“Scienceleavesnoroomforfreewill."
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The“BigQuestions”debateseries—madepossiblebyagenerousgrantfromtheJohnTempletonFoundation—givesstudentstheopportunitytothinkcriticallyabouttheplaceofhumanityinthenaturalworldbyaskingthemtoanalyzeanddebatethebestargumentsoneachsideofaseriesoftopicsattheintersectionofhumannature,science,andethicallife.The2016-2017BigQuestionstopicis,“Scienceleavesnoroomforfreewill.”Thistopicanalysiswillserveasabriefintroductiontothisyear’stopic.Itisintendedprimarilytofamiliarizeyouwiththecoreinterpretivequestionsraisedbyourtopic.Inotherwords,itisintendedtohelpyouunderstandexactlywhatquestionsarebeingraisedbythetopic,whattheprimaryareasofdebatewillbe,andwhatstudentswillneedtoproveinordertosuccessfullyaffirmornegatethetopic.Secondarily,thisanalysisbrieflyreviewssomeofthemostcommonandinterestingargumentsinfavorofeachsideofthetopic.Insubsequenttopicanalyses,wewillzeroinonparticularargumentsonbothsidesofthetopic,treatingtheminfurtherdepth.Theaimhereisonlytopointyouinvariousdirectionsforfurtherresearch.Towardthatend,aninitialbibliographyofsourcesforfurtherresearchisalsoincluded.Thesourcesincludedwereselectedprimarilyonthebasisofbeingapproachableandclear—butstillintellectuallyrigorous—textsforintroducingstudentstothisyear’stopic.DefiningthetermsofthedebateWhenweapproachanewtopicfordebate,agoodfirststepistodefinethetermsofthetopic.Withoutaclearunderstandingofatopic’skeyterms,wewillnotknowwhateithersideneedstoproveoverthecourseofthedebateinordertowin.Aswewillsee,thedefinitionoftermsisespeciallyimportantforourtopicthisyearbecausemuchofthedebateabouttherelationshipbetweenfreewillandscienceturnsonhowwechoosetoanswerpreliminaryquestionslike,“Whatisfreewill?”Inotherwords,whatabilitiesdoesapersonneedtopossessinorderforustobewillingtoaffirmthattheypossessfreewill?Herearesomeinitialconsiderationsaboutthekeytermsinourtopic.“Science”Asparticipantsincontemporarylife,weareallatleastlooselyfamiliarwiththecharacterofscienceasaninvestigativemethodology,anexplanatoryenterprise,andabodyofknowledge.Perhapssurprisingly,however,theproperdefinitionof“science”isanareaoflivedispute.Still,forourpurposeswecancometoasufficientunderstandingofthetermsimplybyidentifyinganumberofelementsthatarecommonlyatplayindefinitions(anddisputesabouttheproperdefinition)ofscience:• Scienceinvolvesasystematicmethodofacquiringknowledgeaboutandexplanationsof
thenaturalworldthroughobservationandexperimentation.• Scienceaimstoachieve(or,atleastapproach)acoherentandcomprehensive
understandingofthenaturalworld.
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• Scienceaimstoidentifyasetofgenerallawsthatgovernthestructureandbehaviorofthenaturalworld.• Scienceseekstotesthypothesesagainstobservablephysicalevidence.• Scienceis(orproduces)anorganizedbodyofknowledgeaboutthenaturalworld.
