ENVIRONMENTAL
PRAGMATISM
EditedbyAndrew
Lightand
EricKatz
I~London
andNew
York
/1\lb
1
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
THOUGHT
KellyA.
Parker
"Pragmatism
"here
referstoaschool
ofphilosophical
thought-American
pragmatism
-and
nottothat
shortsighted,allegedly
"practical-minded"
attitudetow
ardsthe
world
thatisamajor
obstacletoenvironm
entallyresponsible
behaviorinour
time.
1Theinsight
behind"environm
entalpragm
atism"isthat
American
pragmatism
isaphilosophyofenvironm
ents.Although
thefounders
ofpragm
atismrarely
hadoccasion
towrite
explicitlyon
what
wewould
todaycall
environmental
concerns,the
fundamental
insightsofenvironm
entalphilosophy
areimplicit
intheirw
ork.The
observationsthat
thehum
ansphere
isembedded
ateverypoint
inthe
broadernatural
sphere,that
eachinevitably
affectsthe
otherin
ways
thatare
oftenimpossible
topredict,
andthat
valuesemerge
inthe
ongoingtransactions
between
humans
andenvironm
ents,for
example,
areallcentral
conceptsfor
thepragm
atists-asfor
many
contemporary
philosophersofenvironm
ent.Part
1ofthis
essayoutlines
themain
featuresofA
merican
prag-matism
.Sothat
readersnewtopragm
atismmaymore
readilysituate
itsmain
tenetswith
respecttoother
philosophicalapproaches,
themajor
pointsare
herepresented
ascritical
responsestofam
iliarpositions
inepistem
ology,metaphysics,
andvalue
theory.Part
2situates
pragmatism
with
respecttosom
eofthe
major
issuesin
currentecophilosophy.H
ere,too,thepresentation
islargelyacritical
responsetoprevailing
views.Itmust
bestressed,
however,
thatpragm
atismisa
constructivephilosophical
approach:the
purposeof
criticism,after
all,istoopen
theway
fornew
insight.Part
2particularly
stressesthe
questionofametaphysical
groundingfor
environmental
ethics,anarea
ofenvironm
entalphilosophy
where
pragmatism
mayhave
themostto
offer.
21
KELLY
A.PARKER
1PRA
GMATISM
Pragmatism
emerged
asaschool
ofthought
aroundthe
beginningofthis
century.2The
major
earlypragm
atistswere
CharlesS.Peirce,
William
James,
JosiahRoyce,
JohnDewey
andGeorge
Herbert
Mead.
Wemight
alsoinclude
Alfred
North
Whitehead
andGeorge
Santayanaas"honorary"
pragmatists
who
rejectedthe
label,but
someofw
hoseview
sbear
closeaffinity
topragm
atism.
Although
thepragm
atists'view
sare
certainlydiverse
when
itcom
estoparticulars,
somecharacteristic
themes
appearthroughout
theirwritings.
First,all
agreeintheir
rejectionoffoundationalist
epistemology.
Thereare
noinnate
beliefs,intuitions
orother
indubitable"givens"
uponwhich
ourknow
ledgeisbuilt,
orinterm
sofwhich
thetruth
ormeaning
ofconcepts
canbeanalyzed.
Tosay
thatabelief
istrue,
accordingtoJam
es,istosay
thatthe
beliefsucceeds
inmaking
senseofthe
world
andisnot
contradictedin
experience.3Peirce's
versionofpragm
atismasserts
thatthe
meaning
ofan
ideaconsists
entirelyinthe
effectsthat
theidea
couldin
principlehave
insubsequent
thoughtand
experience.4Wehave
noabsolutely
indubitablebeliefs;
onlyastock
ofimportantly
undoubtedones.
Wehave
noabsolutely
clear,immutable
concepts;wedo
havemany
conceptsthat
aresufficiently
clearand
stabletolet
usmake
prettygood
senseofexperience.
Experience,how
ever,can
atany
timeexpose
oursettled
beliefsasfalse,
orreveal
anunsatisfactory
vaguenessorconfusion
inour
concepts.Know
ingisthus
anopen-
endedquest
forgreater
certaintyinour
understanding;ifweforget
thatour
understandingisfallible,
thephilosophical
questforw
isdommaydevolve
intoapathological
crusadefor
absolutecertainty.
Themost
interestingaspect
ofpragm
atistepistem
ologyfor
ecophilosophersisitsrejection
ofthe
dualistic"spectator
theory"of
knowledge
anditscom
panion,the
simple
"correspondencetheory"
oftruth.
Toobject
toJam
es'definition
(asmany
have)because
itdoesnot
make
truthconsist
inthe
conformity
ofabelief
inthe
knower's
mind
tothe
objectivestate
ofthings
inthe
externalworld,
istomiss
what
thepragm
atistshave
tosay
aboutthe
natureofmind,
theworld
andthe
activityofknow
ing.Itoften
comes
across,even
inthe
handsofthose
friendlytoprag-
matism
,that
pragmatism
isonly
atheory
oftruth.
Thisisascorrect,
andasincom
plete,assaying
thatdem
ocracyis
onlyatheory
ofpolitical
sovereignty.In
bothcases,
thetheories
havesignificant
practicalimplications.
Itisintracing
outthese
implications
thatwe
canbegin
tosee
ourselvesand
ourworld
inanew
light.22
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
THOUGHT
Thefounders
ofpragm
atismrecognized
thephilosophical
impli-
cationsofevolutionary
theory.The
characteristicsand
activitiesofany
organismare
always
understoodinlight
ofthe
organism's
relationstoitsenvironm
ents.The
human
capacitiesofthinking
andknow
ingare
noexception.
Consciousness,reason,
imagination,
lan-guage
andsign
use(mind,
inshort)
areseen
asnatural
adaptationsthat
helpthe
human
organismtoget
alonginthe
world.
Theworld
weinhabit
isthe
world
asknown.
Itsfabric
iswoven
ofaplurality
ofphenom
enawhich
canbefunctionally
distinguishedinto
twogeneral
types-though
wefallinto
paradoxand
confusionif
thisfUnctional
distinctionisuncritically
takenasametaphysical
one.The
world
ofexperience
dealsharshly
with
absolutedistinctions,
atwhatever
levelthey
aremade.
