In fact we should not be surprised to find ourselvesthus before the law: for the concept of law is alreadyanalytically entailed by the fact of repetition, and so wehave been talking of nothing else since the beginning.There is no law in general except of a repetition, andthere is no repetition that is not subjected to a law (D,123) . 239For in order to begin to reply to the suspicion ofpassive acquiescence to the law, whatever it be, we shallsay that this co-implication of the law, of repetition andof affirmatiqn, contaminates the law with a constitutiveillegality which will alone allow us to understand howa given positive law could be unjust. Every law tries toground its justice in justesse, transforming the violenceof its performative force into a calm constatation of thestate of affairs it produces, according to the play wehave just seen for the contract. 240