Inaskingwhetherscienceleavesroomforfreewill,wearereallybeingaskedtoconsidertworelated,butdistinct,waysthatsciencemightbeincompatiblewiththeexistenceoffreewill:(1)Ontheonehand,itmightbeclaimedthataparticularexperimentalfinding(orbodyofexperimentalfindings)orbodyofobservationalevidenceposesachallengetothebeliefintheexistenceoffreewill.Forexample,thosewhoclaimthatsciencedeniestheexistenceoffreewilloftencitetheexperimentalfindingsofneurobiologistBenjaminLibet.TheyclaimthatLibet’sexperimentsdemonstratethatour“decisions”toactaremadeunconsciously.Therefore,theyclaim,our“decisions”couldnotbemanifestationsoffreewill,sincewearenotsomuchasawareofthose“decisions”atthetimeatwhichtheyaremade.1SettingasidethedetailsofLibet’sexperiments,aswellastheveracityoftheconclusionsdrawnfromthem,wecanseethatthechallengetofreewillbeingposedhereisthataparticularsetofexperimentalfindingsdisprovetheexistenceoffreewill.(2)Ontheotherhand,itmightbeclaimedthatbeliefinthebasicprinciplesofscientificinquiry,scientificexplanation,orthescientificworldviewisincompatiblewithbeliefinfreewill.Letustakeanexample.FrenchmathematicianPierre-SimonLaplacewrote:
“Wemayregardthepresentstateoftheuniverseastheeffectofitspastandthecauseof its future.An intellectwhichat a certainmomentwouldknowall forces that setnature inmotion, and all positions of all itemsofwhich nature is composed, if thisintellectwerealsovastenoughtosubmitthesedatatoanalysis,itwouldembraceinasingleformulathemovementsofthegreatestbodiesoftheuniverseandthoseofthetiniestatom;forsuchanintellectnothingwouldbeuncertainandthefuturejustlikethepastwouldbepresentbeforeitseyes.”2
Laplacewasexpressingaviewcommonlyreferredtoasdeterminism:thecompletedescriptionoftheuniverseatanypointintimecombinedwithacompletesetofthelawsthatgovernthenaturaluniverseentailsacompletesetofeverythingthatistrueabouttheuniverse(including,therefore,everythingthathaseverhappenedandeverythingthatwilleverhappen).Often,thosewhoargueforthetruthofdeterminismarguethatacommitmenttothebasicexplanatoryambitionsofthenaturalsciencessimplyrequiresbeliefindeterminism.Theymayfurtherclaimthatdeterminismisincompatiblewiththeexistenceoffreewillbecausewe
1 However, for a detailed and illuminating discussion of Libet’s experiments, see Mele 2014. For a contrasting interpretation of those experiments, see Harris 2012. 2 Laplace, Pierre Simon. 1951 (translation). A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. Translated by W.F. Truscott and F.L. Emory. New York: Dover Publications.
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cannotplausiblybesaidtofreelychoosewhatwedoifwhatwedowasdeterminedlongbeforewewereeveninthepicture.Now,onecoulddebatewhetherbeliefinsciencerequiresbeliefindeterminism.Onecouldalsodebatewhetherbeliefindeterminismrequiresdisbeliefinfreewill.Allofthisisquitethorny,andwedonotneedtopursuethequestionfurtherhere.Themainpointisthis:deterministsofthesortjustdescribedarenotprimarilymakingtheclaimthatthisorthatexperimentalfindingposesachallengetotheexistenceoffreewill.Theyareclaimingsomethingmorebasic:beliefinthescientificenterprise(anenterprisewhichtheytaketoinvolveacommitmenttodeterminism)isincompatiblewithbeliefintheexistenceoffreewill.Thisisanexampleofthesecondwayinwhichsciencemightbesaidtoleavenoroomforfreewill.Inevaluatingargumentsonthetopic,studentswillneedtoemploytheskillofidentifyingwhetheranargument—orapartorpremiseofanargument—againsttheexistenceoffreewillposesascientificchallengeofthefirsttypeorthesecondtype.Importantly,claimsagainsttheexistenceoffreewilloftenimplicitlydependonacombinationofthesetwochallenges.“Leavesnoroomfor”Thereisnogreatmysteryaboutthisclause,butitisworthtakingamomenttorecognizewhatitmeansintermsofthestrengthoftheclaimbeingassertedbythetopic.Consideranexample.Anumberofscientificstudiesin“unconsciousbias”demonstrate,orpurporttodemonstrate,thatgradersexhibitbiasesalongdemographic(e.g.racialorgender)lines,evaluatingtheexactsameworkmoreorlessfavorablydependingoncuestheyaregivenastothedemographiccharacteristicsofthestudentpresentedashavingproducedit.Supposethatyouthinkthatthisfindingisconvincing.Youwillthenthinkthatanactivitythatmayappeartobeentirelyundertheconsciouscontrolofadiligentteacher—theassigningofgradestostudentwork—isatleastpartlyinfluencedbybiasesthatarenotbeingconsciouslycontrolledbythatteacher.However,thetopicdoesnotmerelyaskuswhetherscientificfindingsdemonstratethatfreelywilledactionsmakeupasomewhatsmallerportionofthetypicalperson’sbehaviorthanwemaypreviouslyhavebelieved.Afterall,apersonmightbelievethatsomehumanbehaviorfallsinthecategoryofbeinganautomatic,instinctual,orotherwisenon-consciousresponse.Theymayevenbelievethatresponsesofthissortareresistanttoconsciousattemptstochangethem.Infact,almosteveryonethinkthisaboutatleastsomehumanbehaviors(consider,forexample,thebodilyneedtoblinkone’seyes).Still,noneofthisnecessarilyamountstobelievinganythingliketheclaimthathumanbehavioringeneralisautomatic,instinctual,orotherwisenotconsciouslycontrolled.Itisthisgeneralbeliefthatisreallyattheheartofourtopic.Thetopicraisesageneralandstrongchallengetotheexistenceoffreewill:itasksustoconsiderwhetheraproperappreciationofscience(itsexperimentalfindings,itsfoundationalprinciples,andsoon)isfundamentallyincompatiblewith—thatis,leavesnoroomfor—theexistenceoffreewill.
