceinwhatit
doesanddoesnotprovide:thestatute(a)identifiesthebeginningandending
points of themeasurement; (b) states that the distance between those two
points necessary to enhance a sentence under this section is less than
1,000feet;and(c)doesnotrequirethatthedistancebemeasuredonlyalonga
horizontal plane. 17-AM.R.S. §1105-A(1)(E). Moreover, because the plain
languageofthestatuteis“reasonablysusceptibletodifferentinterpretations”
with regard to whether any difference in elevation must be considered,
Cannady,2018ME106,¶7,190A.3d1019(quotationmarksomitted),andthe
recordoftheLegislature’sdeliberativeprocessdoesnotshedanylightonthe
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Legislature’s intent with regard to elevation, L.D. 1740, § 119 (120th
Legis.2001),we considerother relevant indiciaof legislative intent. Dyerv.
Dyer,2010ME105,¶7,5A.3d1049.Amongthoseindiciaaretwointerrelated
canons of statutory construction: the rule of lenity and the rule of strict
construction.Statev.Blum,2018ME78,¶10n.5,187A.3d566.“Pursuantto
eachoftheserules,anyambiguityleftunresolvedbyastrictconstructionofthe
statutemustberesolvedinthedefendant’sfavor.”Statev.Pinkham,2016ME
59,¶14,137A.3d203(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶24] Consistent with Barnard, the distance between the two points
mustbemeasuredalongastraight line fromonepoint to theother,and the
courseofthelinemustnotdeviateonaccountofanyobstaclesinitspath.Our
discussion in Barnard, together with the aforementioned legislative
considerations and simple logic, allows us to conclude that the straight-line
measurement between the school boundary line and the location of the
traffickerinthiscasemustaccountforanydifferenceinelevationbecausethat
difference could place the transaction site outside of the aggravating zone,
whereasalinearhorizontalmeasurementmightnot.
[¶25] This leads toarelated inquiryregarding thepropermethod for
measuring the distance between these points at different elevations. Other
15
courts have approached this issue differently. In Soler, the First Circuit
suggested that the distance between the school boundary and a drug
transaction site located in an upper floor of a building could be measured
horizontallyalongtheground,thenverticallyupthesideofthebuilding,and
thenhorizontallyagaintotheprecisesiteofthetransaction,movingalongthe
various external and internal surfaces of the building. 275F.3d at 154-55.
Althoughthereisnoquestionthatmeasuringinthiswaycreatesalinebetween
the twopoints that runs in a straightdirectionwhen seen fromabird’s-eye
view, itdoesnotcreateastraightlineconsistentwithBarnard. 2003ME79,
¶¶21,24n.7,828A.2d216.6
[¶26] Incontrast, theUnitedStatesCourtofAppeals for theEleventh
Circuit employed a simplermethodology by extending 1,000-foot radii from
andaroundeachpointontheboundariesoftheschoolpropertytocaptureany
drugtransactionsitewithinthatarea.7Clavis,956F.2dat1088(“Thewayto
6 A straight line is one that extends in “the same direction throughout its length; having no
curvatureor angularity.” Straight,Webster’sNewWorldCollegeDictionary (5th ed. 2016). TheseriesofstraightlinesandrightanglesresultingfromtheUnitedStatesv.Soler,275F.3d146,153-55(1stCir.2002)measurementaremoreakintothepedestrianroutewehavealreadydismissedinStatev.Barnard,2003ME79,¶¶21,24n.7,828A.2d216.
7Aradiusis“anystraightlineextendingfromthecentertotheperipheryofacircleorsphere[or]the circularareaordistance limitedby the sweepof such a line.” Radius,Webster’sNewWorldCollegeDictionary(5thed.2016).
