This article was downloaded by: [Fondren Library, Rice University ]On: 15 November 2014, At: 17:39Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of European IntegrationPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/geui20

In it Together Yet Worlds Apart?EU–ASEAN Counter-TerrorismCooperation After the Bali BombingsFelix Heiduka

a Department of Political Science and International Relations,University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UKPublished online: 14 Jul 2014.

To cite this article: Felix Heiduk (2014) In it Together Yet Worlds Apart? EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Cooperation After the Bali Bombings, Journal of European Integration, 36:7, 697-713,DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2014.935361

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.935361

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

ARTICLE

In it Together Yet Worlds Apart?EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism

Cooperation After the Bali Bombings

FELIX HEIDUK

Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Birmingham,Birmingham, UK

ABSTRACT The externalization of the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) as partof the EU’s wider external relations has received increasing scholarly attention in thelast years. An important and reoccurring theme within this field, which has occupiedscholars and policy-makers alike, has been the EU’s counter-terrorism cooperationwith third states. Initially viewed as a ‘paper tiger’ in international efforts to combatterrorism, recent studies have illustrated the increasing activism of the EU in interna-tional counter-terrorism cooperation. However, these studies have exclusively drawnon North American or ENP case studies. By analysing the EU’s counter-terrorismwith ASEAN this article tries to extend the empirical basis of contemporary scholar-ship to the case study of EU–ASEAN cooperation. It thereby attempts to examineprospects and limits of the externalization of JHA with a special focus on counter-ter-rorism policies beyond the immediate EU neighbourhood.

KEY WORDS: Justice and Home Affairs, terrorism, counter-terrorism, ASEAN, Balibombings

Introduction

Against the background of the general diffusion of internal and externalsecurity (Bigo 2000), counter-terrorism policies have come to take a promi-nent place on the EU’s internal and external security agenda. The EU’sInternal Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy both labelterrorism as one of the main security threats facing the European Union.Combating terrorism within the EU as well as outside of the EU’s territory

Correspondence Address: Felix Heiduk, Department of Political Science and InternationalRelations, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK. E-mail: f.heiduk@bham.ac.uk

� 2014 Taylor & Francis

Journal of European Integration, 2014

Vol. 36, No. 7, 697–713, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.935361

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

has therefore moved centre stage. It is specifically the transnational dimen-sion of terrorism that has led to calls over increased cooperation betweenthe EU and third states and international organizations (Ferreira-Pereiraand Martins 2012). As a result, counter-terrorism cooperation has movedto the top of the agenda in EU political dialogues with third countries;especially, the US but also with countries such as Russia, India or Pakistan.Next to dialogues, the EU has signed a variety of agreements on joint coun-ter-terrorism measures, including an EU–ASEAN Joint Declaration to Com-bat Terrorism in 2003. The EU’s motivation for the externalization of itscounter-terrorism policies rests on the assumption that by strengthening thecapabilities of third states to combat terrorism before it reaches the EU’sborders the EU’s internal security is in turn protected (Balzacq 2009, 2). Byexternalizing its own internal security policies, the EU supports thirdcountries to take on security measures based upon its model of internalsecurity. In short, ‘the EU’s external relations should be used to attain EU’sinternal security objectives’ (Wolff 2009, 13).Against this background, the externalization of the EU’s Justice and

Home Affairs (JHA), within which counter terrorism policy is one of thecentral aspects, has evolved into an emerging policy arena and a field ofstudy. The external dimension has hereby mainly been studied with regardto the EU’s cooperation with countries ‘located in its strategic neighbouringareas’ and main allies such as the US (Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012,462). The EU’s cooperation with ASEAN in the field of counter-terrorism,however, has hereby so far received little scholarly attention (Chevallier-Govers 2012). This lack of scholarly attention is in line with the overalloutlook on EU–ASEAN relations, which views them as almost exclusivelydominated by economic agendas with little concern for security coopera-tion (Holmes 2013; Holslag 2012; Robles 2006; Umbach 2008; Wong2012). One dominant explanation hereby points towards the role of theUS, whose regional security alliances guarantee stability while with the EUessentially takes on the role of a ‘security free-rider’ (Berkofsky 2013). Asecond explanation points to the very different modes of regional integra-tion. ASEAN’s integration process has, through the stringent interpreta-tions of national sovereignty and autonomy by its member states, theprinciple of non-interference into the internal affairs of others, and consen-sus decision-making (the ‘ASEAN-way’), taken on a much lower degree ofregional integration. ASEAN displays very low degrees of institutionaliza-tion and its member states prefer non-binding, non-legalistic forms of coop-eration (Acharya 2000; Dosch 2012; Haacke 2003).The widespread hypothesis that Brussels plays no role in Southeast Asian

security (Keohane 2012, 45) notwithstanding, the signing of a ‘Joint Decla-ration to Combat Terrorism’ in 2003 between the EU and ASEAN none-theless did establish counter-terrorism cooperation as a key strategic issuefor EU–ASEAN relations. Against this background, the article will there-fore first of all explore whether any cooperation beyond rhetorical declara-tions of intent has taken place. Secondly the article will, in line with theburgeoning literature on the externalization of the EU’s internal securityagenda, try to assess whether the EU has hereby managed to transfer its