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Ofcourse,onemightthinkthatscientificfindingsaboutaparticularaspectorsegmentofhumanbehaviorteachus(or,areatleastsuggestiveof)adeepertruthabouthumanfreedomingeneral.Thereiscertainlyroomtodebateclaimsofthattypewithintheconfinesofthetopic.Itissimplyworthnotingthatsomeadditionalargumentisneededtomoveusfromtheweakerclaimthatscienceteachesusthatsomehumanbehaviorfallsoutsidethescopeoffreewilltothestrongerclaim—theoneatissueinthetopic—thatscienceleavesnoroomforfreewill.“FreeWill”“Freewill”isthetrickiestterminourtopictodefine.Infact,indebatesabouttheexistenceoffreewill—intheacademicliterature,aswellasinthecultureatlarge—itisasoftenthemeaningoffreewillthatisindispute,asitistheevidenceofwhether“freewill”exists.Inyourresearchonthetopic,youwillevenfinddisputesbetweenauthorswhoessentiallyagreeaboutthesetofevidencethatisrelevanttoassessingtheexistenceoffreewill,mostlyagreealsoabouttheirevaluationofthatevidence,andyetendupdisagreeingaboutwhethertoconcludethatwehavefreewill.Whattheyaredisagreeingabout,inshort,iswhatitreallymeanstosaythatwehavefreewill.Accordingly,successfullydebatingourtopicinvolvesnotonlybeingabletoanalyzeandarguetheevidenceabouttherelationshipbetweenscienceandfreewill,butalsobeingabletoanalyzeandargueaboutwhatwereallymeanwhenwetalkabout“freewill.”Thereareavarietyofviewsaboutthemeaningof“freewill”asaterm,butasastartitishelpfultodividetheseviewsintothreemaincamps.Onewaytothinkaboutthedisputebetweenthesethreecampsisthattheydifferintheirviewofhowstrongaconceptionoffreedomisatplayinfreewill.Inotherwords,whatononeviewcountsasprovidingforgenuinefreedomofwilllooksonanotherviewasifitguaranteesonlythesemblanceoffreedom,ratherthanthegenuinearticle.Herearethethreeviews,whichIhaveorderedfromleaststrongtomoststrong:The“RationalDeliberation”ViewOnthisview,weshouldbecountedashavingfreewillifwehavetheabilitytoactonthebasisofourreasoningaboutwhattodo.Ifwecanidentifycaseswhereweareawareofconsciouslydeliberatingaboutwhattodo—weighingourreasonsforandagainstaparticularaction,consideringalternatives,andultimatelydecidingwhattodo—,andweareabletosaythatthisconsciousdeliberationwasthebasisofourperformingtheactionthatwedecidedtoperform,thenwecountashavingfreewillonthisview.Mostoften,itistakenasanupshotofthisviewthatfreewillisonlypossiblewhereweactvoluntarily,i.e.withouttheinfluenceofundueforce.Insomecasesthisforcemightcomeintheformofexternalcoercion,asitdoeswhenwearethreatenedwithviolenceifwedonottakeaparticularaction.Inother(morecomplexanddisputed)cases,thisforcemightbeinternal,aswhenapersonispathologicallycompelledtoactbyamentalillness.