Onthe
onehand,
however,
wecan
identifythe
matrix
ofconceptual
constructs,both
tacitand
theo-retical,
thatbring
ordertoraw
experience.Onthe
otherhand,
we
findthe
"stuff"ofchaotic,
unassimilated
rawexperience.
Theworld
welive
inissurrounded
byafringe
ofthe
unknown,
anineffable
butinsistent
existentialreality
thatislarger
thanourselves
andour
settledknow
ledge.5Itison
thisfringe,
andinthose
pansofour
knowledge
thatoccasionally
becomeunsettled,
thatthe
transformative
activityofknow
inggoes
on.Mind
isnot
apartfrom
theworld;
itisapart
ofthe
world.
"Know
ingthe
world"
isnotadetached
activity.Itis,rather,
amutual
transactionbetw
eenthe
organismand
itssurroundings.Inthis
transac-tion
anuncertain,
doubtful,indeterm
inatesituation
isreconstructed
soastomake
more
sense,tobemore
intelligible.6The
processof
reconstructiontransform
sboth
theknow
ingsubject
andthe
known
object.T.S.Eliot
describedhis
poetryas"a
raidon
theinarticulate."?
Thephrase
aptlycharacterizes
anymode
ofknowing,
anditiscrucial
tonote
that,inaraid,
bothsides
areliable
tobeaffected
inunforeseen
ways.
Increating
apoetic
vision,developing
ascientific
theory,orarticulating
aconception
ofethics,
weliterally
transformboth
ourselvesand
theworld
asitpreviously
stood.Subjects
andobjects
arenot
absoluteentities;
knower
andknow
nare
inextricablytwined
togetherfrom
thebeginning.
Subjectsand
objectsare
nexusof
relationsinanever-shifting
universeofcom
plexrelationships.
Thevenerable
distinctionbetw
eensubject
andobject
isthus
acon-
venienceof
speechthat
doesnot
bearup
undermetaphysical
scrutiny.Itnam
esan
important
butobjectively
vaguedistinction
between
twopoles
inaprim
ordiallycontinuous
fieldofexperience.8
Any
reconciliationbetw
eenself
andworld
inthe
actofknow
ingis
23
KELLY
A.PARKER
tentativeand
fallible.To
saythat
knowledge
istrue
means
onlythat
thereconciliation
issatisfactory.To
saythat
itisabsolutely
truemeans
thatitw
illnever
standinneed
ofreadjustm
ent-som
ethingwecan
perhapsaccom
plish,but
cannever
judgewith
certaintytobe
thecase.
Experiencemay
shockusinto
doubttom
orrow.
Clearly,this
epistemology
involvesafundam
entalcritique
oftraditional
metaphysics,
butthe
pragmatists'
attitudetow
ardsmetaphysical
speculationwasambivalent.
Peircereportedly
openedone
lectureatthe
JohnsHopkins
University
with
awholesale
denun-ciation
ofmetaphysics
asmere
moonshine
unworthy
ofattention.
Heended
thesam
electure
byurging
hisstudents
toestablish
ameta-
physicalclub
where
thesecrucial
issuescould
bediscussed.
Thestory
nicelyillustrates
what
Itake
tobethe
pragmatists'
typicalattitude:
traditionalaccounts
ofreality
aresomisleading
astobebest
ignored,but
allthe
same,weneed
asound
metaphysics.
AsPeirce
observed,those
who
resolvenot
toengage
inmetaphysical
speculationdo
notthereby
avoidmetaphysics
-they
onlycondem
nthem
selvestoseeing
theworld
throughthe
filterofwhatever
"crudeand
uncriticizedmetaphysics"
theyhave
pickedupalong
theway.9
Peirceand
Royceenthusiastically
embraced
theproject
ofarticulating
ametaphysics;
James
andDewey
were
oftenreluctant
touse
theword
exceptinapejorative
sense.Whether
theycalled
itmetaphysics
ornot,
though,the
pragmatists
were
allconcerned
todevelop
ananalysis
ofreality
thatboth
makes
senseofexperience
anddoes
notoverstep
thebounds
ofknowledge
legitimately
derivedfrom
experience.(Peirce
andJam
esfrequently
citeHegel
asaphilosopher
whose
speculativesystem
wasaspectacular
failureinboth
respects.)The
valueofmetaphysical
thoughtdepends
uponitsmaking
onlyjustifiable
assumptions
andon
following
amethodology
thatallow
sfor
correctionofitsassertions.
Immanuel
Kant
providedthe
startingpoint
forpragm
aticmetaphysics.
Thenoum
enalworld,
theworld
asitisinitself
inde-pendent
ofthe
orderingcategories
ofthe
mind,
isby
definitionincapable
ofentering
intoknow
ledgeorexperience.
Toapragm
atist,the
conceptofaworld,
entityorproperty
existingapart
fromthe
orderinginfluence
ofmind
isstrictly
meaningless.
Tospeak
ofthe
world
atall
isthus
tospeak
ofwhat
Kant
calledthe
phenomenal
world.
Toberealis
tobecapable
ofenteringinto
experience;athing's
effects,itsrelations
toother
phenomena,
arethus
allthereistobe
knownabout
thething.
Theearly
pragmatists
accordinglydropped
talkofform
s,essences
andsubstances,
andset
aboutdeveloping
a24
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
THOUGHT
newmetaphysics
bornofexperience.
Theirresulting
viewstend
tocut
acrosssuch
standardphilosophical
dichotomies
as"idealism
vs.realism
."While
itiswrong
tosuggest
thatthere
isa"consensus
metaphysics"
among
thepragm
atists(and
recognizingthat
"neo-pragmatists"
suchasRichard
Rortywould
maintain
thatitisamistake
totalk
aboutmetaphysics
atall),
wecan
identifYsom
echaracteristic
themes
inpragm
aticthought
aboutthe
world.
Thereisan
irreduciblepluralism
inthe
world
weencounter.
Thereisthe
idea(supported
bycon-
temporary
physics)that
indeterminacy
andchance
arereal
featuresof
theworld.
Change,developm
ent,and
noveltyare
everywhere
therule.
