THE COMMUNIST BALKANS AGAINST NATO IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AREA. 1949 – 1969

Dr. Jordan Baev

Even the definition of the title of this Paper creates some preliminary questions that should to be clarified in the very beginning: Is it possible to speak in general of the “Communist Balkans” as a common concept; How broad should be the scope of the “Eastern Mediterranean area”; To what extend has to be determined NATO’ strategy in the region in order to describe more thoroughly the Soviet bloc’ anti-NATO attitude and policy. Using the term “communist states” in the Balkans we are focusing on the Warsaw Pact member states, mainly Bulgaria and Romania, since Albania actually plays a secondary role within the alliance even in the 50-s. Regarding the political and military presence of the leading NATO countries in the area, it is not our goal to remind well known events or doctrines, but to throw more light on their repercussion within the Warsaw Pact circles and to contribute for a more detailed picture of the Soviet bloc views on the enemy’s intentions during the first Cold War decades. The Communist attitude towards the most lasting postwar conflicts – such as the Middle East and the Cyprus ones – should be discussed as well. Among the topics that have to be clarified are the nature of some internal disputes and differences between the Soviet allies in the Balkans; the place of the Warsaw Pact’ Southern Flank in the bi-polar confrontation, assigned by Kremlin; the changes of the common plans and views caused by the Soviet leadership’ castling from Stalin to Brezhnev. During the last decade a large collection of top secret governmental and Communist Party resolutions and information (from September 1944 till November 1989) was declassified in Bulgaria. As a result of the work of our Bulgarian Cold War Research Group in last two years we have obtained access to some formerly secret Diplomatic, Security and Military Records for the period up to 1992. All this newly available documentation is a solid base and gives us an exclusive opportunity to explore various new issues of the Warsaw Pact history and the place of the Balkans in the Cold War era. The announcement of the North Atlantic Treaty is not followed by any special Soviet bloc action. The only public response is an evident intensification of the “peace propaganda” against the “imperialist warmongers”. After the building of the East European bilateral treaties system in 1947-1949 an increase of the multilateral political, economic and military relations is observed as well. In 1949 – 1951 starts a

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speed up rearmament and a Soviet type’ structural reorganization of the Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian Armed Forces. The Soviet arms supplies for the three former Nazi allies soon go beyond the Paris Peace Treaty’s limitations1, although the number of forces and the quality of the armaments are too much overestimated in some reports of the British and French military representatives in Sofia and Bucharest2 and in official statements of the Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito and the Greek Prime Minister Sofokles Venizelos early in 19513. Two specific issues should be mentioned in regard to the Balkan Soviet allies’ position in late 40-s and early 50-s:

First, Bulgaria is the only former East European Nazi ally, where there aren’t any Soviet troops after 1947. Even at the heat of the Cold War the number of the Soviet military advisers in Bulgaria is approximately small [37 servicemen in 1947, 108 – in 1953, 61 – in 1955]4. At the same time, however, the most key senior commanders’ positions inside the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense are occupied by Bulgarian officers, who have finished Soviet military schools and academies during the interwar years. For a decade after the establishment of a Communist dominance in the country (1945 – 1954) 157 Bulgarian officers receive their education in Soviet military academies5. It sounds as an symbolic anecdote the real story of a Bulgarian communist leadership’s request to Stalin in September 1949 to send a Soviet general as a Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. The request is rejected by Stalin with the surprising argument: “We consider that it is necessary to express our view on the inexpedience of such idea, since the Chief of General Staff has to know well Bulgarian circumstances and language and to be close associated with the Bulgarian Army.”6 The Soviet control over Romania, however, is more direct7 and one of the strategic reasons for it is to secure a permanent Soviet line of communications with Bulgaria and Albania via the Romanian territory.

Second, at the initial stage of the building of the Communist system (1948 – 1956), the main Soviet bloc initiatives and undertakings in the Balkans are declared through Bucharest, not by Sofia as it is done at the time of Georgi Dimitrov. Let’s mention, for instance, the secret “Fund Moscow” initiative, the Cominform Bureau and other communist meetings in Romania, the “non-nuclear Balkans” proposal of the Romanian Prime Minister Kivu Stojka, etc. The Romanian Foreign Policy activity as a Soviet bloc speaker for the Balkans can be observed until late 50-s, when a new flexible Bulgarian Party leader Todor Zhivkov quickly gains full confidence of Khrushchev and further of Brezhnev.

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At the peak of the Cold War confrontation in late 40-s – early 50-s the Balkans occupy a relevantly significant place in the Soviet policy. It is motivated mainly by the continuing Stalin – Tito split, NATO’s expansion in South-East Europe by inclusion of Turkey and Greece to the Alliance, and finally the announcement of a formal “Balkan Pact” between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in February 1953. Although the Kremlin leadership pays primary attention to Central and West Europe in the 60-s, the geo-strategic position of the Balkans as a key factor for securing control of the approaches to the Mediterranean and the Near East still remain actual. The role, assigned to Bulgaria in Soviet plans and intentions, is well described in two Annual Reports of British Legation in Sofia in the early 60-s. In 1960 Anthony Lambert reports to Foreign Office: “The Russians, we must assume, regard Bulgaria as the most reliable of their European satellites. She has a stable government, a good army, and a docile population. She also occupies a key sector in the front line facing NATO. For it seems clear that the Russians are building up the pressure against Greece and Turkey; and here Bulgaria has an important role to play.” And a William Harpam’s Report of 1964 adds some remarks on “Bulgaria’s considerable strategic importance to the Soviet Union, both as a buffer against attack from the South and as a springboard for any offensive to the Mediterranean”.8

The imposing of the Soviet political model and the Soviet type of Armed and Security Forces with a very strong subordination to Moscow brings to a more or less clear conclusion that the creation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 actually marks not the beginning, but the end of a process of Soviet bloc political, economic and military integration. The appropriate mechanisms of effective coordination within the Pact are not established with the signing of the Warsaw Treaty; they have to be developed for more a decade until Warsaw Pact Budapest Summit in March 19699. The Communist regimes in Bucharest, Sofia and Tirana carefully observe the reorganization of Turkish and Greek armies at the eve and after the NATO expansion on the Balkans. The inclusion of Greece and Turkey to NATO, however, produces only formal diplomatic notes from Moscow and Sofia with no practical significance. It is rather a slight reaction in comparison with the energetic Soviet protests against Norway’s inclusion to NATO in April 1949. Similar to such reaction is the Soviet bloc response towards the announcement of the Balkan Pact in 1953. In April 1953 a verbal Note against this act is prepared at the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it had never been delivered to Ankara and Belgrade.10 In a Summary Information of January 1953 over the NATO activity in the Balkans it is pointed out that according to a “new NATO strategy”, in case of a probable Soviet attack in Western