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The“DeepOpenness”View3Onthisview,actingonthebasisofaconscious,reasoneddecisionisnotsufficienttocountasexercisingfreewill,thoughitisnecessary.Whatisrequiredinadditionisthat,whenyoumakeaconscious,reasoneddecisionaboutwhattodo,itmustbegenuinelypossibleforyoutomakeadifferentdecision,giveneverythingasitisatthetimeyoumakethedecision.Here“everything”hasaverybroadmeaningthatincludesthingslikeyourconsciousstateofmind,goals,thoughts,andemotions,butalsothingslikeyourbrainstates,upbringing,socialcontext,andphysicalenvironment,andeventhestateoftheuniverseanditshistoryasawhole.Thatdramaticlistshouldmakeitclearthatthisviewasksustoprovemoreabouttherobustnessofourdecisionmakingabilitiesinordertocountashavingdemonstratedthatwehavefreewill.The“ReasonasaNon-NaturalCause”ViewThefinalviewisthemostdifficulttoexplain.Itstartsbytakingseriouslyaninsightofthefirstview:theabilitytoactonthebasisofconsciousreasoninganddecisionmakingiscentraltotheideaoffreewill.However,thisviewmaintainsthatpossessingtheabilitytoactonthebasisofconsciousreasoninginvolvesagooddealmorethanonemightinitiallythink.Considerwhatwemeanby“reasoning”andwhywethinkthattheprocessofreasoningisamanifestationofourfreedom.Onitsface,theprocessofreasoningaboutwhattodoinvolvestheconsiderationofargumentsaboutwhattodo,theacceptanceofsomeofthoseargumentsbecausewebelievewehavesufficientreasontoendorsethemasgoodarguments,and,ultimately,thedecisiontoactinsomewaybecausewehavereasonedthatitisthebestwaytoact.ItmakessensethatIviewtheprocessofreasoning(andresultingcourseofaction)sodescribedasexpressingmyfreedom:throughouttheprocess,IammakingupmymindaboutwhatIbelieveIshoulddo.Theconclusionofthisprocess—mydecisionabouthowtoact—entirelyreflectswhatIthink.Inshort,myactionreflectsmeandmydecisions.Itisthemanifestationofasortofmentalfreedom,ofamentalrealminwhichIamrunningtheshow.Whatdoesallofthishavetodowiththeideaof“reasonasanon-naturalcause”?Thatphraseisdifficulttograsp;itinvokestheveryabstractideaofdifferenttypesof“causes.”Wecanunderstandthisideaintermsofdifferentusesoftheword“because.”Forexample,Imightsay,“Thetreefelldownbecauseanespeciallystronggustofwindblewitover.”Imeanthattheforceofthewindexplainswhythetreefelltotheground.Imightalsosay,“IwenttothegymbecauseIwanttobecomehealthier.”ImeanthatmywantingtobecomehealthierexplainswhyIwenttothegym.Thesetwostatementsappeartohaveasimilarstructure,butwemightthinkthatthestatementsoffertwofundamentallydifferenttypesofexplanations.Inthecaseofgoingtothegym,myactionisexplainedbymythinkingthatitisgood,proper,ordesirablethatIgotothegymbecauseIthinkthatdoingsowillcontributetomybeinghealthier.Hopefully,ifIdidnotthinkthat,thenthatexplanationofmyactionwouldbeafalseone.Inthecaseofthefallentree,however,whatisgood,proper,ordesirablehasnothingtodowithit.Climatologicalconditionsexplainthewind,andtheforceexertedbythewindonthetreeexplainsthetreefallingdown.Allofthatwillholdtrueregardlessofwhetheranyonethinks
3 This view is commonly taken to be a candidate view of what free will must involve, but I have borrowed the name for it from Mele 2014.
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thatitisgood,proper,ordesirablethatthewindblowsoverthetree.Wemightregisterthisdifferenceintypeofexplanationbysayingthatthefallingofthetreeisexplainedsolelybytheforcesofnature,whereasmyactionisexplained,inpart,byarationalcause—acausethatproducesitseffectbecauseIendorsethedesirabilityorgoodnessofit.Onthisview,then,rationalcausesaredistinctfromnaturalcauses,andourabilitytothinkofouractionsasareflectionofourfreelyreasoningaboutwhattododependsonthisdistinction.Ifwecannotthinkofourreasoningasadistinctivesortofexplanationofouractions,thenitmayappearthatwearedecidingwhattodowhenwereasonaboutwhattodo,butultimatelywearelikethefallentree:blownaroundinourownmindsbyforcesthatoperateonusindependentlyofwhetherwethinkthattheyshould.Thisviewissometimesdiscussedastheviewthat,ifhumanbeingspossessfreewill,thenitmustbebecausehumanbeingshavesomethingcalledasoul.Thisterminologymakessomesense,butforourpurposes,itmightmisleadinglybringtomindunnecessaryreligiousorspiritualcommitments.Aswehaveseen,proponentsofthisviewmightbemotivatedbyconsiderationsthathavenothingtodowithreligiousorspiritualbeliefs.Accordingly,amoreprecisewayofdescribingthisviewmightbetosaythatitmakesthefollowingclaim:ifhumanbeingspossessfreewill,thenitmustbebecausehumanbeingshavetheabilitytocausethemselvestoactinacertainway(touseanawkwardphrase)becausetheyhaverationallyconcludedthattheyshouldactinthatway.Inotherwords,“freewill”isthenameforabeing’sabilitytocausesomethingtohappen,atleastinpart,byforceofreason,ratherthanmerelybyaforceofnature.