16
createadefiniteandidentifiablezoneisbyextendingradiioutwardaroundthe
propertyonwhichtheschoolislocated.”).AlthoughClavisinvolvedmeasuring
thedistanceonlyonahorizontalplane,id.,avariationonthatapproachmaybe
appropriate for measuring whether two points at different elevations are
within1,000feetofeachother.8Forexample,extendingastraightlinefromthe
trafficker’s locationandadjusting thedirectionof that lineatanangleupor
downdirectly to its intersection, ifany,with theboundary lineof theschool
property creates a single, unbroken straight line rather than a series of
connected straight lines—heading in the same direction but extending at
differentangles—assuggestedinSoler.9
[¶27]However,becausetheStatedidnotpresentevidencefromwhich
ajuryrationallycoulddeterminewithanycertaintytheexactlocationofanyof
thetransactionsatissue,asisnecessarytobeabletofindbeyondareasonable
8UnlikethecreationofanareaonahorizontalplanearoundtherealpropertyasinUnitedStates
v.Clavis,956F.2d1079,1088(11thCir.1992),theradiusmethodologycouldbeapplieddifferentlyto determinewhether the trafficking occurred in a protected areawhere the trafficking and theschoolareatdifferentelevations.Relevanttothefactsinthiscase,thosepointscouldbemeasuredalongastraightlinethatistheshortestdistancebetweenasingleidentifiedpoint—thetransactionsiteonthesecondfloorofabuilding—andtheground-levelboundaryoftheschoolproperty,whichhasanuntoldnumberofpointsarounditsperimeter.Forthatreason,thestraight-lineradiusshouldextendfromthetransactionsitetoitsclosestpointofintersection,ifany,withtheschool’sboundary.
9Theresourcesorformulaeusedtocalculateormeasuretheactualdistancebetweentwopointsatdifferentelevationsmayvarydependingonthecircumstancesofeachcaseand,withoutlimitation,could include available technology,maps, line-of-sightmeasurement, or a relevantmathematicalformulation(forexample,thedistancebetweentwopointsatdifferentelevationsmaybeascertainedusingthePythagoreanTheorem).
17
doubtthatBrowntraffickedwithin1,000feetofschoolproperty,thiscasedoes
notrequireustodecidethepropermethodformeasuringthedistancebetween
these points. See infra ¶¶ 32-41. We hold only that the measurement of
1,000feet, which acts as an aggravating element pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.
§1105-A(1)(E), must—in some way—include any difference in elevation
between the location of the trafficker at the time of the offense and the
boundaryoftherealpropertyoftheschool.
D. SpatialLeeway
[¶28] In somecases involving the1,000-footdistance forpurposesof
enhancing a sentence for trafficking in scheduled drugs, federal courts have
determined that “[p]recisemeasurementsmaybeunnecessary ...where the
spatialleewayisrelativelygreatandthegapinthechainofproofisrelatively
small.”Soler,275F.3dat154;seeUnitedStatesv.Baylor,97F.3d542,546-47
(D.C.Cir.1996).TheFirstCircuithasdescribedspatialleewayasanexception
toitsgeneralinsistencethatthegovernmentprovethe1,000-footdistancewith
precisemeasurements,andithasexplainedthatitmaybeappliedinsuchcases
where“commonsense,commonknowledge,androughindicesofdistancecan
carry the day.” United States v. Diaz, 670 F.3d 332, 338 (1st Cir. 2012)
(quotationmarksomitted).Thus,spatialleewaymaybeappliedincaseswhere
18
evidenceofprecisemeasurementsislackingbuttheamountofspatialleeway
allowsafact-findertoreasonablyinferfromotherevidencethatthedistanceis
stillwithin1,000feet.
[¶29] In Applewhite, the government presented evidence that the
distancefromaschoolto“theaddress”ofthedefendant’sapartmentbuilding
wherethedrugoffenseoccurredwas920.2feet,adistancethat“clearly[did]
notincludethedistancebetweentheentrancetothebuildingandtheplacein
[thedefendant’s]apartmentwherethedrugswerediscovered.”72F.3dat142.
Rejecting the government’s argument that the jury reasonably could have
determinedthatthedistancefromthebuildingentrancetothepreciselocation
ofthedrugswasnotmorethan79.8feet,theUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfor
theDistrictofColumbiaCircuitreasoned,
[T]he jury couldnotknowhowmanyotherapartmentunits in thesamebuildingalsofrontedupon[thesamestreet],northeirlocationrelative to [the defendant’s apartment where the drug offenseoccurred],northeirdimensionsnor,therefore,thedistancebetweenthe building entrance and [the apartment’s] living roomwall, norevenwhether[the]apartmentwasonthefirstfloor.
Id.at144.
[¶30]InBarnard,weappliedthespatialleewayprinciplewhenweheld
that the jury reasonably could infer that the distancewaswithin 1,000feet.
