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Lesson for August 23, 2014
Saturday
Parts of a Pleading
Parts of a pleading - Rule 7
a) Caption - Sec. 1, Rule 7
b) Signature and address - Sec. 3, Rule 7
- Republic v. Kenrick Development Corp., G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006
c) Verification and certification against forum shopping - Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7
- Robern Development Corp. v. J. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999
- Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 153785, August 3, 2006
- Montes v. CA, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006
- Far Eastern Shipping Co.v. CA, G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998
- Valmonte v. Alcala, G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008
i. Requirements of a corporation executing the verification/certification of non-forum shopping
- National Steel Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 134468, August 29, 2002
- Kaunlaran Lending Investors Inc. v. Uy, G.R. No. 154974, February 4, 2008
d) Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading
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Signature and address - Sec. 3, Rule 7
REPUBLIC vs KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORP.
G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006
Facts:
Kenrick Development Corporation constructed a
concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land
located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO). As a result, the ATO was
dispossessed of its land. Respondent justified its action
with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented
three TCTs issued in its name and which allegedly
originated from TCT registered in the name of Alfonso
Concepcion.
The Registrar of Deeds had no record of the
TCTs. The land covered by respondents titles was also
found to be within Villamor Air Base in Pasay City.
The OSG filed a complaint before the RTC forrevocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of
title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as
represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso
Concepcion.
Respondent filed its answer which was
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel
for respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the
matter of land registration and titling. The legislative
investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and
focused on how respondent was able to acquire them.
Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel, was
summoned. He testified that he prepared respondents
answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to
respondents president, Victor Ong. The signature
appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no
one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who
finally signed it.
The Republic promptly filed an urgent motion onto declare respondent in default due to its failure to file a
valid answer; since the person who signed the answer was
neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to
him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading.
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, it was
a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.
RTC ordered the answer stricken from the
records and, declared respondent in default.
CA found Atty. Garlitos statements in the
legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not
subjected to cross-examination. It concluded that he
assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his
stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer
may have had. CA granted respondents petition for
certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default
against respondent and ordered the RTC to proceed to
trial with dispatch. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA err in reversing the trial
courts order which declared respondent in default for its
failure to file a valid answer. Yes, it did.
Held:
A signed pleading is one that is signed either by
the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear
on this matter. It requires that a pleading must
be signed by the party or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself
or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from
one that is unsigned to one that is s igned. Counsels
authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him.He may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an
assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for the members of the legal
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of
one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in
good standing.
A signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to
signing by unqualified persons, something the law
strongly proscribes. Therefore, the blanket authority
respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyonewas void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was
likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured
or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts. No doubt,
Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket
authority for just anyone to sign the answer. RTC correctly
ruled that respondentsanswer was invalid and of no legal
effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent insists that even if it were true that
its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the
defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside. To
summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness
and injustice. Like all rules, procedural rules should be
followed except only when they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
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degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. In this case, respondent failed to
show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted
from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to
the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to
account for his possible misconduct.
Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Verification and certification against forum shopping -
Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. J. QUITAIN
G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999
Facts:
Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land
which the National Power Corporation (NPC) is seeking to
expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-
cost housing project. NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent
Domain against Robern. Instead of filing an answer,
Robern countered with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging (a)
that the Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not
showing that the action bore the approval of the NPC
board of directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Caete, who
signed the verification and certification in the Complaint,
was not the president, the general manager or an officer
specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395);
(c) that the choice of property to be expropriated was
improper, as it had already been intended for use in a
low-cost housing project, a public purpose within the
contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary,
as there were similar properties available within the area.NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Possession based on PD No. 42. NPC deposited 6,121.20
at PNB.
RTC denied the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Robern filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out
that (a) the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss could
be resolved without trial, as they could be readily
appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis--vis
the applicable provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the
grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not
require evidence aliunde. RTC denied the Motion.
Robern filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order arguing among others that Section 15-A of RA 6395
was virtually amended when Caete was allowed to
verify and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in
regard to the Complaint for expropriation filed by NPC.
NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Possession.
In spite of Roberns opposition, RTC issued a Writ of
Possession. Before counsel for the petitioner received any
order from the trial court directing the implementation of
the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the disputed
property.
Before the CA. Robern assailed the Writ on the
following grounds: (a) patent on the face of the
complaint were its jurisdictional defect, prematurity and
noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the issuance of the
Writ of Possession was irregular, arbitrary and
unconstitutional, as the trial court had yet to fix the
appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering
upon the property to be expropriated.
CA upheld the RTC. The verification and
certification of the Complaint by someone other than thepresident or the general manager of NPC was not a fatal
jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege that the
expropriating body had the right of eminent domain. The
issues of whether the expropriation was properly
authorized by the board of directors and whether
Caetes verification and certification of the Complaint
was likewise authorized were evidentiary and could be
ruled upon only after the reception of evidence.
Hence, this Petition.
Roberns argument: RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because, (1) Atty. Caete who
signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was neither the president nor the general
manager of NPC; and (2) under Section 15-A of RA 6395,
only the NPC chief legal counsel, under the supervision of
the OSG is authorized to handle legal matters affecting
the government power corporation.
NPCs argument: Caete, as its regional legal
counsel in Mindanao, is authorized to prepare the
Complaint on its behalf.
