Download - Hacking 101 3
HACKING 101Umons
3ème bachelier en Sciences Informatique1ère et 2ème Master en Sciences Informatiques
Master en Sciences Informatiques en 1 an 1ère ET 2ème Master ingénieur Civil en Informatique de gestion
Séminaire d’informatique25 février 2015
Olivier HouyouxTechnology Security Architect @ Nitroxis Sprl
SCHEDULE FOR THE DAY
1. Why are we here?
2. Real Life Examples
3. Owasp – Top 10 (2013)
4. Demo Web Hacking Simulation Walkthrough
5. Summary
6. Questions
DO WE NEED WEB APP.
SECURITY?
Well managed infrastructure
Important data on web applications
Malware spreading
EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
2. Maria Sharapova
EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
2. Maria Sharapova
3. Samy Kamkar
EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
2. Maria Sharapova
3. Samy Kamkar
4. Kevin Poulsen
EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
2. Maria Sharapova
3. Samy Kamkar
4. Kevin Poulsen
5. …
OPEN WEB APPLICATION
SECURITY PROJECT
Make software security visible
Cheat Sheets, Tutorials, Testing guides…
Tools (WebGoat, WebScarab, …)
Library (ESAPI)
…
OWASP TOP 10
Broad consensus about what the most critical web
application security flaws are.
OWASP TOP 10
OWASP Top 10 - 2013
A1 - Injection
A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
A3 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
A5 - Security Misconfiguration
A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control
A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
A9 - Using Known Vulnerable Components
A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
A1 – INJECTION
User input injected without checking
SQL
LDAP
Command
XPath
…
A1 – SQL INJECTION EXAMPLE
Connection conn = pool.getConnection();
String sql = "select * from user where username=‘" + username + "’
and password=‘" + password + "’";
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);
A1 – SQL INJECTION EXAMPLE
Connection conn = pool.getConnection();
String sql = "select * from user where username=‘" + username + "’
and password=‘" + password + "’";
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);
A2 – BROKEN AUTHENTICATION
User / Password
Brute force attack
Birthday paradox
Weak management functions
Change or recover password
A2 – SESSION MANAGEMENT
1. Session Hijacking
Stealing authenticated user’s session ID
2. Session Fixation
Forcing user’s session ID
A2 – SESSION HIJACKING EXAMPLE
A2 – SESSION HIJACKING EXAMPLE
A2 – SESSION FIXATION EXAMPLE
public class LoginServlet extends HttpServlet {
…
public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request,
HttpServletResponse response) {
String user = request.getParameter("user");
String pass = request.getParameter("password");
…
HttpSession session = request.getSession(true);
…
}
…
}
A2 – SESSION FIXATION EXAMPLE
public class LoginServlet extends HttpServlet {
…
public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request,
HttpServletResponse response) {
String user = request.getParameter("user");
String pass = request.getParameter("password");
…
HttpSession session = request.getSession(true);
…
}
…
}
A3 – CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING (XSS)
Untrusted data sent to victim without validation and / or
escaping
XSS allows attackers to execute script in browsers to:
hijacking users’ sessions,
redirecting user to malicious site,
…
1. Reflected XSS
2. Stored XSS
A3 – XSS EXAMPLE 1 - JSTL
<form name="update" method="post" action="...">
<input type="text" value="<%=userBean.getName()%>"/>
</form>
A3 – XSS EXAMPLE 1 - JSTL
<form name="update" method="post" action="...">
<input type="text" value="<%=userBean.getName()%>"/>
</form>
A3 – XSS EXAMPLE 2 - FREEMARKER
<form name="update" method="post" action="...">
<input type="text" value="${userBean.name}"/>
</form>
A3 – XSS EXAMPLE - ESCAPING
JSTL
<form name="update" method="post" action="...">
<input type="text" value="<%=userBean.getName()%>"/>
</form>
Freemarker
<form name="update" method="post" action="...">
<input type="text" value="${userBean.name}"/>
</form>
Browser
<input type="text" value=""/><script>...</script>"/>
A4 – INSECURE DIRECT OBJECT REF.
Reference to internal object like
file,
directory,
database key
without
access control check,
other protection.
