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For Monday (STATCON) Chapter 11 of
textbook
1. National Housing Authority v.
Reyes, 123 SCRA 245 (1983)
2. Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137
SCRA 717 (1985)
3. Eugenio v. Drilon, 252 SCRA 106
(1996)
4. Gan v Reyes, G.R. No. 145527.
May 28, 2002
5. Casela v CA, G.R. No. L-26754.
October 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279
6. Rufino Lopez v. CTA, G.R. No. L-
9274. February 1, 1957 100 PHIL
850
7. Cosico v NLRC, GR 118432, May
23, 1997 272 SCRA 583Alonzo v.
CA, GR 72873, May 28, 1987 150
SCRA 259
8. Pp v. Almuete, G.R. No. L-26551.
February 27, 1976 69 SCRA 410
9. Rufino Lopez v. CTA, G.R. No. L-
9274. February 1, 1957
Chartered Bank of India v.
Imperial, G.R. No. 17222. March
15, 1921See
10.Paras v. Comelec cited on page
241 of Agpalo
11.Salvacion v. Rural Bank, G.R.
No. 94723. August 21, 1997 278
SCRA 27
I suggest that the class google the
IRAC Formula. This stands for Issue,
Rule, Application/Analysis, Conclusion.
This will help in digesting and reciting
on cases.
-Atty. Tanada
June 29, 1983
G.R. No. L-49439NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE
PASTOR P. REYES, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge (on detail), Court of Agrarian
Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch
II, Cavite City, QUIRINO AUSTRIA and
LUCIANO AUSTRIA, respondents.
, J.:
The undisputed fact that in this certiorari
proceeding against respondent Judge for failure
to comply with the provision of the Presidential
Decrees as to the amount to be paid by petitioner
to entitle it to a writ of possession in an
expropriation proceeding, no question was raised
as to their validity, calls for the grant of the
remedy sought.
The controversy started with the filing of a
complaint with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II,
Cavite City, against private respondents, for the
expropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 757, of a parcel of land, with an area of
25,000 square meters, owned and registered in
the name of respondent Quirino Austria, and
needed for the expansion of the Dasmariñas
Resettlement Project. 1 Then came from
petitioner about a year later a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. 2 Petitioner was
able to secure an order placing it in possession. 3
Thereafter, private respondent Quirino Austria
filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the amount
of P6,600.00, a sum which was equivalent to the
value of the property assessed for taxation
purposes and which was deposited by petitioner
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42 . 4 There
was an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw
Deposit by petitioner, citing Section 92 of
Presidential Decree No. 464 which states: “Basis
for payment of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. In determining such compensation
when private property is acquired by the
government for public use, the same shall not
exceed the market value declared by the owner
or administrator or anyone having legal interest in
the property, or such market value as determined
by the assessor, whichever is lower.” 5
Petitioner’s submission is that the owner’s
declaration at P1,400.00 which is lower than the
assessor’s assessment, is the just compensation
for the respondents’ property, respondents thus
being precluded from withdrawing any amount
more than P1,400.00. 6 Respondent Judge,
however, issued an order dated July 13, 1978
which, according to petitioner, is clearly contrary
to the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws. 7
There was a Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 21, 1978. 8 Its basis is the provision in
Presidential Decree No. 1224: “In the
determination of just compensation for such
private lands and improvement to be
expropriated, the government shall choose
between the value of the real property and
improvements thereon as declared by the owner
or administrator thereof or the market value
determined by the City or provincial assessor,
whichever is lower, at the time of the filing of the
expropriation complaint. ” 9 It was then submitted
that under the aforequoted statutory provision, the
owner’s declared market value at P1,400.00
which is lower than that fixed by the assessor is
the just compensation of respondent Quirino
Austria’s property sought to be expropriated. The
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
On January 4, 1979, the Court issued the
following resolution: “Considering the allegations
contained, the issues raised and the arguments
adduced in the petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary injunction with prayer
for a restraining order, the Court Resolved without
giving due course to the petition to require the
respondents to comment, not to file a motion to
dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The
Court further Resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order, effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court.”
10 The comment was thereafter submitted by
private respondents Quirino Austria and Luciano
Austria.
Private respondents stress that while there may
be basis for the allegation that respondent Judge
did not follow Presidential Decree No. 76 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 464, as
further amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
794, 1224 and 1259, the matter is still subject to
his final disposition, he having been vested with
the original and competent authority to exercise
his judicial discretion in the light of the
constitutional provisions. 11 There was a
comment likewise submitted by counsel on behalf
of respondent Judge but again, there was no
question raised as to the validity of the
aforementioned Decrees. Such comments were
considered as answers. The case was originally
submitted to the Second Division, and in a
resolution of February 21, 1979, it referred this
case to the Court en banc.
Under the state of the pleadings as submitted to
this Court, it is evident why, as noted at the
outset, certiorari lies.