Issue:
Whether or not the verification and certification
by Atty. Caete is valid.
Held:
SC found the disputed verification and
certification to be sufficient in form.
Verification is intended to assure that the
allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or
are true and correct, not mere speculations. Lack of
verification is merely a formal defect that is neither
jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not divest the
trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court may order the
correction of the pleading or act on the unverified
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pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in
order to serve the ends of justice.
The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the
plaintiff or principal party to attest under oath that (1)
no action or claim involving the same issues have been
filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and that, to the best of the plaintiff's knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending; (2) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of its present status shall be made; and (3) if it should be
learned that the same or a similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, the plaintiff shall report this fact
to the court where the complaint or initiatory pleading
was filed. This rule is rooted in the principle that a party-
litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different forums, as this practice is
detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. AdministrativeCircular No. 04-94, which came before the 1997 Rules of
Court, is deemed mandatory but not jurisdictional, as
jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the action is
conferred by law.
The questioned verification stated that Atty.
Caete was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC at the
Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not
merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel
and officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal
pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal
cases. As regional legal counsel for the Mindanao area,
he was the officer who was in the best position to verify
the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in
the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal
legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know
and to certify if an action for expropriation had already
been filed and pending with the courts.
Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the
Complaint; he was joined by Doromal, OIC-assistant
general counsel; and Pablo -- both of the NPC Litigation &
Land and Land Rights Dept. They all signed on behalf ofthe solicitor general in accordance with the NPC charter.
Their signatures prove that the NPC general counsel and
the solicitor general approved the filing of the Complaint
for expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in
holding that the Complaint was not dismissible on its face,
simply because the person who had signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping was
not the president or the general manager of NPC.
CA decision, affirmed.
Verification and certification against forum shopping -
Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7
HUIBONHOA vs. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 153785, August 3, 2006
Facts:
A complaint for accounting and damages was
filed by respondent Angel D. Concepcion, Sr. against
petitioner Veronique T. Huibonhoa with the RTC of
Cabanatuan City and prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction to immediately restrain Huibonhoa from
performing her job as manager of Poulex Supermarket,
among others.
On the same day the complaint was filed, Judge
Annang issued a TRO effective for 72 hours.
Huibonhoa, along with fellow stockholders of
CHAS, Inc., filed an intra-corporate and derivative suit andcomplaint for injunction with a prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent respondent Concepcion, Sr. and his agents from
interfering with the management and operations of the
Poulex Supermarket.
Then, Huibonhoa filed an Urgent Manifestation
and Motion Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam, seeking the
issuance of an order certifying the expiration of the TRO.
Thus, Judge Annang issued on the same day an order
declaring the expiration of the temporary restraining
order but at the same time directing the continuous
closure of the supermarket.
Respondent Concepcions complaint for
accounting and damages was raffled to Branch 28 of the
RTC-Cabanatuan City. Huibonhoa filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which sought to
annul the orders of Judge Annang for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction.
Huibonhoas prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order was granted. The CAResolution enjoined respondents from implementing
and/or enforcing the assailed orders of Judge Annang,
including but not limited to the prevention of the breaking
of the padlock and reopening of Poulex Supermarket, and
interference by respondent Concepcion and his agents
with the operations of the supermarket.
CA- dismissed Huibonhoas petition for certiorari
assailing the twin orders of Judge Annang on the grounds
of pre-maturity and forum shopping. CA believed that the
two actions had the same object of nullifying the TRO
issued by Judge Annang.
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Petitioners arguments:
- Civil Case No. 4068-AF was filed not for the
purpose of defeating the TRO issued by Judge
Annang but on account of the acts of disturbance
and attempted forcible take-over by respondent.
- the petition for certiorari was filed with CA to
enjoin or prohibit acts pursuant to the
implementation of the orders of Judge Annang,
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of petition for certiorari
constitute forum shopping
Held:
No.There is forum shopping when, as a result of
an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion, other than by appeal or certiorari in
another. There can also be forum shopping when a partyinstitutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts
to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition or increase a partys chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action.
To determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping, the most important question to
ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present
or whether a final judgment in one case will result to res
judicata in another. Otherwise stated, to determine forum
shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or more
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes
of action, and reliefs sought.
A plain reading of the allegations in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 4068-AF and those in the
petition for certiorari filed with the CA would preclude
the Court from affirming the CA finding that petitioner
had engaged in forum shopping.
Not all the elements of litis pendentia concur.Civil Case No. 4068-AF is a derivative suit and complaint
for injunction instituted by the stockholders of the
aforementioned corporations while the petition for
certiorari was instituted by petitioner in her capacity as
manager of Poulex Supermarket. The complaint in Civil
Case No. 4068-AF alleges different causes of action,
including those relating to interference by respondent
Concepcion in the operations of the supermarket and
causing damages to the corporations and the stockholders
arising from such unlawful interference. The petition for
certiorari aims to nullify the two orders of Judge Annang
on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion since only the designated special commercial
court has jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate
controversies.
A resolution on the merits of the petition for
certiorari would necessarily have to discuss the authority
of respondent Judge Annang to take cognizance of the
case, which was allegedly an intra-corporate matter, and
the issuance of the mandatory injunction, which was
allegedly not sanctioned by any rule. These are the main
issues raised in the petition for certiorari but are not
raised as issues in Civil Case No. 4068-F.
