Download - Avicenna Daneshnameh Part 1: LOGIC
DĀNESHNĀMEH
Part I:
LOGIC
ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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D~~~~neshn~~~~meh part I: Logic
a
CONTENTS
[Preface:] Exposition of the purpose and utility in the science of logic
The Beginning of the Science of Logic
1. Elucidation of that which is called “Single” among Expressions and Concepts
2. Elucidation of Universal and Particular Expressions
3. Exposition of Essential and Accidental Universals
4. Exposition of Genus, Species, Difference, Property and Common Accident
5. Explication of the character of Definition and Description
6. Elucidation of the meaning of Noun, Verb and Particle
7. Explication of what a Proposition is
8. Explication of the types of Propositions
9. Explication of the Predicative Proposition: Affirmation, Negation, Universality,
Particularity and whatever pertains to it
10. Explication of the character of Connective and Disjunctive Conditional Propositions,
in the same manner as was done for Predicative Propositions
11. Explication of the character of Contradiction
12. Exposition of the character of Conversion
13. On Recognizing the Syllogism
14. Explication of the Connective Syllogism
15. Exposition of the Moods of the Syllogisms of the First Figure
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ÅÍËBħ Omjȯ
�دن ��ض ا��ر ��� ���� و ���� ا��روى] �����[���ز�
ز ��� ���� ��
(1) *��� آ�دن )�'� �$�د &�ا��� از ل$# � و �"�! �
(2) *��� آ�دن ل$. آ�- و ,+وى
�دن آ�- ذا0- و ��/-� (3) ��ز�
�دن ,�7 و ��ع و �45 و &��3 و ��ض ��م� (4) ��ز�
(5) *!�ا آ�دن �9ل �9 و ر�8
(6) *��� آ�دن �"�- ��م و آ�> و �9ف
� آ� چ� ��د*!�ا آ�دن ?<ّ! (7)
!ّ>? A�B? ا آ�دن�!*� (8)
AA و ,+وّ�� 9��- و ا��Eب و C�8 و آ�ّ!�دن ?<ّ!*!�ا آ (9)
�د � Fر ا�� و )�'� ا��ر&45 و ��$�45 ه�ى Gّ� -H�I*!�ا آ�دن �9ل ?<ّ! (10)
��( ه� �� )ن روى آ� در 9��- آ�دK!�� (11) *!�ا آ�دن �9ل
7L� دن �9ل�� (12) ��ز�
(13) در FG&��I ?!�س
(14) *!�ا آ�دن ?!�س ا?�Gا�-
�دن �9ل ?!�8 �ى 4LI اول� (15) ��ز�
D~~~~neshn~~~~meh part I: Logic
b
16. Syllogisms of the Second Figure
17. Syllogisms of the Third Figure
18. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Connective [Conditionals]
19. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Disjunctive [Conditionals]
20. Composite Syllogisms
21. Syllogism by reductio ad absurdum
22. Disclosure of the character of Induction
23. Disclosure of the character of Analogy
24. The Way of the Dialecticians in Proving the Absent from the Present
25. Explication of the Form and Matter of the Syllogism
26. Exposition of the types of Primitive Premises in Syllogisms
27. Explication of the Status of these Premises
28. Further Comment on the Account of Demonstration
29. The Types of Problems in the Demonstrative Sciences
30. Explanation of the term “Essential” as used in the Premises of Demonstrative
[Sciences]
31. The [various] types of Principles of Demonstration and that which is Predicate in
them
32. Exposition of the character of Demonstrative Syllogisms
33. Explication of the types of Scientific Questions
34. Directives giving Protection against Fallacies
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ى ��� دّو�� م (16)
ى ��� �ّ��� �م (17)
ى ا������ از ����ت �� (18)
ى ا������ از �����ت�� (19)
ى ��آ�� � (20)
�س ! � (21)
(22) ن)�دن &ل ا��$�اء
(23) ن)�دن &ل ��ل
(24) را2 1*ل�ن ان*ر دل�� .�دن .-ی� از �ه*
ت �س4�*ا آ�دن ص�رت �س و �ّد (25)
�� 7)�ى �$*�ت 4�6�5 ان*ر (26) .زن)�دن
(27) �$*�ت4�*ا آ�دن 1ی8هى ای5
�ح �� &*ی9 .�هن را� ��6�. (28)
(29) ا 7م �7�� ; )ى .�هن�
(30) آ@ ان*ر �$*�ت .�هن� ?�ی�*ذات�ت�7�� آ�دن ل�>
(31) ا 7م �Dدى .�هن و CنB@ ان*ر ای6ن �A)�ل .�د
ى .�هن��� (32) .زن)�دن &ل
7)�ى E� (33)ل� ; )�4�*ا آ�دن
(34) وص�� آ@ از �-لEت ای)�� ده�*
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh
1
Praise and glory upon the Lord, the Creator, the Bestower of reason
Blessings upon His elected messenger, Muhammad, the chosen,
and upon his household and companions
[Preface]
The great command of our lord – the just prince, the assisted [by God] and triumphant,
the pillar of religion – ‘Alâ’ al-Dawla – honor of the nation, crown of the people – Abû
Ja‘far Muhammad, son of Doshmanziâr, [2] my master, the Commander of the Faithful –
long be his life, prosperous his fortune, and may his kingdom increase – came to me, the
bondsman and servant of his court, who have attained in his service all my wishes –
security, grandeur, eminence, fulfillment, engagement in science and [residence in his]
proximity – that I, the servant of this grand court, must compose a book in the Persian
language in which I gather together, with utmost brevity, the principles and [main] points
of five sciences from the sciences of wisdom of the ancients:
(i) The science of Logic, which is the science of the balance.
[3] (ii) The science of Physics, which is the science of those things that can be seen
with the senses and which are in motion and change.
(iii) The science of Astronomy and the structure of the universe: the character
[and] form of the motion of the heavens and the stars, so that it becomes revealed
how the truth of this could be known.
(iv) The science of Music: explication of the cause of the consonance and
dissonance of sounds and the composition of melodies.
(v) The science of that which is outside of nature.
ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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Ai eja ‘fÄÍBrbI iBŒfÍj¯E fÃËAfa j¿ sÍBNm Ë pBƒm .ÔË ÆAiBÍ Ë OÎI ½ÇA jI Ë ,Ó°ñv¿ fÀZ¿ ÔË ‘fÍlŒ jJ¿B΂ jI eËie Ë
[É¿f´¿]
Ò»Ëf»A Õݧ ÅÍf»Afz§ ,iÌvÄ¿ ,f÷ÍÛ¿ ¾eB§ �¼¿ ,B¿ fÃËAfa –ilI ÆB¿j¯ É· ÅÎÄ¿ÛÀ»AjοA ӻ̿ /iBÍlÄÀqe ÅIfÀZ¿ j°¨U ÌIA ÉÀÖÜA XBM Ë Ò÷¼À»Ajb¯ Ë [2] Ë ÊfÄI ÅÀI f¿E ,ÆËl¯A jI sÎÇBqeB‚ Ë ,kËj΂ ObI Ë ,eBI kAie sÎÃBŒfÃk ÓÄÀÍA kA :sÍÌa ÔBÈ¿B· ÉÀÇ ÔË O¿fa ifÃA ÂAÉN¯BÍ É· ,ÔË ÊBŒie ÂeBa Å¿ É· fÍBI É· ;ÅNqAe �ÍelÃ Ë Á¼¨I ÅNaAej‚ Ë OÍB°· Ë Ê̸q Ë ÓŒilI Ë BȼuA ÔË ifÃA É· Ôie ÓmiBƒI ÁÄ· ±ÎÄvM ÓIBN· iAÌŒilI o¼V¿ ÆE ÂeBa .iBvNaA OÍB¬I ,ÂiËE ejŒ ÆBNÄÎr΂ OÀ¸Y ÔBÈÀ¼§ kA Á¼§ WÄ‚ ÔBÈN¸Ã Ë
/.OmËkAjM Á¼§ ÔË É· µñÄ¿ Á¼§ Ó¸Í
,ÆfÍe fÍBrI ÷oZI É· OmBÇlΆ ÆE Á¼§ É· PBΨÎJW Á¼§ Â÷Ëe Ë [3] .fÃAtejŒ Ë sJÄU ifÃA Ë
ÆBŒiBNm Ë BÈÃBÀmE sJÄU PiÌu ¾BY Ë Á»B§ eBÈÃË PDÎÇ Á¼§ Â÷Ìm Ë .ÅNnÃAe ÆE O´Î´Y OnÍBrI Æ̆ É· fÃAÊeÌÀÃkBI ɸÃBĆ
.BÈÄZ» ÆeBÈÃË BÇkAËE kBmBÃ Ë kBm KJm ÆeÌÀÃkBI Ë Ó´ÎmÌ¿ Á¼§ ÂiBȆ Ë
.OmA O¨ÎJW kA ÆËjÎI ɇÃE Á¼§ ÁVÄ‚ Ë
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh
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It was so resolved that upon completion of the science of logic, one contrive [4] to make
a beginning from the superior science, and [from there] proceed gradually to the inferior
sciences, contrary to the established custom and habit. If, therefore, at some point there
should be no alternative other than to refer to one of the inferior sciences, reference will
be made.
So although I – servant that I am – did not consider myself [to be] of the level of this
science, but regarded it as surpassing my capacity, [still] I deemed that if I should comply
with and obey the command of my benefactor, compliance would issue in a favorable
outcome. [Thus] I trusted in my Creator and applied myself to obeying the command.
ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
2
É· fÍE Êej· /ɼÎY ,µñÄ¿ Á¼§ kA fÍE ÉNaAej‚ Æ̆ É· eBN¯A iBÎNaA ÆBĆ Ë [4] ɸÃE ²ÝbI ,fÍE Êfq ÅÍjÍk ÔBÈÀ¼¨I WÍifNI Ë ,eÌq Êej· ÅÍjI Á¼§ kA kB«E ÔBÈÀ¼§ kA ÓÀ¼¨I O»AÌY kA eÌJà ÊiB† ÓÍBU jŒA o‚ .OmA PeB§ Ë Ámi
.fÍE Êej· O»AÌY ,ÅÍjÍk
Ai Á¼§ ÅÍA Ë ,ÁNnÃAfà Á¼§ ÅÍA ÊBNÍB‚ Ai ÅNrÍÌa É· fĆ jÇ ,ÂeBa Å¿ o‚ OÀ¨Ã Ó»Ë ÆB¿j¯ Ë O§BW Æ̆ É· ÂejI ÆBÀŒ ,ÂfÍe sÍÌa if³ kA ÆËl¯A iBŒfÍj¯E jI Âej· ½÷·ÌM Ë ;eiËE iBI µÎ¯ÌM O§BW ÓNNnVa jI ,ÂjI sÍÌa
/.Âfq ¾Ì¬r¿ ÔiAejI ÆB¿j°I Ë sÍÌa
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
3
Exposition of the Purpose and Utility in the Science of Logic
[5] Knowledge is of two kinds: one is conception (in Arabic called taşawwur), e.g. if
someone says “man” or “fairy” or “angel” (or whatever is similar to this), you
understand, conceive and grasp [what he means by this]. The second [kind] is assent, e.g.
when you assent that “fairy exists,” or that “man is under command” or whatever is
similar to this; and this in Arabic is called taşdīq.
Now, each of these two is of two kinds. [6] One [kind] is that which can be grasped by
thought; and there is no alternative [here], for it can [only] be elicited through inquiry by
way of reasoning; for example, conceiving and apprehending the whatness of soul, or for
example, assenting to and affirming the immortality of soul.
The other [kind] is that we conceive [something] and assent to it, neither by means of
thought nor by the inquiry of reason, but rather: (a) we know it by primary reason: e.g.
we know that any [number of] things [that are] equal to one thing (in that each one of
them is equal to it) are also equal to one another; [7] (b) or [we know it] by the senses:
e.g. we know that the sun is bright; (c) or we have received [our conceptions and
affirmations] from the great and the wise, such as from the author of religious laws and
the imāms; (d) or [our conceptions and affirmations] are a thing on which the agreement
of men rests and upon which our upbringing has been based: e.g. we say, “lying is
disgraceful,” or “one ought not to do injustice”; (e) or in another respect that will be
mentioned later.