1. One of the basic postulates in constitutional
law is the presumption of validity of legislative or
executive acts. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission 12 the leading case on the subject
until now, Justice Laurel, in speaking of judicial
review, made clear that it is not for the judiciary to
“pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.” 13 His landmark
opinion continues: “More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government. ” 14
As pointed out in Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila: 15 “Primarily what calls for a reversal of
such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to
a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: “The
presumption is all in favor of validity …” 16 As of
this stage in this particular case, there is a failure
to challenge the validity of such legislation. Both
public and private respondents in their comments
considered as answers raised no such
constitutional question. Even for it, therefore, as
of this stage of litigation, and under the conceded
facts, there should be a recognition that the law
as it stands must be applied. The Decree having
spoken so clearly and unequivocally calls for
obedience. It is repeating a common place to
state that on a matter where the applicable law
speaks in no uncertain language, the Court has
no choice except to yield to its command.
2. Nor is there any choice for petitioner National
Housing Authority for precisely it was created for
the laudable purpose of “urban land reform.” 17
The first whereas clause speaks of the
“magnitude of the housing problem of the country”
which “has grown into such proportions that only
a purposeful, determined, organized mass
housing development program can meet the
needs of Filipino families” for decent housing. 18
Moreover, the Presidential Decree is mandated
by the Constitution which requires the State to
“establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social
services in the field of … housing …” as well as
“to guarantee the enjoyment of the people of a
decent standard of living.” 19 The very first
section of the Decree speaks of the following:
“Pursuant to the mandate of the New
Constitution, there shall be developed a
comprehensive and integrated housing program
which shall embrace, among others, housing
development and resettlement, sources and
schemes of financing, and delineation of
government and private sector participation. The
program shall specify the priorities and targets in
accordance with the integrated national human
settlements plan prepared by the Human
Settlements Commission. ” 20 In view of the
urgency of the housing problem the various
decrees mentioned earlier were issued for the
purpose of assuring that the government would
be in a financial position to cope with such basic
human need which in the Philippines, under the
welfare state concept, and according to the
express language of the Constitution, is an
obligation cast upon the State. The memorandum
for petitioner submitted by Government Corporate
Counsel, now likewise the Presidential Legal
Assistant, Justice Manuel M. Lazaro, pursues the
matter further in prose impressed with force and
clarity: “The issue in this petition for certiorari and
mandamus involves the application of a rule
introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in
subsequent decrees that not only promotes social
justice but also ends the baneful and one-sided
practice abetted by the collusive acquiescence of
government officials and employees, of under
declaring properties for the purpose of taxation
but ballooning the price thereof when the same
properties are to be acquired by the government
for public purposes. Put to the test, therefore, is
the power of the government to introduce
rationality in the laws and to discourage a
deceitful practice that is not only ruinous to the
government coffers but also undermines its
efforts at awakening a democratic
responsiveness of the citizenry toward good
government and its economic and social
programs. The courts should recognize that the
rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in
subsequent decrees does not upset the
established concepts of justice or the
constitutional provision on just compensation for,
precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own
valuation of his property.” 21WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of respondent Judge of July 13, 1978 is hereby nullified and set aside. The restraining order issued by this Court on January 4, 1979 is hereby made permanent. The case is remanded to the lower court for further action conformably to law and to the above opinion. No costs.
July 22, 1985
G.R. No. L-69500JOSE ANTONIO U.
GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO
BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q.
SAGUISAG, petitioners,vs.CHAIRMAN MARIA
KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C.
ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD OF REVIEW
FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION
(BRMPT), respondents.
Irene R. Cortes, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Haydee
Yorac and Joker P. Arroyo for petitioners.The
Solicitor General for respondents.
Fernando, J.:
In this case of first impression, a certiorari
proceeding filed on January 10, 1985, there is a
persuasive ring to the invocation of the
constitutional right to freedom of expression 1 of
an artist-and for that matter a man of letters too-
as the basis for a ruling on the scope of the power
of respondent Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television and how it should be
exercised. The dispute between the parties has
been narrowed down. The motion picture in
question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified “For
Adults Only.” There is the further issue then, also
one of first impression, as to the proper test of
what constitutes obscenity in view of the
objections raised. Thus the relevance of this
constitutional command: “Arts and letters shall be
under the patronage of the State. 2
The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U.
Gonzalez, 3 President of the Malaya Films, a
movie production outfit duly registered as a single
proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade.
The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television, with Maria Kalaw
Katigbak as its Chairman and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo
C. Estrada as its Vice-Chairman, also named
respondents.
In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent
Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit the
film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification “For
Adults Only,” with certain changes and deletions
enumerated was granted. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating
that the classification of the film “For Adults Only”
was without basis. 4 Then on November 12,
1984, respondent Board released its decision:
“Acting on the applicant’s Motion for
Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the
Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-
committee and an examination of the film,
Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-
committee. Considering, however, certain vital
deficiencies in the application, the Board further
Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to
Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until
these deficiencies are supplied. 5 Hence this
petition.
