DISCUSSING BRAZIL’S NUCLEAR FUTURE
Overview
Since the 2001’s electricity shortage, Brazil has been searching alternatives for expanding its power generation. Increasing thermal
power generation has been proposed as a strategy for the country to reduce its dependence upon hydropower. Among the foreseen
thermal power technologies, nuclear energy has been receiving special attention. The impetus with which the revival of nuclear
energy is coming back to the international energy debate also helps to revitalize the nuclear discussion in Brazil. Initially, the
domestic contest focused on whether Brazil should resume the construction of its third nuclear power reactor, Angra III. The paper
describes how the Brazilian nuclear community has been arguing in favor of and mounting the political pressures to influence the
federal government to retake Angra III’s construction. Subsequently, the government issued proposals for a much larger nuclear
power program trying to establish a more aggressive and nationalistic nuclear-based energy strategy. The paper describes the main
aspects of such policy, which must be considered in a historic perspective. Indeed, nuclear power is a historic project for Brazil.
Such history is briefly described from the launching of Brazil’s first reactor, Angra I, in the mid-1960s, to the disappointing
partnership with Germany during the 1970s, which led to the construction of Angra II. The Brazilian flaw experiences with nuclear
energy must be revisited to avoid major failures in the country’s future energy policy. The paper advocates against the immediate
construction of Angra III. Yet, given the current uncertainties regarding the expected role that nuclear energy may play in the future
as well as the interesting opportunities Brazil can take advantage of at the present, the authors suggest a different approach for a
Brazilian nuclear policy, focusing rather on technological development and naval applications, and also including partnerships with
Brazil’s neighboring countries.
The brief panorama of nuclear power in the global energy debate
Due to safety concerns and financial troubles, things have not gone well for the nuclear energy since the Three Mile Island accident
in 1979. However the picture seems to have been changing more favorably to nuclear lately. There are broad discussions regarding
the revival of the nuclear industry in the major western countries. Nuclear energy’s political and economic situation seems to have
been improving lately and increasing therefore its social acceptance.
In many parts of the world and particularly in Asia, nuclear energy was never ruled out. As shown by the IEA (2006a), nuclear
power kept its 15% share in the total world power production from the mid-1980s to 2005. By promoting energy security, countries
such as China, Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Russia continued to move towards energy diversification including some nuclear capacity.
China expects to boost significantly its nuclear power program. In 2007, only 2% of China`s total installed power capacity (i.e.,
about 8 GW) was based on nuclear. The country aims to increase its nuclear power capacity to 150 GW up to the year 2050.
Since the year 2001 and primarily due to climate change and energy security concerns, most western countries have increasingly
restarted to look at building new nuclear facilities as well. Sweden and Germany had formerly and officially banned the nuclear
option setting up policies to phase out all their nuclear capacity over determined period of time. Both countries started to realize the
costs that such policies may impose them. The replacement of all nuclear facilities as well as the need to drastically reduce
greenhouse gas emissions make difficult to find a balanced energy policy for the future. Embracing a nuclear-free energy policy left
the two countries with little room to maneuver among the remaining energy alternatives. As a result, the Swedish and German
public opinion is already accepting (although still with some restrictions) that the former nuclear-free energy proposal will likely
terminate in simple rhetoric.
Changes in public opinion regarding the future role of nuclear energy have also been pushed by part of the scientific community in
many countries and particularly in the UK. Since the 1980s, Britain experiences a kind of moratorium on building new nuclear
Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos, IEE - University of Sao Paulo, 55-11-4153-1693, [email protected]
Paul Louis Poulallion, SINDE, 55-21-2240-5140, [email protected]
Murilo Tadeu Werneck Fagá, IEE - University of Sao Paulo, 55-11-3091-2634, [email protected]
reactors and its 16 stations are getting older and requiring replacement or significant revamping. According to scientists assembled
at the Royal Society, the UK should clearly support a diversified energy policy, combining different energy sources and including
nuclear power as an option to be fostered together with more renewables and energy efficiency measures. Such diversified policy
should guarantee the UK’s future electricity supply to match continuous fast growing demand as well as drastically reduce the
country’s carbon dioxide emissions (Royal Society, 2006).
As suggested by Cohen (2006) and Taylor (2006), nowhere the public opinion vis-à-vis the acceptability of nuclear energy seems to
be shifting more strikingly and surprisingly than in the USA. The revival of nuclear power is increasingly considered as an essential
strategy for the USA to keep its leadership in the nuclear world. In 2004, according to the IEA (2006b), the USA were the world
largest electricity producer (4,148 TWh, representing 23% of the total global production). By holding almost 100 nuclear reactors
in operation (with total annual production of 816 TWh), the USA had still the largest nuclear industry, representing approximately
30% of all nuclear-based electricity production in the world. Yet, the share of nuclear power in the total US electricity production
was 20%, while in countries such as France and Sweden nuclear played a leading role (with respective shares approaching 75% and
50% in the total national electricity production). Increasing the share of nuclear would reaffirm the US commitment to keep the
leadership and push forward the development of new nuclear technologies.
Besides, Americans are increasingly accepting the nuclear energy as the easiest strategy for the USA to secure the future supply of
electricity at the same time as plummeting the national dependence on imported fossil fuel and the greenhouse gas emissions
produced by the power sector. One can hardly believe that, almost 30 years after the Three Miles Islands accident, nuclear energy
can stand up again for Americans as a clean and environmentally friend power source. Growing global warming concerns have
favorably changed the environmental game for nuclear, helping to captivate even many long-opposed-to-nuclear environmentalists.
Furthermore, the re-embrace of nuclear power in the USA transcends political party affiliation. In October 2004, the US Congress
issued a Senate Concurrent Resolution highlighting the increasing Bipartisan support to the expansion of nuclear power. The
Resolution recognized the value of nuclear energy in generating safe, consistent affordable and emission-free electricity. The Bush
Administration proposed an expansion in nuclear power in the Energy Policy Act of 2005The need for the USA to support the
expansion of nuclear energy was then officially acknowledged (Holt, 2007).
Such more positive political momentum for nuclear in the USA transcends the country`s borders. In May 2007, mministers and
other senior officials representing energy-related governmental agencies from China, France, Japan, Russia and the USA (having
Britain as observer) issued a joint statement in support of a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP, 2007). The major aim of
such joint effort is to provide increasing access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including power generation, through a
worldwide international cooperation scheme. Such initiative followed an even more striking outcome form the 2006`s G8
Presidency Meeting in Russia. The St. Petersburg Plan of Action on Global Energy Security stated a strong joint support for
nuclear energy to contribute to global energy security and climate change mitigation (G8, 2006). Just by presenting a single view on
how nuclear energy is eventually supposed to play a leading role in the future, the G8 already proved that distrusts against nuclear
power had already substantially diminished, even among those countries that previously did not accept to issue supportive
declaration favoring the nuclear option.