Thepragm
atistsalso
attendtocertain
common
-perhaps
evenuniversal-
structuresand
relationsthat
appearthroughout
ourexperi-
ence.Pragm
atism,
then,sees
realityasprocess
anddevelopm
ent,and
seesbeingsas
relationallydefined
centersofmeaning
ratherthan
assingular
entitiesthat
simply
standalongside
oneanother
inthe
world.
Itemphasizes
notsubstantial
beings,but
interrelations,connectedness,
transactionsand
entanglements
asconstitutive
ofreality.
Allofthis
isbased
onrigorous
attentiontowhat
isactually
thereinexperience,
andnot
onwhat
thisorthat
philosophysuggests
weshould
find.This
commitment
toexperience
itselfasthe
primary
authorityinspeculative
matters
ledJam
estocall
hisphilosophy
"radicalempiricism
."loThe
pragmatists
proposedreform
sofepistem
ologyand
meta-
physicsthat
turnEnlightenm
entthought
insideout.
Theimplications
ofpragm
aticthought
aboutvalue
areno
lessrevolutionary.
Thecentral
emphases
onexperience,
andon
theexperim
entalapproach
toestablishing
ourknow
ledgeand
practices,make
foravalue
theorythat
highlightsthe
aestheticdim
ension,sees
ethicsasaprocess
ofcontinual
mediation
ofconflict
inanever-changing
world
andlays
thegroundw
orkfor
asocial
andpolitical
philosophythat
placesdem
ocraticand
humanitarian
concernsat
thecenter
ofsocial
arrangements.
Allvalue
emerges
inexperience.
Thequestion
ofethics-"What
isgood?"
-ultim
atelybrings
usback
toconcrete
questionsabout
what
isexperienced
asgood
inthe
interactionofthe
organismwith
itsenvironm
ent.The
inquirydoes
notendwith
theindividual's
affectiveexperience,
ofcourse,
butitrecognizes
thisasthe
onlypossible
birthplaceofvalue.
Indeterm
iningthe
aestheticsignificance
ofexperience,
pragmatists
maintain
aJam
esianradical
empiricism
:nothing
isintroduced
thatisnotexperienced,
butdue
consideration25
KELLY
A.PARKER
must
beafforded
toallthat
isexperienced.IIThe
firstquestion
aboutvalue,
then,isnot
"What
oughtwetodesire?"
but"What
dopeople
infact
desire,and
why?"
Theansw
ersare
many
andcom
plex,and
arenot
fullyreducible,
forexam
ple,tothe
categoriesofautilitarian
pleasure-paincalculus.
Inaesthetics,
asinmetaphysics,
thesheer
pluralismthat
appearsin
livedexperience
givesuspause.
Thevalued
elements
arethere,
andnot
justinprivate
consciousness.Satisfactions
ariseinthe
semi-
private,sem
i-publicdom
ainthat
isthe
organism-in-environm
ent,and
assuch
theyhave
significancenot
onlyfor
thebeing
thatappre-
hendsthem
butalso
forthe
environment
itselfand
forall
thoseother
beingsthat
inhabitit.The
diversityand
tangibilityofaesthetic
values,though,
must
giverise
toconflict
assoon
asmore
thanone
valuingorganism
inhabitsanenvironm
ent.12
Thusarises
theneed
forethics,
asystem
aticunderstanding
ofthe
relationsthat
oughttoobtain
among
variousvalues,
atheory
ofwhat
isright.
Basedasitison
theview
thatvalue
arisesinadynam
ic,infinitely
complex
systemoforganism
s-in-environments,
itisabasic
tenetofpragm
aticethics
thatthe
rightnessofan
actionislargely
system-dependent.
TheEnlightenm
entdream
ofauniversally
validethical
theorymay
appearplausible
atfirst
glancebecause
many
morally
problematic
situationsdo
resemble
oneanother
soclosely.
Thepragm
atist,how
ever,attends
todifference
andchange
aswell
astosim
ilarityand
constancy.Asthe
world
evolves,and
ashum
anthought
andactivities
changealong
with
it,new
kindsofethically
problematic
situationsinevitably
emerge.
Tocope,
weneed
todevelop
newways
ofcom
prehendingwhat
isright.
Nolist
ofvirtues,.no
listofrights
andduties,
notable
oflaws,no
accountofthe
goodshould
beexpected
toserve
inevery
possiblesituation
thatwe
confront.Attem
ptstosetdow
nthe
"finalword"
onwhat
isrighthave
adisturbing
tendencytoshow
upasincom
plete,ambiguous
orquaintly
archaicinthe
nextgeneration.
Pragmatism
maintains
thatno
setofethical
conceptscan
bethe
absolutefoundation
forevaluat-
ingthe
rightnessofour
actions.Weknow
frompast
experiencethat
someethical
conceptswork
betterthan
othersingiven
situations,but
ourpast
experienceisthe
onlything
wehave
asanethical
"foun-dation."
AsAnthony
Weston
putsit,ethics
isanendeavor
more
likecreatively
making
ourway
throughaswampthan
itislike
erectinga
pyramid
onabedrock
foundation.13A
ftermany
tripsthrough
theswamp,
wearrive
atthe
means
thatserve
best.Tom
orrowwemay
havetoreadjust,
though,because
itisthe
natureboth
ofswamps
and26
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
THOUGHT
ofthe
world
ofvalues
toshift
continuallybeneath
us.The
aimof
ethicsisnot
perfectrightness,
then,since
thereisno
absolutestandard
forreference,
butrather
creativemediation
ofconflicting
claimstovalue,
aimed
atmaking
lifeon
theplanet
relativelybetter
thanitis.
Atthe
socialand
politicallevel,
thisperspective
implies
thatthe
individualperson
isof
inestimable
importance.
Allindividuals
are,primafacie,
worthy
ofequal
consideration.Since
itisimpossible
tocom
prehendany
individualexcept
inacontext
ofrelations,
however,
theindividual
isalways
tobeseen
asan
integralpart
ofmany
communities.
Social,political
andcultural
institutionsare
theretoprovide
forthe
needsofindividuals.
Ihaveelsew
hereput
thispoint
interm
sofproviding
forthe
adequacyoflife
and,beyond
this,for
thesignificance
oflife.
14That
is,socialarrangem
entsneed
tobe
constantlyre~evaluated
andreconstructed
toensure
thatminim
alrequirem
entsof
theorganism
s-in-environment
aremet.
