This article was downloaded by: [UQ Library]On: 24 November 2014, At: 11:01Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
The Round Table: The CommonwealthJournal of International AffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctrt20
Distributional conflict, the state andpeace building in BurundiLéonce Ndikumana aa Department of Economics , University of Massachusetts ,Amherst, USAPublished online: 24 Jan 2007.
To cite this article: Léonce Ndikumana (2005) Distributional conflict, the state and peace buildingin Burundi, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 94:381, 413-427,DOI: 10.1080/00358530500243526
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358530500243526
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Distributional Conflict, the State andPeace Building in Burundi
LEONCE NDIKUMANADepartment of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA
ABSTRACT Burundi’s successive conflicts are rooted in an unequal distribution of wealth andpower which has strong ethnic and regional dimensions. It is therefore clear that, if the newBurundian leadership is serious about building peace, it must engineer institutions that uproot thelegacy of discrimination and promote equal opportunities for social mobility for all ethnic groupsand regions. Education is an especially important sector in this regard, and actions to decentralizesecondary education, thereby improving access, and to subsidize loans for students attendingpublic universities, could do much to reduce an important source of social exclusion andmarginalization. The international community can assist demobilization and use debt relief andaid to support the reduction of inequality and the containment of sectarian tendencies on all sides.
KEY WORDS: Burundi, conflict, inequality, education
Introduction
Over the past decade, sub-Saharan Africa has suffered a disproportionate share ofcivil wars, and peace in conflict-affected countries has been fragile and short lived(Bigombe et al., 2000). Countries fall back into civil war when the end of conflict isnot accompanied by strategies explicitly aimed at addressing conflict’s root causes.In Burundi’s case, we argue that civil war arises from distributional conflict. Thuscreating institutional mechanisms to correct the legacy of inequality in access toeconomic and political power across ethnic groups and regions is essential toachieving political stability.
The distribution of economic resources and political power across social groups(defined by ethnicity and/or region) may be equal or unequal. An equal distributionof resources promotes cohesiveness across groups, while an unequal distributioncreates antagonism between privileged groups and marginalized ones. These groupdynamics in turn determine each group’s attitudes, which may be altruistic orexclusionist, and these preferences in turn determine the type of allocativeinstitutions and policies that prevail in the political and economic system. Altruisticpreferences promote egalitarian and nation-building policies, while exclusionistpreferences induce sectarian and inegalitarian allocative policies. Hence the
Correspondence Address: Leonce Ndikumana, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts,
200 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA 01003, USA. Email: [email protected]
The Round TableVol. 94, No. 381, 413 – 427, September 2005
ISSN 0035-8533 Print/1474-029X Online/05/040413-15 � 2005 United Nations University
DOI: 10.1080/00358530500243526
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
distribution of national resources (economic resources and political power) isendogenous in the sense that equality or inequality arise from the type of allocativepolicies that prevail in the system.
It also follows from the foregoing analysis that, while an unequal distribution ofresources may be socially inefficient—reducing national output and income—itnonetheless can be ‘rational’ from the perspective of the ruling elite, in particularbecause inequality perpetuates dominance. For example, the concentration ofeducation infrastructure in the Southern province of Bururi in Burundi and therelative neglect of education elsewhere lowered the country’s overall level of humancapital development (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; Jackson, 2000). Yet thispolicy was a vital mechanism for consolidating the power of the Southern Tutsioligarchy. Obviously, because of the conflict that unequal distribution generates,systems based on inequality are difficult to sustain in the long run as they requireever increasing investments in repression.
This analysis has important implications for our understanding of the causes ofcivil wars in Burundi and the strategies for achieving peace. First, the analysis helpsto clear a major confusion that has always plagued the analysis of civil wars inBurundi (and Rwanda for that matter); that is, the conflation of two distinctphenomena, namely the existence of ethnic groups and antagonism between ethnicgroups. Our argument is that the existence of distinct ethnic groups in Burundi is amatter of historical fact, whereas ethnic antagonism is an acquired phenomenon,arising from a biased distribution of economic resources and political power(Ndikumana, 2000). Distribution rather than ethnicity is therefore the primary causeof civil wars.
Second, and most importantly, by shifting the attention to distribution, theanalysis generates useful insights into strategies for building lasting peace in the post-conflict era. The analysis suggests that emphasis should be placed on policies thatalleviate inequality across ethnic groups and regions while promoting institutionalaccountability. It becomes clear then that, while democracy is the necessary route tostability, simply replacing one ethnic group by another in the political hierarchythrough blind democratic calculus is not a viable long-term solution to civil wars. Inother words, institutional reform will not end with the simple establishment of aWestern-style democratic system. Such a system can in fact be counterproductive if itresults in the institutionalization of ethnic dominance, regional inequality, or anyother form of bias in the economic and political arenas.