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Europe, “the Turkish, Greek and Yugoslav forces are ready immediately to organize a counteroffensive in the Balkans”11 Some Diplomatic Reports from the Bulgarian Legation in Ankara and General Consulate in Istanbul stress on Information regarding the deployment of US troops and tactical aviation, and the plans for built up of US military bases in Turkey.12

Until mid-50-s Soviet bloc countries do not pay special attention to the Near East situation. Bulgaria, as other East European states, supports in 1948 the creation of a new state of Israel in Palestine, whose people fight “against British imperialism and reactionary Islamic empires”.13 It is not accidental, that in 1951 Abdullah, the King of Transjordan, addresses a warning message against “the Russian-Jewish threat to the Arabic world”14. A tension in Israeli-Bulgarian relations appears only in the summer of 1955, when a Bulgarian AF pilot shoots down an Israeli civil airplane. The followed investigation proves, however, that it is not a premeditated action but a pilot fault, caused mainly by the bi-polar propaganda atmosphere of a “war of nerves”15. A definitive change comes after the Suez crisis in 1956, when for the first time the East European countries stand by the nationalistic Nasser’s regime in Egypt. The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in May 1955 does not cause any significant changes in the position of dependence of the smaller East-European Kremlin allies set up during Stalin’s rule. At the very moment of its creation the organization assigns specific observation and analysis tasks to each of its member states in regard of the fighting capacity and military power of their neighboring states - members of the hostile NATO bloc. Thus Bulgaria and Romania share the charge to study the NATO intentions and actions in South Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Owing to the deterioration of the Moscow - Bucharest relations by the end of the 1960-s this task becomes mainly a responsibility of the Bulgarian Intelligence Services. The Bulgarian and other East European archives declassified in the last decade show the channels of information exchange regarding the state of the NATO Armed Forces. This is a priority target for the Bulgarian State Security intelligence and counter-intelligence departments [KDS] and the Military Intelligence [RUMNO]. Part of the summarized collected information is discussed at multilateral Warsaw Pact meetings. Each week Sofia receives from Moscow reports, analyses and reviews of KGB and GRU regarding the political and military situation in various crisis regions all over the world. “Special Intelligence” Bulletins are also sent by the Unified Command of the Warsaw Pact Allied Forces. It is explicitly agreed to send such intelligence analyses

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to the allied neighboring states for their information and assessment. Thus, for instance, in fulfillment of a bilateral agreement, signed in 1963, in the course of the next decade, the State Security agencies of Bulgaria and Romania exchange about 200 information reports on NATO of 1500 pages total volume. Similar exchange of intelligence information with other East European countries is proceeded during the whole period of existence of the Warsaw Treaty organization. In May 2001 it was announced, for instance, that inside the East German Archives more than 3 800 messages from STASI to Sofia can be found.16

The key issues for the political and military leaders of the East-European Bloc are the NATO policy and strategy, the dislocation of its nuclear and missile weapons and the stationing of the US troops in Europe, the interdependence and contradictions among the members of the North-Atlantic Alliance. With no fail a place of importance is always given to the condition of all types of armed forces and their participation in NATO joint maneuvers and exercises. A valuable information about East-European military leaders’ assessments and forecasts can be discovered in the overview of the tasks assigned during joint military exercises of the Warsaw Treaty members. The importance of the new evidence and estimates of the NATO historical development discovered in the East-European archives requires a more detailed and profound analysis of the authentic data accumulated during the period of the Cold War. Regardless the case, however, one should always take into consideration the influence of the ideological, political and strategic concepts in the Soviet Bloc at the time as well as the relative trustworthiness of the Intelligence sources used. Soon after the Suez crisis of 1956 the contacts between Warsaw Pact countries and some Arabic nationalist regimes become more intensive. The Near East conflict is estimated by the Soviet bloc experts as a part of the global confrontation and in the light of a direct application of the Eisenhower Doctrine for securing the US strategic dominance in the region. Despite of some kind of misunderstanding and mutual suspicions in the beginning, the Bulgaria’s relations with Egypt, Syria and Iraq are growing up and in mid-60-s Bulgaria holds third place of relationship with the Arab states within the Warsaw Pact. In the same period Romania tries to elaborate a different line toward the Arab-Israel conflict, one of its efforts to follow an independent – as much as possible – international position. First signs for such distance from Moscow are expressed in two letters of the Romanian Communist leadership to Kremlin in June 1963 and March 1964, and publicly announced at a Plenary meeting in April 1964. Georghe Georgiu Dej repeats the claims during the visits of Soviet top officials [Nikolay Podgorni and Anastas Mikoyan] to Bucharest in

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July and August and once again before the new Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in November 1964 immediately after the dismissal of Nikita Khruschev17. Raymond Garthoff delivers new data over the motives for such drastic move explaining it as a reaction of the Cuban missile crisis.18 However, there are some more reasons for the Romania’s distance, one of it linked with the Transylvanian problem in Romanian-Hungarian relations, activated again exactly in 1964.19

Bulgarian Secret Services carefully observe US and British high rank officers’ visits to Greece and Turkey. Special attention is paid to the NATO exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean in the summer and fall of 1957 as well as of a dislocation of Turkish troops on the Syrian border. Even in February 1957 Bulgarian Military Intelligence reports about “an increasing US military activity in the Near and Middle East” and some indications of a possible further attack against Syria 20. A conclusion that each concentration of the Sixth US Fleet battleships near to the Turkish and Greek shores means a “complication of the situation in the area” is made in the report, too. At a BCP Politburo discussion the NATO exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean in August – September 1957 are evaluated as “preparation for a provocative action against Syria by the USA, Turkey and Israel”. In the same time Moscow sends urgent recommendations to its smaller Balkan allies with a request for more active policy on this issue. As a result of the Soviet demand, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivers protest verbal notes to the diplomatic representatives of Turkey and Israel in Sofia.21 A mass anti-US campaign starts in Eastern Europe after the landing of US and British marines and paratroopers in Lebanon and Jordan in the summer of 1958. During this campaign both the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense and the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party receive many requests from reduced officers insisting to be send as “volunteers to support the struggle of the Arabic people”.22 Two special sessions of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party in July and October 1958 are dedicated to the situation in the Near and Middle East. In his report on 19 July 1958 Todor Zhivkov states, that the US intervention in Lebanon is a result of the political changes in Iraq, which seriously affect the US strategy aims in the region. Zhivkov underlines that due to the proximity of the events to the “Socialist camp’ borders” it is necessary to discomfit the “imperialist aggression” in the area.

