Download - Buridan Davidson Akrasia
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
1/22
John Buridan and Donald Davidson on "Akrasia"Author(s): Risto SaarinenSource: Synthese, Vol. 96, No. 1, Studies in Early Fourteenth-Century Philosophy (Jul., 1993),pp. 133-153Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117803 .
Accessed: 22/12/2013 08:35
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springerhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20117803?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20117803?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
2/22
RISTO SAARINEN
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON AKRASIA
1.
INTRODUCTORY
REMARKS
This article has
two
objectives.
First,
it is
my
aim
to
outline
some
medieval views
concerning
the
acts
that
oppose
one's
better
judgment.
I will
use
Aristotle's
term
akrasia
to
denote
the
moral
state
of
an
agent
behaving
in this
way.
John Buridan's
(1285-1349)
treatment
of akrasia
is
especially
relevant
here.
Second,
it will
be
argued
that
some
impor
tant
philosophical
ideas
proposed
recently by
Donald
Davidson,
in his
influential
study
'How is
Weakness of the Will
Possible?',1
are
antici
pated
in
the medieval
discussion.
Aristotle's
akrasia,
or
''weakness of the
will ,
has
recently
received
increasing scholarly
attention.2
The
problems
concerning
akrasia arise
ifwe adopt the view of Socrates, according to which no one can know
the
good
and will
evil.3
Given
this,
how
is
it
possible
to
explain
the
seemingly
common
phenomenon
of
acting
against
one's better
judg
ment? Aristotle's discussion of
akrasia
in the
seventh book
of
his
Nico
machean
Ethics
has
become
a
paradigmatic
example
of how
a
classical
problem
is
actually
perennial
and
can
arise
again
in modern
thought.
Many
recent
treatments
of the weakness
of the will
combine historical
interpretation
of
Aristotle with
developments
in
analytical
philosophy,4
thus
demonstrating
the
importance
of historical
awareness
even
in mod
ern
action
theory.
Although
this awareness has
undoubtedly
been instructive both for
historians
and
philosophers,
one
important
aspect
of the
historical di
mension,
as
far
as
I
can
see,
has been
almost
completely
neglected.
The
modern
studies and
textbooks
on
akrasia first
deal
extensively
with ancient
Greek
philosophy
and
then
immediately
proceed
to
the
twentieth-century
discussion.
The
remaining
gap
of 2000
years
of
philo
sophical
reflection is
sometimes filled with
short
references
to
Augus
tine,
Aquinas,
Leibniz,
and
Kant.5
One does
find
sophisticated
philosophical
discussions
on
akrasia,
or
incontinence
(Lat.
incondnenda),6
however,
both in
medieval
Synthese
96:
133-154,
1993.
?
1993
Kluwer
Academic
Publishers.
Printed in
the Netherlands.
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
3/22
134
RISTO SAARINEN
scholastic
philosophy
and in sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century
neo
scholasticism.7
The
conceptual
refinement of
the
fourteenth-century
medieval discussion
makes contributions that
are
wholly
comparable
to
those
of
twentieth-century
philosophers.
The
neglect
of medieval authors
is rather
surprising,
as
it
is well
known that
many
of them
wrote
lengthy
commentaries
on
the Nicoma
chean
Ethics.
Nevertheless,
Justin
Gosling,
e.g.,
wrote
in
his
recent
historical
introduction
to
Weakness
of
the Will that so far
as
I
know
there is
no
literature
on
the
problem
in
medieval
philosophers .8
Al
though some preliminary studies have been done,9 the medieval dis
cussion
has
obviously
been
neglected.
The
short
chapter
on
Aquinas
and Others
in
Gosling's
own
monograph10
is,
in
any
case,
not
very
illuminating,
because he
only
pays
attention
to
Anselm of
Canterbury,
Thomas
Aquinas,
and
John
Duns
Scotus,
none
of whom
wrote
compre
hensive
treatises
on
akrasia}1
Although
the
simplest
explanation
for this
state
of affairs
might
be
that
medieval
texts
are
largely
unknown
to
modern
philosophers,
per
haps
a
more
likely
reason
for
it is the
common
prejudice
that
the
Judaeo-Christian notion
of 'free will' does
not
allow
any proper
philo
sophical
discussion of akrasia.
According
to this
prejudice,
akrasia has
no
special
philosophical
interest,
since
Christian
psychology
considers
the
will
an
autonomous
faculty
in human action. Such
an
autonomous
faculty
is
not
bound
to
any
intellectual
judgment;
therefore
the
will
need
not
obey
reason's
commands.12
Although
the Greek
notion of 'will'
certainly
differs from its Judaeo
Christian
counterpart,
the
supposition
of
the above-named
prejudice
is
proved
historically
false.
In
medieval
Aristotelianism,
e.g.,
acting
against
one's
better
judgment
was
a
difficult
phenomenon
to
grasp
philosophically,
since it
was
commonly regarded
that
the
will,
being
a
rational
capacity,
follows
the
practical
intellect. Aristotle's
problems
with
akrasia
are
in
fact
discussed
extensively
in
medieval
commentar
2.
THE
DEVELOPMENT
OF AKRASIA IN MEDIEVAL
THOUGHT
2.1.
Augustine's
Two Wills :
Doing
Something Only Reluctantly
The
complete
text
of Aristotle's
Ethics
was
introduced
to
Western
philosophy by Robert Grosseteste
in
the
1240s. Before that time
Augus
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
4/22
JOHN BURIDAN
AND DONALD DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
135
tinian
psychology
dominated the ethical
discussion.14
Although
Augus
tine
(354-430)
had
no
familiarity
with
Aristotle's
ethical works and
although
he used the Latin
term
incontinentia
only
to
denote the
lack
of
chastity
and
temperance,15
he
often
analyzed
examples
of moral
conduct
that
are
similar
to
those found
in
Nicomachean Ethics.
In De
spiritu
et
litera
Augustine
comes
to
the
conclusion
that
good
actions,
if
performed
only
unwillingly
or
reluctantly (invitus),
do
not
count
as
true
merits.
If,
for
example,
a
person
does
something against
his
primary
wishes
only
in order
to
avoid
punishment,
his
action
is
not
meritorious.16 Only if the person acts wholeheartedly does he receive
the
merit
toward
a
true
reward.
Nonetheless,
Augustine
also
asserts
that
by
acting
reluctantly
a
person
can
be held
responsible
for both his
external
act
and his
intention.17
This reluctant
acquiescence
bears
some
analogy
to
Aristotle's
enkrateia,
since
in
both
a
person
does
something
right
and
manages
to
thwart his evil desire
to
do otherwise.
In his
Confessiones Augustine
speaks
also
of
doing
evil
reluctantly.
Immediately
before his
own
conversion,
the church father
continued
his bad habits
only
reluctantly,
because his will could
already
see
the
right
alternatives.18
It
is
no
wonder that
some
modern authors have
seen here a counterpart to Aristotle's akrasia.19 But unlike Aristotle,
Augustine
thinks that the
agent
in
some
sense
chooses
his
own
inconti
nent
behavior,
however reluctant
this
assent
and
choice20
may
be.
