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Conceptual History and Politics: Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested?Author(s): Oliver HidalgoSource: Contributions to the History of Concepts, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2008), pp. 176-201Published by: Berghahn BooksStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23730897 .

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i RIL L Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 www.brill.nl/chco

Conceptual History and Politics:

Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested?

Oliver Hidalgo Institut fiir Politikwissenschaft der Universitat Regensburg

Abstract

This article surveys the history of the concept of democracy from Ancient times to

the present. According to the author, the conceptual history of democracy shows that

the overwhelming success of the concept is most of all due to its ability to subsume

very different historical ideas and realities under its semantic field. Moreover, the

historical evolution of the concept reveals that no unequivocal definition is possible

because of the significant paradoxes, aporias, and contradictions it contains. These

are popular sovereignty vs. representation, quality vs. quantity, liberty vs. equality,

individual vs. collective, and, finally, the synchronicity between similarities and dis

similarities. The ubiquitous usage of democracy in present-day political language

makes it impossible to speak of it from an external perspective. Thus, both demo

cratic theory and practice are suffused with empirical and normative elements.

Keywords

democracy, conceptual history, conceptual politics, normative theory

The concept of democracy has been associated at different points in history with some very opposing ideas: while the ancients used the term dripoKpaxta to identify the effective rule of the many or even of the whole people

(despite the fact only a minority were considered citizens and the popula tion was constricted to a small area), modern thinkers employ it in order

to refer to a society in which people are able to elect and control their

rulers as a means to guarantee freedom, equality, and the pursuit of self

interest for all individuals.1 There are also countless other forms of govern

" For a comprehensive analysis of ancient and modern democracies see Moses I. Finley

(1980), Fritz Gschnitzer (1995), and Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (1996).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/187465608X363463



O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 177

merit which adopt patterns, (sub-) types, and varieties of decision-making

processes that have also been labelled democratic, making it hard to keep orientation. This myriad usage of the concept leads to a spate of distinc

tions and qualifications. Most traditionally, one can speak of democracies

that are liberal or republican, direct or representative, consensual or majori

tarian, market or socially oriented. More recently, other variants acquired

prominence such as participatory, deliberative and grassroots democracies,

or even alternatives like demarchy, skewed democracy and non-partisan

democracy. Finally, considering how democracies have evolved worldwide, even the possibility of a specific Islamic transformation of democracy or of

a socialist and anarchist brand of democratization might expand the scope

of the concept in the future.

If a typology is plausible (a difficult task as it is, since nowadays the basic

traits of a direct democracy -initiatives, referenda and recalls — take place

within the representative system and the people sometimes not only han

dle legislative but certain executive and judicial powers as well), we cannot

avoid the suspicion that the "government of the people, by the people, and

for the people" (Abraham Lincoln) might just as well mean "everyone and

everything."2

Rather than succumbing to a mood of dismay, we must take into con

sideration W. B. Gallie's classical statement that democracy - like justice or

arts — is yet another one among those "essentially contested concepts"

which lack unique standards of definition.3 Furthermore (and fortunately) the contest seems to concern first and foremost the interpretation of the

concept, not the concept of democracy itself.4 Obviously then the question

that must be made is whether it is possible to find arguments and criteria

to assess what is the best interpretation of the concept of democracy or

whether all there is to be done is to accept a juxtaposition of competing

versions. This approach implies a second, deeper problem, namely, the

extent to which conceptual history might help in acquiring a normative

perception of democracy. At first glance, there can only be an answer in the

negative: conceptual history (here understood as the description and anal

ysis of concrete historical semantics, origins, derivations and alterations of

8 Giovanni Sartori (1992), 11. 3> See Walter B. Gallie (1956). 4) See some considerations concerning normative concepts presented by Stephen Lukes

(1974) and Rainer Forst (2003), 50-52.



178 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201

concepts) apparently belongs to the empirical paradigm in social sciences,5

therefore a normative notion of democracy (and not only a reflection of

the social and moral impact of democratic ideas and values) can only be

informed by political philosophy. However, simply considering what the

entire range of the history of political ideas is able to offer would be much

too simple. Instead, we must acknowledge the importance and thus pro

ceed to analyze the historical and conceptual contexts that provide the

framework for the development of a normative theory of democracy after

the linguistic turn.6 It is therefore possible to separate conceptual history

from an abstract history of ideas even if it remains closely bound to norma

tive theories. This presents the political philosophers with an additional

task. They must also make an effort to clarify the extent to which the con

ceptual history of democracy might function as a basis for any kind of

conceptual politics7 depending on whether they are able to extrapolate the

"best interpretation" of the concept of democracy. However, first I would

like to discuss, briefly, democracy as a historical concept, before showing that conceptual history also leads to the necessity of a normative concep

tion that reflects the aporias and contradictions of democracy.

1. The Concept of Democracy

As it is well-known, ancient Greece is the birthplace of democracy.8 The

word "5r|poKpaxia" (which means the "rule by the people") was invented

by the Athenians in order to define their political system after 462/461

B.C., particularly after Ephialtes put in place the proposals of Cleisthenes

in 508/507 B.C, disempowering the aristocratic Areopagand turning most

5) Through his writings on Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck, Kari Palonen (2002)

intends to turn the history of concepts into a subversive critique of normative political

theory. 6) Arno Waschkuhn (1998), part 3. 7)

"Conceptual politics" is my translation of Reinhard Mehring's concept of Begriffspolitik

by which he wants to characterize both the method of Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleck

in contrast to their own conceptions of sociologist or historian of concepts. See Reinhard

Mehring (2006), 31, as well as the analogy to Hermann Liibbe's concept of Ideenpolitik.

