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Fordham Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 3 Article 6
1936
Some Aspects of Joinder of CausesEdward Q. Carr
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Recommended CitationEdward Q. Carr, Some Aspects of Joinder of Causes , 5 Fordham L. Rev. 452 (1936). Available at: hp://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/r/vol5/iss3/6
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SOME ASPECTS
OF
JOINDER OF
CAUSES
EDW RD
Q
C RRt
CONTEMPORARY
reforms
in
practice
and
procedure include
the
-
removal
of many
of the
restrictions
covering
the joinder
of
causes
of
action
in
the complaint.
The
policy
of
modern
statutes
is to
encourage
joinder
of
causes. Typical
of
this
trend
is
the
statutory
system
of joinder
of
parties
and
causes
which
is
now in effect
in New
York
State.'
The system
bears
the
strong
imprint
of
equitable
principles.
A
favorite
ground
of
equity
jurisdiction
has
been the
prevention
of
a
multiplicity
of suit.
Purely
as
a
matter
of pleading,
equity
permitted
the
joinder
of parties
plaintiff
or defendant
where
they
had
a common
interest
in
the subject matter
of
the
bill.
But further than
this,
equity
recognized
the prevention
of multiplicity
of
suit
as
an independent
and
substantive
ground
of
equity
jurisdiction
and
invented
the
remedy
known
as
the
bill
of
peace.
2
A
bill
of peace
combined
the
two-fold
functions
of
a
restraining
order
and
an order
of
consolidation.
Numerous
parties
plaintiff
who were
threatening
to sue
or
were actually
suing
the
same defendant
in different
actions
at
law,
were
in a proper
case
enjoined
by
a
bill
of
peace
from
prosecuting
their
actions,
and
the issues
involved
in
the numerous
law
actions
were
tried
and
disposed
of
in
a
single
equity
suit
the
equity
plaintiff
being
the
prospective
or actual
defendant
at
law, and
the
law plaintiffs
becoming
defendants
in
equity
The
bill of
peace
also
functioned
where
a single
plaintiff
had
threatened
to
sue or
was actually
suing
different
defendants
in
numerous
actions
at law.
2
Equity
enjoined
the
bringing
or
the
further prosecution
of
the numerous
law actions,
the
position
of
the
parties
again
being
reversed,
the
law
defendants
becoming
plaintiffs
in equity
and
the
law
plaintiff
becoming
the
defendant
in
the
equity
suit.'
The
early
rule
with
respect
to a
t Associate
Professor
of
Law,
Fordham
University,
School
of
Law.
1 N.
Y.
CIV.
PRAC
AcT
1921)
§ 209,
211,
212, 213; 1935)
§ 258.
2.
In
some
of its
earlier
opinions
the
New
York
Court
of
Appeals
held that
the
pre-
vention
of
a
multiplicity
of
suits
was
in
itself
sufficient
to
confer
jurisdiction
on
a
court
of
equity
even
though
no other
element
of
equity
jurisdiction
was
present,
New
York
N. H.
R.
R.
v.
Schuyler,
17 N.
Y.
592
1858);
Supervisors
of
Saratoga
County
v.
Deyoe,
77 N.
Y.
219 1879).
In
a
recent
case,
however,
the
court
intimates
that
pre-
vention
of
multiplicity
of
suits
alone
is
not
sufficient,
but
there
must
be
some other
ground
of
equitable
interference
present.
Boston
Maine
R.
R.
v. Delaware
Hudson
Co.,
263
N.
Y.
382,
197
N.
E.
321 1935);
1936)
5
FORDHAx
L. REV
171.
3.
In addition
to the
c ses
mentioned,
a
bill of
peace
was
sometimes
granted to
restrain
repeated
actions
by
the
same
plaintiff
against
the
same
defendant.
1
PoMERoY,
EQuITY
JURISPRUDENCE
4th ed. 1918)
§ 245.