This paper reviews the evidence on the causes of conflict in Burundi. We illustratethe distributional nature of conflict by examining the role of two key institutions thatcemented inequality and exclusion in colonial and postcolonial regimes, namely theeducation system and the military. We examine the conflicts that plagued the post-independence era, namely the 1965 killings, 1972 massacres, the 1988 uprising andkillings, the rebel invasion of 1991, and the conflict that erupted at the assassinationof the newly democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, in October 1993.The analysis refers to four main historical eras, the pre-colonial and colonial eras,the reign of the monolithic military republics (1966 – 93), and the post-1993 period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the following section reviews thelessons from the literature on conflicts in Burundi and in Africa in general, with anemphasis on the role of ethnicity, patrimonialism, predation and institutional failure.
414 L. Ndikumana
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
Section three discusses how civil wars in Burundi arise from distributional conflict.Section four uses the lens of distributional conflict to highlight the main economicand political problems that must be addressed in building lasting peace. The finalsection concludes with policy recommendations.
Explaining Conflicts in Burundi: What Have We Learned?
The Role of Ethnicity
The question of the role of ethnicity in explaining conflict in Burundi has occupied acentral place in the literature. Conflicts in Burundi have often been characterized asclashes between two inherently antagonistic ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi. Weargue that this characterization is fundamentally flawed and inconsistent withhistorical evidence.
In his influential book on conflict in Burundi, Lemarchand (1995) pointed out animportant ‘paradox’ in the history of the country. He noted that uncharacteristicallyfor a sub-Saharan African country, Burundi’s ethnic groups have a long history ofpeaceful cohabitation, speaking the same language, sharing the same culture andhaving submitted to the same traditional monarchy. However, towards the end ofthe colonial era and throughout the independence era, the country experiencedconflicts that, on the surface, opposed the Hutu to the Tutsi. Given that the Hutuand the Tutsi have not always been antagonistic, it must therefore be asked whathappened during the colonial and postcolonial periods to generate violent conflictalong ethnic lines.
One explanation for why conflict happened is the introduction of ethnicity as aprimary determinant of access to power, starting from the colonial era. The 1929reorganization of the territorial administration by the Belgian colonizers marked aturning point in the country’s history with regard to the political role of ethnicity andresulted in the increasing marginalization of the Hutu in politics. Chiefs from theTutsi ethnic group became increasingly dominant; in 1929, 20% of the chiefs wereHutu but by 1945 the administration contained none. Tutsi domination ofthe political system continued after independence and consolidated especially afterthe 1972 massacres. Table 1 illustrates this increasing Tutsi dominance, as well as thevolatility, of the political system in the periods leading to and followingindependence, which resulted from both antagonism between the Hutu and Tutsielites and from fractionalization within the Tutsi elite, especially between Bururi andMuramvya.1
Ethnic diversity is not a direct cause of conflict in Burundi but ethnicity isintertwined with other political and regional factors that contribute to conflict.2 Onthe one hand, the Tutsi-Hima from the Southern province of Bururi exploited ethnicidentity to obtain power. In turn, political entrepreneurs excluded from state spoilsactivated ethnic solidarities to challenge the regime in place. Thus, ethnic diversitybecame an instrument of political competition in the pursuit of economic andpolitical advantages. It follows that conflicts are caused not by ethnic diversity per sebut by inequality in the distribution of access to national resources and politicalpower across ethnic groups. When the political system discriminates along ethniclines, then ethnicity becomes a vehicle of conflict.
Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi 415
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
Patrimonialism, Predation and Institutional Failure
In the pre-colonial era leadership was associated with the mythical notion of divinepower of the king. The king was above the nation and just under god: Imana,Umwami, Uburundi (God, the king, and the nation) was the traditional order(Ngaruko, 2003). Everything belonged to the king, including material resources aswell as the people. This tradition established the notion that the king not only ruledthe country but also owned the country and its resources. A patrimonial systemgenerates rents that accrue only to those who belong to the ‘clan’ of leaders. Thesmaller the clan the larger the individual share in the rents. Therefore, clan membershave incentives to erect barriers to entry into the club.