698 Felix Heiduk

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

own norms and practices of counter-terrorism cooperation to South-EastAsia (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 800).The research for this article has been carried out on the basis of analys-

ing the key strategic documents with specific attention given to the ‘Plansof Action’ published by the EU in conjunction with ASEAN in 2007 and2012, respectively. Their importance with regard toward the aim of thispaper originates from the fact that they are both descriptive and prescrip-tive; not only do the Plan of Action’s (PoA) provide a commonly agreedframework as a key structuring element in the EU’s relations with thirdstates, but they also contain a list of policies upon which the EU and itspartners are cooperating. By comparing the descriptive and prescriptive ele-ments of the PoA with the key strategic documents produced, it is possibleto gauge whether the EU has successfully managed to externalize its policypreferences (Balzacq 2009). These findings will be complemented by draw-ing on other publicly available sources: EU country strategy papers, dataand reports published by EU institutions such as Europol, as well as reportsreleased by other international organizations such as the UN’s SecurityCouncil Counterterrorism Committee. The article begins with a distillationof the main insights the theoretical literature on the EU’s external gover-nance provides us with. We then turn to EU’s cooperation with ASEANby, first, examining the rhetorical commitments made in the field of coun-ter-terrorism cooperation, and, second, by assessing the scope and depth ofthe operational dimension of counter-terrorism cooperation. The latter partof this article, building on the works of Rees (2006) and Kaunert andLeonard (2011), will be structured alongside five key policy sub-fields incounter-terrorism cooperation — police cooperation, judicial cooperation,intelligence cooperation, migration and border management, and coopera-tion in combating terrorist financing. We then bring this article to a closewith the observation that, based on our findings, there is little externaliza-tion of the EU’s counter-terrorism agenda to be found in its relation withASEAN. However, we found that the non-appearance of direct, hierarchi-cal avenues for the transfer of EU norms and policies to South-East Asia isnot tantamount to an overall absence of cooperation between EU andASEAN. Such cooperation has largely taken place alongside horizontal‘network governance’ modes through which the EU disseminated ideas andbest practices and engaged in capacity building. Whilst these attempts havecertainly been limited in their scope and depth to this day, they nonethelessillustrate that EU–ASEAN cooperation in the field of counter-terrorismcooperation has moved beyond mere declarations of intent.

EU Counter-Terrorism and the Externalization of JHA

Whilst many of the scholarly works on the EU’s external counter-terrorismcooperation forego any theorizing, there have been attempts to develop atheoretical concept of external governance, hereby understood as attempts‘to transfer the EU’s rules and policies to third countries and internationalorganisations’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 791). By and large thetheoretical literature highlights three different sets of explanatory factors

EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 699

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

that can help us to explain the extent to which the EU is able to externalizeits own rules, norms and policy preferences to actors outside of theEU’s territory: institutions, power and domestic structure (Lavenex andSchimmelfennig 2009, 792).The first set of factors (‘institutions’) claims that the modes and the

impact of externalization is primarily shaped by the EU’s internal modes ofgovernance. Essentially, the argument hereby is that the degree of Europe-anization in any given policy field has a strong impact on the scope anddepth of the externalization of said policies beyond the EU’s borders. Thehigher the degree of Europeanization, the more the EU is able to external-ize its policy preferences in any given policy field. Various studies on theEU’s counter-terrorism policies have referred to the dearth of communitar-ization, resulting from lack of cooperation between the security agencies ofthe member states and EU institutions (Keohane 2008, 129; Monar 2007),different threat perceptions amongst the EU member states with regard toterrorism (Monar 2007, 302; Shapiro and Byman 2006, 34), or the under-funding and understaffing of Brussels-based institutions (Bures 2006, 72;Rees 2006, 4), as a main factor behind the EU’s minor role in the field ofinternational counter-terrorism.The second set of factors (‘power’) claims that the power resources the

EU holds vis-a-vis other actors are the main explanatory factor when tryingto understand externalization processes. This has been framed as the EU’s‘governance by conditionality’ approach, whereby the EU is able withrespect to its enlargement to make compliance with its own rules andpolicies (laid out in the Copenhagen criteria) and adopting the acquiscommunautaire a condition candidate countries have to fulfil to becomeEU members (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Similarly, albeit notby directly invoking the ‘governance by conditionality’ approach, the EU’sattempt to externalize its own rules and policies to its imminent neighbour-hood has also been understood as a governance transfer which mainly restson the EU’s superior economic power vis-a-vis its neighbours in theMaghreb, the Mediterranean, the Balkans or former Soviet Republics. Vari-ous scholars have illustrated how the EU used its strong economic clout toexport its security objectives through the introduction of counter-terrorismclauses into association agreements (Eder 2011; Joffe 2008; Kaunert andLeonard 2011; Watanabe 2011; Wolff 2009). Conversely, with regard toEU–US cooperation scholars have argued that the EU has become the‘norm taker’ mainly due to its weaker power position (Argomaniz 2009;Beyer 2010). Coming from there, the general theoretical claim is that theEU is successful in externalization processes when it can, based on its supe-rior power position (often vis-a-vis alternative poles of power such as theUS or Russia), use coercive mechanism to transfer its own preferences inthe field of internal security to third states.The third set of factors highlights the importance of domestic structures

and practices. It is argued that successful externalization hinges on thedegree of similarities between the EU and third states. The more the domes-tic structures and practices of other actors resemble those of the EU, themore likely a successful externalization becomes. A number of studies on

700 Felix Heiduk

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation have suggested that closer coopera-tion between the two was largely hampered by the disregard for humanrights and the militarization of counter-terrorism by the US (Keohane2008, 135; Monar 2007, 294; Shapiro and Byman 2006, 34). Whilst allthree sets of factors produce different explanation for the EU’s ability toexternalize its internal security interests (or the lack thereof), they are simi-lar in that they conceive of externalization as a hierarchical, coercive modeof governance.On the other hand there is another, less hierarchical and more horizontal

conceptualization of externalization which thus far has been overlooked byscholarship on EU counter-terrorism cooperation: that of externalizationthrough networks (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009, 85). It is first and fore-most based on the observation that JHA cooperation within the EU is infact not hierarchically organized as Brussels has merely taken on a coordi-nating function due to security policies still being conceived as the domainereserve of EU member states (Wong 2011). Therefore, it is argued that theEU’s dominant mode of internal cooperation is intergovernmental (insteadof Europeanized) and therefore more horizontal than vertical. The lack ofhierarchical governance modes in the field of counter-terrorism, however,is not tantamount with the absence of cooperation.This observation has led Lavenex and Wichmann to conceive of horizon-

tal modes of externalization through ‘network approaches’. What’s more,they emphasized that cooperation through networks can, at least theoreti-cally, also take place independent of any coordinating actor or institution,thereby distinguishing between different types of ‘transgovernmental net-works’ (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009, 85). They differentiate betweenthree network types: (a) information networks, which are set up to diffuseideas and policy-relevant knowledge and to identify best practices; (b)implementation networks, which focus on enhancing cooperation amonginstitutions to enable the implementation of existing norms and rules —this takes usually place through capacity building measures and technicalassistance; and (c) regulating networks, which have the strongest impact onthird states as they are based on a legislative mandate to enforce rules andstandards in a specific policy field. Such enforcement through regulatingnetworks then can lead to the full or partial transfer of a, until then, inter-nal policy to an actor outside the EU. Hence, while information networksresemble the weakest measure to externalize, regulation networks are themost powerful measures to do so. Despite their differences, all networktypes are similar in that they are non-hierarchical and voluntarily; they areestablished between formally equal partners (Lavenex and Wichmann2009, 86). With these theoretical insights in mind, we now turn to the caseof the EU’s counter-terrorism cooperation with ASEAN.

