Development Aid and Portfolio Funds: Trends, volatility and
fragmentation
Paris
February 2009
Emmanuel Frot and Javier Santiso
Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
OECD Development Centre
Research agenda in development finance
• Compare flows along several dimensions– Quantity: are portfolio capital flows more important than ODA?– Volatility: is ODA a more stable source of income than portfolio capital flows?– Efficiency: is the fragmentation of ODA increasing?
• Complementarity between flows– Pro or counter-cyclical role of ODA (with respect to private capital flows)– Can we expect ODA to insure against capital flows shortfall in the future?– In the current crisis, what role is there for ODA if we consider the sudden stop
of private flows?• Towards an aid efficiency index?
Different sources of finance for developing countries
ODA and capital flows quantities
• Growth of all inflows– FDI and remittances increased
much faster– FDI and remittances are more
important than ODA.– Equity flows almost as high as
ODA recently.• Any fall in capital flows
expected to severely harm developing countries.
• Role for ODA
ODA has been less important than other external income sources in the past 15 years
Source: Authors based World Bank and OECD data.
• ODA is accused of being too volatile• But it is much less than capital
flows.• However:
– Its volatility has increased while those of private capital flows fell.
– In recent years ODA has actually been more volatile than remittances (during the year 2008 trend different).
Volatility
ODA is less volatile than capital flows, hence a potential role for cushioning against shocks
Volatility of flows, coefficient of variation, 1970-2006
Total ODA FDI Bond Equity Remittances Mean 0.67 1.23 2.35 3.06 0.74
Source: Authors based World Bank and OECD data.
Volatility of flows, by decade, 1960-2006
Total ODA
FDI Bond Equity Remittances
1960-1969 0.73 n.a n.a n.a n.a 1970-1979 0.61 0.99 1.79 2.20 0.36 1980-1989 0.37 0.97 1.74 2.19 0.38 1990-1999 0.46 0.90 1.83 1.86 0.50 2000-2006 0.46 0.88 1.72 1.83 0.41
Source: Authors based World Bank and OECD data.
A shock in capital flows does not trigger an ODA inflow. ODA is not countercyclical.
Correlation between aid and capital flow shocks
Coefficients of correlation
FDI-5-year moving average of FDI
Bond-5-year moving average of Bond
Equity-5-year moving average of Equity
Remittances-5-year moving average of Remittances
ODA-5-year moving average of ODA
0.009 -0.04 -0.03 0.008
FDI-5-year moving average of FDI
0.12 0.09 0.19
Source: Authors based World Bank and OECD data.
Does ODA compensate for capital flow shortfalls?
• In the paper:– ODA and capital flows are
substitutes across countries: redistributive role of ODA.
– They are neither complements nor substitutes at the country level.
• A country experiencing a capital flow shock does not see a change in its ODA.
• No observed risk insurance against capital flow shocks of ODA.
Fragmentation has become more severe: aid efficiency is reduced
1,000,75
0,50
0,25
0,15
0,10
0,00Non-developing country / missing data
1970-1979
1990-1999
1980-1989
2000-2006
Aid fragmentation for recipients: Hirschman-Herfindahl index
Source: Authors based on OECD DAC data.
• DAC uses a different fragmentation measure for recipients (DAC10): number of donors that represent less than 10% of total receipts.
• Normalizing the Hirschman-Herfindahl index to make it comparable to DAC10 actually yields very similar results.
Aid fragmentation for recipients
Average recipient fragmentation 1960-2006
Source: Authors based on OECD DAC data.
• ODA has a role to play in a globalized world of development finance with large quantities of private capital flows.
• The current crisis reinforces the need for countercyclical mechanisms, particularly because of the importance of sudden stops of private flows.
• Aid fragmentation is severe whereas it increases transaction costs and reduces the value of aid.
• There are gains to be made by implementing coordination and adopting the recommendations of the Paris declaration.
• However ODA is a potentially more efficient tool in the development process. It does not currently use opportunities to smooth away variations harmful to developing countries. Even worse, it often adds to them.
Conclusion and policy implications
ODA is not exploited at its potential value
Herding in Development Aid Allocation
Paris
February 2009
Emmanuel Frot and Javier Santiso
Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
OECD Development Centre
Are aid donors herding?
• Herding has been suspected for years.– Cassen (1986): donors move in herd, suddenly disbursing money into star countries,
and sudden increases are followed by long aid declines.– Riddell (2007): “herd instinct” among donors.
• But no study has ever quantified its size or its causes.• Herding is defined as the tendency for donors to follow the crowd, a
trend, to mimic each others’ decisions.– We look at simultaneous decisions about aid increases and decreases.– Even without herding this is expected because donors react to similar variables, and
we will control for this.– Other reasons are closer to those identified in finance: informational cascades,
strategic behaviors.
Many claims that they are, and that this decreases aid efficiency.
• Herding sometimes creates benefits for recipients (humanitarian aid following an emergency).
