1
Marital Disruption and Economic Wellbeing:
A Comparative Analysis
Arnstein Aassve(ISER, University of Essex and CASE)
Gianni Betti(Department of Quantitative Methods, University of Siena)
Stefano Mazzuco(Department of Statistics, University of Padua)
Letizia Mencarini (Department of Statistics, University of Florence)
2
What do we know?
Large differences across European countries in terms of Divorce rates Poverty associated with marital dissolution
Marital dissolution is the most important cause for single motherhood
Poverty is particularly high among single mothers There is a strong gender bias in terms of economic wellbeing
Divorced women have a considerably higher likelihood of experiencing poverty than men
Divorced men do not have a higher poverty rate than non-divorced men.
These differences seem to be clustered – at least to some extent – by welfare regimes
4 typologies:Liberal, Social Democratic, Conservative, Mediterranean
3
Trends: Crude divorce rates around 2001 [Council of Europe (2002) ]
4
Trends: Divorces per 100 marriages in the selected countries, from 1994 to 2001 (Eurostat data)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
United
King
dom
Irelan
d
Austri
a
Belgium
Franc
e
Germ
any
Denm
ark
Finlan
d
Nethe
rland
s
Greec
eIta
ly
Portu
gal
Spain
Pe
r 1
00
ma
rria
ge
s
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
5
Total Divorce Rate in the selected countries, from 1994 to 2001 (Eurostat data)
The mean number of divorces per marriage in a given year
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
United
King
dom
Irelan
d
Austri
a
Belgium
Franc
e
Germ
any
Denm
ark
Finlan
d
Nethe
rland
s
Greec
eIta
ly
Portu
gal
Spain
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
6
Mean duration of marriage at divorce in the selected countries, from 1994 to 2001 (Eurostat data)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
United
King
dom
Irelan
d
Austri
a
Belgium
Franc
e
Germ
any
Denm
ark
Finlan
d
Nethe
rland
s
Greec
eIta
ly
Portu
gal
Spain
Ye
ars
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
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What do we know?
Large differences across European countries in terms of Divorce rates Poverty associated with marital dissolution
Marital dissolution is the most important cause for single motherhood
Poverty is particularly high among single mothers There is a strong gender bias in terms of economic wellbeing
Divorced women have a considerably higher likelihood of experiencing poverty than men
Divorced men do not have a higher poverty rate than non-divorced men.
These differences seem to be clustered – at least to some extent – by welfare regimes
4 typologies:Liberal, Social Democratic, Conservative, Mediterranean
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Research on divorce patterns in Europe
Increasing amount of research on marital dissolution and wellbeing of men and women in Europe. Recent studies:
Andres at al (2004) – comparative study of Belgium, Germany, Italy, UK, and Sweden:
Women with dependent children in the UK suffer most Sweden: hardly any gender difference due to high benefits and
generous provision of childcare Uunk (2004)
Generally women suffer from divorce, but at varying degree A country’s welfare state arrangements are important for the
economic consequences of divorce Median income declines weakest in Scandinavian countries
and largest in France, Austria, Luxembourg and UK
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Research issues concerning the link between marital dissolution and economic wellbeing
Economic welfare very often measured in terms of income or poverty
BUT income and poverty are highly sensitive to the use of equivalence scales
The issue of equivalence scales becomes more precarious when considering divorce – as
this is normally associated with a significant change in household composition
They are also limited in measuring overall wellbeing Selection issues:
the prospect of a dramatic decline in wellbeing might itself affect the marital dissolution event.
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Focus of this paper
Measurement: Here we construct a range of wellbeing indices and compare
these with poverty status Wellbeing indices are less sensitive to large shifts in the
household composition (and hence the equivalence scale) Q: Do they produce similar results? Q: Do differences between welfare regimes persist with
alternative measures of wellbeing? Selection:
Since the prospect of a dramatic decline in wellbeing might itself affect the marital dissolution event, dissolution is potentially endogenous with respect to wellbeing
We would like to identify the net effect of marital dissolution on wellbeing
We do so by applying propensity score matching (PSM) techniques
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Measuring wellbeing: poverty
Poverty status i.e. a dichotomous version of household income[Poverty threshold defined as 40-50-60-70 percent of median net
equalised household income] Equivalence scales used
OECD (modified) They do have an impact on computed poverty rates but no
impact on the ranking of countries
Relative income Poverty is treated as a matter of degree (1 for poorest
and 0 for the richest) The level is determined by the rank in the income
distribution and the individual’s share in the total income received by the population
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Measuring wellbeing: Deprivation index
Defining wellbeing in terms of a dichotomous poverty status variable is
an over-simplification only monetary
A Deprivation index, in contrast is multidimensional, and may include subjective measures, conditions of the
dwelling, possession of consumables, affordability etc. We built a total d.p. and then one for each of 5
“dimensions”
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Measuring wellbeing: Deprivation index
24 items grouped:
Basic non-monetary deprivation (affordability) Secondary non-monetary deprivation (lack of
common durables) Lacking of basic housing facilities Housing deterioration Environmental and neighborhood problems
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Deprivation index and weights
The imposed weight used in calculating the deprivation index is important
Two factors influence the weight The item’s power to describe deprivation
depends on the frequency distribution of the item. That is, lack of an item should be assigned a large weight if most people possess this item
Correlation between deprivation items Smaller weight should be assigned if the correlation is very
high
Also, not possessing an item (durables) counts toward deprivation only if the household could not afford it
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Estimating the impact of marital disruption on wellbeing
Approach: compare wellbeing of divorced and non-divorced women
Ideally …. we would like to compare a divorced individual with him
or herself in the case where she/he is NOT divorced This would give us the effect of the marital dissolution
Problem (of course!): the two cases are mutually exclusive: A woman cannot
be divorced and not divorced at the same time. In other words – the counterfactual is non-existent
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Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
so instead of the counterfactual, we construct an approximation to the counterfactual
Dividing individuals into a control group and a treatment group.