For the conceptual politics of Max Weber, see also Kari Palonen (2005). 8) Some authors argue that the historical origins of democracy can be found already in the

Sumerian City and the first republics of ancient India but these examples are at best democ

racies avant la lettre which makes them irrelevant for this article.




of the important political decisions to the assembly constituted exclusively

by male citizens.9 At the time, the first principles of democracy were free

dom and equality — all citizens being free by birth each one would accept

the other as an equal,10 and henceforth by ruling they accepted to be ruled

in return. After the second half of the fifth century, democracy also meant

that officials were to be controlled by fixed laws and by the people's vote

and - as stated in Pericles' funeral oration which survived thanks to Thucy

dides — that citizens would be ensured the right to live on their own behalf

without being educated and guarded by the state and its public norms."

The first historian to mention the concept of SquoKpcmw was obviously

Herodotus. Nevertheless, we must retrace its origins at least back to the

tyranny of the Peisistratides12 and the Athenian Sea Union13 when the

nobles' position was weakened while that of the citizens - the 8t|po<; - was

strengthened. Moreover, the etymological derivation of the word

8ri|roKpana also shows the replacement of law (nomos) as constitutional

concept (ehvopta, iaovopfa) by an emphasis on power, that is arche

((tovapyia, oXtyapyta) and kratia (hripoKpaxta), respectively.14 These shifts show evidence that the concept of democracy was above all

an attempt to identify political reality in ancient Athens. Today one can

hardly call democratic the political system in Attica, which included slav

ery and excluded all women and foreigners from citizenship. This con

versely makes it much easier to adopt the concept of 8r|poKpaxia in order

to describe present-day political conditions. However, the very singular

and complex circumstances that led to the development of the rule by the

people in Athens hardly compare with other political contexts and eras.

Rather than applying contemporary standards of democracy, one should

be able to contextualize the claims of the ancient Greeks. In this light, it is

no surprise that many thinkers in ancient Greece - among them Plato

(who associated democracy with chaos and anarchy), but also Socrates,

Xenophon and others — hoped for an aristocratic wind of change in the

city of Athens, leading them to lament the loss of moral order and authority

91 Kurt A. Raaflaub (1995), Jochen Martin (1995), andjochen Bleicken (1995). 10) See Aristotle (1280a), 5-7 and 24; (1291b), 32-38; and (1301a), 28-32. n) Werner Conze et al. (1972), 828. 12) Michael Stahl (1987) and Konrad Kinzl (1995). 13) Kurt A. Raaflaub (1995), 36ff. 14) Christian Meier (1983).




and to call for the rule of the best (aptaxot), or of the ones distinguished

by their bravery (xt|tf|i) instead of the rule of the many, the mob (oyAoc;).15

Nevertheless, they were also capable of developing a readiness to accept an

arrangement compatible with democratic reality in Athens. Socrates

famously preferred to die rather than to break the democratic laws of the

city; Xenophon returned to Athens after the reconciliation between Ath

ens and Sparta; Plato made an interesting distinction between a "good"

and a "bad" form of democracy, which is supposed to have influenced

Aristotle's conception of ttoXtxeta as an amalgam between oligarchy and

democracy and therefore as a compromise between the quality of govern

ment and the people's participation.16 The mixed constitution subsequently

became the only conceivable form of Greek democracy outside Athens and

its Sea Union.17 Later the Romans put a new emphasis on law as a system,

including democracy only as a supplement. Their concept of res publico. -

connecting monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements18 — was a

model of constitution deemed to be the best insurance against instability,

from Polybius to Machiavelli.

After the fall of the republic and the rise of the Roman Empire the con

cept of democracy was submitted to new assessment as a result of political

circumstances. While Aelius Aristides called the Imperium romanum a

"common democracy of the world, under one man, the best ruler and

director,"19 Cassius Dio stressed that real democracy could only exist under

a monarchy, whereby the Platonic formula of justice ("Doing one's own")

was supposed to be no longer aristocratic but democratic.20 Ultimately,

15) Early supporters of democracy like Herodotus and Pericles, who linked justice and iso

nomia to the rule of the 8r||io<;, still did not envisage a conflict between citizens and nobles

but merely did emphasize the unity of the city against the menace of oligarchy and tyranny.

At first nobles like Pindar and Plato innovated the political and moral concept of aristocracy

in order to pit the rttle of the best against democracy or - as Thucidides and Aristotle did

later - to distinguish good from bad oligarchies. For the conceptual history of aristocracy

see Werner Conze and Christian Meier (1972). 161 In Aristotle a pure democracy is described as degenerated rule of the poor (1279b 5-10).

His concept of politeia understood as the good form of democracy or also as free constitu

tion was shared by Isocrates (IV, 125; ep. VI, 11) and Demosthenes (I, 5; VI, 21; XV, 20). 17)

Wolfgang Schuller (1995), 316-23 and Alexander Demandt (1995), viii and ix.

18) por jPg strong elements of popular participation in Rome, see John North (1994). 19) Aelius Aristides (1981), XXVI, 60. See also Richard Klein (1981), 131f.

20) Cassius Dio (1961), LVI, 43.4. and VI, 23.5. See also Alexander Demandt (1995),

213.




neither Aristides nor Dio wanted to renounce the legitimizing value the

concept of democracy still carried in the first centuries of the Christian era.

