The PRISMA capacity platform offers easy access to infrastructure operators for the European energy community.
PRISMA in a nutshell
+640Shippers
+1700Network pointson the platform
39TSOs
4SSOs
2
+86.000Concluded contract in 2018
+7.800Secondary trades in 2018
Most relevant obligations for capacity allocation • Standard capacity products (art. 9)• Publication and start of the auctions (from art. 11 to art. 15)• Allocation mechanisms: “Ascending clock auction” (art. 17) and
“Uniform-price auction” (art. 18)• Bundled capacity products (art. 19)• Capacity booking platform and secondary Market (art.37)
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Standard Capacity Products
Yearly
Quarterly
Monthly
Daily
Within-day Balance of the day
Next day
Next month
Max 12 months
Min 5 years and max 15 years
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• Same products could be offered as “firm” or as “interruptible” capacity
• All available capacity shall be offered bundled
Ascending clock Uniform price
Organization of WD products
16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 11:0004:00 05:00 07:00 09:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 17:00 18:0016:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 06:0004:00 05:00
Gas Day DGas Day D-1
24h24h23h22h21h20h19h18h17h16h15h14h13h12h11h10h
9h8h7h6h5h4h3h2h1h
• Day-ahead auction for the product runtime of the next gas day takes place everyday at 16:30 CE(S)T
• The first within-day auction has the same product runtime (06:00-06:00) and it starts at 19:00 CE(S)T
• Every consecutive within-day auctions starts at full hour and lasts for 30 minutes.
• The last Within-day auction starts at 01:00 for the product runtime of 05:00 – 06:00(the same gas day)
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clockPr
ice
Avai
labl
eca
paci
ty
1 2 301
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Amount
• Demand and availablecapacity
• Defined price steps• Ascending price
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• There are different possible behaviors• Example 1: Undersell in first bidding round• Example 2: Clearance in first bidding round• Example 3: Oversell • Example 4: Undersell
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clockExample 1: Undersell in 1st bidding round
• Round 0.0, RT• Less demand than available
capacity• Auction closes after Round
0.0• Only RT will be charged
B1 B2 B3
Price
Amount
avail. capacity
1. biddinground (0.0)
P0
Legend:P0 Regulated TariffB1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clockExample 2: Clearance in first bidding round
• Round 0.0, only Regulated Tariff (RT) applies
• The available capacity is fully requested by the four participants
• The auction closes after round 0.0
• Only RT will be charged
B1 B2 B3 B4
Price
Amount
avail. capacity
1. biddinground (0.0)
P0
Legend:P0 Regulated TariffB1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• Round 0.0, RT• More demand than available
capacity (oversell)
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
Price
1. biddinground (0.0)
Amount
avail. capacity
P0
Legend:P0 Regulated TariffB1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
Example 3: Oversell
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• Round 1.0, RT + 1 large price step (LPS)
• B3 reduced bid• B5 dropped out• Still an oversell situation
P0
B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 2. bidding round (1.0)
P1
B4 B6
Price
Amount
avail. capacity
1. biddinground (0.0)B1 B2 B3 B5
Legend:P0 Regulated TariffB1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
Example 3: Oversell
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• Round 2.0, RT + 2 LPSs• B4 reduces their bid• B6 drops out• Perfect sell-out• The auction closes after
round 2.0 with RT + 2 LPSs applied
Price
1. biddinground (0.0)
3. bidding round (0.0)B1 B2 B3 B4
P2
Example 3: Oversell
Amount
avail. capacity
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
B1 B2 B3 B4 B6
P0
P1
Legend:P0 Regulated TariffB1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• Round 0.0, RT• More demand than available
capacity (oversell)
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
Price
1. biddinground (0.0)
Amount
avail. capacity
P0
Legend:P0 Regulated TariffB1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
Example 4: Undersell
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• Round 1.0, RT + 1 large price step (LPS)
• B3 reduced bid• B5 dropped out• Still an oversell situationB1 B2 B3 B4 B6 2. bidding
round (1.0)
P1
B4 B6
Price
Amount
avail. capacity
1. biddinground (0.0)B1 B2 B3 B5
Legend:P0 Regulated TariffB1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
Example 4: Undersell
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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• Round 2.0, RT + 2 LPSs• B4 and B6 drop out• This results in an undersell
Price
1. biddinground (0.0)
3. bidding round (2.0)B1 B2 B3
P2
Amount
avail. capacity
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
B1 B2 B3 B4 B6
P0
P1
Legend:P0 Price step (P0 =Regulated Tariff)B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
Example 4: Undersell
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B1 B2 B3 B4
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• Previous LPS (2.0) is reversed• 1st small price step (SMP) is
added to RT + 1 LPS• This is now Round 1.1, RT +
1LPS + 1SMP• B4 is back in• B1, B2 & B3 have to bid min. P1
amount• Oversell
Price
2. biddinground (1.0)
Amount
avail. capacity
B1 B2
P1
P2
Legend:P0 Price step (P0 =Regulated Tariff)B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
Example 4: Undersell
B3 B4 B6
P1.1
3. biddinground (2.0)
3. biddinground (1.1)
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
P0
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B1 B2 B3 B4
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock
• Round 1.2, RT + 1LPS + 2SMPs• B4 reduces their requested
capacity• B1, B2 & B3 still have to stick to