Despite all the clear signals of a more positive outlook for nuclear energy, uncertainties are still present and the international debate
vis-à-vis the future role of nuclear power is still opened. As the climate change issue is increasingly perceived as the largest
environmental worry for the sustainability of the human beings on Earth, the nuclear industry can improve its acceptability in
respect to the producers and final users of fossil fuel. Gradually, the case for supporting the revival of nuclear energy as the leading
and most cost-effective carbon-free electricity production alternative seems to become stronger. Better management is allowing the
nuclear power plants to run more efficiently and to perform much better environmentally. In many countries, nuclear electricity has
turned into the cheapest solution. France became, to some extent, the nuclear icon by proving the feasibility to run a national power
grid based almost on nuclear power. In the long term, France turned into a major electricity exporter within Europe.
The US case must be closely followed. No new nuclear reactor has been built in the USA in the last 20 years. No reactor has been
ordered in the United States since 1978. The last new unit stared the operation in 1996. Since then only uprating or retirement of
existing units were registered. However, after the full amortization of main capital costs, the nuclear facilities still in place rank
among the most competitive generating units, producing inexpensive and high reliable electricity. Such picture is imposing
revisiting the long-term competitiveness of nuclear energy as compared to other options. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 removed
important regulatory barriers that used to scare the electricity utilities to even think about trying to license and build new nuclear
facilities. Moreover, the action of local communities has been positively boosting the national public support vis-à-vis the nuclear
energy. The globalization of the world economy has been treating harshly several small towns in the USA, the economy of which
has been devasted with manufactories shutting down and jobs being lost. Some of those communities are eager to attract the
utilities` billionaire investments to build and operate new large nuclear plants. Their dreams of potential economic revitalization
help to increase the national enthusiasm and the social and political support to nuclear power.
Holt (2007) emphasizes that, together with higher fossil fuel prices and the possibility of greenhouse gas controls; the Federal
government incentives to nuclear power have already helped to spur renewed interest by potential nuclear reactor developers. Plans
for about 30 new reactors have been announced. Yet, no actual commitment has been made to build those plants. The delay to get
the licenses and launching the construction works may weaken the revival of nuclear power in the USA. In fact, according to the
EIA (2007), even with the projected increase in nuclear capacity and generation, the nuclear share in the total electricity generation
is expected to fall from 19% in 2005 to 15% in 2030. In the AEO2007`s reference case, up to 3 GW are projected to be added by
uprates in existing facilities, which shall balance the 2.6 GW of older plant retirements. Only 9 GW of new nuclear capacity is
expected to be built in response to the Energy Policy 2005 Act. Others 3.5 GW might be added in later years in response to higher
fossil fuel prices. Yet, even such less optimistic vision may not materialize. No new nuclear facility was in construction by mid-
2007. Therefore worries of future electricity shortages in the USA are rising and the urgent additional supply can only be match by
other power technologies taking much shorter to be built.
Moreover the USA may be just starting a new phase in its energy history. It is really not sure whether Americans will be able to
keep matching the electricity demand and supply always increasing production and without restructuring their electricity
consumption. Deep restructuring in the electricity demand will eventually allow the USA to avoid the need of an early return to
nuclear energy.
The revival of the nuclear energy debate in Brazil
The impetus with which nuclear energy is debated internationally also helps to revive the nuclear discussion in Brazil. Initially, the
political debate focused on whether the construction of Brazil’s third nuclear reactor, Angra III, should be pursued. Such discussion
has been evolving up and down with different paces for more than ten years. In 2006, the Federal government issued the so-called
National Energy Plan with projections to 2030 (NEP2006). As shown in Table 1, Angra III is still expected to be the only new
nuclear plant to be built in the 2007-15 period. Nevertheless, the NEP2006 sets up a larger national nuclear program for the period
2016-30. The NEP2006 suggests that, by 2030, Brazil may add from 4 to 8 GW of new nuclear capacity. In other words, the
projection for new nuclear energy in Brazil is comparable in scale to what the Energy Information Administration is estimating to
the USA.
TABLE 1: Expected new nuclear power capacity in Brazil – 2007 to 2030 (in MW)
Scenarios: 2007 – 2015 2016 – 2020 2021 – 2025 2026 – 2030 2016 - 2030
LOW 1360 (Angra III) 1000 1000 2000 4000
MEDIUM 1360 (Angra III) 1000 2000 3000 6000
HIGH 1360 (Angra III) 2000 3000 3000 8000
Source: NEP2006 – EPE
Since the 2001’s electricity shortage, Brazil has been searching alternatives for expanding its power generation. Among the
foreseen power technologies, nuclear energy received special attention. In fact, nuclear power is a historic project in Brazil. As
shown in Table 2, the first reactor, the Westinghouse PWR Angra I, the construction of which was launched in the mid-1960s,
begun to operate only in 1985. Then, disappointed with its partnership with the USA, Brazil decided to co-work with the former
West Germany in the 1970s. A broad Nuclear Program previewed the construction of up to 8 major KWU PWR reactors plus the
complete technology transferring, which would supposedly allow Brazil to fully command the uranium cycle from mining,
processing, fuel-manufacturing and enrichment. The Nuclear Program with Germany also failed. Only one power station, Angra II,
was built, coming on service in the year 2000.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, hydropower was the main driver for the expansion of Brazil`s electricity system up to 1995. By the
mid- 1990s, the searching for thermal alternatives to generate power had already risen up the political agenda. Thermal power
generation was seen as essential strategy for Brazil to reduce its dependence on the “humors of water”. From 1995 to 2005, thermal
power generation grew much faster than hydropower generation. Moreover, since the year 2000, thermal installed capacity,
including nuclear capacity, became the main driver for the expansion of the system. Primarily, the Federal government supported
the construction of many oil-and-gas-fired power plants. Then, Angra I and II also played a leading role increasing substantially
their power generation. During the electricity crisis, the nuclear reactors were essential to help the country to alleviate its electricity
shortage. In this context, the discussion about resuming the construction of Agra III heated up and became a major political issue.