After Bali: EU–ASEAN Relations and Counter-terrorism

The Rhetorical Dimension

The EU’s relations with Asia in general, and with South-East Asia in partic-ular, have historically been dominated by economic aspects (Robles 2006;

EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 701

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

Umbach 2008). It wasn’t until the events of 9/11 and the Bali bombingsthat security-related issues appeared on the agenda. Next to the fact that50 EU citizens had become victims of the Bali bombings, it was the possi-bility of a terrorist attack in the Straits of Malacca, which is the most directmaritime trade route between Europe and Asia, that put the ‘terroristthreat’ in South-East Asia on the EU’s agenda (Bunte 2009). Against thisbackground, the EU and ASEAN signed a ‘Joint Declaration to CombatTerrorism’ only a few months after the Bali bombings in 2003. In the ‘JointDeclaration’, the EU and ASEAN established terrorism as a shared, inter-regional security issue and called for an increased cooperation between thetwo regional organizations in the field of counter-terrorism. It contained anumber of non-binding, very general letters of intent with regard to cooper-ation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and with regardto EU support for counter-terrorism measures implemented by ASEANmember states. The document thereby rests on the definition of terrorismestablished by the UN Security Council resolution 1373 and stronglyemphasizes the central role of the UN for international counter-terrorismcooperation: ‘We acknowledge that the fight against terrorism must be con-ducted in accordance with international obligations, the UN Charter andgeneral norms of international law, including respect for human rights andhumanitarian law’ (European Union 2003).In the same year, the EU published her first ASEAN strategy paper, enti-

tled ‘A new partnership with Southeast Asia’, which called for a deepeningof the EU’s relations with the region. The document then laid out six ‘stra-tegic priorities’ of the EU toward South-East Asia, encompassing:

� Support for regional stability and the fight against terrorism;� Human rights, democracy and good governance;� Mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs;� Reinforcing economic ties;� Poverty reduction; and� Intensified dialogues and cooperation in specific policy areas (one ofthem being JHA).

The document furthermore defined ‘the fight against terrorism’ and‘mainstreaming JHA’ explicitly as strategic priorities of the EU towardSouth-East Asia. This is mirrored in the EU’s ‘A Strategy for the ExternalDimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice’ published in2005, which explicitly refers to the Bali bombings as evidence for the diffu-sion of the internal and external security and the internationalization ofterrorism, calling for the intensification of counter-terrorism cooperationwith South-East Asia (Council of the European Union 2005). At the sametime, Europe has been careful to emphasize her own, so-called rights-basedapproach by stating that the EU ‘needs to encourage its partners to distin-guish clearly between international terrorism and peaceful political opposi-tion’ and ‘respect basic human rights’ (European Commission 2003, 13).More broadly, it is furthermore stated that human rights aspects and demo-cratic governance ‘should be promoted in all aspects of policy dialogue and

702 Felix Heiduk

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

development cooperation, through building constructive partnerships withASEAN and national governments based on dialogue, encouragement andeffective support’ (European Commission 2003, 3).The EU’s most current document (‘Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-

ASEAN Enhanced Partnership’) outlining the EU’s relations withSouth-East Asia refines the EU’s strategic priorities by establishing fiveinter-regional areas for cooperation: ‘political and security cooperation’,‘economic cooperation’, ‘cooperation on the field of energy security and cli-mate change/environment’, ‘socio-cultural cooperation’ and ‘developmentcooperation’ (European Commission 2007a). One of the sub-areas underthe header ‘political and security cooperation’ is counter-terrorism coopera-tion. Whilst the content of the ‘Nuremberg Declaration’ basically resemblesthat of previous documents, its relevance lies with the ‘Plan of Action’to implement the ‘Nuremberg Declaration’ between 2007 and 2012(European Commission 2007b). The accompanying PoA lists the respectivepolicy measures to be implemented under the five inter-regional areas forcooperation. Upon its expiry in 2012, the EU–ASEAN Ministerial Meetingin Brunei published a new PoA for the years 2013–2017 (EuropeanCommission 2012). The PoAs are attempts to achieve the objectives laidout in the Nuremberg Declaration through ‘comprehensive exchange ofexperiences and information sharing, capacity building, and enhancedcooperation between relevant governmental agencies and academies/univer-sities’ (European Commission 2007b). The next section of this article willgo on to contrast the strong rhetorical commitments to deepen cooperationwith the policies implemented as a result.

The Operational Dimension

At a first glance, the lists of joint actions and measures listed in the PoA for2007–2012 look impressive. Under ‘Political and Security Cooperation’, atotal of 29 measures and joint actions are listed. In comparison with otherpolicy fields, security-related measures provide for the largest number, fol-lowed by measures in the field of economic cooperation. Similarly, the PoAfor 2013–2017 lists 22 measures and joint actions under ‘Political andSecurity Cooperation’ — again making this field the largest in terms ofmeasures listed. Both PoAs hereby registers EU–ASEAN dialogues address-ing issues such as ‘civilian crisis management’, ‘human rights issues’ and‘illegal drug trafficking’. Also, inter-religious dialogues are explicitly men-tioned in the documents.Concrete activities are listed in the annex of the PoA. In the PoA for