This Court, in a resolution of January 12, 1985,
required respondent to answer. In such pleading
submitted on January 21, 1985, as one of its
special and affirmative defenses, it was alleged
that the petition is moot as “respondent Board has
revoked its questioned resolution, replacing it with
one immediately granting petitioner company a
permit to exhibit the film Kapit without any
deletion or cut [thus an] adjudication of the
questions presented above would be academic
on the case.” 6 Further: “The modified resolution
of the Board, of course, classifies Kapit as for-
adults-only, but the petition does not raise any
issue as to the validity of this classification. All
that petitioners assail as arbitrary on the part of
the Board’s action are the deletions ordered in the
film. 7 The prayer was for the dismissal of the
petition.
An amended petition was then filed on January
25, 1985. The main objection was the
classification of the film as “For Adults Only.” For
petitioners, such classification “is without legal
and factual basis and is exercised as
impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The
film is an integral whole and all its portions,
including those to which the Board now offers
belated objection, are essential for the integrity of
the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis
even for the vague speculations advanced by the
Board as basis for its classification. 8 There was
an answer to the amended petition filed on
February 18, 1985. It was therein asserted that
the issue presented as to the previous deletions
ordered by the Board as well as the statutory
provisions for review of films and as to the
requirement to submit the master negative have
been all rendered moot. It was also submitted that
the standard of the law for classifying films afford
a practical and determinative yardstick for the
exercise of judgment. For respondents, the
question of the sufficiency of the standards
remains the only question at issue.
It would be unduly restrictive under the
circumstances to limit the issue to one of the
sufficiency of standards to guide respondent
Board in the exercise of its power. Even if such
were the case, there is justification for an inquiry
into the controlling standard to warrant the
classification of “For Adults Only.” This is
especially so, when obscenity is the basis for any
alleged invasion of the right to the freedom of
artistic and literary expression embraced in the
free speech and free press guarantees of the
Constitution.
1. Motion pictures are important both as a
medium for the communication of Ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on
the perception by our people of issues and public
officials or public figures as well as the prevailing
cultural traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out
in Burstyn v. Wilson 9 is the “importance of
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion
lessened by the fact that they are designed to
entertain as well as to inform. 10 There is no clear
dividing line between what involves knowledge
and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction
were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic
right to free expression. Our recent decision in
Reyes v. Bagatsing 11 cautions against such a
move. Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of
the Court, “may be Identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without censorship or punishment. 12
This is not to say that such freedom, as is the
freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if
“there be a ‘clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that [the State] has a right to
prevent. 13
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not
all there is to free speech or free press. If it were
so, then such basic rights are emasculated. It is
however, except in exceptional circumstances a
sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such
right. This is not to deny that equally basic is the
other important aspect of freedom from liability.
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this litigation,
the emphasis should rightly be on freedom from
censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-settled
principle in our jurisdiction. As early as 1909, in
the case of United States v. Sedano, 14 a
prosecution for libel, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines already made clear that freedom of
the press consists in the right to print what one
chooses without any previous license. There is
reaffirmation of such a view in Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections, 15 where an order of
respondent Commission on Elections giving due
course to the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
but prohibiting him from using jingles in his mobile
units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers was considered an abridgment of the
right of the freedom of expression amounting as it
does to censorship. It is the opinion of this Court,
therefore, that to avoid an unconstitutional taint
on its creation, the power of respondent Board is
limited to the classification of films. It can, to
safeguard other constitutional objections,
determine what motion pictures are for general
patronage and what may require either parental
guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to
abide by the principle that freedom of expression
is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The
power to exercise prior restraint is not to be
presumed, rather the presumption is against its
validity. 16
3. The test, to repeat, to determine whether
freedom of excession may be limited is the clear
and present danger of an evil of a substantive
character that the State has a right to prevent.
Such danger must not only be clear but also
present. There should be no doubt that what is
feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be
evident. Also, there must be reasonable
apprehension about its imminence. The time
element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if
such danger be only probable. There is the
require of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic
postulate, wherefore, as noted earlier, is that
where the movies, theatrical productions radio
scripts, television programs, and other such
media of expression are concerned – included as
they are in freedom of expression – censorship,
especially so if an entire production is banned, is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil to public
public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest. 17 There is merit to the
observation of Justice Douglas that “every writer,
actor, or producer, no matter what medium of
expression he may use, should be freed from the
censor. 18
4. The law, however, frowns on obscenity and
rightly so. As categorically stated by Justice
Brennan in Roth v. United States 19 speaking of
the free speech and press guarantee of the
United States Constitution: “All Ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance –
unorthodox Ideas, controversial Ideas, even Ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion – have
the full protection of the guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance. 20 Such a view
commends itself for approval.
5. There is, however, some difficulty in
determining what is obscene. There is
persuasiveness to the approach followed in Roth:
“The early leading standard of obscenity allowed
material to be judged merely by the effect of an
isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible
persons. Regina v. Hicklin [1868] LR 3 QB 360.