TABLE 2: Power Generation Installed Capacity by Fuel - 1985 - 2005 (in MW)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Installed Capacity 44,107 44,953 47,561 49,575 52,125 53,050 54,141 55,049 56,222 57,629 59,120 60,801 62,972 65,209 68,181 73,712 76,255 82,458 86,505 90,733 93,158
UTILITIES 40,818 41,664 44,260 46,265 48,836 49,761 50,852 51,760 52,751 54,105 55,533 57,194 59,150 61,312 63,960 68,669 71,117 76,807 80,287 84,108 86,300
AUTO-PRODUCTION 3,289 3,289 3,301 3,310 3,289 3,289 3,289 3,289 3,471 3,524 3,587 3,607 3,822 3,897 4,221 5,043 5,138 5,651 6,218 6,625 6,858
Total Hydro power 37,077 37,786 40,329 42,228 44,796 45,558 46,616 47,709 48,591 49,921 51,367 53,119 54,889 56,759 58,997 61,063 62,523 65,311 67,793 68,999 70,858
UTILITIES 36,453 37,162 39,693 41,583 44,172 44,934 45,992 47,085 47,967 49,297 50,680 52,432 53,987 55,857 58,085 60,095 61,551 64,146 66,587 67,572 69,274
AUTO-PRODUCTION 624 624 636 645 624 624 624 624 624 624 687 687 902 902 912 968 972 1,165 1,206 1,427 1,583
Total Thermal power (by fuel) 7,030 7,167 7,232 7,347 7,329 7,492 7,525 7,340 7,631 7,708 7,754 7,682 8,083 8,450 9,183 12,649 13,732 17,147 18,712 21,734 22,300
UTILITIES
NON-NUCLEAR 3,708 3,845 3,910 4,025 4,007 4,170 4,203 4,018 4,127 4,151 4,197 4,105 4,506 4,798 5,217 6,567 7,559 10,654 11,693 14,529 15,019
NUCLEAR 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 2,007 2,007 2,007 2,007 2,007 2,007
AUTO-PRODUCTION
NON-NUCLEAR 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,847 2,900 2,900 2,920 2,920 2,995 3,309 4,075 4,166 4,486 5,012 5,198 5,274 Source: BEN2006
Both Angra I and II had never performed well during reasonable period of time. As revealed by Table 3, from 1986 to 1994, the
average utilization factor was lower than 40%. Then, it gradually grew up to 80%. In 2001, the utilization factor of those two
nuclear plants turned very positive. For the first time in history, it was greater than 80%, achieving the international standards.
From its historical “lower than 1.5%”, the market share of nuclear energy in the total power generated in the country increased to
4.0% in 2000 and 4.3% in 2001. Nuclear energy helped to increase the market share of total thermal power from the historical
“lower than 10%” to 12.8% (2000), 18.5% (2001) and 17.2% (2002). The share of nuclear energy in the total thermal power
generation was approximately 23% during those three consecutive years. In 2005, due to technical problems in Angra II, the
average utilization factor of Angra I and II declined to 56%. Yet, according to early data issued by the government regarding the
forthcoming BEN2007, nuclear generation increased 44% in 2006 with the resuming of continuous operation in Angra I and II, the
production of which increased from 9.9 TWh in 2005 to 13.8 TWh in 2006.
Figure 1: Figure 2:
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Installed Capacity - Annual expansions of Hydro - Total Thermal and Nuclear vis-à-vis the Total Expansion of the System (1985 - 2005)
"Total expansion of the system"
"Hydropower expansion"
"Total thermal power expansion"
"Nuclear power expansion"
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Power Effectively Generated - Annual expansions Hydro - Total Thermal and Nuclear
vis-à-vis the Total Expansion of the System (1985 - 2005)
Total expansion of the system
Hydropower expansion
Total thermal power expansion
Nuclear power expansion
Source: BEN2006
TABLE 3: Market Share & Annual Average Utilization Factor per Fuel - 1985 - 2005 (in %)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
MKT SHARE - INSTALLED CAPACITY:
Mkt Share Hydro 84.1% 84.1% 84.8% 85.2% 85.9% 85.9% 86.1% 86.7% 86.4% 86.6% 86.9% 87.4% 87.2% 87.0% 86.5% 82.8% 82.0% 79.2% 78.4% 76.0% 76.1%
Mkt Share Thermal 15.9% 15.9% 15.2% 14.8% 14.1% 14.1% 13.9% 13.3% 13.6% 13.4% 13.1% 12.6% 12.8% 13.0% 13.5% 17.2% 18.0% 20.8% 21.6% 24.0% 23.9%
NON-NUCLEAR 14.4% 14.5% 13.8% 13.5% 12.8% 12.9% 12.7% 12.1% 12.4% 12.2% 12.0% 11.6% 11.8% 12.0% 12.5% 14.4% 15.4% 18.4% 19.3% 21.7% 21.8%
NUCLEAR 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 2.7% 2.6% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2%
NUCLEAR / TOTAL THERMAL 9.3% 9.2% 9.1% 8.9% 9.0% 8.8% 8.7% 9.0% 8.6% 8.5% 8.5% 8.6% 8.1% 7.8% 7.2% 15.9% 14.6% 11.7% 10.7% 9.2% 9.0%
MKT SHARE - POWER GENERATED:
Mkt Share Hydro 92.1% 90.2% 91.3% 92.6% 92.3% 92.8% 92.9% 92.4% 93.3% 93.3% 92.1% 91.3% 90.6% 90.6% 87.5% 87.2% 81.5% 82.8% 83.9% 82.8% 83.7%
Mkt Share Thermal 7.9% 9.8% 8.7% 7.4% 7.7% 7.2% 7.1% 7.6% 6.7% 6.7% 7.9% 8.7% 9.4% 9.4% 12.5% 12.8% 18.5% 17.2% 16.1% 17.2% 16.3%
NON-NUCLEAR 6.2% 9.7% 8.2% 7.1% 6.9% 6.2% 6.5% 6.9% 6.5% 6.6% 7.0% 7.9% 8.4% 8.4% 11.3% 11.0% 14.1% 13.2% 12.5% 14.2% 13.8%
NUCLEAR 1.7% 0.1% 0.5% 0.3% 0.8% 1.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.9% 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 1.2% 1.7% 4.3% 4.0% 3.7% 3.0% 2.4%
NUCLEAR / TOTAL THERMAL 22.1% 0.7% 5.5% 3.8% 10.7% 13.9% 8.7% 9.6% 2.6% 0.3% 11.6% 9.5% 10.9% 10.8% 9.5% 13.6% 23.6% 23.2% 22.7% 17.4% 15.0%
Annual Average Utilization Factor:
Total System 50.1% 51.3% 48.8% 49.5% 48.6% 47.9% 49.4% 50.1% 51.2% 51.5% 53.2% 54.7% 55.8% 56.3% 56.0% 54.0% 49.2% 47.9% 48.1% 48.7% 49.4%
Hydro 54.9% 55.1% 52.5% 53.8% 52.2% 51.8% 53.3% 53.4% 55.2% 55.5% 56.4% 57.1% 58.0% 58.6% 56.7% 56.9% 48.9% 50.0% 51.5% 53.1% 54.4%
Thermal 24.9% 31.4% 28.0% 24.6% 26.6% 24.5% 25.2% 28.6% 25.3% 25.7% 31.9% 37.9% 41.0% 40.9% 51.9% 40.2% 50.4% 39.7% 35.8% 35.0% 33.6%
NON-NUCLEAR 21.4% 34.3% 29.1% 26.0% 26.0% 23.2% 25.2% 28.4% 27.0% 28.0% 30.8% 37.5% 39.7% 39.6% 50.5% 41.3% 45.1% 34.5% 31.0% 31.9% 31.3%
NUCLEAR 58.7% 2.5% 16.9% 10.6% 31.8% 38.9% 25.1% 30.6% 7.7% 1.0% 43.8% 42.2% 55.1% 56.7% 69.1% 34.4% 81.2% 78.7% 76.0% 66.0% 56.1%
Source: BEN2006
By mid-2002, having started raining again and the electricity demand having declined substantially as a result of many
rationalization initiatives put in place in 2001 (the Brazilian electricity consumption declined by almost 20% during the crisis), the
electricity supply/demand balance turned fast from deficit to oversupply of power. The electricity price collapsed to astonishing
less than 4 $/MWh. The thermal power plants, some of which built as merchant plants, without the backup of long-term power
purchase agreements, started running into financial difficulties. The units protected by long-term contracts were subsidized in some
extent. Thermal power could no longer co-exist in a market dominated by low-cost hydroelectricity. Angra I and II only survived
due to their long-term sales agreement with the state-owned Furnas, which paid for nuclear energy significantly more expensive
than it could otherwise have paid for the electricity available in the spot market.
