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Islamism in the South CaucasusAuthor(s): Hrant Ter-AbrahamianSource: Iran & the Caucasus, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2007), pp. 127-139Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25597321 .

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brill Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139 \Cl! /

Islamism in the South Caucasus

Hrant Ter-Abrahamian Arya International University, Yerevan

Abstract

The article is dedicated to Islamism and its specific forms of manifestation in the

South Caucasus (in Georgia and Azerbaijan Republic in particular). Making no at

tempt to a full-scale coverage of the subject, the author aims at identifying and dis

playing the specific targets of a complex study of Islamism, indicating its primary and secondary geographic, social and other points, as well as specifying the basic

tendencies for each point thus identified. A special attention is paid to the Internet forums and blogs as more relevant sources for specifying the lines of conflict within

diverse trends of Islam and Islamism in the South Caucasus.

Keywords

Islamism, Islam in the South Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan Republic, Wahhabism

FOREWORD

Islamism, a rather uncertain term, indicates in this paper the public and

political programming and activities, finding their substantiation in the Islamic religion, and contrasting themselves to programmes and activi ties based upon secular principles. The subject of Islamic development in the South Caucasus as hereby represented, has been rather insuffi

ciently covered, anyway, it has been rarely considered in its complexity, spanning a complete gamut of all regional aspects. This situation, no

doubt, has a realistic explanation. Researchers are mostly attracted by regions with distinctly observable Islamist activities. Meanwhile, par ticularly during the last years, a considerable number of different publi cations on this subject, mostly journalistic, still appear in growing num bers. Despite its sluggish activity, Islamism in the South Caucasus is a

fairly important trend, which is not to be discounted when analysing the regional political developments.

Making no pretence to a full-scale coverage of the subject under

scrutiny, we nonetheless visualise two main targets. ? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10.1163/157338407X224969



128 H. Ter-Abrahamian /Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139

First, stating the problem, i. e. identifying and displaying the specific targets of a complex study of Islamism in the South Caucasus, indicating its primary and secondary geographic, social and other points, as well as

specifying the basic tendencies for each point thus identified.

Second, identifying the sources. The author's priority is to specify the material to be drawn from the Internet forums and blogs, which enables a researcher to observe the trends and processes that are either faintly or not at all represented by the "traditional" sources. In particular, the lines of conflict within diverse trends of Islam and Islamism accord

ingly, downplayed oftentimes in printed sources, are presented quite prominently in live discussions at forums and blogs. Actually, forums and blogs are in many ways functionally identical to the field material.

Besides, they constitute a crucial component in the structure of the most recent phenomena in the south Caucasian Islamism, or, at any rate, of its essential parts.

Traditional Areas of the Spread of Islam in the South Caucasus

It is a common knowledge that of the three recognised regional states in

the South Caucasus, only one, the Republic of Azerbaijan, is traditionally Islamic.1 Of the other two, Armenia and Georgia, the former as of today has zero Islamic population (although there is the famous 18th century Blue Mosque of Yerevan, recently restored, taking care of the tempo rary residents from Iran). As to Georgia, despite the traditionally domi

nating role of Christianity there, with a crucial role of the Christian fac tor within the national discourse of that country in our days, some sub stantial regions are compactly populated by groups confessing Islam.

And, in spite of the seeming weakness and little promise for the future of Islamism in this country, it should not be currently discounted nor, all the more so, disregarded as to the possible contingencies of devel

oping the Islamistic discourse and networks in the future. Thus, looking at the Islamism in the South Caucasus, we can primarily make out the two countries of the region: Azerbaijan and Georgia, without loosing

sight of Abkhazia, a republic created on the former Soviet Georgia's ter

ritory that has yet to be recognised. In the case of Armenia, being cur

rently devoid of a resident Muslim population, it is naturally defaulting from the general domain of the subject, however, in view of the future

developments, the Armenian factor, too, should not be disregarded,

being one of the operational entities in the region in the context of re

See, e. g. A. Yunusov, Islam v Azerbajdzane, Baku, 2005.



