Download - Key Exchange Protocols
Key Exchange Protocols
J. Mitchell
CS 259
Next few lectures
Today 1/17• Brief cryptography background• Key exchange protocols and properties
Thursday 1/19• Wireless security: 802.11i• Choose your project partner
Next Tues 1/24• Password authentication protocols
Next Thurs 1/26• Contract-signing protocols
Project presentation #1 2/2
Talk about protocols for a while before looking at more tools
Encryption scheme:• functions to encrypt, decrypt data • key generation algorithm
Secret key vs. public key• Public key: publishing key does not reveal key-1
• Secret key: more efficient, generally key = key-1
Hash function, MAC• Map input to short hash; ideally, no collisions• MAC (keyed hash) used for message integrity
Signature scheme• Functions to sign data, verify signature
Basic Concepts in Cryptography
Cryptosystem
A cryptosystem consists of five parts• A set P of plaintexts• A set C of ciphertexts• A set K of keys• A pair of functions encrypt: K P C decrypt: K C P such that for every key kK and plaintext pP decrypt(k, encrypt(k, p)) = p
What is a “secure” cryptosystem?
One idea• If enemy intercepts ciphertext, cannot recover plaintext
Issues in making this precise• What else might your enemy know?
– The kind of encryption function you are using– Some plaintext-ciphertext pairs from last year– Some information about how you choose keys
• What do we mean by “cannot recover plaintext” ?– Ciphertext contains no information about plaintext– No efficient computation could make a reasonable guess– Cannot use ciphertext for any nontrivial purpose
Passive Adversary
Challenger Attacker
m0, m1
E(mi)
guess 0 or 1
Chosen ciphertext CCA1
Challenger Attacker
m0, m1
E(mi)
guess 0 or 1
c
D(c)
Chosen ciphertext CCA2
Challenger Attacker
m0, m1
E(mi)
guess 0 or 1
c
D(c)
c E(mi)
D(c)
Different keys to encrypt and decrypt• encrypt(key, message)
• decrypt(key -1, encrypt(key, message)) = message
Encryption key does not help decrypt• Cannot compute m from encrypt(key, m) and
key, unless you have key-1
Public-key Cryptosystem
key pair
Example: RSA
Arithmetic modulo pq• Generate secret primes p, q • Generate secret numbers a, b with xab x mod pq
Public encryption key n, a• Encrypt(n, a, x) = xa mod n
Private decryption key n, b• Decrypt(n, b, y) = yb mod n
Main properties• This works• Cannot compute b from n,a
– Apparently, need to factor n = pq
n
Cryptographic hash functions
Length-reducing function h • Map arbitrary strings to strings of fixed length
One way (“preimage resistance”)• Given y, hard to find x with h(x)=y
Collision resistant• Hard to find any distinct m, m’ with h(m)=h(m’)
Also useful: 2nd preimage resistance• Given x and y=h(x) hard to find x’x with
h(x’)=h(x)• Collision resistance 2nd preimage resistance
Iterated hash functions
Repeat use of block cipher or custom function• Pad input to some multiple of block length• Iterate a length-reducing function f
– f : 22k -> 2k reduces bits by 2
– Repeat h0= some seed
hi+1 = f(hi, xi)
• Some final function g completes calculation
Pad to x=x1x2 …xk
f
g
xi
f(xi-1)
x
Applications of one-way hash
Password files (one way)
Digital signatures (collision resistant)
• Sign hash of message instead of entire message
Data integrity• Compute and store hash of some data• Check later by recomputing hash and comparing
Keyed hash for message authentication• MAC – Message Authentication Code
Digital Signatures
Public-key encryption• Alice publishes encryption key• Anyone can send encrypted message• Only Alice can decrypt messages with this
key
Digital signature scheme• Alice publishes key for verifying signatures• Anyone can check a message signed by
Alice• Only Alice can send signed messages