The reliefs sought in the two actions are also
different. In Civil case 4068-F, aside from the main action
for a permanent injunction, complainants therein also
claimed damages. In the petition for certiorari, Huibonhoa
sought the prevention of the implementation of the
assailed orders of Judge Annang.
The only common thread between the two
actions is with respect to the TRO sought to preventrespondent Concepcion from interfering with the
operations of the supermarket, but said relief is only
incidental and does not constitute the main cause of
action in both cases.
However, the Court cannot take favorable
action on the petition of Petitioner. In the light of the
supervening events, particularly the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 4065, the instant petition has clearly become
moot and academic and, therefore, deserves to be
dismissed.
Verification and certification against forum shopping -
Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7
MONTES vs CA
G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by
complainants Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth
Fontanilla against Carlito L. Montes( petitioner), Chief of
the Legal Division of DOST, for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
Rodriguez and Fontanilla alleged that while
Montes was in the process of adducing evidence against
Rodriguez and the DOST Secretary in the complaint for
misconduct he had filed against them before the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC), Montes produced a tape recording of a private
conversation he had had with the DOST Secretary.
Montes admitted that he had taped the conversation at
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the DOST Secretarys Office without the DOST Secretarys
knowledge and consent. Montes publicly played the illegal
tape recording during the hearing. Montes likewise
admitted that he had also recorded a private conversation
he had with Fontanilla at the DOST Office in Taguig which
was without the knowledge and consent of Fontanilla.
The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave
misconduct and suspended him for 1 year without pay.
The Ombudsman held that Montes taping of his
conversations with Fontanilla was prohibited by the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.
The Ombudsman denied Montes MR and
affirmed the decision. Hence, Montes filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with prayer for temporary restraining order
before the Court of Appeals.
CA- dismissed outright Montes petition for being
procedurally infirm. Specifically, the appellate court notedthat Montes failed: a) to state the specific date when he
received a copy of the Ombudsmans Decision; b) to
attach duplicate originals or certified true copies of the
challenged Decision and Order; and c) to provide an
explanation why the copy of his petition was not served
personally upon therein respondent DOST Secretary.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the
appellate court issued a Resolution requiring the
Ombudsman to file his comment. Notably, the appellate
court considered Montes motion for reconsideration
abandoned in a Resolution in view of the commencement
of the instant petition. Meanwhile, the DOST Secretary
issued the assailed suspension order.
Petitioners argument:
- the implementation of the suspension order is
premature considering the pendency of his petition
before the appellate court. He further states that there is
no law or provision mandating the immediate execution
of the Ombudsmans decision in an administrative case
where the penalty imposed is suspension for 1 year.
Respondent Ombudsman and DOSTs argument:
- the filing of the instant petition is a violation of the
proscription against forum-shopping
- they argue that the execution of the suspension order
despite the pendency of an appeal is allowed under
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 14-A-00.
Issue:
Whether or not the instant petition for
prohibition with prayer for TRO of Montes constitutes
forum shopping.
Held:
YES. We find that Montes transgressed the
proscription against forum shopping.
There is forum shopping when a party seeks to
obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had
already been solicited, and in other courts and other
proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is also the
act of one party against another when an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum
other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.
In the case at bar, when Montes filed the petition
for prohibition against the suspension order, his motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition forcertiorari was still pendingbefore the CA. In fact, Montes
motion for reconsideration has not been fully resolved.
Montes petition for certiorari prayed, among
others, that the appellate court issue an order "restraining
the Honorable Secretary, Department of Science and
Technology from implementing the order.
Montes motion for reconsideration likewise
prayed that the implementation of the suspension for one
year from the service without pay of the herein petitioner
be restrained.
In the present petition, Montes prays that an
order be issued to restrain the Honorable Secretary, DOST
from implementing the Suspension Order on the herein
petitioner.
Clearly, the relief sought from the appellate court
is the same as the relief prayed for in the present
petitionthat is, that an order be issued restraining the
DOST Secretary from implementing the Ombudsmans
Order. In filing the instant petition without awaiting the
resolution of his pending motion before the appellate
court, Montes asked for simultaneous remedies in twodifferent fora. This act is censurable and serves as a
ground for the dismissal of the instant case with
prejudice.
In this regard, the Court notes that Montes
implicitly confirmed that he committed forum shopping
by stating that he had to file the instant petition before
this Court in view of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration before the appellate court. Montes failed
to consider that the same implementation of the
suspension order which impelled him to abandon his
motion for reconsideration also rendered the instant
petition academic.
As the present petition is one for prohibition
which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact,
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that the suspension order has already been
implemented. The act sought to be enjoined having
taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain.
Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere
subject matter of purely theoretical interest.
Verification and certification against forum shopping -
Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING CO. vs CA
G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998
Facts:
M/V PAVLODAR flying under the flagship of USSR,owned and operated by Far Eastern Shipping Company
arrived at the port of Manila from Vancouver, British
Columbia.
Captain Abellana was tasked by Philippine Ports
Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant Gavino was assigned by appellant MPA to
conduct docking maneuver for the safe berthing of the
vessel.
Gavino boarded the vessel and stationed himself
in the bridge with the master of the vessel, Victor
Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet
from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel.
The left anchor were dropped, however the anchor did
not take hold as expected. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles cold be dropped, the bow rammed
into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to
the pier. The vessel sustained damage too.