Moreover,
Augustine's
psychological explanation
of 'weakness
of
the
will'
differs
significantly
from
Aristotle's doctrine.
Augustine
speaks
of
two
wills
struggling
within the
same
person.
He
is
not
referring
here
to two autonomous
wills,
but rather
to two
initial tendencies of the
human
appetite.21
He
stresses
that this
disintegration
of
the motives
takes
place
within
the
same
mind and its
single
will.
Moreover,
the
act
of
willful choice
creates
a
unity
and
wholeness
within
the
will.22
Another
important
element in
Augustine's thought
is his view of the
hierarchy
of desired ends.
The
highest
goals
are
to
be
willed for the
sake of their
own,
inherent
goodness.
But
some
lower ends
are
to
be
willed
only
for
the
sake
of the
higher
and
final
goals.23
This distinction
between
willing something
for its
own
sake
(propter se)
and
for
the
sake of
something
else
(propter aliud)
will
become
an
integral
part
of
medieval discussions
concerning
akrasia.
Augustine's
model
is
further
qualified by
his
theological
presupposi
tions. He tends
to
think
that God is the
only
rational
agent
who
never
acts
reluctantly.24 Moreover,
his
use
of
continentia is conditioned
by
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
5/22
136
RISTO SAARINEN
the
Vulgate
translation of
Sapientia
Salomonis
8,
21:
And
as
I
knew
that
I
could
not
otherwise
be
continent,
except
God
gave
it .
For
Augustine,
this
verse
is
universally
valid:
no
man
can
be
continent
without God's
grace.25
Thus in
Augustinian theology
the
state
of
being
'incontinent'
(mainly
in
the
realm
of
sexuality)
becomes the
fate of
every
human
being. Although
the
Aristotelian
scholastics
gave up
much
of this
Augustinian background,
the
presupposed
universality
of 'incon
tinent' behavior
is
one
reason
why
the
topic
was
so
extensively
discussed
in
the later Middle
Ages.
2.2.
Anselm and
Abelard
on
Reluctant Actions
In
his De
lib?rtate
arbitrii Anselm
of
Canterbury (1033-1109)
radicalizes
Augustine's
theory
of will.
For
Anselm,
the
freedom of
the will'
(libertas arbitrii)
does
not
imply
the
ability
to
sin
but
only
the
ability
to
carry
forward rational
decisions.
The
freedom of
a
rational
being
means
acting
in
accordance
with
reason.26
Anselm holds that
a
rational
being
can
will
irrational evil
only
so
that he in
principle
could resist
it
(ut
possit
quidem
nolle)27
Because Anselm
argues
strongly
that the
freedom of the will is a rational
capacity,
we cannot
explain
our ir
rational behavior
against
our
better
judgment
by
simply
referring
to
this
freedom.
In
this
way
the
Augustinian
theory
of will
becomes
com
patible
with
Anselm's
intellectualistic
action
theory.
In his
Ethics,
Scito
teipsum,
Peter Abelard
(1079-1142)
discusses
what
actually
happens
when
people
act
reluctantly
or
against
their
better
judgment.
He
wants
to
show
that the actual
committing
of
a
sin
does
not
increase its
degree
of
sinfulness
in
respect
to
the
mere
consent
to
commit
sin. This idea leads
him
to
distinguish
between
'will' and
'consent'.
The
distinction
is
relevant
in
examples
that
resemble Aristot
le's
akratic
behavior.
For
instance,
a man
who
falls
into
longing
for
a
woman
or
for fruit
that
does
not
belong
to
him
has
the will which
lacks
consent .28
Abelard
is also
interested
in
cases
where the
consent
can
be
under
stood
as
allowing
something
to
happen
for the
sake of
something
else
(propter
aliud)
that
is
actually
willed.
For
example,
if
somebody
bears
a
painful operation
in
order
to
be
healed,
we
don't
say
that he
wants
the
pain.
He
doesn't
will
it,
but
only
allows
it
to
happen
for
the
sake
of
something
else.
Such
behavior
is for
Abelard
a
passio ,
in which
a
person endures what he does not will (quod
non
vult tol?rai) in
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
6/22
JOHN BURIDAN
AND DONALD DAVIDSON ON AKRASIA
137
order
to
reach
something
else.29
The
topic
of
willing
propter
aliud
derives
from
Augustine,
but Abelard
interprets
it
as
enduring
or
suffering ,
in which the
will
orders itself
to
remain in
a
passive
state.30
2.3.
The
Semantics
of
Will
in
Peter
of
Poitiers
Anselm's and
Abelard's
ideas
are
reflected
in
many
twelfth-century
discussions
that aim
at
deepening
the
conceptual
understanding
of
Au
gustinian
topics,
such
as
acting reluctantly
and
willing something
propter
aliud.31 Some significant developments took place in the Sentendae of
Peter of
Poitiers
(1130-1205).
At least three
distinct
points
are
here
of
interest.
One,
Peter
adheres
to
the Anselmian
view that
a
rational
being
must
always
to
some
extent
possess
knowledge
of the
right.
For
him,
the
so
called
synteresis
is
the small
spark
of
reason
(scindllula
rationis),
which
cannot
be
extinguished.32
But
if
an
evil
person
simply
wills
evil,
how
can we
claim that his
synteresis
is
still
functioning?
Peter solves
this
problem
by
distinguishing
between
counterfactual
wishes
(vellem)
and actual
willing
(volo).
Some counterfactual
good
wishes
remain
in
the sinner, even if he doesn't actually want to do the right thing. So
we
can
say
that
such
people
in
some
weak
and counterfactual
sense
would like
to
behave
rightly
(vellet
declinare
a
malo).33
Two,
another
way
of
describing
the
plurality
of
desires within the
same
will
is
to
say
that
some
things
are
willed
without
qualification
(simpliciter),
whereas others
are
willed
only
if
some
pre-condition
is
present
(cum
quaedam
conditione).
For
example,
Peter
says
that
we
want
the death
of
Christ
not
for its
own
sake but under the
pre
condition
that
it
is
part
of
God's
salvatory
plan.34
Three,
according
to
Peter,
willing
the antecedens
does
not
necessarily
imply
that the
consequens
is also willed. In other
words,
N(p ?>q)
and
Wap
together
do
not
imply
Waq
(N
=
'it
is
necessary
that',
W= 'to
will',
Wap
=
'a
wills
that
p')35
Peter's
example
is
classical: consider
thatp
stands for 'a is
showing
penitence'
and
q
stands
for
'a has
sinned'.
Now
N(p
.-*
q)
is
correctly
formed,
because sins
cannot
be
repented
unless
they
have been
committed.