H. Ter-Abrahamian / Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139 129

gional contingencies, particularly with regard to the probable further

upgrade of the role of Islamism in the South Caucasus.

Islam and Islamism in Georgia

The Islamic Regions in Georgia Islam in Georgia is spread both among a part of ethnic Georgians and

the representatives of national minorities. There are several distinct ar

eas of residential Islamic groups, primarily Kvemo Kartli, an area south of Tbilisi down to the Armenian border, also known as Borchalu or

Marneuli (by the name of its largest population centre); Pankisi, or

Ajaria. Moreover, some villages in the north-east are home to the Avar

population. According to the 1989 census, the total number of the fol lowers of Islam in Georgia can be estimated around 640,000, with

308,000 in Kvemo Kartli.2 In Kvemo Kartli, with the Azerbaijani majority descended from the

Turkic-speaking tribes (mostly the tribe of Borchalu) and relocated there in the early 17th century by Shah 'Abbas I (1587-1628) to replace the exiled Georgians, dominating is the Shi'a Islam, though with some

Sunni presence. Population is mostly rural, stipulating the popular character of the local Islamic tradition. Meanwhile, it is to be noted that Kvemo Kartli is, as it were, a "strong" zone amidst the Islamic centres of

Georgia, and despite the Shi'a Islam being dominant in Borchalu, the lo cal preachers had an influence on other Islamic regions of Georgia, in

particular, they were instrumental in the so-called "re-Islamisation" of Pankisi in the 70s of the 20th century, during the Soviet rule.3 The Mus lim identity is of paramount importance in group self-determination of the population; it has not yet been completely replaced by the purely ethnic one, the two being rather intermixed. If questioned on national

identity, the common response by residents of Borchalu even today is

miisurman, i. e. "Muslim".4 This may allegedly be due not only to the ru

ral, hence conservative character of the population, but rather to living in a country with a non-Islamic religion, where the religious identity is

becoming the chief marker of distinction amid the surrounding groups. The Pankisi Gorge populated by the ethnic Vainakhs, the Kistins, be

came known a few years ago through the war in Chechnia. Kistins, the

See NacionaVnyj sostav naseleniya SSSR: Perepisf naseleniya (Goskomstat SSSR),

Moscow, 1989.

E. W. Walker, G. Sanikidze, "Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia", Occasional

Paper Series, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Fall 2004: 28. 4 Field Materials of the Author Recorded in Sadakhlo (15-26.08.2006).




traditional residents of this gorge, were joined by refugees from Chech

nia, including the groups confessing radical Islam, the so-called Wah habism. That changed not only the demographic but also the social and

religious picture of Pankisi. Although the Kistins are regarded as follow ers of Islam, there are specific features characterising this group and

having an impact upon the traditional Islam in Pankisi. The Kistin

community is very outdated even against the background of other

highlander groups of Georgia (the Svans, Khevsurs, Pshavs, etc.) and the North Caucasus. Even during the Soviet period, the Kistins were gov erned by the traditional patriarchal rules. The official structures and

standards operated formally, rather than essentially.5 They are the peo

ple of oral traditions, hence Islam here has rather a fanciful manifesta tion from the viewpoint of cultures leaning upon a written tradition. Al

though the Pankisi residents regard the religious affinity as an impor tant marker of group identity, and see themselves within the Islamic

tradition, in the course of the 19-20th centuries, the Kistins used to con

vert to Christianity and back to Islam several times, the latest large scale conversion to Islam having taken place, oddly enough, in the late Soviet period (1970s) through the efforts of the preachers from Kvemo

Kartli.6 Such twists and turns of traditions could only occur under the conditions of a profoundly patriarchal community with a dominating oral culture whereby the events aged three to four generations may seem to be grey antiquity.