The PPA through the Sol Gen filed before the RTC
of Manila a complaint for sum of money against FarEastern Shipping, Captain Gavino and MPA praying that
they be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff
for damages.
RTC ordered the defendants jointly and
severally to pay the PPA.
Defendants appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed
the findings of the court a quo except that it found no
employer-employee relationship existing between private
respondents MPA and Captain Gavino.
Neither Far Eastern Shipping nor MPA was happy
with the decision of the CA and both of them elevated
their respective plaints to the Supreme Court via separate
petitions for review on certiorari.
In G.R No. 1300068 (separate petition of Far
Eastern), Far Eastern imputed that the CA seriously erred
in in not holding Captain Gavino and MPA as parties solely
responsible for the resulting damages sustained by the
pier.
On the other hand, in G.R No. 130150, MPA avers
that respondent courts error consisted in disregarding
and misinterpreting the Customs Admin Order which
limits the liability of MPA. The MPA asseverates that it
should not be held solidarily liable with Capt. Gavino as
there is no employee-employer relationship existing.
Upon motion by Far Eastern in G.R No 130150,
the case was consolidated with G.R No. 130068.
Note: Certification against non-forum shopping is
not part of the issues raised in this case. However, the
court simply expressed its displeasure and
disappointment with the conduct of the parties as regards
to the certification. Thus, SC made a discussion on thematter.
Held:
G.R No 130068 (petition of Far Eastern),
commenced with the filing by Far Eastern through counsel
on Aug. 22, 1997 of a verified motion for extension of
time to file its petition for thirty days. Said motion
contained a certification against forum shopping signed
by Atty. Tria as affiant with an undertaking that no action
or proceeding with the same issues is pending in other
court. Far Eastern filed its petition on September 26, 1997
bearing another verification and certification against
forum shopping executed by one Teodoro Lopez with the
same undertaking that no action of proceeding with the
same issues is pending in other court.
MPA in G.R No 130150 also filed a petition on
August 29, 1997 and revealed in its certification that it has
not commenced any other action of proceeding involving
the same issues with the court but there is an action or
proceeding pending in the court entitled Far Eastern
Shipping vs PPAInasmuch as MPAs petition in G.R No. 130150
was posted by registered mail on August 29, 1997 and
taking judicial notice of the average period of time it takes
local mail to reach its destination, by reasonable
estimation it would be fair to conclude that when Far
Easten filed its petition on Septermber 26, 1997, it would
already have received a copy of the former and would
then have knowledge of the pendency of the other
petition initially filed with the first division. It was
therefore incumbent upon Far Eastern to inform the court
of that fact through its certification against forum
shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it would
appear the aforequoted certification in GR 130068 is
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defective and could have been a ground for dismissal
thereof.
Furthermore, the certification against forum
shopping is to be executed by the petitioner and not by
counsel. It is the petitioner who is in the best position to
know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of
a petition in that case. Hence, a certification against
forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification.
Clearly equivalent to non-compliance and constitutes a
valid cause for dismissal.
Hence, the initial certification appen ded to the
motion for extension of time to file petition executed in
behalf of Far Eastern by Atty. Tria is procedurally
deficient. But considering that it was a superfluity at that
stage of the proceeding, the court shall disregard the
error. Besides, the certification subsequently executed by
Teodoro Lopez in behalf of Far Eastern cures that defect
to a certain extent.
Verification and certification against forum shopping -
Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 7
VALMONTE vs ALCALA
G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against Alcala
before the MTC.
Petitioner alleged that they are the
unregistered owners of the Apartment located in Paco,
Manila, as the petitioner is one of the heirs and
successors-in-interests of the registered owners of the
property.
Since petitioners were migrating to the United
States they offered apartment no. 1411 for lease to therespondent; the latter accepted the offer.
Due to respondents subsequent failure to pay
the agreed rentals despite written demand, petitioners
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC.
As the petitioners were already a US resident,
they signed the required certification of non-forum
shopping before a notary public in the state of
Washington and had it authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General.
MTC ruled in favour of the petitioners.
Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC which
reversed the MTC ruling.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the
CA and formally manifested that to comply with the
verification they were in the meantime submitting a
photostatic copy of the verification as the original was still
in the Philippine Consulate for authentication. Indeed, on
Apil 8, 2005 petitioners submitted to the CA the original
authenticated certification.
CA issued a resolution on the same day, April 8,
2005 dismissing the petition due to the failure of
petitioners to attach the complaint and other material
portions of the record.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration by the
CA denied the motion reasoning that while the
verification was executed on March 17, 2005, the petition
is dated March 31, 2005. Petitioners could not have
actually read and understood the petition or attested to
the truth of the contents because at the time they
executed the verification the petition was still inexistent.
Issue:Whether or not the court erred in ruling that the
variance between the dates of the verification and the
petition mean that they did not actually read the petition
before it was filed in the court.
Held:
Petition is meritorious. The CAs conclusion
results from an overly technical reading of the verification
and from a failure to appreciate the circumstances of the
parties litigating in Philippine courts while they are
overseas.
We should not lose sight of the reality that
pleadings are prepared and signed by the counsel at the
instructions of the client; the latter merely provides the
supporting facts of the pleading and, as needed, verifies
that the allegation are true and correct. In short, the
pleading and the verification are prepared separately and
a variance in their dates is a matter that may be
satisfactorily explained. To demand the litigants to read
the very same documents that is to be filed before the
courts is to rigorous a requirement. What the rulesrequire is for a party to read the contents of a pleading
without any specific requirement on the form or manner
in which the reading is to be done.