A4 –DIRECT OBJECT REF. EXAMPLE
String query = "select * from accounts where account = ?";
PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(query);
stmt.setString(1, request.getParameter("account"));
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
A4 –DIRECT OBJECT REF. EXAMPLE
String query = "select * from accounts where account = ?";
PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(query);
stmt.setString(1, request.getParameter("account"));
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
http://foo.com/app/accountInfo?account=notmyaccount
A5 – SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION
Secure configuration defined and deployed for the:
application,
frameworks,
application server,
web server,
database server,
platform.
A5 – MISCONFIGURATION EXAMPLE
A5 – MISCONFIGURATION EXAMPLE
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<Server port="8005" shutdown="SHUTDOWN">
<GlobalNamingResources>
<Resource name="UserDatabase" auth="Container" … />
</GlobalNamingResources>
<Service name="Catalina »>
<Connector port="80" protocol="HTTP/1.1" … />
<Connector port="443"
protocol="org.apache. … .Http11Protocol" … />
</Service>
</Server>
A5 – MISCONFIGURATION EXAMPLE
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<Server port="8005" shutdown="SHUTDOWN">
<GlobalNamingResources>
<Resource name="UserDatabase" auth="Container" … />
</GlobalNamingResources>
<Service name="Catalina »>
<Connector port="80" protocol="HTTP/1.1" … />
<Connector port="443"
protocol="org.apache. … .Http11Protocol" … />
</Service>
</Server>
A6 – SENSITIVE DATA EXPOSURE
Protect sensitive data such as
credit cards,
authentication credentials
…
Apply extra protection (encryption at rest or in transit) and
precautions when exchanged with browser.
A6 – DATA EXPOSURE EXAMPLE 1
An application encrypts credit card numbers in a database
using automatic database encryption.
However, this means it also decrypts this data
automatically when retrieved, allowing an SQL injection
flaw to retrieve credit card numbers in clear text.
A6 – DATA EXPOSURE EXAMPLE 2
A site simply doesn’t use SSL for all authenticated pages.
Attacker simply monitors network traffic (like an open
wireless network), and steals the user’s session cookie.
A7 – MISSING ACCESS CONTROL
Verify function level acces:
before making functionality visible in GUI ✓
when each function is accessed ✗
A7 – ACCESS CONTROL EXAMPLE
@Stateless
public class OrderBean implements Order {
public String getDetail(String id) {
…
}
public String approve(String id) {
…
}
…
}
A7 – ACCESS CONTROL EXAMPLE
@Stateless
public class OrderBean implements Order {
public String getDetail(String id) {
…
}
public String approve(String id) {
…
}
…
}
A8 – CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY
1. User authenticates to bank.com2. User visits forum.com
3. Page contains tag
<img
src=bank.com/transfer.jsp?account=atta
cker&amount=300000>
4. User’s browser makes GET request
bank.com/transfer.jsp?account=attacker&
amount=300000
without user knowing
A8 – CSRF EXAMPLE
Nearly everything is susceptible to CSRF, so no need to
hunt the bug …
A9 – USING VULNERABLE COMPONENTS
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database (https://cve.mitre.org)
A10 – UNVALIDATED REDIRECT
1. Lure the user into clicking a redirect link
http://www.trusted.com/redirector?to=http://www.evil.com
2. Code does not perform any validation
String location = (String) request.getParameter(« to »);
response.sendRedirect(location);
3. User thinks (s)he’s accessing trusted.com but is in fact
at evil.com
OWASP TOP 10
OWASP Top 10 - 2013
A1 - Injection
A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
A3 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
A5 - Security Misconfiguration
A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control
A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
A9 - Using Known Vulnerable Components
A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
WEBGOAT
is a deliberately insecure web application designed to
teach web application security lessons.
SUMMARY
LAYERS OF DEFENSE IN DEPTH
Policies, Procedures, Awareness
Physical
Perimeter
Internal Network
Host
App
Data
AND NOW … bWAPP
OWASP Top 10
CWE 25
Mitigations (SANS, OWASP Cheat Sheets, …)
Web Services (SOAP & REST)
Mobile
And more …
QUESTIONS ?
FOLLOW US ON …
@Nitroxis_sprl
nitroxis Nitroxis.BE
Training and Certification for
information Security
Professionals
Nitroxis sprl
ADD DEPTH TO YOUR INFORMATION SYSTEM
Olivier Houyoux Technology Security Architect
Version 1.2
Date 25/02/2015
Mail Contact (at) nitroxis.be
Website www.nitroxis.be