During the republican era leaders perpetuated patrimonialism by activelyengineering institutions and mechanisms of exclusion and repression, including theuse of force and intimidation against those who were suspected of not adhering tostate ideology. These regimes also used ideology and propaganda mainly through theUnite pour le Progres National (UPRONA) party, which was instituted into a singleparty during the first military regime (1966 – 76). The single party played the same
Table 1. Ethnic composition of governments in Burundi, 1961 – 93
Government head: titleand ethnic origin
Duration and fateof government head
No. ofHutu
No. ofTutsi Total
Louis Rwagasore,Prime Minister,Ganwa
2 weeks: Sept. –Oct.1961 (assassinated)
n/a n/a n/a
Andre Muhirwa,Prime Minister, Tutsi
18 months: Oct. 1961 –June 1963 (resigned)
4 (37%) 7 (63%) 11
Pierre Ngendandumwe,Prime Minister, Hutu
9 months: June 1963 –March 1964(resigned)
6 (46%) 7 (54%) 13
Albin Nyamoya, PrimeMinister, Tutsi
9 months: March1964 – Jan. 1965(resigned)
5 (38%) 8 (62%) 13
Pierre Ngendandumwe,Prime Minister, Hutu
1 week: 7 – 15 Jan. 1965(assassinated)
6 (40%) 9 (60%) 15
Joseph Bamina, PrimeMinister, Hutu
8 months: Jan. – Sept.1965 (executed)
6 (40%) 9 (60%) 15
Leopold Bihumugani(Biha), PrimeMinister, Tutsi
14 months: Sept. 1965 –Nov. 1966 (arrested)
6 (60%) 4 (40%) 10
Michel Micombero,President, Tutsi
10 years: Dec. 1966 –Nov. 1976(overthrown)
5 (36%) 9 (64%) 14 (Dec.1966)
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza,President, Tutsi
10 years: Nov. 1976 –Sept. 1987(overthrown)
4 (20%) 16 (80%) 20 (Nov.1976)
Pierre Buyoya,President, Tutsi
5 years: Sept.1987 – July 1993 (lostdemocratic elections)
5 (26%) 14 (74%) 19 (1987)
Source: Eggers (1997); Ntibazonkiza (1993).
416 L. Ndikumana
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
role as that of myth under the monarchy in brainwashing the public and promotingthe notion of unchallenged submission to authority.
Two important features characterized the patrimonial state in Burundi:centralization and penetration (see Laely (1997) on the former). Centralizationfacilitated control over the economy and the political system, while penetrationextended control down to the lowest strata of the social structure. Theadministration and party leadership from the lowest level to the top were controlledby ‘agents of the state’ who were accountable to the central authority only. Localofficials were often ‘expatriates’ from other communes and provinces. Officials fromthe South served as administrators of communes in the North, while the reverse wasunthinkable. This institutional engineering allowed the central authority to controlpower at all levels. The system also undermined the public accountability ofgovernment officials and allowed them to behave like the old king in that they wereabove the people and just under their ‘god’, that is, the central authority.
The state also hijacked civil society organizations to consolidate state ideology.Youth and women’s associations and labour unions were branches of the singleparty, and were used as propaganda instruments to brainwash the citizenry andenforce the supremacy of state ideology. State penetration extended even to theclergy. The Catholic Church in particular was viewed as a potential threat, especiallybecause of its involvement in formal and informal education, potential vehicles foralternative ideological beliefs. The church’s independence was neverthelesscompromised by the presence of influential clergymen from the South whofrequently served as arms of the state. The state was often able to take advantageof the trust enjoyed by clergymen vis-a-vis the people to extract valuable informationfrom potential opposition leaders and to induce cooperative behaviour.
While the patrimonial system was effective in repressing potential dissidence, itnevertheless sowed the seeds of conflict by perpetuating alienation among themajority of the population, namely the Hutu and the non-southern Tutsi. Becausediscrimination had operated along ethnic lines, it is not surprising that thesubsequent conflicts had an ethnic dimension.
The regional dimension has generally been overlooked in the analysis of conflictsin Burundi, but it is important to understanding why ethnicity is not a deterministicfactor of conflict (see Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; 2003; Ndikumana, 1998). AsNgaruko and Nkurunziza (2003, p. 384) argue, regionalism is a tool which facilitatesrent-seeking in Burundi and ‘‘ethnic and regional factors complement each other toshape rent collection and sharing, and none of them can explain violence alone’’(emphasis added). Both ethnicity and regionalism are related to conflict only becausethey are dimensions along which power and resources have been concentrated andmonopolized. They are not deterministic factors of conflict in and by themselves.The post-independence regimes established true ‘predatory bureaucracies’ (Ngarukoand Nkurunziza, 2003; Ngaruko, 2003) aimed at channelling wealth to the benefit ofthe Southern Tutsi-Hima elite. The minority Southern elite extracted rents throughbribes and other forms of corruption obtained through excessive regulation of theeconomy, as well as by expanding public procurement. This, coupled withmonopolization of political power by ethno-regional entities, increased thediscretionary power of leaders, creating an ‘economy of solidarity’, and promotedwhat Bayart (1993) calls the ‘politics of the belly’.
Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi 417
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
Lack of accountability is a consequence of heavy centralization and concentrationof political and economic power and it tends to perpetuate itself, as Collier (2000,p. 197) emphasizes. Corruption became the norm in public management, thencorruption became ‘expected’, and in the end corruption became a self-perpetuatingprocess. Corruption is vertically and downwardly contagious, which takes away notonly administrative accountability, but also moral guilt.