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Requirements of a corporation executing the
verification/certification of non-forum shopping
NATIONAL STEEL CORP. vs CA
G.R. No. 134468, August 29, 2002
Facts:
Dispute arose between petitioner and
respondent union regarding the grant of Productivity and
Quality Bonus and Fiscal Year-End incentive award.
Representative of NSC and the union appeared
before a voluntary arbitrator. The latter issued a decision
ruling that the demand for productivity and quality bonus
is without merit while the demand for distribution of
year-end incentive award is in order.
The NSC filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals.
The CA issues a resolution dismissing the
companys petition for review on the ground that Atty.Padilla, one of the counsels of record of the petitioner is
not a real party in interest but a retained counsel with
mere incidental interest and therefore not the petitioner
or principal party required by law to certify under oath to
the facts or undertakings.
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the signature of petitioners
counsel be deemed sufficient for the purposes of Revised
Circular Nos. 28-91 and AO No. 04-49?
Held:
NSCs counsel of record was duly authorized to
represent them not only before the voluntary arbitrator
but also to prepare the petition for review filed before the
court of appeals.
The Corporation has no powers except those
expressly conferred on it by the corporation code. In turn,
a corporation exercises said powers through its board of
directors or authorized agents.While it is admitted that the authorization of
petitionerscounsel was submitted to the appellate court
only after the issuance of its resolution dismissing the
petition based on non-compliance with the aforesaid
circular, we hold that in view of the peculiar
circumstances of the present case and in the interest of
substantial justice, the procedural defect may be set
aside.
Requirements of a corporation executing the
verification/certification of non-forum shopping
KAUNLARAN LENDING INVESTORS INC. vs. UY
G.R. No. 154974, February 4, 2008
Background of the case:
Sometime in 1987, her son Jose, nephew Virgilio,
and Wilfredo agreed to establish a business of buy and
sell of second-hand motor vehicles in which Virgilio would
be the manager, Wilfredo would scout for a financier, and
Jose would provide the security for any loan. Through the
efforts of Wilfredo, Lelia (Branch Manager of FEBTC and
owner of Kaunlaran [KLII]) agreed to arrange for the grant
of a loan. Wilfredo thus asked Jose (with SPA from his
mother) to turn over the TCTs of the 2 parcels of land in
Quezon City owned by Loreta to serve as security for the
loan.
Jose entrusted the TCTs to Wilfredo who thenturned it over to Lelia. The loan forms were sent by
Wilfredo to Loretas residence for her signature. After
Jose examined the forms, Loreta signed them.
While Jose and Virgilio were in Manila to canvass
prices of second-hand motor vehicles, Magno (manager of
KLII) brought to Loretas residence another set of loan
forms together with a blank Solidbank check drawn from
the account of KLII and a check voucher, explaining (in the
presence of Arlene, Joses wife) that the new set of loan
forms would be sent to Manila and that the proceeds
would be promptly delivered to her residence once she
affixes her signature on the said check and voucher. When
Jose learned about it, he confronted Magno and was told
that the documents were already sent to Lelia. Virgilio
and Jose tried to withdraw the application and the TCTs
but Lelia told them that it was no longer possible. Lelia
admitted having applied the loan proceeds amounting to
P800,000 to Wilfredos personal debt to her. Upon
verification with the RD, the loan was annotated on
Loretas TCTs. Hence, the complaint.
Facts:
Respondent Loreta filed a complaint before the
RTC Dagupan for annulment of real estate mortgage and
related documents plus damages against the petitioners,
along with WIlfredo and Magno. She alleged that said
documents were absolute nullities due to the absence of
consideration and vitiated consent.
After the defendants submitted their Answer
with Counterclaim, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring as valid and legal the subject documents.
All parties appealed except for Magno who died
in 1991, including Lelia. KLIIs appeal was only to the non -
award of damages to it.
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The CA reversed the trial court decision,
declaring the subject documents as null and void. MR
having been denied, hence, this petition filed by KLII and
Lelia.
Loreta moves for the dismissal of the petition
due to defective verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping.
Issue:
Whether or not the president of KLII was
authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping on its behalf
Held:
NO. For failure of KLII to present proof that its
president, Rolando Tan, was authorized to sign the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping on its
behalf, the petition must be denied.In case of a corporation, it has long been settled
that the certificate [of non-forum shopping] must be
signed for and on its behalf by a specifically authorized
officer or agentwho has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be disclosed.
x x x x
Consequently, without the needed proof from the board
of directors, the certificate would be considered
defective. Thus, xxx even the regular officers of a
corporation, like the chairman and president, may not
even know the details required in a certificate of non-
forum shopping; they must therefore be authorized by
the board of directors just like any other officer or agent.
Disposition:
The merits of the petition, however, justify the
relaxation of the rule on verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping, for from a review of the records
Loreta has not proven by preponderance of evidence thatshe was deceived into signing the documents required for
the release of the proceeds of the loan.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 11, 2002 is SET ASIDE, and
the decision of Branch 41 of the RTC Dagupan City in Civil
Case No. D-9136 dated March 3, 1994 is REINSTATED.
