Download - Dr John Rynne PHD, Griffith University - Management impacts on Australian prison reform

1 Prison Construction Conference, 2013

Prisons & Public Private Partnerships: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going.

John Rynne, B.App.Sc., BSc(Hon), MPhil, PhD, MAPS

Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice, and Governance

2 Prison Construction Conference, 2013 Photographs courtesy Brisbane City Council, 2013

3 Delivering Front Line Criminal Justice


• Inappropriate infrastructure

•Closed to external scrutiny and often

brutal, punitive regimes

•Highly unionised inflexible workforces

•Retribution focus limited rehabilitation

• Inefficient and ineffective

(AIC, 1989; Kennedy, 1988)

Prison systems in Australia pre 1990


Post 1990 Prison Construction Drivers • 1984+: Government reengineering

» NPM » Smaller Government » Outsourcing & Competition

• 1990–1995: Prison Reform Agenda

» Innovation » Human Rights agenda » Organisational development » Service Delivery innovation

• 1998–Ongoing: Penal Populism & Reform

(Harding, 1997,2001; Rynne,2004; Wanna, 2013).

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(ABS, 2013) Prison Construction Conference, 2013

Prisoners In Australia 1990-2012

14,305

29,106

12,000

16,000

20,000

24,000

28,000

32,000

Prisoner population 104% Australian population 33%


0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

1824-1

826

1828-1

830

1832-1

834

1836-1

838

1840-1

842

1844-1

846

1848-1

850

1852-1

854

1856-1

858

1860-1

862

1864-1

866

1868-1

870

1872-1

874

1876-1

878

1880-1

882

1884-1

886

1888-1

890

1892-1

894

1896-1

898

1900-1

902

1904-1

906

1908-1

910

1912-1

914

1916-1

918

1920-1

922

1924-1

926

1928-1

930

1932-1

934

1936-1

938

1940-1

942

1944-1

946

1948-1

950

1952-1

954

1956-1

958

1960-1

962

1964-1

966

1968-1

970

1972-1

974

1976-1

978

1980-1

982

1984-1

986

1988-1

990

1992-1

994

1996-1

998

2000-2

002

2004-2

006

2008-2

010

2012-2

014

Prisons opened

20 year moving average

Prison Construction Australia 1820-2014


Prison Reform Drivers – International Differences • Depends on where you are in the world

– Australia/New Zealand/United Kingdom • Service delivery reform

• Value for money

• Innovation

–USA

• Exploding incarceration rates

• Court orders

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Change Agent

• Innovation to destabilize and challenge an entrenched dysfunctional system

–Public Private Partnership (PPP)/Private Finance Initiatives (PFI)

• Innovation

• Competition

• Performance standard development (Feeley, forthcoming;

Harding, 1997)

Prison Construction Conference, 2013


• PPP

– Two primary forms

• Concession

• PFI: Private Finance Initiative

– PFI Styles

• Finance/Construct/Ownership

– Variance: (DCFM/DBFO), DBM, DB,OM, BO1OT, BO1O

– Francophile Model

PPP/PFI Models

D-Design; C-Construct; F-Finance; M-Manage; B-Build; O-Operate; O1-Own; T-Transfer

(Hall, de la Motte, Davies, 2003)


Consequences of PPP/PFI – What have they Delivered:

• Construction (UK, National Audit Office, 1997)

– Construction costs fell 45% under PFI

– On-time completion (overrun savings of 13% compared with traditional construction)

– On-budget completion (overrun saving of 18% compared with public sector comparator)

– Note: No Australian data available.


Consequences of PPP/PFI – What have they Delivered:

• Operating costs – DCFM contracts (UK)

• Private bids 17% lower than public sector

• Operational costs reduced by 38% in three years due to competition.

• 2005, Home Office estimated PFI process savings 8.5% in public sector bidders and 6% in private contractors (Sturgess, 2007).

– Australia: Estimates of up to 30% on individual prisons – estimated average 10% • However – savings are accepted but the extent and

actual amount unclear.

