Psychological ReviewVol. 62, No. 5, 1955

PSYCHOLOGY FROM A BIOLOGIST'S POINT OF VIEW

C. JUDSON HERRICKGrand Rapids, Michigan

THE BASIC PROBLEMA student of the philosophy of sci-

ence might be tempted to say there areas many biologies as there are biolo-gists, if account is taken only of themen whose exceptional insight and pro-ductiveness have guided the growth ofthe science. The same may be true ofpsychology, and perhaps we can do nobetter than accept Cattell's character-istic definition"Psychology is whatthe psychologist is interested in quapsychologist." There are, however,some general principles about whichbiologists and psychologists are in sub-stantial agreement. One of these prin-ciples is that no factual findings havescientific significance until they arefitted into the appropriate niche in theintegrated system of knowledge.

The neurologist finds this orientationespecially difficult because almost allexperiences and activities of men andother animals involve nervous functionsand his field has no boundaries. Thehuman brain is the most importantthing in the world, for, as Gibbs (1)expresses it, "Human history is a his-tory of the brain activity of the humanrace" (p. 1SOS). This relationship tiesneurology closely with psychology andalso with psychiatry, sociology, andevery other human interest. But whenthe neurologist tries to find out justwhere his findings tie in with psychol-ogy he is puzzled. There are so manypsychologies that one wonders what itis all about.

The interested spectator who sits onthe fence watching the game sees twoopposing teams and, on the side lines,a goodly number of other psychologistswho do not join either faction. In one

team the partisans of traditional dual-ism contend for a sharp separation ofthe conscious, or "spiritual," activitiesfrom the unconscious, or "physical,"thus splitting the world as we experi-ence it into two universes, one of whichhas been characterized as "spiritual re-ality" or "ideational reality" and theother as "physical reality." Opposedto these radical spiritists are the mecha-nists, who insist that, since the searchin both science and philosophy is forunifying principles, and since it has notbeen possible to explain how a non-physical agency can act upon a physi-cal structure so as to influence humanconduct, we must search for physical-istic principles of sufficiently wide im-port to embrace all the known phe-nomena.

The more radical members of thesecond group, apparently accepting thetraditional doctrine that anything "spir-itual" is ipso facto nonphysical, takethe easy way out and deny that con-scious experience of any kind has sci-entific or operational significance. Thisdespite the fact that the very denial isa conscious act. This exclusion of ev-erything mentalistic from psychology isobviously a defense reaction against theprimitive animistic mythologies whichstill survive in every human culture.But even though mind is called an epi-phenomenon, it is nonetheless a phe-nomenon, a natural event, and a placein the system of nature must be foundfor every natural event.

The spiritists' quest for a psychologyreleased from the limitations imposedby the laws of the physical world, andthe objective psychologists' insistencethat only observable physical processes

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are significant for psychology, seemto be irreconcilable. The controversypoints again to the fact that the basicproblem of psychology is, as it alwayshas been, the exact nature of the rela-tionship between our knowledge of theobjective world and the subjective ex-perience of knowing and all other con-scious acts.

My purpose here is to examine, fromthe standpoint of mechanistic biology,some of the diverse fields of inquirywhich must be integrated before thisbasic problem can be formulated in ac-cordance with physical, physiological,and psychological principles now gen-erally accepted. The divisive tendenciesof current scientific movements are re-tarding progress.

The key factor in the current con-troversy about the nonphysical natureof the human spirit really hinges on adefinition: Just what do we mean byphysical structure and what are itsproperties? We must define the physi-cal before we can talk rationally aboutthe nonphysical. A brief summary ofa few principles of current physical sci-ence is prerequisite to further consid-eration of the meaning of the word"physical" in biological and psycho-logical contexts.

PHYSICAL SCIENCE OF TODAYThe history of ideas about the na-

ture of the physical world records threerevolutionary periods. The Greek pe-riod, typified by Aristotle and Euclid,dominated formal thinking for twothousand years and is still influential.Beginning in the middle ages a secondrevolutionary period culminated withthe Newtonian system of mechanics.The third period began with the twen-tieth century, as exemplified in rela-tivity and quantum mechanics. It isstill in its infancy and its findings aremore revolutionary than any of thepreceding.

The fundamental conceptions of phys-ics are in flux. New methods have re-vealed new facts which require newprinciples, and some principles formerlyregarded as axiomatic are now suspect.The absolutes of earlier times are nowtreated relativistically, with radical re-organization of the science of mechan-ics.

