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Practical Aspects of Quantum Coin Flipping
Anna Pappa
Presentation at ACAC 2012
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What is Quantum Coin Flipping?
quantum
classical channel
channel
• Strong CF : the players want to end up with a random bit• Weak CF : the players have a preference on the outcome
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DefinitionsA strong coin flipping protocol with bias ε (SCF(ε)) has the followingproperties :
• If Alice and Bob are honest then Pr [c = 0] = Pr [c = 1] = ½• If Alice cheats and Bob is honest then P*Α = max{Pr [c = 0],Pr [c =
1]} ≤ 1/2 + ε.• If Bob cheats and Alice is honest then P*Β = max{Pr [c = 0],Pr [c =
1]} ≤ 1/2 + ε.
The cheating probability of the protocol is defined as max{P*Α,P*B}.We say that the coin flipping is perfect if ε=0.
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Background
• Impossibility of classical CF =1 • Impossibility of perfect quantum CF(LC98) >1/2• Several non-perfect protocols:
– Aharonov et al (‘00) = (2+√2) /4– Spekkens, Rudolph(‘02), Ambainis(’02) =3/4
• Kitaev’s theoretical proof (‘03) ≥1/√2• Chailloux, Kerenidis protocol (‘09) ≈1/√2
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Practical Considerations
• Channel noise• System transmission efficiency, losses• Multi-photon pulses• Detectors’ dark counts• Detectors’ finite quantum efficiency
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Some practical results
• Berlin et al (‘09)
• Chailloux (‘10)
Loss-tolerant with cheating probability 0.9
Loss-tolerant with cheating
probability 0.86
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Berlin et al protocolProperties• Allows for infinite amount of losses• Doesn’t allow for conclusive measurement (the two distinct density
matrices cannot be distinguished conclusively)
Disadvantages• Not secure against multi-photon pulses (ex: for 2-photon pulses,
there is a conclusive measurement with probability 64%)• Doesn’t take into account noise and dark counts.
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The Protocol uses K states (i=1,...,K), where αi is the basis and xi is the bit:
,
The measurement basis is defined for :
Our Protocol
,0 0 ( 1) 1 1i
i
aa ,1 1 0 ( 1) 1i
i
aa
,0 ,1{ , }i i ia a aB
{0,1}i
,i ia x
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Our Protocol
, {0,1}i i Ra x ,i ia x ˆ {0,1}i Ra measure in ˆia
B
For i=1,...,K
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Our Protocol
, {0,1}i i Ra x ,i ia x
, c j
, j jx a
ˆ {0,1}i Ra measure in ˆia
B
{0,1}Rc
For i=1,...,K
If Bob’s detectors don’t click for any pulse, he aborts. Else let j be the first pulse he detects.
If , Bob checks the correctness of the outcome and aborts if not correct.If he doesn’t abort, then the outcome is .jb x c
jj aa ˆ
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Properties of the protocol
• We take into account all experimental parameters.• We use an attenuated laser pulse (the number of photons μ follows
the Poisson distribution), instead of a perfect single photon source or an entangled source.
• We bound the number of sent pulses.• We allow some honest abort probability due to the imperfections of
the system (noise).
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Coin flipping with honest abort Hanggi and Wullschleger (2010) defined CF that is characterized
by 6 parameters:
• The honest players will abort with probability .00 111H p p
H
*1quantum:
2Hp
*
*
1 1classical : for H2 2
1 1 for H2 2
Hp
Hp
00 11 *0 *1 0* 1*( , , , , , )CF p p p p p p
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Parameter Value Detector constant loss [dB] k 1 Absorption coefficient [dB/km] β 0.2
Detection efficiency η 0.2
Dark counts (per slot)
Signal error rate e 0.01Bd
Our Results
510
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1 km10 km20 km25 kmclassical
Honest Abort ProbabilityC
heat
ing
Prob
abili
ty
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Different Models• Unbounded computational power
(all-powerful quantum adversary)
• Bounded computational power(inability to inverse 1-way functions)
• Bounded storage(noisy memory)
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Bounded Computational PowerSuppose there exist:• a quantum one-way function f• A hash function h
There exists a protocol with cheating probability 50% when the adversary is computationally bounded.
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Bounded Computational Power
If Bob’s detectors don’t click for any pulse, he aborts, else let j be the first pulse
Pick string s Pick string s’For i=1,...,K
, {0,1}i i Ra x ˆ {0,1}i Ra measure in ˆia
B)(, shxii
{0,1}Rc)'(),'(, shcsfj
jjxs ,,
cs ,'
Bob checks the correctness of the outcome for same bases. If he doesn’t abort, then the outcome is .cxb j
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Noisy Storage
• Introduced by Wehner, Schaffner and Terhal in 2008 (PRL 100 (22): 220502).
• Adversary has a noisy storage for his qubits.• Protocol needs waiting time Δt in order to use the noisy
memory property.
There exists a protocol with cheating probability 50% when the adversary has a noisy quantum memory.
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Implementations
1. G. Molina-Terriza, A. Vaziri, R. Ursin and A. Zeilinger (2005)
2. A.T. Nguyen, J. Frison, K. Phan Huy and S. Massar (2008)
3. G. Berlin, G. Brassard, F. Bussières, N. Godbout, J.A.Slater and W. Tittel (2009)
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The Clavis2 System
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