Excessive regulation acts as a barrier to entry into the private sector for actors whoare not politically connected. It is not surprising that a substantial proportion ofthose who own large private companies in Burundi are former high-rankinggovernment officials or their relatives (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2003). Theconcentration of economic and political power therefore go together.
Public-sector management is another mechanism of redistributive politics.Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000, p. 386) find that, in 1996, the assets of the 37 fullystate-controlled firms represented 48% of the country’s GDP. For all parastatalscombined the ratio was a staggering 77%. The parastatal sector constituted a channelfor distributing wealth to members of the Southern Tutsi minority. Moreover, public-sector expansion suffocated the private sector while diverting scarce funds away fromsocially productive investments. Inequality along ethnic and regional lines increasedsince only a select few had access to parastatal employment.
We can therefore conclude that institutional failure is an important cause ofBurundi’s conflict (Ndikumana, 1998). The state has failed to enforce the rule of law,to protect individual and property rights, to enforce the rules of fair social exchange,to administer justice for all, and to redistribute national wealth. Institutional failurecreated a divorce between the privatized state and the population, while perpetuatinga culture of impunity as well as incentives to capture the state for personal interests.However, failing institutions have proved resistant to change, thereby predisposingBurundi to recurring conflict (Ndikumana, 1998).
Greed and Grievance
The ‘greed and grievance’ models of civil wars, which emphasize the motives andcosts of organizing and maintaining rebellions, have been influential in explainingconflict in Africa and elsewhere (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; 2002; Fearon, 2004; DeSoysa, 2002). The Collier –Hoeffler model indicates that the average probability of anew war over the 1960 – 95 period was 26% for Burundi, compared with about 7%for the sample (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2003).3
In addition to ethnicity, regionalism has also been an important dimension offractionalization and antagonism in the political system. Burundian politics in the1960s were marked by sharp antagonism between the Tutsi monarchists of Muramvyaand the Tutsi from Bururi. The post-independence military regimes dominated by theSouthern Tutsi systematically sought to limit Muramvya’s political influence. There arealso regionalist tensions within the Hutu ethnic group, as the non-Southern Hutu feelthat the Hutu from the South have benefited from ‘neighbourhood effects’ and havebeen less marginalized than the Hutu in the rest of Burundi.
Given these considerations, it is more appropriate to think of ethno-regionalfractionalization rather than ethnic fractionalization, with the former being adynamic phenomenon rather than a fixed factor, which helps to explain the pattern
418 L. Ndikumana
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
and timing of civil wars over time. Consider the most recent war, which broke out in1993, for example. First, the monolithic army and the Southern Tutsi elite wereunwilling to accept the shift in power away from its concentration in the South;President Ndadaye was the first president to be a Hutu, a non-Southerner, and acivilian. Second, the war has lasted longer than previous conflicts in Burundi becauseit has been fought on several fronts, not just opposing the Hutu against the Tutsi.For example, the non-Southern Tutsi and Hutu have accused the Southern Tutsi andHutu leadership of shielding the South from the killings while allowing destructionof the rest of Burundi. Non-Southern Tutsi have discovered that not all Tutsi arecreated equal, and that a monolithic military certainly does not provide insurance forany ethnic group. As the war progressed, ethnic affinity eroded in both camps. It willbe harder in the future for divisionist leaders simply to ride on the back of ethnicityas a way of mobilizing political support.
Distributional Conflict
This section explains how successive wars in Burundi arise from distributionalconflict, focusing on education and the military—two sets of institutions that formedthe foundation of the politics of exclusion. We then identify key factors of each pastwar that make it a distributional conflict.
Education and Distributional Conflict
The goal of any education system should be to build human capital by achievingthe highest enrolment rates, and highest quality of education, with the resourcesavailable. But since mass literacy increases demands for political participation andeconomic equity, monolithic regimes see it as a threat, and therefore tend tounder-invest in mass education, concentrating instead on providing the besteducation for a privileged few, and marginalizing the majority (and increasingtheir resentment). This largely explains why the Southern Tutsi elite in Burundimaintained a discriminatory education system as a tool of power consolidation.Since the rest of the population has little influence on the allocation of resources,their incentive to rebel against the dominant group rises. Therefore discriminationin education encourages conflict (see Ndikumana (2005) for further developmentof this argument). Finally, society’s output and income as a whole is reducedsince human capital investment is not maximized, thereby perpetuating under-development.
The Military and Distributional Conflict
The military, especially its structure and its links to politics, must be at the centreof any objective analysis of post-independence conflicts in Burundi from adistributional-conflict perspective. The contribution of the military in generatingdistributional conflict arises from its structure, what it provides to those who haveaccess to it, and what it represents for those who are excluded from it. Furthermore,the role of the military is closely connected with state legitimacy, which also hasimportant implications for resource allocation and political instability.
Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi 419
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
The structure of the military in Burundi changed dramatically in 1965. Followingthe aborted coup by members of the Hutu elite, the government orchestratedsystematic cleansing of the Hutu in the military and the civilian elite (Ntibazonkiza,1993). From that point on the military became largely monolithic. The Micomberoregime (1966 – 76) initiated systematic discrimination against non-Southern Tutsiand the military became a monopoly under the control of the Southern Tutsi-Hima elite. For the latter the military provided a source of rent in the form of politicalpower, a source of employment, and an avenue to other material advantages from themilitary coup by Micombero in 1966 until the establishment of the transitionalgovernment in 2001. Because of the monopolization of the military by the SouthernTutsi elite, and its role as a guarantor of political power, public expenditures havesystematically been skewed in favour of security to the disadvantage of sociallyproductive investments such as infrastructure, education and health (Figure 1). Thebiased allocation of public resources to favour security is closely connected to statelegitimacy (Ndikumana, 2004a). A state that lacks legitimacy invests in security inorder to repress demands for political opening. This fiscal policy orientation increasesthe marginalization of the disenfranchised majority while it promotes rent extractionby the elite in power, which increases the risk of conflict.
The Conflicts of 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993 – ongoing as DistributionalConflicts
To summarize our analysis of the causes of conflict in Burundi, we highlight keydirect and underlying causes of the various civil wars with the purpose ofidentifying factors that show that these wars arise from distributional conflict(Table 2).
The 1965 killings. The assassination of theHutu PrimeMinister Pierre Ngendandumwein January 1965, and the refusal by the king to appoint a Hutu as prime ministerdespite the landslide victory by Hutu deputies in the May 1965 legislativeelections, created political upheaval and poisoned the relations between the Hutuand Tutsi political elite, on the one hand, and between the king and the civilian elite,
Figure 1. Expenditures on education and the military in Burundi, 1972 – 2001
420 L. Ndikumana
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
on the other hand. The events demonstrated that the monarch and the eliteTutsi were not ready to share power. Furthermore, the Tutsi elite were afraid of apossible repetition of the bloody overthrow of the king by the Hutu inneighbouring Rwanda in 1959. The events in Rwanda were used to cultivate fearamong the Tutsi of an impending danger of extermination in the event of control ofpower by the Hutu majority. The alleged coup plot by the Hutu against the king inBurundi gave the Tutsi the opportunity to decapitate the Hutu civilian and militaryleadership.
The 1972 massacres. The overthrow of the monarchy by army officer Micombero in1966 intensified the tensions between the Tutsi from Muramvya (the former royal
Table 2. Elements of distributional conflict in Burundi’s civil wars
Civil wars Deaths and refugees Aspects of distributional conflict
Oct. –Nov. 1965 Deaths: 5000 (Hutu)Refugees: negligible
. Prime Minister Ngendadumweassassinated
. The king refuses to appoint a Hutu asprime minister
. Rwanda’s Hutu ‘revolution’ of 1959
April – July 1972 Deaths: 200 000(mostly Hutu)
. Bururi –Muramvya antagonism;suspicions of return of the monarchy
Refugees: 300 000(Hutu)
. Consolidation of Bururi Tutsi-Himadomination (started in 1966)
. Ethnic cleansing of the military (startedin 1965)
August 1988 Deaths: 15 000(Hutu and Tutsi)
. State penetration: ‘expatriate’ localadministrators
Refugees: 50 000(Hutu)
. Vent d’Est (wind of democratic changefrom the former communist bloc)
. 18 years of formation of Hutuintelligentsia at home (thoughconstrained) and abroad: a threat to theregime and an opportunity for change
Nov. 1991 Deaths: 1 – 3000(Hutu)
. Intensification of Hutu opposition(armed and unarmed opposition)
Refugees: 38 000(Hutu)
Oct. 1993 – ongoing Deaths: 4300 000(mostly Hutu)
Refugees: 700 000
. President Ndadaye declares intention toreform the military: threat to thefoundations of power
(Hutu) . Rapid dismissal of former governmentofficials: vanishing rent base
. Return of Hutu refugees: threat to biensmal acquis (looted property).
. Scrutiny of business practices (e.g. thecase of AFRIMET gold miningcompany): threat to rent base
Source: The death toll and number of refugees are from Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003), whocompiled the statistics from UNHCR data.
Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi 421
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
headquarters) and those from Bururi. In 1971 rumours of a possible re-establishmentof the monarchy, the return of Prince Ndizeye, and his assassination by the armydeepened the tensions further. An alleged coup plot by the Hutu accelerated thedescent into chaos. The Southern Tutsi elite took advantage of this chaos tocomplete the ethnic cleansing of the Hutu from the military and the civil service thathad started in 1965. The regime also used the opportunity to sideline the Tutsi fromMuramvya and the rest of the country. The 1972 war was indeed a distributionalconflict in that the Southern Tutsi elite opted for the ‘final solution’ to consolidatetheir hold on power by eliminating the Hutu elite.