2007–2012, 10 activities are listed under ‘Political and Security Coopera-tion’, all of which are either workshops, visits to EU institutions or jointseminars. The activities include amongst others a seminar on anti-personnellandmines and a workshop on small arms and light weapons, but againthere list of activities is devoid of anything that falls under the category ofcounter-terrorism cooperation. The PoA for the years 2013–2017 is for themost part extending measures and activities listed in the first PoA. Themain focus is on dialogue forums and the exchange of best practices

EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 703

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

through formats such as seminars and workshops. Hereby, it is again theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that is deemed the central forum for secu-rity affairs. In the 2013–2017 PoA, technical assistance takes up moreroom as the EU aims to support newly created ASEAN institutions such asthe Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), the South-east Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) and theInternational Law Enforcement Academy. The current PoA also sets outthe implementation of an ASEAN–EU Comprehensive Border ManagementProgramme with the aim of improving border management in ASEANmember states. This is very much in line with key objectives laid out in the‘New partnership with Southeast Asia’, which put emphasis on ‘supportfor judicial capacity building’ and ‘support for border management andmoney laundering’. Additionally the document, in contrast with its prede-cessor, mentions a policy dialogue on counter-terrorism — albeit this dia-logue being cast in a very vague language: ‘… exploring the establishmentof a regular policy dialogue on counter terrorism’ (European Commission2012, 2). Hence, both PoAs consist of non-binding measures, which by andlarge draw on facilitating (and deepening) political dialogue, the exchangeof best practices and, to a lesser extent, capacity building. More so, a regu-lar EU–ASEAN dialogue on counter-terrorism has yet to be established.Moreover, with regard to dialogues on JHA-related issues, the PoAs refer

to established forums at UN level, the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) andthe ARF for the facilitation of closer cooperation between South-East Asiaand Europe. However, the key interregional institutions, ASEM and ARF,hereby not only encompass the EU and ASEAN in terms of their member-ship, but also include a variety of other regional and global actors such as,amongst others, Australia, India, Japan and China (ASEM and ARF) andthe US (ARF). More so, while ASEM and the ARF have been credited withpromoting trust and establishing confidence-building mechanisms betweentheir respective members, both are by and large based on the ‘ASEAN-way’. In other words, they are characterized by non-legalistic, non-bindingforms of cooperation, only display a minimal degree of institutionalizationand thus lack any enforcement mechanisms. As a result, both forums havebeen criticized as being little more than talk-shops as their ASEAN mem-bers and China remain ‘fiercely protective of their political autonomy,manoeuvrability and freedom of action’, thereby restricting the role ofpotentially more ‘activist’ members such as the EU or the US (Gilson 2002;Haacke 2009; Narine 1997; Sukma 2010; Weber 2013). However, despitethe fact that direct EU–ASEAN policy dialogues on counter-terrorism haveyet to be established, both PoAs have provided indications for cooperationbetween the EU and ASEAN in specific fields such as law enforcement orborder management. Given the low levels of Europeanization of counter-terrorism policies in Europe, these activities are for the most part to be car-ried out by individual EU member states. The paper will therefore proceedby examining more closely potential cooperation in the fields of police andlaw enforcement; justice; intelligence; borders and transport; and thefinancing of terrorism.

704 Felix Heiduk

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

Police and Law Enforcement

Cooperation between police and law enforcement agencies is listed varioustimes in all key strategic documents analysed. This includes cooperationbetween institutions at EU and ASEAN levels — namely Europol andAseanapol — as well as providing support for law enforcement agencies inASEAN member states. Generally, it has been noted that for cooperationbetween the EU and third states, Europol has, despite its counter-terrorismfunction within the EU being hampered by a lack of supranational powersand a lack of trust by national law-enforcement and intelligence agencies,increasingly become a port of call (Deflem 2006; Kaunert 2010). Withregard to third states, Europol has for some time obtained the status of alegal entity, which entails Europol to enter cooperation agreements withthird states or international organizations to facilitate international cooper-ation in the field of ‘organized crime’ or counter-terrorism. There are twotypes of agreements Europol enters with third states or international orga-nizations: ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’ agreements.The two types differ significantly in terms of the depth and the scope of

cooperation that is established. Strategic agreements are ‘limited to theexchange of non-personal data, which means strategic and technical data’.So-called operational agreements on the other hand ‘include the possibilityto exchange personal data, which means data relating to an identified oridentifiable natural person’.1 Hence, the main difference between the twotypes lies in the dissemination of personal data to third states. Strategicagreements exclude the dissemination of personal data, whereas opera-tional agreements include it. Strategic agreements have been described asbeing ‘reserved for countries with a questionable human rights or data pro-tection track record’ (de Hert and de Schutter 2009, 319). Europol cur-rently has entered nine operational agreements with third states, amongstthe partner countries are the US, Switzerland or Australia. Europol also hasentered nine strategic agreements; amongst its partners are Turkey, Russiaand Ukraine. Europol has not entered into any agreements, strategic oroperational, with ASEAN or a South-East Asian country. Hence, EU–ASEAN cooperation in the field of law enforcement thus far lacks ‘regulat-ing networks’ based on legal agreements.There is also little proof for a future substantiation of this to be found in

the PoAs, which speak of ‘encouraging the possible establishment oflinkages between law enforcement agencies in ASEAN and the EU with aview to sharing experience and best practice in combating transnationalcrime and counter-terrorism’ and of ‘supporting efforts to strengthencounter-terrorism cooperation amongst regional counter terrorism institu-tions’(European Commission 2007b, 3). However, given the fact that As-eanapol has for the most part been a discussion forum for the police chiefsof ASEAN member states — a formal secretariat and headquarters was onlyestablished in 2010 in Kuala Lumpur — and still lacks a sufficient budgetand staff, an ASEAN equivalent to Europol has yet to materialize (Holmes2013, 157). Aseanapol also lacks an equivalent to Europol’s counter-terrorism unit (the Counter terrorism Task Force — CCTF). The EU hasthus far been cooperating with Indonesia, where it provides ‘capacity

EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 705

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

building’ in the field of police and counter-terrorism by supportingIndonesia’s police in establishing the Jakarta Centre for Law EnforcementCooperation (JLEC). JLEC offers courses for police on organized crime,money laundering and terrorism. The EU has funded the development ofthe courses and syllabi, teacher training programmes and regional network-ing activities of JLEC (Delegation of the European Union to Indonesia,Brunei Darussalam and ASEAN 2011, 42). Similar forms of cooperationbetween the EU and other ASEAN states such as Thailand are currently notunder consideration due to the human rights abuses committed by securityagencies.2 Furthermore, EU member states have provided expertise tocounter-terrorism training seminars and workshops at the SEARCCT. Forexample, France ran workshops at SEARCCT on the links betweencybercrime and terrorism, money laundering and on countering financialterrorism; Great Britain ran seminars on aviation security; and Italy ranseminars on document fraud and illegal immigration.3

Justice

To facilitate closer judicial cooperation within Europe and between the EUand third states, Eurojust has been created at EU level (Bures 2010). Thereport of the EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator on judicial aspects of theEU’s counter-terrorism policies has called for a stronger channelling ofcooperation with third states through Eurojust (Council of the EuropeanUnion 2010). Similarly to Europol, Eurojust is also a legal entity and thusis able to enter cooperation agreements with third states or international.These cooperation agreements mainly set out the legal ramifications forjudicial assistance and for extradition requests between the EU and thirdstates. Eurojust has entered a number of agreements with countries such asNorway, Switzerland or the US. Agreements for example enable the send-ing of liaison magistrates from third states to Eurojust’s headquarters inThe Hague and vice versa. Eurojust has so far entered no agreements withASEAN or any of its member states.The main obstacle hereby are the significant differences between the

EU’s benchmarks for entering cooperation with third states and the prevail-ing justice systems in South-East Asia. First and foremost, there is the lackof data protection regulations in third states (Eurojust 2009, 10). The strictdata protection regulations held by Eurojust have made a direct coopera-tion with South-East Asia nearby impossible as data protection regulationsin the region are poor according to EU-standards. Second, a number ofASEAN members such as Malaysia have yet to sign the International Con-vention against Torture, which is a prerequisite for the establishment ofjudicial cooperation with the EU.4 Third some states, most famously Singa-pore (and Malaysia until 2011) have enacted counter-terrorism legislations,in Singapore named the Internal Security Act (ISA) that allow for the indef-inite detention of terror suspects. Again these legislations exist in starkcontrast to the rights-based approach to counter-terrorism promoted by theEU. And fourth, with the exception of Cambodia and Philippines, allASEAN member states still have death penalty for activities in which

706 Felix Heiduk

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

terrorists might be involved, such as drug trafficking or treason. Indonesiaeven has the death penalty explicitly for terrorism (Holmes 2013, 156).Hence, Eurojust thus far only maintains contact points in Thailand andSingapore.

Intelligence

Whereas the cooperation between intelligence agencies has developed intoa key aspect in the field of EU–US counter-terrorism cooperation (Aldrich2009), there is no mentioning of intelligence cooperation mentioned inboth PoAs. Equally all of the strategic documents bear no mentioning ofintelligence cooperation. Also, none of the EU’s country strategies for theASEAN member states make references to intelligence cooperation. Theonly trace of this is to be found in the partnership agreement the EUentered with Indonesia in 2009, where it states that ‘exchange of informa-tion on terrorist groups and their support networks in accordance withinternational and national law’5 should be furthered in the future. How-ever, beyond this fairly vague formulation, there were no other indicationsof actual inter-institutional cooperation to be found.

Borders and Transport

And whilst intelligence cooperation between the EU and South-East Asiaseems to still be in its infancy, both PoAs explicitly outline cooperationactivities in the field of border and transport management between the EUand ASEAN. Both PoAs highlight the importance of measures such as‘information sharing and the use of technologies relevant to bordermanagement and document security’. In order to achieve these goals, the‘ASEAN-EU Comprehensive Border Management Programme’ is to beimplemented until 2017 (European Commission 2012, 3). The programmeis hereby to provide EU capacity building in border management tech-niques to develop a more efficient border management system in ASEANmember states. A pilot project, financed by the EU and implemented byInterpol, had been launched between 2009 and 2012 in Vietnam and Cam-bodia. In the course of the project 16 far-flung border crossings were pro-vided with modern technical equipment for effective border management— especially access to Interpol databases. By being able to access Interpoldatabases, and also supply them with new or updated information, it isbelieved that South-East Asian states then will be able to engage in interna-tional cooperation.6 Further cooperation in the field of border managementbeyond the scope of the relatively small pilot project with a budget of just4.7 million Euros has for the time being not materialized.

Financing of Terrorism

Similar to border management cooperation, which runs via an internationalinstitution (Interpol), cooperation aimed at curbing the financing of terror-ist activities is facilitated through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).Founded in 1989 to curb money laundering, the FATF since 9/11 has come

EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 707

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

to play an important role in setting international standards to effectivelycurb money laundering. Further to this, the FATF is also monitoring com-pliance with these standards by issuing annual reports on countries that failto comply with the international regulations against money launderingestablished by the FATF. So-called NCCTs (Non-cooperative countries andterritories) — countries which are viewed as being non-cooperative in theglobal fight against money laundering and terrorist financing — fall intotwo broad categories: state who refuse to comply with FATF standards(high risk non-cooperative states),and those that cooperate with the FATFbut still have major deficiencies in their national Anti-Money Laundering(AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) regulations.While currently only Iran and North Korea are classified as high-risk

non-cooperative states, a number of ASEAN member states are classifiedunder the second category of NCCTs (Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, andVietnam). The Philippines, Brunei and Cambodia are reported to recentlyhaving made progress in their implementation of international regula-tions, but still do not fully comply with all AML and CTF regulations.7