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As a response to the US action in Lebanon, long scale military exercises are carried out in Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Odessa Military District. In Bulgaria the exercise is conducted close to the Bulgarian-Turkish border with the participation of almost all of the Army, Air Forces and Navy in a position of full battle alert. Few Soviet airborne divisions are dislocate in Bulgaria during the exercise. In his report at the CC Plenary meeting in July Zhivkov notices: “This exercise is a demonstration, but depending on the development of the situation, it could become a real power”.23 The followed discussion discloses very interesting details, typical for the existing psychological circumstances at the moment. At the peak of the Lebanese crisis a Bulgarian armored division, sent to attend an exercise in Romania, is urgently returned back to its former disposition near to the Turkish border. Due to a technical error, the coordinates on the map show pre-dislocation of a tank brigade near to Edirne, the biggest town on the European territory of Turkey. The only comment of the brigade commander is: “At last, time has come to start a real action”.24

On 2-4 October 1958, a week after Zhivkov’s meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in Crimea, another CC BCP Plenary session is held. Zhivkov’s statement at the Plenary expresses a strong enthusiasm and euphoria of the rising power of the Soviet war potential. The Bulgarian leader triumphantly announces that the Lebanese crisis settlement is the third subsequent Soviet bloc’ victory after the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Syrian crisis in 1957. As a result, urges Zhivkov, the US invasion in the Near East is stopped without using a sole Soviet weapon. One of the conclusions, made by the Balkan Communist leader, is that the Near East events have respected the governments of Turkey, Greece and Iran. Thus an opportunity is created to “detach these countries from the US imperialism, or at least not to be committed so much to the US policy.”25

Such an “optimistic” estimate of the Bulgarian Communist leader is very soon denied by the Intelligence reports. An Information sent by the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior Gen. Tzankov to Zhivkov in July 1959 reports that at a meeting of NATO Secretary General Spaak with the Greek Defense Minister Averoff an agreement for activation of the Greek and Turkish policy “against the Soviet deep penetration in the Near East” has been reached26

At the height of the Berlin crisis in the summer and autumn of 1961 the Bulgarian Military Intelligence prepares a number of analyses and information reports on the co-relation between the intensification of the global military and political tension and the increased activity of NATO ships in the vicinity of the Black Sea. A report dated 5th

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August 1961 states that the US Government has requested Turkey to close the Black Sea Straits, should the USSR not accept a compromise on the Berlin issue. According to another information from the Intelligence Department of the Defense Ministry [RUMNO] dated 1st September, 1961 the commandment of the Egerli Black Sea naval base is put at advanced alert and is ordered to present everyday reports on the Black Sea coast situation to the Turkish Navy Staff in Ankara27. NATO’s military exercises in the Mediterranean in September - October 1961, i.e. - RED FOX, MANZIP CONVOY and CHECKMATE are not only most attentively followed, they are also analyzed from the Berlin crisis development perspective. The reports state that the main goal of the exercises is to hold the Black Sea Straits by the NATO forces, a successful coastal landing with 5 000 marines in the region of the Saros Bay under the umbrella of the naval aviation and artillery and a preparation for acounter-offensive to the North28. One of the Bulgarian counter-intelligence reports includes a ridiculous information (taken by an Italian source) that “the Turkish Fleet Commander has entered the port of Burgas disguised as a senior assistant of a merchant ship”29. A diplomatic airgram from Istanbul informs that in case of military confrontation in relation to the Berlin issue, the Armed Forces of Turkey and Greece are to subordinate to the NATO Supreme Allied Command. Another source, close to American diplomatic officer stationed in Istanbul, informs of plans for quick building of military facilities at the Black Sea coast since the ones existing at the moment “could not secure effective defense in case of eventual hostile offensive”30. Allegedly, an urgent delivery of 10 American submarines, “built especially to suit the Black Sea specifics”, is planned.

The Cuban missile crisis also has an indirect influence on the situation at the Balkans and the Mediterranean area. Just before the crisis started, from 15th to 19th October 1962 an operational and tactical Warsaw Pact exercise takes place in Romania and Bulgaria and their contiguous Black Sea aquatory. At this exercise overview Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Allied Armed Forces gives a place of special attention to the NATO Forces on the Balkans and the Mediterranean. He states that the Sixth US Fleet and the British Mediterranean Navy are the backbone of the NATO naval power in the region. The Sixth US Fleet allegedly has in its possession up to 50 warships and its two aircraft carriers are with up to 250 airplanes, and both - between themselves - 1030 nuclear warheads. Marshal Grechko stresses in particular the entrance of US warships in the Black Sea basin during the recent years and qualifies that as a deliberate “military demonstration” close by the Bulgarian, Romanian and Soviet coasts. According to him that underlines the

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importance of the Black Sea Straits in the NATO geo-strategic plans as a crossing point of three continents and an approach toward the most important Mediterranean lines of communication31.

