Download - CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools
Design
Violence
Out of
Schools Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor Texas Tech University
General Concepts
School Applications
Making it Happen
CPTED in Schools
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CPTED in Schools
General Concepts
(Anti-CPTED Premise) shifts the location of
anti-social activity
(CPTED Premise) decreases anti-social activity
Greater perceived risk of getting caught…
Research predominantly supports the pro-CPTED premise
(CPTED Premise) decreases anti-social activity
(Anti-CPTED Premise) shifts the location of
anti-social activity
Educational CPTED is important either way
(CPTED Premise) decreases anti-social activity
(Anti-CPTED Premise) shifts the location of
anti-social activity
Perceived risk of being caught is based upon SAT
scores…
S urveillance (Will I be seen?)
A ccess (Who can get in and out)?
T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
S urveillance (Will I be seen?)
“burglarized houses had less visual access to immediately neighboring houses than did non-burglarized houses”
Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
Most burglary entries do not occur through the front door, often because of natural surveillance
Open access to side or rear entry points where there is no natural surveillance make for more attractive burglary entrances
“Convenience stores experienced mean annual robbery rate reductions after installation of CCTV systems (-23%); installation of video cameras with monitors (-54%)”
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
Office beverages available with payment on an “honor” system.
Picture above payment instructions rotated weekly.
Payments were higher when picture of eyes was posted.
M. Bateson, D. Nettle & G. Roberts (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters 2, 412–414.
A B
Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Each person receives $10. Computer question: Do you want to share any of it with another (anonymous) participant?
K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256
Sharing 55%
Not Sharing
45%
Normal Screen
Sharing 88%
Not Sharing
12%
Eyes Screen
K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256
In London double-decker buses, far more vandalism to seats farther away from high traffic stairwell areas and driver
Sturman, A., (1980). Damage on buses: The effects of supervision. In Clarke R., and Mayhew, P. (Eds.) Designing out crime (31-38). London: Her Majasty’s Stationery Office.
What natural surveillance issue best predicted convenience store robberies?
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
Visibility from outside the store to inside the store was the most important sight line
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
Visibility from outside the store to inside the store was a more significant predictor of convenience store robberies than the number of clerks or the proximity to drug traffic, gangs, or subsidized housing
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
A ccess (Who can get in and out)?
“Burglarized houses had fewer fences and locked gates surrounding the yard than did non-burglarized houses”
Brown, B., Altman, B. (1983). Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
Preventing access by adding chain link fencing and lighting to lower levels of this parking garage led to 50% drop in reported crime
Tseng, C.-H. (Ohio State U.), Duane, J. (Ohio State U.), & Hadipriono, F. (Ohio State U.). 2004. Performance of Campus Parking Garages in Preventing Crime. Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, 18(1), 21-28.
Cul-de-sacs may limit access and make visiting cars more noticeable
Helpful in a law-abiding community, but Harmful in a gang-controlled community
T erritoriality
(Does anyone care what happens here?)
“burglarized houses had fewer symbolic barriers characteristic of primary territories (i.e., fewer markers depicting the identity of the territory owners)”
Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
“Broken windows” theory:
signs of disorder like broken windows, litter,
and graffiti induce other types of
disorder and petty crime
K Keizer et al. Science 2008;322:1681-1685 Published by AAAS
Visible violation of graffiti prohibition led to violating litter prohibition where Dutch experimenters posted bicycle fliers and added graffiti
K Keizer et al. Science
2008;322:1681-1685
Published by AAAS
When letter with money was hanging out of a post office box theft occurred 13% normally but 27% if box had graffiti
In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, one significant difference between robbed and non-robbed stores was distance from nearest graffiti
S. A. Hendricks, D. P. Landsittel, H. E. Amandus, J. Malcan, & J. Bell. (1999) A matched case-control study of convenience store robbery risk factors. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 41(11), 995-1004
No maintenance implies no one
cares what happens there
Better to remove it, than
leave it vandalized
All three CPTED principles must work together
Access barriers alone can be overcome
Surveillance +
Access +
Territoriality
work together
If no one cares what happens here, is it less risky to try opening the door with a crowbar or bolt cutter?
Territoriality impacts Access
Some high fences control access, but
(1) Blocking surveillance
(2) Sending a territoriality message that the area is dangerous and no one cares what happens outside the wall
An opaque chain link fence blocks surveillance and permits graffiti showing a lack of external territoriality
With proper design and maintenance,
high fences can limit access without
damaging surveillance or
territoriality
A high fence blocking access without damaging surveillance or territoriality
Stark window bars limit access, but may also send a negative territoriality message
about neighborhood safety
Glass block can create security similar to window bars but without the stigma
Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance and easy access for both entry and escape
Combined with territoriality deficiencies, stairwells can create CPTED problem areas
Design solutions can improve the
natural surveillance for
stairwells
Open stairwells have strong
natural surveillance properties
CPTED in Schools
School Applications
S urveillance (Will I be seen?)
A ccess (Who can get in and out)?
T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
School CPTED concepts are the same…
S urveillance (Will I be seen?)