Angra I and II are operated by Eletronuclear, a state-owned enterprise, which sells all the power generated to Furnas. Both
companies are controlled by another state-owned enterprise, the holding company Eletrobras. The process of setting up the price
for the electricity generated by Angra I and II is rather political (and decided within the government and Eletrobras). The nuclear
plants are not supposed to operate in full market conditions. Since December 2004, after tough negotiation, Furnas agreed to pay to
Eletronuclear approximately 37 US$/MWh generated by Angra I and II. This price does not reflect the full cost of those plants. It
results from an adjustment mechanism by which Eletronuclear sells its energy at a price compatible to Furnas hydroelectric plants
and the difference is balanced by the Federal government.
As shown in Table 3, since 2001, the market share for hydropower in terms of total installed capacity has been continuously falling
as new (non-nuclear) thermal plants are built and made available for operation. As far as the power effectively generated is
concerned, the market share of hydro has actually increased by almost 2%. The hydro system`s utilization factor increased from
48.9% in 2001 to 54.4% in 2005. As a result, the whole thermal system reduced its average utilization factor from 50.4% in 2001 to
33.6% in 2005. Taking the system as a whole, the average utilization factor, after having declined to its floor level in 2002
(reaching 47.9%), increased continually from 2002 to 2005. Though, it is still far from the levels registered just before the
electricity shortage. The presence of more thermal facilities should, nevertheless, allow the system to operate with higher utilization
factor. The recent investments may have helped to increase the electricity supply security, but they damaged the efficiency in the
overall capital allocation.
Unless the electricity demand starts growing much faster, the more intense operation of Angra I and II requires the non-nuclear
thermal facilities to reduce even more the charge and run with higher idle capacity. Any early investment in new nuclear power
facility will have to turn even less competitive the non-nuclear thermal plants. In other words, promoting even more nuclear power
in Brazil could eventually lead to growing over supply of electricity and expressive reduction in the average utilization factor of the
system. In 2004 and 2005, while Angra I struck its production records, Angra II presented operational problems, which resulted in
interruptions and load reductions. Such situation allowed the non-nuclear thermal plants to stabilize the average utilization factor in
31%. However, in 2006, as already mentioned, nuclear power generation increased by more than 40% as Angra II resumed its
normal operation. Moreover, as also to be shown by the BEN2007, coal-and-biomass-fired power plants also registered expressive
growth in power generation (respectively 8.5% and 7.2% as compared to 2005`s levels). The nuclear, coal and biomass-fired plants
responded for almost 60% of all the thermal power generated in 2006. The biomass (wood fire, sugar-cane residues as well as other
wastes) became the main fuel for thermal power generation in Brazil, producing almost 20 TWh (or about 28% of the total thermal
power generated). The oil-fired plants also presented a growing power generation (2% from 2005 to 2006). Such results were
achieved due to the 3.1% reduction in the use of natural gas for power generation. Since 2001, Brazil invested from US$ 7 to 10
billion in gas-fired power plants, the operation of which has never been appropriate, primarily due to insufficient market.
Yet, the debate regarding the construction of Angra III was not frozen. Actually, it has been amplified by the publication of the
NEP2006 proposing boosting the future role of nuclear power in Brazil. Moreover, nuclear energy definitively returned to the
domestic political agenda in July, 2007, when President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva officially announced the launch of Brazil New
Nuclear Program. The President reaffirmed the Program’s peacefulness and no intention of pursuing nuclear weapons, but he also
avowed that Brazil would resume its historical objective of fully controlling the uranium cycle and building up an extensive nuclear
power program.
Starting from 2004, the debate regarding nuclear power and the construction of Angra III intensified. Following similar arguments
found in the international debate, the case for more nuclear power as an energy diversification strategy became stronger. The gas
supply for Brazil, both domestically produced and mainly imported from Bolivia, which had previously been assumed as abundant
and at low risk to supply a major power program based on gas-fired plants, suddenly turned into nightmare. Despite the rapid
growing dependence on gas imports from Bolivia, the policy of promoting gas-fired power plants had been considered the most
cost-effective strategy to increase the security of electricity supply in Brazil. However, as described by Moutinho dos Santos et al
(2007), the gas relations between Bolivia and Brazil started to deteriorate in 2004. Scared by mounting energy nationalism in
Bolivia, the Brazilian perception of risk regarding the gas supply substantially increased. Natural gas turned rapidly to be
understood as the major source of energy insecurity for Brazil and its electricity system. The NEP2006 echoed such new
perspective and gave priority to the development of domestic energy sources, including the considerable expansion of nuclear
power.
On the other hand, Eletronuclear has also been propping up the Brazilian return to nuclear energy based on environmental grounds.
Again, the arguments favoring nuclear power in the international debate are imported to Brazil and then adapted to the domestic
reality. In fact, the nuclear power environmental benefits of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions are not straight realized in a
country where power is mainly generated by hydro sources and the potential for new hydropower is still huge. As shown by Table
4, the Brazilian hydro system can be divided into eight major hydro basins, which present different levels of hydropower
exploitation. The total hydroelectric potential is estimated at 260 GW. Only 68% of that potential has ever been inventoried, which
means that the total potential might be even larger. The Bacia do Rio Paraná and Bacia do Rio Amazonas are the two basins with
the highest hydro potential. The first is located close to the main markets in the South and Southeast regions. It is already exploited
in more than 60%. No new large hydropower facility is expected to be built in this basin. The latter is roughly unexploited, but its
remote location challenges potential investors willing to develop such huge hydro potential.