2003ME79,¶¶2,24,828A.2d216.BecausethefactsinBarnardestablished
19
that“anylocationwithinthebuildingwas,necessarily,evenclosertotheschool
property”andtheState’smeasurementleft242feet,8inchesofspatialleeway,
westated,
Even if the interior distance to [the defendant’s] apartment iscounted fromeither thebackdooror the frontdoor, there isnoquestionthatthejurycouldconclude,basedonalloftheevidence,that [thedefendant’s]apartmentwaswithin the242-foot,8-inchdistancenecessarytobringthetransactionwithin1000feetoftheschool,beyondareasonabledoubt.
Id. ¶ 24. In reaching this conclusion, wewere guided by the First Circuit’s
“observation that precisemeasurementsmay be unnecessary in some cases
wherethespatialleewayisrelativelygreatandthegapinthechainofproofis
relativelysmall.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶31] Insum,wehold that17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)requiresproof
beyondareasonabledoubtthatthelocusofthedrugtraffickeratthetimeof
theoffensebewithin1,000feetoftherealpropertyofaschool,measuredina
straight lineandaccounting foranydifference inelevationbetween the two
points. Additionally, in cases where the State fails to offer a precise
measurementofthedistancebetweenthetwopointsbutthespatialleewayis
greatenough tomakeup forsuchevidentiarygaps, the juryreasonablymay
inferthatthetraffickingoccurredwithin1,000feetoftheschool.Theconcept
of spatial leeway does not excuse the State from proving the 1,000-foot
20
distance, however; it only recognizes that jurors are well-equipped in
appropriate cases to apply their “common sense, common knowledge, and
roughindicesofdistance”whenfactsprovedbeyondareasonabledoubtpermit
a jury to reasonably infer distances not precisely accounted for. Barnard,
2003ME79,¶24,828A.2d216(quotationmarksomitted).
E. ApplicationtothisCase
[¶32] Turning to theevidence in thiscase,whichweview in the light
mostfavorabletotheState,seeAdams,2015ME30,¶2,113A.3d583,theDEA
agent’s testimonywas sufficient to establishbeyonda reasonabledoubt the
following measurements. First, the distance between the “front step of
72WalnutStreet,”whichisattheWalnutStreetentrance,and“fourorfivefeet”
onto the realpropertyof LongleyElementarySchool amounts to958.9 feet.
Moreover,becausetheDEAagenttestifiedthataterminusofhismeasurement
was“fourorfivefeet”pastLongleyElementarySchool’spropertyline,thejury
could reasonably infer that the actual distance between the front step of
72Walnut Street’s front entrance and the real property line of Longley
ElementarySchoolwas953.9feet. SeeBarnard,2003ME79,¶23,828A.2d
216. Second, the juryrationallycouldhave found,basedon theDEAagent’s
testimony about his additional measurements and from other testimony
21
regardingthelayoutoftheapartment,thatthedistancebetweenthe“doorway
thatopensintothelivingroom”fromtheWalnutStreetentranceandthefront
stepof72WalnutStreet,wheretheinitialmeasurementbegan,constitutesan
additional37.3feet. Therefore,basedontheevidencepresentedattrial, the
jury rationally could conclude that the distance between the “doorway that
opensintothelivingroom”andtherealpropertylineofLongleyElementary
Schoolwas991.2feet.10Asaresult,theevidenceestablished,atamaximum,
8.8feetofspatialleeway.
[¶33] In an attempt to use the spatial leeway exception, the State
contendsthat,becauseitsmeasurementsincludedaverticaldistanceusingthe
method suggested in Soler and employed a pedestrian-route measurement
ratherthanastraight-lineroutemeasurement,thejurycouldhavereasonably
inferredthattheapartmentwasevenclosertotheschool.Weareunpersuaded
bythisargumentfortworeasons.
[¶34] First, because the difference in elevation between the school
boundarylineandthelocationofthetraffickeratthetimeoftheoffensemust
10Again,thiscalculationcomesfromthe953.9-footmeasurementconductedwiththemeasuring
wheelandacceptingtheDEA’sagent’stestimonythathewentfivefeetpastthepropertyline,plusthethreemeasurementsconductedonthemorningoftheseconddayoftrial,whichtotaled37.3feet.Together,thesemeasurementsequal991.2feet.