In a Intelligence Information, sent by the Minister of the Interior Gen. Dikov to the Minister of Defense, Gen. Djurov, on 17 December 1962, some details over a meeting of Giulio Andreotti, the Italian Minister of Defense, with the Chiefs of Staff of Italian Army, Navy and Air Forces are reported. According to the Information, Andreotti informs the generals of his talks with Robert McNamara, US Secretary of Defense, and with Gen. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his visit in the USA in November 1962. Two topics attract the attention of the Bulgarian Intelligence: 1. An initiative of ensuring closer contacts between NATO and some neutral states; 2. The proposal to modernize the Italian Air Forces by delivery of new fighters and “Corporal” missiles, and to strengthen all NATO missile bases in Italy [in particular, in Venezia Giulia and in Belluno Alps].32

Both - the Western and Eastern assessments show that throughout the whole Cold War period the NATO Naval Forces on the South European Flank are nearly twice the number of the Warsaw Pact maritime power. The summary intelligence estimates of the power and fighting efficiency of the NATO Naval Forces during this period are of particular interest. An evaluation report of the Romanian General Staff’ Operational department of April 1965 states that the NATO Naval Forces have at their disposal a total of about 1 500 warships and auxiliary ships of which -370 main combat ships; 45 naval aviation squadrons with more than 680 assorted aircraft; 8 battalions of marines. The main NATO naval group, comprising the naval forces of the USA, the Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey and, Greece, is concentrated in the Mediterranean. The NATO Naval Forces combat unit in the region is the Sixth US Fleet which has 3-4 aircraft carriers with nuclear warheads of types A-3B and A-4B with 300 kt equivalent and 2400 to 1500 km tactical radius. At the same time 3-4 other US nuclear submarines with “Polaris-A2” missiles of 2800 km range patrol in the Mediterranean33. According to official Soviet data of 1970 the Allied NATO Naval Forces in the Mediterranean [of which the French Navy is no more a member], have at their disposal 260 ships and up to 120 airplanes and helicopters. The Naval Forces combat unit is the 16th Squadron of US nuclear submarines, based in Rota, Spain. Apart of that, the Sixth US Fleet has about 60 ships, 2 aircraft carriers of 180-200 airplanes, 20 destroyers, 1-2 missile cruisers as well as marine units34.

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In a summary study of the Intelligence department at the General Staff of Bulgarian Armed Forces [RUMNO] under the title: ”Conclusions from the NATO Allied Military Forces’ exercises at the South-European war theater in the period 1960 - 1972” major NATO military exercises are analyzed, such as “DANCE CROP”, “DAWN PATROL”, “SOUTH EXPRESS”, ”FALLEX” as well as special naval exercises like “MEDSABEX”, “MEDTAXEC” “AHOY NEPTUNE”, “FADEN ESCORT”, “AGGRAVATE ESCORT”, etc. The study points out that in the early 1960-ies the tasks to be worked out were concerned predominantly with organizing an initial defensive operation with a subsequent surprising nuclear thrust at the enemy, carrying out a coastal landing and an air-landing and then taking the offensive. At the end of the explored period the use of strategic nuclear weapons becomes more and more limited. ”As a rule the naval units of the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Turkey and Greece permanently placed in the Mediterranean, always participate in the amphibious operations at the South European War Theater accompanied by US marines.”35 After 1967, informs another Intelligence study, one third of Turkish Naval Forces within the NATO complement are based on the Black Sea - mainly torpedo and missile cruisers and submarines.36

The available Intelligence data of the assumed NATO countries’ intentions and operations are used for planning the operational-tactical and staff exercises involving the Warsaw Pact Black Sea Fleets. The largest operational and tactical exercise in the Balkans area within the stated period is carried out in August 1967, with code name “RODOPI”. This exercise covers nearly the whole territory of Bulgaria and the West Black Sea coast from Sevastopol to Sozopol. One of the main tasks set to the Bulgarian and Romanian Naval forces and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet is to off a coastal landing after enemy’s nuclear missile strike. All available naval forces of Bulgaria, 12 Romanian war ships, 139 ships and submarines and the whole combat aviation of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet take part. The following is explicitly stated in the “RODOPI” military exercise overview: “An air-dropping coastal landing and its deterrence is the most complicated of military actions not only on sea but in any case of military hostilities whatsoever” it is also “an unavoidable element” of a future war37. In preparation of this significant military exercise on the Bulgarian territory the Military Counter-intelligence Department carries out a special operation called “MULNIA” [THUNDERBOLT]. The operation is aiming to accomplish a set of desinformation measures against the military attachés of the NATO countries in Bulgaria and neutralize their intelligence activities in the regions of the exercise

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“RODOPI”. The movements of the Greek, Turkish, British and Italian military attachés in the Burgas coastal area as well as in the areas of other towns in Southern Bulgaria were closely followed. The Bulgarian counter-intelligence services report to the Ministers of Defense and of the Interior that on most part the data collected about the “RODOPI” exercise by the Western military representatives has been “inaccurate”. The conclusive report on the “MULNIA” operation points out: ”The data gathered by the enemy parties and their assessment of the beginning of the exercise, the Danube forcing, the airdrop landings in the Ruse and Sarafovo areas and the D-day in Sozopol are really far from the truth… Even now the military attachés are aware of nearly nothing in regard of such important operations like the air landings in Kondofrei and Bezmer …”38

The available Bulgarian Secret Services’ documentation shows that early in the 60-s a process of closer coordination and exchange of sensitive Intelligence information between the Warsaw Pact Security Agencies has intensified. In mid-60-s few successful operations of the Bulgarian Counterintelligence [supported technically by KGB experts] against diplomatic missions of some NATO countries in Sofia are carried out. In a letter to the KGB Chairman V. Semichastny of 16 April 1965 Gen. Dikov informs about some documents, taken from the Greek AF attaché’s office in Sofia. In another Information to Moscow, the Bulgarian State Security Committee [KDS] chief, Angel Solakov, informs of the results of another operation, against the Italian Embassy – the Bulgarian Counterintelligence officers gain secret ciphers for correspondence both with CIFAR, the Italian Foreign Intelligence, and with the Italian General Staff’ Military Intelligence Department.39 Some of the received Intelligence information from Sofia [for instance, about the transfer of CETAF Command from Verona to Vicenza, the NATO Policy in the Near East, etc.] are included in the KGB Special Daily Bulletin.40 In January 1968 another collection of secret documents, taken after a new operation of penetration inside the Italian Embassy in Sofia are delivered to Moscow. In a letter to Gen. Solakov on February 13th 1968 the KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov highly appreciates the received information, pointing out that the Soviet experts consider the taken Italian documents as “very important”.41 Two months later some Bulgarian Intelligence and Counterintelligence chiefs visit Moscow and in a personal meeting with Andropov receive his personal “recommendations” to intensify the efforts for “demoralization” of NATO’s Southern Flank.