***Nowthatwehavethreecandidateviewsofwhat“freewill”involves,itisnaturaltowonderwhichviewweshouldadoptinsettingthetermsfordebateaboutthetopic.Inotherwords,howshouldstudentsgoaboutarguingforoneoranotherviewofwhattheterm“freewill”meansinthecontextofourtopic.Obviously,thisareaofargumentisanimportantoneforstudentstoengagein.Withoutmakingadecisionaboutwhichviewoffreewilltoadopt,wewillnotbeinapositiontosaywhetheranygivenargumentinthedebatecountsasevidenceeitherinfavoroftheexistenceoffreewill,orinfavorofascientificdisproofofitsexistence.For,howcouldwesaythatifwedonotevenknowwhattheterm“freewill”means,i.e.unlessweknowwhatabilitiesapersonneedstopossessinorderforustobewillingtoaffirmthattheypossessfreewill?Eachofuscouldconsultourownintuitionsaboutwhatisinvolvedinfreewill.Uponreflection,weallprobablyhavefeelingsaboutthematter,andthesefeelingslikelypointusinthegeneraldirectionofoneofourcandidateviews.Thisiscertainlynotabadplacetostart.However,itisnotapromisingplacetoend,sinceitleavesuswithoutawayforwardinanycasewherethereisadisagreementofintuitionsamongtheparticipantsinadiscussionordebate.Herearethreeotherwaysthatwemightapproachthequestionofwhatweshouldunderstandtheterm“freewill”tomean:
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(1)Wecouldlooktosurveystudiesofwhatpeople(peoplewhoarenotselectedonthebasisofbeingparticipantsinacademicdebatesaboutfreewill)ordinarilythinktheterm“freewill”means.Believeitornot,thereisabodyofliteraturethatspeakstothisquestion.SeeMele2012,MonroeandMalle2010,andNahmiasandThompson2014.(2)Wecouldreflectontherolethattheconceptoffreewillplaysinourindividual,interpersonal,social,andpoliticallives.Thebeliefsthatwehaveaboutfreewillshapeourviewsofpersonalresponsibility,charactereducation,criminaljustice,luckandmerit,andsoon.Totakeoneexample:ifyoubelievethat,atleastinsomecases,criminalsoughttobepunishedbecausetheirchoicesdeserveretribution,thenyouprobablybelievethatthosechoicesweremanifestationsofthecriminal’sfreewillinsomesense.Accordingly,wecanask:whatviewoffreewilldoweneedtooperateunderinordertopreserveorjustifyothercommonlyheldviews(aboutcriminaljustice,forexample)?Askingquestionslikethisoneisagoodwaytocheckwhetheradoptingaparticularunderstandingoftheterm“freewill”forthepurposesofdebatewillmaketheoutcomeofthatdebatesignificantorinterestingintermsofourlife.Ifweshowthatscienceleavesroomfor“freewill,”butonlyonadefinitionunderwhichourbeliefin“freewill”isinsufficienttowarrantanyofourothercloselyheldbeliefsabout,say,personalresponsibility,thenthiswillnotbeaveryinformativeresult;for,thatsenseof“freewill”apparentlydoesnotreallymattertous.(3)Wecouldargueforoneoftheviewsoffreewillbyarguingthattheotherviewsinfactdependonit,sothattheotherviewscannotbeunderstoodasplausiblealternativestoit.Relatedly,wecouldargueagainstaviewoffreewillbyarguingthatitisincoherent,orotherwisefailsbyitsownlights.Thisargumentativerouteisbestunderstoodbylookingatexamplesofit.Hereisone.Recallthatonthefirstviewoffreewill,wecountashavingfreewillifwehavetheabilitytoconsciouslyreasonaboutwhattodoandtoactonthedecisionthatwemakeasaresultofthatconsciousreasoning.Onthesecondview,thisisnotenough.Wealsoneedtobeabletosaythatwecouldhavemadeadifferentdecision,evenifeverythingasidefromthatdecisionremainedthesame.Now,proponentsofthesecondviewtendtoarguethatwhatthefirstviewrequires—consciousreasoningandactingonthebasisofthatreasoning—isnotsomethingwecangenuinelyhave,unlesswehavefreewillunderstoodasthesecondviewdefinesit.Theyreasonthatifwecouldnothavemadeadifferentdecision,evenifeverythingelseaboutusandtheworldremainedthesame,thenwewereneverreallyconsciouslydeliberatingaboutourdecisionatall.Itmayhaveseemedtousthatwewerecarefullyconsideringwhichofseveralalternativeactionstotake,butinfactwehadnochoiceinthematter—wehadtomakethedecisionthatwemade.Ifthisargumentiscorrect,thenthefirstviewoffreewillisnotacompetitortothesecondviewoffreewill,sincewecouldnevercountashavingfreewillinthefirstsenseunlesswecountedashavingitinthesecondsense.Fromtheperspectiveofanyoftheviewsoffreewill,onecouldmakeargumentsthattheotherviewseitherdependonthatview,orthattheotherviewsareincoherentinawaythatthatviewisnot.Commontermsintheliterature