22
beaccountedforinthemeasurementrequiredby17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E),
the vertical distance included in the State’s measurement does not provide
morespatial leeway that the jurycouldhaveapplied inreasonably inferring
thatBrowntraffickedwithin1,000feetofLongleyElementarySchool.Second,
theState’s argument that the jury could reasonably infer that a straight-line
measurement would have provided evenmore spatial leeway that the jury
couldhaveappliedinreasonablyinferringthatBrownwastraffickingwithin
1,000 feet of Longley Elementary School is also unavailing. The DEA agent
measured thedistance fromLongleyElementarySchool to72Walnut Street
using a pedestrian-route measurement, and the State provided no
“straight-line”measurementforthejurytoconsider.Therefore,therewasno
evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that, if a
straight-linemeasurementhadbeenconducted,thedistancewouldhavebeen
within1,000feet.SeeJohnson,46F.3dat1169.Althoughcommonsensewould
dictate that a pedestrian-route measurement is necessarily longer than a
straight-linemeasurement,itwouldbepureguessworkforajurytodetermine
how much shorter the straight-line measurement would have been. See
Applewhite, 72F.3d at 143 (“[T]here is no evidence in the record here from
which the jury could have derived the shorter straight-line distance. The
23
Government’s case must therefore stand or fall upon the adequacy of [the
government’spedestrian-routemeasurement].”).
[¶35] Because8.8 feetof spatial leeway is very slight, “and [because]
personallibertyisatstake,[we]mustexaminethe[State’s]proofwithamore
critical eye.” Soler, 275F.3dat154. Indoing so,weevaluate each countof
aggravatedtraffickinganddeterminewhethertherewassufficientevidenceto
convictBrownofthatcount,applyingtheruleoflenityintheabsenceofany
cleardirectionastohowtoaccountforthedifferenceinelevationbetweenthe
schoolandthevarioustransactionsites.SeeBlum,2018ME78,¶10n.5,187
A.3d566;Pinkham,2016ME59,¶14,137A.3d203.
1. Count1
[¶36]Theconfidentialinformantspecificallytestifiedthatthefirstbuy
occurredatthedoorwayofthedefendant’sbedroom.However,withregardto
Count1,thereisnoevidencefromwhichthejurycouldreasonablyinferthat
thedistancefromthedoorwayofthelivingroomtoBrown’sbedroomdoorway
iswithinthespatialleewayof8.8feet.Theonlyevidencedepictingtheinside
oftheapartmentbuildingwereseveralphotographsoftheinsideofBrown’s
24
bedroom11andseveralcloseshotsofspecificpiecesofevidencefoundinthe
apartment. Although photographs may sometimes allow a jury to make a
reasonable inference concerning distance, see United States v. Harrison,
103F.3d986,990(D.C.Cir.1997),12thatisnotthecasehere.
[¶37] The First Circuit held in Soler that the jury could not have
determinedbeyondareasonabledoubtthattheverticaldistancenotaccounted
forinmeasurementswaswithin37feetbasedonavideotapethatwasplayed
severaltimes.275F.3dat154-55.Asitsreasoning,theFirstCircuitexplained,
Althoughthevideotapewasplayedseveraltimesforthejury,itwasneither filmedwith an eye toward elucidating relative distancesnor introduced into evidence for that purpose. Moreover, itshowed the relevant portion of the building fleetingly and as anincidental matter; the camera angles were distorted by therepeated use of a zoom lens; and the prosecutor did not evenattempttodrawthejury’sattentiontothescaleinvolved.
Id.at155.Applyingthesamereasoninghere,inlightoftheabsenceofevidence
intherecorddemonstratingthesizeoftheapartment,oreventhesizeofthe
livingroom,thejurycouldnotmakeareasonableinferencethatthedoorway
11ThesephotographsareirrelevantforpurposesofCount1becausethetransactiontookplace
atthedoorwayofBrown’sbedroom.
12SomewhatanalogoustotheaerialmapusedinUnitedStatesv.Harrison,103F.3d986,990(D.C.Cir.1997), the State did offer in evidence a tax map that portrayed an aerial view of LongleyElementarySchoolandsomesurroundingneighborhoods. However, the taxmapdidnot include72WalnutStreet.Therefore,thejurycouldnothaverelieduponthemap’sscaleasanindependentmeansoffindingthattheapartmentbuildingwaswithin1,000feetoftheschool’slocation.
25
of Brown’s bedroom was within 8.8 feet of the living room doorway. See
Goodsonv.UnitedStates,760A.2d551,554-55(D.C.2000).