4.
While
ordinarily
the
bill
of
peace
has
been
used
to
enjoin
the
prosecution
of
numerous
actions
at
law,
the
bill
may
also
be maintained
to prevent
multiplicity,
by
restraining
numerous
actions
in
equity.
Erie
Ry.
v. Ramsey
45
N.
Y.
637 1871);
Alleghany
K.
R.
R. v.
Weidenfeld,
5
Misc.
43,
25
N.
Y.
Supp.
7
Sup. Ct.
1893).
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45 3
bill
of peace
was technical
and
narrow. It
was necessary, in order
for
equity to
exercise its
jurisdiction,
that there
exist
among
the
numerous
individuals or
between each of them
and their
common
adversary a
common right, a community of
interest in the
subject matter
of
the
con-
troversy,
or
a
common
title
from
which
all
of
the separate
claims
arose.
5
Gradually
a more liberal
view was adopted
by
Courts
of
Chancery
and a
bill
of
peace
issued
even though
no common right,
title or
community
of
interest in
the
subject
matter
of the
action existed among the
numerous
parties, provided
there
was
a
common
question of
law
or fact
involved
in the
general
controversy.
The New
York
statutes governing the
joinder
of
parties
and
causes
are
remedial in
character
and have
as their object the prevention
of a
multiplicity
of suit.
The
so-called
liberal rule governing
bills of peace
in
equity has
been
woven
into the
statute
governing
the joinder
of
plaintiffs
so that
it
covers both
actions
at law
and
actions in
equity.
A
community
of interest in
a common question
of l w or
fact arising
out
of
the
same transaction
or series of transactions, is
the
test of joinder
of
plaintiffs.
7
While
the
statutes governing the joinder
of parties
defendant
do not in
so
many words
state
the requirement
that there be
a community
of
interest
among
the
defendants
in
a
common
question
of
law or fact,
this
requirement
is to be read into
these statutes.
8
During the
year
1935 the legislature
of
the
State
of New York
made
an
important
change in
the statute governing
the joinder
of causes of
action. Former
Civil
Practice Act
Section
258,
was repealed and a
new Section
258 added,
which reads
as follows:
Section 258
Joinder of
Causes of Action. The
plaintiff may unite
in
the
same
complaint
two or
more causes of
action whether
they
are
such
as
were
formerly
denominated legal or equitable,
provided that
upon
the application
of
any
party
the court
may
in its discretion
direct
a severance
of the action
or
separate
trials
whenever required
in
the
interests
of
justice Y
The
new statute is
patterned
after
similar
statutes
and
rules of
practice
in England
0
and
New Jersey. The
scope
and
effect of
the
statute
will necessarily have
to
await
the construction
placed upon
it
by
the
courts,
but an insight into the
motives behind
its passage
can
5.
1 Po~maoy op
cit
supra note
3,
§ 268.
6 Id § 269.
7.
N
Y. Cmv PRAc Acr 1921) §
209.
8
Bossak
v.
National Surety
Co.,
2 5
App.
Div.
707,
200
N
Y.
Supp.
148
(Ist
Dep't 1923);
Sherlock v. Manwaren,
208
App.
Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp.
709 4th
Dep t
1924).
9. N. Y. Laws
1935,
c. 339,
in effect
Sept.
1
1935.
10. English Practice
Act, Order 18, Rule
1.
11.
N J
RAc.
ACr,
§§
6
(2),
11;
N.
J urxs
or PRAc.
21.
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be
gathered by
comparing
it
with
its predecessor, the
former Civil Practice
Act Section
258. As
previously
constituted,
the
Section
provided
that
the
plaintiff might
unite
in
the
same complaint
two or more
causes of
action,
whether
they
be
legal
or
equitable,
provided
they
fell
within
one
and
the
same
subdivision
of the
Section
and provided
further
that
they
were
not inconsistent
and
did
not
require
different
places of
trial.