The situation only changed during the European Middle Ages, when the

predominance of religion over all aspects of life made the reference to

democracy evidently useless. It was not until the thirteenth century that a

few thinkers revived the concept - notably, St. Thomas of Aquinas, Engel bert of Admont, Marsilius of Padua and Nicole Oresme — who encoun

tered it through their reception of Aristotle21 and started using it to describe

the contemporary politics of the Italian cities.22 But even the rise of Prot

estantism and the diminishing authority of the Catholic Church (accom

panied by the rise of contract theory, which epitomized the new forms of

rationalism in politics) could not immediately change the association of

the concept of democracy with antiquity. The concept of representation,

especially, was for a long time considered to be incompatible with the idea

of the ruling people. Hence Thomas Hobbes argues in favour of represen

tation and against democracy — even though his argument that every man

is born free and equal can be said to be democratic. Meanwhile, Rousseau

insisted, vice-versa, on the sovereignty of the people against representation.

Obviously they shared the unchanged idea that democracy means nothing else than the reign of the people over themselves - for Hobbes a terrible

image and for Rousseau something too nice to be actualized.23 Further

more, since the Reformation and the Enlightenment the concept of democ

racy was sporadically used to identify some specific elements of the mixed constitution in England (Blackstone, De Tolme, John Adams), of the

republican constitutions of Switzerland and its cantons, of the Netherlands,

21) Hie philosophical work of Aristotle was unknown in the West from the fifth century all

the way to the late twelfth century. 221 See Claire R. Sherman (1995), 240-52; Karl Ubl (2000), 134ff., R.W. Dyson (2003),

203-05 and 246-50. 23) "A prendre le terme dans la rigueur de l'acception, il n'a jamais existe de veritable demo

cratic, et il n'en existera jamais [...] S'il y avait un peuple de dieux, il se gouvernerait demo

cratiquement. Un gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas a des hommes." Translation: "In

its most rigorous sense, there has never been a true democracy, such a thing will never exist

[...] If a people of god existed, it would govern itself democratically. Such a perfect govern ment is not appropriate for mankind." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, (1959

1969), III, 4.




and also of some German cities.24 Nevertheless, the (Aristotelian) scepti

cism concerning the realization of a "pure" democracy still predominated

until the end of the eighteenth century. Indeed, also very Aristotelian was

the fact that many thinkers restricted the concept's use to the description

of the state and government system, as, for example, in the works of Johan

nes Althusius, John Henry Alsted, Thomas Hobbes, William Temple, John

Locke, Samuel von Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, Charles de Montesquieu, the Encyclopaedic (De Jaucourt), Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Christoph Martin

Wieland and August von Schlozer.

This historical context explains why the concept of democracy would

not strike a chord during the French Revolution. During its first stage,

republic was still the most widely used concept.25 In this sense, the works

of the Abbe Sieyes are instrumental in proving that only the republic was

assumed to be able to include a modern market economy as well as a rep

resentative government,26 whereas democracy was still associated with the

direct rule of the people and the virtu of citizens. A few years later, how

ever, there was a significant increase in the number of positive statements

concerning democracy uttered by the revolutionaries,2' but eventually the

reign of the Jacobins only served to confirm scepticism towards democracy,

discrediting the concept for another few decades, especially in England and in Germany. This is how in Kant's Zurn Ewigen Frieden (1795) — a

complement of Rousseau's Contrat social in which an important distinc

tion between the forma regiminis (republicanism and despotism) and the

forma imperii (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) can be found —

democracy remains associated with the absence of checks and balances as

well as of representation and the rule of law.28

24> See for example Martin Luther's address on February 7th 1539 (WA IV: 4324), and

Rene Louis d'Argenson's Considerations (1764), 8ff., 61f., 70ff., and 103. 25) Therefore the concept of democratic did not play any role during the French debate

concerning the suffrage universe/in 1790. See Robert R. Palmer (1953), 214.

26) Jean Roels (1969).

27> See for instance Robespierre's address on February 5th 1794 when he made no substan

tial distinction between democracy and republic. Charles Vellay (1908), 324ff.

28) Before Sieyes and Kant, the Federalists argued in favour of the republic and against the

"ancient" idea of a democratic executive that might lead to despotism. In the United States,

the concept of democracy had a rather pejorative image at least until the Jacksonian

Democracy, after 1828 - despite the sympathies sporadically voiced by Thomas Jefferson.

See Gustav H. Blanke (1956), 43ff. Supposedly, the reason for this is that democracy




Two complementary things had to happen before the concept of democ

racy could start its triumphant advance. First of them was the historical

overcoming of the antagonism between democracy and representation

and, second, the extension of the concept beyond the classification of state

and government to the description of a particular form of society as well.

The Marquis d'Argenson was possibly the author who prepared and antic

ipated both innovations in the middle of the eighteenth century. In his

Considerations sur le gouvernement (1764) he distinguished between a fausse and a legitime democracy, the first one being anarchic and revolutionary, the second its "true" version, being represented by elected deputies.29 The

amalgam between the concept of democracy and political representation

became possible because d'Argenson neglected the state and constitutional

order and focussed on the social system. About one hundred years before

Tocqueville30 he already was concerned with the historical progres de la

democratic in France and also stressed the decisive role of the French mon

archy in repressing European feudalism and the privileges of the nobles

and in allowing the rise of civil society and social equality.31

D'Argenson's royalist view on democracy became politically efficient

soon after the French Revolution when Thomas Paine's answer to Edmund

Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) in The Rights of Man

(1791) began to dissolve the idea that democracy and representative

government must remain a contradictio in adjecto?2 In this same vein,

the distinction between the forma regiminis and the forma imperii, as it

was expressed by Kant, shifted towards the interpretation that rather

than the republic, democracy might be the forthcoming aim of history, whether in France (Constant, Guizot) or in Germany (Schlegel, Gorres).