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Beforeturningtoabriefoutlineofargumentsoneachsideofthetopic,weshouldgooverthemeaningofafewtechnicaltermsthatarenotpresentinthewordingofthetopicitself,butthatyouwilllikelyencounterasyouresearchit.Above,weencounteredthetermdeterminismanddefineditastheviewthatthecompletedescriptionoftheuniverseatanypointintimecombinedwithacompletesetofthelawsthatgovernthenaturaluniverseentailsacompletesetofeverythingthatistrueabouttheuniverse(including,therefore,everythingthathaseverhappenedandeverythingthatwilleverhappen).Youwillnodoubtencounterthenamesofthreedifferentpositionsaboutthequestionofwhetherscienceleavesroomforfreewill:compatibilism,incompatibilism,andlibertarianism.Wecandefineeachofthesepositionsaccordingtotheirviewofdeterminismandwhatconsequencesdeterminism(iftrue)hasontheexistenceoffreewill.Compatibilistsmaintainthatthetruthofdeterminismdoesnotruleouttheexistenceoffreewill.Compatibilistsoftenalsobelievethatdeterminismisfalse,buttheircentralpointisthat,evenifdeterminismistrue,itdoesnotthreatenfreewill.Incontrast,incompatibilistsbelievethat,ifdeterminismistrue,thenfreewilldoesnotexist.Someincompatibilistsbelievethatdeterminismistrueandfreewilldoesnotexist.Libertariansareincompatibilistswhobelievethatdeterminismisfalseandthatfreewillexists.Asyouencounteradditionalunfamiliartermsinthecourseofyourresearch,agoodreferenceforquickandreliabledefinitionsisHaggard,Mele,O’Connor,andVohs2015,whichisalexiconoftermsastheyarecommonlyusedindebatesaboutfreewill.Thislexiconincludesanumberoftechnicaltermsthatyoulikelywillnotneedtoknow,soitisbestusedasareferencetoconsultwhenyouencountertermsyouwouldlikedefined,ratherthanasasourcetobeginbyreadingstraightthroughonitsown.AbriefoverviewofargumentsoneachsideAsyoubeginyourresearchonourtopic,itmighthelptobearinmindsomebasicvarietiesofargumentsoneachsideofthetopic.Thiswillhelpyouwatchoutforrelevantargumentsasyoulookatthesuggestedmaterials.Later,wewillexaminetheseargumentsinsignificantlymoredepth.Forthemoment,thegoalisonlytoprovideyouwithinitialguidepostsasyoubeginyourownresearchandthinkingaboutthetopic.ConsiderationsontheAffirmative:Scienceleavesnoroomforfreewill• Naturally,thehigherthebarissetfordemonstratingthatwehavefreewill,theeasieritis
toprovethatscienceleavesnoroomforfreewill.Accordingly,itmakessensefortheaffirmativetoarguethatarobustsetofconditionsmustbemetinordertoprovethatwehavesomethingthatamountsto“freewill.”Thus,itisintheaffirmative’sinteresttoargueforoneofthestrongerviews(outlinedabove)ofwhat“freewill”means.Ofcourse,italso
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makesensefortheaffirmativetoarguethat,evenonweakerviewsoffreewill,scienceleavesnoroomforfreewill.
• Thereareavarietyofneuroscientificstudiesthatpurporttodemonstratethatour
decisionsaretheproductofbrainactivityofwhichweareunaware.Thesestudiesuseelectroencephalogram(EEG)orfunctionalmagneticresonanceimaging(fMRI)technologytomonitorsubjects’brainactivityastheyareaskedtomakedecisions.Thestudiesclaimtodemonstratethatbrainactivitythatcorrespondstothe“decision”totakeactionisdetectablepriortosubjectsreportinghavingmadeaconsciousdecision.Ifyouwouldliketomakeargumentsonthebasisoftheseexperiments,itiscriticalthatyoufamiliarizeyourselfwiththedetailsoftheirmethodology.Itisalsocriticalthatyoubepreparedtodefendnotonlythedataproducedbytheexperiments,butalsotheresearchers’interpretationofthatdata.
• Therearealsorelevantstudiesofhumanbehaviorfromtheperspectiveofsocial
psychology.Thesestudiesvarygreatlyinformatandsubjectmatter,buttheirpointofcommonalityisthattheyidentifywaysinwhichfactorsoutsideofaperson’scontrol,andperhapsevenoutsidethescopeoftheirawareness—factorssuchasaperson’senvironment,socialcontext,andupbringing—significantlyshapetheirconduct.Again,youshouldbepreparedtospeakaboutnotonlytheconclusionsdrawnbytheauthorsofthesestudies,butalsototheirmethodologyandtheirreasonsforinterpretingtheirdataastheydid.