Because of these deficiencies, the PoAs list measures to support compliancewith AML and CTF regulations in South-East Asia. When analysing theactivities provided by the EU in this field, only two very small projects toenhance capacity building in the Philippines8 and Indonesia9 have beenimplemented thus far.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis of the EU’s counter-terrorism cooperation withASEAN demonstrates first and foremost that cooperation is still at infantstage. Despite strong declarations of intent to strengthen the cooperationbetween Europe and South-East Asia in the field of counter-terrorism,cooperation has not advanced beyond various workshops and joint semi-nars on terrorism-related issues. No legally binding cooperation agreementshave been reached thus far between the EU and ASEAN in any of the fivekey policy fields examined for this paper. Nor has a regular dialogue forumon counter-terrorism been established. Hence, we do not find evidence forhierarchical modes of external governance nor for the establishment of hor-izontal ‘regulating networks’ based on legally binding agreements.Coming from there this analysis, secondly, demonstrates that the EU has

been unsuccessful to externalize her policy preferences to South-East Asia.Neither has the EU been able to export its definition of terrorism toASEAN, nor has the EU managed to transfer her own, in her words ‘rights-based’, approach to counter-terrorism to the region. Despite the strongtenor to be found in Brussels over the adherence to human rights in theinternational fight against terrorism, none of the key documents establishexplicit links between human rights protection and counter-terrorism poli-cies. Instead of externalizing the norms, the EU has prescribed itself in itsfight against terrorism (‘a rights-based approach to counter terrorism’), therelevant documents drew on the UN Charter and UN Security Council res-olution 1373, which refers to the issue of human rights in non-binding

708 Felix Heiduk

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

wording and to which all ASEAN member states as members of the UNare subject to anyway, as a lowest common denominator. A similar pictureevolves with regard to US–ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation. While ajoint declaration between Washington and ASEAN was signed in 2002, noinstitutional cooperation mechanisms at ASEAN level followed. That saidcounter-terrorism cooperation between the EU and ASEAN does not con-tain any elements that can be viewed as attempts to externalize norms orpractices of EU internal security governance through conditionality or theprescription of any particular policies via ‘regulating networks’.Thirdly, this article made some modest inroads toward explaining the

finding that EU–ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation has not advancedvery much in the last decade. What most crucially has stood in the way ofa closer cooperation are the different regionalization processes in Europeand South-East Asia. The so-called ASEAN-way has limited intra-ASEANcooperation as well as ASEAN’s external cooperation. Whilst the EU hasevolved into a supranational institution, which, despite the low level ofEuropeanization in the field of counter-terrorism, has managed to createEuropean institutions (such as Europol or the EU’s counter-terrorism coor-dinator) facilitate close cooperation within Europe and beyond, whileASEAN has by and large remained an intergovernmental organization. Forexample, there are thus far no ASEAN equivalents to Eurojust. Even whereinstitutionalization processes on the ASEAN level haven taken place as inthe case of ASEANAPOL, these institutions are mere discussion forumswhich lack sufficient budget and staffing.Fourthly, there are a number of domestic factors which have hampered

the EU’s cooperation with individual member states. The lack of data pro-tection regulations in all ASEAN member states makes data exchangesbetween the EU and ASEAN nearby impossible. In addition to that a num-ber of ASEAN member states have not signed International Conventionagainst Torture. Others have enacted counter-terrorism legislations thatviolate core aspects of civil liberties and human rights, such as the ISA inSingapore, or have the death penalty for terrorist offences (Indonesia). Attimes, these factors have fully circumvented EU–ASEAN cooperation, atother times cooperation was relocated to international organizations, suchas via Interpol in field of border management or via the FATF in field ofterrorist financing. Cooperation with the security forces in some ASEANcountries is furthermore hindered by their tarnished human rights records.More so, the US has traditionally played an important role with regard tocooperation with South-East Asian security forces. Building on long-estab-lished military ties with its traditional regional allies (Singapore, Malaysia,Thailand and the Philippines) Washington bolstered its military aid toSouth-East Asia in the context of the GWOT. The US furthermore re-estab-lished military ties with Indonesia, which had laid dormant for over a dec-ade due to the atrocities committed by the Indonesian army in East Timor,and supported the establishment of Indonesia’s counter-terrorism policeunit Detachmen 88 through the provision of funding and training (Daviesand Rondonuwu 2010; Moreno 2007; Murphy 2010). While US engage-ment was not without constraints, mainly due to strong public resentment

EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 709

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

over perceived anti-Muslim overtones, Washington has used its clout as themost powerful external actor in the region to bring about closer bilateralinstitutional cooperation with the security forces of various ASEAN mem-ber states (Mauzy and Job 2007). Hence, it has been argued that the EU‘has been commensurate to activities and assistance provided by othermajor Western development and humanitarian actors in the region’(Maier-Kapp 2012, 39).Finally, however, what this paper also demonstrates is that cooperation

between the EU and ASEAN in the field of counter-terrorism policies hasnot been fully absent. Whilst cooperation for the time being certainlyremains at infant stage in comparison with other third states / regions, coop-eration did actually take place — largely via ‘network governance’ modes.When moving away from hierarchical modes of external governance, wefind evidence for externalization along horizontal modes of security gover-nance of the EU to ASEAN and to its member states. The EU has engaged ina number of seminars and workshops (‘information networks’), which serveto disseminate ideas and best practices to third countries. The EU has alsoengaged in capacity building (‘implementation networks’) with regionalagencies in South-East Asia such as the Southeast Asia Regional Centre forCounter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) and the JCLEC. The EU has launched semi-nars and workshops, and has engaged in capacity building exercises (i.e. inthe field of border management) together with individual ASEAN countries.And whilst an analysis of the specific bilateral policies of the EU’s memberstates with South-East Asian nations is certainly beyond the scope of thisarticle, our research produced no evidence on substantive bilateral agree-ments between EU members states and ASEAN member states in the field ofcounter-terrorism in the first place. Secondly, the relevant activities carriedout by EU member states, such as funding and running seminars at theSEARCCT, did not contradict the overall EU’s approach.Additionally, and in line with a wider move away from seeking region-

to-region agreements with ASEAN (see the decision to abandon negotia-tions over a EU–ASEAN FTA in 2009, after which the EU has launchedbilateral FTA negotiations with ASEAN countries), the EU has introducedanti-terrorism clauses in all Partnership and Cooperation Agreements(PCAs) it has signed with ASEAN countries (with Indonesia in 2009, andwith the Philippines and Vietnam in 2010).10 The counter-terrorism clausesdirectly refer to important aspects of the EU’s policy preferences such asclose cooperation with Interpol, sharing of best practices and joint train-ings. They furthermore include a human rights clause, which directly makereference to the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism.In conclusion, while the EU has not engaged in more robust forms of exter-nalization through for example regulating networks based in legally bind-ing agreements with ASEAN, the paper illustrates that the EU hasnonetheless been able to establish cooperation modes that allow for thetransfer of policy preferences through horizontal networks, where the EUcapitalizes because of its specific skills and experiences. These are likely toincrease incrementally, as the signing of PCA’s with key ASEAN playershas strengthened the EU’s reciprocal influence on ASEAN countries.