However,
it
does
not
follow
from
a's
willing
to
show
penitence
(Wap)
that
a
wills
to
have sinned
(Waq).36
Points
one
and
two
above
are
sometimes
connected
in
medieval
discussions
so
that
the
counterfactual
wishing
(vellem,
velleitas)
is
understood
as
readiness
to
will
something
under
given pre-conditions
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
7/22
138
RISTO SAARINEN
(promptitudo
volendi
sub
conditione)
31
Point three
above is
very
con
troversial,
because
it
seems
to
say
that the
side-effects
of
willing
a
goal
are
not
necessarily
themselves willed. This idea in
turn
leads
to
dis
cussion about the
possibility
of
doing
evil
to
achieve
good .38
How
ever,
we
will
only
here follow the
results of Peter's
analysis
insofar
they
are
relevant for the
explanation
of akrasia.
2.4.
Albert the Great and the
Problem
of
Moral
Certainty
Albert the Great (1200-80) was the first Latin writer to treat compre
hensively
Aristotle's notion
of
akrasia. Albert
was
well trained both
in
Augustinian
tradition and
in
Aristotle.
His
two
commentaries
on
Nicomachean Ethics
give
a
congenial
picture
of
Aristotle's akrasia inso
far
as
they
teach
that it is
impossible
to act
against
clear and
distinct
knowledge
of
a
moral
goal.39
Albert
preserves
the
Augustinian-Chris
tian
theological
stance
in
his
analysis by
arguing
that
all sin
is due
more
or
less
to
ignorance.40
He also
recognizes
the
Aristotelian idea that the
akrates
acts
against
his
own
choice
(elecdo,
prohairesis).41
In
Augustin
ian
tradition,
as we
have
seen,
the
reluctant actions
were
nevertheless
due to a
partial
assent or choice.
One of
Albert's
many
original
contributions
in
his discussion of akra
sia
is
the
distinction between various
degrees
of
moral
certainty.
A
historical
happenstance
aided
him in
making
this
distinction. The Latin
translator of Nicomachean
Ethics,
Robert
Grosse
teste,
rendered Aris
totle's akribeia
( precision )
as
certitudo
and his endoksos
( a
reputable
opinion )
as
probabilis.
Thus,
when the
Greek
philosopher
in
Nicoma
chean Ethics 1104al-6 holds
that
an
account
of
matters
of conduct
can
be
given only
in
outline
and
not
precisely,
Albert understands
Aristotle
to
mean
that
the
science
of ethics does
not
possess
the
same
degree
of
certainty
(certitudo)
as some
other branches
of
science.42
Moreover,
Albert
grasps
the
meaning
of
Aristotle's
endoksa
as
implying
that ethics
does
not
attain strict
demonstration,
but
must
rely
on
reputable opin
ions
in
a
probabilist
manner.43
Before
solving
the
problems
connected
with
akrasia,
Albert
in
his
first
commentary
discusses
whether ethics
ever
attains absolute
certainty
(certitudo)
as
presupposed
in Aristotle's notion
of
scientia. Albert ad
heres
to
the Aristotelian view
that
we
have scientific
knowledge
of
some
universal
principles
of
ethics,
but the
judgments
concerning
particular
actions
must
remain
opinions,
because
they
are
more
or
less
probable
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
8/22
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
9/22
140
RISTO
SAARINEN
theory
in
which the
agent's thought
and
decision-making
process
is
analyzed
into three
parts.
Each
of
these
parts
causes
some
activation
in
the
will. The
first
act
of the will is the
act
of
complacence
and/or
displacence
(actus
complacentiaeldisplicentiae),
which
emerges
as a re
sult of the
primary
judgment
of the
practical
intellect.
According
to
Buridan,
this first
act
does
not
yet
lead into action.
Moreover,
a
plu
rality
of
such
acts
which
are
incompossible
in
respect
to
their realization
may
reside
simultaneously
in
the soul. As the first
act
is
something
like
a
passive
reception
of sense-data offered
by
the
intellect,
the will
at
this point possesses no freedom. The second act of the will is called the
act
of
acceptation
of
refutation
(actus acceptationis/refutationis).
The
freedom
of
the
will
pertains
to
its
second
act:
it
can
either follow the
action
proposed
by
the intellect
or
it
can
defer
its
act.
The third
act
is
the external manifestation
of
the
action
(prosecutiolfuga).52
Buridan's
first and second
acts
of the will
are
rather
analogous
to
the
Stoic-Augustinian
distinction between desire
and
consent.
Moreover,
he himself
connects
them with the volo-vellem distinction
presented
by
Peter of
Poitiers and others.
The
first
act
of the will is the
hypothetical
velleitas;
only
the
second
act
can
be called the
act
of
the
will in
a
proper
sense.53
In the seventh book
of his
commentary
Buridan defines enkrateia
(continentia)
as a
moral
disposition
that
helps
us
to
stick
to
right
reason
and
thus
to
resist the
passions suggesting
deviant behavior.
But these
passions
cause
an
additional
resisting
impulse,
namely,
that
of
the
first
act
of the will
(displicentia),
to
become
connected
with
our
actual
behavior.54
Correspondingly,
in akratic behavior the
resisting
displac
ency
defending right
reason
remains
in
some
sense
within the
agent.55
According
to
Buridan,
akrasia and enkrateia
occur
in situations
in
which
two
or
more
conflicting,
simultaneous
first
acts
of the will
are
active within
the
agent's
mind. The
incompossible
alternatives A and
B
are
both
presented
to
the
agent
sub ratione
boni, i.e.,
as
being
desirable.
Buridan
calls this
a
situation of double
inclination
(inclina
tio
duplex).56
Buridan
shares
the
view of Albert and
of Aristotle
that it is
impossible
to act
against
knowledge
of the
good
in
the
strict
sense
(scientia
per
fecta).
Such
'clear-eyed
akrasia' is
impossible.
But he
repeatedly
stresses
that in
practical
decision-making
the
agent
normally
does
not
possess
such
perfect
scientia but
operates
within
a
framework of
conflicting
reasons.57 It is
no
wonder, therefore, that he pays attention
to
the
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
10/22
JOHN BURIDAN
AND DONALD DAVIDSON ON AKRASIA
141
decision-making
process
in situations of 'double inclination'.
Buridan's
main
interest
in his discussion of akrasia
is
directed toward
situations
marred with
some
ambiguity.
He thus refines Albert's
concept
of moral
certainty.
Double
inclination
makes
akratic
judgment
weak
(iudicium
debile
seu
formidinale).
Accordingly,
the second and
proper
act
of the
will,
the
act
of
acceptation,
also remains
weak
(acceptatio
debilis).58
The
weakness
of
the akratic
judgment
can
be
seen
in the fact
that
the
two
inclinations
become
successively
actual
in
the akratic
person:
after
committing sin he suffers regret.59 Like Albert, Buridan too develops
a
gradation
of moral
certainty
and concludes that it is
impossible
to act
against
a
completed
judgment
(iudicium completum).
In
order
to
explain
what
a
completed
judgment
is,
Buridan
presents
a
fourfold
gradation
of
completion
in
judgment.