2. Counts2-3
[¶38]Thereisnospecificevidenceastotheexactlocationofthesecond
and third controlledbuys. The testimonyelicitedduring trialdemonstrated
onlythatthecontrolledbuystookplaceeitherinBrown’sbedroomdoorwayor
by an end table in the living room.13 Because the State’s 991.2-foot
measurement extends only to the doorway of the living room, and the
confidential informant testified that thedrug transactions tookplacebeyond
thatlocation,ineitherthedoorwayofBrown’sbedroomorbyanendtablein
thelivingroom,therewasnoevidencethatwouldpermitthejurytoreasonably
inferthatthedrugtransactionstookplacewithinthe8.8feetofspatialleeway
permittedbytheevidencepresented.SeeSoler,275F.3dat154-55.
3. Count4
[¶39] For the fourth count of aggravating trafficking, the State was
requiredtoprovethatthelocationinsideofBrown’sbedroomwherethedrugs
were discovered was within 1,000 feet of the school property. The only
evidence presented to show—or even suggest—the distance from the living
13Thereisnoevidenceintherecordregardingthelocationoftheendtableinthelivingroom.
26
roomdoorwaytothelocationinsideBrown’sbedroomwherethedrugswere
foundwerethephotographsshowingwherethedrugswerefoundinBrown’s
bedroom.Thephotographsrevealarelativelysignificantdistancebetweenthe
doorwayofBrown’sbedroomandwherethedrugswerefoundbyBrown’sbed.
Consequently,nojuryrationallycouldfind,basedontheevidencepresented,
thatthecocainewaslocatedwithin1,000feetofLongleyElementarySchool.
[¶40] Aswe acknowledged inBarnard, “‘the governmentmust prove
beyondareasonabledoubtthatthedistancefromaschooltotheactualsiteof
thetransaction,notmerelytothecurtilageorexteriorwallofthestructurein
which the transaction takesplace, is1,000 feetor less.’” 2003ME79,¶21,
828A.2d216(quotingSoler,275F.3dat154).Here,unlikeinBarnard,theDEA
agent did notmeasure to the farthest point of the building from the school,
which might have permitted the jury to find that “any location within the
buildingwas,necessarily,evenclosertotheschoolproperty.”Id.¶24.Rather,
theDEAagentmeasuredonlytothe“doorwaythatopensintothelivingroom”
fromtheWalnutStreetfrontentrance.
[¶41]Giventheabsenceofprecisemeasurementsofthedistancefrom
the doorway that opens into the living room to the doorway of Brown’s
bedroom,thelivingroomendtable,orthelocationwherethedrugswerefound
27
inBrown’sbedroom,andgiventheactualevidenceandthelimitedutilityofthe
“spatialleeway”principle,thejurycouldnothavefound,beyondareasonable
doubt,thatanyofBrown’straffickingtookplacewithin1,000feetofLongley
Elementary School. See Johnson, 46 F.3d at 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“It is
entirelypossible—perhapsprobable—thatthisistrue.Ifso,wehavenoidea
whythegovernmentdidnotproveit... .Sincethereisnoevidenceofeither
thestraight linemeasurementor thedistancebetween the terminalpointof
[the officer’s] measurement and the point of possession, it is impossible to
determinewhetherornotthisequationistrue.”);seealsoSoler,275F.3dat155
(“Althoughitispossible(indeed,probable)thatthedistancefromtheschoolto
thesiteoftheheroinsaleswaslessthan1,000feet, that isnotgoodenough.
Thegovernmentmustprovetheelementsofanoffensebeyondareasonable
doubt—and its proof here simply does not conform to that high standard.”
(footnoteomitted)).
III.CONCLUSION
[¶42]Accordingly,wevacatetheaggravatingelementsoftheconvictions
ofCounts1-4andremandtotheSuperiorCourtforresentencingonfourcounts
oftraffickinginscheduleWdrugs(ClassB). See17-AM.R.S.§1103(1-A)(A),
(3)(B).
28
Theentryis:
Judgmentvacatedinpart.RemandedforentryofmodifiedjudgmentandresentencingonCounts1-4.
SAUFLEY,C.J.,withwhomMEAD,J.,joins,concurring.
[¶43]WeconcurcompletelyintheCourt’sopinion.Wewriteseparately
to draw attention to the broader consequences of the statute making drug
traffickinganaggravatedoffenseifthetransactionoccurswithin1,000feetof
therealpropertyofaschool.See17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(E)(1)(2018).
[¶44]Tobeclear,theLegislature’sadoptionofastatutedesignedtokeep
school children fromobtaining drugs,witnessing the sale of drugs, orbeing
exposedtotheviolencethatcouldariseduringadrugtransactionislaudable.