became identified with the terreur of the Jacobins. See William Corbett's History of the

American Jacobins Commonly Denominated Democrates (1796). 29) Rene Louis d'Argenson (1764), 7f. A similar yet not so strict distinction can be found

in the Deutsche Encyclopiidie from 1783. 30) The Considerations started circulating in France after the 1730's. See R.R. Palmer 1953:

205. 311 Rene Louis d'Argenson (1764), 135ff. 32) Cf. Dolf Sternberger (1980). Therefore Fichte's and Schlegel's receptions of Kant's

Zum Ewigen Frieden — following Campe's Zweitem Versuch deutscher Sprachbereicherung

(1792) - insist on the compatibility between a representative democracy and a republic. See

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1965a), 160; (1965b), 431ff. and Friedrich Schlegel (1966), 12-17.

Kant himself confirmed this view in his Metaphysik der Sitten (1797).




As this development occurred, Aristotle's quantitative criterion — the rule

of one, a few or many — and most notably the opposition between monar

chy and democracy receded into the background. Later in the nineteenth

century (and particularly after the 1848 Revolution) the question was not

longer if democracy was within the historic horizon, but simply what kind

of democracy lied ahead in the future: free or despotic, liberal or socialist, monarchic or republican, elitist, grass-rooted or anarchic, or perhaps even

a "democratic" dictatorship. All these options became available due to the

fact that the concept of democracy had increasingly become a synonym for

modern society and culture,33 and that democratic theories (Jefferson, Toc

queville, von Stein, Lincoln, Mill, Proudhon,34 Marx, Mosca, Dewey)

changed into normative (or normative-empirical) concepts tailored to

organize the social reality of democracy or to overcome it, as for Nietzsche,

Sorel, and Pareto. Starting in the nineteenth century, one is also able to

observe how democratic systems develop distinctively in each country,

region, and continent. While the Anglo-American brand stood out for its

liberal aspects, France and other countries in Continental Europe remained

more strongly connected to the republican tradition. If presidential democ

racy is dominant today in North and South America (and in Eastern

Europe more recently), in Western Europe parliamentary governments

have been prevalent (despite some ill-fated hesitations and interruptions in

Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). The epoch-defining success of

democracy as a constitutional and social order, and, additionally, as a polit

ical practice gave rise to a host of empirical and formal theories during the

twentieth century (Weber, Schumpeter, Popper, Downs, Carl J. Friedrich,

Dahl, Lipset). A trait these theories have in common is the attempt to

describe, analyze, and forecast democratic processes and politics. The dom

inance of the formal-empirical paradigm in the social sciences succeeded in

promoting the opinion that concepts of democracy resting upon norms

and ideals lacking systematic reference to political reality were generally

33) In this respect, the fundamental break between the concept of democracy and its ancient

heritage occurred during the nineteenth century (Constant, Bluntschli). Since then the

identification of democracy with Protestant equality and Contract Theory (von Rotteck)

have been reflected in the use of the concept. 34) In Tocqueville and Proudhon it is also possible to find the Kantian insight that modern

democracy means most of all a peaceful handling of political and social conflicts beyond

the former Kriegergesellschaft.




undermined by empirical definitions.35 Nevertheless, there are still effec

tive normative concepts of democracy, emphasizing, for example, justice

(Rawls) or its bond to human rights (Habermas). Neither should other

lesser known conceptions of democracy be ignored, such as those that

criticize the lack of people's participation in contemporary liberal democ

racies (Barber, Bellah, Putnam) or that underscore its inevitable decline

due to the belief that democratic levelling is the conditio sine qua non of

totalitarianism (Lefort, Arendt). Furthermore, it is possible to find theories

that combine aspects of normative and empirical conceptions36 as well as

other rather empirical concepts that are used to formulate quasi-normative

concepts that inform the construction of a new social and political world

order, such as modernity, for example. It seems inevitable today that the

empirical reality and variety of democratic institutions and societies is

accompanied by renewed critical normative reflections on the concept

given that not only the best form of democracy is an object of dispute but

also its chances and risks in the context of globalization.

2. Paradoxes, Aporias, and Contradictions of Democracy

If we are to judge according to the large amount of different social and

political systems named "democracies" (among them the democratic peo

ple's republics of Korea, Laos and Algeria, the democratic republics of

Congo and East Timor, the people's republics of China and Bangladesh, the democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka, and the Islamic republics of

Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan), there is no doubt no country in the world

would call itself "anti-democratic" today. Since the twentieth century, the

legitimizing value of democracy is such that any country will be quick to

call itself "democratic" in the sense that the ruler allegedly draws his legiti macy from the people, regardless of the existence of individual rights, free

elections, and the political power is not under people's control. Interest

ingly, the countries with the longest democratic traditions - the Swiss

Confederation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America -

do not draw attention to their democratic institutions and society by

means of their official name, whereas socialist countries in particular

35) Mostafa Rejai (1967), 31. 36) Giovanni Sartori (1992), Arno Waschkuhn (1998).




seldom renounce or have renounced such a reference. While the use of the

concepts of republic and monarchy in order to define a state and a political

system demand the visibility of political institutions that have traditionally been associated with them, the employment of the term democracy appar

ently is not bound to such strictures. Whereas the first two concepts must

be supported by hard evidence, the concept of democracy remains amor

phous; whereas it is not so hard to identify a constitution as a republic or

monarchy, a fierce and protracted struggle has evolved around the question

of which countries are entitled to call themselves democracies. Prior to

1990, this issue was disputed between liberal and socialist regimes, nowa

days the same seems to be happening between the so-called Western

democracies (with their offshoots in Latin America, India, Japan, and

Eastern Europe) and political systems from other parts of the world, espe

cially in the Middle East and Asia.