Eletronuclear has been emphasizing the potential conflict between energy and environmental interests in the occupation of the
Amazon region, which shall make difficult for the country to completely exploit its hydro resources. As highlighted by Figures 3
and 4, the energy sector as well as the Brazilian environmental authorities, which have been expanding the National Protection
Areas in Brazil (aiming to preserve both the forest and the biodiversity), are both moving towards the Amazon region. In the long
term, the conflicts will likely arise and there are uncertainties regarding how much of the total available hydropower potential will
actually be ever exploited. Following such argument, the nuclear industry suggests that Brazil should rather continue enforcing
policies aiming to increase the power generation diversification. Keeping the nuclear program in expansion is proposed as the main
option for Brazil to substitute the hydropower not to be developed in the Amazon region. According to Eletronuclear, quoting EPE
(2006), the options for large power plants, which can provide large-scale blocks of new energy in the future, are not countless. Only
six new hydro plants expected to come in operation in the period 2006-2015 can offer installed capacities larger than the 1.3 GW
foreseen for Angra III. Those projects are all located in remote areas in the Amazon region. They all involved environmental
difficulties as well as significant technical and economic challenges, including the long-distance transmission lines required to make
their energy available to the main markets. It is in comparison to those options that nuclear energy should be revisited in Brazil.
TABLE 4: Hydropower Potential in Brazil - In average available MW (*) - As stated by March 2003
Hydro Basin
Name
Hydro
Basin
Code
Inventoried
Potential (a)
Inventoried
+ Estimated
Potential (b)
Installed
Capacity
(c)
Exploited Index
(c) / (a) (c) / (b)
Bacia do Rio Amazonas 1 40.883,07 105.047,56 667,30 1,6% 0,6%
Bacia do Rio Tocantins 2 24.620,65 26.639,45 7.729,65 31,4% 29,0%
Bacia do Atlântico Norte e NE 3 2.127,85 3.198,35 300,92 14,1% 9,4%
Bacia do Rio S. Francisco 4 24.299,84 26.217,12 10.289,64 42,3% 39,2%
Bacia do Atlântico Leste 5 12.759,81 14.539,01 2.589,00 20,3% 17,8%
Bacia do Rio Paraná 6 53.783,42 60.902,71 39.262,81 73,0% 64,5%
Bacia do Rio Uruguai 7 11.664,16 12.815,86 2.859,59 24,5% 22,3%
Bacia do Atlântico Sudeste 8 7.296,77 9.465,93 2.519,32 34,5% 26,6%
Brazil - 177.435,57 258.825,99 66.218,23 37,3% 25,6%
Source: ANEEL – 2002 - Atlas de Energia Elétrica do Brasil - Found at: htt://www.aneel.gov.br
Data provided by CENTRAIS ELÉTRICAS BRASILEIRAS – ELETROBRAS.
(*) Measured in terms of Firm Energy, i.e., the continuous maximum generation in the hypothesis of future repetition of the most critical
Hydrological season ever registered (assuming average load factor ~ 55%).
Figure 3: Figure 4:
Source: ANEEL – 2002 - Atlas de Energia Elétrica do Brasil - Found at: htt://www.aneel.gov.br
Ministério do Meio Ambiente – www.mma.gov.br
Avoiding past mistakes and proposing a Brazilian nuclear policy aiming to the future
Despite the heating contest regarding the revival of nuclear energy in Brazil, the uncertainties in relation to the Brazilian New
Nuclear Program are as big as or even larger than those surrounding the international nuclear reality. Even the decision of retaking
the construction of Angra III has been engendering controversies within the society and divisions within the government itself. In
parallel to those supporting a growing nuclear program, respected voices, for example, Goldemberg (2007), alert about the risks of
Brazil repeating the same flaw experiences with nuclear energy as it happened in the past.
As in the case of UK, there also seems to be a kind of alliance between the Brazilian nuclear industry and part of the academic
community and even many environmentalists. Some scientists lend their support based on the argument that Brazil must keep
developing the nuclear technology for its tomorrow needs. Others just argue on practical topics such as the fact that Brazil has
already spent about US$ 1.0 billion in Agra III (with early acquisition of equipments as well as their annual maintenance costs or
even with early civil works already done) and such investment can only be recovered by indeed building the plant. Yet, the
discussion is still gloomy and the politics seems to prevail over the economics.
According to Eletronuclear (2006), Angra III`s fixed investment cost is estimated at 75 to 80 US$/MWh. Then, supposing the plant
working with utilization factor higher or equal to 80%, the total cost is estimated at 90 to 100 US$/MWh (such estimates based on
fuel cost projected at 15 to 20 US$/MWh). The next nuclear facility in Brazil should have slightly higher costs (approximately 100
US$/MWh for fixed investment cost and 120 to 130 US$/MWh for total cost). However, by expecting growing economy of scales
and scope as well as increased learning process, Eletronuclear suggests that the costs of the nuclear plants should decline overtime
as a large-scale nuclear program is put in place.
Those figures must be compared to other power options in the country. For example, according to the so called CCEE (2007) (the
CCEE is the Brazilian Electric Power Commercialization Chamber, which is a not-for-profit organization in charge to carry out and
settle the wholesale transactions in the Brazilian power system. It operates as a Clearing House for the electricity transactions), the
First Auction for alternative energy in Brazil took place in June, 2007, when approximately 30TWh from small hydro and biomass-
fired power facilities were commercialized at average prices ranging from 68 to 71 US$/MWh. About US$ 2 billion of new
contracts were signed among 38 companies participating in the Auction (19 small hydropower producers; 19 thermal producers;
and 17 buyers). Near 640 MW of new installed capacity were contracted (15% coming from small hydro facilities – with contracts
extending over 20 years -; and 75% based on biomass-fired plants – with contracts extending for 15years). One shall expect this
Auction, which aimed to promote more costly alternative energy, indicating a kind of ceiling price for new power in Brazil. Angra
III would hardly be able to win any contract in this competitive bidding.