Beyondthis,
growthought
tobeencouraged.
"Grow
th"here
isnot
reducibleto
"material
growth."
Toequate
thetwoleads
tounfortunate
conclusions-for
example,
thatper
capitaGross
DomesticProduct
measures
well-being,
which
isultim
atelyasuicidal
conceptfor
asociety
toembrace.
Grow
thmight
betterbeunderstood
interm
sof
increasingthe
aestheticrichness
ofexperience,
ofexpanding
theavailable
means
offinding
satisfactioninlife.15
Contrarytowhat
thetelecom
munications
industrytells
us,this
might
well
mean
recyclingone's
televisionset
ratherthan
upgradingthe
cableservice.
Oritmay
mean
gettinginvolved
inthe
publicsphere,
which
bringsustothe
otherside
ofpragm
aticsocial
andpolitical
philo-sophy.
Socialinstitutions
constantlyneed
reform.Their
directioncan
legitimately
beset
onlyby
thepeople
theyserve.
Forthe
pragmatists,
"participatorydem
ocracy"isa
politicalexpression
ofthemetaphysical
ideathat
realityisinvolvem
entand
transformation.
Becausethe
publicconsists
ofavast
pluralityofpeople
andthings
valued,and
becausethe
world
ischanging
atevery
moment,
theways
andmeans
ofbest
providingfor
theindividual
andcom
mon
goodhave
tobeexperim
entallydeterm
ined.The
experimenters,
thepolitical
scientistswho
serveon
avast,
ongoing"ways
andmeans
committee,"
shouldbethe
peoplethem
selves.Innovation
isalways
neededingovernance,
andinnovation
typicallyarises
atthe
levelofone
orafew
peopletrying
toresolve
aparticular
problem,
toreconstruct
theircorner
ofreality.
Pragmatism
(especiallyinDewey's
writings)
emphasizes
thenecessity
ofthese
many
diverseindividuals,
27
KELLY
A.PARKER
activelycom
ingtogether
inthe
publicsphere,
topresent
theirdem
ands,offer
theirinsights,
andham
merout
theirdifferences.16
Thatisan
activitysuitable
forhum
ans,and
itcan
beanintensely
rewarding
mode
ofbeing.Ultim
ately,thatsociety
works
bestwhich
makes
bestuse
ofthe
diverseintelligence
andexperience
ofits
CitIZens.2PRA
GMATIC
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
PHILO
SOPHY
Theearly
pragmatists
were
visionarythinkers,
oftenahead
oftheirtime.They
areour
contemporaries
inmany
respects.Nonetheless,
theynaturally
wrote
fortheirowntime.They
addressedthe
problems
andprom
isesthe
world
facednear
thebeginning
ofthe
twentieth
century.EvenJohnDewey,w
holived
until1952,w
asunablefully
toenvision
theenvironm
entalcrisesw
eface
nearthe
beginningofthe
twenty-first
century.The
classicalAmerican
pragmatists
provideus
with
apow
erfulsetofbasic
philosophicalideas.W
henitcom
esto
applyingthese
insightstocontem
poraryissuesof"the
environment,"
though,todeveloping
thedetails
oflegitimate
environmental
philo-sophy,w
eenternew
territory.Theonly
thingforusto
doisto
begin.What
followsisonly
abeginning,
abroad
attempttointerpret
andreconstruct
ourunderstanding
ofsom
emajor
issuesincurrent
environmental
philosophy,byshow
inghow
theyappear
inthe
lightofpragm
atism.Mypositions
onthese
issuesare
herestated
andeXplained
onlybriefly.The
work
ofconstructingdetailed
arguments
forthese
positionsand
judgingtheir
merits
forenvironm
entalphilosophy
liesahead,inthe
ongoingexam
inationoffundam
entalconcepts,
problems,and
approachesinour
field.Therem
ainderof
thisessay
comprises
abrief
surveyofthe
matters
Itaketobemost
germane
toanexploration
of"environm
entalpragm
atism."These
matters
are(1)
theconcept
ofenvironm
ent,(2)the
placeofenviron-
mentalethics
inphilosophical
inquiryand
(3)thesocialand
politicaldim
ensionsofenvironm
entalethics.U
nder(4)Ipropose
pragmatic
contributionstothe
currentdebates
over(a)
moral
pluralism,(b)
anthropocentrismand
(c)theintrinsic
valueofnature.
(1)Forthe
pragmatist,
theenvironm
entisabove
allnotsom
ething"outthere,"
somehow
separatefrom
us,standingready
tobeused
uporpreserved
aswedeem
necessary.Asthe
Frenchphenom
enologistMaurice
Merleau-Ponty
said,"Ourownbody
isinthe
world
asthe28
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
THOUGHT
heartisinthe
organism".17
Wecannot
talkabout
environment
without
talkingabout
experience,themostbasicterm
inpragm
atism.
Allthatw
eoranybeing
canfeel,know
,value,orbelievein,fromthe
most
concretefact("Iam
cold")tothe
most
abstractortranscend-
entalidea
("Justice,""God"),
hasitsmeaning,
firstofall,insom
easpectofan
immediately
felthereand
now.Environm
ent,inthe
most
basicsense,isthe
fieldwhere
experienceoccurs,w
heremylife
andthe
livesofothersariseand
takeplace.
Experience,again,isnot
merely
subjective.Ithasits"subjective"
side,butexperienceassuch
isjustanothernam
efor
themanifestation
ofwhatis.W
hatisisthe
ongoingseriesoftransactions
between
organ-ism
sandtheirenvironm
ents.The
qualityofexperience-
whether
lifeisrich
orsterile,chaoticororderly,harsh
orpleasant-
isdetermined
atleastasmuch
bythe
qualityofthe
environment
involvedasby
what
theorganism
bringstothe
encounter.Environm
entisasm
uchapart
ofeachofusasw
eare
partsofthe
environment,
andmoreover,each
ofusisapartofthe
environment
-apartofexperience-
with
which
otherbeings
havetocontend.