In view of the above, this brief analysis might raise the suspicion that the

abuse of the concept by dictators, parties, and ideologists is a danger. How

ever, the conceptual history of democracy shows that different interpreta

tions are inherent to the concept itself. This goes beyond the general thesis

that all political concepts are liable to continuous change in terms of mean

ing since they reflect the mutating values and norms of a society. Not only

does democracy fit the general insight that (political) concepts are always collections of a plurality of meanings?7 that is, formed by historical reality

which makes it impossible to demarcate the boundaries between syn

chronic and diachronic time, but it also contains many and contradictory

meanings, dimensions and associations, all of which invite us to adapt its

semantics to different historical entities. Below one finds a list of five of the

most important paradoxes and aporias38 of democracy, which are not dis

cussed at length in this article:

(1) Democracy is obviously against the natural idea that the few above

should rule over the many below.39 In this respect, the sovereignty of the

people remains simply a metaphor for democracy as a special form of order,

37) Reinhart Koselleck (1978), 29. 38) A good overview concerning the huge list of relevant aporias and paradoxes pertaining

the concept of democracy can be found in Paul B. Clarke and Joe Foweraker: (2001), or

also in Robert Dahl et al. (2003). 39)

Jean-Antoine Laponce (1991).




although complete identity between rulers and subjects is impossible to

achieve. With representative government, elections, and the dismissal of

rulers, the concept of democracy is supposedly converted into political

practice but the contradiction between democracy and representation ulti

mately remains unsolved.40 Thus modern democratic theories try to distin

guish between the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of democracy.41

While every government system guarantees the necessary hierarchy and

verticality in order to avoid anarchy, only democracy provides horizontal

elements of control such as checks and balances, opposition, institutional

ized conflicts, and pluralism. The difference, however, between power

coming from above and legitimacy coming from below as underlined by thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Guglielmo Ferrero,42 and Max

Weber's is not specifically democratic.

(2) With respect to the democratic decision-making processes, there is

a general competition between the principles of quality and quantity.

Although some new models of radical democracy (Barber, Lummis) deny this antagonism and strive to widen the scope of democracy as well as the

intensity of participatory moments, the problem seems to be determining

how to achieve good or at least acceptable political choices. The vote of the

majority might be seen as an indicator of the quality of a decision (or of a

politician) but what will happen, however, if the majority is wrong about

decisive or fundamental questions?43 ffence one of the most important

tasks of democratic theory will always be locating the boundaries for dem

ocratic decision-making. Should it be bound by the constitution or by human rights or religion? Radical theorists like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and

ff ans Kelsen stressed that any kind of border will necessarily violate democ

racy itself. This also led into a new paradox. While Rousseau claimed that

a divine legislator was necessary to educate the people in order to conciliate

quantity and quality (or the volonte generate and the volonte de tous) in

democratic decisions, Kelsen declared that voting for anti-democratic par

ties and demagogues in order to prevent the majority from destroying

democracies is actually an act of betrayal.44 Therefore, if democracy is to be

40) Danielo Zolo (1998) and Guiseppe Duso (2006). 411 Giovanni Sartori (1992), 137f. 42) See Alexis deToqueville (1954), 333 and Guglielmo Ferrero (1944), 481. 43) Bernd Guggenberger and Claus Offe (1984). 4'" Hans Kelsen (2006), 237. The paradox is also known as the Toleranzproblem of democ

racy. Manfred Hattich (1965).




protected against its own dangers we must eventually accept some bound

aries and values located beyond democracy even if we agree that democ

racy and human rights might come from the same source (Habermas).45 As

long as a contradiction in practice is possible the appeal to anti-democratic

measures always remains a plausible option for democracy.46

(3) Democracy rests upon two fundamental principles that are often

following colliding trajectories: liberty and equality.47 When Goethe said:

"Legislators and revolutionaries who promise equality and liberty at the

same time are either psychopaths or mountebanks," he was indicating that

absolute equality could only be achieved by repression since a free society

will necessarily display differences and inequalities. On the other hand, the

classical controversy between Left and Right can persuasively be described

as a debate concerning the possible extent of equality, although neither

camp needs to challenge democracy itself given that they show respect for

the principle of freedom.48 Hence the struggle between democratic parties

all over the world is usually a quest for the right balance between liberty and equality. In this respect, the liberal ideal combining social hierarchy and political equality (Rawls) is one possible orientation among many. Moreover, in addition to the problem that some will become more equal

than others, there is the question of what kind of freedom is preferred: an

undefined negative one, giving us the opportunity to start our own pursuit

of happiness, or a defined positive one securing our participation in mak

ing the laws we have to obey. The former type is supported by liberals like

Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin, the latter by democrats such as Ben

jamin Barber and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. And there are other thinkers,

like Kant and Habermas, that attempted to combine both aspects. In sum,

reflection upon liberty and equality and the tension between them is one

of the perennial subjects of democratic theory.

45) This aporia persists in one of Habermas' earlier contributions (1973), 316, in which he

affirms that the "Verfassungswirklichkeit des biirgerlichen Rechtsstaates" was "seit je her in

Widerspruch zur Idee der Demokratie." An advanced discussion about the possible anton

ymy between democracy and the constitutional state can be found in Werner Kagi (1973). 46> For this see also Derrida's figure of "la democratic a venir." Jacques Derrida (2002), 112

157. 47) See the famous first chapter of Tocqueville's Democracy in America Vol. 2, book 2 Why

Democratic Nations Show a More Ardent and Enduring Love of Equality than of Liberty. A

meditation on the topic is offered in Ralf Dahrendorf (1963). 48) Norberto Bobbio (1994).