Everything whose conception or affirmation must be elicited by thought, requires that
prior to it we know something else, so that by means of this we may know the unknown.
[8] An example of this in the case of conception is: if we do not know what man is, and
someone explains to us, saying, “man is an animal that speaks,” we would first need to
have known, and conceived of, the meaning of “animal” and the meaning of “speaks.”
We would then know what we did not know [in regard to] the meaning of “man.”
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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ÔË ifÃA ÊfÍB¯ Ë µñÄ¿ Á¼§ ifÃA ~j« ÆeÌÀà kBI [5] jŒA ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÃAÌa iÌvM ÔkBNI É· ÆfÎmi ifÃA Ó¸Í :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe ÅNnÃAe iÌvM Ë ÓÄ· Áȯ ÌM (fÃB¿ ÅÍfI Ɇ jÇ Ë) ÉNqj¯ BÍ Ôj‚ BÍ Âej¿ :fÍÌŒ Ón· É· ÔËjNI ɸÃBĆ ,ÆfÍËjŒ Â÷Ëe Ë [.fÇAÌa Ó¿ Ɇ ÅÍfI É·] ÓIBÍ ifÃA Ë ÓÄ· ÔkBNI Ai ÅÍA Ë ;fÃB¿ ÅÍfI Ɇ jÇ Ë ,#OnÃB¿j¯ jÍk Âej¿$Ë #OnÇ Ôj‚$
.fÄÍÌŒ µÍfvM
ÊiB† Ë ,ÅN¯BÍifÃA fÍBq ÉrÍfÃBI É· OnÃE Ó¸Í /.fÃA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe Ëe jÇ ÅÍA Ë [6] ÔlΆ ɇI ÆfÎmi ifÃA ɸÃBĆ ,ÆeiËE ÔBVI fÍBq eja ÊAi kA K¼ñI Ai ËA É· ,eÌJà .ÔÌI Æej· µÍfvM Ë ,ÆAËi Æej¿BÄI ÆfÍËjŒ ɸÃBĆ Ë ;ÔË Æej· iÌvM Ë ,ÆAËi
K¼ñI ÉÃ Ë ÉrÍfÃA OÈU kA Éà ,ÁÍËjNI ÔÌI Ë ,ÁÎIBÍifÃA Ai ËA É· OnÃE jNÍe Ë É·) lΆ �Í BI fÄqBI jIAjI Ɇ jÇ É· ÁÎÃAe ɸÃBĆ ,ÁÎÃAe eja ¾÷ËBI :ɸ¼I ,eja É· ÁÎÃAe ɸÃBĆ ,÷oZI BÍ /.fÃÌI jIAjI lÎà jNÍe BI �Í (fÃÌI ÔË fĆ �Í jÇ [7] KYBu kA ɸÃBĆ ÆBÍBÃAe Ë ÆBŒilI kA ÁÎqBI ÉN¯jÍh‚ BÍ .OmA ÅqËi LBN¯E
ÔË jI B¿ tiËj‚ Ë ,eÌI ÔË jI Âej¿ ¶B°MA É· fqBI ÔlΆ BÍ .ÆB¿B¿A Ë ÆBN¨Íjq ÔËjI BÍ .#Æej· fÍBJà ÁNm$ Ë #OmA Oqk ®Ëie$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,fqBI ÊeÌI
.fÍE Êej· eBÍ jNnƒm É· BÈÍËi kA jNÍe
fÍBI ÔË kA s΂ ,ÆeiËE fÍBI ÔBVI ÉrÍfÃBI ÔÌI µÍfvM BÍ ÔË iÌvM Ɇ jÇ Ë /.ÁÎÃAfI ÔÌI Ai ÉNnÃAeBà BM ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAe jNÍe ÔlΆ É·
Ë eÌI Ɇ Âej¿ É· fqBJà ÉNnÃAe Ai B¿ jŒA :ɸÃE - iÌvM LBI ie ÅÍA ¾BR¿ [8] Onbà B¿ É· fÍBI ,#BÍÌŒ eÌI ÔiÌÃBU Âej¿$ É· fÍÌŒ Ë ,fÍBÀà kBI Ai B¿ Ón·
o‚ ;ÆBrÍBI ÁÎqBI ÊfÎmi ifÃA Ë BÍÌŒ ÓĨ¿ Ë ,iÌÃBU ÓĨ¿ ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAe .ÁÎÃAfI Âej¿ ÓĨ¿ kA ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAfà ɇÃE ÊBNÃE
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
4
An example of this in the case of affirmation and assent is: if we do not know that the
world is created, and someone explains to us, saying, “the world is [endowed] with form,
and whatever is [endowed] with form is created,” we would need to have affirmed and
known [beforehand] that the world is [endowed] with form, as well as affirmed and
known [9] that whatever is [endowed] with form is created. We would then know what
we did not know [before] about the createdness of the world.
Hence anything that we do not know but wish to know, we will know by the things that
we have first known; [i.e.] whatever is unknown [to us] comes to be known by the
known. However, not every known leads the way to every unknown, since for every
unknown there exists an appropriate known, through which [that unknown] may be
known. [Moreover,] there exists a path by which it is possible to proceed from the
known to the unknown, so that [the unknown] comes to be known.
Now, the science of logic is the science in which it becomes evident what the modes are
of the coming-to-be-known of the unknown through the known, viz., which are the true
[modes]; which are the ones close to the truth; which are false; and of how many [10]
kinds each are.
The science of logic is the science of the balance, while the other sciences are the
sciences of profit and loss. The salvation of man is through the purity of soul, and the
purity of soul consists in the conception of the beings within it and in keeping distant
from the defilement of nature. The way to both of these is through science. But any
science that is not weighed in the balance [of logic] is not certain, hence is not truly a
science. Consequently, there is no alternative but to learn the science of logic.