The 1988 conflict. In August 1988 the country experienced a civil war in the Northernprovinces of Ngozi and Kirundo following a long truce of 16 years. What makesthe 1988 conflict a distributional conflict is the role played by state penetration andthe resistance to it by the Hutu population. In the periods leading to the outbreakof the conflict, the government had been warned of tensions in the Northernprovinces of Ngozi and Kirundo between local administrators and the population.One major area of contention was that these ‘expatriate’ local administrators fromthe South were arrogant and insensitive to the needs of the local community.Moreover, the ‘wind from the East’, that is, the international drive for democrati-zation energized by the fall of the communist bloc, also contributed to theintensification of mobilization activities by clandestine Hutu opposition movements.
It is important to note that, from 1972 to 1988, the country did not experience anymajor violent conflict. While this allowed the military regimes to consolidate power,it also allowed the rebuilding of a sizeable Hutu intelligentsia abroad and at home.As the Hutu intelligentsia expanded, domestic demand for power sharing increased.This explains the increase in the intensity of the activities of opposition groups butalso the response of the Hutu to repression after the outbreak of the civil war in theNorth. Fearing a repetition of the 1972 massacres, the Hutu intelligentsia decided tochallenge the government openly. In a near-heroic move a group of Hutuintellectuals wrote an open letter to the president to condemn indiscriminate andarbitrary arrests and execution of Hutu intellectuals and to demand a nationaldebate on ethnic discrimination, and reform of the political system to achieveegalitarian representation. The open letter marked a turning point in the history ofconflict in Burundi: the intelligentsia ended its long-standing passivity as governmentsecurity forces slaughtered the people. They decided to confront the government andalso to expose the tragedy to the international community. This largely explains whythe repression was less widespread and shorter than in 1972. These reactions of theHutu intellectuals, along with external pressure on the regime, were instrumental inthe initiation of the process of political opening, starting with the formation of anethnically balanced ‘government of unity’ in 1989, the opening of a national debateon ethnic divisions, and the ensuing opening of the political process that wouldeventually culminate in democratic elections in 1993.
The 1991 rebellion. The invasion by Hutu rebels in November 1991 may be linked tothe general dissatisfaction of Hutu opposition groups with regard to the nature andpace of the political liberalization process initiated in 1989. They accused thegovernment of managing the process to preserve the control of power by the
422 L. Ndikumana
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
Southern Tutsi-Hima. The rebellion demonstrated that cosmetic changes, such ashaving more Hutu in top government positions, were not enough to satisfy theopposition, which demanded more sharing in the instruments of power, especiallythe military. The 1991 events demonstrated also that the Hutu rebellion had changedtactics, opting to confront the military head on.
The 1993 – ongoing war. The ongoing war that started in 1993 following theassassination of President Ndadaye is by far the most vivid illustration ofdistributional conflict. Four key factors illustrate how this war is a distributionalconflict. First, President Ndadaye announced his intention to reform the military tomake it more representative of the ethnic and regional make-up of the society, aspart of his plan to build what he called a Burundi Nouveau (New Burundi).Throughout the period of transition towards democracy which started in 1989 themilitary had systematically exhibited strong opposition to relinquishing power.Second, the Ndadaye regime quickly proceeded to replace former governmentofficials in a drive to establish control of power but also to fulfil campaign promises.For outgoing government officials and their allies in the private sector, these reformsmeant the loss of the means of extracting rents, which explains the wide support thatthe military coup received among the Tutsi civilian elite.
Third, the massive return of Hutu refugees and their demand for jobs andrestitution of their land and other property constituted a major threat to members ofthe Tutsi ethnic group who had appropriated the property of those Hutu who hadfled the country. Reparation and restitution had never crossed the minds of the manyTutsi who had enriched themselves from looting the property of orphans and widowsof their Hutu neighbours.
Fourth, the Ndadaye government was also a threat to the Tutsi business sector. Asdiscussed throughout this paper, under the patrimonial regimes connections with thegovernment were essential for success in the business sector. These advantages wereto evaporate with the institution of a broad-based government.
The nature of the war on the ground and its duration also demonstrate itscharacter as a distributional conflict rather than just a Hutu –Tutsi conflict. Themultiplicity of belligerents demonstrates that political rivalry matters probably asmuch as—if not more than—ethnic rivalry. Political parties and rebel groups havesplit as leaders failed to agree on mechanisms for rent sharing.
Making Peace Work: Strategies for Post-conflict Reconstruction
The Political Problem
To achieve lasting peace, Burundi’s leaders must overcome the legacy of politicalimbalance between the country’s ethnic groups and regions. We emphasize threedimensions of the political problem: the military, the ethno-regional balance, and theconstitutional process and independence of the judiciary.