Ajaria is another traditionally Islamic region of Georgia. It is mostly

populated by the Ajarians, the ethnic Georgians having adopted Sunni Islam during the 16-19th centuries, when the territory was under the Ottoman Empire. It should be noted that a considerable part of Georgi ans living under the Ottomans were converted to Islam. Part of them

(mostly the Laz) reside in Turkey to date, another part, including the

Ajarians, were joined to the Russian Empire, and later to Georgia (So viet, then independent). Islam had been well rooted amidst the Ajarians, but was appreciably weakened in the 20th century as a result of both

the modernising and directly antireligious policies in the USSR and of

the Georgian national discourse regarding the Byzantine Christian

confession (the so-called Orthodoxy) an important component of the

Georgian national identity.

I. Culaya, "Byf kistincem mezdu gruzinami I cecencami", Yuznyj Kavkaz: Territo

rii, istorii, lyudi, Tbilisi, 2006:179ff.

G. Sanikidze, E. W. Walker, ibid.



H. Ter-Abrahamian/ Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139 131

In Abkhazia, Islam has very specific forms, as, by the way, Christian

ity. The Abkhazians are formally divided into Muslims and Christians

(the spread of Islam goes in parallel with the similar processes in Aja ria). Actually dominating and encouraged by the current authorities is

the so-called Abkhazian popular religion, i. e., a complex of pre-Chris tian and pre-Islamic local beliefs retained to date.7 Islam in Abkhazia is so formal that even consumption of pork or alcohol is not regarded as

prohibitive by the Muslims. This situation is contrasted by the high de

gree of Islamic devotion in the Abkhazian diaspora, among the so-called

Muhajirs, descended from the expatriates of the 19th century.

The Post-Soviet Trends in the Traditional Zones of the Spread of Islam in

Georgia Kvemo Kartli (Borchalu or Marneuli) The post-Soviet developments in Kvemo Kartli were primarily con nected with national and social problems, while the religious factor was

somewhat in the background. In the last years, however, the religious or Islamic factor has been coming to the fore. As has been noted, the

Turkic-speaking population of Kvemo Kartli has a predominantly rural

life-style. A stereotypic Azerbaijani person in Georgia is a farmer selling his produce in the market. A virtual table of ethnic rating inherently visualised by the Georgian mind, would show the Marneuli Azerbaijanis on the lowest line. The reason is both a stereotypic non-acceptance of

Islam, as well as instilled Georgian cultural values partly stipulated by the traditional (prior to early 20th century) aristocratic and feudal na ture of the Georgian social medium, in contrast to, say, the Armenian

society characterised by the early emergence of urban and trading strata with a nearly complete extinction of the feudal aristocracy. A sys tem of values like that could naturally feature an Azerbaijani person only as a farmer or a salesman devoid of whatever manlike or djigit (horsemanlike) features, having a low level of social culture, to boot.

The ethnic problems of the post-Soviet Kvemo Kartli are very closely associated with the social ones. The economic slump of the 90s, corrupted officials (mostly ethnic Georgians), low modern background and the ensuing social inactivity (the Azerbaijani population of Bor chalu has become more vulnerable than the Armenians of Javakheti/ Javakhk living in harsher economic and natural environment) in the context of Georgian nationalism fearing the growth of minorities

See A. Krylov, Religiya i tradicii Abxazov (Po materialam polevyx issledovanij 1994

2000 gg.), Moscow, 2001.



132 H. Ter-Abrahamian / Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139

against the negative demography of Georgians proper?that is roughly the range of problems emerging in Kvemo Kartli on the turn of the cen

tury. True, it is to be noted that the economic conditions of Marneuli are sustained at a tolerable level by virtue of congenial climate, fertile land and borderline commercial activities. As concerns the religious fac

tor, it has not, until quite recently, shown any improper manifestations.