Properties of signatures
Functions to sign and verify• Sign(Key-1, message)
• Verify(Key, x, m) =
Resists forgery• Cannot compute Sign(Key-1, m) from m and Key• Resists existential forgery:
given Key, cannot produce Sign(Key-1, m) for any random or otherwise arbitrary m
true if x = Sign(Key-1, m)false otherwise
Encryption scheme:• functions to encrypt, decrypt data • key generation algorithm
Secret key vs. public key• Public key: publishing key does not reveal key-1
• Secret key: more efficient, generally key = key-1
Hash function, MAC• Map input to short hash; ideally, no collisions• MAC (keyed hash) used for message integrity
Signature scheme• Functions to sign data, verify signature
Basic Concepts in Cryptography
Key Management
Out of band• Can set up some keys this way (Kerberos)
Public-key infrastructure (PKI)• Leverage small # of public signing keys
Protocols for session keys• Generate short-lived session key• Avoid extended use of important secret• Don’t use same key for encryption and signing• Forward secrecy
Cryptography reduces many problems to key management
Key Distribution: Kerberos Idea
Client
KeyCenter
Server
Shared symmetric key Kc
Shared symmetric key Ks
{Kcs, {Kcs}Ks}Kc
{Kcs}Ks { msg }
Kcs
Key Center generates session key Kcs and distributes using shared long-term keys
Public-Key Infrastructure
Certificate Authority
Client Server
Known public signature verification key Ka
Sign(Ka, Ks), Sign(Ks, msg)
CertificateSign(Ka, Ks)
Ks
Server certificate can be verified by any client that has CA key Ka
Certificate authority is “off line”
Key Exchange
Parties may have initial information Generate and agree on session key
• Authentication – know ID of other party• Secrecy – key not known to any others• Avoid replay attack• Forward secrecy• Avoid denial of service• Identity protection – disclosure to others• Other properties you can think of???
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Assume finite group G = S, • Generator g so every xS is x = gn
• Example: integers modulo prime p Protocol
ga mod p
gb mod p
A B
Alice, Bob share gab mod p not known to anyone else
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Authentication?Secrecy?Replay attackForward secrecy?Denial of service?Identity protection?
ga mod p
gb mod p
A B
IKE subprotocol from IPSEC
A, (ga mod p)
B, (gb mod p)
Result: A and B share secret gab mod p
Signatures provide authentication, as long as signature verification keys are known
A B
m1
m2 ,
signB(m1,m2)
signA(m1,m2)
IPSec: Network Layer Security
Authentication Header (AH)• Access control and authenticate data origins• replay protection• No confidentiality
Encapsulated Secure Payload (ESP)• Encryption and/or authentication
Internet Key management (IKE)• Determine and distribute secret keys • Oakley + ISAKMP• Algorithm independent
Security policy database (SPD)• discarded, or bypass
IKE: Many modes
Main mode• Authentication by pre-shared keys• Auth with digital signatures• Auth with public-key encryption• Auth with revised public-key encryption
Quick mode• Compress number of messages• Also four authentication options
Aug 2001 Position Statement
In the several years since the standardization of the IPSEC protocols (ESP, AH, and ISAKMP/IKE), … several security problems…, most notably IKE.
Formal and semi-formal analyses by Meadows, Schneier et al, and Simpson, have shown … security problems in IKE stem directly from its complexity.
It seems … only a matter of time before serious *implementation* problems become apparent, again due to the complex nature of the protocol, and the complex implementation that must surely follow.
The Security Area Directors have asked the IPSEC working group to come up with a replacement for IKE.
