Zachary E. Henthorn12/5/2012
PLS 4670 – Dr. Luehrmann
China’s Path to Technology
A Look into Military and Industrial Espionage
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Zachary Henthorn
Dr. Luehrmann
PLS 4670
5 December 2012
China’s Path to Technology: A Look into Military and Industrial Espionage
I. Introduction
Is China, on a modern scale, able to keep up with the rest of the world in terms of
research, development and critical technological advancements without relying on industrial or,
more importantly to some, military espionage and intellectual property rights violations? On the
books for the Chinese military are two planes that many military intelligence enthusiasts would
take notice to immediately. Known as the Chengdu J-20 (Jian-20) and the Shenyang J-31 (F-60,
Jian-31, J-21), these two planes are the very first Chinese stealth attack fighter planes. The larger
J-20 is longer, wider and overall much heavier than the smaller J-31. Its wings are set far back on
the fuselage, dual engines side by side and a set of smaller wings set back just from the cockpit
known as canard wings. In terms of overall body shape, the Chengdu J-20 greatly resembles a
particular Russian plane known as the Mikoyan Project 1.44/1.42 Flatpack, which was a
response to the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program that the United States had started,
with its production of the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. Its nose-cone and frontal air-intakes are
almost a direct copy from the F-22 as well.
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Its vertical stabilizers resemble the now retired Lockheed Martin F-117 Nighthawk.
A detailed view, showing the similarities of other Fifth Generation Aircraft to the Chengdu J-20
(Top two images from http://www.defenceaviation.com/, bottom image from http://www.andrewerickson.com/)
When speaking on the Shenyang J-31, its entire body is extremely reminiscent (almost an
exact copy of) the F-22 Raptor, but more importantly, the new Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning
II. It’s similar in the design and shape of its wings, horizontal and vertical stabilizers and nose-
cone to the F-22, on a size comparable to the F-35 with comparable flight dynamics to this
United States produced Fifth Generation Multirole Fighter. Both the J-20 and J-31 are so similar
to most newly produced Fifth Generation Fighters from countries such as the United States, but
also the more recent Russian and Korean aircraft. The Chengdu J-20 is even reported to be using
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a particular type of Russian produced engine known as the Saturn AL-31, developed by NPO
Saturn, which was originally used in the Sukhoi Su-27 air superiority fighter.
Images of the Shenyang J-31
(Left Image: http://militaryfactory.com; Right Image: http://english.ruvr.ru)
II. Background, Context & The Current Situation
But why does any of this matter? Why do all these confusing aeronautical terms mean
something to military intelligence analysts and enthusiasts? Why is it an important fact that these
Chinese produced aircraft resemble any other Fifth Generation Fighter at all? Or why is it
important that Chinese stealth aircraft are using Russian produced engines, or that the shape of
both the Chengdu J-20 and the Shenyang J-31 strikingly resemble many of the recently produced
American stealth fighters and prototypes? The answer is a simple one, but hardly surprising
given China’s current record. The answer is military technology espionage. China could not be
where it is militarily unless it used deception and the stealing or copying of foreign secrets.
How can this be attributed to stolen military technology secrets? One way to point at
espionage is the amount of pure capital that is spent on military projects between the United
States and China. Currently, the budget breakdown for the United States’ Military is between
$925.2 billion for fiscal year 2012 and $737.5 billion of that on Military defense alone
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(USFederalBudget). Compare this to the 2012 Chinese military budget, which is reported from
China as being $106 billion (with the Pentagon placing total Chinese military spending
somewhere between $120 and $180 billion) (Moss).
The United States has almost had an unlimited budget for military spending since the
beginning of the Cold War. The program cost for the F-22 Raptor alone was $66.7 billion with
each individual aircraft costing $150 million (DefenseIndustryDaily). The origin of the F-22
reaches back to October of 1986 when development and design of the YF-22 and the YF-23. The
first flight of the F-22 was on the September 7th, 1997, over 11 years later. It was introduced to
the United States Air Force for fielding on December 15th, 2005, eight years after its first flight.