1
The
scheme
of
the
statute
classifying
the
different
types of
actions
and
segregating
them
into the
different
subdivisions
seems
to have
rested
on
purely
arbitrary
grounds.
X
could
not unite
in the
same
complaint
against
Y
a cause of
action on
contract
and
a cause of
action
in replevin
because
they
did
not
belong
to
one and
the
same
subdivision
of
the
Section. The requirement,
that
the
causes
joined
must
belong to one
and
the
same
subdivision
of
the
Section was
not
imposed
where
the
claims arose
out
of
the same transaction,
or transactions
connected
with
the same subject
of
action
as
set forth
in
subdivision
9 of
the
statute.
Therefore
X
could
unite
in
the same
complaint
against
Y a
cause of
action
on contract
and
a
cause
of
action
in
replevin,
provided
they both
arose
out
of the
same transaction,
or
transactions
connected
with
the
same
subject
of action
As
compared
to
the arbitrary
confinements
of the
other subdivisions
of
the
Section,
subdivision
9
of the former
Civil Practice
Act
Section 258
12.
Former N. Y.
Civ. PRAc
AcT
(1921) §
258 read
as follows:
JOINDER
OF CAUSES
OF
ACTION.
The
plaintiff
may
unite
in
the same
complaint
two
or more
causes
of action,
whether
they are such
as were
formerly
denominated
legal
or
equitable,
or both,
where
they
are
brought to recover
as
follows:
1.
Upon
contract, express
or
implied.
2 For personal
injuries,
except
libel, slander,
criminal
conversation
or seduction.
3. For libel
or
slander.
4.
For
injuries
to real
property.
5.
Real
property
in
ejectment,
with
or
without
damages
for
th
withholding
th r of
6 For
injuries to personal
property.
7.
Chattels,
with
or without
damages
for
the taking
or
detention thereof.
8 Upon
claims
against
a trustee,
by
virtue
of a
contract, or
by operation
of
law,
9. Upon
claims
arising
out of the
same
transaction,
or transactions
connected
with
the
same
subject of action,
whether or
not included
within one
or
more
of the
other subdivisions
of this
section.
10.
For
penalties
incurred
under
the conservation
law.
11.
For penalties
incurred
under
the agricultural
law.
12. For
penalties
incurred
under the public
health law.
It
must appear
upon
the
face
of the
complaint
that
all the
causes of
action
so
united
belong
to one
of the
foregoing subdivisions
of this
section;
that
they are
consistent
with each
other;
and it
must appear
upon
the
face
of
the complaint,
that
they
do
not
require
different
places
of trial.
A
provision
of
statute
authorizing
a particular
action,
or regulating
the
practice
or
procedure
therein,
shall not
be construed
to
prevent
the
plaintiff
from
uniting
in the
same complaint
two
or
more
causes of action
pursuant
to
this
section .
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was undoubtedly intended
by the legislature to
be
a
concession
towards
liberality of
joinder of causes of action,
in
the interest
of
prevention of
multiplicity of suit.
But
the use of the words
Upon claims
arising
out
of
the
same
transaction, or transactions connected
with the same sub-
ject
of
action
.
rendered
the
subdivision ill
adapted
to
clear
con-
struction
at
the hands
of
the courts. Referring to these
identical words
as used
in Section 484 of the Code
of Civil
Procedure
from which
former
Civil Practice
Act Section 258 was derived, the Court
of Appeals
with
a
touch of cynical
humor
said:
Neither,
in our
iudgment,
can
it be said that
the causes of action
are
brought to recover 'upon
claims
arising
out
of
transactions
connected
with the same subject
of
action'
which
phrase
has been said by a
distin-
guished
judge to be
'well
chosen ecause it is
so obscure
and so
general
as to
justify
the
interpretations which shall be found
most
convenient
and
best calculated to
promote
the ends
of justice'. New York N.
H. R.R.
Co.
v.