Now, these sciences of the ancients have the character that the one who studies them does
not at first know what utility there is in that which he is studying; then, at the end, he
realizes all at once and grasps its utility and purpose. Therefore, the reader of this book
must not lose heart on hearing things that do not disclose their utility quickly.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
4
É· fqBJà ÉNnÃAe Ai B¿ jŒA :ɸÃE - µÍfvM Ë ÆfÍËjŒ LBI ie ÅÍA ¾BR¿ Ë Ë ,Omi÷Ìv¿ Á»B§$ É· fÍÌŒ Ë fÍBÀà kBI Ai B¿ Ón· Ë ,OmA TfZ¿ Á»B§ É· ÉNnÃAe Ë ÁÎqBI ÊfÍËjŒ B¿ É· fÍBI .#eÌI TfZ¿ eÌI i÷Ìv¿ Ɇ jÇ
TfZ¿ eÌI i÷Ìv¿ Ɇ jÇ É· /ÉNnÃAe Ë ÁÎqBI ÊfÍËjŒ lÎÃ Ë .Omi÷Ìv¿ Á»B§ [9] .ÁÎÃAfI Á»B§ ÓQfZ¿ ¾BY kA ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAfà ɇÃE ÊBNÃE o‚ .eÌI
ÉNnÃAe Ai ÆBrÍA ¾÷ËA É· ÁÎÃAe BÇl·I ,ÁÎÃAfI É· ÁÎÇAÌa Ë ÁÎÃAfà Ɇ jÇ o‚
ejI ÊAi ÉNnÃAe jÇ ÉÃ Å¸Î»Ë .eÌq ÉNnÃAe ÉNnÃAfI ,eÌI ÉNnÃAeBà Ɇ jÇË .ÁÎqBI AiËA fÍBq ÔË kA É· ,ÔË iÌaifÃA OnÇ ÉNnÃAe Ai ÉNnÃAeBà jÇ É· ;ÉNnÃAeBà jÈI .eÌq ÉNnÃAe BM ÉNnÃAeBÄI ÉNnÃAe kA Æfq fÍBq ÊAi ÆAfI É· OnÎÇAi Ë ÅNnÃAe
ÉNnÃAeBà Æfq ÉNnÃAe ¾BY eÌq fÍf‚ ÔË ifÃA É· OmA Á¼§ ÆE µñÄ¿ Á¼§ Ë ,eÌI O´Î´ZI �Íelà ɷ eÌI ÂAf· Ë ,eÌI O´Î´ZI É· eÌI ÂAf· É· ,ÉNnÃAfI
.eÌI ÉÃÌŒ /fĆ Ó¸Í jÇ Ë ,eÌI ¡¼« É· eÌI ÂAf· Ë [10]
ÔiBNNmi Ë .OmA ÆBÍk Ë eÌm Á¼§ jNÍe ÔBÈÀ¼§ Ë ,OmËkAjM Á¼§ µñÄ¿ Á¼§ Ë iËfI Ë ,ÔË ifÃA OmBÈÎNnÇ ÅNnI PiÌvI ÆBU Ó·B‚ Ë ,OmA ÆBU Ó·BƒI Âej¿ ËkAjNI É· ÓrÃAe jÇ Ë ,OmA sÃAfI Ëe jÇ ÅÍfI ÊAi Ë ,O¨ÎJW sÍÜE kA ÆeÌI ÅNaÌ¿E kA OnÎà ÊiB† o‚ .eÌJà sÃAe O´Î´ZI o‚ ,eÌJà ÅÎ´Í ,eÌJà ÉNbm
.µñÄ¿ Á¼§
É· fÃAfà iB· ¾÷ËBI ÔË ‘fÃkÌ¿E É· OnÃE OÎuBa AjÃBNÄÎr΂ ÔBÈÀ¼§ ÅÍA Ë ÆE ‘fÍB°I Ë ,fÃAfI iBJ¸ÎI jaFI o‚ ,ekÌ¿E ÓÀÇ É‡ÃE ifÃA OnΆ ÊfÍB¯ eÌrà •ÄM ¾e Ai LBN· ÅÍA ‘fÄÃAÌa É· fÍBI o‚ .ÔË ~j¬I Ë fmi ifÃA
.fÍBÀÄà Ai ÊfÍB¯ eËk É· ÓÍBÇlΆ ÆfÎÄrI
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
5
THE BEGINNING OF THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC
1. Elucidation of that which is called “Single” among Expressions and Concepts
[11] [Knowing single and composite expressions:] It must be known that expressions are
of two kinds: One is called single [i.e. when none of the parts of the expression signify
any part of the meaning], such as when you say “Zaid” or “Muhammad,” or as when you
say “man” or “wise.” The other is called composite or compound [i.e. when some of the
parts of the expression signify some part of the meaning], such as when you say “man is
wise,” or “the wise man.” As long as the character of single expressions is not known,
the character of composite expressions will not be known.
2. Elucidation of Universal and Particular Expressions
Every single expression is either universal or particular. [12] A universal [expression] is
one that can apply with the same meaning to many things equally: e.g. “man,” for man
applies with the same meaning to Zaid, ‘Amr and Bakr. If it happens that [a universal
expression] has been applied to one thing, you can imagine applying it to many things,
for from that meaning you can, by the imagination, think of many things; for instance,
you can think of many suns and many moons. A particular [expression] is one that
cannot apply with the same meaning to other than a single thing, and you cannot apply
that same meaning of it to anything else: e.g. [13] “Zaid,” for the meaning of Zaid
belongs to none other than Zaid. Hence if you call another thing Zaid, you do so with
another meaning and not with the same meaning.