Some American courts adopted this standard but
later decisions have rejected it and substituted
this test: whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test,
judging obscenity by the effect of isolated
passages upon the most susceptible persons,
might well encompass material legitimately
treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as
unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of
speech and press. On the other hand, the
substituted standard provides safeguards
adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional
infirmity. 21
6. The above excerpt which imposes on the
judiciary the duty to be ever on guard against any
impermissible infringement on the freedom of
artistic expression calls to mind the landmark
ponencia of Justice Malcolm in United States v.
Bustos, 22 decided in 1918. While recognizing
the principle that libel is beyond the pale of
constitutional protection, it left no doubt that in
determining what constitutes such an offense, a
court should ever be mindful that no violation of
the right to freedom of expression is allowable. It
is a matter of pride for the Philippines that it was
not until 1984 in New York Timer v. Sullivan, 23
thirty-years later, that the United States Supreme
Court enunciated a similar doctrine.
7. It is quite understandable then why in the Roth
opinion, Justice Brennan took pains to emphasize
that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous. 24
Further: “Obscene material is material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature
and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason
to deny material the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and
mysterious motive force in human life has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest
to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital
problems of human interest and public concern.
25
8. In the applicable law, Executive Order No. 876,
reference was made to respondent Board
“applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard, 26 words which can be construed in an
analogous manner. Moreover, as far as the
question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it
cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and
letters “shall be under the patronage of the State.
27 That is a constitutional mandate. It will be less
than true to its function if any government office
or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy
that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in
what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the
artist to determine what for him is a true
representation. It is not to be forgotten that art
and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination,
not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is
seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to
respect, unless there is a showing that the
product of his talent rightfully may be considered
obscene. As so wen put by Justice Frankfurter in
a concurring opinion, “the widest scope of
freedom is to be given to the adventurous and
imaginative exercise of the human spirit” 28 in
this sensitive area of a man’s personality. On the
question of obscenity, therefore, and in the light of
the facts of this case, such standard set forth in
Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in
such a fashion to avoid any taint of
unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in
a recent decision 29 citing the language of Justice
Malcolm in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 30 it is “an
elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role
of construction, applied when considering
constitutional questions, that when a law is
susceptible of two constructions’ one of which will
maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will
always adopt the former. 31 As thus construed,
there can be no valid objection to the sufficiency
of the controlling standard and its conformity to
what the Constitution ordains.
9. This being a certiorari petition, the question
before the Court is whether or not there was a
grave abuse of discretion. That there was an
abuse of discretion by respondent Board is
evident in the light of the difficulty and travail
undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim
was classified as “For Adults Only,” without any
deletion or cut. Moreover its perception of what
constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly
restrictive. This Court concludes then that there
was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there
are not enough votes to maintain that such an
abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly,
certiorari does not lie. This conclusion finds
support in this explanation of respondents in its
Answer to the amended petition: “The adult
classification given the film serves as a warning to
theater operators and viewers that some contents
of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the
scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club
and a good portion of the film shots concentrated
on some women erotically dancing naked, or at
least nearly naked, on the theater stage. Another
scene on that stage depicted the women kissing
and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of
the picture, there exists scenes of excessive
violence attending the battle between a group of
robbers and the police. The vulnerable and
imitative in the young audience will
misunderstand these scenes.” 32 Further:
“Respondents further stated in its answer that
petitioner company has an option to have the film
reclassified to For-General-Patronage if it would
agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare
down the violence in the film.” 33 Petitioners,
however, refused the “For Adults Only”
classification and instead, as noted at the outset,
filed this suit for certiorari.
10. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is
to be limited to the concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus
of this Court that where television is concerned: a
less liberal approach calls for observance. This is
so because unlike motion pictures where the
patrons have to pay their way, television reaches
every home where there is a set. Children then
will likely will be among the avid viewers of the
programs therein shown. As was observed by
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is
hardly the concern of the law to deal with the
sexual fantasies of the adult population. 34 it
cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of
caring for the welfare of the young.
WHEREFORE, this Court, in the light of the principles of law enunciated in the opinion, dismisses this petition for certiorari solely on the ground that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as “For-Adults-Only.”
[G.R. No. 145527. May 28, 2002]AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner, vs.
HON. ANTONIO C. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61, Baguio City, ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, assisted by BERNADETTE C. PONDEVIDA, respondents.