710 Felix Heiduk

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

Notes

1. EUROPOL, International Relations, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/international-

relations-31 (accessed 09 September 2012).2. European Union, Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007–2013,

http://eeas.europa.eu/thailand/csp/07_13_en.pdf (accessed 09 November 2012), 4.

3. For a full list of the seminars and workshops, please go to http://www.searcct.gov.my/our-

courses/previous-courses (accessed 13 March 2014).4. European Union, Malaysia — European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007–2013,

http://eeas.europa.eu/malaysia/csp/07_13_en.pdf (accessed 09 November 2012), 4.

5. Council of the European Union, Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and coop-

eration between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and theRepublic of Indonesia, of the other part, 14032/09, Brussels 21.09.09, 12.

6. Interpol: EU-funded programme sees Interpol global tools reach frontline officers across ASEAN

region, http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2012/N20120619 (accessed08 November 2012).

7. FATF: Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: ongoing process, Rome, 22.06.12, http://www.

fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20-%20Improving%20global%20AML%20CFT%

20compliance%20_%20an%20ongoing%20process%20%2022%20June%202012.pdf (accessed09 November 2012).

8. European Union, The EC-Philippines Strategy Paper 2007–2013, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/phil

ippines/csp/07_13_en.pdf (accessed 09 November 2012), 21.

9. European Union, Indonesia — European Community Strategy Paper 2007–2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/indonesia/csp/07_13_en.pdf (accessed 09 November 2012), 9.

10. Negotiations over PCA’s are currently taking place with Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.

References

Acharya, A. 2000. Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem ofregional order. London: Routledge.

Aldrich, R.J. 2009. US-European intelligence Co-operation on counter-terrorism: low politics and com-

pulsion. British Journal of Politics & International Relations 11, no. 1: 122–39. doi:10.1111/

j.1467-856X.2008.00353.x.Argomaniz, J. 2009. When the EU is the ‘norm-taker’: the passenger name records agreement and the

EU’s internalization of US border security norms. Journal of European Integration 31, no. 1:

119–36. doi:10.1080/07036330802503981.Balzacq, T. 2009. The Frontiers of governance. In The external dimension of EU justice and home

affairs: governance, neighbours, security, ed. T. Balzacq, 1–34. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Berkofsky, A. 2013. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t: the EU’s asia security policies. Interna-tional Relations and Security Network, November 7. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=172135.

Beyer, A.C. 2010. Counterterrorism and international power relations: the EU, ASEAN and hegemonicglobal governance. London: I.B. Tauris.

Bigo, D. 2000. When two become one: internal and external securitisation in Europe. In Internationalrelations theory and the politics of European integration: power, security and community, eds. M.

Kelstrup and M. Williams, 171–204. London: Routledge.

Bunte, M. 2009. Piraterie in Sudostasien — Neuere Entwicklungen und Perspektiven [Piracy in South-east Asia – recent developments and perspective]. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 28,

no. 2: 87–99.

Bures, O. 2006. EU counterterrorism policy: a paper tiger? Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1:

57–78. doi:10.1080/09546550500174905.Bures, O. 2010. Eurojust’s fledgling counterterrorism role. Journal of Contemporary European

Research 6, no. 2: 236–56.

Chevallier-Govers, C. 2012. Antiterrorism cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. European ForeignAffairs Review 17, no. 1: 133–56.

Council of the European Union. 2005. A strategy for the external dimension of JHA: global freedom,security and justice. 14366/3/05. Brussels.

EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 711

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

Council of the European Union. 2010. Judicial dimension of the fight against terrorism — recommenda-tions for action. 13318/1/10. Brussels.

Davies, Ed, and O. Rondonuwu. 2010. U.S.-Funded Detachment 88, Elite of Indonesia

Security. Reuters, March 18. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/18/us-indonesia-usa-security-

idUSTRE62H13F20100318.

Deflem, M. 2006. Europol and the policing of international terrorism: counter-terrorism in a global per-spective. Justice Quarterly 23, no. 3: 336–59.

de Hert, P., and B. de Schutter. 2009. International transfers of data in the field of JHA: the lessons of

Europol, PNR and swift. In Justice, liberty, security: new challenges for EU external relations, eds.B. Martenczuk and S. van Thiel, 299–335. Brussels: VUB Press, IES.

Delegation of the European Union to Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam and ASEAN. 2011. Blue book2012: EU-Indonesia development cooperation 2010/2011. Jakarta.

Dosch, J. 2012. ASEAN and the challenge of regionalism in the Asia Pacific. In The new global politicsof the Asia Pacific, eds. J. Dosch, M.K. Connors, and R. Davison, 2nd ed., 121–39. London:

Routledge.

Eder, F. 2011. The European Union’s counter-terrorism Policy towards the Maghreb: trapped between

democratisation, economic interests and the fear of destabilisation. European Security 20, no. 3:431–51. doi:10.1080/09662839.2011.608353.

Eurojust. 2009. Eurojust annual report 2009. Den Haag.

European Commission. 2003. A new partnership with Southeast Asia. COM (2003) 399/4. Brussels.

European Commission. 2007a. Nuremberg declaration on an EU-ASEAN enhanced partnership.Nuremberg.

European Commission. 2007b. Plan of action to implement the Nuremberg declaration on an EU-ASEAN enhanced partnership. Nuremberg. http://eeas.europa.eu/asean/docs/action_plan07.pdf.

European Commission. 2012. Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of action to strengthen the ASEAN-EUenhanced partnership (2013–2017). Bandar Seri Begawan. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/

cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129884.pdf.