(4) Modern democracy also marks a new epoch in terms of the com

plex relationship between individuals and the collective. While in the

ancient world private concerns were strictly subordinated to the public

interest,"19 capable even of turning slavery into a moral imperative,50 the

modern age has set itself apart by the protection of individual rights and of

the pluralism of opinions, aims, and ambitions. Nevertheless, even mod

ern democracies require some degree of public spiritedness and social

homogeneity in order to conserve political unity and represent something

more than just a crowd of people. The question of how to bind democratic

individuals together is another problem for which several tentative solu

tions have been offered. Theory as well as history have witnessed several

such attempts under several (partially antagonistic) concepts such as the

state and the nation, race and ethnicity, religious and cultural traditions,

rationality, ethical categories like justice, tolerance or solidarity, the civil

society, communication, and, last but not least, economical success and

consumer needs. Furthermore, some degree of social homogeneity also

seems to be a necessary precondition for the functionality of democratic

techniques and for the peaceful coexistence of majorities and minorities.51

However, there is always a danger that in striving to forge political unity

and to solve essential social and political conflicts, the exact opposite might be achieved through the elimination of a sense of indefiniteness and divi sion that is inherent to democracy.52 Therefore, striking a balance between

private and public interests, individual and collective claims represents a

constant challenge for democratic theory.

49) Although some ancient authors also made important ethical innovations strengthening

the individual's position (sophists like Antiphon and Alcidamas, for example, emphasized

equality, Socrates and Aristotle considered the prospect of an apolitical way of life, and the

philosophical schools of Cynicism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism called for a kind of world

citizenship), one should not forget that the concept of the individual only becomes identifi

able with a singular human life after the first civil revolutions. Hence in Antiquity there is

neither a theoretical nor a practical separation between the individual and his community

comparable with modern individualism (Vittorio Hosle (1997), 36fF.). For the ancients it

was difficult to believe that the aims and purposes of one single man could be deemed

higher than the public need. 50) Alexander Demandt (1993), 51. 511 Herrmann Heller (1971). 52) Claude Lefort (1990).




(5) The dislocation of the concept of democracy from a form of govern

ment to a form of society also leads to understanding of the heterogeneity

of democratic institutions as a result of moral, social, and cultural dissimi

larities. As indicated by Montesquieu and Tocqueville, the particular men

talities, habits, and intellectual manners of nations endow all social and

political systems with a character of their own. Thus there are two reasons

why democracy has become such a ubiquitous concept: it is able to explain

what democratic societies have in common as well as what distinguish

them from each other. This leaves democratic theory with the task of pro

viding cogent criteria to determine what is still, not yet, or no longer, a

democracy. But even in this respect there can be only provisional answers,

once again, as a result of the special dynamics of democracy. In particular,

the history of democracy can also be interpreted as a permanent movement

of inclusion that progressively incorporated once marginal individuals and

groups: slaves, the poor people, women, and so forth. Yet there have always

been those willing to criticize the alleged overreach of democratic equality.

This continues in the present as discussions on the extension of democracy

to other social groups (children, foreigners, and next generations)53 prog

ress. Thus when evaluating other societies one must keep in mind that

democracy is a process that might evolve differently or that might incorpo

rate key aspects that are not necessarily familiar to certain societies. Ulti

mately, however, we must eventually be able to say whether or not the

application of the concept is justified. The tensions between liberty and equality, individualism and collectiv

ism, participation and leadership will persist as problems each democratic

theory and system will have to deal with, even if they cannot ultimately be

solved.54 Given the diversity of societies and cultures, this also means that

solutions can hardly be universal. This approach also suggests that the

empirical variety of democratic political formations demands the acknowl

edgement that defining "what a democracy is" is a normative decision

reflecting different tentative solutions to the paradoxes of democracy. The

types of policies that are eventually pursued are inevitably a consequence

of this previous normative decision.

53) See for instance Bobbio (1988) and Dryzek (2000). 54)

J. Roland Pennock (1979).




3. Conceptual History and Conceptual Politics

The numerous contradictions, paradoxes, and aporias proper to democ

racy mean that the concept is rarely used in isolation, it is often qualified

by special adjectives that attribute a descriptive or normative meaning by

increasing differentiation and restricting conceptual stretching.55 Examples

of such adjectives used to qualify the concept of democracy are "authori

tarian," "neopatrimonial," "military-dominated," "parliamentary," "presi dential," "federal," "guarded," "electoral," "protected," "illiberal," "restrictive,"

"tutelary," "one-party," and "elitist"; or also "Western," "modern," "plebi

scitarian," "representative," "pluralistic," "socialistic," "liberal," and "delib

erative."56 In this respect, it is important to understand that the usage of

the noun reveals the intention to ensure that the referred state, society, or

system is in fact a democracy, since it displays at least one of its many prox

ies — elections, referenda, a constitution, parties, civil rights, a market

economy or also the pluralism of opinions and lifestyles. Meanwhile, the

adjective serves the purpose of emphasizing either the rejection or the

adoption of certain democratic practices. This is also why descriptive and

normative perspectives interfere in this conceptual construction. For

example, a "military-dominated," "authoritarian," or "parliamentary"

democracy just means that in fact different actors play powerful roles — the

military, the (elected) political leader or the parliament. Most importantly, the adoption of these adjectives normatively indicates whether the described

subject is more democratic or less so. For example, the adjectives "authori

tarian,", "neopatrimonial," "military-dominated," "guarded," "protected," "illiberal," "restrictive," "tutelary," "one-party," or "defect" are always detri

mental to the quality of democracy whereas the concept of a "parliamentary,"