However, it should be taken into account that not only the Islamic iden

tity for the Azerbaijani individuals is important, as already noted, but for Georgians nonetheless the religious factor retains its significance. The latter can be illustrated by the conflicting situation between the authorities and the local population around the building of an Orthodox Church in Marneuli. One more point is to be considered. Despite the acute character of the problems, the Kvemo Kartli issue has until re

cently been in part purely Georgian, to mean that it aroused no media

response beyond Georgia or the Republic of Azerbaijan. The situation has clearly changed after 2003, i. e. after the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Roughly since that time, the flow of information from the province penetrated into the Russian media, among others. Moscow hosted many

press-conferences, while the "Evropa" publishers, close to the Russian official circles, published a book dedicated to the Azerbaijanis of Kvemo

Kartli.8 Dated around the same time was the formation of the national movement in Borchalu, with a heightened visibility of the Islamic fac tor. Of course, the role of the external elements should not be exagger ated, particularly the role of the Kremlin; it is, however, clear that the role of outside forces in actuating both the national and the religious political factors in Kvemo Kartli is not to be dismissed. Clearly seen here is not only the influence of Russia, but also the role of Turkey hosting

many conventions and gatherings of the political, religious, and politi cal organisations of Borchalu. As a result of ongoing social and political processes in this region, quite recently, in 2002, the National Assembly of the Azerbaijanis in Georgia, which is in the extreme opposition to M.

Sahakashvili's regime, even accusing him of programmed sterilisation

of the Azerbaijani women,9 was founded. At the same time, and in connection with the establishment of the

National Assembly of the Azerbaijanis in Georgia, the summer of 2006

marked the founding of the Islamic Party of Georgia in Erzerum, Tur

key. The party joined the representatives of all the Islamic areas of

8 X. Ibragimli, Azerbajdzancy Gruzii, Moscow, "Evropa", 2006.

See www.regnum.ru/news/629169.html and http://www.day.az/forum/lofiversion/

index.php/t28408.html.



H. Ter-Abrahamian /Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139 133

Georgia (except Abkhazia, which representatives in the first congress did not join the party), while the central role was played by the National

Assembly of the Azerbaijanis in Georgia.10 For the time being, the Is

lamic Party is seen as a supplement to the national struggle in Kvemo

Kartli; however, what is interesting is the claim for representing the in terests of the entire Islamic population of Georgia and a determined us

age of the religious factor. The future operation of the Islamic Party may become more autonomous. Anyway, the very fact of its initiation

that would have seemed sensational just a few years ago is an occur rence of symbolic proportions. Interestingly, the obvious Islamic pref erences of the Borchalu residents also manifested themselves during the so-called scandal for the caricatures published in a Danish tabloid

ridiculing the Prophet Muhammad. On that occasion multiple rallies and protests were held in the region. That is also a somewhat symbolic event, since the inhabitants of Kvemo Kartli have never before dis

played any devotion to Islamic solidarity.

Pankisi Described above were peculiar features of the functioning of Islam in Pankisi. However, the post-Soviet period here, too, has introduced ad

justments. The basic effect here was due to the war in Chechnia, the contacts between the Kistins and Vainakhs of Chechnia, the Chechens,

including also the Wahhabi rebels. This situation has caused a growth in the religious affiliation of the local population (actually, the final Isla

misation of the Kistins). At the same time, the line of conflict has be come obvious between the traditional local "popular Islam" and the

Wahhabism, the situation, which is, however, typical for many re

gions.11 Nevertheless, the Kistins remain a marginal group within the

Georgian context, and, naturally, cannot have a decisive impact on the Islamic trends in Georgia, in contrast to the Azerbaijanis of Kvemo Kar tli. Still, it should be noted that the Kistin representatives have taken

part in the first congress of the Islamic Party of Georgia in Erzerum.

Ajaria Two parallel processes can be observed in the post-Soviet Ajaria: the first and the more dominant is the re-Christianisation, i. e. conversion of young Ajarians to the Georgian Orthodox Faith, which is considered

See, e. g. http://www.day.az/print/news/georgia/49269.html.