Besides, the Brazilian power system is characterized by two different sub-markets. In the free market, independent consumers as
well as generators and marketers can liberally negotiate contracts in competitive terms. Moreover, consumers` unexpected demands
must be covered by acquisitions on a kind of spot market (also orchestrated by CCEE). In the regulated market, the utility
companies hold monopoly rights for electricity distribution and marketing, supplying captive consumers in specific geographic
areas. After having estimated their future needs, the utilities must annually buy electricity from authorized suppliers through
auctions promote by CCEE. The totality of the foreseeable market must be covered by competitive acquisitions in which the
winning suppliers in each auction will offer the smallest prices. The buyers must sign up power purchase contracts (3 or 5 years in
advance) to anchor the new generators, which will have to assume financial commitments to obligatorily build the plants. The
utilities can also buy with one year in advance from existing generators. Moreover, very marginally, aiming to cover unforeseeable
demands up to 1% of the total load, the utilities make use of Adjustment Auctions promoted by CCEE.
In 2007, the fourth CCEE`s Auction for new power registered transactions totaling 171.5 TWh (equivalent to almost US$12 billion
in revenues) with prices ranging from 67 to 70 US$/MWh. In this auction, only thermal plants burning fuel oil presented winning
proposals. The fifth Auction for new power was initially cancelled by the government and then rescheduled to the end of September
and mid-October 2007. The fifth Adjustment Auction registered no transaction. In any case, Angra III would probably have failed
to offer the most competitive price in the last auctions organized by CCEE, which eventually highlights that the Brazilian utilities
are still not prepared to turn towards the nuclear energy.
Yet, the perspective of a tighter electricity market is increasing in Brazil. As far as the electricity demand is concerned, the
Brazilian economic growth in 2007 and 2008 is expected to be larger than initially previewed. According to IBGE (2007), the
Brazilian GDP increased 5.4% in the second quarter of 2007 as compared to the same period in 2006. Such result is the largest
economic expansion registered since the second quarter of 2004. It seems that Brazil is resuming a sustainable and strong economic
growth. As a consequence, the electricity demand is also expected to grow with higher annual rates. On the other hand, the
perception of risk regarding the future electricity supply is rising. The availability of gas for new power generation is not at all
certain. Petrobras has been announcing the construction of at least two LNG terminals aiming to supply the existing gas-fired
power stations that currently cannot be dispatched due to the lack of gas supply. Yet, it is not clear how competitive those power
stations will be by burning much more expensive LNG rather than the domestically produced gas. As far as the new hydropower is
concerned, the government has mainly focused on two major projects (Santo Antonio and Jirau), which is supposed to be built on
the Madeira River in the Bacia do Amazonas. Those plants should add up to 6.4 GW of new capacity by 2012, requiring total
investment estimated at US$13 billion. Nevertheless, everything related to those plants seems to be ambiguous, from their
environmental licensing, which was approved, but also imposed many restrictions, the additional costs of which still must be
assessed, up to the political, economical and engineering challenges. The projects are expected to be driven primarily by the state-
owned Eletrobras, which still has to come up with sounding financial solutions for them.
Given the anticipate growth of electricity demand and the difficulties to guarantee additional power supply for the future, the
electricity price in Brazil experiences a rising trend. According to Comerc (2007), from January to June, 2007, the total electricity
demand in the free market increased by 3.2% vis-à-vis the same period in 2006. The large independent consumers paid, over the
first semester of 2007, an average electricity price ranging from 75 to 80 US$/MWh. In total, 676 companies (large industries in the
great majority) have operated in the free market and may have jointly saved, over the same period, approximately US$ 1 billion in
comparison to what they would have otherwise paid (more than 100 US$/MWh) for the same electricity in the regulated market.
Based on those numbers, the independent consumers should be very much interest to revisit Angra III as an option for their future
secure electricity. Yet, such more market-driven scenario, where large private consumers would anchor the construction of Angra
III by signing up long-term power purchase agreements with Eletronuclear is far from realism.
It may sound weird that consumers with outsized perception of risk vis-à-vis an eventual new electricity shortages, and willing to
secure the future electricity supply, are not prepared to assume risks and tie their energy future to nuclear power. Indeed, it is a very
intricate problem. The two most relevant points seem to regard: (1) the real energy cost one may expect from Angra III; and (2) the
risk of delays in delivering the promised power. The past history of the Brazilian nuclear industry does not help to create a
perception of high reliability on nuclear. In the past, Brazil struggled with tremendous technological difficulties in building Angra I
and II, the costs and construction time of which overrun any reasonable expectation. Long delays led to uncontrollable additional
financial costs. Then, high inflation led the government to adopt controls over the electricity prices turning the state-owned energy
companies into insolvency and unable to keep up with their initial construction commitments.
Although the Brazilian economic reality seems much improved as compared to the huge instabilities of the late 1970s and the
1980s, favoring, therefore, long-term projects such as a new nuclear facility, there is indeed a growing feeling of uncertainty
regarding the future behavior of the global economy. The 2007`s increasing volatility in the international financial market is
cautiously seeing as a potential crisis approaching, which can leap the global economy towards a major recession. Such scenario
would significantly cool down the growing rhythm in the global as well as the national electricity consumption. Consequently, the
Brazilian industrial sectors as well as the electricity utilities may not seem to be geared up to backup a major long-term
commitment supporting the construction of Angra III.
In addition, the Brazilian consumers seem not to rely on Eletronuclear`s ability to deliver the electricity from Angra III just in time
and in tune with their eventual needs. Such low confidence may firstly arise from observing Eletrobras` last failures on delivering
formerly pledged new power. As shown in Figure 5, Eletrobras` announced investment plans in the last years did not fully
materialize. In 2005 and 2006, the private investments overcame in respectively 68% and 120% Eletrobras` actual investments. The
apparently absence of private developers willing to promote Angra III’s construction does not help to increase the reliance in the
project.
Figure 5 – Historical investments in Energy (in R$ billions)
Eletrobras Private Sector
Planned (or expected) Actual
Source: Instituto Ascende Brasil (2007)
Furthermore, there seems to be a general perception that Eletronuclear and the Brazilian nuclear industry as a whole have actually
lost their expertise in managing large scale projects. The state company counts upon a small group of high skilled operational
professionals. The more senior staff, which has lived the real experience of building Angra I and II, retired. There has not been a
continuous process of transferring the past experiences to the juniors entering the company. Eletronuclear no longer commands the
necessary independent knowledge to solve more intricate problems that often surprise those construction works. In fact, even for
the operation of Angra I and II, the company is often obliged to call upon the Brazilian research centers to find specific expertise to
solve technical problems. Whenever those problems cross beyond the competences of those research centers, Eletronuclear must
appeal to foreign contractors.
