Download - First District Court of Appeals Decision in the case relating to the Mayor's Car Allowance
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7/28/2019 First District Court of Appeals Decision in the case relating to the Mayor's Car Allowance
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
CITY OF CINCINNATI EX REL. MARKMILLER,
and
CITY OF CINCINNATI EX REL.THOMAS E. BRINKMAN,
Relators-Appellants,
vs.
CITY OF CINCINNATI,
REGINALD ZENO, FINANCEDIRECTOR OF CITY OF CINCINNATI,
and
JOHN T. WALSH, TREASURER OFCITY OF CINCINNATI,
Respondents-Appellees.
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APPEAL NO. C-120221TRIAL NO. A-1103680
JUDGMENT ENTRY.
We consider this appeal on the accelerated calendar, and this judgment entry
is not an opinion of the court. See S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 3(A); App.R. 11.1(E); Loc.R. 11.1.1.
Relators-appellants Mark Miller and Thomas Brinkman (collectively, the
taxpayers) appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment and the trial
courts grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents-appellees the city of
Cincinnati, Reginald Zeno, Cincinnati Finance Director, and John T. Walsh, Cincinnati
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Treasurer (collectively, the City). For the following reasons, we reverse the trial
courts judgment in part.
In May 2011, the taxpayers sued the City, alleging that the City was paying the
mayor of Cincinnati, Mark Mallory, more compensation than he was entitled to
under the Charter of the City of Cincinnati (Charter). Specifically, they alleged that
the Charter currentlycapped the mayors compensation at $121,291.50, but that the
City had been paying the mayor $6,000 above that cap in the form of a $500
monthly car allowance. In their complaint, they sought a declaratory judgment (1)
relating to the total annual compensation for the mayor of the City or in other
words, that the term compensation as set forth in the Charter included fringe
benefits as well as salary and (2) that the Citys council had not authorized the
expenditure of city funds for a mayoral car allowance. Further, the taxpayers sought
an injunction restraining the City from continuing to pay the car allowance to the
mayor.
After the City filed its answer, both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court summarily granted summary judgment in favor of the City and denied
the taxpayers motion for summary judgment. The taxpayers now appeal.
In their single assignment of error, the taxpayers assert that the trial court
erred by denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the Citys motion
for summary judgment in the taxpayers declaratory judgment action. We agree in
part.
We review the trial courts decision on the summary judgment motion de
novo. Koos v. Central Ohio Cellular, Inc, 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588, 641 N.E.2d 265
(8th Dist.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56(C) when (1) no
genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most
strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State ex rel. Parsons v.
Fleming, 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 599, 628 N.E.2d 1377 (1994).
In the Citys motion for summary judgment, it argued that the issues
presented by the taxpayers had already been litigated in Mallory v. Cincinnati,
Hamilton C.P. No. A-1103447 (Aug. 10, 2011), and thus, the taxpayers action was
barred under the doctrine of res judicata. In Mallory, the mayor of Cincinnati sued
the City in a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination as to whether his
compensation, as that term is used in the Charter, included only his salary or his
salary and fringe benefits, such as an automobile allowance. The trial court in
Mallory decided that compensation, as that term was used in the city charter, only
encompassed the mayors annual salary and did not include fringe benefits. The City
appealed the trial courts decision.
WhileMallorywas pending on appeal, the trial court in this case ruled on the
parties motions for summary judgment. While the trial court did not issue a
detailed opinion as to why it had entered summary judgment in the Citys favor, it
can be presumed that the trial court considered and adopted the Citys reasoning that
the taxpayers lawsuit was barred by res judicata.
Subsequent to the trial courts decision here, this court decided the appeal in
Mallory, issuing an opinion that reversed the trial courts decision in that case. See
Mallory v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist. No. C-110563, 2012-Ohio-2861 (the Mallory
Appeal). We held in the Mallory Appealthat the trial court did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction to determine the issues presented because there was no
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justiciable controversy between the parties. On remand, we instructed the trial court
to dismiss the case.
When a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a case, any
proclamation by that court is void. SeePratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-
Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, 11. Thus, because the trial court in Mallory lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction, its decision determining the issues in that case was void.
Because its decision was void, the issues in Mallory had not been litigated.
Therefore, the Citys argument that the doctrine of res judicata barred the taxpayers
lawsuit here is untenable. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the City. The assignment of error is sustained in part.
With respect to the trial courts denial of the taxpayers motion for summary
judgment under Civ.R. 56(A), we cannot say that the trial court erred. Because the
trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to the City on the basis of res
judicata, the factual record and arguments pertaining to what the term
compensation meant as set forth in the Charter was not fully developed below.
Thus, given the record that was certified for our review under App.R. 9(A), we are
unable to make any determination as to whether the mayors compensation, as set
forth in the Charter, includes salary and fringe benefits or just salary. Because the
taxpayers did not affirmatively demonstrate that there were no genuine issues of
material fact with respect to their claim, we overrule the portion of the assignment of
error that alleges the trial court erred in overruling their motion for summary
judgment. See Capital Fin. Credit, LLC v. Mays, 191 Ohio App.3d 56, 2010-Ohio-
4423, 944 N.E.2d 1184, 5 (1st Dist.).
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Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts judgment in part, and affirm it in
part, and we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this
judgment entry and the law.
Further, a certified copy of this judgment entry shall be sent to the trial court
under App.R. 27. Costs shall be taxed under App.R. 24.
HILDEBRANDT,P.J.,DINKELACKERand FISCHER,JJ.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on April 19, 2013
per order of the court ____________________________.Presiding Judge