Culaya, op. cit.: 176; see also V. Arakelova, "Vahabakanut'yun: Patmakan an

kark", Iran-Name, Armenian Journal of Oriental Studies, 35 (2000): 17-28.




more appropriate for the ethnic Georgians, and the second process is the partial re-Islamisation, in many ways associated with a foreign in

fluence, Turkish in particular. The re-Christianisation is seen in the ur ban and plain areas, while re-Islamisation is more related to the high lands. There also exists a conflict situation between the adherents of the traditional local Islam and the "Young Muslims" newly educated abroad. The political significance of Islam in present-day Ajaria can

hardly be a subject of debate, however, as a background factor, Islam in

Ajaria can be regarded as element of political combinations concerned with this part of Georgia. For instance, as is known, at the time of A. Abashidze's rule in Ajaria, the latter had some contacts with the Azer

baijanis of Kvemo Kartli (as well as, though, with the Armenians of Java kheti); in this connection the Islamic identity was instrumental for es

tablishing special relationship between the two regions of Georgia. In

this case, however, we deal with a pragmatic usage of the religious fac tor by an essentially secular politician. Anyway, representatives of

Ajaria have also taken part in establishing the Islamic Party of Georgia.

Abkhazia

Attempts by Muhajirs, representatives of the Abkhazian diaspora, to

gain a foothold in Abkhazia during the post-Soviet period have been un

successful primarily through the religious and cultural incompatibility with the local population, part of which is formally considered to be Muslim. A rebirth of Islam in Abkhazia cannot be seriously discussed.

However, emerging in this country is a group of the Wahhabi Muslims, so that with regard to the specific character of the Abkhazian society so

far indicated, the situation is not to be dismissed.

Georgian Nationalism and Orthodox Fundamentalism

A special mention is to be made on the specific political role of Christi

anity in Georgia, making this country very different from many other centres of traditional Christianity. In Georgia, Orthodox Christianity and nationalism are concepts very much merging with each other.

What we deal here with is the Georgian religious Orthodox funda mentalism. Perhaps, in no other Christian society of Europe there exists a fundamentalist Christian discourse as powerful as in Georgia. Only a

very small part of messages on this phenomenon is breaking through into the world information channels, but only in connection with anti

sectarian activities. However, the phenomenon itself is rather exten sive. It leans on several factors, namely: strong positions of fundamen talists within Georgian Orthodox Church (up to the actual domination);



H. Ter-Abrahamian / Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139 135

the popularity in Georgian society of the Institute of confessors,

whereby representatives of different strata, from the political elite to

the middle class, including members of parliament, government offi

cials, journalists, employees of International organisations, etc. have

their personal confessors, observe the church ceremonies, even fast on

Wednesdays and Fridays; high authority of the Church; the association

of Georgian Orthodoxy with the national idea in crowd scenes; etc. At

the local Georgian level the religious fundamentalism has also some

forms of institutionalisation, as well as a social networking and a con

tingency of forming its own local informational environment and its own discourse thus enabling us to perceive a certain social factor.

It should be mentioned that the Georgian Orthodox fundamentalism has a pronounced anti-Western and anti-modernistic tendency, which does not automatically indicate its, say, pro-Russian orientation. In con

trast to Islamic (say, Iranian) religious fundamentalism, the Georgian one has a distinct nationalistic component. The Georgian religious fun damentalism has rather an isolationist tendency.

Islam and Islamism in the Republic of Azerbaijan

Islamic Party and Traditional Islam

The Islamic Party in Azerbaijan Republic, established in early 1990s, is

representing the Shi'a Islam, traditional for that country. However,

likely, this party does not have the potential to become a dynamic so

cio-political force and a serious factor either inside the country or the

region at large. It is still to be taken into account that the party enjoys a

traditional support in some parts of the Republic, primarily the rural areas of Apsheron and the suburbs of Baku, as well as in the plain areas of the Talish region where the traditional Shi'a Islam is more powerful and can still mobilise the masses under social and political slogans. It should be noted that this Islam and its political component have a very distinct pro-Iranian orientation. Besides, the point of interest here is that the residents of the mentioned regions?the Iranian-speaking Tal ishis (in the Talish region), and the partially assimilated but descended from Iran Tats (self-denomination Pars)?inhabitants of rural Apsheron and other regions?still retain their religious and ethnic identity in contrast to Turkic identity. Carriers of traditional Islam are essentially inhabitants of rural areas, not dynamic socially and with conservative values. To our mind, the Islamism based on the Shi'a tradition centred in Iran, has no more potential in the region, including the Republic of

Azerbaijan, and will rather remain within the local boundaries of its current distribution.