As seen above, in the last CCEE`s auction, only the oil-fired plants won and signed 15 years-long contracts with the electricity
utilities. The easier construction guarantees that those plants can come in operation without delay. The fuel availability is also just a
minor issue. Those variables seem to have been decisive for those plants to thrash any potential attempt from Eletronuclear to
participate and win the necessary contracts to justify Angra III’s construction in sounding economic basis. Yet, as the crude oil
price continues escalating beyond 80 US$/barrel in the international market, the fuel cost of those thermal plants will skyrocket
beyond the 150 to 200 US$/MWh, i.e. much higher than Angra III’s expected total cost. In other words, by choosing oil-fired
plants rather than nuclear power, both the consumers and the generators will have to face important additional costs if those plants
operate with high utilization factor. Such decision sounds peculiar in an economic environment characterized by potential
shortages, rising prices and insecurity of supply, which can all lead to a more intense use of those thermal plants.
In fact, the oil-fired plants are proving to be more competitive to operate within an environment marked by growing uncertainties
and in tune with the dominant hydro system. They are only supposed to work in critical moments. They will probably be the last
units to be dispatched. Such picture is very Brazilian specific. The nuclear reactors can never operate in the same way. They are
fitted to match the demanded base loads, having, therefore, to compete with the hydropower (both the existing and the projected
new hydro plants). As the whole electricity system in Brazil is still operating with low utilization factor, the competitive room for
thermal plants willing to operate with very low utilization factor as well increases. On the other hand, base-load-related thermal
plants such as nuclear reactors have to face tremendous competitive disadvantage.
Imposing the construction of Angra III (or even a large nuclear program) based on politics rather than on the above economic
reality will help the whole hydro system to retain more water during the dry seasons, reducing, therefore, the risks of eventual
shortages in the future. Nevertheless, it will equally decrease the average utilization factor in the hydro system, augmenting,
therefore, the likelihood of wasting water in the raining seasons. In the long term, the hydro system will operate with higher average
water level, increasing eventually the flows of water over the dams. Such policy can definitively reduce the risks of electricity
shortages, but it also drives the country into a poorer management of its natural resources as well as a substantial worsening in the
economic allocation of long-term capital. Any definition of sustainability may be lost when the available hydropower must be
wasted and the consumers must pay for more costly nuclear energy.
Indeed, the Brazilian decision to revival the nuclear energy should not be just a political issue. The construction of Angra III does
not seem to be the most appropriate icon for anchoring the launch of a New Nuclear Program aiming to the future. As highlighted
by Goldemberg (2007), the decision of building Angra III seems to be incorrect for several reasons. In first place, it will not help to
solve the eventual electricity supply crisis that one might fear to be configuring for 2009 or 2010. Most optimistically Angra III will
only begin to operate in 2013. The construction works may likely take another 10 years to be ended. Therefore the non-delivery of
a pledged large amount of new energy can expose the system to even higher risks. Besides, Angra III, even assuming
Eletronuclear’s expected costs, is definitively not competitive with other more attractive options such as hydropower and biomass-
fired (as well as oil-fired) thermal plants. On top of that, the figures proposed by Eletronuclear were not submitted to inclusive
independent analyses, which could appropriately validate them and give them more credibility. The Brazilian nuclear industry
presents long tradition of low transparence, which usually leads to miscalculations clearly aiming to underestimate costs. Finally,
the vowed environmental benefits declared by the nuclear community internationally will contribute very a little to reduce the
greenhouse gases emissions in Brazil. If the government is, in fact, concerned in reducing the Brazilian carbon emissions, it should
rather focus on reducing deforestation and forest burning, as well as on improving the management of agro-business-generated
residues and the use of vehicular-fuels in the transportation sector.
As in the USA and other countries, the Brazilian current difficulties to keep increasing limitlessly its power sector shall be revisited
before even starting thinking about Angra III or any other major New Nuclear Program. Brazil needs to evolve through a
tremendous and painful restructuring of its electricity demand in order to improve the final use of electricity, including a major
reduction in the thermal uses of electricity. By promoting abundant, but less cost-effective, nuclear power and recreating an energy
scenario based on excess of electricity supply, Brazil may just postpone, again and artificially, the major changes its energy matrix
urgently requires. Yet, given the current uncertainties regarding the expected role that nuclear energy may play in the future as well
as the interesting opportunities Brazil can take advantage of at the present, it might be interesting to think about different
approaches for a Brazilian New Nuclear Program. Rather than focusing on an early development of Angra III, a New Nuclear
Program really aiming to the future should primarily centers the attention on the technological aspects, developing the domestic
nuclear expertise. The nuclear technology is achieving new edges with new generators being conceived for the next decades. Brazil
does not need to lead the global effort in developing those new technologies. The country can, in fact, substantially benefit from
letting the others make the inevitable and expensive mistakes in developing the new generation of nuclear reactors (more safety,
reliable and cost-effective).
The Brazilian Environmental Ministry alleges that the nuclear energy still involves high risks with not yet solved environmental
issues related, for example, to the nuclear waste disposal. Many scientists would not completely agree with that argument saying
that the technologies are available and currently operate with acceptable safety level. In Angra I and II, only temporary solutions
have been adopted for waste disposal. The life cycle of those solutions can still be extended for another decade or so. However, no
major expansion of nuclear power can stand upon those precarious solutions. Brazil has to start thinking about the definitive
measures for the final disposal of its nuclear waste. This engages not only technical expertise, but rather a tough social discussion.
Finding a final repository for the nuclear waste is a major political issue, which Eletronuclear will have to face. Moreover,
Eletronuclear must still achieve long-term adequate performance on Angra I and II, before the company can convince the society
about its competence to well manage (with safety and reliability) a larger nuclear program.
The nuclear industry suggests that building up Angra III is necessary to allow Brazil to keep pursuing the development of nuclear
technologies aiming to fully command the uranium fuel cycle. As seen in Figure 6, very few countries detain the full command of
the nuclear fuel cycle. Brazil`s first attempt to enter such restrict nuclear club took place in the 1970s with the blemish agreement
with former-West Germany, which left very few fruits beyond Angra II. The domestic excellence is actually centered at IPEN (the
Institute for Energy and Nuclear Researches in Sao Paulo) and CTM/SP (the Navy’s Center for Nuclear Technology in Aramar, Sao
Paulo). In Figure 7, it is shown that those institutions developed the domestic technology outside the former Nuclear Program with
Germany. Brazil already dominates the whole technology behind the nuclear fuel cycle, including the enrichment of uranium.
However, some steps still have to be accomplished abroad. Additional investments would make it possible to internalize in the
country all the still lacking activities.
Figure 6: Figure 7:
Source: URANIUM INFORMATION CENTRE Ltd.