To put it briefly, natural science to-day regards our cosmos as a stupendousmechanism (physicalism) composed ofinnumerable subsidiary mechanisms, allbound together in accordance with law-fully ordered principles. We do notadequately understand any thing or anyevent until we know the mechanismthat produces it and the principles inaccordance with which it operates. Amechanism is defined by D'Arcy Thomp-son (7) as ". . . whatsoever checks orcontrols, and guides into determinatepaths, the workings of energy" (p.291). Accepting this definition, thescience of mechanics deals with energyand the "whatsoever" that controls itsworkings.

The mechanism makes some specifickind of product and the nature of theproduct is the crucial issue in its or-ganization. This product may be ma-terial arranged in a different way orplace, or energy in a different patternof manifestation. Or it may be mattertransformed into energy or energy intomatter, for these are known to be in-terconvertible in quantitatively meas-urable relations (Einstein's conversionequation, E = Mc2). In view of thislast point the distinction between mat-ter and energy becomes rather fuzzy,and any manifestation of an energychange is a physical event.

The belief now current among physi-cists is that the various kinds of atomsare relatively stable and different pat-terns of energy. There are no differentkinds of energy. The so-called thermal,electrical, and other energies are differ-

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ent patterns of manifestation of onecommon measurable quantity which inour ignorance we call energy. Natureas a whole is process. There is noth-ing static about it anywhere.

In a natural mechanism the mate-rials and energies used may come froma wide field and the product made is inturn delivered to the surroundings. Itfollows that the active structure, themachine itself, must be so denned as toinclude the entire field with which ithas transactional relations. The mis-taken popular notion that a machine isa passive inert structure operated byan outside agent is derived from theartificial machine with a human op-erator. It is true that a lathe in amachine shop has no value as mecha-nism without the operator who startsit, stops it, and controls its action.This means that, from the operationalstandpoint, the operator must be re-garded as an integral part of the mecha-nism. In natural mechanisms it is moreevident that the operator is inside theapparatus. The apparatus itself is theoperator; that is to say, the machineoperates itself. No natural mechanismneeds a djinn or any external operatorto run it or tell it what to do. This,we believe, is as true of a man as of asolar system or a volcano.

Classical physics as formulated inNewtonian mechanics deals with inertsolid particles of matter which differ inmass and are pushed about by forcesacting upon them. These forces areconsidered to be manifestations of en-ergy, and the movements are measur-able in arbitrary units of space andtime. Twentieth century science, onthe contrary, finds that matter and en-ergy are different manifestations of thesame unknown something and that insome domains of physics space andtime in the objective world must betreated relativistically with reference toeach other. In subatomic physics they

cannot be measured in arbitrary units,with the observer as a fixed point ofreference.

A physical mechanism is defined dy-namically. It may make some particu-lar product, repetitively, because it isso organized as to do this by virtue ofthis organization. But if the organiza-tion changes its pattern so as to de-liver a different kind of product, a fac-tor is introduced which may properlybe called creative. Even a repetitiveperformance like that of some particu-lar chemical reaction exhibits the prop-erty of transforming a pattern of ma-terial or energy into a different pattern,and this capacity is the source fromwhich creativity, as here defined, is de-rived. Creation does not imply thatsomething is made out of nothing. Thescientific problem is to discover thelaws in accordance with which thesechanges take place. Since the operat-ing forces are manifestations of energy,it is evident that energy as such hascreative efficiency. In other words, itsactivities are not stereotyped in rigidlypredetermined patterns. These patternsare constantly changing by conversionas they interact with one another, andthis capacity for change is responsiblefor cosmic and organic evolution andfor the orderly processes of growth ofliving individuals. This perhaps is whatWhitehead had in mind when he said,"creativity is ultimate"; that is to say,it is something which science cannot ex-plain or analyze further.

This intrinsic creativity of physicalprocesses is not a metaphysical specula-tion. It is an observed fact, and if itwere not so our cosmos would now bein a state of homogeneous equilibriumat the lowest level of organization. Inview of these dynamic and creativeproperties of the physical universe, andof our incomplete knowledge of thelaws in accordance with which the suc-cessive changes take place, we can set

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no limits to the kinds of products thatnatural mechanisms (physicalisms) canmake. If now we wish to push furtherinto the domain of psychophysics, ac-count must be taken of this change inthe climate of science which has comewithin the memory of men now living.