European Union. 2003. Joint declaration on co-operation to combat terrorism. 5811/03. Brussels.Ferreira-Pereira, L.C., and B.O. Martins. 2012. The external dimension of the European Union’s coun-

ter-terrorism: an introduction to empirical and theoretical developments. European Security 21,

no. 4: 459–73. doi:10.1080/09662839.2012.700639.

Gilson, J. 2002. Asia meets Europe: inter-regionalism and the Asia-Europe meeting. Cheltenham:Edward Elgar.

Haacke, J. 2003. ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture: origins, development and prospects.London: Routledge.

Haacke, J. 2009. The ASEAN regional forum: from dialogue to practical security cooperation? Cam-bridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3: 427–49. doi:10.1080/09557570903104057.

Holmes, L. 2013. dealing with terrorism, corruption and organised crime: the EU and Asia. In ThePalgrave handbook of EU-Asia relations, eds. T. Christiansen, E. Kirchner, and P.B. Murray,143–64. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Holslag, J. 2012. Europe’s convenient marginalisation. European Voice, July 5. http://www.european

voice.com/article/imported/europe-s-convenient-marginalisation-/74781.aspx.

Joffe, G. 2008. The European Union, democracy and counter-terrorism in the Maghreb. JCMS: Journalof Common Market Studies 46, no. 1: 147–71. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00771.x.

Kaunert, C. 2010. Europol and EU counterterrorism: international security actorness in the external

dimension. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 7: 652–71. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2010.484041.

Kaunert, C., and S. Leonard. 2011. EU counterterrorism and the European neighbourhood policy: an

appraisal of the southern dimension. Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 2: 286–309.

doi:10.1080/09546553.2010.538276.Keohane, D. 2008. The absent friend: EU foreign policy and counter-terrorism. Journal of Common

Market Studies 46, no. 1: 125–46.Keohane, D. 2012. The EU’s role in East Asian security. In Look East, act East: transatlantic agendas

in the Asia Pacific, ed. P. Pawlak, 45–50. ISS Report 13. Paris: European Union Institute for Secu-rity Studies.

Lavenex, S., and F. Schimmelfennig. 2009. EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance

in European politics. Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 6: 791–812. doi:10.1080/

13501760903087696.

712 Felix Heiduk

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014

Lavenex, S., and N. Wichmann. 2009. The external governance of EU internal security. Journal ofEuropean Integration 31, no. 1: 83–102. doi:10.1080/07036330802503932.

Maier-Kapp, N. 2012. The EU and non-traditional security in Southeast Asia. In EU-ASEAN relationsin the 21st century: towards a stronger partnership in the making, eds. D. Novotny and C. Portela,

26–44. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mauzy, D.K., and B.L. Job. 2007. U.S. policy in Southeast Asia: limited re-engagement after years ofbenign neglect. Asian Survey 47, no. 4: 622–41. doi:10.1525/as.2007.47.issue-4.

Monar, J. 2007. Common threat and common response? The European Union’s counter-terrorism strat-

egy and its problems. Government and Opposition 42, no. 3: 292–313. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00225.x.

Moreno, E. 2007. ‘Homeland security beyond our borders: examining the status of counterterrorismcoordination overseas’. Testimony before the House committee on homeland security subcommit-tee on border, maritime, and global counterterrorism. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.http://2001-2009.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rm/93261.htm.

Murphy, A.M. 2010. US rapprochement with Indonesia: from problem state to partner. ContemporarySoutheast Asia 32, no. 3: 362–87.

Narine, S. 1997. ASEAN and the ARF: the limits of the ‘ASEAN way’. Asian Survey 37, no. 10:961–78. doi:10.2307/2645616.

Rees, W. 2006. Transatlantic security cooperation: counter terrorism in the twenty-first century.London: Routledge.

Robles, A.C., Jr. 2006. The ASEAN and the European Union. In Interregionalism and internationalrelations, eds. R. Roloff, J. Rueland, and H. Hanggi, 99–112. London: Routledge.

Schimmelfennig, F., and U. Sedelmeier. 2004. Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the

candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4:661–79. doi:10.1080/1350176042000248089.

Shapiro, J., and D. Byman. 2006. Bridging the transatlantic counterterrorism gap. The WashingtonQuarterly 29, no. 4: 33–50. doi:10.1162/wash.2006.29.4.33.

Sukma, R. 2010. The accidental driver: ASEAN in the ASEAN regional forum. In Cooperative securityin the Asia-Pacific: the ASEAN regional forum, eds. J. Haacke and N.M. Morada, 111–23.

London: Routledge.

Umbach, F. 2008. Asian-European relations: more security through inter- and transregional relations?

In Asian-European relations: building blocks for global governance?, ed. J. Rueland, 114–42.London: Routledge. http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415450577/.

Watanabe, L. 2011. EU-Maghreb counter-terrorism cooperation: the need for a more holistic approach.GCSP Policy Paper No. 24. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy. http://www.gcsp.ch/Euro-Atlantic-Security/Publications/GCSP-Publications/Policy-Papers/EU-Maghreb-Counter-Terrorism-

Cooperation-The-Need-for-a-More-Holistic-Approach.

Weber, K. 2013. The ASEAN regional forum and the EU’s role in promoting security in the Asia-Paci-

fic. In The Palgrave handbook of EU-Asia relations, eds. T. Christiansen, E. Kirchner, and P.B.Murray, 344–58. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.

1057/9780230378704.0033.

Wolff, S. 2009. The Mediterranean dimension of EU counter-terrorism. Journal of European Integra-tion 31, no. 1: 137–56.

Wong, R. 2011. The Europeanization of foreign policy. In International relations and the EuropeanUnion, eds. C. Hill and M. Smith, 149–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wong, R. 2012. Still in deficit: perceptions of the EU’s capabilities among foreign policy elites inSingapore, Indonesia and Vietnam. EU External Affairs Review 2, July: 34–45.

EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism 713

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Fond

ren

Lib

rary

, Ric

e U

nive

rsity

] a

t 17:

39 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2014