Schuyler, 17
N. Y.
592, 604).
13
The bulk of
the decisions in the
past,
having to do with
the
joinder
of causes of action,
have related
to the
construction
to be
placed
on the words
arising
out of the
same
transaction or transactions
connected with the same
subject
of action found in
former Subdivision
9. Some of these decisions served only
to increase confusion and doubt
in
the
mind
of
the practitioner. Typical
of
the narrow
refinements
and
distinctions
which
arose in
connection
with
Subdivision
9 are the
following:
If
A
assaulted
B
and while making
the assault spoke defam-
atory
words
of B, causes
of action for
assault and
for
slander
could
not
be
joined in the same complaint,
14
yet
if A
trespassed
upon
B s
land and while
committing the
trespass assaulted
B,
B could
join
causes
of action
for trespass and assault
in the same complaint, for while
in
the former case
it
was
held the
claims did
not
arise
out of the same
transaction,
or
transactions
connected
with the
same
subject
of
action ,
in
the latter it
was
said
they did.
A
case
where there was a chance
to
avoid a
possible multiplicity
of
suit by
joinder
of causes
in
the
same complaint but
where the opportunity
had
to be
passed by,
because of the
narrow construction
placed on
Subdivision 9 of Section 258, involved
the sale of a
gun
by
A to
B.
13
Ader v.
Blau,
241
N
Y.
7
16, 148
N. E. 771, 774 1925). Pomeroy in his
work
on
Code Remedies concluded that the words
under discus,con did
not
apply
to
actions
at
law but only to those in equity. PoaMMoY, CODE
Ri.rmizs
3d
ed.
1893) §
475.
14.
Paul
v.
Ford,
117
App.
Div.
151,
102
N
Y.
Supp.
359
(Ist
Dep t
1907).
15.
Doyle v. American
Wringer Co.,
60 App.
Div.
525,
69
N.
Y. Supp. 952 2d ep t
1901).
16.
These
two decisions construing
N. Y.
CODE
CIV. PRoC.
§
484 were
authority
as
to
former
N. Y.
Civ. PRAc.
cT 1921)
§
258
which
was
identical
in language with the
Code
section.
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FORDH M
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B
was
injured
by the explosion of
the
gun and in
his
complaint joined
a
cause of action for
breach of
warranty
with
a
cause
of
action
for
negligence.
The
joinder
was held
bad on
the ground
that the
claim
did
not arise
out of
the
same transaction
or transactions
connected
with
the
same
subject
of action. The
bewildering
hodge-podge
of decisions
arising
from
the judicial
construction
of
Subdivision
9
of
Civil
Practice
Act Section
258 was
largely
instrumental
in the repeal
of the
section
and the
adoption
of
the
present
Section 258
which
appears
to permit
joinder
of
causes
of
action
without
restriction
save for the discretionary
power
vested
in
the court
to
direct
a
severance
of
the
action or separate
trials
whenever required
in the
interests
of
justice.
To
attempt to formulate
rules governing the joinder
of causes
of action
under
a
statute
which in
itself
contains
no
words
of
limitation
and
which
seemingly
leaves
the
question entirely
to the
discretion of
the
court
might
appear
both
presumptuous
and
futile Yet
if the statute
is to
perform
satisfactorily
it
is not enough
to
say categorically
that
each
case of joinder will
be
judged
on its
own merits
and
upon
its
own peculiar
set of facts.
It
is
essential to
recognize
that two
distinct
classes
of
cases will arise
in which
the question
of joinder
of
causes will
be
governed by entirely
different
considerations.
In
the first
class may
be grouped
actions
brought by
a single
plaintiff
against
a
single
defendant
in
which
a
number
of
different
causes
of action
have
been combined
in
the
complaint.
It is in
this class of
cases
that
the reforms
intended
to
be
accomplished by
the
new statute will
be
fully
felt.
