Smart Grid: A National Perspective
Albany Law School
Patricia HoffmanAssistant Secretary
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
U.S. Department of Energywww.OE.energy.gov
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Growing AssetStress
▶ Operating Closer to Edge
▶ Lower System Inertia
▶ Aging Infrastructure
▶ Fewer Power Engineers
▶ More DynamicBehavior
▶ More Stochastic
▶ Multi-levelCoordination
IncreasedVariable
Generation
▶ Broader Markets & More Services
▶ GreaterComplexity
▶ Market Clearing at Shorter Intervals
More DynamicMarkets
▶ DemandResponse
▶ Energy Storage / Electric Vehicles
▶ DynamicT&D Assets
NewControlla
bleAssets
▶ PMU & Over the HorizonMonitoring
▶ New control paradigms
Massive Data
▶ FasterComputation
▶ Cloud Computing
▶ Probabilistic Methods
▶ Pervasive Intelligence
Computational
AdvancesNeeded
Source: PNNL
Unprecedented Challenges Make Grid Modernization Urgent
Modernized Grid
Affordable
Safe
Accessible
Reliable
Clean
Secure
Resilient
Adaptable, flexible
Grid Modernization
How do we keep rates reasonable while making major new
investments?How do we make the
transformed grid safe for workers and consumers?
How do we make the grid accessible to new actors and new technologies?
How do we keep the grid reliable while transforming it?
How do we make our electricity supply system dramatically cleaner?
How do we protect against
cyber and physical threats?
How do we harden the grid against severe
events?
How do we design the grid to accommodate
ceaseless change?
Modernization Must Support 8 Key Grid Attributes
Illustrative Early Highlights
Draft / Pre-Decisional / Not for Distribution 4
Near and Long-term Infrastructure Vulnerabilities Are Growing
Climate Change: weather related power outages have increased from 5-20 each year in the mid-1990s to 50-100 per year in the last five years.
Cyber-security: 53% of all cyber-attacks from October 2012 to May 2013 were on energy installations.
Physical Threats: There were three highly visible attacks on grid infrastructure in 2013. Supply chains for key components of grid infrastructure are not robust.
Interdependencies: The interdependencies of the electric and fuel infrastructures seen in Superstorm Sandy greatly complicated the response and recovery.Supply/demand Shifts: The lack of pipeline infrastructures for associated gas in the Bakken has resulted in large-scale flaring of this gas, in amount sufficient to be seen from space.
Early Results Show Tangible Benefits
Transmission
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)
18 transmission owners installing and connecting 393 PMUs and 57 PDCs to
modernize transmission in the Western Interconnection
Distribution
Electric Power Board of Chattanooga
Advanced automated circuit smart switches and sensor equipment will enable 40%
reduction in customer outage minutes – worth $35 million/year to customers
AMI
Talquin Electric Cooperative (TEC)
Smart meter installations are saving hundreds of thousands of dollars in
misreporting (from manual reading) and saving an expected $200,000/year from
5,500 avoided truck rolls
Customer Systems
Oklahoma Gas and Electric (OGE)
Time-of-use and variable peak / critical peak pricing with in-home customer device use
enabled up to 30% peak demand reduction (which could offset a new peaking plant) and lowered customer bills by up to $150
Cyber Security FrameworkComprised of Capability and Risk Management
• Risk Management • Asset Configuration Management • Identity and Access Management • Threat and Vulnerability Management• Situational Awareness • Information Sharing and Communications• Event and Incident Response • Supply Chain and External Dependencies Management• Workforce Management
G T&D L- -Today’s EMS
Next-Generation EMS
EMS
DMS/OMS
BMS
Fostering tighter integration and coordination between transmission, distribution, and load.
Next-Generation Energy Management System
Many more Control Options
10s of million of control points.
100s of thousand of control points.
Transactive Energy
Source: GridWise Architecture Council and Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
Customers: A Path Forward