Inasserting
thefundam
entalrelatedness
among
organismsand
environments,
pragmatism
commits
ustotreating
allenvironments
with
equalseriousness.Urban
andrural;
wilderness,
parkand
city;ocean
andprairie;
housingproject,
hospitaland
mountain
trail-allare
placeswhere
experienceunfolds.The
world,in
thisview,isa
continuumofvarious
environments.
Endangeredenvironm
entsperhaps
rightlyoccupy
ourattention
first,butenvironm
entalphilo-
sophyand
ecologicalscienceareatbottomattem
ptstounderstand
allthe
environments
weinhabit.
Attention
tothe
whole
continuumofenvironm
entsallow
sustoput
intoperspective
whatistruly
valuableabout
each.Theenvironm
entsweinhabit
directlyaffectthe
kindsoflives
thatweand
otherscan
live.Thereisan
unfortunatetendency
todraw
crasslyinstrumentalist
conclusionsfrom
thisline
ofthought.Iwant
tocaution
againstthis
tendency.Ifenvironm
ent"funds"
experience,this
reasoningmight
go,thenletus
usetechnology
toturn
thewhole
world
intoaneasily
manageable,
convenientstock
ofenvironm
entsthat
conduceto
pleasanthumanexperiences.This
ThemePark:
Earthline
ofthinkingneglectsour
inherentlimitations
asfiniteparts
oftheworld,
andsets
usupfordisaster.Repeated
attempts
todom
inatenature
(e.g.,ourdam
ming
theNileand
itsdam
ningusright
back,orourtragicom
ic'effortsto
"tame"the
atom)should
havebeguntoteach
ussomething
aboutthe
limitsofhum
anintelligence.
Suchattem
ptstodom
inate29
KELLY
A.PARKER
natureassum
ethat
nopart
ofthe
environment
inquestion
isbeyond
thefield
ofsettled
experience.Wecan
indeedexert
remarkable
controlover
partsofthe
experiencedworld,
remaking
ittosuit
ourpurposes.
Thismaybeappropriate,
ifourpurposes
make
senseinthe
firstplace.
(Iknow
ofno
reasontoobject
tothe
prudentuse
ofnatural
gastoheat
ourhom
es,for
example.)
Butthe
veryidea
thatthe
environment
fundsexperience
involvesthe
notionthat
thereisan
ineffableaspect
ofthe
world.
Itisindeed
arroganttothink
thatwecan
master
nature;itismoreover
delusionaland
ultimately
self-negating.Ifwehave
ourbeing
inthe
ongoingencounter
with
environment,
thentowill
thatthe
environment
become
afully
settled,predictable
thing,amere
instrumental
resourceinwhich
therecan
beno
furthernovelty,
istowillthat
weundergo
nofurther
growth
inexperience.
Theattem
pttodom
inatenature
completely
isthus
anattem
pttoannihilate
theultim
atesource
ofour
growth,
andhence
toannihilate
ourselves.What
wemust
trytodo
isnot
tomaster
thenatural
world,
butto
cultivatemeaningful
liveswithin
variousenvironm
ents.Weare
exceedinglyefficient
ataltering
anddestroying
partsofthe
earth,but
arefor
themost
partinept
atliving
wellon
it.Toexercise
ourpow
erwisely
would
requirethat
wegenuinely
understandthe
sourcesof
valueinthe
world
andinourselves.
Environmental
philosophymust
beginwith
closeattention
tothe
qualityofexperience
thatarises
(orcould
arise)from
inhabitingvarious
environments.
ISWeneed
toask
what
isvaluable
inexperiences,
what
featuresofenvironm
entsthey
areassociated
with,
andwhat
ways
ofinhabiting
environments
aremost
appropriate.Allthe
while
wemust
retainrespect
forthe
wild
andineffable
aspectofthe
world.
Weneed
toask
oncemore
theaes-
theticquestions
ofwhat
isgood,
andhow
goodnesscom
estobein
ourworld
-aworld
importantly
differentfrom
thatofK
ant,ofJam
esorofJohn
Muir
-before
wecan
gomuch
furtherinimplem
entinganethics
ofenvironm
ent.
(2)Pragm
atismsees
philosophicalethics
asan
ongoingattem
ptto
determine
what
isgood,
andwhat
actionsare
right.The
suddenemergence
ofanew
areaofethical
inquiryisasignal
thatsom
ethinghas
changedatavery
deeplevel
ofour
collectivelife.
Experiencehas
thrownusawhole
newset
ofproblem
sinrecent
years,resulting
ina
batchofnew
intellectualindustries.
Environmental
ethicsisone
among
severalnew
disciplinesthat
haveemerged,
firstto
extend,and
thento
transformsettled
ways
ofthinkingabout
value.
30
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
THOUGHT
Medical
ethics,business
ethicsand
feminist/fem
inineethics
areother
developments
similar
inthis
way
tothe
emergence
ofenvironm
entalethics.
Ineach
ofthese
areas,traditional
theorieswere
firstapplied
tonew
problematics.
Thenew
problematics
soonoutstripped
theavailable
conceptualresources,
showing
thein-
adequaciesofsuch
receivedtheoretical
orientationsasutilitarianism
,contractualism
anddeontological
ethics.Extension
ofconcepts
shadedover
intothe
development
ofnew
concepts,new
theoreticalfram
eworks.
Thetendency
ofenvironm
entaliststorely
onecological
metaphors
intheir
thinkinghas
ledsom
eto
embrace
anethic
thatrecognizes
thecentrality
ofrelations.
Thisethic,
likethat
ofpragm
atism,tecognizes
theinttinsic
value,within
andfor
thesystem
,ofallthe
thingsrelated.
Much
work
infem
inistand
feminine
ethicsalso
focuseson
relations.Anum
berofwriters
havenoted
thatthe
notionofan"ethic
ofcare"
appearstobeaprom
isingdirection
forenvironm
entalethics
topursue,
andthe
literatureon
"ecofeminism
"isgrow
ingsteadily.
19From
thepragm
aticperspective,
thisemerging
ethicofrelationships
appearstobeonto
logicallymore
soundthan
traditionalethical
theories.