their capacity• Auction closes with perfect
sell-out• RT + 1LPS + 2SMPs will be
charged
Price
2. biddinground (1.0)
Amount
avail. capacity
B1 B2
P1
P2
Legend:P0 Price step (P0 =Regulated Tariff)B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n
Example 4: Undersell
B3 B4 B6
P1.1
3. biddinground (2.0)
B1P1.2
B2 B3 B4 4. biddinground (1.2)
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
P0
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Bearing in mind
• Participation in first bidding round
• Ratio between the total demand and the available capacity
• Amount of the bid
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Auction algorithm – Uniform price
• There are different possible behaviors• Example 1: Fill procedure• Example 2: Kill procedure• Example 3: Pro-rata allocation• Example 4: Demand lower than available capacity
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• Uniform price auctions only have one bidding round
• Bids contain a surcharge, a minimum and a maximum capacity amount
• Evaluation and allocation of capacity is done after the bidding round is closed
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Amount
Surc
harg
e
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Basics
Clearing Price
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C
• During evaluation, overdemand is detected
• A & B get full amounts because of the higher surcharge
• C’s maximum exceeds available capacity
• C’s maximum is cut to fill the remaining capacity
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Maximum amount Shipper C
Minimum amount Shipper C
Example 1: Fill procedure
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CC
• During evaluation, overdemand is detected
• A & B get full amounts because of the higher surcharge
• C’s maximum exceeds available capacity
• C’s maximum is cut to fill the remaining capacity
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Maximum amount Shipper C
Minimum amount Shipper C
Example 1: Fill procedure
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C
• Bid with minimum surcharge that gets capacity sets clearing price for the auction
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Maximum amount Shipper C
Minimum amount Shipper C
Example 1: Fill procedure
Clearing Price
35
DDC
• During evaluation, overdemand is detected
• A & B get full amounts because of the higher surcharge
• C’s Minimum exceeds available capacity
• C’s bid is killed and D is cut and used to fill the remaining capacity
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Maximum amount Shipper C
Minimum amount Shipper C
Maximum amount Shipper D
Minimum amount Shipper D
Example 2: Kill procedure
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D
• Bid with minimum surcharge that gets capacity sets clearing price for the auction (D)
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Maximum amount Shipper C
Minimum amount Shipper C
Maximum amount Shipper D
Minimum amount Shipper D
Example 2: Kill procedure
Clearing Price
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C
• During evaluation, overdemand is detected
• A & B get full amounts because of the higher surcharge
• Together, C&D exceed the available capacity
• Prevent discrimination• Pro-rata used
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Example 3: Pro-rata allocation
D
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Maximum amount Shipper C
Minimum amount Shipper C
Maximum amount Shipper D
Minimum amount Shipper D
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C
• During evaluation, overdemand is detected
• A & B get full amounts because of the higher surcharge
• Together, C&D exceed the available capacity
• Prevent discrimination• Pro-rata used
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Example 3: Pro-rata allocation
D
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Maximum amount Shipper C
Minimum amount Shipper C
Maximum amount Shipper D
Minimum amount Shipper D
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Auction algorithm – Uniform priceExample 3: Pro-rata allocation
• Pro rata formula
Maximum demand of bid
Sum of all bids at this pricex remaining capacity
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• Bid with minimum surcharge that gets capacity sets clearing price for the auction (C&D)
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Example 3: Pro-rata allocation
Clearing Price
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Maximum amount Shipper C
Minimum amount Shipper C
Maximum amount Shipper D
Minimum amount Shipper D
C D
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• Underdemand is detected• Clearing price is set to 0
surcharge• Only RT applies
Auction algorithm – Uniform price
A
Surcharge
avail. capacity
B
Amount
Maximum amount Shipper B
Minimum amount Shipper B
Maximum amount Shipper A
Minimum amount Shipper A
Legend:
Example 1: Fill procedure
Clearing Price
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Secondary Market
Proposal Response Trade Creation Validation Publishing
of Trade
2 Types ofproposals:
To buy or to sell
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Secondary Market
Two types of trades:
Transfer of use
• Use of capacitytransferred
• Obligations towardsTSOs stay with sellingshipper
Assignment
• Full rights and obligations aretransferred tocounterparty
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Secondary Market
• Three different trading procedures:• Over the counter (OTC)• First come first served (FCFS)• Call for orders (CFO)
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Secondary Market
• Helpful features:• Trader lists• Trading conditions• EIC search and anonymous trading• Different trade proposal stati: new, closed, rejected, expired, withdrawn
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Yearly auctions
52
Similar results as for 2018, the majority of the capacity is bought for next gas year.