Now, the devotees of science are not concerned with the character of particular
expressions or particular concepts; their concern is rather with universal concepts,
[though] there is no doubt that every universal has [a number of] particulars [subsumed]
under it.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
5
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ kB«E [11] BÈÎĨ¿ Ë BȤ°» kA fÄÃAÌa ej°¿ ɇÃE Æej· fÍf‚ (1) .eÌI ÉÃÌŒ Ëe ¥°» É· fÍE ÉNnÃAe É· fÍBI .K·j¿ Ë ej°¿ ¥°» ÅNnÃAe
ÓĨ¿ ÕAlUA kA Óz¨I jI ¥°» ÕAlUA kA Óz¨I É· OnÃE ÆEË]fÄÃAÌa ej°¿ Ai Ó¸Í .#BÃAe$Ë #Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ Ë #fÀZ¿$ Ë #fÍk$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ [fĸà O»Üe kA Óz¨I jI ¥°» ÕAlUA kA Óz¨I É· OnÃE ÆEË] fÄÃAÌa ±÷»Û¿ Ë K÷·j¿ Ai Ó¸Í Ë .#BÃAe Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ BÍ #OmBÃAe Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ [fÄ· O»Üe ÓĨ¿ ÕAlUA
.fÍBÎà ÉNnÃAe K÷·j¿ ÔBȤ°» ¾BY ,fÍBÎà ÉNnÃAe ej°¿ ÔBȤ°» ¾BY BM Ë
ÔËlU Ë Ó÷¼· ¥°» Æej· fÍf‚ (2) ÔBÇlΆ jI ÓĨ¿ �ÎI É· eÌI ÆE Ó÷¼· Ë /.ÔËlU BÍ ,eÌI Ó÷¼· BÍ ej°¿ Ó¤°» jÇ [12] fÍk jI ÓĨ¿ �ÎI Âej¿ É· ,#Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,jIAjI fN¯A É· fÍBq iBÎnI Á÷ÇÌM ÌM ,eÌI ÊeBN¯A lΆ �Í jI É· eÌI ÆBĆ jŒA Ë .j¸I jI Ë ËjÀ§jI Ë ,fN¯A ÓĨ¿ ÆE kA ÓÃAÌM ÁÇÌI É· ,Óĸ¯A iBÎnI ÔBÇlΆ jI Ai ËA É· Æej· ÓÃAÌM Ë ,iBÎnI ÔBÈIBN¯E ÆfÎrÍfÃA ÓÃAÌM ɸÃBĆ .ÆfÎrÍfÃA iBÎnI ÔBÇlΆ
,eÌI Ai l·¸Í lU É· fÍBrà ÓĨ¿ �ÎI É· eÌI ÆE ÔËlU Ë .iBÎnI ÔBÈIBNÇB¿ É· ,#fÍk$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ Æfĸ¯A jNÍe ÔlΆjI AiË ÓĨ¿ ÆBÀÇ ÓÃAÌNÃ Ë jNÍe ÓĨÀI ,ÓÃAÌa fÍk Ai jNÍe ÔlΆ jŒA o‚ .eÌJà Ai fÍk lU fÍk ÓĨ¿
.ÓĨ¿ ÆBÀÈI Éà ,ÓÃAÌa
ɸ¼I ,ÔËlU ÔBÈÎĨ¿ Ë ÔËlU ¦B°»A ¾BZI OnÎà ӻ̬r¿ Ai Á¼§ ½ÇA Ë BÈÍËlU Ai Ó÷¼· jÇ É· OnÎà �q Ë .OmA Ó÷¼· ÔBÈÎĨÀI ÆBrÍA ½¬q
.eÌI jÍk ifÃA
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
6
3. Exposition of Essential and Accidental Universals
The universal, in relation to its particulars, is either essential or accidental. The essential
[universal] is that which, when you know its meaning and the meaning of its particular,
you of necessity know [the following] three factors: (i)You know that [the given]
particular has the meaning [conveyed by the universal]. For instance, when you know
what animal is, what man is, what number is, and what four is, you cannot fail to know
that man is animal, and likewise you cannot fail to know that four [14] is number.
However, if instead of animal and number you put existent or white, it is possible for you
not to know whether man exists, or four exists, or whether man is white or not. (ii) You
know that first the essential concept (meaning) must exist, in order that it [can then apply
to] a particular thing. For instance, a thing must first be animal, in order that it [can] then
be man; and it must first be number, in order that it [can] then be four; and it must first be
man, in order that it [can] then be Zaid. [15] (iii) You know that nothing has given that
concept (meaning) to the particular, rather, it has it through itself. For instance, you
rightly know that nothing has made man animal, or made four number; otherwise, if that
thing did not exist, there could be a man that is non-animal, and similarly there could be a
four that is non-number, and this is impossible.
The meaning of our saying, “something made something [else] such-and-such,” is that
the thing was not in itself that way, but that something from the outside rendered it thus.