(3)Environm
entalethics
hasalso
beenassociated
with
innovativepublic
policy-making
procedures,new
applicationsof
thelegal
system,and
grass-rootsactivism
.These
ways
ofputtingenvironm
entalawareness
intoaction
havecom
ealong
wayinthe
pastfew
decades,but
ofcourse
thereisalong
wayyet
togo.The
aiminallthese
areas,according
tothe
pragmatic
view,istokeep
experimenting
with
ways
torestructure
oursocial
institutionssothat
thepublic
hasareal
voiceindeterm
iningthe
kindofenvironm
entsweinhabit.
Pragmatism
,as
notedbefore,
seesindividuals
asthe
sourceofgenuine
insightinto
what
isneeded,
andaccordingly
triestomaxim
izeparticipation
ingoverning.
Pragmatism
is,inthis
respectasinothers,
closelyallied
with
theideals
ofthe
socialecology
movem
ent.20
(4)Inow
want
toturn
tothree
debatesthat
currentlyloom
largein
environmental
ethics.These
arethe
debatesover
moral
pluralism,
anthropocentrismand
theintrinsic
valueofthe
naturalworld.
What
pragmatism
suggestsabout
eachofthese
debatesisperhaps
contro-versial.
Ihope
thecontroversy
willsuggest
somealternative
ways
tothink
aboutthese
focalissues.
(a)Moral
pluralismcan
bedefined
asthe
viewthat
nosingle
moral
principle,orover-arching
theoryofwhat
isright,
canbe
31
KELLY
A.PARKER
appropriatelyapplied
inall
ethicallyproblem
aticsituations.
Pragmatism
recognizesthat
thereare
genuinedifferences
among
moral
situations,because
thereare
many
kindsofentities
andpossible
relationsamong
them.These
situationsinvolve
asignificantvariety
ofvalues,
andhence
ofkinds
ofconflict
toberesolved.
J.BairdCallicotthasobjected
tomoralpluralism
onthe
groundsthat
changingamong
traditionalethical
frameworks
involveschanging
metaphysical
assumptions.21
Wecannot
ingood
faithbeKantians
inthe
morning
andLeopoldians
inthe
afternoon.Peter
Wenz
hasidentified
thisgam
e,which
Callicottcalls
"metaphysical
musical
chairs,"asan
implication
ofwhat
hecalls
extrememoralpluralism
.22To
shiftmetaphysical
systemsatw
illindeed
doessuggest
shallowcom
mitment
tobasicbeliefs,ifnot
aprofoundmental
instability.Pragm
atismpoints
towards
what
Wenz
callsmoderate
moral
pluralism.The
movem
entamong
moral
principlesishere
groundedinasingle
metaphysicalview
thatacknowledgesirreducible
pluralisminthe
world
-som
eethically
significantsituations
aresim
plydif-
ferentfrom
others,since
theyinvolve
differinggoods
andkinds
ofentity.Hence
wefind
ourselvesappealingtoavariety
ofprinciplesaswedealw
ithvarious
situations.Ifw
eembrace
moderate
moral
pluralism,environm
entalethicists
inheritthe
serioustask
ofsortingoutw
hatconsiderationshavepriority
when
conflictingprinciples
canbeapplied
inagiven
situation.Twobenchm
arksmayhelp
inthis
task:withitsem
phasisonthe
qualityofthe
experiencedworld,prag-
matism
suggeststhat
thesustainability
anddiversity
ofexperiencesmade
possiblebyacourse
ofactionshould
beprom
otedwherever
possible.23Both
arecrucial
notonly
forthe
landethic,
asAldo
Leopoldnoted,
butfor
anyethic.
(b)The
debateover
anthropocentrismisespecially
tendentious.The
questionconcerns
theprim
arylocusofvalue.A
nthropocentrismmaintains
thatvalueisoforfor
humanbeings.Biocentrism
maintains
thatallform
soflife,assuch,
arevaluable.Ecocentrism
emphasizes
thevalueofecologicalsystem
sasawhole,including
naturalprocesses,relationships
andnon-living
partsofthe
environment.
Anaspectof
thisdebate
concernswhether
valueattaches
toindividual
entitiesor
whether
valuemust
beseen
holistically.The
pragmatist
would
askwhyweshould
beexpected
topledge
allegiancetoany
ofthese
flagsapriori,
andexclude
theothers.
Genuine
valueemergesatallofthese
focallevels.Indeedthere
willbe
conflictsbecause
ofthis,butthe
occurrenceofsuch
moral
conflictisnot
pe<;uliartothis
approach.Antigone
foundthat
"familyvalues"
32
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
THOUGHT
cantragicallyconflictw
iththe
valuesofthestate;today'sCEO
likewise
findsthat
businessvaluesconflict
with
thevalue
ofanendangered
owl'shabitat.
Denying
thatone
orthe
othersphere
isworthy
ofconsideration
mayappear
toprevent
potentialmoral
conflictfrom
arising,butonly
attherisk
ofseriousmoralblindness.Blind
anthro-pocentrism
hasdeplorable
consequencesforthe
non-human
world,
butablindly
misanthropic
ecocentrismisno
lessdeplorable.Again,pluralism
isafactencountered
inexperience.V
aluearises
inavariety
ofrelationshipsamong
differingparts
oftheexperienced
world.
Eachsituation
must
beappraised
onitsowndistinct
terms.
Asbefore,
thetwinvalues
ofsustainability
anddiversity
providereference
points.Sometim
eswerightly
focusonthe
sustainabilityof
thewhole
system;som
etimeson'the
uniquevalue
ofanindividual.
Sometim
esthe
individualorthe
systemishum
anand
sometim
esitisnot.
Fromthis
perspective,environmental
ethicscan
beseen
ascontinuous
withother
areasofethics,adistinct
butintegral
partof
valueinquiry
ingeneral.
Ihavespoken
oftheexperience
oforganisms-in-environm
entsas
centrallyimportant.
Pragmatism
is"anthropocentric"
(orbetter,
"anthropometric")24
inone
respect:thehum
anorganism
isinevitablythe
onethatdiscussesvalue.This
issobecausehum
anexperience,the
human
perspectiveonvalue,isthe
onlything
weknow
ashumans.