"presidential," "federal," or "electoral" democracy rather confirms the fact we

are dealing with true democracies, albeit admitting different subtypes.57

Hence in all of these cases the concept of democracy itself remains a positive

norm whose devaluation demands an adjective. Consequently, it is hardly

551 David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997). 56) David Collier & Steven Levitsky (1997) and Hubertus Buchstein (2006), 48. See also

Giovanni Sartori (1970); David Collier and James E. Mahon (1993); David Collier and

Steven Levitsky (1997). 571 While the studies of Juan Linz (1978) and (1994) suggest that a presidential democracy can more easily deteriorate into an authoritarian regime than a parliamentary one, this does

not mean that the adjective "presidential" has an anti-democratic connotation.




surprising that the semantic use the adjective democratic serves to legiti

mize states, societies, institutions, national and international organizations

or to support techniques, actions, value propositions, or even human traits.

But what about the other adjectives mentioned above? Are they also the

product of a conflict between a descriptive and a normative perspective?

Indeed they are. This becomes evident if the five aporias or contradictions

of the concept of democracy are considered: popular sovereignty vs. repre

sentation, quality vs. quantity, liberty vs. equality, individual vs. collective,

and, finally, the synchronicity between similarities and dissimilarities. In

order to demonstrate this argument, I shall point out that all those adjec

tives that cannot be immediately or unequivocally associated with the

decrease or increase in the quality of democracy can be rearranged as

antagonistic subtypes of democracy that stress only one side of a paradox

(or perhaps of several paradoxes). According to this criterion, the following

pairs of concepts dealing with the issues of government, decision-making,

ideology, economy, time, and space seem to be relevant:

direct (or radical) vs. representative democracy

elitist vs. deliberative58 (or participatory) democracy liberal vs. republican democracy

pluralistic (or market) vs. social democracy ancient vs. modern democracy

Western vs. non-Western democracy59

All of these conceptual constructions might include an empirical descrip

tion of existing democracies. However, they always include a normative

perspective as well. This occurs both at a theoretical level (in that a particu

lar dimension of democracy is valued positively or negatively in each case)

and at a practical level (through the observation of democratic institutions

and habits that reflect a normatively constituted political culture). There

fore direct or republican democracy emphasize the ancient heritage against

modern forms of representative or liberal democracy, whereas deliberative,

republican, social or also the known forms of non-Western democracy

58) For the concept of deliberative democracy, see Joshua Cohen (1989); Jon Elster (1998);

and Robert Talisse (2005). 591 Of course, this list is incomplete and could be enhanced with oppositions like consensus

vs. majoritarian democracy or also consociational vs. competitive democracy.




stress the collective against the more individualistic concepts of elitist, lib

eral, pluralistic and Western democracy. Liberal and elitist democracy

underline freedom against equality, the republican and deliberative sub

type vice versa; and while ancient and modern democracy are associated

with opposing notions of freedom, pluralistic and social democracy sug

gest a different concept of equality. Finally elitist, representative, and lib

eral democracy stand for the quality of democratic decision-making, whereas deliberative, direct, and republican democracy emphasize the

quantity of people participating. In this respect the evident cross relations between the different opposi

tions of conceptual constructions show at least two things: first, that one

adjective is hardly enough in order to produce an in-depth characterization

of a democratic system, and, second, that different democratic systems

have both similarities and dissimilarities (aporia no. 5) whereby the crucial

question is whether these dissimilarities include not only different norma

tive decisions concerning the aporias inherent to democracy but also

choices pertaining to aspects that diminish democracy. For example,

ancient democracy which included slavery and did not take individual

rights into account today would hardly be deemed as a sound democracy.

Likewise this can apply to the adjectives used to describe the decline of

radical forms of democracy into a tyranny of the majority, of social democ

racy into socialism, or the serious lack of democratic legitimacy in liberal, elitist or representative systems. Ffowever, the most difficult problem is of

course how to treat concepts of democracy in view of the existence of dif

ferent societies and cultures. From a Western point of view, the proximity

between existing Asian or Islamic democracies and authoritarian or totali

tarian regimes60 might seem quite obvious. Yet, we must not forget that the

fact that Western civilization has dominated our view of global democracy

means nothing else but the long-term result of normative decisions, values,

habits, and practices. So although the appreciation of non-Western democ

racies might be almost impossible for Westerners, we must keep in mind

that we are never simply describing but always evaluating in accordance

with our norms. These evaluations prove that the interaction between the

empirical and the normative perspective relative to the concept of democ

racy becomes even more accentuated in spatial comparisons.

For this difference, see Juan Linz (2000).




But what does all of this mean for the conceptual history of democracy?

Hitherto we have been discussing how different conceptual constructions

are not only descriptions or attempts to grasp the normative decisions

made by democratic societies but are also normative decisions themselves

that serve to strengthen the functionality, efficacy, or simply the legitimacy

of a democratic system, or to stress either homogeneity or plurality, the

position of individuals or of the collective, the role of cultural identity and

so on. Thus the role conceptual history plays in this whole game is first and

foremost to reveal the conceptual politics of democracy. This brings us

back to the initial question of whether conceptual history might help us to

arrive at a normative perception of democracy. It is now possible to answer

that this is indeed the only possible perception since the contradictions

and aporias inherent to the concept of democracy require choosing one

kind of democracy over other.61 Conceptual history also shows that it is

not the concept of democracy itself that is essentially contested. Rather

contention is an essential feature of the democratic moment and is what

allows the use of the concept to subsume quite different historical realities

under its semantic field.