The modern mechanist is not a ma-terialist in the classical sense. Wegrant that he deals only with physicalstructures and their operations. Theoperating body is always a mobilestructure, which may be relatively sta-ble as we see it in a mountain or a cat,or it may be a specific pattern of en-ergy manifestation in which no par-ticulate matter is recognizable, as in aray of light. Usually it is a combina-tion of both, as in a volcano or a think-ing man. In current science by "mecha-nistic" we mean physicalistic, and thesewords now have meanings which arequite different from those of fifty yearsago, although the latter are still cur-rent in both common speech and sci-entific literature.

Subsequent references to relativityand quantum mechanics do not carrythe implication that the psychobiologistthinks that these principles, as now for-mulated in mathematical physics, areadequate to give a satisfactory explana-tion of the mind-body relationship. Themost that can be claimed for them inthis connection is that they may besteps toward the discovery of the stillunknown principles that satisfy the re-quirements of the problem.

THE NATURAL HISTORY or THE SPIRITMy understanding of current scien-

tific thought about some of the proper-ties of the natural world has just beenoutlined. It is physicalistic through-out. Let us see now where the oppos-ing psychologies mentioned at the be-ginning of this essay stand in the lightof this evidence.

Many years ago I said (2) that in-trospection is as manifestly a biologi-cal method as is reflexology, and thisprinciple needs re-emphasis today. Con-scious experience influences conduct. Itis therefore a factor of behavior. Wemay go further and say with Edwin G.Boring that a conscious experience is it-self a behavior, a bodily act which maybe observed introspectively just as weobserve other kinds of behavior. Intro-spection, like the other methods of ob-servation, is, of course, subject to thehazard of erroneous interpretation. Andagain it is timely to insist that thedualistic theories merely pile mysteryupon mystery and only confuse theissues without explaining anything.

Because man is an animal and be-cause his "spiritual" capacities are dem-onstrably vital processes, psychologyis necessarily articulated with biology;but it does not follow from this thatthe laws of conscious experience areidentical with those of the things ofwhich we have experience. It is, infact, clear that they are not. Eachlevel of organization has its own dis-tinctive properties, some of which can-not be reduced to those of lower levels(3).

The mind-body problem will neverbe solved by ignoring the troublesomefactors, either those of spirit or of mat-ter. The inquiry cannot be limited toeither the conscious or the unconsciousfactors, because what we are lookingfor is the relation between the two. Itdoes no good to try to evade the issueas a "pseudoproblem." Traditional ma-terialism (the "crude" variety) andclassical spiritism (or, more reputably,"idealism") both involve neglect of avast wealth of human experience, in-cluding common sense and refined sci-entific knowledge. We cannot choosebetween materialism and spiritualism.We must have both.

The attempts so far made to find a

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PSYCHOLOGY FROM A BIOLOGIST'S POINT OF VIEW 337

suitable formula of psychophysics haveled into blind alleys. The chief diffi-culty arises from the fact that we haveno common measure for objectivelyknown dimensions and the relations ob-served in the process of knowing them.If ever a suitable formula for this re-lationship is discovered, it will prob-ably be stated in some kind of rela-tivistic terms, and it may dispense withnumerical units altogether. Mathe-matics and symbolic logic are now de-veloping methods of dealing with situa-tions devoid of any quantitative factors,and this may point the way towardhitherto unexplored fields of inquiry inpsychobiology.

The human brain controls many ofthe internal bodily activities and by farthe larger part of overt behavior. Itsstructure is inconceivably complicatedand much of the detail is still obscure.There is on record, however, a vastamount of knowledge about nervousstructure and the laws of its operation.The products delivered by this mecha-nism are of many kinds, includinggrowth of the structure itself, a varietyof chemical reactions and associatedchanges in electrical potential, and theexcitation of mass movements of thebody. These have been thoroughlystudied and described in physiologicalterms.

There is another unique property ofsome of these operations that cannot bestudied by the objective methods ofanatomy and physiology, because it isstrictly private and can be recognizedonly subjectively by the person whois operating. Fortunately, we have amechanism by which this personalawareness can be made public. Ideascan be translated into symbolswordsand othersthe utterance of whichevokes similar symbols in other people.By this indirection subjective experi-ence can be objectified and so com-municated. This enables us to develop

a legitimate science of introspectivepsychology. We do not know the me-chanics of this process of symbolizingor the physical laws of its operation,but we have an interesting analogyin the electronic computing machineswhich perform similar operations witha quite different mechanism. Doubt-less there are some common principlesin these two kinds of operations.

There are no conscious factors, sofar as we know, in most physiologicaloperations; but we know as surely aswe know anything in science that allmental acts are vital functions and weknow where the organs are that per-form them. We know also that thedistinctively human types of highermental functions are added to pre-exist-ing physiological functions in the courseof personal and evolutionary develop-ment.