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It is important to reveal the specific topics of interest and forms of collaboration between Bulgarian and Romanian Secret Services against NATO. Just exactly in mid-60-s, when the discord between the Romanian leaders and their Warsaw Pact colleagues is more or less evident, the mutual Security contacts are becoming more frequent and remain active until mid-70-s, even when the Party and State relations are strongly reduced. Listed bellow are some of most typical examples of the Intelligence exchange in the correspondence between the heads of Bulgarian and Romanian State Security Services Angel Solakov and Kornel Onescu [replaced in 1968 with Jon Stanescu]:

- On 5 November 1965 Solakov sends to Bucharest Secret Information re: “The reasons for keeping France inside NATO”, “The state of defense capacity of the population in the NATO countries”, “About new US pressure on the Greek government to make concessions in regard to the Cyprus issue”, “About a discussion at the Turkish General Staff on establishment of new Turkish Task Force”;

- On 11 January and on 8 February 1966 from Sofia to Bucharest new Information is sent, amongst it “On a NATO Special Committee meeting”; “About Turkish Government’ objections against the NATO Headquarters’ intentions to build an air defense installation at the Greek Island of Lemnos”; “About the personal changes of the Turkish Army Commandmend”; “Some estimates of the Greek Ministry of National Defense”; - On 13 June 1966 – “About the political situation in Italy and US and the Vatican position toward it”; “Some problems of preparation the NATO June Ministerial meeting”; “About the visit of the Italian Defense Minister Tremeloni in Greece”; “The French position over the Cyprus issue”;

- On 7 September 1966 Gen. Solakov informs his Romanian colleague Onescu about some data from a “reliable source” that the Italian Military Intelligence has ordered its representative in Sofia, Lt-Col Achile Amico, to collect various information against Romania [including the number and dislocation of the Romanian units];

- On 11 and 12 May 1967 Onescu receives from Sofia another collection of Secret Information, amongst them “New data about the events in Greece”; “On the Situation in Cyprus after the Coup in Greece”; “On the forms and techniques of the Greek, French and British Counterintelligence Services against Bulgarian diplomatic missions in Athens, Paris and London”;

- On 28 December 1967 a new Information is delivered to Bucharest – “Some views of Italian Christian Democratic Party on NATO”.

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Among the Information sent by Kornel Onescu to his colleague Angel Solakov in Sofia are: On 28 January 1966 – “On the intention of the Greek Government to withdraw 10 000 Greek soldiers from Cyprus and the split between Archbishop Makarios and Gen. Grivas”; “About the serious discord between the Suleyman Demirel’s Government and the leadership of the Turkish Armed Forces”; “The delivery of a British radar station in Cyprus to NATO’s Southern Command”; On 26 March 1966 – “Some data about the US military bases in Turkey”; “The US pressure on the Turkish government to reject a proposal for purchase of French military equipment” 42, etc. Only for the period April 1967 – May 1968 from the Romanian State Security Council to Sofia 105 secret Information are sent, 25 % of them related to the Foreign and Defense Policy of Turkey and Greece and the situation in the Middle East. For the same period Bulgarian Security Services deliver to Bucharest 76 secret Information, mostly regarding the NATO activity in the region [for instance, “Some data on NATO June meeting in Luxembourg”; “On the Bundeswehr and NATO command conclusions from the Near East war”; “About a Turkish secret instruction regarding preparation of a NATO Defense Committee session in May 1968”] 43. As a result of the implementation of a new agreement for collaboration between Bulgarian and Romanian Security Services, signed on 1 June 1968, during the period 1968 – 1970 they continue to exchange a large number of Intelligence Information44. Just in the time, when an increased reduction of the Romanian political contacts with the other Warsaw Pact countries is observed more clearly. The Cyprus crisis and the situation in Greece after the military coup of 21 April 1967 are amongst the most important regional issues, discussed within the Warsaw Pact in late 60-s. These topic are commented in direct connection with the question of the NATO Southern Flank’ stability. In particular, the Information about the Greek and Turkish reaction toward the US and NATO efforts to reach a compromise solution of the Cyprus crisis, is explored very carefully. The Bulgarian Embassy in Athens sends Information to Sofia, received from sources, close to the Greek governmental circles. In a cipher telegram, for instance, a symptomatic statement of Andreas Papandreou, the son of the Greek Prime Minister and a Deputy Minister of Coordination himself, is cited: “In case of a Turkish aggression that will provoke a Greek military action in response, NATO – as a defensive organization – should react against the aggression. Otherwise, the Greek participation in NATO has no sense. 45” At the same time, in a Diplomatic Report the Bulgarian Legation in Ankara comments that the US President

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Lyndon Johnson’ pressure on his Turkish ally Ismet Inönü and the announcement of the “Acheson” Plan create very sharp discontent in Turkey. The US diplomatic efforts to settle the crisis in the relations of their NATO allies in the Balkans are viewed as acts of disrespect of the “national interests” and the “honor” of Turkey46 For the first time after the Turkey’s inclusion to NATO mass demonstrations and press campaign against NATO are organized in Turkey. The Information, received in Sofia and Moscow, is interpreted by the Communist experts as a sign for a new chance to decrease the NATO power in the Eastern Mediterranean and to increase the Soviet influence in the region. In order to gain more advanced positions, new contacts with some circles closed to Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, are maintained. Some data and Information on confidential meetings and discussions with Makarios, founded inside the BCP “Foreign Relations” Department’s files, confirm this intentions. 47

In the months immediately after the military coup in Greece the Bulgarian leadership analyzes several times the newly established situation in the region. Not long after the coup takes place, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev in a report of his informs the Politburo that according to the obtained information "the participation of the Pentagon and the CIA in the implementation of the Coup is indisputable and most active." In the Politburo resolution passed on the Bashev’s Report, three main tasks are fixed: "1. Preventing aggravation or a setback in the relations between the PR of Bulgaria and Greece and a complication in the situation at our Southern border... 2. Intensification of the outside isolation of the regime... 3. A detailed Study of the actual political factors which might step on the political stage in the near or not so near future and establishing a cautious contact with them, preparing ground for future steps in view of restoring the democratic and parliamentary regime in Greece and a future improvement of our relations with Greece. "48 On 3 August 1967 CC BCP Politburo takes a special decision to propose at the next Warsaw Pact summit some measures for more close coordination between the Warsaw Pact member states and Yugoslavia against the military dictatorship in Greece. Following the adopted line in the course of the next few months the Bulgarian leadership approves several top secret directives for financial aid for the Greek leftist forces and their political emigration. In May 1967 the CC BCP Secretariat passes a resolution for the transfer of the Greek Communist Party [KKE] functionaries across the border. For the purpose US $ 4 000 and BG Lv 10 000 are assigned49. In August a new similar decision is approved. The Bulgarian government meets the KKE request