An additional question that arises is whether conceptual history simply unveils the issues and categories that inform normative perspectives of

democracy or whether it is also a form of conceptual politics. As Reinhard

Mehring argued, noting some surprising methodological analogies between

Reinhart Koselleck and Carl Schmitt, in the writing of a history of (politi

cal) ideas there seems to be a kind of blending of Begrijfssoziologie, Begriffs

geschichte, and Begrijfspolitik into each other.62 Although conceptual history should try to reveal the strategies of conceptual politics, the potential of

concepts to exert political power, and also the polemic purposes of seman

tic uses, it almost goes without saying that conceptual history may also

6,1 Here I have in mind Max Weber's statement that there is no "truly objective scientific

analysis of cultural life or [...] social phenomena" but only knowledge depending on "indi

vidual realities" or precisely on "normative ideas". See Max Weber (1991), 49 and 61f. So

an "objective" point of view turns out to be possibly by separating facts and norms (like

Weber assumed) it matters little if social phenomena which might be called or even treated

as facts are merely a result of our interpretation (Peirce), of our "realization-leading interest"

(Habermas) or of social communication (Niklas Luhmann) - in any case, we must decide

first what democracy "should" mean. And by all means this sort of definition is part of a

normative process which I call conceptual politics. 621 Reinhard Mehring (2006).




include a claim for the normative prevalence of particular conceptions —

perhaps already by deciding which concept might be worth analyzing. Most importantly however, it must not be forgotten that the analysis con

ducted according to the methods of conceptual history require the use of

concepts per se, almost all of which might be "political,"63 which means

that these concepts might become charged in a normative-political way

which means that they contain the potential for polemics.64 After all, con

cepts not only have a history but they also make history as "leading con

cepts of the historical movement" and by formulating "prerequisites of

possible futures."65 In other words, it may be possible to make a clear dis

tinction between the analytic and the normative application of concepts

yet it is impossible to act only as an observer of history and of changing semantic uses.66 Even the fundamental critique of normative concepts

includes an absolute normative approach. As discussed above, this dynam

ics is more than evident when it comes to democracy. In this sense, the

concept captures much more than one of the four fundamental criteria of

the Lexikon der Geschichtlicben Grundbegriffe,b7 which describes the seman

tics of modernity in toto - democratization. It also signifies that the con

ceptual history of democracy, which requires the consideration of the most

diverse spatial and temporal perspectives in order to become intelligible, cannot release itself from modern democracy's claim to be the exclusive

form and method capable of generating legitimacy. Therefore the concep tual history of democracy is also part of democratic history.

4. Conclusion

In his posthumously published book, Begriffsgeschichte. Studien zur Seman tik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (2006), Koselleck

emphasized that "the historian does research on concepts, in which social

63) HorstGiinther (1978), 102. 64) See Reinhart Koselleck (1967), 87fF.; (1972), XXf.; (1979). 65) Reinhart Koselleck (1972), XVII, (2000), 327ff. 66) See Reinhard Mehring (2006), 41. Hence the author's aim is also to extract a practical

proposition from Koselleck's studies focussing on a subversive critique of modernity whose

semantics and concepts are analyzed only with superficial objectivity (2006), 46. 671

According to Koselleck, the other three criteria are "temporalization" (Verzeitigung), "polit icization" and "ideologization" of all modern concepts. See Reinhart Koselleck (1972), 46.




and political processes are recorded persisting over the course of genera

tions and even centuries ."68 Hence conceptual historians research the his

torical transformations of perceptions and receptions of semantics in order

to understand the veritable meaning of concepts and to make sure their

usage remains critical and historically informed.

In the specific case of democracy, it is even more important to analyze

semantic change because the concept's inherent contradictions and aporias

require a special type of conceptual history. Paradoxically, the fact that

democracy is necessarily an "unfinished journey" (John Dunn) is what

might be the best guarantee that the concept maintains its hegemonic

status within political semantics. The fact that the concept of democracy

is still in use in scientific discourse as well as in everyday language is far

from being "an exception in the history of language."69 Rather, the under

determination of the concept seems to be the most important reason for its

success. The eternal question concerning the best political constitution

seems to have been translated into the question about the best kind of

democracy. Therefore the symbiosis between "social history" and "history o ( linguistic meaning"70 obviously suggests that the current debate con

cerning a possible "post-democracy" (Guehenno, Ranciere, Crouch, Jorke) will be futile.

However, conceptual history also proves that democracy is not simply a

label that could be used in order to legitimize any political or social system.

Although we cannot escape conceptual politics, because it is embedded

into the structure of concepts, democracy is much more than a strategy of

persuasion used to advance political agendas. What conceptual history

shows is the framework of the concept democracy in which different nor

mative decisions are available and also become necessary reference points

in the search for the best interpretation of democracy Nevertheless, it is

impossible to escape the problem that the contest over the best interpreta

tion of the concept must always establish the boundaries that cannot be

crossed. This search for the best interpretation of democracy is ultimately

a form of conceptual politics. It is less the lack of standards than the con

tradictions and aporias inherent to the concept that prevent us from for

mulating a valid single idea of democracy. Instead, we must always keep in

681 Reinhart Koselleck (2006), 365. 691 Hubertus Buchstein (2006), 48.

70> Karlheinz Stierle (1978), 184.




mind that the many sides of democracy render each definition of "what

should democracy mean today"71 merely a preliminary, political decision.

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