In
judging
between
A
and
B,
the
weakest
case
arises
(1)
when
no reason
supports
either
A
or
B;
another
weak
case
arises
(2)
when
equal
reasons
support
both
A and B. In the
third
case
(3)
there
is
a
stronger
reason
for A
than
for
B;
but
some
other
reason
nevertheless
promotes
B.
For
Buridan,
even
the
judgment
concerning
this
third
case
remains weak
and
incomplete.
Only
in
case
(4), where all doubts, however small, are removed, can we reach a
completed
judgment.
In this
case,
A
is
categorically supported
over
B.60
Buridan also
speaks
of
uncertain
(dubium)
and certain
(certum)
judgments. Only
when
a
judgment
possesses
absolute
certainty
is it
not
possible
to
act
against
it.
But
if there is
any
reason,
however
small and
insignificant,
against
a
judgment
concerning
the
probable right,
it
is
possible
to
act
akratically.61
Buridan's
emphasis
on
the
uncertainty
of moral
judgments
is
con
nected with
his
idea
that
the will's freedom consists
mainly
in its
capacity
to withdraw its own act. Buridan shares the medieval view that the free
will is
a
rational
capacity.
But
then it would be
highly misleading
to
say
that
the
will's freedom
is
the
source
of irrational
behavior. There
fore,
the
free
will
never
resists the
rational
judgments
of
the
intellect.62
We
already
saw
that Peter Abelard
and Albert the
Great
regarded
the
will's
consent to not
doing
anything
as
useful
in
some
situations.
Buridan
cultivates
this view and
makes it
a
cornerstone
of
his action
theory.63
He does
not
consider the
will's
decision
to
remain
passive
as
an
irrational
liberty,
but
argues
that
in
cases
of double
inclination
it
is
often
the
most
rational choice.
This
rationality
is founded
in the
nature
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
11/22
142
RISTO SAARINEN
of
practical
decision-making:
Buridan
says
that it is
often better
not to
choose
to act
too
rapidly,
because
what
seems
good
prima
facie
might
prove
to
be
wrong
after
thorough
consideration.
It
is
difficult
to
see
the latent
consequences
of
practical
decisions;
therefore it is
useful
to
possess
the
capacity
of
delaying
the actual decision for
a
while.64
Impor
tant
decisions, however,
should
not
be
delayed
too
long.65
The
capacity
to
postpone
the will-act is thus for Buridan
an
aspect
of
prudential66
behavior. Because
our
estimations
of moral
situations
remain
incomplete
and
our
practical
judgments
weak,
it is
often
pruden
tial to postpone a decision. Moreover, in his discussion of prima facie
willing something
Buridan
seems
to
adopt
the above-mentioned view
of Peter of
Poitiers,
according
to
which
we
often will
something
without
necessarily willing
all
of the
consequences.
For
Buridan,
the
pruden
tiality
of
withdrawing
the will-act derives from
the fact that it offers
the
possibility
of
investigating
whether the
agent
in
fact
wants
all
the
implied
consequences.
We
have
already
seen
that the akratic man's
judgment
is weak
and
uncertain
(debile, dubium).
Buridan
adheres
to
the Aristotelian view
that the
akratic
intellect
is somehow
captured
by
the
passions.
But,
in
addition to that, with the
help
of his idea that the freedom of the will
consists
in
its
possibility
to
defer
its
own
act,
he also
develops
another
way
of
understanding
akratic action.
If
the
agent
in
the
case
of conflict
ing
alternatives and weak
judgment postpones
his
decision for the sake
of
reflection,
the
judgment
attains
greater
certainty,
until
most
doubts
have been
extinguished,
at
which
time
it
has become
as
certain
as
possible.
Only
then is it
prudential
to
act
in accordance
with
it.67
Buridan
seems
to
think that
passion
causes
the
agent
to
act
hastily,
that
is,
without
paying
enough
respect
to
the eventual
consequences
of
the action.
The
weak
judgment
would have
gained
more
certainty,
if
passion
had
given
the
agent
enough
time
to
weigh
the
evidence
pro
perly.
This
is also the
reason
why
the akratic
man
later
repents:
after
the
passion
has
extinguished
itself,
the
consequences
become
evident,
which
affords
rational
consideration.68
Buridan
certainly
does
not
mean
that all
ambiguities
can
be
removed
by
proper
consideration
of
a
moral situation. On the
contrary,
he
is
likely
to
think that
in
most
cases
we
do
not
reach absolute
certainty
and often
simply
have
to
make
judgments
in
the
context
of
ambiguous
situations. But false
judgments
in
totally ambiguous
situations,
if
made
after
proper
moral
consideration,
are
not
instances of
akrasia.69
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
12/22
JOHN BURIDAN AND DONALD DAVIDSON ON AKRASIA
143
In
sum,
we
can
say
that Buridan
employs
Aristotle's
concept
of
akrasia
as a
framework for
analyzing
what
happens
in
uncertain moral
situations.
He
defends
Aristotelian
intellectualism
by
claiming
that free
dom of the will
as
such
does
not
imply
that
free action
is
irrational
behavior.
But
Buridan's
discussion is non-Aristotelian
in
the
sense
that the
gradation
of moral
certainty
is
not
relevant for the Greek
philosopher.
Like Socrates and
Aristotle,
Buridan
denies
the
possibility
of
'clear-eyed'
akrasia,
but
he
is
in
fact
more
interested
in
the akratic
behavior that
occurs
in
situations
of
conflicting
alternatives.
In
these
situations, akrasia is due to weak judgment influenced by passion.
4.
'medieval'
elements
in
Davidson's
explanation
of
akrasia
4.1.
The Distinction between
Prima
Facie and Unconditional
Judgments
It is
not
my
aim here
to
outline
wholly
Donald Davidson's
argument
in
How is
Weakness
of
the
Will
Possible?,
nor
will I
go
into
the details
of
the
far-reaching
recent
discussion of Davidson's
ideas.70
I
will
simply
list some of the ideas that to my view have their obvious counterparts
in
the medieval discussion.
Donald
Davidson
argues
that
it
is
possible
to
perform
an
akratic
action while
judging
that,
all
things
considered,
it would be
better
not
to
do it than
to
do
it.
Moreover,
Davidson holds that the existence of
such akrasia
is
compatible
with the
principle
(which
he calls
P2)
that
[i]f
an
agent
judges
that
it would
be
better
to
do
x
than
to
do
y,
then
he
wants to
do
x
more
than he
wants to
do
y .71
Davidson makes the existence of akrasia
compatible
with P2
by
distinguishing
between
prima
facie (conditional,
'all-things-considered')
judgments
and unconditional
(sans
phrase,
absolute)
judgments.72
He
argues
that the
akrates
operates
with
prima facie
judgments
in
the
sense
that both the
reasons
for and
against
an
action in
question
and the
resulting
decision
are
not
unconditional
and
absolute,
but
only
'all
things-considered'
(prima facie)
judgments.