Joinder of
causes is
no
longer
limited to
actions of
certain
types nor
need there
any longer
be any inquiry
as
to whether
the
claims arise out
of
the same
transaction
or transactions
connected
with
the
same subject
of
action.
The man
who
is assaulted
by
his
neighbor
and at the
same
time slandered
may
now
sue
for
assault
and slander
in
the
same
complaint.
The purchaser
of merchandise
which
proves
defective
may sue
the vendor
in the
same action
for breach of
warranty
and for
negligence.
It is fair
to assume
in this first
class of
cases
that
the discretionary
power
of
severance
vested in
the
court
by
statute,
will
only find
room
for
exercise where the
objection is
raised
that
the
causes
of action
joined
are inconsistent
and
therefor
mutually
exclusive,
8
or
where
in
rare
cases
because
of
statutory
provisions
the
17. Reed
v. Livermore,
101 App.
Div.
254 91
N. Y. Supp.
986 (3d
Dep't 1905).
18
Inconsistency between
causes of
action cannot
exist
unless
they
arise
out
of
the
same
transaction
or
series of
transactions.
Hill
v.
McKane,
71
Misc.
581 128
N.
Y.
Supp.
819
Sup. Ct. 1911).
Former
N.
Y. CIV PRAc.
ct 1921)
§ 258 expressly
required that
the
causes
of
action
joined,
he
consistent
and that
different
places
of
trial
be not re-
quired.
These
limitations
on joinder
have
been eliminated
from the
present
statute,
but
it
is conceivable
that
an
application for
a
severance
might still
properly
be made to
the
court
on the
ground
of inconsistency
or
the
necessity
of a
different
venue
for
trial.
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causes joined
require
a
different venue
for trial or where
finally the
broad
ground is urged that
the joinder
will confuse
the issues and render
a fair trial impossible.
second cl ss of
cases
is
composed of
those
in
which
controversies
involving
a number
of
plaintiffs or
defendants
have been
assembled
to-
gether
in the
same
complaint.
The problem has
now become
one
both
of
joinder of
parties and causes. Obviously the
question
presents itself
whether
the
propriety
of
joinder in
the complaint
is to
be
determined
by
the
statute
relating
to
joinder
of causes of
action standing alone
or
by
this
same statute
read in the light of
the
kindred statutory provisions
governing
joinder of parties.
To adopt the first
alternative would be
in
effect
to hold
that
the
new
statute
governing joinder
of
causes
of action
had submerged
and rendered obsolete
the
statutes
relating to
joinder of
parties.
It
would
be
the
equivalent
of
saying
that
the joinder
of causes
of action
in
all actions,
whether
by a
single plaintiff against
a single
defendant or
involving multiple
plaintiffs or multiple
defendants is
subject
to
no
further
restriction
than
that
of
the reserved
discretionary
power vested in the court
to
sever
causes
of action
in
the interest
of
justice.
On
the other
hand to
adopt the second
alternative
is
to
rec-
ognize
what
has
been
the previously accepted
rule, that the
statutes
relating to
joinder of parties and
causes are part
of
a
flexible system
and
intended to be
read together
as
a
whole.
20
Courts
of
equity animated by motives of
practical expediency devised
the remedy
of a bill of peace to do
away
with
a
multiplicity of suit.
Both parties and
causes were joined
in
the
bill under circumstances
which
would have
been im possible in the
courts
of
common
law.
The
granting
of
the
remedy
rested
in the sound
discretion
of
the Chancellor.
This
discretionary
power
was controlled
by the knowledge
that
not all
causes
of action
could
be
joined
in the bill. A bill
which prayed for
relief against different
defendants on
independent and unrelated
trans-
actions
was
demurrable
on
the
ground
of
multifariousness.
There
had
to
be
at
least
a
basic
question of
either law
or fact common
to all
parties and causes
embraced within the
bill.