The "New Islam"

Beside Shi'a Islam, traditional for Azerbaijan Republic, the country is ac

tively penetrated by other Islamic trends, starting from the 90s. Those are diverse movements of Sunni Islam. Sunnism here is traditionally confessed by the North Caucasian ethnic groups with only a small part of the Turkic and the Iranian speaking ones. However, Sunnism today is

spread primarily among the urban youth. Traditional Sunnism pene trated into Azerbaijan due to the targeted activities of the Turkish, Saudi and other structures. However, Sunnism itself is not uniform. In

Azerbaijan Republic, it is represented by different trends to be divided

generally into traditional and Wahhabi. We are interested in the latter as a religious movement with a huge political potential.

Using the slogan of return to the original Islam, exempt from the

later laminations, like other typologically protestant movements, the

Wahhabis reject all popular rites, mysticism, irrational and emotional

elements inherent to the traditional devotion. Thus, the slogan of the tradition covers a radical updating of religion, its rationalisation and

adjustment to the current situation.

Social Portrait of an Azerbaijani Wahhabi

In contrast to the traditional Shi'a Islam spread rurally among the aged and the Iranian-speaking groups, Wahhabism is diffused in urban cen

tres, mostly in the capital, amidst the youth having higher education and descended from the civilised Russian-speaking families, enjoying

good earnings and status, but having lost their social and ideological reference points through prevailing psychological instability and social

decay. The centre of the Wahhabi promotion is the mosque of Abu Bakr

in Baku. Unlike traditional Islam, the spread of Wahhabism is supported

by substantial funding from overseas, mostly Saudi Arabia. The massive

funding enables Wahhabis to publish extensively. Moreover, they are

very smart in using the modern techniques of promotion and advertis

ing. To appreciate the social and economic difference between the fol

lowers of Shi'a and the "New Islam" in Azerbaijan, it will suffice to com

pare the forum of the site of the traditionalists12 with the forum of the

Abu Bakr mosque.13 The Wahhabis are now capable to generate the local

12 Cf. http://eforum.com.ua/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?cdff=00969.

Cf. http://www.abubakr-mescidi.com/forums/.



H. Ter-Abrahamian/ Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139 137

styles: the struggle for the right to wear a hijab on the passport photo has been vigorously discussed in Baku since late 90s.14

Having examined some Azerbaijani Islamic Internet forums, we can

offer the social portrait of an average Wahhabi in Azerbaijan. A young man of 20 to 40, successor of the educated Soviet environment, whose

parents were very distant from religion or popular customs, but re

tained some links with the rural areas, though living in cities them selves. He is in good command of Russian, knows English and has a

competitive job, like a programmer or a manager. In his youth he was

very distant from religion. However, social instability, collapsing values of his original upbringing in a family of Soviet intellectuals, unavail

ability of a comprehensive ideological alternative to old ideology, re

sulting in a psychological discomfort, make him seek spiritual alterna tives. The traditional religion does not satisfy him, for it is mixed up on

popular superstitions, while its ministers are corrupted and smeared.

So, he goes to the "New Islam", which rejects superstitions, is strictly rational, while its protagonists are specimens of straight-laced morals. As a result, our man learns to perform namaz five times a day, goes off

drinking and smoking to learn that his grandma's confessed Islam was not Islam at all, but a misleading belief. From now on, he has two impor tant things: a clear picture of the world with responses to all questions and with a clear-cut distinction between black and white, as well as common involvement with those that are his like.

Percentage of those young people may be not too high, but they look

by all appearances like a socially mobile and by no means marginal group in the society.

Political Priorities and the Potential of the uNew Islamyy

The modernised Wahhabi Islam is politicised by definition. Firstly, it is based on negating all mystical or other personal or intimate manifesta tions inherent to traditional religion and clearly oriented to a rational, group-related social religious piety. Being a rational doctrine, it is cate

gorical, total and aggressive. It is small-minded; it goes deep into all domestic activities and vital functions. Besides, its ideal is the world wide caliphate, nationality being secondary in importance to religious affinity.