But
the
judgment
pre
supposed
in
P2
is
absolute.73
He further holds that
reasoning
that
stops
at
conditional
judg
ments
...
is
practical
only
in its
subject,
not
in
its
issue .74
By
this
he
means
that
the
agent's
prima
facie thoughts
concerning
an
action do
not
necessarily
materialize
as
actions. As such
they
differ
from absolute
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
13/22
144
RISTO
SAARINEN
judgments,
which,
if
used
in
practical
syllogisms,
have the
proposed
action
as
their
conclusion.75
Of
course
there
is
something
irrational
in
akratic
behavior,
since it
is
nevertheless odd
to act
against
one's best
all-things-considered
judgment.76
But
akratic actions
are
not
logically
impossible,
because
a
prima
facie
judgment
does
not
compel
the action
to
materialize. Therefore Davidson
can
conclude that
there is
no
(logical)
difficulty
in the fact of
incontinence,
for the
akrates is characterized
as
holding
that,
all
things
considered,
it
would be
better
to
do b than
to
do
a,
even
though
he
does
a
rather
than
b
and with
a reason.
The logical difficulty
has
vanished
because
the
judgement
that
a
is better than
b,
all
things
considered,
is
a
relational,
or
pf
[prima facie], judgement,
and
so
cannot
conflict
logically
with
any
unconditional
judgement.77
We have
seen
that
Buridan,
too,
uses78
the
expression
prima
facie
in
describing
the moral situation that arises after the first
act
of
the
will
has
produced
some
interior
motion,
that
is,
when
some
desires have
emerged.
It would be
highly
anachronistic,
of
course,
to
maintain
that
Buridan's
use
of the
term
prima
facie
is
synonymous
with that of
Davidson.
But
the
interesting
thing
to
notice here
is
that Buridan
also
makes a clear distinction between
imperfect
(iudicium
debile, iudicium
incertum)
and
perfect
judgments
(iudicium
completum,
certum),
and
holds that
akrasia
only
occurs
in
situations
in
which the
judgment
is
imperfect.
With
the
help
of this distinction Buridan extends
Aristotle's
discussion
to
moral situations
in
which
reaching
perfect
judgment
is
difficult.
This
'extended'
view of
akrasia,
which
is
already
present
in
Albert
the
Great,
has
many
affinities
with
Davidson's discussion of
prima
facie
judgments.
In
the
eighth question
of Book
VII
Buridan
asks,
e.g.,
whether the
will
necessarily
follows the
practical
intellect. He ascribes different
degrees
of
certainty
to
different
judgments,
and
concludes that the
will
necessarily
follows
only
the
most
certain
ones.79
We
have
already
no
ticed that Buridan
does
not
say very
clearly
whether
we ever
in
fact
attain
judgments
possessing
absolute
certainty
(iudicium certum).
And
the
same
problem
pertains
to
the work
of
Davidson;
it is evident
that
in
inductive
reasoning
even
the best
judgments
remain
'all-things
considered'
judgments.80
Buridan
and Davidson
differ,
of
course,
in
how
they
employ
the
distinction
between
perfect
and
imperfect judgments.
Whereas
David
son
describes
akratic behavior
as
an
irrational
course
of action left
open
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
14/22
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
145
because of the
uncompelling
nature
of
prima
facie
judgments,
Buridan
elaborates
a
peculiar
dynamics
of the will.
According
to
him,
in
situ
ations
lacking
certainty
the
will
can
be
directed
to
various alternatives
because
the
intellect has
not
excluded
them;
therefore
a
type
of
akrasia
(though
not
'clear-eyed'
akrasia)
is
possible.
But
although
these
expla
nations
differ,
they
both
presuppose
a
distinction
between
prima
facie
and
definitive
practical
judgments.
Moreover,
Davidson remarks that it is
not
enough
to
know the
reasons
on
each
side:
he
[the
agent]
must
know how
they
add
up .
And he claims that this cannot be done in
a
syllogistic way.81 Thus, he
stresses
the
prima
facie
character of
even
the
best
'all-things-considered'
judgments.
In
holding
that
no
logical
calculus
can
determine
the
out
come
of moral
reasoning
in
complex
situations,
Davidson
approaches
Buridan's view that the
so-called 'weak
judgment'
does
not
guarantee
the
Tightness
of the
outcome
of the action.
4.2.
Prima Facie
Judgments
as
Conditional
Judgments
We have
seen
that
Davidson also calls his
prima
facie
judgments
'con
ditional'. In his article
'Intending'
Davidson concludes that
[w]ants,
desires,
principles, prejudices,
felt
duties,
and
obligations
provide
reasons
for
actions and
intentions,
and
are
expressed
by
prima
facie
judgements;
intentions and the
judgements
that
go
with
intentional actions
are
distinguished
by
their all-out
or
uncon
ditional
form.82
From
this it
again
becomes clear that
an
unconditional
judgment
is
a
final
statement
concerning
the
whole of the situation
under consider
ation.
It
yields
intentional
actions,
whereas
prima
facie
judgments
are
valid
only
relative
to
their
reasons.
The
suggested
unconditional
con
clusion of the practical syllogism, i.e. the action, is not 'detachable'
from the
prima
facie
reasons
supporting
and
opposing
it. Davidson
wants to
point
out
that
[w]e
can
hardly expect
to
learn
whether
an
action
ought
to
be
performed simply
from
the
fact
that
it
is both
prima
facie
right
and
prima
facie
wrong
....
...
if
we
are
to
have
a
coherent
theory
of
practical
reason,
we
must
give
up
the idea
that
we
can
detach
conclusions about what
is
desirable
(or better)
or
obligatory
from
the
principles
that
lend those
conclusions
colour.83
This line
of
thought
has
similarities with
the
action-theoretical
role
of
the
counterfactual,
or
conditional, willing
as
developed by
Peter
of
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
15/22
146
RISTO SAARINEN
Poitiers
and used
by
Buridan. The
wants
and desires that
are
recognized
but
not
carried forward
can
be
explained
as
counterfactual,
or con
ditional,
judgments.
In this
sense
Peter
of
Poitiers's
example
of the
sinner who
says
that he
counterfactually
wishes
(vellet)
to
abstain
from
sin
would
be
an
instance of
Davidson's
prima
facie
judgment.84
Simi
larly,
in
Buridan's
example
a
continent
man
is asked
whether he
wants
to
fornicate.
He
answers
that he
wants
it
only conditionally (non
respon
debit
vol? ,
sed dicet
vellem ),
namely,
only
under the
counterfactual
pre-condition
that
it
were
not
sinful. In Buridan's
analysis
this
answer
means that there exists a first act of the will supporting the fornication.
However,
no
conclusion
is detached from that
conditional
judgment,
and
the
second
act
of the will
refutes
it.85
It
looks
as
though
both Davidson
and
Buridan
in
fact
operate
accord
ing
to
a
kind
of
distinction between desire
and
assent,
in which
the
desires
are
prima
facie
evaluations
conditioned
by
the
respective
rea
sons.