Now, if a thing cannot be other than the way [it is], then another thing has not made it
such. Indeed, that thing which made man, made [therewith] animal; but it did not make
man [16] animal, for man is himself animal, four is itself number, and blackness is itself
color. And this is not in the way whiteness is for man, for there is something that makes
man white [both] within his nature and outside of his nature. Nor is it in the way
existence is for man, for there must be something which gives man existence.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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Óyj§ Ë ÓMAg Ó÷¼· ÆeÌÀà kBI (3) Æ̆ É· eÌI ÆE ÓMAg Ë .Óyj§ BÍ eÌI ÓMAg BÍ Ai sÍÌa ÔBÈÍËlU j¿ Ó÷¼·
:ÉÄÍEjÇ ÓÃAfI ¾BY Ém ,ÓÃAfI ÔË ÔËlU ÓĨ¿ Ë ,ÓÃAfI ÔË ÓĨ¿ É· ÓÃAfI Æ̆ ɸÃBĆ ,OnÇ ÓĨ¿ ÆE Ai ÔËlU ÆE É· ÓÃAfI ɸÃE Ó¸Í
É· ÓÃAÌNà ,eÌI Ɇ iBȆ Ë ,eÌI Ɇ iBÀq Ë ,eÌI Ɇ Âej¿ Ë ,eÌI Ɇ ÆAÌÎY .OmiBÀq /iBȆ É· ÓÃAfà ɷ ÓÃAÌNà ÆBćÀÇ Ë ,OnÃAÌÎY Âej¿ É· ÓÃAfà [14] É· Æej· ÓÃAÌM ,ÓÈà f΃m BÍ ,ÓÈà eÌUÌ¿ iBÀq Ë ÆAÌÎY ¾fI jŒA ŸλË
.OnÎà BÍ Omf΃m Âej¿ BÍ ,OnÇ iBȆ BÍ ,OnÇ Âej¿ É· ÓÃAfà ÓĨ¿ ÆE BM eÌI É· fÍBI OmA ÓMAg É· ÓĨ¿ ÆE Onbà ɷ ÓÃAfI ɸÃE jBÍe Ë Âej¿ ËA ÊBNÃE BM eÌI ÆAÌÎY lΆ Onbà ɷ fÍBI ɸÃBĆ .eÌI Ai ÔËlU lΆ ÆE BM eÌI Âej¿ É· fÍBI Ë ,eÌI iBȆ ËA ÊBNÃE BM eÌI iBÀq Onbà ɷ fÍBI Ë ,eÌI ÊeAfà ÓĨ¿ ÆE Ai ÔËlU ÆE lΆ ˆÎÇ É· ÓÃAfI ɸÃE ÂÌm Ë / .eÌI fÍk ËA ÊBNÃE [15] Ai Âej¿ lΆ ˆÎÇ É· ÓÃAfI OmifI ɸÃBĆ .eÌI eÌa kA ÆE Ai ËA ɸ¼I ,eÌI
ÆAÌÎYBà ÔeÌI Âej¿ ,ÔeÌJà lΆ ÆE jŒA ÷ÜAË ,ej¸Ã iBÀq Ai iBȆ Ë ,ej¸Ã ÆAÌÎY .eÌI ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA Ë ,iBÀqBà ÔeÌI iBȆ ÆBćÀÇ Ë
ÔeÌbI lΆ ÆE É· eÌI ÆE ,#ej· ÅÎĆ Ai ÔlΆ ÔlΆ$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ ÓĨ¿ Ë ÔlΆ É· fÍBrà jŒAË ,ej· ÅÎĆ ÔlΆ Ai ËA ÆËjÎI kA Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌJà ÅÎĆ eÌa Ai Âej¿ É· lΆ ÆE ÔiE .eÌI Êej¸Ã ÅÎĆ Ai ËA ÔlΆ o‚ ,eÌI ÅÎĆ lU eÌa
eÌa Âej¿ É· ,ej¸Ã ÆAÌÎY / Ai Âej¿ Å¸Î»Ë ;ej¸I Ai ÆAÌÎY ,ej¸I [16] ÆBĆ Éà ÅÍA Ë .OmA ÉÃÌŒ eÌa ÓÇBÎm Ë OmiBÀq eÌa iBȆ Ë OnÃAÌÎY ÔË ©JW ifÃA fÄ· f΃m Ai Âej¿ É· eÌI ÔlΆ É· ,Ai Âej¿ Ôf΃m É· OmA fÍBI ÔlΆ É· ,Ai Âej¿ j¿ ÓNnÇ É· OnÃBĆ ÉÃ Ë ;ÔË ©JW kA ÆËjÎI Ë
.fÇe ÓNnÇ Ai Âej¿ É·
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
7
Hence every concept that embraces these three conditions is an essential concept, and
anything that lacks any one of these conditions is accidental. [Yet] there is an accidental
[characteristic] which can never be separated from the thing, not even by the imagination:
for instance, evenness [cannot be separated] from thousand; or from triangle [one cannot
separate] its three angles being equal to [17] two right angles (the explanation of which
will be made known later). Or for instance, [one cannot separate] from man [the ability
to] laugh by nature. However, these are characteristics which are subsequent to the
reality of the thing; and of this, too, we must speak in more detail.
Man possesses two characteristics that are analogous: one essential, the other accidental.
As for the essential [characteristic], it is [having the faculty of] speech/reason, and its
explanation is that man has a soul [capable of] speech – that soul from which comes
speaking, discernment and the characteristics belonging to man. The other, the accidental
[characteristic], is [his being capable of] “laughter,” and its explanation is that man’s
nature is such that when he sees or hears something perplexing [and] strange, he becomes
perplexed, [18] and if there be no hindrance from either [his] nature or disposition, he
may laugh. [However,] prior to these two characteristics, it is necessary that the soul first
exist, in order that man exist. So when this soul becomes coupled with body, and man
becomes man, then do laughing and wonderment come about. Thus the later
characteristic [only] comes about when man has become man; accordingly, you can say
that man must first possess a human soul in order to become human, and in order that he
may be [capable of] laughing by nature. But you cannot say that he must first be [capable
of] laughing by nature, in order that he [then] have a human soul and become human.
Consequently, the former characteristic is in reality essential, and the second
characteristic, even though it is never separated from man, is not essential but is
accidental.