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for submitting some State Security Services classified information regarding the forms and methods, used by the Asfalia, the Greek Secret Police50. In another resolution the BCP leadership expresses its consent to extend assistance to the Greek communists: "1. For the repeated transfer of special Greek émigrés groups over our border to establish five channels on Greek territory; 2. A KKE functionary is to be appointed to a suitable post in Burgas to enable him to carry out special work among the Greek sailors; 3. A Greek political émigré provided with a Bulgarian passport, shall be included in the staff of one of our commercial ships so that he can explore the situation in the Greek ports according to the KKE interests; 4. The CC BCP car park is to provide a jeep for the needs of a KKE special representative; 5. The KKE is to receive BG Lv 35 000 and US $ 15 000 for performing special tasks in 1970."51

In next Diplomatic and Intelligence analyses as well as in the KGB Daily Intelligence Bulletins received from Moscow more reliable data about the existing disagreement between the Greek military Junta and its NATO allies is given. These differences can be seen clearly now in the available US State Department documentation, too52. It is quite possible that a more valuable and detailed information on the matter [in particular on the CIA role] could be found in a new Volume XVI [Cyprus/Greece/Turkey] of the “Foreign Relations of the United States” series for the period 1964-1968, prepared for publication in Washington in 2000. According to a National Security Archive at the George Washington University announcement, however, the release of the Volume is stalling by the US Central Intelligence Agency, even though the documents included in it have been officially declassified in 1998 and 199953. In a Special Report “Greece and NATO” of 24 November 1967 the Bulgarian Embassy in Athens underlines: “During the last few months the Cyprus issue acquired a special significance to NATO. The French withdrawal from the Atlantic alliance and the Near East crisis increase much more the value of the Island, situated in an important strategic place inside the neuralgic triangle between three continents. The presence of Soviet battleships in the Mediterranean is a quite new phenomenon that worries too much the NATO strategists. All this urge the USA to resolve quickly the problem. The Americans are ready to support each one solution of the Cyprus question, achieved between Turkey and Greece.54” A year later this topic is discussed in a Diplomatic Report of the Bulgarian Embassy in Ankara [“The measures for the NATO strengthening and its repercussion in Turkey”]. In the Report a special attention to the Turkish reaction towards a NATO Brussels session’ decisions in November 1968 is devoted. Over the discussed proposals, in particular, are the

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establishment of a new Air-Naval Mediterranean NATO Command and the radical changes of the NATO Strategy and military plans.55

The aggravation of the Near East conflict in mid-60-s provokes also the Warsaw Pact close attention to the Eastern Mediterranean area. Among the issues discussed inside the Pact’ Secret Services on the matter a particular concern cause the Israeli Intelligence services activities against Eastern Europe and their contacts with the NATO Secret Services. In two KGB Reports of November 1961 and April 1963, entirely included in the Top Secret Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior’ Informative Bulletin, some detailed data about the structure and tasks of various Israeli Security Agencies as well as about the secret Israeli operations against the USSR and the East European countries is given. According to these reports, 21 of all 39 diplomatic officials of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow for the period 1948-1959 are discovered as Intelligence and Counterintelligence officers or agents. A secret agreement between the US and Israeli governments for mutual investigation and use of the Information, taken by the Soviet and East European immigrants to Israel, has been concluded in late 50-s. At a NATO Intelligence Services’ meeting in 1959 a special decision (proposed by the British Intelligence Service) “for more active use of the Israeli Intelligence capabilities in favor of the Western countries” , has been taken. The KGB Reports argue that in late 50-s – early 60-s the Israeli Security Services have maintained close contacts with their partners in Western Germany, France [at the time of the Algerian war], Italy and Turkey56.

After the first visit of Admiral Gorshkov, Commander of the Soviet Navy, in Egypt in 1961, the presence of Soviet military vessels in the region is significantly increased. That comes not only as a result of the increase of the NATO maritime power in the Mediterranean but is also connected with the change of the political regimes of some Arab and African states and the sharpening of the Near East situation. In November 1962 three Soviet guided missile boats 183-R are delivered to the naval base in Alexandria which makes possible the formation of the first guided missile boats battalion of the Egyptian Navy. As a commander of the group of the Soviet naval experts in Alexandria Rear Admiral Vassiliev is sent next year. By the end of the 1960-ies other Soviet naval bases are created - in the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus and the Somali port of Berberra. In the period after the Six Days War in 1967 there are about 400 Soviet military advisers in all types of armed forces in Egypt only57. According to Western sources, after the Six-Day War in the Middle East in June 1967 Moscow has at its permanent

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disposal about 50 combat and auxiliary ships and 9-10 submarines in the Mediterranean, and during the October War in 1973, the Soviets double the number of their vessels in the region. As the London daily - The Times, ironically points out in its editorial, the participants in the NATO naval exercises in the Mediterranean are very often with one more than it has originally been planned as Soviet warships and submarines are all the time located very near by58. More close political and military contacts with some Near and Middle East countries and more energetic commitment with the Arabic cause determine the place of Bulgaria – unlike Romania – during the Near East conflict. In 1966 – early 1967 Bulgarian diplomatic missions in Damascus, Cairo and Tel Aviv send a large number of Reports and cipher telegrams regarding the increasing tension in the Israeli-Arabic relations and ceaseless border incidents as a result.59 The Israeli air attack against Egypt on 5 June 1967 in the morning, however, surprises a Bulgarian governmental delegation, headed by Todor Zhivkov, in Belgrade. Zhivkov and Tito immediately discuss the newly created situation, holding an identical position. As a leader of the Nonaligned states movement Josip Broz Tito maintains close relations with the other founder of the Movement – Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Yugoslav president has committed himself to render significant economic and military assistance to the Arabic “front-line” countries.60