• Theconclusionsthattheaffirmativecandrawfromthefindingsofneuroscienceandsocial
psychologywillbesignificantlystrengthenediftheaffirmativeisalsopreparedtoarguethatgeneralfeaturesofscienceasanenterpriseorframeworkforexplainingtheworldareincompatiblewiththeexistenceoffreewill.Oneformthatthisargumentcantakeistheclaimthatscientificexplanationentailsthetruthofdeterminism.Thisisanimportantvarietyofargumentfortheaffirmativeinitsownright.However,italsohelpsprovideafavorablecontext(fortheaffirmative)forinterpretingtheexperimentalfindingsmentionedabove.Forexample,viewedfromtheperspectiveofageneralcommitmenttodeterminism,aneurosciencestudy,evenifitisimperfectormorelimitedinitsconclusionsthantheaffirmativemighthope,lookslikeapositivestepinthedirectionofprovidinganexplanationofhumanbehaviorinawaythateliminatesfreewillfromtheequation.
• Someopponentsoffreewillarguethattheideaoffreewillisincoherentonitsface,either
becauseitissubjecttoadilemma.Brieflystated,thepurporteddilemmaisthis:eitherouractionsareentirelydeterminedbypriorcausesoutsideofourcontrol,orthesetofpriorcausesdoesnotdetermineouractions.Intheformercase,ouractionsarenotdirectedbyfreewill,butratherbyadeterministicsetofpriorcauses.Inthelattercase,wehavetheopportunitytomakeadecision,butitappearstobeanexerciseinrandomselection,sincethedecisionisleftentirelyopenbyeveryfactor.Onemightarguethatascientific
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explanationofhumanbehaviorthateliminatedfreewillfromthepicturewouldavoidthisproblem,whichitselfisasymptomoftheinabilityoffreewilltoprovideasatisfactoryaccountofanyofourbehavior.
ConsiderationsontheNegative:Scienceleavesroomforfreewill• Thenegativedebaterislargelytaskedwithmountingadefensivemaneuver.Theyneedto
proveonlythatnothingaboutscienceprovidesuswithsufficientevidencetoruleoutfreewill.Thisisparticularlytrueifthenegativecanargueforafairlyunambitiousviewofwhatfreewillinvolves.Accordingly,itmightbeinthenegative’sinteresttoargueforaweakerviewoffreewill(outlinedabove).Onaweakerviewoffreewill,theaffirmativehasmoreworktodoinordertodemonstratethatscienceleavesnoroomforfreewill.Moreover,onaweakerviewoffreewill,wehavefairlyobviousinitialevidenceforbelievingintheexistenceoffreewill:ourpersonalexperienceofregularlymakingupourmindsaboutwhattodo.Ofcourse,thenegativemightalsochoosetocombinethisargumentativetacticwiththetacticofdefendingtheexistenceoffreewill,evenunderaverystrongviewofwhatfreewillinvolves.
• Asignificantpartofthenegative’sdefensivetaskwillbetowarrantdoubtsaboutthe
designorfindingsofthestudiesavailabletotheaffirmative.Thereareseveralcrucialquestionstoconsiderhere.Dothestudiescitedbytheaffirmativeprovesomethingabouthumanactioningeneral,ordotheyinsteadmerelydemonstratesomethingaboutaveryparticularsubsetofhumanactions?Aretherealternativewaystoexplainthedataproducedbytheaffirmative’sstudies—waysthatdonoteliminatethepossibilityoffreewill?Dothestudiesonlyseemtothreatentheexistenceoffreewillbecausetheymakeunnecessaryassumptionsaboutwhatmustbeinvolvedindecisionmakingandaction?
• Researchpresentedbytheaffirmativeislikelytopaintapictureofhumanlifeasfullof
unconscious,automaticbehaviors.Fromtheaffirmative’spointofview,thispicturedemonstratesthatouractionsarenotmanifestationsoffreewill.Thenegative,however,mightofferanalternativeinterpretationofthispicture:muchofhumanbehaviorinvolvesunthinking,orautomatic,responsesnotbecausetheseresponsesareunfree,butbecausetheseresponsesmanifestourdeeprelianceonbothourcharacterandourskills.Aperson’scharacterandskillinnavigatingtheworldarebothsignificantlyshapedbyaprolongedandcontinuousattempttoshapeoneself,withtremendoushelpfromothers,ofcourse.IfIreachoutwithoutthinkingtohelpastrangerwhohasfallenonthestreetortoblockaballthatisflyingatmyface,isthisevidencethatmybehaviorisautomatic(inthesenseofbeingunfree,aproductofmysteriousforces),orisitevidencethatmybehaviorexpresseswhoIaminadeepsense,asensethatisatleastpartiallyreflectiveofwhoIhave,overtime,freelychosentobe?