But as for your saying “Zaid is sitting,” or “is sleeping,” or “is old,” or “is young” – there
is no doubt that these are accidental, although one changes more quickly and another
remains longer. [19]
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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BÈÀ¸Y ÅÍkA Ɇ jÇ Ë .eÌI ÓMAg ÔË ,eÌI AiË Á¸Y Ém ÅÍA É· ÓÎĨ¿ jÇ o‚ elÎajI lŒjÇ É· fÍBrà ɷ eÌI Óyj§ Ë .eÌI Óyj§ ÔË ,eÌJà AiË Á¸Y �Í Ém ÆeÌI ,S¼R¿ kA ɸÃBĆ Ë ÓN°U ,iAlÇ kA ɸÃBĆ ,ÁÇÌI lÎà ÉÃ Ë ,lΆ kA kA ɸÃBĆ Ë ,eÌq ÉNnÃAe ÅÍA jÎn°M jNnƒm É· ÉÀÖB³ Ëe / fćÀÇ ËA �ÍËAk [17] .fÃÌI lΆ O´Î´Y oƒm É· fÃA ÓÖBÈN°u ÆBrÍA Å¸Î»Ë ,©JñI Ó·BÃfÄa ,Âej¿
.ÁÎÍÌNI jNYjrI lÎÃ Ai ÅÍA É· fÍBI Ë
.Óyj§ Â÷Ëe Ë ÓMAg Ó¸Í :�Íelà jNÍfI Ó¸Í ,OmA O°u Ëe Ai Âej¿ j¿ ,eÌI BÍÌŒ Åbm ÆBU AiË É· eÌI ÆE ÔË jÎn°M Ë ,#µWBÃ$ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓMAg B÷¿A ,Óyj§ jNÍe Ë .fÍE ËA kA Ó¿ej¿ ÔBÈ÷uBa Ë lÎÀM Ë ÅN°Œ Åbm É· ÆBU ÆE ÔlΆ Æ̆ É· OnÃBĆ ÔË ©JW ifÃA É· OnÃE ÔË jÎn°MË ,#�YBy$ ɸÃBĆ ©JW kA eÌJà ÊfÃiAekBI jŒA Ë /.fÍE O°Nq AiË ,eÌÄq BÍ fÄÎI KÍj« Ë O°Nq [18]
eÌJI ÆBU É· fÍBI O°u Ëe ÅÍA kA jNr΂ Ë ;efÄbI É· fÍBq ,ÔÌa kA BÍ ,eÌq Âej¿ Âej¿ Ë ,eÌq O°U ÅM BI ÆBU ÅÍA Æ̆ o‚ .eÌJI Âej¿ BM ,Onbà Âej¿ É· fÍE ÓÀÇ ÊBNÃE ±uË ÅÎnƒm o‚ .fÍE ÔiAe O°Nq Ë Ó·BÃfÄa ÊBNÃE Ó¿ej¿ ÆBU Ai Âej¿ É· fÍBI Onbà ɷ ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM Ai ½J³ ÅÍA kAË ,eÌq Âej¿ É· fÍBI Onbà ɷ ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌNÃ Ë .©JñI fqBI ÆAfÄa BM Ë ,eÌq Âej¿ BM eÌI ÅÎr΂ ±uË o‚ .eÌq Âej¿ Ë fqBI Ó¿ej¿ ÆBU Ai ËA BM ©JñI fqBI ÆAfÄa ÓMAg elÎbÃjI Âej¿ kA lŒjÇ É· fĆ jÇ Â÷Ëe ±uË Ë O´Î´ZI OmA ÓMAg
.OmA Óyj§ É· ,OnÎÃ
BÍ ,#Omj΂$ BÍ ,#OmA ÉN°a$ BÍ ,#OmA ÉNnrà fÍk$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃE B÷¿AË Ë eejŒjI jMeËk Ó¸Í É· fĆ jÇ ,OmA Óyj§ É· OnÎà �q ,#OnÃAÌU$
.fÃBÀI jMjÍe Ó¸Í
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
8
4. Exposition of Genus, Species, Difference, Property and Common Accident
There are altogether five [kinds of] universal terms: three essential, two accidental. The
essential is of two kinds:
(a) The first is that when you ask in regard to [some] things, “what are they?,”
seeking [to learn] by that question the reality of their meaning, answer is given to that by
an essential term. For instance, if you ask “what are man, ox and horse?,” it will be
answered, “they are animals”; and if you ask “what are blackness, whiteness and
redness?,” it will be answered, “they are colors”; and if you ask “what are ten, five and
three?,” it will be answered, “they are numbers.” Similarly, if it is asked “what are Zaid,
‘Amr and Kh~led?,” it will be answered, “they are men.” [20] Hence “animal,” “color,”
“number,” and “man” fall within the answer [to the question] of the whatness of these
things; in Arabic this is called the answer to m~ huwa? [“What is?”]
(b) The other [kind of essential universal term] is that given as answer when you
ask about the which-ness of each [thing] in itself; e.g. [if] you ask “which animal is
man?,” it will be replied, “the rational [animal].” Thus “rational” is the answer to [the
question] “which is?” regarding man; in Arabic it is said in answer to [the question] ’ayyu
shay’in? [“Which thing is it?”]. Or for instance, [if] it is asked, “four is which number?,”
it will be replied “that [number] which on being halved twice arrives at one.”
[21] Everything which is an essential universal, and is the response to [the question]
“Which thing is it?,” is called difference (faÕl). As for that essential universal which is in
response to [the question] “What is?” (m~ huwa?), it is more general and more particular
[than the former]. For instance, body is more general than animal, but more particular
than substance; animal is more general than man, but more particular than body;
similarly, number is more particular than quantity, but more general than even (for
example); even is more particular than number, but more general than four; and four is
more particular than even, but more general than this four or that four. Hence everything
that is a more general universal is the genus of a more particular [universal], and
everything that is a more particular universal is the species of a more general [universal].