• Remains highly contentious (Archambeault & Geis, 1996; General Accounting Office, 1996 Ringrose, 2002; Pratt & Maahs, 1999; Segal & Moore, 2002; Thomas, 1997; Woodbridge, 1999)


• UK House of Commons, 2011 PFI report* – Capital costs typical PFI currently over 8%; double the

long term government gilt rate of approximately 4%. – The majority of PFI debt is not detailed in government

debt or deficit figures; – Government departments use PFI to leverage up

budgets without using allocated capital budget • The investment is additional and not budgeted for.

– Conclusion: Why continue with PPP/PFI

• USA – Some states - prisons are closing: DCFM/’SPEC’/Out of

State.

New Areas of Contention

*http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1146/114603.htm


• PPP/PFI Contracting involves – Production Costs – Transaction Costs

• Corrections purchasers’ in Australia – Emphasis on production costs

• Bring the build (time to construct) and maintenance costs down. • Defer/extend debt

– Acknowledgement of transaction costs but minimal costing.

• The distraction Transaction Costs can have on Outcomes – United Kingdom Electronic Bracelets fiasco. – G4S recently apologized and issued credit notes to £23.3m for

incorrect invoices between 2005 and May 2013 plus £800,000 for June 2013 to date and £2m of professional fees.

– SERCO ‘lost’ three prison contracts. – Why did the Monitors not pick this up?

New Areas of Contention - Australia


• Increased need to understand and cost transactions in service/prison delivery. – That is, “the external production option that

minimizes production costs also maximizes transaction costs” (Ferris & Graddy, 1991, pp.545).

• For example, costs associated with – Monitoring,

– Audit and Inspection,

– Prisoner Services and Programme,

– Usefulness of ‘innovation bonuses’ and penalties in service delivery improvement.

PPP/PFI Implications


Consequences of PPP/PFI – Did It Deliver: Australia

• Despite limited external independent evaluation on efficiency and effectiveness gains

• From its very low base pre 1990 - significant prison reform has been achieved(Feeley, forthcoming; Harding, 2000; WA Inspector of

Custodial Corrections various). – PPP have been central in driving that innovation. – Hindrances

• Despite contract sophistication in performance measures public and private sectors performance evaluated against different criteria,

• Performance measures continue to be input/output. • Difficulties in implementing Prison Rating Score (UK) or Prison

Performance Table (NZ).


The ‘big’ question for any prison system is: Is the model effective and efficient in keeping the community safe and reducing crime?


• Recidivism – The Ultimate Outcome measure

– Australia:

• 40% of prisoners released 2008-09 returned by 30 June 2011;

• 46% returned to corrective services. Likely underestimate as performance indicators change to reflect decrease.

– Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander recidivism rates are as high as 92% in some jurisdictions.

– Prison is not a good specific or general crime deterrent

• It is not currently possible to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of prison on recidivism.

What’s Changed in Outcomes since 1990?


What Next • Real OUTCOME measures to determine what the

implications of PPP/PFI and Pubic Sector prison services are in recidivism.

• Use the PFI development of Inputs and Output measures of structure/service delivery to assess recidivism. – That is, what impact does ‘this’ prison have on

recidivism?

• Contract maturation – Sophistication without suffocation.


How • System Wide Contestability

– Genuine contestability across the whole system: • Custodial • Community • PbR/Social Impact Bonds/Public Sector Mutuals

• Through-the-gate innovation – Innovation in combining service delivery between

custodial and community/NGO re-entry.

• Open and Independent Inspection. • Cultural resilience in Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander prisoners: • Justice reinvestment tied to Elders and Respected delivering

specific programmes and non-custodial/deterrence approaches on a commercial/payment by results approach.


• Mandated cross sector pathways for transfer of ‘what works’.

• Unified data on actual system performance: • Privatisation indicates performance measures can be

designed for more than ‘input/output’ effectiveness and efficiency measures: – Measures of behavioral and qualitative change

– Knowledge shared across all relevant agencies

» Police

» Juveniles

» Mental Health

How


Thank You

John Rynne, B.App.Sc., BSc(Hon), MPhil, PhD, MAPS

Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice, and Governance [email protected]

Download - Dr John Rynne PHD, Griffith University - Management impacts on Australian prison reform

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