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Security in Sensor Networks
By :Rohin SethiAranika MahajanTwisha Patel
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Outline
Introduction Time Syncronization Attacks Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks Conclusion
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Need for Security in Sensor Networks
Broadcast nature of Wireless Communication Lack of tamper-resistant hardware Limited storage & computational resources
rendering public key cryptography impractical
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Time Synchronization Attacks
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Time Synchronization Protocols
Time synchronization protocols :– provide a mechanism for synchronizing the local
clocks of the nodes in a sensor network– used by many applications of sensor networks, such
as tracking and localization.
Attacks on time-synchronization protocols: – have one main goal, to somehow convince some
nodes that their neighbors’ clocks are at a different time than they actually are.
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Time-sync Protocol for Sensor Networks (TPSN)
TPSN initially creates a spanning tree of the sensor network.
While the tree is being built, the nodes perform pair-wise synchronization along the edges of the tree.
Each node exchanges synchronization messages with its parent in the spanning tree.
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Time-sync Protocol for Sensor Networks
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Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol (FTSP)
Root node broadcasts its local time and any nodes that receive that time synchronize their clocks to that time.
Synchronization messages:1. rootID2. seqNum3. sendingTime
Whenever a node receives a message from the root node, it updates its global time. In addition, it broadcasts its own global time to its neighbors.
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Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol
Each node retains the highest sequence number it has received and the rootID of the last received message used.
If a node does not hear a time synchronization message for a ROOT_TIMEOUT period, it declares itself to be the new root.
If a root hears a time synchronization message from another root with lower ID than itself, it gives up its root status.
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Attacks on Time Synchronization Protocol for Sensor Networks
Send Incorrect Information to its children Lie about its level in the tree It can avoid participating in the tree building
phase.
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Attacks on FTSP
The compromised node can claim to be the root node with ID 0 and begin at a higher sequence number than the original root
All updates originating at the actual root node will be ignored.
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Counter Measure For Time Synchronization Attacks
Corrupted Root:– A subset of the nodes act as the root on a rotating basis. – All nodes share a private key with that subset of the nodes
that may become a root.– Any corrupted nodes might continue to send erroneous
updates under this scheme, but the effects on the nodes' calculations of the skew and offset would be reduced.
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Counter Measure For Time Synchronization Attacks (contd…)
Increasing Reliability :– The nodes record a subset S of the updates from
their neighbors.
Preventing False Updates:– Skeptic Node may cease sending updates to its
neighbors – Policy of containment
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Denial of Service Attacks
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Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
Attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to intended users
Force victims to reset/consume resources– Service no longer available
Obstructs communication media between intended users and victim
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DoS in WSNs
Sleep Deprivation Attacks Path Based DoS Attacks Jamming Attacks
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Sleep deprivation Attacks
Also known as Battery Exhaustion Attacks Attacker drains the battery of pervasive
computing device– Device rendered inoperable
Successful Attack Currently not widespread but the potential
exists
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Forms of Sleep deprivation Attacks
Service Request Power Attacks Benign Power Attacks Malignant Power Attacks
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Remedy for Sleep Deprivation Attacks
Existing security techniques Power Secure Architecture
– Goal: Provide some guaranteed fraction of the system’s expected battery life.
– Fundamental Security Features: -1. Multilayer Authentication
2. Energy Signature Monitoring
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Power Secure Architecture
Multilayer Authentication– Service Request Attacks– Energy profile of service
Crippling energy level– Initial authentication must be
lightweight process Energy Signature Monitor
– Benign and Malignant Attacks– Energy Monitoring Unit (EMU) :
Self-contained unit for dynamically measuring the systems power consumption
– Concerns Allows Attacker to more easily tune
a sleep deprivation attack Checking signature must be
lightweight process
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Power Secure Architecture (contd..)
Energy Signature Monitor– Benign and Malignant Attacks– Energy Monitoring Unit (EMU) : Self-contained
unit for dynamically measuring the systems power consumption
– Concerns Allows Attacker to more easily tune a sleep deprivation
attack Checking signature must be lightweight process
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Path Based DoS Attacks
Damaging form of DoS Attacks
Hierarchical organization of sensor networks
– Member Nodes– Aggregator Nodes– Base Station
Easy to launch and disable large portions of WSNs
PDoS Attack in End-to-End Communication in WSNs
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Remedy for PDoS Attacks
One-way Hash Chains (OHCs) Detect spurious packets using separate
shared key Detect spurious packets using single “path”
key Rate Control
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Jamming Attacks
Well-known attack on wireless communication
Adversary can disrupt entire network with k randomly distributed jamming nodes, putting N nodes out of service, where k << N
Attacks is simple and effective for single frequency networks
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Remedy for Jamming Attacks
Standard Defense: Various forms of spread-spectrum communication
Phase I Phase II
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Conclusion
Attacks Severity Ease of implementation of solution
PDoS High Medium
Sleep Deprivation Medium Medium
TPSN Medium Medium
Jamming Medium High (Hardware cost involved)
FTSP Low Medium
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THANK YOU