On 9 June 1967 an urgent meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders is convoked in Moscow. For the first time Tito is also invited to attend such a meeting. As a result of the meeting all participating countries (except Romania) break on June 10th 1967 their diplomatic relations with Israel. Nicolae Ceausescu and Jon Georghe Maurer, the Romanian representatives at the Moscow meeting, refuse to sign the proposed common Declaration against Israel disagreed with the assessment that Israel is a sole aggressor. Later on Romanian government undertakes some independent diplomatic actions towards the Near East conflict. On 14 June 1967 a special CC BCP Plenary meeting is hold with only one topic on the Agenda – Zhivkov’s report over the Near East situation. The Bulgarian leader gives a comparatively realistic estimate on the reasons for the complete defeat of the Arabic armies. He acknowledges that the Egyptian military have not been prepared to use the modern Soviet weaponry; they have acted with a great dose of self-reliance. A lack of coordination between the Armed Forces of the Arabic countries is observed, too. The Arabic nationalism has played also a negative role with its slogans for a Jihad and extermination of the Israeli state as a final aim, “despite of our warning that

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such task is definitely in contradiction with the Socialist principles”. Zhivkov adds in his report: “Almost all of the actions of the Arabic leaders were not coordinated with the Soviet Union and with us.” According to Zhivkov’s testimony, during the Six Days War the Bulgarian Communist leadership has maintained permanent contacts with the Soviet and Warsaw Pact command and he has had himself “everyday personal phone calls with Comrade Brezhnev”. At the end of his statement the Bulgarian Communist leader summarizes the conclusions: “How can we estimate the war? Obviously, we can not examine it as an occasional event, as a partial war between Israel and the Arabic countries. It is clear for us, that it is a struggle between the Socialism and Imperialism, a struggle for getting the control over the region.”61 In two further BCP Politburo meetings in August and October 1967 some additional assessments of the Near East conflict repercussion on the Warsaw Pact – NATO global confrontation are made. In the October meeting Gen. Dobri Djurov, Bulgarian Minister of Defense, delivers a detailed report “About the state of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in the light of the actual events in the Near East”. In the report a critical appraisal of the combat - readiness of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is given. A special critical remark in regard to the Unified Command of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces is made, too. According to Gen. Djurov, “the existing structure, command and rights of authority” do not allow to secure “an adequate management of the allied forces”. Bulgarian Defense Minister pays special attention to the question of the Bulgarian army’s preparedness to react to a possible enemy’s attack from the South. He recognizes the concerns of the Bulgarian military experts that “in case of a surprising attack within the frames of a local conflict, the Bulgarian Army will not be in a position to counterattack effectively even in one of both possible directions (against Turkey or against Greece)”.62

By the end of the 1960-s following the experience resulting from of the Near East and Indochina wars, the Unified Allied Command of the Warsaw Treaty Organization change their previous strategic concepts in regard of the inavoidability of a “nuclear missile war”. In exercises and maneuvers, carried out from that time on, a participation in “local wars” with of conventional armament is foreseen. Thus, for instance, the Directive for the Training of the Warsaw Pact Allied Armed Forces of 1969 points out as an important weakness in the military training before that time the fact that ”… the possibilities of conducting continuous fight without the use of nuclear weapon are not considered…”63 When analyzing the naval exercises carried out on the Black Sea in March 1969 a point is explicitly made of the fact that the NATO Military Command [SHAPE] takes particular care of the development of the

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organizational structures of its Armed Forces and with their being supplied with new types of conventional arms applicable in local wars64.

The above presented new documentary evidences visibly illustrate the views and estimates of the Warsaw Pact member-states concerning the plans, operational-tactical concepts and the combat potential of the NATO Forces in the East Mediterranean and the Balkans till the 1970-s. These “visions from the North” in respect of the possibilities and intentions of the NATO Allied Command at the Southern Flank are meant to improve the environmental background of those times and to contribute for establishment of a more differentiated picture and understanding of the Cold War years’ global and regional confrontation. They might as well help the joint efforts to throw more light on the half Century contemporary history of the North Atlantic Treaty as the most effective and long lasting military and political alliance of our times. 1 Central State Archive [CDA], Sofia, F. 1-B, Op. 7, Files 1607, 1611, 1679; Op. 64, Files 183, 200, 203; Central Military Archive [CVA], Veliko Turnovo, F. 22, Op. 1, File 322. 2 PRO, Kew, Foreign Office. Political.371/87586, 95074; MAE, Paris, Archives Diplomatiques. Serie Z, 1949-1955, Carton 68, Dossier 1, v. 23. 3 CDA, Sofia, F. 214-B, Op. 1, File 711. These claims are used in 1951 as arguments for Turkish and Greek inclusion in NATO. 4 CVA, F. 1, Op. 2, Files 14, 15. As a comparison, US military advisers in Greece after the end of the Greek Civil War (1950) are almost 1000 personnel. In 1951 in Turkey there are 450 US military advisers and their number grows up in late 50-s to 3000 military men. - NARA, Washington, RG 218 [Joint Chiefs of Staff], Geographic File, 1948-1950, Box 27; “USAF Operations in Turkey. 1947-1959.”, Part. 1 - National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, Record 232, Box 6. 5 CVA, F. 1, Op. 3, File 7, p. 46-51. 6 CDA, F. 1-B, Op. 7, File 1435, p. 3. In February 1950 a rumor that Soviet marshal Konev is appointed as a Commander-in-Chief of Bulgarian Army had been published in “The Manchester Guardian” – PRO. FO. 371/87583, p. 3. 7 See: S. Verona, Military occupation and diplomacy. Soviet Troops in Romania. 1944-1958. (Duke Univ. Press: 1992). 8 Cited in: D. Dimitrov, Soviet Bulgaria. From the Foreign Office Records, Book 1, 1956-1963, (BBC World Service: 1994), p. 67; Book 2, 1964-1966, (BBC World Service: 1999), p. 66. 9 See a new comparative study of Vojtech Mastny – Learning from the Enemy. NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact, (Zurich: 2001). During the discussions in late 60-s Bulgarian leader Zhivkov repeatedly appeals for establishing of a unified military command adequate to the ‘orderly NATO Command” – J. Baev, “Building of the Warsaw Pact’ military structures. 1955-1969”, Military History Journal, Sofia, 5, (1997), p. 56-77. 10 Diplomatic Archive [DA], Sofia, Op. 11-P, File 596, p. 45-46. 11 DA, Documentary Records, 1953, V/2/2/6, p. 6. 12 DА, Op. 2-Sh, File 351, p. 134; File 452, p. 99. 13 In March 1948 after a Report by the Prime Minister Georgi Dimitrov a Special Decision to support the establishment of the new state of Israel in Palestina and a possible collaboration between Communists and Zionists, is taken – CDA, F. 1-B, Op. 8, File 167, p. 1-2. 14 CDA, F. 214-B, Op. 1 , File 709, p. 14.