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G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land
Registration Authority, Petitioner,
vs.
KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001
decision1and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick
Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around
some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training
Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a
result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square metersof prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of
ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name
and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in
the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose
Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the
LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City
had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No.
5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also
found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the
Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation,
annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA)
against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to
Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for
respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with
summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias
summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.
The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative
to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or
continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare
defendants in default and other procedural matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights
conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of landregistration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation
looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how
respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and
135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998,
one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former
counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and
transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr.
Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his.
He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not
know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed anurgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in
default,2predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The
Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer
was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him,
the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,3it was a mere scrap of
paper and produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting
the Republics motion.4It found respondents answer to be
sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.
The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records,
declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic topresent its evidence ex parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it
rested its case and formally offered its evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February
19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari5seeking to set aside the
February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent
contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for
failure to file a valid and timely answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision. It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative
hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-
examination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos
acts after the filing of the answer6and concluded that he
assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead.
This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have
had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition
for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default
against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to
trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but
it was denied. Thus, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order
which declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid
answer? Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify
anothers statement.7Where it appears that a party clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of
another, evidence of those statements is admissible against
him.8This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat thepartys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
by the other person.9By adoptive admission, a third persons
statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or
espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
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(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by
another;10
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;11
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of
another;12
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by
another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the
other make13
or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.14
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty.
Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it ever
deny or contradict its former counsels statements. It went to
great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its
implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact wasthat the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be
considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that
the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor
specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important
thing was that the answer bore a signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be
signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel
from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer
for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who
actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as
counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This was
similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it mayconcern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she
was not known beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never
disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for
respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show
that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the
answer by another.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999
resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of
Appeals as well as in the comment
15
and memorandum itsubmitted to this Court.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos
statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission
constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that
is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3,
Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must
be signedby the party or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his
counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that isunsigned to one that is signed.
Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to
him. He may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he
has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay.16
Under the Rules of Court, it
is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to
these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work
involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for themembers of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer17
but cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing
by unqualified persons,18
something the law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty.
Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken
pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way
it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent
acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate
hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the
answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We
give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanketauthority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court
correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no
legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was
properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It
maintains that even if it were true that its answer was
supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere
technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly
labeled as mere technicalities have their own validraison d
etrein the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush
them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.19
The Courts pronouncement inGarbo v. Court of Appeals20
is
relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus
[enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the
rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in
the interpretation and application of the rules applies only inproper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
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Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.21
In this case, respondent failed to show
any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly
abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the actscommitted by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal
profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31,
2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSEDand SET
ASIDEand the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default
is herebyREINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for thecommencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre
Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting
his position as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 135042 September 23, 1999
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Br. 15; and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents,
PANGANIBAN,J.:
Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1,
1997. Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed
reversed or modified. Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to
dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a complaint in eminent
domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once
the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without
need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be
deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be
issued prior to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and
defenses of the property owner.
The Case
Before us is a Petition under Rule 45, challenging the Decision of
the Court of Appeals1 promulgated February 27, 1998 and its
Resolution promulgated July 23, 1998 in CA-GR SP-46002, which
(1) dismissed the action for certiorariand preliminary injunction
filed by Robern Development Corporation ("Robern" for brevity);
and (2) effectively affirmed the Orders (dated August 13, 1997;
September 11, 1997; and November 5, 1997) and the Writ of
Possession (dated September 19, 1997), all issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 25356-97.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:2
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is ordered DISMISSED. Costs against
the petitioner.
In its assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
reconsideration in this manner:3
There being no compelling reason to modify,
reverse or reconsider the Decision renderedin the case dated February 27, 1998[;] the
Motion for Reconsideration posted by
petitioner on March 23, 1998 is DENIED, it
appearing further that the arguments raised
therein were already considered and passed
upon in the aforesaid Decision.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed.
1. Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an
area of about 17,746.50 square meters, which the NationalPower Corporation ("NPC" for brevity) is seeking to expropriate.
The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project
in Inawayan, Binugao, Toril, Davao City.
2. On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
against Robern.4Instead of filing an answer, petitioner
countered with a Motion to Dismiss,5
alleging (a) that the
Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not showing that
the action bore the approval of the NPC board of directors; (b)
that Nemesio S. Caete, who signed the verification and
certification in the Complaint, was not the president, the general
manager or an officer specifically authorized under the NPC
charter (RA 6395); (c) that the choice of property to beexpropriated was improper, as it had already been intended for
use in a low-cost housing project, a public purpose within the
contemplation of law; and the choice was also arbitrary, as there
were similar properties available within the area.
3. Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for
the Issuance of Writ of Possession based on Presidential Decree
No. 42. On July 9, 1997, NPC deposited P6,121.20 at the
Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch, as evidenced by PNB
Savings Account No. 385-560728-9.6
4. In its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
This refers to the motion to dismiss. The
issues raised are matters that should be
dealt with during the trial proper. Suffice it
to say that [NPC] has the privilege as a utility
to use the power of eminent domain.
The motion is denied for lack of merit. The
pre-trial conference shall be on August 27,
1997 at 2:30 P.M.7
5. On September 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, pointing out that (a) the issues raised in theMotion to Dismiss could be resolved without trial, as they could
be readily appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis--
visthe applicable provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the
grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not require
evidence aliunde.