This conditional
(prima facie)
evaluation does
not
lead
to
action;
the actual
assent
can
be
described
as
the 'second act' of the
agent's
mind,
emerging
as
the result of
an
unconditional
judgment.
4.3.
Reasoning
from
Prima
Facie
Judgment
as an
Instance
of
Reasoning from
Probabilistic
Evidence
Davidson also remarks
that moral
reasoning
on
the
basis
o?
prima
facie
judgments
has
an
analogy
with
reasoning
from
probabilistic
evi
dence.86
Without
entering
the fallacies shown and re-formulations
undertaken
by
Davidson
here,87
we
note
that
his
understanding
is
not
far
from how
Albert the Great and Buridan
also
understood the
nature
of moral
reasoning.
In
ethics
we
proceed
ex
probabilibus
(Aristotle's
reputable
opinions ),
and
although
this
expression
does
not
yet pre
suppose
any
elaborate
theory
concerning
probabilities,
it
is
already
evident that for Albert
and Buridan it
implies
that
our
moral
judgments
are
conditioned
by
finite
reasons
and,
therefore,
lack absolute
certainty.
The
same
analogy
is
also
visible in Davidson's
principle of
continence,
which
asserts
that
we
should
perform
the
action
judged
best
on
the
basis
of all available relevant
reasons.88
For
Davidson,
this
directive
is
analogous
to
the so-called
requirement
of total evidence for inductive
reasoning,
which
states
that
we
should
give
our
credence
to
the
hypo
thesis
supported
by
all available relevant
evidence. Just
as
this latter
maxim is
not
part of the logic of inductive reasoning but
a
directive the
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
16/22
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND DONALD DAVIDSON ON AKRASIA
147
rational
man
will
accept,
so
the
principle
of continence
has
no
compel
ling logical
force,
though
it
is
nevertheless
a
guideline
of rational be
havior.
When the akratic
person
acts
against
his
own
'all-things-con
sidered'
best
judgment,
he is
not
breaking
any
syllogistic
structure
but
only
this directive
principle.89
Davidson's
principle
of continence has
some
resemblance
to
what
we
might
call Buridan's directive
of
prudentiality,
which
asserts
that
a
pru
dent
man
should
postpone
his
decision
until
all
relevant
considerations
have
been
completed.90
As
we
have
seen,
Buridan considers the will's
postponement of its will-act
as
prudential just because it gives
an
oppor
tunity
to
collect
and
to
weigh
properly
more
evidence.
Davidson's
principle
of continence and Buridan's directive of
pruden
tiality
are
meaningful only
if
we
consider
the
ethical
decision-making
process
as
analogical
with
reasoning
from
probabilistic
evidence. David
son's
important point
in
stressing
this
analogy
is that
we
need
to
know
in ethics
as
well
how the
different
reasons
'add
up'.
In
other
words,
besides Aristotle's deductive model
of
the
practical syllogism,
ethical
thinking
needs
to
be
supported
by
some
kind
of
inductive
logic
of
decision-making.
When
Albert the
Great
and
Buridan consider ethics
as proceeding ex probabilibus, they are recognizing that inductive think
ing
is
necessary
in
situations
permeated
with
a
plurality
of,
more or
less,
probable
prima facie
reasons.
NOTES
1
First
published
1970.
We
use
the
1980
edition,
as
reprinted
with
corrections
(1982).
2
Recent
bibliographies
of
the
modern historical and
philosophical
discussion
of Aristot
le's akrasia
are
Mele
(1987,
pp.
172-80),
Charlton
(1988,
pp.
185-91),
and
Gosling
(1990,
pp.
210-12).
These
three
monographs
also offer
a
general
survey
on
the
most
important
studies.
3
For
Socrates'
position,
see,
e.g.,
Charlton
(1988,
pp.
13-33).
For
Aristotle's
view,
cf.
Charles
(1984).
4
Cf.
Mortimore
(1971);
Vermazen
and Hintikka
(1985);
Mele
(1987).
5
See
Broadie
and
Pybus (1982);
Hintikka
(1988);
Gosling (1990).
6
We will
use
the
expressions
akrasia ,
incontinence ,
and
weakness
of the will
as
synonymous.
7
Perhaps
the
most
interesting
medieval discussions
on
akrasia
are
found
in
the
two
commentaries of Albert the Great
(1891;
1987),
as
well
as
inWalter
Burley's
(1521)
and
John Buridan's
(1968)
commentaries. In
my
forthcoming study,
Weakness
of
the Will
in
Medieval
Thought,
these
commentaries
will be
analyzed.
8
Gosling (1990, p. 3).
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
17/22
148
RISTO
SAARINEN
9
See Kent
(1984,
pp.
269-331;
1989),
Krieger
(1986,
pp.
184-92),
and Saarinen
(1986).
10
Gosling
(1990,
pp.
69-86).
11
For
Aquinas,
see
Kent
(1989).
In
my
opinion,
the relevant
problem
for Anselm
and
Scotus
was
not
the 'fall of the devil' described
by
Gosling
(1990,
pp.
74-86),
but
rather
the
problem
of
doing
something only reluctantly,
or
with the
help
of
some
'probable'
reasons.
For
this,
see
below and Scotus
(1968:
Opus
oxon.
Ill,
d.
36,
q.
1).
12
This
line
of
thought
is
consequently
followed
by
Charlton
(1988,
e.g.,
pp.
5-7,
177).
13
This
is
contrary
to
Charlton
(1988,
p.
7),
who
claims that
Western
European
Philos
ophy
has little
to
show
on
the
subject
of
weakness
of will
before
the
present
century .
According
to
Kent
(1984,
p.
295),
even
the medieval Franciscan literature
on
inconti
nence can
only
be described
as
voluminous .
14
Cf.
Wieland
(1982).
15
Cf. Zumkeller
(1986,
p.
35).
As
Zumkeller
points
out,
Augustine
got
the notion
of
continentia
from
Cicero.
16
De
spiritu
et
litera,
8.13
and 31.53.56. See
Augustine
(1844-: Patrolog?a
latina,
Vol.
44,
pp.
207-08,
234,
236-37).
17
Cf.,
e.g.,
De
sermone
Domini
in
monte,
11.17.54-55
(Patrolog?a
latina,
Vol.
34,
p.
1294).
18
Cf.
Confessiones,
VIII.5.11-12. For
an
English
translation,
cf.
Bourke
(1966).
19
E.g.,
Charlton
(1988,
pp.
5-6)
and
Gosling (1990,
p.
70).
20
Cf.,
e.g.,
Confessiones,
VIII. 5.11-12.
Augustine
is
not
influenced
by
Aristotle's
prohairesis
(choice),
but
by
the
Stoic distinction between
(animal)
desire and
(rational)
assent/consent.
For this
distinction
and its
later
Christian
use
see,
e.g.,
Lapidge
(1988,
pp.
90-98).
For
Augustine's
Stoicism, cf. Colish
(1985,
II, pp.
142-218).
21
Cf. Bourke
(1966,
p.