Many
otherentities
indeedhave
experienceand
dovalue
things.Again,this
isnottosaythathum
anwhim
isthemeasureofallthings,
onlythat
humans
areinfactthe
measurers.This
must
beafactor
inallour
deliberationsabout
environmental
issues.Wecan
andshould
speakonthe
others'behalfwhen
appropriate,but
wecannot
speakfrom
theirexperience.W
ecan
insom
esense
heartheirvoices,butwe
cannotspeak
intheirvoices.Iseeno
wayoutofour
owndistinctively
human
bodies.Inthis
sense,the
human
yardstickofexperience
becomes,
bydefault,
themeasure
ofallthings.Although
thedebate
overenvironmental
issuesisthuslimited
tohum
anparticipants,
thisisnot
inappropriate-afterall,the
debatecenters
almostexclusively
onhum
anthreats
tothe
world.
Wolves,
spottedowls,and
old-grow
thforestsare
unabletoenter
theethics
debateexceptthrough
theirhum
anspokespersons,
andthat
isperhaps
regrettable.Far
betterthat
theyshould
speakforthem
selves!Lackingthis,they
doat
leasthave
spokespersons-and
thesespokespersons,
theiradvocates,
needtocom
municate
theirconcerns
onlytoother
humans.
Todo
thisinanthropic
valuecategories
isnotsham
eful.Itis,after
all,theonly
waytogo.
33
KELL
YA.PARKER
(c)Thelastpoint
Iwant
totouch
uponisone
thatmany
taketobe
themost
important
issueinenvironm
entalethics.
Itisoften
repeatedthat
theviability
ofenvironmental
ethicsdepends
onestablishing
theintrinsic
valueofthe
non-human
world.
(PerhapsIshould
usethe
term"inherent
value."I'll
dealwith
thatmomentarily.)
Themain
concernisthat
aslong
asthe
non-human
world
isseen
asastock
ofresources
havingonly
instrumental
value,there
canbeno
genuine"environm
entalethic."
Tobemorally
considerableinastrong
sense,the
non-human
world
must
bemore
thanuseful.
Itmust
bevaluable
initsownright.
Pragmatism
cutsthis
Gordian
knotbydenying
thatinstrum
entalvalue
andintrinsic
valueare
evermutually
exclusive.The
beingofany
existentthing,
human
ornon-hum
an,isconstituted
inits
relationswith
otherthings
inacontext
ofmeaningful
connections.Thus
anythingthat
isgood
isboth
instrumentally
valuable(itaffects
somegoods
beyonditself)
andintrinsically
valuable(itisgood
forwhat
itis,a
significantentity
essentialtothe
constitutionofthese
relations).Wecan
indeeddistinguish
thetwokinds
ofvalue,
butnothing
canever
beinstrum
entallyvaluable
without
atthesam
etime
possessingintrinsic
value.Thus
eventhe
"lastman"
onearth,
inRichard
Routley'sclassic
scenario,would
bedoing
something
morally
wrong
inwantonly
destroyingparts
ofthe
naturalworld.25
Hewould
beannihilating
intrinsicallygood
pansofthe
fieldof
experience.Hewould
beneedlessly
damaging
notjust
thosesup-
posedlydiscrete
things,but
intrinsicallygood
partsofhim
selfand
ofallother
beingspotentially
oractually
inthe
eXperiential
web.
Peoplemay
mean
something
elseby
"intrinsicvalue,"
however.
Callicottreserves
theterm
"intrinsicvalue"
forthe
goodnessofsom
e-thing
independentofany
consciousnessthat
might
valueit.26
Thisis
sometim
escalled
the"inherent
value"or"inherent
worth"
ofnatural
objects.Now,pragm
atismwould
pointout
thatwhere
thereisand
couldinprinciple
benovaluing
agent,there
isnoconceivable
experi-ence
-and
henceno
aestheticormoral
valueatall.
Inauniverse
ofmere
objectsabsent
avaluing
consciousness,things
may
havebeing
butnot
value.Perhaps
intrinsic/inherentvalue
isthe
contemporary
equivalentofthe
medieval
conceptof"ontological
goodness"-then
insofar
asitexists,
everythingisgood
inGod's
eyes.Orperhaps
whatever
is,isgood
forsom
enon-hum
anconsciousness
otherthan
God.
(Theselatter
twocases
conformtowhat
Callicottidentifies
asinherent
value.)Irespect
bothofthese
possibilities,but
asahum
anphilosopher
Icannot,
andneed
not,com
prehendthem
fromthe
34
II\
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
THOUGHT
inside.Ifthere
were
nohum
anagent
therewould
afterall
beno
possibility(and
noneed)
forthe
kindofenvironm
entalethic
weseek.
Idonot
knowwhat
itislike
tobeGod,
nordo
Iknowwhat
itislike
tobeabat.
Theconcept
ofintrinsic/inherent
valueisthus
eithermeaningless,
orelse
itreduces
tothe
valueofsom
ethingthat
entersinto
ecologicalrelations
thatdo
notimmediately
affectany
human
agent.Allthat
is,however,
doeseventually,
mediately,
affectsom
ehum
anagent.
Itsvalue
canthus
becognized
byhum
ans,and
itsmoral
considerabilitycan
beacknow
ledgedand
respected.The
lessonhere,
thatweare
connectedatallpoints
toour
environments,
andthey
tous,
isthe
Alpha
andthe
Omega
ofpragm
aticthought
aboutthe
environment.
ACKNOWLED
GMENTS
Anearlier
versionofthis
essaywaspresented
attheannual
meeting
ofthe
InternationalSociety
ofEnvironm
entalEthics
inAtlanta,
GA,
Decem
ber1993.
Iparticularly
wish
tothank
EricKatz,
Andrew
Light,Stephen
Roweand
BethSinger
fortheir
assistance-any
flaws
thatrem
ainare
certainlynot
forwant
ofsuggestionsontheir
part.
NOTES
Thisattitude
isapparently
anoutgrow
thofanother
American-bred
wayofthinking,
which
JohnDeweyidentified
in1929
as"the
busi-ness
mind."
JohnDewey,
Individualism,Old
andNew,
TheLater
Works,
1925-1953,vol.
5,ed.
JoAnn
Boydston(Carbondale,
II:Southern
IllinoisUniversity
Press,1988),pp.
61,69.
2Jam
esnam
edthe
movem
ent"pragm
atism"inan
1898address,
andthere
creditedC.S.Peirce
with
introducingthe
centralinsight
inan
1878article.The
publishedversion
ofJames'
addressappears
as"The
Pragmatic
Method,"
Essaysin
Philosophy,The
Works
ofWilliam
James,
gen.ed.