Source: ELETRONUCLEAR
As shown in Table 5, the NEP2006 projects two scenarios, self-sufficiency and exporting, for the Brazilian nuclear fuel cycle by
2030. It should be Brazil’s main objective to integrate and foster all its acquired competences towards the full control of the
uranium cycle. Yet, integrating industrial and military activities into just one lucid and articulate program also involves major
political negotiations, especially in the definition of priorities and setting up the budgets. In an open and democratic debate, the
most strategic decisions should be prioritized to receive the public investment. According to the Brazilian Navy, by investing
another US$ 250 million in its research centers, Brazil could already have the full access to the uranium cycle by 2010.
Nevertheless, the government keeps reducing the Navy’s budget and Brazil’s major nuclear research centers find themselves in an
almost calamity. It is hard to believe that Angra III is the best strategy for Brazil to keep pace with the development of the nuclear
technology.
TABLE 5: Expected scenarios for the Brazilian uranium cycle projected to 2030
Scenarios: Self-sufficiency Exporting
URANIUM RESERVES (*)
< 130 US$ / Kg Ur
Measured and Inferred
500 thousand tons of U3O8
Measured and Inferred
1 million tons of U3O8
MINING & MILLING
To U3O8 – YELLOW CAKE 2 thousand tons of U3O8 + 3 thousand tons of U3O8
CONVERSION
To UF6 - Gas uranium
hexafluoride
2.5 thousand tons of UF6 + 3.75 thousand tons of UF6
ENRICHMENT
To SWU – Separative Work
Unit
1 thousand tons of SWU 1.5 thousand tons of SWU
(*) In 2007, Brazil measured and inferred uranium reserves totaled 309 thousand tons of U3O8 representing the 6th
world largest.
Those reserves can sustain 35 GW of installed capacity operating with utilization factor equal to 85% during 40 years.
Potential reserves are estimated at 800 thousand tons of U3O8.
Source: NEP2006 – EPE
The nuclear industry sustain that Angra III is essential to create the critical domestic demand for enriched uranium to support the
construction of Brazil`s first commercial uranium enrichment plant. However, the enriching activity is far from being a competitive
business. Brazil should not really care about the initial poor economic perspective of its first uranium enrichment facility. As far as
Angra I and II are concerned, Eletronuclear (2006) estimates that doubling the fuel cost might have a minor effect (only a 2.5%
rise) in the total generation cost. Such difference can be easily rearranged by internal negotiations between Eletronuclear, Furnas
and the Federal government. In fact, the leading aspect should be to achieve the self-sufficiency in enriched uranium and boost the
security of fuel supply for those plants. Regarding Angra III, as already seen, its poor economics has nothing to do with the fuel
cost. It is unacceptable the argument that Angra III, which requires billionaire investments, is taken as a precondition to justify the
construction of a much less-costly enrichment plant.
Developing the full uranium cycle at industrial level, rather than Angra III, should receive the main investments, including eventual
subsidies. Then, Brazil must decide whether enriching uranium just for its domestic purposes or eventually even for exports given
its availability of uranium reserves as well as a potential growing market for enriched uranium. However, important barriers still
need to be overcome for that strategy to be executable. The most critical obstacle is to find the financial resources to maintain and
foster the Brazilian nuclear intelligence. For that, the country needs to look at the future and propose credible and feasible projects,
for which the support can be obtained close to the public opinion.
The New Nuclear Program should rather focus on technological developments for naval applications of nuclear energy. The
Brazilian Navy has been spending too long time and too much effort to build Brazil`s first nuclear submarine. The naval nuclear
reactor will find broader and more useful applications in the future merchant marine, reducing Brazil`s exporting and importing
costs by diminishing the oil-dependence in the naval transportation sector. The use of nuclear energy in the naval transportation
sector seems to be a much more realistic policy. About 30% of the total generated energy is transformed into final useful energy in
the big engines of large merchant vessels. Then, starting from the development of the naval nuclear engine, Brazil can gradually
conceive the most appropriate technology for a true national nuclear power reactor, which better expresses the future energy needs
of the country.
Finally, the New Nuclear Program should be seen as an integration effort from Brazil towards its neighboring countries. In 1953, in
a speech delivered by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at the United Nations, the USA launched the “Atoms for Peace” program as
a visionary initiative to bring the civilian applications of nuclear energy close to less developed countries. It was under the auspices
of this program that Brazil was supplied with its first research reactor, entering the nuclear era. Today the USA is highly focused on
international terrorism and the Iraq war. The Bush administration has made little efforts to build up strong links with South
America. The void left by the USA in the region allows Brazil to come up with new joint strategic alternatives to develop with the
neighbouring nations. Brazil should be prepared to support the expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the region. A kind
of “Atoms for a Latin Peace” should be inspired, encouraging the countries of the region to reaffirm the “non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons” principle, and helping the less privileged nations to get access to pacific uses of nuclear energy, helping them to
finance and construct their own research reactor. Moreover, the Brazilian nuclear naval engine should be developed in partnership
by countries that share similar challenges.
Conclusion
Not a single new nuclear facility is in construction in the major western countries, but nuclear power seems to be back as a public
favourite. All the changes described throughout the paper sound like music for an industry that spent more than 20 years
restructuring procedures, improving operational and environmental standards, reducing costs and expanding markets mainly
eastward. The nuclear industry appeared organized, very well articulate and ready to harvest long-awaited fruits. In spite of that, the
pending uncertainties continue important. It is impossible to develop a better judgement on how such more positive moment will
turn into real, profitable and competitive investments in nuclear energy.
One shall never forget though that each nation has its own energy particularities, priorities, legislation and capabilities, resulting
ultimately in different needs and opportunities for the nuclear energy. The paper provided an overview on Brazil`s New Nuclear
Program and discussed topics that are crucial for a better understanding of Brazil actual demand for an early revival of nuclear
power generation. No anti-nuclear position was previously conceived and the authors do not believe any energy technology should
be ruled out on ideological basis. Yet, the arguments here presented do not favor a position pro-nuclear per se. The text is
definitively against the construction of Angra III and/or the launch of an even more aggressive nuclear program in Brazil. For the
world, pushing nuclear policy seems to be a wise policy. For Brazilians, with so many other energy opportunities available for the
power industry, the eagerness to have a sounding nuclear power program is just foolish.
But nuclear energy is not only producing electricity. Brazil should seek to develop a new consensus on enabling expanded use of
nuclear energy to meet other growing demands. More competitive and cost-effective naval transportation is an essential tool for a
country developing a fast rising exporting industry mainly focused on agricultural, industrial and agro-business commodities. Many
decades ago, after the World War II, when nuclear energy flourished as the most promising energy source the human beings have
ever touched, the immediate use of this new energy was on naval vessels whose size rapidly increased at the same time as the global
economy boomed. The nuclear technology then leapfrogged from the naval uses to the power sector where it found its most fertile
soil to grow up in size and sophistication. The paper proposes that Brazil should look backward at history of nuclear energy in
order to eventually find its own path toward a new future.
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