D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO, J.:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan[1] demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite.[2]
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support.[3] His motion, however, was denied by the trial court.[4]
Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Thus, on 19 January 2000 private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. In its Order declaring petitioner in default the trial court noted that petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex parte.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every
month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent.[5]
Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate need for schooling.[6] Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor vehicle, a Honda City, with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading," and found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan City.[7]
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of Appeals.[8]
On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing.[9]
On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any to argue that there were no good reasons to support its
immediate execution. The second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence."[10]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner came to us impugning the dismissal of his petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that under the rules a judgment for support which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any good reason for its immediate execution. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the writ asserting that it was issued in violation of his right to notice and hearing. Petitioner also seeks the setting aside of the default order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that should he be allowed to prove his defense of adultery, the claim of support would be most likely denied.[11] Petitioner claims that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's mother would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in such case, it would not be the child of the defendant and therefore not entitled to support. Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother of Francheska Joy. Petitioner consents to submit to Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve the issue of paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for accuracy.[12]
A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails to persuade this Court to brand the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. There is no evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion.
Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial
court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition.
Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. As the records show, in partial fulfillment of the writ of execution petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as it was later ordered released to a third party who laid claim over the levied vehicle.[13] Also, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente Lite promising to deposit the amount due as support every 15th of the month, but to date has not deposited any amount in complete disavowal of his undertaking.[14] He was not even deterred from appealing before us and needlessly taking up our time and energy by posing legal questions that can be characterized, at best, as flimsy and trivial. We are thus not prepared to abrogate the writ of execution issued in favor of private respondent for substantial justice would be better served if petitioner be precluded from interposing another barrier to the immediate execution of the support judgment.
We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this case that there has been too much temporizing in the execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance and chief enemy.[15] Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice.
Lastly, we note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default and his insistence that he be subjected, together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity. The futility of his arguments is very apparent. It is not for us at this instance to review or revise the Decision rendered by the trial court for to do so would pre-empt the decision which may be rendered by the Court of Appeals in the main case for support.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano[16] is relevant, thus:The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up
for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant petition is DENIED. The 31 August 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Certiorari instituted by petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and upholding the validity of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court – Br. 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4234-R, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26754 October 16, 1970MATEO CASELA, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, and EXEQUIEL MAGSAYSAY, respondents.Amor G. Fuentecilla for petitioner.Federico Diaz for respondent Exequiel Magsaysay. CASTRO, J.:.This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals of August 31, 1966 in CA-G.R. 35593-R, denying a petition for a writ of certiorari brought against an order of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch III of the Third Regional District at Iba, Zambales. This latter order, promulgated on October 1, 1964 in CAR 5666-R-Z-55, set aside an earlier order of the same court denying a motion for a writ of execution of the final judgment in the said CAR case.The following findings of the Court of Appeals are not disputed.In CAR Case No. 5666-R-Z of the Court of Agrarian Relations of Iba, Zambales, Mateo Casela, the petitioner herein, was the defendant, and Exequiel Magsaysay, now one of the respondents, the plaintiff. On October 26, 1956, after due trial, the said Court decided the case against the defendant, who was ordered ejected; and decision thereon having become final and executory the Court on August 12, 1957, issued a writ of execution commanding the defendant to vacate the premises and remove his house therefrom. The defendant, however, refused to comply with the said writ; so, the Court issued another writ on May 6, 1958, and still another on April 14, 1959.Instead of obeying the writ, however, the defendant instituted Civil Case No. 2142 before the Court of First Instance of Zambales asking that the plaintiff be condemned to pay him the value of his house in the amount of P5,000.00, improvements of P2,000.00, in addition to damages in the sum of P1,600.00. At the same time, the defendant filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution pending the final outcome of the said civil case. Against this motion for suspension, the plaintiff
filed a counter-motion to declare the defendant and the provincial Sheriff in contempt of Court. After hearing the respective motions of the parties, the Court granted the defendant's motion for suspension until after the said Civil Case No. 2142 would have been disposed of on the merits.Civil Case No. 2142 eventually reached the Court of Appeals, which, on October 6, 1965, rendered a decision dismissing the defendant's appeal. In said decision, the appellate Court ruled once and for all that the claims of the defendant for indemnity for the value of his house and improvements were in the nature of compulsory counterclaims that should have been pleaded before the agrarian court and not in the Court of First Instance where they were brought. Consequently, the plaintiff could not be compelled to pay said claims and the demolition of the defendants house could be done without payment of indemnity. By reason of this categorical pronouncement of the Court of Appeals, respondent Magsaysay filed a motion dated December 6, 1963 and another dated February 11, 1964 praying for the issuance of an alias writ of execution attaching thereto a copy of the appealed decision. The agrarian court, however, in an order dated March 5, 1964, denied the motion, holding that its decision dated October 26, 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a period of five (5) years had already elapsed from the said date.On April 10, 1964, the plaintiff moved for a reconsideration of the order of denial of March 5, 1964; this was granted by the Court in its order of October 1, 1964, which forthwith directed the execution of its judgment of October 26, 1956.That the decision of October 26, 1956 of the Court of Agrarian Relations became final and executory on December 17, 1956, is not controverted. Counting five years from December 17, 1956, the plaintiff Exequiel Magsaysay had until December 17, 1961 within which to move for execution of the said decision. It would thus appear that Magsaysay's motion for execution of December 11, 1963, having been filed beyond the five-year reglementary period, was time-barred.The peculiar circumstances of this case, however, would, to our mind, indicate that the said motion