FrederickH.Burkhardt
(Cambridge,
MA:Harvard
University
Press,1978),
pp.123-139.
(Referencestothe
Harvard
editionofJam
es'writings
aresubsequently
citedby
VolumeTitle,
Works(publication
date).)Peirce's
"How
toMake
OurIdeas
Clear,"towhich
Jameswasreferring,
appearsin
CollectedPapersof
CharlesSandersPeirce,vol.5,ed.Charles
Hartshorne,
PaulWeiss
andArthur
Burks(Cam
bridge:Harvard
University
Press,1931-1958),
5.388.(References
toPeirce's
CollectedPapers
citevolum
eand
paragraphnum
bers:CP
5.388indicates
volume5,paragraph
388.)3See
especially"Lecture
VI"
inPragm
atism,Works
(1975)and
thesequel
toPragm
atism,Jam
es'The
Meaning
ofTruth,
Works(1975).
4See
CP5.1-13
andCP
5.438for
Peirce'sdifferences
with
James
concerningthe
pragmatic
method.
35
KELLY
A.PARKER
5William
James,
"AWorld
ofPure
Experience,"Essaysin
RadicalEm
piricism,Works(1976),
pp.21-44.
Thepoint
ofthis
pivotalessay
istoargue
thatthe
common
distinctionbetw
een"subjective"
and"objective"
aspectsofexperience
ismerely
functional,rather
thanbeing
agiven
metaphysical
fact.6See
Dewey's
accountof"inquiry"
inthese
terms.John
Dewey,
Logic:The
TheoryofInquiry,
TheLater
Works,
1925-1953,vol.
12,ed.Jo
Ann
Boydston(Carbondale,
II:SouthernIllinois
University,
1986),p.
108.7T.
S.Eliot,
"EastCoker,"
CollectedPoem
s1909-1962
(New
York:
Harcourt
BraceJovanovich,1970),
p.189.
8Onthe
notionofvagueness
asanobjective
featureofthe
world,
seePeirce's
discussionofvagueness
andgenerality,
CP5.505.
9CP
1.129.10
ForJam
es'account
ofradical
empiricism
,see
"AWorld
ofPure
Experience,"Essaysin
RadicalEmpiricism
,Works(1976),
pp.21-44.
11That
thismethod
issimilar
toEuropean
phenomenology
hasnot
goneunnoticed.
See,forexample,
thestudies
inJam
esEdie,
William
James
andPhenom
enology(Bloom
ington,IN:Indiana
University
Press,1987).
Itisworth
notingthat
in1902,
independentlyofEdm
undHusserl,
Peircenam
edhis
versionofthis
method
"phenomenology"
(CP5.121).
12Jam
esprovides
asim
ilaraccount
ofthe'genesis
ofvalue
andethical
conflictinSection
11of"TheMoral
Philosopherand
theMoral
Life,"The
Will
toBelieve
andOther
EssaysinPopular
Philosophy,Works
(1979),pp.
141-162.13
Anthony
Weston,
"BeyondIntrinsic
Value:
Pragmatism
InEnvironm
entalEthics,"
Environmental
Ethics7(Winter
1985):
321-339and
"Unfair
toSwamps:
AReply
toKatz,"
Environmental
Ethics10(Fall
1988):285-288
(includedwith
EricKatz's
articleand
responseinthis
volume).
14Idiscuss
thenotions
ofadequacyand
significancein"The
Values
ofa
Habitat,"
Environmental
Ethics12(Winter
1990):353-368.
15Ipresent
amore
detailedexploration
ofthese
twoconcepts
ofgrowth
in"Econom
ics,Sustainable
Grow
th,and
Community,"
Environmental
Values2(Autum
n1993):
233-245.
16Dewey's
idealofparticipatory
democracy
isbest
presentedin
ThePublic
andIts
Problems,The
LaterWorks,1925-1953,
vol.2,ed.
JoAnn
Boydston(Carbondale,
II:Southern
IllinoisUniversity
Press,1988).
17Maurice
Merleau-Ponty,
ThePhenomenologyofPerception,trans.
ColinSmith
(New
Jersey:Humanities
Press,1962),p.203.
18Anthony
Weston
hasproposed
oneapproach
toaccom
plishingthis
in"Before
Environmental
Ethics,"Environm
entalEthics
14(Winter
1992):321-338
(includedinthis
volume).
19Onecofem
inism,see
Karen
J.Warren,
''ThePow
erand
theProm
iseofEcological
Feminism
,"Environm
entalEthics
12(Sum
mer
1990):125-146,
andChristine
J.Cuom
o,"Unravelling
theProblem
sin
Ecofeminism
,"Environm
entalEthics
14(Winter
1992):351-363.
36
\
PRAGMATISM
AND
ENVIRO
NMENTAL
THOUGHT
20Those
wishing
toexplore
thisconnection
may
wish
tostart
with
a
readingofM
urrayBookchin,
ThePhilosophyofSocialEcology:EssaysonDialecticalM
aterialism(Toronto:
BlackRose
Books,1990).
21J.Baird
Callicott,"The
Caseagainst
Moral
Pluralism,"Environm
entalEthics
12(Sum
mer
1990):99-124.22
PeterWenz,
"Minim
al,Moderate,
andExtrem
eMoral
Pluralism,"
Environmental
Ethics15(Spring
1993):61-74.
23This
pointisdeveloped
more
fullyinParker,
"Economics,
Sustainable
Grow
th,and
Community",
op.cit.24
Theterm
"anthropometric"
(literally"hum
an-measured")
isdiscussed
inAlan
E.Wittbecker,
"Deep
Anthropology:
Ecologyand
Human
Order,"
Environmental
Ethics8(Fall
1986):261-270.
25Richard
Routley,"Is
ThereaNeed
foraNew,an
Environmental
Ethic?"Proceedings
ofthe
FifteenthWorld
CongressofPhilosophy
(Sophia,1973),
1:205-210.26
J.Baird
Callicott,"Intrinsic
Value,
Quantum
Theory,and
Environ-mental
Ethics,"Environm
entalEthics7
(Fall1985):
262.
37