Although we do not yet know howawareness emerges within the metabo-lism of brain tissue, we know that itdoes so and that it is as truly a physi-cal process as is the transmission oflight through apparently empty space.We do not know all about the me-chanics of light either, but long agoHelios was banished from science be-cause he could not explain anything.When a weight is lifted by muscular ac-tion the cause of the movement is nota disembodied contractility. It is con-tracting muscle. When a problem inmental arithmetic is solved the operat-ing agent is not a nonphysical mindwhich activates an inert structuralmechanism. It is a living brain en-gaged in thinking. There is no specifickind of mental energy. Mental workis bodily work, and it is the body thatgets tired when we do it. Mind doesnot move matter. It is "minding" mat-ter that does "mental" work just as itis contracting muscle that does "physi-cal" work. A thought is not a productmade by a mechanism, the way bile is

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made by the liver. It is the operationof the mechanism, an act, not a mate-rial or any other kind of an object. Tosplit the junction from the organ thatperforms it is scientifically as absurdas is the separation of the properties ofany other thing from the object thatmanifests them.

The claim of the parapsychologiststhat psi phenomena in general involve"extrasensory perception," presumablythrough nonphysical agencies, calls fora critical appraisement of current stud-ies of the mechanics of perception.This inquiry brings out very clearly thefundamental difference between the re-lations of space and time factors in theacquisition of perceptual knowledge ofthe objective world and these relationsin the higher rational use of this knowl-edge.

Every perception of a physical ob-ject or event and every consciouslycontrolled movement of the body in-volves a transactional relation of somesort between the "spiritual" and the"physical." In all these activities theconscious and the unconscious factorsare inextricably interwoven. The firstcan be observed only introspectively,the other again introspectively but onlyby an indirection, by the observer be-coming aware of some objective (un-conscious) physical events. The actof perception involves the conversionof "physical" processes into "mental"processes, and conversely a voluntaryact requires the conversion of a con-scious purpose into movement of thephysical body. The nub of the mind-body problem lies in the nature of theseconversions.

The significant factors of such con-versions can be isolated by experimen-tal analysis more readily in the studyof perception than of any other psy-chological processes. We have biologi-cal evidence that the internal integra-tive and regulatory functions of an ani-

mal body must be sharply distinguishedfrom the analytic functions of sensori-motor type which are concerned withthe adjustment of the body to externalthings and events. The physical prin-ciples of integration are fundamentallydifferent from those of the analyticfunctions, and some of the former canbe described only in relativistic terms.

The most complicated integrative ap-paratus known is in the human brain,and the act of knowing is an integra-tive process which gives us two kindsof knowledge which Sellars (6) hascalled "perceptual knowledge" and"conceptual knowledge." The formergives us all the information we haveabout the spatial, temporal, and en-ergic properties of the objective world.Newtonian mechanics was developed onthe basis of this knowledge. This me-chanics is of necessity framed in be-havioral space and time. Conceptualknowledge comprises those higher ra-tional and emotive functions whichcannot be quantified in the numericalunits of space, time, mass, and energyof Newtonian mechanics.

This distinction is fundamental. Itis explained, in part at least, by the na-ture of the act of perception and of theapparatus employed. Its neglect ac-counts for the failure of the earlier at-tempts to find acceptable laws of psy-chophysics. This theme cannot beelaborated here. Enough has been doneto show that this lead points to apromising field worthy of further in-vestigation.

PARAPSYCHOLOGYThe intimate relationship between ob-

jective things and events and our knowl-edge of them is so commonplace that itis generally uncritically accepted. Butthe manifestations of hypnotism, te-lepathy, and the other so-called psiphenomena are so unusual, and in someinstances so bizarre, that there is in-

PSYCHOLOGY FROM A BIOLOGIST'S POINT OF VIEW 339

sistent demand that they be eitherexplained or explained away as spuri-ous. The latter has been tried repeat-edly without convincing proof.

These phenomena have been underinvestigation by competent scientistsfor more than seventy-five years. Theworkers in this field of "parapsychol-ogy" who are now most active are ad-vocates of dualistic theories which havebeen given wide publicity, but the ma-jority of other scientists question thesignificance of their findings. Thisskepticism is due in part to the factthat this field of inquiry was so longcontaminated with fraud and delusionthat the prejudice against it is stillstrong. The prejudice has not beenmitigated by the fantastic claims madein some of the recent literature. Never-theless, these are real phenomena whichmerit critical study by every availablemethod.