Getting the military out of politics is critical to building a lasting peace. Historywas made with the accord signed in November 2003 between the transitionalgovernment of Burundi (TGB) and the Conseil national pour la defense de lademocratie – forces pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD–FDD) on a ceasefire
Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi 423
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
and mechanisms for organizing a new national defence force that is balanced at alllevels. The restructuring process has already commenced but the accord does notinclude the Front National de Liberation (FNL) which refuses to negotiate. Anyprogress in the peace process means further marginalization of the FNL, but thisgroup can disrupt the peace even though it has no chance of withstanding an openconfrontation with the restructured national defence force. For the sake of peace it isvital to find ways of convincing, if not forcing, the FNL to put down its arms and totake part in the new democratic process.
However, accommodating all the political tendencies will result in an unsustain-ably large military and therefore a large proportion of the regular army and rebelforces must be demobilized and integrated back into civilian life (especially the14 000 child soldiers in the rebel forces (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2003)). This isvery politically sensitive and will pose a security threat if it is not well executed andwell funded by the international community.
Although the process of peace building needs to take into account both ethnicity andregional balance in designing new institutions, representation should not be reducedto mechanical quotas based on the numerical size of ethnic groups. The objectiveshould be to protect the interests of minority groups in addition to the majority.
The legal system has always been partisan and is an integral part of the militaryregime’s repressive apparatus. The constitution has had little meaning thanks tothe universal veto power of the president. If reformed, these institutions couldbe valuable agencies of restraint that transcend political cycles. In particular, theleadership of these institutions should be either elected directly or confirmed byrepresentative bodies.
The Economic Problem
Some of Burundi’s economic problems contribute to conflict, while others are aresult of the conflict. And still other economic problems that may seem unrelated toconflict need to be addressed to improve living standards and to reduce poverty.Poverty may not cause conflict, but a solid economy is essential for political stabilityand consolidating peace. Poverty erodes the relationship between the people and thestate and is therefore detrimental to peace building. A weak economy also increasesthe temptation to use the state as a source of wealth accumulation when the returnsto investing in politics exceed the returns in the private sector. Consequently, a goodeconomic performance is vital for building lasting peace.
However, even as the country struggles to finance its immense reconstructionneeds, its limited resources are drained by debt service. In 2003 Burundi spent65.8% of its exports revenues on debt service, up from 39.3% in 2000. Bycomparison the government spent US$3 per capita on health care in 2001, but paid$5 per capita on servicing debt owed to official creditors alone. Even as debtaccumulated, fewer funds stayed in the country as a large proportion of the resourceswere transferred abroad. Official development aid (ODA) has dried up since the startof the 1993 conflict. The international community can help Burundi achieve lastingpeace by writing off its debts and increasing ODA to finance economic recovery,conditional on commitment to democratic governance—such as implementingthe Arusha and Pretoria accords—by the new leadership (Ndikumana, 2004b).
424 L. Ndikumana
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
The population of countries such as Burundi are burdened by ‘odious debt’and the call to cancel their debt has been given added momentum by the USA’spressure to cancel Iraq’s debt (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2003a; 2003b). The recentdecision by the G8 government to write off more debt for Heavily Indebted PoorCountries (HIPCs) is a promising sign, but more needs to be done to prevent therecurrence of debt crises.
Education
Education policy must increase efficiency in resource allocation and reversediscrimination in provision. There are at least two important steps to take, bothof which should be central in donor assistance to education. First, it is necessary toaccelerate the decentralization of secondary education by increasing subsidies todistrict high schools (colleges communaux). Second, a subsidized loan programmewould help all academically qualifying students to afford university education.Private higher education has recently expanded, alleviating pressure on the publicuniversity, but private universities are expensive and no country has been able toestablish a solid higher education system without a network of first-class publicuniversities.
Conclusion
Civil wars are fundamentally the result of discrimination and exclusion from thedistribution of national wealth, as well as of the monopolization of power, and inBurundi’s case these had both ethnic and regional dimensions. Moreover, just asconflicts do not arise spontaneously, they need not reoccur if their root causes areaddressed by implementing economic policies and institutional reforms that achieveequity in access to power and national resources. The overriding goal of thesereforms should be the protection of the rights of all groups, minorities as well asmajorities. While the new Burundian leadership bears the burden of crafting andimplementing political and economic reforms, the international community is alsocritical to success. Given Burundi’s long history of patrimonialism, some interestgroups may try to protect their old privileges and sabotage the reforms. Theassassination in 1993 of the democratically elected president demonstrated that thislegacy of patrimonialism is a serious constraint on reform. The internationalcommunity can use its leverage through financial aid as well as military interventionto contain such sectarian tendencies on all sides.