How then, with its comparatively meager military budget, is China able to develop and produce
not one but two Fifth Generation stealth aircraft in such a drastically short amount of time?
If the question were to be posed to the Chinese government, but more specifically, the
Chinese military, the answer would possibly be that the two planes were produced by Chinas
greater might, manpower and how its engineers are more superior to any other in the world.
Chinese might and ingenuity, over the need of stolen technology. But this is a standard response
from China – a predictable one. The most recent and most covered bit of Chinese cloning
technology can be found in the iPhone 5 copy scandal.
Before consumers even knew what the new Apple iPhone 5 even looked like, China was
reporting on their new GooPhone i5 – a near exact body copy of the actual iPhone 5, running the
Android operating system instead of Apple OS. Not only had GooPhone copied and produced
this knockoff iPhone 5, but also began issuing threats to Apple that it would sue the company if
the iPhone 5 was released in China. Is this to say that there is a strict correlation between how
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certain elements of the Chinese industry will openly copy a product through leaked documents or
even espionage, and the actual Chinese military? Possibly not, but it raises the question of why
doesn’t the Chinese government do anything to curb such blatant copying?
All of this is begging and leading toward a larger question that China is currently facing:
can China keep up with the world in actual development, research and innovation? Or, is China
only able to gain through this copying, espionage and reverse engineering? Does China have
capability to innovate, create new and exciting products and designs? Or, has the fact that China
is currently the ‘factory of the world’ stained the country?
One particular story, coming from a paper written by Sergei Skorobogatov of the
University of Cambridge and Christopher Woods of Quo Vadis Labs, and reported on by a
DefenseTech.org news story proves the possibility that China could be stealing American
military secrets. The product in question was the American-designed, Chinese-made
Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 A3P250 microchip (known as the PA3). This chip was found to
have a “backdoor, or Trojan, deliberately built into it” (Reed). The reason that this is extremely
important to have found out earlier than later is because the “PA3 is what’s called a Field
Reprogrammable Gate Array (FRGA); an almost blank slate of a microchip that can be
programmed by its owner to perform a variety of tasks” (Reed). This microchip was seen as
being one of the most “impenetrable” chip designs available to military and industrial
applications. Used by the military through “weapons, guidance, flight control, networking and
communications” hardware to “nuclear power plants, power distribution, aerospace, aviation,
public transport and automotive products” (Skorobogatov and Woods), this chip is embedded in
multitudes of products.
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Why is this important? Because the backdoor embedded within the microchip can allow
Chinese cyber espionage agents access into whatever the chip is installed in to gain remote
access to the chip and reprogram it. This reprogramming can then be used to gain access to
important military pass codes, records, identification codes, nuclear plant procedure, the layout
of power grids and even more. And the main problem with this backdoor is that this backdoor is
unable to be removed, due to it being embedded in the chips silicone and hardware. That means
the chip would have to be completely redesigned and reproduced, and each chip be replaced in
order to fix the problem that has surfaced because of this backdoor. According to Skrobogatov
and Woods, “to our knowledge, this is the first documented case of finding a deliberately
inserted backdoor in a real world device with critical applications” (Skrobogatov and Woods).
The implications of these findings points to an active and heavily backed espionage
program, (likely) funded by the government and possibly the Chinese military, specifically
aimed at stealing secret and sensitive information from not only the United States, but from the
world due to the microchip being applied in more than just US technology. If China is after
sensitive information through the use of something as innocuous as a microchip, then what is to
stop them from seeking the actual technology that these microchips are installed in, such as next
generation United States military weapon systems, ships, aircraft, aircraft carriers, missiles,
satellites, tanks and mobile infantry carriers?
The problem, however, might stem from a simple reason. The idea of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) have only been acknowledged and placed in law books since 1979.
Officially, the government nods toward many international laws on the protection of intellectual
property rights. Thus, most Chinese view the very “western” idea of intellectual property rights
as something close to non-existent. This is partially due to a problem with the education about
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intellectual property rights, to the point that there is little awareness that property right has been
infringed or that there is even a crime for those infringements. This has led to copyright
violations being common in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and IPR crimes being
committed by prominent members of the electronics and automotive industries.