A study of five Midwestern high schools found of 166 violent incidents, none took place when adults were present Astor RA, Meyer HA, Behre WJ. 1999. Unowned places and times: Maps and interviews about violence in high schools. Am Educ Res J 36:3–42.
Adding openings or windows in solid walls
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Blocking access to hidden areas
convex mirrors for visibility around corners
Electronic surveillance
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Promote surveillance and prevent hiding by keeping bushes below 1.5 feet and tree limbs above 8 feet
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Design signage to prevent concealment
“replacing bathroom entrance doors with right-angle entrances permit the warning sounds of crime to travel more freely and reduce the sense of isolation”
Sommer, R. (1983). Social design: Creating buildings with people in mind. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Bathroom areas allowing sound and smoke to transmit to hallway
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
45 degree tapered angles allow seeing around blind
corners and
expanding scope of
vision
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
moving the staff lunch area or office locations
A
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
coaches’ offices should have direct visual and auditory surveillance
A ccess (Who can get in and out)?
Too much obvious access
control can undermine
school environment
Effective and subtle
Attractive window grates or separated small windows prevent access
Converting most exterior doors to emergency exits improves access control
Avoid pull down ladders or utility boxes that allow
roof access
Territoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
Gangs use graffiti to establish their territory; schools take it back through repainting, following up with ongoing, vigilant maintenance
Any generally neglected exterior area will also seem ideal for misbehavior
Landscape buffers may reduce access to
graffiti prone walls
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Consider the use of
inspirational or student-
created artwork
In progress results from my fMRI research shows greater fear reduction from public art
than from visible security cameras
Combining Access Control
and Natural Surveillance
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Access Control + Surveillance
A secure bicycle
rack
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
Access Control + Surveillance
wrought iron
fencing instead of solid
walls
Access Control + Surveillance
Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
CPTED in Schools
Making it Happen
The frontal approach
Suggest that the school hire a CPTED
specialist to complete an analysis of campus buildings
and make recommendations on improvements
Did you just say, “let’s spend money so we can create a
need to spend more money?”
The “what I think” approach
Examine the buildings and make recommendations based on what you see
Why should we spend
money based on your
subjective opinions?
What if neither of these
approaches work?
Campus Risk Assessment Algorithm Maps Russell James, J.D., Ph.D.
Associate Professor Texas Tech University
A free Excel template to generate hot spot maps available at goo.gl/h3KVY
or http://www.encouragegenerosity.com/maps.xlxs
*a more precise model would incorporate a discounting function by multiplying each area block by 1 where, d = meters to the target space if greater than 7, else d=1 k*(1.1d/7) k=2 if area is separated from target space by glass or video, else k=1
1. Panorama Viewing Area (PVA) The total area* from which a person in the space can be viewed
2. Student PVA Typical student population of the PVA over time
3. Staff PVA Typical staff population of the PVA over time
Input three objective scores for each space
Hot Spot Type 1: Crimes of Opportunity (Minor)
High activity/low
supervision reflected by a high level of
Student PVA Percentile*
- Staff PVA Percentile *
*percentiles are relative ranking across all occupied areas
Hot Spot Type 2: Concealed Criminal
Activity (Major)
Low activity/low supervision reflected by an accessible area with
low total score of
Student PVA Percentile* + Staff PVA Percentile*
*percentiles are relative ranking across all
occupied areas
1. Paste outline into Excel template
Obtain / create a line drawing floor plan (or campus map) picture with a transparent background to paste and resize in Excel
2. Insert data into Excel template
Insert number of blocks visible from each block [PVA tab] X the
student [StudentPVA tab] or staff
[StaffPVA tab] population
during target period in cells
underlying map
3. Results
Color coded maps with percentile
rankings for PVA, PVA-
Student, PVA-Staff, Hot
Spot Type 1, and Hot Spot
Type 2
Time Series CRAA Maps
Complete
previous analyses for each 20
minute block during a school
day
Publish CRAAMaps, with suggestions for addressing hot spots • Physical changes to
increase visibility • Camera placement • Staff location
changes • Access restriction
(for low activity areas)
Prove the problem
Track exact location of
campus conduct
violations and overlay
against CRAAMs
Prove the solution
but not at a comparison
hot spot
Place treatment(s)
at one hot spot
track violations in one
compared to the other
General Concepts
School Applications
Making it Happen
CPTED in Schools
Ready for
more?
If you found these useful, CLICK on
this slide and leave your name and institution to show my bosses
that I should make more! (Plus, get
info on other free videos/slides)
Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. is associate professor in the Department of Applied and Professional Studies at Texas Tech University. He is the most frequently published author in ISI-ranked academic journals on the topic of residential satisfaction. His research in residential satisfaction led to his interest in environmentally-influenced perceptions of safety. He has presented his urban studies related research nationally and internationally at conferences including The Environmental Design Research
Association, The Housing Educators Research Association, and The European Network of Housing Researchers. He worked briefly in the U.S. Attorneys Office (narcotics division) in Kansas City and later served over five years as president of Central Christian College in Moberly, Missouri during which time several new buildings were constructed. His current research involves the use of fMRI brain scanning to uncover neural correlates of financial and environmental satisfaction.