6. On September 11, 1997, the trial court denied the Motion. as
follows:
The . . . motion [of the
petitioner] for
reconsideration is denied
for lack of merit. Findingthe . . . motion [of NPC]
to be meritorious[,] let a
writ of possession issue.8
7. On September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of September 11, 1997, arguing
among others that Section 15-A of RA 6395 was virtually
"amended" when Caete was allowed to verify and sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in regard to the Complaint for
expropriation filed by NPC.
8. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for
Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ ofPossession.
9. On September 19, 1997, in spite of petitioner's opposition,
the trial court issued a Writ of Possession as follows:
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WHEREAS, the applicant National Power
Corporation in the above-titled case has
presented to this Court a petition praying for
the issuance of a Writ of Possession of the
affected property of the . . . Robern
Development Corporation, described
hereinbelow, as follows:
TCT No. Total Area in Area Affected in
Square Meter Square Meter
T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00
T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00
T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00
T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50
TOTAL 97,371.00 17,746.50 Total
affected area
WHEREAS, on September 11, 1997 the court
issued an Order granting the issuance of a
Writ of Possession in favor of the . . .
National Power Corporation for the
immediate possession and control of the
parcels of land owned by the [petitioner] as
aforestated for the construction Mantanao-
New-Loon 138 KV Transmission Line Project
to be undertaken by the petitioner affecting
17,746.50 sq. m. of the 97,371.00 sq. meters
as shown above.
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby
commanded to place [NPC] in possessionand control of the affected property
consisting 17,746.50 [s]quare [m]eters of the
total area of 97,371.00 square meters
described above and to eject therefrom all
adverse occupants, Robern Development
Corporation and [all other] persons . . .
claiming under it.9
10. On November 5, 1997, before counsel for the petitioner
received any order from the trial court directing the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC occupied the
disputed property.
11. In a Petition for Certioraribefore the Court of Appeals (CA),
Robern assailed the Writ on the following grounds: (a) patent on
the face of the complaint were its jurisdictional defect,
prematurity and noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the
issuance of the Writ of Possession was irregular, arbitrary and
unconstitutional, as the trial court had yet to fix the
"appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering upon the
property to be expropriated."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the following
grounds.
First, the verification and certification of the Complaint by
someone other than the president or the general manager of
NPC was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege
that the expropriating body had the right of eminent domain.
The issues of whether the expropriation was properly authorized
by the board of directors and whether Caete's verification and
certification of the Complaint was likewise authorized were
evidentiary and could be ruled upon only after the reception of
evidence.
Second, whether the disputed property could still be
expropriated even if it had already been intended to be used in a
low-cost housing project and whether the choice of that lot was
arbitrary and erroneous, given the availability of similar
properties in the area, were factual issues that would entail
presentation of evidence by both parties.
Third, the allegation in the Complaint that NPC sought to acquire
an easement of right-of-way through the disputed property did
not preclude its expropriation. Section 3-A of the NPC charter
allowed the power company to acquire an easement of right-of-
way or even the land itself if the servitude would injure the land.
Fourth, the issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper in
view of NPC's compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine
National Bank an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
disputed property.
Fifth, certiorariwas not the proper remedy, as the Order
sustaining the right to expropriate the property was not final
and could still be appealed by the aggrieved party. The
availability of appeal ruled out certiorari.
Hence, this Petition.10
The Issues
In their Memorandum,11
petitioner raises the following
issues:12
I WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED
ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED
SEPTEMBER 11, 1997 DIRECTING THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HIGHLY IRREGULAR,
ARBITRARY, AND DESPOTIC.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT FILED
IN THE INSTANT CASE IS DISMISSIBLE ON ITSFACE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, BEING
FLAWED WITH PREMATURITY, AND
VIOLATIVE OF RA 6395.
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III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS MADE A FINDING NOT BORNE OUT
BY THE COMPLAINT, THUS IT EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
IV WHETHER OR NOT THE CHOICE OF THE
PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS
ARBITRARY.
Simply stated, the petition raises the following issues:
1. Were there valid grounds to dismiss the Complaint?
2. Was the Writ of Possession validly issued, considering that the
trial court had not conducted any hearing on the amount to be
deposited?
This Court's Ruling
The Court of Appeals was correct in its rulings, but in the interestof substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an
opportunity to file its answer.
First Issue:
Grounds for Dismissal
Jurisdiction
Petitioner contends that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because,first, Atty. Caete who signed
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was
neither the president nor the general manager of NPC;
and second, under Section 15-A of RA 6395, only the NPC chief
legal counsel, under the supervision of the Office of the Solicitor
General is authorized to handle legal matters affecting the
government power corporation. On the other hand, NPC argues
that Caete, as its regional legal counsel in Mindanao, is
authorized to prepare the Complaint on its behalf.
We find the disputed verification and certification to be
sufficient in form. Verification is intended to assure that the
allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or are true
and correct, not mere speculations.13
Generally, lack of
verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional
nor fatal. Its absence does not divest the trial court ofjurisdiction.
14 The trial court may order the correction of the
pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may
be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.