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15 The Investigation results at published in two Governmental Reports: CDA, F> 1-B, Op. 6, File 2629, p. 14-21; CVA, F. 1, Op. 3, File 6, p. 166-170; File 7, p. 380-385. 16 On STASI cooperation with other East European Security Service see: Borodziej/Kochanowski/Schäfer, Grenzen der Freundschaft. Zur Kooperation der Sicherheitsorgane der DDR und VR Polen zwischen 1956 und 1989, (Dresden: 2000). 17 A detailed confidential report on Romanian discord with Kremlin is prepared on 4 January 1965 for the members of Bulgarian Politburo– CDA, F. 1-B, Op. 51, File 429, p. 1-10. 18 R. Garthoff, “When and Why Romania Distanced Itself from the Warsaw Pact”, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Washington, 5, (1995), p. 111. 19 Transylvania and the Romanian-Hungarian Relations. A new Approach, ( 9 0 1993) , p. 113. 20 CVA, F. 1, Op. 3, File 42, p. 21, 61, 63. 21 DА, Op. 3-Sh, Files 129, 149, 151, 212; Op. 13, Files 360, 418; CDA, F. 1-B, Op. 5, File 270, p. 5-6, 51; Op. 6, File 3397, p. 62-64. 22 CDA, F. 1-B, Op. 24, File 239, p. 1-7. 23 Ibid., Op. 5, File 344, p. 1-21. 24 Ibid., p.161. 25 Ibid., File 353, p. 1-30. 26 Archive of the Ministry of the Interior [AMVR], Sofia, F. 1, Op. 10, File 62, p. 243-245. 27 Ibid., File 73, p. 29, 77-78. 28 Ibid., p. 7-9, 20, 22, 30, 51; DA, Op. 3-Sh, File 433, p. 222-224. 29 AMVR, F. 1, Op. 10, File 72, p. 126. 30 DA, Op. 3-Sh, File 433, p. 197, 263. 31 Vojensky Historicky Archiv [Military History Archive], Praha, MNO-1963, 65/65, sf. 17/1. 32 Ibid., File 80, p. 220-223. 33 Archivele Militare Romane, Bucuresti, Marele Stat Major, Directia Operatil, Fila 110-119, 17/04/65. 34 DA, Documentary Records, 1970,V/I/4. 35 RUMNO, Conclusions from the NATO Allied Military Forces’ exercises at the South-European war theater in the period 1960 – 1972, (Sofia: 1972). 36 RUMNO, Analysis of the operational-tactical and the combat training of the Turkish and Greek naval forces in the period January 1969 – May 1973, (Sofia: 1973). 37 CVA, F. 1027, Op. 12, File 101, p. 73-90. 38 AMVR, F. 1, Op. 10, File 258, p. 112-138. 39 Ibid., File 335, p. 12, 70-73. In his memoir Gen. V. A. Udilov, former deputy-head of a KGB’ Counterintelligence Department, confirms this information adding that during the operation against the Italian Embassy Bulgarian agents have uncovered some members of the Italian Intelligence network in Bulgaria and that among the gained ciphers are some code books in use in NATO. He also adds that another Secret Information on the discord between France and NATO in 1966 had been obtained from French Embassy in Sofia – Voennie znania, Moscow, 4, (1995), p. 18-19. 40 AMVR, F. 1, Op. 10, File 338, p. 55-56; File 343, p. 136-137. A Special Bulletin No. 79 of 14 February 1966 informs that inside the NATO structures has been created a Standing Group for coordination regarding NATO’s Near East policy. 41 AMVR, F. 1, Op. 10, File 535, p. 1, 26. 42 Ibid., Files 338, 356, 349, 538. 43 Ibid., File 447, л. 2-4. 44 Ibid., Files 749; 1532. 45 DА, Op. 5-Sh, File 106, p. 43; File 124, p.. 292-3, 382. 46 DА, Op. 21, File 2082, p. 4-5, 15-16. 47 The documents from the collection of the CC BCP “Foreign Relations” Department, 1967-1989, still are not proceeded. Working over the book “Military and Political Conflicts after WW II and Bulgaria” in the beginning of 90-s, I had a chance to explore partly this collection. Some data could be found in the book, published in 1995 in Sofia [p. 143-154.]. 48 CDA, F. 1B, Op. 6, File 6770, p. 13-29. 49 Ibid., Op. 64, File 382. 50 Ibid., Op. 6, File 6792. 51 Ibid., Op. 64, File 414. 52 NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, Box. 1549 [DEF-Greece]; 1581 [DEF-NATO]; 2157 [POL-Greece-USA]. 53 Washington Post, 27 July 2001.

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54 DA, Op. 23, File 242, p. 2-12. 55 Ibid., Op. 24, File 2491, p. 1-11. 56 AMVR, F. 1, Op. 10, File 72, p. 188-194; File 83, p. 28-42. 57 Voennie Znania, Moscow, 7, (1994), p. 8; Voennoistoricheskij Zhurnal, Moscow, 4, (1994), p. 36-42. 58 The Times, London, No. 59 406, 27 May 1975. 59 DА, Op. 21, File 1160; Op. 22, File 2053; Op. 23, File 1090; CDA, F. 1-B, Op. 51, File 651. 60 CDA, F. 1-B, Op. 34, File 69, p. 1-14. 61 CDA, F. 1-B, Op. 34, File 59, p. 1-13. 62 Ibid., Op. 64, File 367, p. 1-24. 63 CVA, F. 1027, Op. 13, File 7, p. 72. 64 Ibid., File 13, p. 62-65.