• But also costs– It provokes aid swings and so contributes to volatility.– It increases fragmentation if it results in many uncoordinated missions.– It potentially creates aid darlings and orphans:
• Reinhardt (2006): “I can't get IDB money if I drop the ball with the World Bank”.
• Additionally, we identify which variables prompt donors to increase aid and so we improve our understanding of donor allocation policies.
Motivation
Why is it important to learn about herding mechanisms?
Different types of herding
• Natural disasters cause donors to react similarly
– Though beneficial, it may cause an overflow.
• Debt relief is often granted in a coordinated fashion.
• Current crisis: sudden stops in capital flows should trigger simultaneous decisions by donors.
Beneficial herding: exogenous shocks trigger simultaneous reactions
Source: Authors based and OECD data.
Proportion of donors increasing aid to countries hit by the 2004 Asian tsunami
• A fall in capital flows does not induce more donors to increase aid.
Beneficial herding following capital flow sudden stopsNo evidence of beneficial herding shows no counter-cyclical decisions from donors
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f do
nors
incr
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aid
-1000 -500 0 500 1000Capital Flows
Percentage change to a 3-year moving average, 1970-2006
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-50
05
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ropo
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f do
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incr
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aid
-1000 -500 0 500 1000Capital Flows
Percentage change to a 3-year moving average, 2000-2006
Source: Authors based and OECD and WDI data.
Herding is detected by exploiting deviations from an average behaviour.
How to measure herding in aid allocation
• Carefully define aid (gross ODA net of debt relief, humanitarian and food aid) and carefully select a group of donors and recipients.
• Adopt a time horizon suitable for aid:– Look at 3 and 5-year periods to avoid capturing small changes.
• Idea behind the measure:– If “many” donors simultaneously increase or decrease aid to a recipient there is
herding.– How to define “many”? We need a benchmark: Global proportion of aid changes in a
period that are increases– If in a recipient-year the proportion of increases is far from the benchmark then it is
interpreted as herding.
Finance provides some guidance about herding measurement
• Use two measures from the finance literature that use this intuition.– LSV developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992).– h proposed by Frey, Herbst and Walter (2007) to correct for the downward bias
present in LSV.
• Results– All the measures adopted in the paper indicate that herding is present.– Using 3-year periods: LSV has a value around 3% (similar to financial markets), h has a
value close to 10%.– It means that if 50% of all allocation changes are increases then 60% (or 53%) of
donors take the same decisions for each recipient.
Two herding measures
Source: Authors based on OECD DAC data.
Herding determinants
When do donors simultaneously decide to increase aid to a recipient?
• Estimate the effect of various shocks on aid allocation decision:– Economic growth– Political transitions– Natural disasters– Armed conflicts
• Results:– No effect of growth (decisions are neither pro nor counter-cyclical)– Positive effect of “new polity”– No effect of democratic transitions– Negative effect of authoritarian transitions– Positive effect of natural disasters– No significant effect of armed conflicts
Asymmetry in political transitions
• Netting out the effect of these determinants leaves the herding measures quite unaffected.
• The “corrected” levels are due to herding caused by strategic behaviours, informational cascades, etc.
• Such behaviours are more than anecdotal: Marysse et al. (2006) argue that political considerations and donor coordination problems have created aid darlings and orphans in the region of the Great Lakes in Africa.
How much do these determinants account for herding?
“Rational”, observables causes explain very little of herding
Original measure
New polity
Foreign intervention
Democratic transition
Authoritarian transition
Natural disasters
Conflicts
LSV 2.981 2.950 2.947 2.936 2.887 2.844 2.836
h 9.83 9.76 9.77 9.76 9.63 9.53 9.49
Source: Authors based and OECD data.
• Beneficial herding occurs for natural disasters but not for other expected reasons: capital flow stops, democratic transitions, recessions.
– Beneficial herding may also be harmful: humanitarian aid overflow is no panacea.• Once again aid allocation decisions are not found to be pro or counter-cyclical for many
variables: growth, democratic transitions, wars, capital flow stops.– Nancy Birdsall argued this week that because of capital flight, credit drying up, and declining
remittances, most developing countries will experience big shortfalls in revenue this year, and called for $1 trillion to be urgently unlocked. Given past experiences, this is unlikely to happen.
• Overall it seems herding does not occur for observable reasons, but more because of some unobserved motives: there is still a lot to understand about donor allocation policies.
• The aggregation of donors’ individual behaviours potentially leads to large aid swings and donor darlings/orphans.
• Coordination in the donor community would help to prevent such outcomes , or to create swings when they are most needed.
Policy Implications
Herding was expected to be caused by external shocks, but it is only weakly so.
• Volatility and fragmentation have so far been measured at the country level: extend the analysis at the sector level.
– Is fragmentation more pronounced in some sectors? If yes, why?– Is volatility influenced by some sector specificities? What can be done about it?
• Similarly, herding is likely to be stronger in sectors– Fads and fashions
• These intermediate characteristics of donor allocation will ultimately be combined to build an aid efficiency index.
Future research
These results call for further investigation