for execution was filed on time. The record indubitably shows that Magsaysay had persistently and consistently moved the court to execute the decision of October 26, 1956 which became final and executory on December 17, 1956. In point of fact he succeeded in securing a writ of execution for no less than three times, which writs were however not executed because of the stubborn refusal of the petitioner Casela to vacate the premises and because of the lower court's order sustaining Casela's motion for suspension of execution. Magsaysay obtained a writ of execution as early as August 12, 1957. This was not served on account of Casela's refusal to comply with the writ. On Magsaysay's motion, the court issued an alias writ on April 14, 1959, which writ explicitly directed the sheriff to eject Casela and to demolish the latter's house. This second writ was however not implemented because the court, upon Casela's own motion, ordered the suspension of the writ two times. The first suspension was effected by order of September 22, 1959 and lasted until April 22, 1960. This suspension was occasioned by the pendency of civil case 2142 between Casela and Magsaysay before the Zambales Court of First Instance. The second suspension, which was effected by the lower court's order of July 11, 1960, lasted until October 6, 1963. These two suspensions which all told covered a period of three years, nine months and twenty-five days were granted on motions of Casela, to await the final disposition of civil case 2142.It thus appears that Magsaysay had not incurred in the least delay in the enforcement of the judgment which had become final and executory. He exhausted all legal means within his power to eject Casela from his land. But the writs of execution issued by the lower court were not complied with and/or were suspended by reason of acts or causes not of Magsaysay's own making and against his objections.From December 17, 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory, to December 11, 1963, the date when Magsaysay's motion for execution was filed, a period of six years, eleven months and twenty-four days elapsed. From this period must be subtracted the
time during which the writs of execution could not be served, or a period of three years, nine months and twenty-five days. Consequently, only three years, one month and twenty-nine days can be charged against the five-year reglementary period. Undoubtedly, therefore, Magsaysay's motion for execution of December 11, 1963 was filed well within the five-year reglementary period.Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of statutes. The courts are not to be hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the statute; the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This rule of construction is especially applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and injustice.ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of tile Court of Appeals of August 31, 1966, which upheld the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations of October 1, 1964, is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.
G.R. No. L-9274 February 1, 1957RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondent.Isidro A. Vera and Eulalio F. Legaspi for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padila, Assistant Solicitor General Ramon L. Avanceña and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for respondent.MONTEMAYOR, J.:Petitioner appellant Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. is appealing from a resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing its appeal from a decision of the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, assessing additional fees on petitioner for a certain importation of wire netting. The facts are simple and undisputed. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently, however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of May 23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to us, seeking a reversal of said resolution of dismissal.For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125 relied upon by the Tax Court and the Solicitor General, as well as Section 11 of the same Act invoked by the petitioner:Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided —(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue
in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and(3) Decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals in case involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.
x x x x x x x x xSEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any person, association or corporation adversely by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling.No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue or the Collector of the Customs shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by existing law: Provided, however, that when in the opinion of the Court the collection by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs may jeopardize the interests of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of the proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount with the Court. (Emphasis supplied.)There is really a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11 above reproduced. Section 7 provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue, decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs and decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals on cases mentioned in said section. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Republic Act in listing and enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal as well as the effect of said appeal, mentions those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or City Board of Assessment Appeals, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. Taken literally, a person affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals; and since no mention is made about decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, a person affected by said decision may not appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. However, section 7 of the Act above reproduced specially provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. That legal provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Tax Appeals to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs would be empty, meaningless, and unenforceable because under Section 11, no person affected by the decision of the Commissioner of customs may appeal to the Tax Court. These two meaningless, and unenforceable because under Section 11, should be harmonized and reconciled if possible, in order to give effect to the whole Act.We are in entire accord with the Tax Court and the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in section 11, mentioning therein the Collector of Customs. It should be, as it was meant to be, the Commissioner of Customs. There are several reasons in support of this view. Under the Customs Law, found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Commissioner of Customs (Insular Collector of Customs) is the Chief of the Bureau of Customs and has jurisdiction over the whole country as regards the enforcement of the Customs Law, whereas, there are about sixteen Collectors of Customs for the sixteen collection districts and principal parts of entry into which the Philippines has been divided. These Collectors of Customs are subordinates of the Commissioner of
Customs over whom he has supervision and control (section 1152, Revised Administrative Code). Pursuant to said supervision and control, under section 1405 of the Revised Administrative Code, when any new or unsettled question shall be determined by the Collector of Customs, he shall, if matter is not otherwise carried upon for review in ordinary course, notify the Commissioner of his decision, submitting an adequate statement of acts involved. What is more important is the provision of section 1380, which reproduce below:SEC. 1380. Review by Commissioner. — The person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs in any matter presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen days after notification in writing by the collector of his action or decision, give written notice to the collector signifying his desore to have the matter reviewed by the Commissioner.Thereupon, the Collector of Customs shall forthwith transmit all the papers in the cause to the Commissioner, who shall approve, modify, or reverse the action of his subordinate and shall take such steps and make such order or orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision.Under this section, any person affected or aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Customs. From all this, it is clear if we followed the literal meaning and wording of section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, in the sense that persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly tot he Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would, not only be gravely affected, but even destroyed. We cannot believe that was the intention of the Legislature in passing Republic Act No. 1125. It is more reasonable and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of Customs in the first paragraph and the first part of the second paragraph of said