207).
22
Confessiones,
VIII. 10.24.
23
A
paradigmatic
case
is
Augustine's
exposition
of the Sermon
on
the
Mount,
where
the
church
father concludes
that the
temporal things
are
to
be
willed
only
for the sake
of the eternal
goal (De
sermone
Domini
in
monte,
11.17.56:
Patrolog?a
latina,
Vol.
34,
p.
1294).
24
Confessiones,
VII.4.6.
25
Scivi
quoniam
aliter
non
possem
esse
continens
nisi
Deus
det . The
translation
is
from
Wolfson
(1965,
p.
167),
who
counts
over
twenty
references
to
this
verse
in
Augustine.
See
also Zumkeller
(1986,
pp.
35,
39).
26
Anselm
(1938,
pp. 213-14).
Cf.
also
p.
207.3:
Potestas
peccandi
non
pertineat
ad
libertatem
arbitrii .
27
Anselm
(1938,
p.
217.26-32).
28
Peter
Abelard
(1971,
pp.
24-25).
In
another
example (pp.
24-25),
a man
who
kills
his
master
in self-defense has
an
evil
consent
without evil will.
29
Ibid.
(pp.
8.26-10.21).
30
In
medieval
Latin,
non
vol?
refers
to
a
passive
state,
whereas nolo denotes
a
case
of
active resistance.
31
See
Knuuttila and
Holopainen
(1993).
32
Sent.
11.14.
Peter
of
Poitiers
(1950-61,
p.
98.256-64).
For
synteresis ,
see,
e.g.,
Baylor (1977).
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
18/22
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
149
33
Sent. 11.14. Peter of Poitiers
(1950-61,
p.
98.271-84).
34
Sent. 11.17. Peter of Poitiers
(1950-61,
p.
124.84-91).
See also
Sent.
IV.16 for
the
example
of
wanting
the
death of Christ: Peter of Poitiers
(1855,
pp.
1200-02).
35
Sent. 1.9. Peter of Poitiers
(1950-61,
p.
83.141-44):
Solvunt dicentes
non
accidere
quod
si
aliquid
antecedat
ad
aliud,
et
aliquis
vult vel
potest
antecedens,
quod
ideo velit
vel
possit
consequens.
.
. .
Here the
view is
presented
as mere
opinion
( dicunt
quid
am ),
but in
his
discussion of the
two
wills in
Christ
(Sent.
IV.16:
1855,
pp.
1199-1202),
Peter
adopts
this
view.
36
Sent. IV.16. Peter of Poitiers
(1855,
p.
1199).
37
E.g.,
inWilliam
of
Auxerre's
Summa
?urea,
I,
XII,
4,
q.
3
(1980-86,
pp.
235-36).
38
Cf.,
e.g.,
McCormick
and
Ramsey
(1978).
39
Albert
(first commentary: 1987, pp. 532-36;
second
commentary: 1891, pp. 474-76).40
Albert
(1891,
pp.
206-07;
1987,
pp.
523-24).
He
here
(1987,
p.
523.45-47)
considers
this view
as
wholly
in
keeping
with
Augustine.
Cf.
Augustine's
De
duabus
animabus,
6.6
(Patrolog?a
latina,
Vol.
42,
p.
98).
41
Albert
(1891,
pp.
214-19).
42
Ibid.
(pp.
53-54).
43
For
example,
Albert
(1891,
p.
54)
compares
the
certainty
of rhetorics with that of
ethics.
Later,
Albert
(p.
176)
concludes
that
the
knowledge
of the
virtues
is
less certain
than
the
knowledge
of
nature,
but
more
certain
than
knowledge pertaining
to
the technical
artes.
44
Albert
(1987,
p.
523.48-59).
45
Ibid.
(p.
523.61-73).
Aristotle,
Rhetorics
I.
2,
14
(1357a-b).
46
Albert
(1987,
p.
530.21-22):
Tertio videtur,
quod
contra
ambiguum
facer? non sit
incontinentiae .
47
This
expression
is
adopted
from
Charlton
(1988,
p.
58).
48
Albert
(1987,
p.
530.40-49).
In medieval
Latin,
firmitas
has
also the connotations
authority
and truth .
49
It
ought
to
be noted here that
Albert in his
second
commentary
(1891,
p.
467)
is
unwilling
to
speak
of
akrasia in decisions
concerning ambiguous
situations.
50
On
the
influence
of
Buridan's
commentary,
cf.
Michael
(1985).
Walsh
(1966,
pp.
24
25)
concludes: Whatever
we
find in this
commentary
we
may
be
sure
was
available
to
thousands of students
over
hundreds of
years.
.
. .
Buridan's
practical
philosophy
is
analyzed
by
Krieger (1986).
See
also Saarinen
(1986).
51
The
most
often
quoted
scholastic
authors
in
Buridan's
commentary
are
Albert
the
Great and
the
Augustinian-minded
Franciscan Gerald
Odonis
(1290-1349).
See
Walsh
(1975,
p.
258).
52
This
view
is
presented
in
Book
III,
q.
3
(Buridan
1968,
pp.
41va-43rb).
53
Buridan
(1968,
p.
43ra-rb).
54
Ibid.
(p.
142ra):
Continentia
. . .
capitur
pro
habitu,
quo
insistentes rectitudini rationis
resistimus
passionibus
in nobis
vehementibus existentibus
non
auferentes
totum tractum
ipsarum,
propter
quod
operi
nostro
contradicentia
quaedam
vel
displicentia
annexa
est .
55
Ibid.
(p.
143va).
56
Ibid.
(p.
141rb-va: Book
VII,
q.
3).
57
Cf.,
e.g.,
Buridan
(1968, 143rb):
Quoniam
sepe,
ut
mihi
videtur,
expertus
sum,
quod
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
19/22
150
RISTO
SAARINEN
cum
rationes
viderem ad
utramque
partem
probabiles,
tarnen
ad
neutram
partem
iudicii
determinabam
me
. . .
sed
in
suspenso
tenebam
me
... .
Imo
prudentis
est
prius
examin
are
consilia . Cf. also
p.
42va
(cited below).
58
Ibid.
(p.
143va:
Book
VII,
q.
6).
59
Ibid.
(pp.
142va,
143va).
60
Ibid.
(p.
143ra).
61
Ibid.
(p.
145rb).
Here
Buridan
also concludes
that
the certum iudicium need
not
be
scientia ',
it
can as
well
be
an
opinion
that
the
agent
adopts
because
he has
no
reason
whatsoever
to
think otherwise.
62
This
point
is
made
with
great
clarity by Krieger (1986). Only
the
most
radical
non
Aristotelian
Franciscans,
such
as
Walter of
Bruges
(around 1270),
claimed that
the
will
could be the
source
of irrational behavior. See St?dter (1971).
63
For
this,
cf.
Krieger (1986,
pp.
146-208).
64
Buridan
(1968,
p.
42va: Book
III,
q.