The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the "plaintiff or
principal party" to attest under oath that (1) no action or claim
involving the same issues have been filed or commenced in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and that, to the best of
the plaintiff's knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of its present status shall be made; and (3)
if it should be learned that the same or a similar action or claimhas been filed or is pending, the plaintiff shall report this fact to
the court where the complaint or initiatory pleading was
filed.15
This rule is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant
shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different forums, as this practice is detrimental to orderly
judicial procedure.16
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which
came before the 1997 Rules of Court, is deemed mandatory but
not jurisdictional, as jurisdiction over the subject or nature of
the action is conferred by law.17
In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty. Caete
was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC at the Mindanao
Regional Center in Iligan City. He was not merely a retainedlawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and officer, whose basic
function was to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPC-
Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for the
Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the best position
to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations
in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal
legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know and to
certify if an action for expropriation had already been filed and
pending with the courts.
Besides, Atty. Caete was not the only signatory to the
Complaint; he was joined by Comie P. Doromal, OIC-assistant
general counsel; and Catherine J. Pablo both of the NPCLitigation & Land and Land Rights Department. They all signed
on behalf of the solicitor general in accordance with the NPC
charter.18
Their signatures prove that the NPC general counsel
and the solicitor general approved the filing of the Complaint for
expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in holding that the
Complaint was not dismissible on its face, simply because the
person who had signed the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping was not the president or the general manager
of NPC.
Legal Standing and
Condition Precedent
Next, petitioner asserts that NPC had no legal standing to file the
expropriation case, because the Complaint did not allege that its
board of directors had authorized its filing. It added that under
Section 6, RA 6395, only the board was vested with the
corporate power to sue and be sued.
The National Power Corporation explains that, like other
corporate officers and employees whose functions are defined
by the board, Atty. Caete is authorized to file the expropriation
case. Even if he is not the general counsel, he has residual
authority to prepare, verify and certify the Complaint for
expropriation.
We rule for the private respondent. Rule 67, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 1. The complaint. The right of
eminent domain shall be exercised by the
filing of a verified complaint which shall state
with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal
property sought to be expropriated, and join
as defendants all persons owning or claiming
to own, or occupying, any part thereof or
interest therein, showing, so far aspracticable, the separate interest of each
defendant. . . . . .
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The foregoing Rule does not require that the Complaint be
expressly approved by the board of directors of a corporation. In
any event, such authorization is a factual issue that can be
threshed out during the trial. As held by the appellate court,
"the issue of whether or not the expropriation proceedings
[were] authorized by the Board of Directors or that those who
signed the complaint [were] authorized representatives are
evidentiary in character determinable only in [the] trial proper."
Prematurity of the Complaint
The same ruling applies to the argument alleging prematurity of
the Complaint. Petitioner's insistence that NPC must secure the
approval of the provincial board and the municipal council is
unfounded. Section 3(j), RA 6395, merely requires that the
Complaint be filed in the same manner as an expropriation case
of the national, the provincial or the municipal government. At
bottom, all that is needed is compliance with Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court and theprevailingjurisprudence on
expropriation.
Defenses and Objections
Petitioner avers that the Complaint should be dismissed,
because the subject property was already committed to be used
in a low-cost housing project. Besides, there were other
available properties in the area. Finally, the Complaint allegedly
sought only an easement of a right-of-way, not essentially an
expropriation.
We disagree. Petitioner's argument in this case is premised on
the old rule. Before the 1997 amendment, Section 3 of Rule 67
allowed a defendant "in lieu of an answer, [to] present in a
single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take hisproperty . . . ." A motion to dismiss was not governed by Rule 15
which covered ordinary motions. Such motion was the required
responsive pleading that took the place of an answer and put in
issue the plaintiffs right to expropriate the defendant's
property.19
Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a
defense in a condemnation proceeding, such as that which
tended to show that (1) the exercise of the power to condemn
was unauthorized, or (2) there was cause for not taking
defendant's property for the purpose alleged in the petition, or
(3) the purpose for the taking was not public in character.20
This old rule found basis in the constitutional provisions on the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, which were deemedto be for the protection of the individual property owner against
the aggressions of the government.21
Under the old rule, the
hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence
followed.
However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer
requires such extraordinary motion to dismiss. Instead it
provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. . . . .
If a defendant has any objection to the filing
of or the allegations in the complaint, or anyobjection or defense to the taking of his
property, he shall serve his answer within
the time stated in the summons. The answer
shall specifically designate or identify the
property in which he claims to have an
interest, state the nature and extent of the
interest claimed, and adduce all his
objections and defenses to the taking of his
property. . . . . .
In his book on remedial law, Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes
that the old Rule was a "bit confusing as the previous holdings
under that former provision also allowed the filing of anothermotion to dismiss, as that is understood in Rule 16, to raise
additionally the preliminary objections authorized by that Rule."
Further, an answer, which is now required, gives more
leeway. First, even if it still applies the omnibus motion rule, it
allows amendments to be made within ten days from its
filing.22
Second, the failure to file an answer does not produce
all the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil
actions, because the defendant may still present evidence as to
just compensation.23
When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure had already taken effect. Statutes regulating
procedure in the courts are applicable to actions pending andundetermined at the time those statutes were passed.
24New
court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of
their effectivity.25
On April 8, 1997, the Court en bancissued a
Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, declaring that the revisions in
the Rules of Court were to become effective on July 1, 1997.
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not
consider as grounds for a motion to dismiss the allotment of the
disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a
mere easement of right-of-way in the complaint for
expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those
specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground
authorized by this provi