• Wesawthattheaffirmativecanarguethatgeneralfeaturesofscientificexplanationare
incompatiblewithfreewill.Thenegativehasacounter-claimtomakeinthisareaofthedebate.Thenatureofscientificexplanationbyitselfcannotthreatentheexistenceoffree
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will,unlesswealsobelievethatscienceistheonlylegitimatesourceofexplanationoftheworld,oratleastthesourceofhighestauthority.Incontemporarylife,thismightbeabroadlyheldbelief.However,anotherpossibilityisthatsciencespeakswiththehighestauthorityaboutcertaintypesofworldlyphenomena,butnotabouteverytypeofworldlyphenomena.Perhapstherearesomephenomenathatareundoubtedlyreal,butthatmustbeexplainedinnon-scientificterms(whichisnottosayanti-scientificterms).Onthestrongestviewof“freewill”outlinedabove,humanactionsarephenomenaofthistype.Defendingthispositionrequiresthenegativetotakeonasignificantargumentativeburden,butitalsostandsachanceofchallengingtheaffirmative’sapproachinaveryfundamentalway—awaythatmanyoftheaffirmative’sargumentsmanynothelpthemdisprove.
Bibliography* AverygoodpointofentryintoourtopicwouldbetoreadAlfredMele’sFree:WhyScienceHasn’tDisprovedFreeWillandSamHarris’FreeWill.Thesetwotextsareshortandaccessibleintroductions,andtheyapproachourtopicfromopposingperspectives.
AreweFree?.Slate.Retrievedfromhttp://www.slate.com/bigideas/are-we-freeCoyne,JerryA.“YouDon’tHaveFreeWill.”TheChronicleofHigherEducation.Retrieved fromhttp://www.chronicle.com/article/jerry-a-coyne-you-dont-have/131165Dennett,DanielC.“ReflectionsonFreeWill:AReview.”SamHarris.Retrievedfromhttps://www.samharris.org/blog/item/reflections-on-free-willFreeWill.ClosertoTruth.Retrievedfromhttps://www.closertotruth.com/topics/consciousness/free-willHaggard,P.,Mele,A.,O’Connor,T.,andK.Vohs.2015.“FreeWillLexicon.”InSurrounding FreeWill:Philosophy,Psychology,Neuroscience.EditedbyAlfredR.Mele.NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress.Harris,Sam.2012.FreeWill.NewYork:FreePress.Harris,Sam.“TheMarionette’sLament:AResponsetoDanielDennett.”SamHarris.Retrieved fromhttps://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-marionettes-lamentHolton,Richard.“TheProblemofFreeWill.”WirelessPhilosophy.Retrievedfromhttp://www.wi-phi.com/video/problem-free-willIsFreeWillanIllusion?.TheChronicleofHigherEducation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.chronicle.com/article/Is-Free-Will-an-Illusion-/131159/
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Mele,Alfred.2012.“AnotherScientificThreattoFreeWill?”Monist95:422-40.Mele,Alfred.“DoesFreeWillExist?.”BigThink.Retrievedfromhttp://bigthink.com/videos/does-free-will-existMele,AlfredR.2014.Free:WhyScienceHasn’tDisprovedFreeWill.NewYork:Oxford UniversityPress.“MindOverMasters:TheQuestionofFreeWill.”WorldScienceFestival.Retrievedfromhttp://livestream.com/WorldScienceFestival/events/4063353/videos/88765079Monroe,A.,andB.Malle.2010.“FromUncausedWilltoConsciousChoice:TheNeedtoStudy, NotSpeculateAboutPeople’sFolkConceptofFreeWill.”ReviewofPhilosophyand Psychology1:211-24.Nahmias,Eddy.“IsNeurosciencetheDeathofFreeWill?.”TheNewYorkTimes.Retrievedfromhttp://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/is-neuroscience-the-death-of-free-will/?_r=0Nahmias,E.,andM.Thompson.2014.“ANaturalisticVisionofFreeWill.”InCurrent ControversiesinExperimentalPhilosophy.EditedbyE.O’NeillandE.Machery.Boston: Routledge.O’Connor,Timothy.“FreeWill.”StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.Retrievedfromhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/Strawson,Galen.2003.“OnFreeWill.”RichmondJournalofPhilosophy4.Retrievedfrom http://www.richmond-philosophy.net/rjp/back_issues/rjp4_strawson.pdfStrawson,Galen.“YourMove:TheMazeofFreeWill.”TheNewYorkTimes.Retrievedfrom http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/your-move-the-maze-of-free-will/