Protecting our children from exposure to this pernicious activity and the
presenceof a culture that includesviolence,misery, anddeath is a critically
importantlegislativegoal.
[¶45]Thestatuteputinplacetoeffectuatesuchgoals,however,misses
itsmark.Thecaseatbarisaperfectexampleoftheunintendedconsequences
ofthisbluntinstrument.Thedrugsalesatissueoccurredinaprivatedwelling,
outsidetheviewofanychildren,youth,orparticipantsinschoolactivities.The
29
transactions had no connection to the school. Had the sales occurred in an
apartment closer to the part of the building thatwas nearest to the school,
ratherthanintheapartmentatissue,theaggravatingfactorwouldlikelyhave
beenproved,subjectingthedefendanttoalongerperiodofincarcerationfor
eachcrime,evenintheabsenceofanyschoolinvolvement.
[¶46] Worsethanthearbitrarynatureofthisaggravatingfactoristhe
potential that it may disproportionately affect defendants in more densely
populated geographic areas, where neighborhood schools are present
throughout a municipality. The result could include a disparate racial or
poverty-based impact that was unintended by the drafters. Meanwhile, in
suburban or rural areas where much of the population resides more than
1,000feetfromschoolproperty,drugtransactionsbetweenadults inprivate
homes are significantly less likely to incidentally result in convictions of
aggravatedtraffickingbasedonproximitytoaschool.
[¶47] Although thischallengewasnot raised in thematterbefore the
court, likely because challenges to similar laws based on assertions of
constitutionalinfirmityhaveregularlybeenunsuccessful,14thefactthatalaw
14SeeUnitedStatesv.Holland,810F.2d1215,1218-24(D.C.Cir.1987);Statev.Coria,839P.2d
890,894-901(Wash.1992);cf.UnitedStatesv.Falu,776F.2d46,48-50(2dCir.1985)(applyingprinciples of statutory construction). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuitobserved: “Thecourt [inFalu]concludedthatCongress intendedthatdealersbear theburdenof
30
meetsminimalconstitutionalstandardsdoesnotmakeitagoodlaw.Hence,
weraisethisissueforconsiderationbythepeople’selectedrepresentatives.
[¶48] In short, although the noble goal of the statute is to protect
schoolchildren from the ills of drug trafficking, the statute may
disproportionatelyexposepeoplelivingindiverse,urbanareastoaggravated
convictions and harsher sentences for conduct that may have no effect
whatsoever on the schoolchildren the statute seeks to protect. A more
descriptivedefinitionoftheactivitytobeproscribedwouldgreatlyenhancethe
justiceofthisaggravatingfactor,andwehopethattheMaineLegislaturewill
seriouslyconsidertheconsequencesoftheprovisionaswritten.15
ascertainingwhere schoolsare locatedand removing their operations fromthose areas.” UnitedStatesv.Cross,900F.2d66,69(6thCir.1990).“Similarly,inHolland,theD.C.Circuitstatedthatitwouldnotbeappropriatetoapplytheruleoflenityhere,wheretheapplicationwouldundercuttheunambiguouslegislativedesignofthesection.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).BasedonFaluandHolland,theSixthCircuitheldthat“thelackofknowledgeoftheproximityofaschooldoesnotviolatedueprocess.”Id.15TheLegislaturemayconsidersomeofthelanguageprovidedinasimilar,althoughprocedurally
distinct,statuteinNewJersey:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of this section that theprohibited conduct took place entirely within a private residence, that no person17yearsofageoryoungerwaspresentinsuchprivateresidenceatanytimeduringthecommissionoftheoffense,andthattheprohibitedconductdidnotinvolvedistributing,dispensing or possessingwith the intent to distribute or dispense any controlleddangerous substance or controlled substance analog for profit. The affirmativedefense established in this section shall be proved by the defendant by apreponderanceof theevidence. Nothinghereinshallbeconstrued toestablishanaffirmativedefensewithrespecttoaprosecutionforanoffensedefinedinanyothersectionofthischapter.
31
RoryA.McNamara,Esq.(orally),DrakeLaw,LLC,Berwick,forappellantDavidT.BrownJanet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Johanna L. Gauvreau, Asst. Atty. Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineAndroscogginCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2017-472FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY
N.J.Stat.Ann.§2C:35-7(e)(LEXISthrough2018SecondAnnualSess.)(emphasisadded).