3):
Ad cuius evidentiam
est
sciendum
quod
libertas secundum
quam
voluntas
potest
non
acceptare
quod
sibi
presentatum
fuerit sub
ratione boni
vel
non
refutare
quod
presentatum
est
sub
ratione
mali,
prodest
valde nobis
ad vite directionem
pro
tanto,
quia
in
multis,
in
quibus
prima
facie
sunt
alique
rationes
bonitatis
apparentes,
latent
sepe
mille
malicie,
vel
annexe
vel
cons?quentes, propter
quod
acceptare
illud
quod apparebat
bonum
esset
nobis
inconveniens
et
damnosum. Et
sic
etiam,
quod
prima
facie videtur
esse
malum,
habet
aliquando
bonitatem latentem
propter
quam
r?futasse illud
esset
nobis malum .
65
Ibid.
(p.
42va-vb).
66
Cf.
again
Buridan
(1968,
p.
143rb,
cited
above).
For Buridan's notion of
prudentia,
see
Krieger (1986,
pp.
15-145).
67
Buridan
(1968,
p.
145rb-va).
68
Cf.
again
Buridan
(1968,
pp.
142va;
143va:
Book
VII,
q.
6).
69
This
point
was
explicitly
made
by
Albert the Great
(1987,
p.
530,
see
above).
Buridan
also
concludes
(1968,
p.
145rb,
see
above)
that
even
the
opinio
falsa
may
be
certain,
if
no
available
reason
opposes
the
opinion
and if
it is
considered
long
enough.
70
For
these,
see
Vermazen
and Hintikka
(1985),
Charlton
(1988,
pp.
114-34),
Gosling
(1990,
pp.
103-18),
and
Hurley
(1992).
71
Davidson
(1982a,
pp.
22-23).
72
All
these
expressions
are
used
in Davidson's article. It
is
problematic
whether
they
can
in
the last
analysis
be
divided
into
two
synonymous groups,
but this is
normally
presupposed
in
discussion
around
Davidson's
point.
See Charlton
(1988,
p.
115)
and
Gosling (1990,
pp.
104-05).
73
Davidson
(1982a,
p.
39).
74
Ibid.
75
E.g.,
Davidson
(1982a,
p.
26;
1982b,
p.
98).
76
Davidson
(1982a,
p.
41).
77
Ibid.
(p.
39).
78
Buridan
(1968,
p.
42va,
cited
above).
79
Ibid.
(pp.
144vb-145va).
See above.
80
Davidson
(1982a,
pp.
40-41).
Cf.
also
Gosling
(1990,
p.
105).
81
Davidson
(1982a,
p.
36).
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
20/22
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
151
82
Davidson
(1982b,
p.
102).
83
Davidson
(1982a,
p.
37).
On
detachment ,
see
also
Gosling
(1990,
pp.
107-09).
84
Peter
of Poitiers
(1950-61,
p.
98).
Cf. above.
85
Buridan
(1968,
p.
43ra-rb).
Cf.
above.
86
Davidson
(1982a,
p.
37).
87
Ibid.
(pp.
37-39).
Davidson
claims,
as
we
have
seen,
that in
practical reasoning
it is
fallacious
to
detach
absolute
judgments,
i.e.
conclusions that materialize
as
actions,
from
prima facie
reasons.
He
compares
practical reasoning
with
probabilistic
reasoning
of the
type:
(a)
if
the barometer
falls,
it
almost
certainly
will
rain;
(b)
the
barometer
is
falling;
and
(c)
it
almost
certainly
will rain.
In
this
example,
(a)
and
(b)
do
not
allow
detachment
of the modal conclusion
(p.
37).
Davidson further
argues
that
practical reasoning
should
not
proceed
in the form of universalized conditionals.
For
discussion, cf., e.g.,
Charlton
(1988,
pp.
118-23)
and
Gosling
(1990,
pp.
105-07).
88
Davidson
(1982a,
p.
41).
89
Ibid.
(pp.
41-42).
90
Buridan
(1968,
pp.
143rb, 42va,
cited
above).
REFERENCES
Abelard,
Peter:
1971,
Ethics,
ed.
D.
E.
Luscombe,
Clarendon
Press,
Oxford.
Albert the Great:
1891,
Ethicorum Lib.
X,
in
his
Opera omnia,
Vol.
VII,
ed. A.
Borgnet,
Vives,
Paris.
Albert the Great:
1987,
Super
Ethica
commentum et
quaestiones,
Pars
2,
in his
Opera
omnia,
curavit
Institutum
Alberti
Magni
Coloniense,
Tomus
14/2,
ed. W.
K?bel,
Aschendorff,
M?nster.
Anselm of
Canterbury:
1938,
De
lib?rtate
arbitrii,
in
his
Opera
omnia,
Vol.
1,
ed.
F. S.
Schmitt,
T.
Nelson,
Edinburgi.
Augustine:
1844-,
Opera
omnia,
in
Patrolog?a
latina,
Vols.
32-47,
ed. J.-P.
Migne,
Paris.
Baylor,
M.:
1977,
Action and
Person,
Conscience
in
Late
Scholasticism
and
Young
Luther,
Brill,
Leiden.
Bourke,
V.
J.:
1966,
Introduction and
Notes,
in
Augustinus, Confessions,
The Fathers
of the
Church,
Vol.
21,
trans.
V.
J.
Bourke,
Catholic
University
of America
Press,
Washington.
Broadie,
A. and E.
Pybus:
1982,
'Kant and
Weakness
of
Will',
Kant-Studien
73,
406
12.
Buridan,
John:
1968,
Quaestiones
super
decem libros
Ethicorum,
Minerva,
Frankfurt
(reprint
of
Paris 1513
edition).
Burley,
Walter:
1521,
Expositio
super
decem libros Ethicorum
Aristotelis,
Venice.
Charles,
D.:
1984,
Aristotle's
Philosophy of
Action,
Duckworth,
London.
Charlton,
W.:
1988,
Weakness
of
Will,
A
Philosophical
Introduction,
Blackwell,
Oxford.
Colish,
M. L.:
1985,
The
Stoic
Tradition
from Antiquity
to
the
Early
Middle
Ages,
I?II,
Brill,
Leiden.
This content downloaded from 130.251.200.3 on Sun, 22 Dec 2013 08:35:30 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
-
8/9/2019 Buridan Davidson Akrasia
21/22
152
RISTO
SAARINEN
Davidson,
D.:
1982a,
'How
is
Weakness
of the Will
Possible?',
in
his
Essays
on
Actions
and
Events,
Clarendon
Press,
Oxford,
pp.
21-42.
Davidson,
D.:
1982b,
'Intending',
in his
Essays
on
Actions and
Events,
Clarendon
Press,
Oxford,
pp.
83-102.
Gosling,
W.:
1990,
Weakness
of
the
Will,
Routledge,
London.
Hintikka,
J.:
1988,
'Was
Leibniz's
Deity
an
Akrates?',
in S. Knuuttila
(ed.),
Modern
Modalities,
Synthese
Histo