section. In thus holding, the Court are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation. They are merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the Legislature. This the Courts should and can validly do. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not the letter but rather the spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that is important and which matters. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous results, or would contravene the clear purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the latter of the law. Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal meaning of the terms, for that which is clearly within the intention of the Legislature in enacting the law is as much within the statute as if it were within the latter. Here the error (clerical and misprint) is plain and obvious. It is within the province of the courts to correct said error. This is not to correct the act of the Legislature, but rather to carry out and give due course to the true intention of said Legislature. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd edition, pp. 66-67; 157-158.).Furthermore, section 11 of Republic Act 1125 may well be regarded as a mere complement or implementation of section 7. Since section 7 provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue. decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, and decisions of provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals, so section 11 naturally provides that persons adversely affected by said decisions may appeal to the Tax Court. However, in enumerating the governmental bodies or agencies rendering said decisions that may be appealed, it erroneously listed the Collector instead of the Commissioner, of Customs. The error is plain.As a matter of fact, the Court of Tax Appeals in its resolution of dismissal of May 23, 1955 cites in support thereof a resolution promulgated by it on January 22, 1955 in C.T.A. Case No. 17, entitled "Acting Collector of Customs vs. Acting
Commissioner of Customs", wherein it said:The phrase "Collector of Customs" appearing in the above-mentioned provision (section 11) of Republic Act No. 1125 is clearly an oversight on the part of Congress. It should read "Commissioner of Customs" to make the provision conform with section 7 of the said Republic Act section 1380 of the Revised Administrative Code.Petitioner contends that the literal meaning of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 should be adopted in the sense that the Court of Tax Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of Customs over Appeals from decisions of Collectors of Customs, so that a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs is given the choice of appealing the said decision either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the Courts of Tax Appeals. We find contention unteable. In the first place, the two remedies suggested are entirely different, one from the other; an appeal to the Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should first be exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested by the petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy, whether with the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to decide because, if he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy before the Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should the Court of Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal said decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an administrative officer may not review the decision of the Court. On the other hand, if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an adverse decision, he may yet appeal therefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place, even if the person affected by an
adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the petitioner, under the literal meaning of section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.In view of the foregoing, we hold that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, with costs.
[G.R. No. 118432. May 23, 1997]CONRADO COSICO, JR., petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EVA AIRWAYS CORPORATION, LEWIS CHANG, and ALLEN SOONG, respondents.
D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN, J.:
May 28, 1987
G.R. No. 72873CARLOS ALONZO and
CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.Luis R.
Reyes for private respondent.
Cruz, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious
inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a
court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the
law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice
even against the law? Thus queried, we do not
equivocate. The answer is that we do neither
because we are a court both of law and of justice.
We apply the law with justice for that is our
mission and purpose in the scheme of our
Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro
indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the
name of their deceased parents under OCT No.
10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino
Padua, transferred his undivided share of the
herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way
of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22,
1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own
share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated “Con Pacto de Retro Sale,” for the
sum of P 440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners
occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a
fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-
concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the
five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to
the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen . 5 On May 27, 1977, however,
Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption
claimed by her brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now
on the ground that the right had lapsed, not
having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although
there was no written notice, it was held that actual
knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied
the requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-
heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-
heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same
lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters,
including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8
Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was
staying in the same house with her sister Tecla,
who later claimed redemption petition. 9
Moreover, the petitioners and the private
respondents were close friends and neighbors
whose children went to school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were
unaware of the sales and that they thought, as
they alleged, that the area occupied by the
petitioners had merely been mortgaged by
Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances
just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to
know that the area occupied by the petitioners
had been purchased by them from the other. co-
heirs. Especially significant was the erection
thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure
by the petitioners’ son, which was done without
objection on her part or of any of the other co-
heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is
the correct interpretation and application of the
pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by
both the petitioners and the private respondents.
This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition,
any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to
the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within
the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court
declared that the notice required by the said
article was written notice and that actual
notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing
the same case of De Conejero v. Court of
Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the
respondent court held that that decision,
interpreting a like rule in Article 1623,
stressed the need for written notice although
no particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the
co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the
property subject to redemption would satisfy
the requirement for written notice. “So long,
therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner)
is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof,” he declared, “the thirty
days for redemption start running. ”
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 ” the
Court, speaking through the same learned
jurist, emphasized that the written notice
should be given by the vendor and not the
vendees, conformably to a similar
requirement under Article 1623, reading as
follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by
the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as
the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners
excludes that of the adjoining owners.