III. Likely Developments
So what does this mean for the future of Chinese military and industrial espionage? Can
the problem be solved through international sanctions and trade embargos, or through the
removal of product production within China to avoid the possibility of having technology or
trade secrets stolen and replicated? This is doubtful, due to the increasing interconnectivity of the
world on a scale that surpasses regional boundaries. Especially with the recent transition of
government, it is likely that any possible sanctions or warnings of intellectual property right
infringement will be swept under the carpet by the Party or ignored completely.
With the introduction of the very first backdoor in the PA3 microchip, it is likely that
other such secret ‘ins’ will be found as China spreads the manufacturing process used in the
production of the PA3 to other arenas. It is even likely that soon, we will be seeing more stories
just like the PA3 come to light.
This stolen intellectual property, however, is a financial boon for China as a whole. It
allows China to spend much less on research and development programs and innovation than
other countries, thus allowing it to allocate its precious and limited resources to other parts of its
economy such as the education and welfare of its some 1.344 billion people. It also allows the
Chinese to stand back and say how much better and more efficient their military program is,
when compared to the United States military budget and programs.
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If the uncontrolled copying and downright espionage aren’t halted by the Chinese by
sanctions or through tightening of regulations on production of sensitive materials and a
strengthening of internet firewalls to block cyber warfare, then several things are most likely
bound to happen. One likely outcome of this would be the continued theft of military secrets and
technology, and a real, marked increase in the speed at which China can reverse engineer and
reproduce a replica or reformation of the piece. The possibility that China could continue to
develop the Chengdu J-20 and the Shenyang J-31 could double, and the possibilities of having
mass produced versions of these aircraft becomes ever more likely. As China would feel
confident in its military power, the possibility of armed conflict with China in certain parts of
Asia could become a reality. The sphere of influence that China holds could expand, through
technological and militaristic superiority alone. Suddenly, their active military of approximately
2.3 million personnel would be viable on the world stage. The approximately 369 million males
available for military service would suddenly be overwhelming, as replacement for troops lost in
battle would be virtually limitless.
The current power of the United States military is based on technological superiority,
versus overwhelming odds. It is focused on weapon systems that act as force multipliers; guns,
bombs, planes or tanks that make a few troops worth the cost of hundreds, through training and
capability. If China were somehow able to catch up to the United States through the militaristic
espionage that they have been conducting, the United States could surely feel threatened. A
brand new arms race could ensue, one that would put the nuclear buildup with Russia during the
Cold War to shame. Weapons would be developed to be more deadly on the battlefield, without
having to resort to nuclear exchange. A future war between China and the United States (given
current trends within the United States military, technologically) could be between unmanned
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aerial drones, robotic tanks and super soldiers (all out cyberwarfare), both sides holding the same
type of technology – one saying Made in the U.S.A., the other saying Made in China.
IV. Conclusions
Can China survive in this world without resorting to militaristic and industrial espionage?
Most likely, the answer is no. Their education system is vastly different than that in the United
States. The way that large sections of the population still live as subsistence farmers, or are
vastly undereducated when compared with their U.S. counterparts is still a major problem. The
way that China, as a whole, deals with intellectual property would have to change populace wide,
instead of just having the laws protecting intellectual property on their books with little to no
enforcement.
A complete paradigm shift would need to occur within China in order for the country to
be able to shift and give back to the world with innovation, research and development rather than
just needing to steal or copy the ideas of others to hold power. New laws would need to be
written and the power to enforce them given to police. Internal investigations would need to be
conducted to remove those who would continue their practices of theft and copying. The
likelihood of this happening, however, is almost non-existent with current PRC leaders. China
and the Chinese people come first.
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Works Cited
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<http://www.defense-update.com/products/j/29122010_j-20.html>.
Chen, Shirong. "China Conducts First Test-flight of Stealth Plane." BBC News. BBC, 01 Nov.
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>.