Do the poor benefit from forest devolution policies?
Evidence from forest co-management in Malawi
Charles Jumbe, PhD & Arild Angelsen, PhDBunda College of Agriculture
Centre for Agricultural Research & Development P.O. Box 219, Lilongwe
Malawi
Background
Women’s popular trade
More than 90% of the 13 million people live in rural areas Forests as a vital source of energy for cooking (5% with electricity) Forests a source of income for people living within or adjacent to forests
Men’s popular trade
The Context For many years forest policies were restrictive Forest cover continue to decline From 59% of total land (9.4 mn ha) in 1960s to 47% in the 1980s to 37% by mid 1990s to 27% currently (FAO, 2005)
Government’s response National forestry policy (1996) Forestry act (1997) Key features Removal of restrictions Co-management of protected forest areas. Emphasis on women’s participation in forest management
Forest Co-management Program Designed as an experiment in 1996 in two sites, Chimaliro &
Liwonde/Machinga Forest Reserves (WB &DfID)
Objectives of the ProjectImprove forest management in return for
increase access to forest products
Enhance contribution of forests to rural poverty reduction
Key distinguishing featureChimaliro Liwonde
Forest size (‘000 ha) 160 274
Co-area (ha) 210 1172
Resource state Dense Degraded
Forest Management governance
Good Not good
Degree of forest dependence
Low High
Ethnicity Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Forest product markets
Undeveloped Highly developed
Pressure on forests Low High
Poverty rate 45% 74%
Purpose of Evaluation
Evaluating program effectiveness in harnessing the contribution of forests to poverty reduction
Identifying households adversely affected by the program - designing appropriate interventions
Draw lessons for designing future programs
Research Questions
Focus on vulnerable households- defined by participation, gender & poverty class
1. Does participation forest management address the plight of the poor as intended?
2. Who is capturing the rent >>> do the poor benefit?
Analytical FrameworkTheoretical model Roy’s self-selection model (Roy, 1951) Choice whether to participate based on utility
Comparison of utility of participation & non-participation
Econometric methods Endogenous switching regression model –to estimate forest income
Selection bias correction Propensity score matching
Measure net gains of participating in the program Overall program impact (full sample & across the two,
Chimaliro & Liwonde) Impact on vulnerable household (women & poor
households)
Analytical framework (cont’d)
Decomposition Analyses Estimate the extent of inequality in benefit sharing
between groups of participants (Reimers, 1983) Male-female income disparity Poor-rich income disparity
Data sources Part I: Participatory Rural Appraisal: Context Analysis & basic
data collection (e.g., household list, persipectives of the program
Part II: household survey: Random sampling of participants and non-participantsSample: Total sample 404; Chimaliro 205 & 199 Liwonde 199
What do raw data show-A synopsis? Sample P (MK) NP (MK) Differential(%)
Full sample 244.58 431.23 -43.28
Chimaliro 37.45 80.18 -53.29
Liwonde 442.80 815.41 -45.60
LOW-INCOME
Full sample 173.62 292.05 -40.55
Chimaliro 38.90 44.11 -5.21
Liwonde 318.86 570.56 -44.11
FEMALE
Full sample 223.55 210.21 +6.35
Chimaliro 35.68 43.11 -17.23
Liwonde 411.42 386.11 +6.56
Results from Matching techniques (impact)Results Income gain
(MK/household/month)% Change
Overall (Pooled) 16.82 - 18.02 +47-51%
Chimaliro (Site 1) 12.14 - 12.37 +90%
Liwonde (Site 2) -161.48 - 281.76 -(54)-(-68%)
Female-participants
15.59 - 29.36 +13-65%
Low-income 13.52 - 27.58 +35-68%
Decomposition Results: Identifying Sources of inequality in benefit sharing
Case Who benefits most from the program?
Source of inequality
Discrimination (Coefficients)
Endowment (Variables)
Male-female Male income: 16 % higher
100% -
Rich-Poor Rich: 23% higher 40% 60%
Summary of key findings Does participation in the program lead to better
outcomes? Overall, there are marginal benefits to participants The program drastically reduce forest revenue for participants
in Liwonde (23% share of forest income) Forest income for female & low-income households is
enhanced by participating in the program
Who captures the benefits of the program? High-income & male participants!!
Discrimination against female participants. Differences in endowments (e.g. education,
experience, household assets) in favour of high-income participants
Key lessons & implications for policy Forest co-management is not a panacea for addressing
poverty in different socioeconomic conditions
1. Sensitive to the short-term needs of the local people Complimentary interventions to provide alternative livelihood
sources (e.g., where forests have low economic value)
2. Discrimination can have adverse affects the disadvantage group
Conclusion: FCM has the potential of enhancing rural incomes Design gender & poverty-focussed devolution programs
Eliminate capture by the elite Induce greater participation by vulnerable households Increase the allocation to be shared by the community
70% Government & 30% local community
Land Economics . November 2006 . 82 (4): 562–581