Furthermore,
the bill had
to result in a consolidation and simplification
of
the issues
else
its pur-
19.
By
analogy it
would seem that
the
objection
that
the joinder
of causes
vill
prevent
a proper trial of the
issues
might
well be left to the
good judgment of
the trial
court.
Akely
v.
Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y.
466 144
N.
E. 682 (1924).
20.
Sherlock
v. Mlanwaren
208 App. Div. 538,
203
N. Y. Supp.
709
(4th Dep t
1924).
21. Herndon
v. Chicago
Rock
Island and Pac. Ry. Co., 218
U. S.
135
(1910).
BiS-
joinder of
causes
at
Common Law
and
under
the
New
York
Code
of Civil Procedure =as
ground of
demurrer.
N. Y. ODE CIv. Paoc. §
488
7). With
the advent
of the
Civil
Practice
Act
and
Rules
of
Civil
Practice,
effective October
1st,
1921, mis-
joinder ceased to exist as a
ground of demurrer to the complaint
and
a
new
remedy
was
given to the
defendant
of making a corrective
motion
pursuant to Rule 102
of the Rules
of Civil
Practice,
to compel service
of an
amended complaint. The
motion had to be noticed
-
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8/9
•
FORDHAM
LAW
REVIEW
pose failed
of
accomplishment.
2
Modem statutory provisions
liberalizing
the
joinder
of parties
and
causes
and
permitting
the
consolidation
of
actions
have
it is true,
supplanted to
a large extent
the
bill
of
peace.
Yet
the
principles
underlying
the bill still serve as a guide, in
con-
struing the statutes
and
in solving ever
recurring
questions
of
joinder.
The discretion
vested
in the
court by statute
to permit
joinder
of causes
of action or to
direct a severance is comparable with
the
discretion
exercised
by
the
Chancellor in granting a bill of peace.
In
cases
involving multiple plaintiffs
or
defendants it seems proper to
draw the conclusion
that the sweeping provisions
of Civil
Practice Act
Section
258
governing
joinder
of causes
of action
are intended to
be
supplemented and
limited
by
the
statutes governing joinder
of
parties.
It
is
not
to
be
assumed
that
X
as
plaintiff may
without
restriction,
join
separate and independent causes
of action in
his
complaint
against
A B C and D or
that X Y
and Z as plaintiffs may unite in the same
complaint separate and distinct causes of action
against the defendant
A.
To justify joinder in multiple party actions, there must
be
present
a common question
of
law
or fact
in
the
causes
of
action united. Other-
wise hopeless
confusion
would ensue. The common
question
should
arise out of
the
same transaction or series
of
transactions
but
no
longer
need it
be
connected with
the
same subject
of
action . Those vague
and mysterious words
are
no
longer found in
any
statute.
Lest it be said
that the
placing of
restrictions
on the joinder
of causes
of
action in
the
complaint is out of
harmony
with
the
spirit
of
the new
statute,
let
it
be
remembered that the
purpose
of procedure is
order, and
without order there
cdn
be no satisfactory
or
uniform enforcement of
substantive
law .
3
by the defendant within twenty days from
the service of the
complaint, Rule
105 of
the
Rules
of
Civil
Practice. Misjoinder of causes
of action has now been eliminated as
a ground
of
motion under
Rule 102.
The
rule
as amended
and
effective September
1st,
1936,
reads
as follows:
RULE 102. Motion to correct
pleading.
If any
matter contained in a pleading
be so
indefinite,
uncertain
or
obscure that
the
precise meaning
or
application thereof
is
not
apparent,
or if there be a misjoinder of
parties
plaintiff, or a defect of
parties plaintiff
or
defendant,
the court
may order
the
party
to serve
such amended pleading as
the nature of the case
requires .
The words
or
if causes
of action
be improperly united previously appearing
after
the
word
defendant
have been
omitted. The defendant
under the
broad
provisions
of N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. Acr (1935) § 258
may now
move
at any time
during
the pendency of the
action for an order of severance.