It should be recognized and empha-sized that the mysteries associated withpsi phenomena are of the same order,and no different in principle, as thosepresented by every mental and inten-tionally controlled act whatsoever. Ifparapsychology is to win acceptance aslegitimate natural science, it must befitted into the same general frame ofreference as the other branches of psy-chology and of natural science as awhole. "Parapsychology" is a mis-nomer, for psi phenomena are eitherpsychological or they are not. If not,what are they?

In psi phenomena the unconsciousfactors clearly play the critical role.These can be studied only by the meth-ods of objective science and these meth-ods have so far proved inadequate.The same is true for many other un-solved scientific problems. So when Dr.Rhine writes (5, p. 300), "We know bythis time that we cannot use a physicaltheory to explain psi," we freely grantthat no satisfactory physical theory has

yet been found; but that is far fromproof that it cannot be found. In an-other passage (4, p. 62) he has insistedthat the physics of tomorrow is irrele-vant here; we must think in terms ofpresent knowledge. But this is exactlywhat he does not do. What he does dois to base his argument on nineteenthcentury physics. As for the physics oftomorrow, which Rhine says is a point:less speculation, we should remember,as Walker (8) points out, that our mostvaluable instruments of scientific prog-ress are the working hypotheses whichlook forward by extrapolation frompresent knowledge in all promising di-rections. Without these prescient ex-cursions into the unknown, growthwould be arrested and science woulddie of senile sclerosis.

We are surprised also to read thatthe claim that human mentation as avital function is "a metaphysical as-sumption" or "mere conjecture," andthat psychologists have the vague no-tion that mind and body "are somehowfundamentally unified on some complexbut wholly unknown physical basis,"and that "this half-formulated mate-rialism is taken for granted; it has notbeen subjected to experiment" (5, p.197). The fact is that it would be pos-sible to cite literally thousands of ex-periments devoted explicitly to thisproblemexperiments made by themost competent neurologists, physiolo-gists, and psychologists we have. Theseexperiments are of many kinds, using awide variety of methods.

The most instructive of these ex-periments are based on the fact thatall nervous action is accompanied bychanges in electrical potential that canbe localized and accurately measured.Using the same technique, a particularkind of mental work can be shown tobe accompanied by similar changes inpotential which are localized in specificregions of the body. The "brain waves"

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recorded by the oscillograph of thou-sands of conscious persons have beenstudied under a great variety of condi-tions, and the effects of various kinds ofmental experience are clearly seen inthis permanent record of the relatedchanges in electrical potential. This isonly one among many other methodswhich have been used to prove that wethink with our bodies, and with differentparts of the body for different kinds ofthinking.

THE SPIRITUAL LIFEIt is possible to mention here only a

few samples of the evidence whichjustifies the conviction that man's spir-itual life, in the ordinary vernacularmeaning of that term, is a real and sig-nificant component of his natural life.For the biologist this means that allmental acts of whatever kind are astruly vital processes as are nervous con-duction and muscular movement.. Thisgives us a unitary system of scientifi-cally acceptable principles for every-thing within the range of human experi-ence.

A man has native capacities for spir-itual culture which set him at the high-est level of integrative and creative effi-ciency yet reached in cosmic evolutionso far as we know. This physicalisticconception of human nature, which has

been accused of degrading the dignity ofman and destroying his spiritual values,really points the way to the most effi-cient measures for enhancing these mostprecious human treasures. By settingthe spiritual life in vital operationalrelationship with all other domains ofscience and of human endeavor, we getthe benefit of all the resources of thesciences to reinforce and guide into ap-propriate channels the efforts of theother agencies of spiritual cultureeducation, philosophy, art, religion, andall the rest. This is a magnificentachievement.

REFERENCES1. GIBBS, F. A. The most important thing.

Amer. J. publ. Hlth, 1951, 41, 1503-1508.

2. HERRICK, C. J. Introspection as a bio-logical method. /. Phil., 1915, 12, 543-551.

3. HERRICK, C. J. A biological survey of in-tegrative levels. In R. W. Sellars et al.(Eds.), Philosophy {or the future. NewYork: Macmillan, 1949. Pp. 222-242.

4. RHINE, J. B. The reach of the mind.New York: William Sloane, 1947.

5. RHINE, J. B. New world of the mind.New York: William Sloane, 1953.

6. SELLARS, R. W. An analytic approach tothe mind-body problem. Phil. Rev.,1938, 47, 461-487.

7. THOMPSON, D. W. On growth and form.New York: Macmillan, 1942.

8. WALKER, R. Parapsychology and dualism.Set. Man., 1954, 44, 1-9.

(Received October 14, 1954)

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