Note:The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bund led.
Quarterly auctions
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The introduction of multiple sessions during the year, in which quarterly capacity is offered, increased the demand for quarterly products.Note:The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bund led.
Monthly auctions
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The demand of monthly products doesn’t seem to be affected by the introduction of multi-session of quarterly auctions.Note:The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bund led.
Daily auctions – sold in a month
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Also the demand of daily products is characterized by high volatility.
Note:The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bund led.
Within day auctions – sold in a month
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Demand of within day products seems to follow the seasons.
Note:The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bund led.
Capacity allocated via PRISMA for delivery period
57
The amount of allocated capacity per delivery period increased on a yearly base.
Note:The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bund led.
Conclusions
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CAM NC clearly is supporting the development of well functioning gas markets in the European countries….
… but the market conditions changes since the CAM NC approved.
Amendments will be probably implemented in the upcoming years to further support European gas markets.
Note:A similar assessment is included in the ACER’s Market Monitoring Report 2018; in this report ACER stated that “The implementation of the CAM NC is favouring the possibility for shippers better to profile their capacity portfolio and to incorporate short-term price signals in the management of their capacity at the IPs. Starting from the capacity booked for 2018, more quarterly products and more yearly products were booked via the CAM auctions because of the entry into force of some amendments to the CAM NC. NRAs, the European Commission and ACER could consider the possibility to further increase the frequency of CAM auctions with a standardised timing in order to make them even more useful for the network users.”
Any combination of such services can be selected by TSOs in order to create their own tailored service package
PRISMA currently offers a wide range of services to TSOs around capacity allocation
FCFS capacity allocation
Secondary capacity trading
Reverse capacity auctions
CoreGraphical user interface
User registrationUser management
System automation
REMIT reporting
Capacity linking
Bid limitation
Capacity upgrade (interr. to firm)
Capacity conversion (unbundled to bundled)
Balancing group / portfolio code management
Surrender of capacity
TSO acting as a shipper
1-n bundling
Basic CAMLong-term auctionsDay-ahead auctionsWithin-day auctions
Bundled auctionsIncremental capacity auctionsNetwork point administration
Reporting section
Competing auctions
Multi currency support
Credit limit check Volume based tariff
Specific terms and conditions
Autom. cancellation of interr. day-ahead
auctions
Minimum bid amount
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PRISMA also offers a variety of services to SSOs and shippers
Shipper Services
Additional features and packages (Analyst API, Trader API)
Storage Services
Standard services and add-ons (Allocation, API)
CoreGraphical user interface
User registrationUser management
BasicOffer publication
Bid collection
SSO APISystem automation
Allocation mechanismsAutomatic bid allocation
Click & BookDirect request process
FCFS allocation
Shipper APISystem automation
Shipper self-serviceClick & book add-onsShipper admin access
REMIT reportingSecondary tradingReporting to ACER
Credit managementCredit limit check upon
bid placement
FCFS booking
• The platform acts as an intermediary between shipper and TSO* regarding all booking information (e.g. request, confirmation of availability)
• Capacity is sold at the regulated tariff
* FCFS is possible with selected TSOs (depending on national regulation and TSO decision)
Shipper requests capacity
TSO checks if capacity is available
Either confirms or presents alternative
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Surrender
• Return capacity to TSOs for re-marketing• Important:
• TSOs will first market free capacity, then surrendered• A surrender can be partially successful • Not all TSOs offer surrender
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