How to study complex protocol
General Problem in Security
Divide-and-conquer is fundamental• Decompose system requirements into parts• Develop independent software modules• Combine modules to produce required
system
Common belief:• Security properties do not compose
Difficult system development problem
Example protocol
Protocol P1
A B : {message}KB
A B : KA-1
This satisfies basic requirements• Message is transmitted under encryption
• Revealing secret key KA-1 does not reveal message
Similar protocol
Protocol P2
B A : {message’}KA
B A : KB-1
Transmits msg securely from B to A• Message is transmitted under encryption
• Revealing secret key KB-1 does not reveal message
Composition P1; P2
Sequential composition of two protocols
A B : {message}KB
A B : KA-1
B A : {message’}KA
B B : KB-1
Definitely not secure• Eavesdropper learns both keys, decrypts
messages
STS family
m=gx, n=gy
k=gxy
STS0H
STSa STSaH
STSHSTS
STS0
STSPH
JFK1
distributecertificates
cookie
openresponder
JFK0
symmetrichash
JFK
protect identities
RFK
STSP
Example
Construct protocol with properties:• Shared secret • Authenticated• Identity Protection• DoS Protection
Design requirements for IKE, JFK, IKEv2 (IPSec key exchange protocol)
Component 1
Diffie-Hellman A B: ga
B A: gb
• Shared secret (with someone)– A deduces:
Knows(Y, gab) (Y = A) ۷ Knows(Y,b)
• Authenticated• Identity Protection• DoS Protection
Component 2
Challenge Response: A B: m, A B A: n, sigB {m, n, A}
A B: sigA {m, n, B}
• Shared secret (with someone)• Authenticated
– A deduces: Received (B, msg1) Λ Sent (B, msg2)
• Identity Protection• DoS Protection
Composition
ISO 9798-3 protocol: A B: ga, A B A: gb, sigB {ga, gb, A}
A B: sigA {ga, gb, B}
• Shared secret: gab• Authenticated• Identity Protection• DoS Protection
m := ga
n := gb
Refinement
Encrypt signatures: A B: ga, A B A: gb, EK {sigB {ga, gb, A}}
A B: EK {sigA {ga, gb, B}}
• Shared secret: gab• Authenticated• Identity Protection• DoS Protection
Transformation
Use cookie: JFK core protocolA B: ga, A
B A: gb, hashKB {gb, ga}
A B: ga, gb, hashKB {gb, ga}
EK {sigA {ga, gb, B}}
B A: gb, EK {sigB {ga, gb, A}}
• Shared secret: gab• Authenticated• Identity Protection• DoS Protection
(Here B must store b in step 2, but we’ll fix this later…)
Cookie transformation
Typical protocol• Client sends request to server• Server sets up connection, responds• Client may complete session or not (DOS)
Cookie version• Client sends request to server• Server sends hashed data back
– Send message #2 later after client confirms
• Client confirms by returning hashed data• Need extra step to send postponed message
Cookie in JFK
Protocol susceptible to DOS A B: ga, A B A: gb, EK {sigB {ga, gb, A}}
A B: EK {sigA {ga, gb, B}}
Use cookie: JFK core protocolA B: ga, A
B A: gb, hashKB {gb, ga}
A B: ga, gb, hashKB {gb, ga}, eh2
B A: gb, eh1
eh1
eh2
Efficiency: Reuse D-H key
Costly to compute ga, gb, gab
Solution• Keep medium-term ga, gb (change ~10 min)
• Replace ga by pair ga, nonce JFKi, JFKr protocols (except cert or grpinfo, …)
A B: Na, ga, A B A: Nb, gb, hashKB {Nb, Na, gb, ga}
A B: Na, Nb, ga, gb, hashKB {Nb, Na, gb, ga},
EK {sigA {Na, Nb, ga, gb, B}}
B A: gb, EK {sigB {Na, Nb, ga, gb, A}}Note: B does not need to store any short-term data in step 2
Conclusion
Many protocol properties• Authentication Secrecy• Prevent replay Forward secrecy• Denial of service Identity protection
Systematic understanding is possible• But be careful; easy to make mistakes• State of the art: need to analyze complete protocol
Block cipher modes (for DES, AES, …)
ECB – Electronic Code Book mode• Divide plaintext into blocks• Encrypt each block independently, with same key
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining• XOR each block with encryption of previous block• Use initialization vector IV for first block
OFB – Output Feedback Mode• Iterate encryption of IV to produce stream cipher
CFB – Cipher Feedback Mode• Output block yi = input xi encyrptK(yi-1)+
Electronic Code Book (ECB)
PlainPlain Text Text
t CipCiphe r Tex her T
Block Ciphe
r
Block Ciphe
r
Block Ciphe
r
Block Ciphe
r
Problem: Identical blocks encrypted identically No integrity check
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
PlainPlain Text Text
t CipCiphe r Tex her T
Block Ciphe
r
IV
Block Ciphe
r
Block Ciphe
r
Block Ciphe
r
Advantages: Identical blocks encrypted differently Last ciphertext block depends on entire input
Comparison (for AES, by Bart Preneel)
Similar plaintext blocks produce similar ciphertext (see outline
of head)No apparent pattern