Treatment refers to a divorce event Control group: those who did not experience a
divorce event Then “match” or “pair” treated (divorced) with
individuals from the control group (not divorced) - which are similar in their characteristics
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Propensity Score Matching (PSM) - STEPS
1. Matching on background variables is based on the propensity score.
2. Approach is to estimate a probit model of divorce events on background variables this gives the propensity of experiencing a treatment
3. Treated (had a divorce) and untreated (did not have any) are then matched based on this estimated propensity
4. The (average) effect of divorce on wellbeing is computed by comparing differences between matched individuals
But note that we are estimating the effect of a CHANGECHANGE in divorce status on a CHANGECHANGE in well-being status
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Results (PSM): The effect of marital dissolution on entering poverty
Conservative countries
0,0000,0500,1000,1500,2000,2500,3000,3500,4000,450
40% 50% 60% 70%
Poverty thresholds
Men
Women
Liberal countries
0,0000,0500,1000,1500,2000,2500,3000,3500,4000,450
40% 50% 60% 70%
Poverty thresholds
Men
Women
Mediterranean countries
0,0000,0500,1000,1500,2000,2500,3000,3500,4000,450
40% 50% 60% 70%
Poverty thresholds
Men
Women
Scandinavian countries
0,0000,0500,1000,1500,200
0,2500,3000,3500,4000,450
40% 50% 60% 70%
Poverty thresholds
Men
Women
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Results (PSM): Average Treatment Effect of marital dissolution on relative income
•No significant effects for men
•Significant effects for women, with important differences according to presence of children or not
MALES FEMALES
All Couples Couples with
children All Couples Couples with
children
Att t-value Att t-value Att t-value Att t-value
Liberal 0.014 0.624 -0.011 -0.508 0.298 9.039 0.346 8.268 Social Democratic 0.022 1.178 0.035 1.716 0.141 6.106 0.077 3.918 Conservative -0.000 -0.031 -0.001 -0.541 0.144 9.464 0.152 7.528
Mediterranean 0.011 0.472 -0.015 -0.696 0.205 9.561 0.199 7.697
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Results (PSM): Average Treatment Effect of marital dissolution on change in total deprivation
MALES FEMALES
All Couples Couples with
children All Couples Couples with
children
Att t-value Att t-value Att t-value Att t-value
Liberal 0.124 3.100 0.093 2.203 0.138 4.166 0.123 3.094
Social Democratic 0.023 0.723 0.073 2.054 0.106 3.646 0.097 2.736
Conservative 0.041 2.688 0.044 2.341 0.058 3.682 0.075 4.795
Mediterranean 0.034 1.137 0.036 1.112 0.115 4.860 0.105 3.831
Different picture:
• Significant effects for men as well (see Soc.Dem. Men with children)
• For women: Liberal still highest, but the effects are closer
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Results (PSM): Average Treatment Effect of marital dissolution on change in basic lifestyle deprivation (affordability)
MALES FEMALES All Couples Couples with children All Couples Couples with children
Att t-value Att t-value Att t-value Att t-value
Liberal 0.114 2.785
0.136 2.178 0.224 4.541 0.194 3.303
Social Democratic 0.033 0.850 0.100 2.251 0.166 3.646 0.104 2.173
Conservative 0.086 4.840 0.089 3.904 0.127 6.010 0.145 5.881
Mediterranean 0.025 0.809 0.024 0.613 0.126 4.374 0.118 3.988
•Effects are consistent with the results for total d.i.
•This time effects for women are higher than total d.i., weaker in case of children
•For men, now, higher and more signficant in case of children
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Results (PSM): Average Treatment Effect of marital dissolution on change on secondary lifestyle deprivation
MALES FEMALES
All Couples Couples with
children All Couples Couples with
children
Att t-value Att t-value Att t-value Att t-value
Liberal 0.149 3.311
0.148 2.734 0.147 3.067 0.077 1.647
Social Democratic 0.069 2.147 0.119 2.625 0.157 4.976 0.129 3.179 Conservative 0.052 2.750 0.046 1.987 0.086 4.840 0.109 4.938
Mediterranean 0.049 1.578 0.042 1.008 0.134 4.393 0.149 4.826
•The gender gap is reduced
•For women Social Dem. have quite strong effects
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Concluding remarks and caveats
Gender gap confirmed When monetary measures are used women suffer
disproportionately larger effects than men Findings consistent with welfare regime theory Effects differ depending on poverty threshold chosen The effects are somewhat different when wellbeing is
measured in terms of deprivation Gender gap not so clear any longer for social democratic and
liberal welfare regimes Gender difference is smaller when children are not present Separate estimates for couples with children and no
children Divorced women with children suffer considerbly more
compared to women without children – as long as economic wellbeing is measured in terms of poverty
Much less difference when economic wellbeing is measured in terms of deprivation or relative income
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Extensions (not included in paper)
At the moment we analyse economic wellbeing before and after a marital disruption
Of interest is to analyse economic wellbeing two, three and four periods/year after divorce.
Will answer to what extent a marital disruption may lead to long term disadvantage
Estimates country by country, clustering the results
to see whether the welfare regimes grouping is confirmed