22.
1
PommaO
,
op. cit. supra note 3
§
251%.
23. Todaro
v. Somerville
Realty
Co., 138
App.
Div. 1 6, 122 N Y. Supp, 09,
513 (2d
Dep't
1910).
[Vol.
5
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FORDHAM
LAW REVIEW
Published
in January, May and
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V
NOVEMBER,
1936
NUIIBER
3
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Edited by the
Students
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EDITORIAL
BOARD
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WniLar
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WALTER
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Comment
Editor
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Editor
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X.
CRONAN
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J.
LPrrsno FRAmcms
A.
O Co
EL
Ro3ERT L. DooHUE
RALPH F. LEWIS Jomz
R.
Sciotaii
BmNARD GLASER
EDWARD
J.
MIcCAN
NonA
F.
SaArino
ARTiruR
GooD.AN
GEORGE
M.
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J.
SINE
WALTm
B. KENNEDY
Faculty Adviser
Editorial
and
General
Offices,
Woolworth
Building, New York
Co
inguros
To
T IssUz
WnmmA_
L. RANSom, LL.B., 1905, Cornell
University,
College
of Law.
Member of the
New
York
Bar. Justice of the
City Court of New York,
1913-1917.
President
of
the
American
Bar Association,
1935-1936; member of the
House of Delegates of
the
Legal
Profession, 1936;
honorary
member
of
the
Canadian Bar Association.
Author of
numerous
legal articles.
Rxv.
Louis
LAug, Rector,
Cathedral
at
Trguier,
Brittany.
JoN
H. WrGmon,
A.B.,
1883,
LL.B.,
1887,
Harvard
UniverAty. Professor
of
Law,
Northwestern University,
1893-1929.
Dean,
1901-1929. Author of E 'MDECE
2d
ed.
1923);
PANORAfA
or WoRm s
LEGAL. SysTEM 1928),
and numerous other treatises
and
articles.
FmAsgois
J.
M. OLuVIn-AARrnr,
LL.D., Facult6
de
droit, Paris, 1901. Professor
of
Law,
Rennes, 1908;
Professor
of Law, Facult6 de
droit, Paris, 1921. Director
of
Rvuz
His-
TORIQUE
DE
Daorr FRAlA
s Ex rRAN GER.
Author of Pnovosrsn AND
NriscoUTY
Or
PArs
(1922-1928); CoiumENmr
oF HISTORY OF Fm,;cn LAw
2d
ed.
1934).
REv. ROBERT
J.
WnIrE,
A.B.,
1915,
LL.B.,
1920,
Harvard University;
S.
T.
B.,
1930,
J. C.
D.,
1933,
Catholic
University
of America. Former
Assistant
District Attorney,
Middlesex
County,
Massachusetts. Lecturer
in
Law,
Catholic University
of America,
1931 to
date. Author
of LEGAL. Errxci
OF AN-TE-NUrnAL PnozMnES
and contributor
to
various
law reviews.
CnARis L. B. LowNDxs,
A.B.,
1923, Georgetown
University;
LL.B., 1926,
S.
3 D., 1931,
Harvard
University. Professor of Law, Duke University.
Author
of
The Passing of
Situs-Jurisdiction
o Tax Shares of Corporate
Stock 1932) 45 Hazy.
L. REv.
777; Rate
and Measure
in
Jurisdiction
o Tax-Afternath
of Maxwdl v.
Bugbee 1936) 49 HAM.
L.
REv. 756, and numerous
other articles.
EnwARD
Q. CARR A.B.,
1910,
Georgetown
University; LL.B.,
1913,
Columbia University.
Co-author,
CARMODY S
NEW YORK
PRACTICE
(Compact
Edition,
1934);
MEDInA,
CAnn
Fm- s
NEW YORK
CIrm
PRAcTIc:E
MANUAL
1936).