Download - IAEA Nuclear Security Programme
IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA Nuclear Security Programme
Enhancing cybersecurity in nuclear infrastructureTWG-NPPIC – IAEA May 09 – A. Cavina (IAEA-NSNS)
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IAEA and Nuclear Security
• Office of Nuclear Security was created (2002) to address the urgent threats posed by the changing geopolitical situation
• The Nuclear Security programme has been one of the fastest growing programmes in the IAEA
• Current budget €15-20m/year
• Focus on prevention, detection and response to malicious acts (sabotage, insider threat, theft...)
• About 50 staff
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Interplay within Nuclear Security
NUCLEARSECURITYFRAMEWORK
ConventionsLaws & regulationsRegulatory bodiesLaw enforcementThreat assessmentAccounting and controlGuidancePreventionDetection/responseCoordinationSecurity culture
TARGETS
Nuclear weaponsNuclear materialRadioactive materialNuclear facilitiesTransportsTransitsTechnologyCyberspaceSensitive information
THREATS
TerroristsCriminal organizationsNon-state factions
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IAEA - Improving Nuclear Security
• Promoting international instruments and their implementation
• Developing recommendations and guidelines
• Providing evaluation and advisory services
• Providing education and training – human resource development
• Providing technical improvements and upgrades
• Coordinating Member States and the global effort towards Nuclear Security
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Nuclear Security & Cybersecurity
• Cyber is a relative newcomer in an established culture of (physical) security
• Two documents in the Nuclear Security Series (to be published 2009, available in draft version)
• A series of training courses on offer, from awareness to technical issues
• A pilot Security Assessment Service at facilities
• Coordination & cooperation with national authorities (regulators & operators)
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Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities
The history:
• Work started in 2003!!
• Has been the object of 4 CMs and 1 TM
• Has been widely reviewed
• Will be published later in 2009
Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities
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Why an IAEA CompSec document?
Global reasons:• Attackers focus on critical infrastructure (existing examples
of sabotage / extortion), new attention to SCADA systems as targets
• Relevant legislation and regulations of the field are lagging behind
• Not all national infrastructures have recognized and standardized the issue
• Existing international guidance is not industry specific and fails to capture some of the key issues
• No existing IAEA document specifically addresses the field
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Why an IAEA CompSec document?
Technological reasons:• Increased presence of digital I&C systems in the design of
new (and old) NPPs and the corresponding introduction of new and unknown vulnerabilities
• Increased interconnection and reliance of Physical Protection systems on computerized systems (alarms, access control,...)
• Increased request for connection of Extranet, Intranet (Business) and Control networks
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Approaches: Responsibilities
• Ensuring continuity and thoroughness in the implementation of security through levels of resp.
• Connecting the levels and the relevant expertise
• Regulating cybersecurity in all critical infrastructure
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App. II: Threat identification
• Threats of either stand alone attacks or coordinated attacks including the use of computer systems should be incorporated into DBT (Design Basis Threat) scenarios
• An adequate process of intelligence gathering is required to ensure the completeness and relevance of each facility’s attacker matrix
• Likewise sensitive assets and their vulnerabilities should be identified and assessed
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App. III: People issue
• No technological solution will replace the security provided by well trained personnel
• Security awareness should start at the very highest level
Direct reporting lines for Security responsibilities!
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GRADED APPROACH TO COMPUTER SECURITY
• The security of CS to bebased on a graded approach
• The assignment of CSto different levels andzones should be basedon their relevance to safety and security
• The risk assessment process should be allowed to feed back into and influence the graded approach
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Special considerations for Nuclear Facilities
• Facility lifetime phases and modes of operation
• Differences between IT systems and control systems
• Demand for additional connectivity and related consequences
• Considerations on software updates/patching
• Secure design and specifications for computer Systems.
• Third party/vendor access control procedure
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With many thanks...
Andrea CavinaOffice of Nuclear Security
International Atomic Energy [email protected]
+43-1-2600-26637
http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/