However, at the current stage of development, Wahhabism in Azer

baijan Republic has not yet made itself recognised as a political force. At

14 See Ajsel Vezirova, "Xidzab v bol'som gorode", Yuznyj Kavkaz: Territorii. Istorii.

Lyudi, Tbilisi, 2006:148-169.




this point its leaders think that it has yet to get established and rein

forced lest the repressions that are to follow the political activation of the "New Islam" should not be able to wreck the whole movement. It follows from the above that Wahhabism will not fail to establish itself as a political force at some time in the future, since its objectives are po litical. Actually, Wahhabism is not as much Islam, i. e. not a religion but rather Islamism, or a socio-political trend.

As we see it, Wahhabism in Azerbaijan still has potential for expan sion, which has not yet been worn out, in contrast to the traditional Is lam. That may be stipulated by the social dynamism and mobility of the "New Islam", its engagement with the urban educated young social

strata, funding from overseas, using the up-to-date techniques of pro motion and information technologies, etc. Those factors will sooner or

later usher this religious-political movement to the political stage. That will happen when the leaders of Islamism gather enough strength for a

political contest. The political vacuum in the Republic of Azerbaijan following the failure of the opposition at Presidential Election 2006 will

facilitate the ascension of Islamists who can mobilise masses of disgrun tled voters. No doubt, this type of Wahhabist development has limita

tions; they can grab power only after very radical changes, which are

currently not clearly visualised. Anyway, the aforesaid suggests that

they may become a functional political force at some time in the future.

That prospect may be an effective destabilising background for the inte rior situation in the country.

Islamism in Azerbaijan Republic as a Regional Factor

However, the prospective growth of Islamism will affect not only the in

terior situation in the Republic, but can also become an additional sub versive factor for the South Caucasus. The weakest link in this case is

Georgia. The low growing rate of the Georgian population and the high birth rate of the ethnic Muslim minorities (Azerbaijanis, among others), as well as a large spread of drug abuse and alcoholism among the Geor

gian youth, etc., may well result in the situation when the Muslim

population will become a very feasible factor for that country. Even to

day, although the absolute number of the Turkic ethnic element has

gone down since 1989, their percentage to the Georgians is rising, and now they really claim to be the second largest ethnos in Georgia. Be

sides, remaining unclear is the issue with the return of the Meskhetian

Turks; if it happens, the percentage of Muslim population in Georgia may give a sharp rise. All those groups will be more and more affected



H. Ter-Abrahamian /Iran and the Caucasus 11 (2007) 127-139 139

by Azerbaijan somehow or other, and by the Azerbaijani Islamism in

particular, with regard to the countering spirit of those minorities.

Conclusion

Thus, analysis and prognostication of the trends of Islamism in Georgia should take into account the factor of the Georgian Orthodox funda

mentalism, which is intolerant even towards other traditional Christian confessions (Catholics, Armenian Church, etc.).

As of today, Islamism in Georgia is quite remote from becoming a

weighty factor in the political life of the country. It will rather not ac

quire this capacity in the coming years, largely because it is leaning primarily upon the Kvemo Kartli population, which is poorly modern ised and socially inactive. Nevertheless, the development of Islamism is evident in the last years. The establishment of the Islamic Party of

Georgia is a significative, rather than a symbolic act. Moreover, the pos sible involvement of outside players is to be considered as well. Islam in

Georgia is not to be fully discounted even if it does not become a factor of the big politics.

On the one hand, the predicted rise of the radical Islamism in the

Republic of Azerbaijan, and on the other hand, the growing percentage of the Muslim population in Georgia can produce an additional regional imbalance. Even a mere growth in percentage of the Georgian Muslim

population with no regard for the effect of the Azerbaijani-Islamic fac tor will question the very basic principles of the Georgian statehood, which assume (informally, but very distinctly) a mandatory domination of the Christian Georgian element. With regard to the Islamist influence

by Azerbaijan this scenario can make the situation in Georgia very com

plicated.



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