As “it is thus apparent that the Philippine
legislature in Article 1623 deliberately
selected a particular method of giving notice,
and that notice must be deemed exclusive,”
the Court held that notice given by the
vendees and not the vendor would not toll the
running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an
illustration of the Holmes dictum that “hard
cases make bad laws” as the petitioners
obviously cannot argue against the fact that
there was really no written notice given by the
vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and
interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one
conclusion, to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption
had not begun to run, much less expired in
1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a
law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in
its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and
we must keep them so. To be sure, there are
some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not
and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and
consequence. “Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law,” so
we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
“where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them.” 13 While we admittedly may
not legislate, we nevertheless have the power
to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect
the will of the legislature. While we may not
read into the law a purpose that is not there,
we nevertheless have the right to read out of it
the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we
defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the
spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law
maker’s will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute
determines its construction, hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent.
For what is within the spirit is within the letter
but although it is not within the letter thereof,
and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute.
Stated differently, a thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as if within the letter; and a thing
which is within the letter of the statute is not
within the statute unless within the intent of
the lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks
to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of
such notice as the starting time of the 30-day
period of redemption. Considering the
shortness of the period, it is really necessary,
as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date
it is supposed to begin, to obviate any
problem of alleged delays, sometimes
consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem
because the right of redemption was invoked
not days but years after the sales were made
in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by
Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the
first sale and fourteen years after the second
sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners
extends to more than a decade, assuming of
course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the
law requires the notice to be written, would
such notice be necessary in this case?
Assuming there was a valid notice although it
was not in writing. would there be any
question that the 30-day period for
redemption had expired long before the
complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot
accept the private respondents’ pretense that
they were unaware of the sales made by their
brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we
would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law
over its purpose. The purpose is clear
enough: to make sure that the redemptioners
are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this
case the other brothers and sisters were
actually informed, although not in writing, of
the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that
such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of
redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period
started from the dates of such sales in 1963
and 1964, we do say that sometime between
those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other
co-heirs were actually informed of the sale
and that thereafter the 30-day period started
running and ultimately expired. This could
have happened any time during the interval of
thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs
made a move to redeem the properties sold.
By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua
filed her complaint, the right of redemption
had already been extinguished because the
period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a
party with laches in the assertion of an
alleged right it is essential that he should
have knowledge of the facts upon which he
bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were
such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily
available upon inquiry, but the party neglects
to make it, he will be chargeable with laches,
the same as if he had known the facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-
heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who
were not among them, should enclose a
portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a
house of strong materials. This definitely was
not the act of a temporary possessor or a
mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an
act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object
or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts,
which were readily available. It took all of
thirteen years before one of them chose to
claim the right of redemption, but then it was
already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion
today, we are deviating from the strict letter of
the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly
as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the
above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be
clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle
doctrines. What we are doing simply is
adopting an exception to the general rule, in
view of the peculiar circumstances of this
case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably
informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and ended
during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs
exercising their right of redemption. These are
the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian
defined justice “as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due.” 16 That
wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming
that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. So we have done in this case.WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-26551 February 27, 1976THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.WENCESLAO ALMUETE FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO FRONDA, defendants-appellees.Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for appellant.Emiliano D. Castellanes for appellees. AQUINO, J.:Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that in December, 1963, in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five (5) cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan (Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto. Domingo Branch VI).Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to the exact date of the commission of the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion because they had already entered their plea.Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds (1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged; (2) that there is no law punishing it, and (3) that the court has, no jurisdiction over the alleged time The fiscal opposed the motion.The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order of August 11, 1966. It held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe t lie circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest.The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal. The Solicitor General argues in his
brief that the information in this case alleges all the elements of the offense defined in section 39 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended of Republic Act No. 2263. Sections 39 and 57 of the same law reads as follows:SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. — It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing- That if the tenant n food for his family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to allow the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for its threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net share in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law applicable to that act committed.SEC. 57. Penal Provision. — Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of this Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court. ... *We hold that the order of dismissal should be affirmed because as held in People vs. Adillo, L-23M, November 27, 1975, a case similar to the instant case, section 99 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and as implemented by Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was already in force when the act complained of was committed. The repeal may be rationalized in this manner:The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests.The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law (except as qualified in sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished
share tenancy subject to certain conditions indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more raison d'etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area". Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipated the tenant from the bondage of the soil. And Presidential Decree No. 316 interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding until the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 27. (See People vs. Adillo, supra).The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that, as already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace the Agricultural Tenancy Law with the Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the Agricultural Land Reform Code, at least as far as ricelands are concerned.As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian
Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contain in the old act and not included in the amendatory act" (Crawford, Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising statute is in effect a 'legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225; People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; People vs. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431. See dissent in Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252, 254).WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.