The international community should also assist in financing peace building andeconomic recovery. However, politically blind interventions are detrimental to peacebuilding, and donors should scrutinize carefully the distributional impact of aid. Forexample, aid to education can help the country correct the legacy of exclusion and itseffects, and we have argued that aid channelled to funding a complete decentraliza-tion of high school education and a student loan programme for tertiary educationwould be invaluable. This would alleviate pressure on the government budget andcontribute to the equalization of educational opportunities across ethnic groupsand regions. This is just one action, albeit a crucial one, to reverse inequality andantagonism across ethnic and regional lines.
Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi 425
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
Acknowledgements
Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the UNU-WIDER conference on‘Making Peace Work’, Helsinki, Finland, 4 – 5 June 2004, and at the Five-CollegeAfrican Studies Council on 9 December 2004. The author is grateful for constructivecomments from participants in seminars where this paper was presented. Specialthanks go to Tony Addison at UNU-WIDER and to Ralph Faulkingham, FrankHolmquist and David Newburry in the Five-College African Studies Council.
Notes
1. The Muramvya province was the historical headquarters of the kingdom. Under the monarchy, the
Tutsi from the Hima clan were considered an underclass within the Tutsi ethnic group. Bururi contains
a large proportion of Tutsi-Hima, the clan of all the former military presidents (Micombero, Bagaza
and Buyoya).
2. A similar conclusion has been reached in careful analyses of conflicts in neighbouring Rwanda,
including studies of the genocide. See, for example, Hintjens (1999, p. 248).
3. See Ndikumana (2005) and Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2003) for further discussion of issues in applying
the Collier –Hoeffler model to Burundi, in particular quantitative measures of ethnic fractionalization.
References
Bayart, J. F. (1993) The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman).
Bigombe, B., Collier, P. and Sambanis, N. (2000) Policies for building post-conflict peace, Journal of
African Economies, 9(3), pp. 323 – 348.
Boyce, J. K. and Ndikumana, L. (2003a) Africa may have a case on basis of odious debt, Bangkok Post,
2 July.
Boyce, J. K. and Ndikumana, L. (2003b) Africa’s odious debts: the war in Iraq might have succeeded in
dismantling at least one weapon of mass destruction, the debt bomb, Taipei Times, 6 July.
Collier, P. (2000) How to reduce corruption, African Development Review, 12(2), pp. 191 – 205.
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (1998) On the economic incidence of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers, 50,
pp. 563 – 573.
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002) On the incidence of civil war in Africa, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
46(1), pp. 13 – 28.
De Soysa, I. (2002) Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, creed, and governance in civil war, 1989 – 99, Journal of
Peace Research, 39(4), pp. 395 – 416.
Eggers, E. (1997) Historical Dictionary of Burundi (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press).
Fearon, J. D. (2004) Primary commodities exports and civil war, mimeo, Department of Economics,
Stanford University.
Hintjens, H. M. (1999) Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(2),
pp. 241 – 286.
Jackson, T. (2000) Equal Access to Education: A Peace Imperative for Burundi (London: International
Alert).
Laely, T. (1997) Peasants, local communities, and central power in Burundi, Journal of Modern African
Studies, 35(4), pp. 695 – 716.
Lemarchand, R. (1995) Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Ndikumana, L. (1998) Institutional failure and ethnic conflicts in Burundi, African Studies Review, 41(1),
pp. 29 – 47.
Ndikumana, L. (2000) Towards a solution to violence in Burundi: a case for political and economic
liberalization, Journal of Modern African Studies, 38(3), pp. 431 – 459.
Ndikumana, L. (2004a) Fiscal policy, conflict, and reconstruction in Burundi and Rwanda, in: T. Addison
and A. Roe (Eds), Fiscal Policy for Development. Poverty, Reconstruction, and Growth, pp. 274 – 302
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
426 L. Ndikumana
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
Ndikumana, L. (2004b) Additionality of debt relief and debt forgiveness, and implications for future
development financing, International Review of Economics and Finance, 13, pp. 325 – 340.
Ndikumana, L. (2005) Distributional conflict, the state, and peacebuilding in Burundi, WIDER Research
Paper 2005/45 (Helsinki: UNU-WIDER).
Ngaruko, F. (2003) Political economy of reform in polarized and war-prone societies: the case study of
Burundi, mimeo, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Ngaruko, F. and Nkurunziza, J. D. (2000) An economic interpretation of conflict in Burundi, Journal of
African Economies, 9(3), pp. 370 – 409.
Ngaruko, F. and Nkurunziza, J. D. (2003) Civil war and its duration in Burundi, mimeo, Center for the
Study of African Economies, Oxford University.
Ntibazonkiza, R. (1993) Au Royaume des Seigneurs de la Lance: Une Approche Historique de la Question
Ethnique au Burundi, Vol. 2 (Brussels: Bruxelles-Droits de L’Homme).
Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi 427
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
11:
01 2
4 N
ovem
ber
2014