There may be a thing that is both genus and species; [22] and there may be a thing that is
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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ÂB§ ~j§ Ë ÉuBa Ë ½v¯ Ë ªÌÃ Ë oÄU ÆeÌÀÃkBI (4) [19] :fqBI ÉÃÌŒ Ëe ÓMAg Ë .Óyj§ Ëe Ë ÓMAg Ém :fÃA WÄ‚ ÉÀÇ Ó÷¼· ¦B°»A
smj‚ ÆAfI É· #?fÃA Ɇ$ É· BÇlΆ kA ÓmjƒI Æ̆ É· eÌI ÆE Ó¸Í ,Onbà ÓmjƒI Æ̆ ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÇe ÓMAg ¥°» ÆAfI LAÌU ,ÓÇAÌa ÆBrÍA ÓĨ¿ O´Î´Y
Æ̆ Ë .#fÃA ÆAÌÎY$ É· fÄÇe LAÌU #?fÃA Ɇ KmA Ë ËBŒ Ë Âej¿$ É· .#fÃA ÉÃÌŒ$ É· fÄÇe LAÌU #?fÃA Ɇ Óajm Ë Ôf΃m Ë ÓÇBÎm$ É· ÓmjƒI .#fÃiBÀq$ É· fÄÇe LAÌU #?fÃÌI Ɇ Ém Ë WÄ‚ Ë Êe$ É· ÓmjƒI Æ̆ Ë fÄÇe LAÌU #?fÃÌI Ɇ f»Ba Ë ËjÀ§ Ë fÍk$ É· fÄmjƒI Æ̆ ÅÎćÀÇ Ë
LAÌU ifÃA #Âej¿$ Ë #iBÀq$ Ë #ÉÃÌŒ$ Ë #ÆAÌÎY$ o‚ / .#fÃA Âej¿$ É· [20] .fÄÃAÌa #?ÌÇ B¿$ LAÌU Ai ÅÍA ÔkBNI Ë .fN¯A BÇlΆ ÅÍA ÔlΆ Ɇ
;eÌI ÆE LAÌU ,sÍeÌa ifÃA ÓmjƒI Ó¸Í jÇ Ó¿Af· kA Æ̆ É· eÌI ÆE Ó¸Í Ë #µWBÃ$ o‚ .#µWBÃ$ É· fÄÍÌŒ #?OmA ÆAÌÎY ÂAf· Âej¿$ É· ÓmjƒI ɸÃBĆ
ɸÃBÄ†Ë .fÄÍÌŒ #?ÕÏq ÷ÐA$ LAÌU ÔkBNI Ë eÌI Âej¿ Ó¿Af· LAÌU /.fmi Ó¸ÎI Æej· ÉÀÎà iBIËfI ɸÃE fÄÍÌŒ #?OmiBÀq ÂAf· iBȆ$ É· fÄmjƒI
ÆE B÷¿AË .fÄÃAÌa ½v¯ AjÃE ,eÌI #?ÕÏq ÷ÐA$ LAÌU Ë eÌI ÓMAg Ó÷¼· Ɇ jÇ Ë [21] :ɸÃBĆ ,jN÷uBa Ë eÌI jN÷¿B§ ÔË kA ,eÌI #?ÌÇ B¿$ LAÌU ifÃA É· ÓMAg Ó÷¼· OmA jN÷¿B§ É· ÆAÌÎY Ë ;jÇÌŒ kA OmA jN÷uBa Ë ,ÆAÌÎY kA OmjN÷¿B§ ÁnU Ë ÔfĆ kA OmA jN÷uBa iBÀq ÅÎćÀÇ Ë ,ÁnU kA OmA jN÷uBa Ë Âej¿ kA
.iBȆ kA OmA jN÷¿B§ Ë iBÀq kA OmA jN÷uBa O°U Ë ;õÝR¿ O°U kA OmA jN÷¿B§ Ɇ jÇ o‚ .iBȆ ÆE Ë iBȆ ÅÍkA OmA jN÷¿B§ Ë O°U kA OmA jN÷uBa iBȆ Ë .eÌI jN÷¿B§ ªÌà ,eÌI jN÷uBa Ó÷¼· Ɇ jÇ Ë ,eÌI jN÷uBa oÄU ,eÌI jN÷¿B§ Ó÷¼·
;oI Ë eÌI oÄU É· eÌI ÔlΆ Ë /.ªÌà ÁÇ Ë eÌI oÄU ÁÇ É· eÌI ÔlΆ Ë [22]
É· eÌI ÔlΆ Ë .ÔfĆ Ë jÇÌŒ :BÈ»BR¿ ÅÍA ifÃA ɸÃBĆ ,eÌJà ªÌà ÔlΆ jÍk Ë
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
9
genus only, and is not a species below any [other] thing: e.g., in the [above] examples,
substance and quantity. Or there may be a thing that is species only, and that is not the
genus of any species because there is no essential universal below it in answer to [the
question] “what is?” (m~ huwa?); rather, below it are only particulars, such as man, four,
blackness – for blackness does not differ from blackness by nature, as does color from
color: for color differs from color as does blackness from whiteness and is opposed to it
with an essential difference. Blackness, however, does not differ from blackness
substantially or [by essential] difference, but [23] by extrinsic factors: e.g. one is the
blackness of the raven, another the blackness of ink: raven and ink are things extrinsic to
the nature of blackness. The existence of blackness in the raven is not an essential state
for blackness, even though it cannot now be separated from the raven; however, in
imagination it could be that this same exact blackness did not exist in the raven but in
some other thing.
In sum, particulars subsumed under [the same] species differ from one another by
something accidental; e.g. Zaid differs from ‘Amr in that Zaid is, for example, taller,
whiter, older, the son of someone else, [24] and from another town – and these are all
accidental characteristics.
It has thus become clear what the character is of the species that does not become genus;
and this is called the Species of species, i.e. the species of all the species that are below it.
Hence it is evident that the essential universal is either genus, or species or difference.
As for the accidental universal, either it belongs to a single universal alone (just as
laughter belongs to man), and this is called property; or it belongs to more than one
universal (just as movement belongs both to man and to another thing, or blackness
belongs both to the raven and to another thing); [25] and this is called common accident.
Consequently, every universal term is either genus (e.g. animal), or species (e.g. man in
relation to animal), or difference (e.g. rational), or property (e.g. laughing), or common
accident (e.g. mover, white, black).
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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LAÌU ifÃA ÓMAg Ó÷¼· ÔË jÍk É· AjÍk ,eÌJà ªÌà ˆÎÇ oÄU Ë ;oI Ë eÌI ªÌà ɸÃBĆ Ë Âej¿ ɸÃBĆ ,oI Ë fÃÌI PB÷ÍËlU ÔË jÍk ɸ¼I ,eÌJà #?ÌÇ B¿$
É· ©JñI eiAfà ÓÍAfU ÆE jNÍe ÓÇBÎm kA ÓÇBÎm É· ,ÓÇBÎm ɸÃBĆ Ë iBȆ Ë ,Ôf΃m kA ÓÇBÎm É· eiAe ÓÍAfU ÆE ÉÃÌŒ kA ÉÃÌŒ É· AjÍk ,ÉÃÌŒ kA ÉÃÌŒ
,½v¯ Ë jÇÌNI eiAfà ÓÍAfU ÓÇBÎm kA ÓÇBÎm B÷¿AË .eiAe O°»Bb¿ ÓMAg ½v°I Ë .eAf¿ ÓÇBÎm Ó¸Í Ë eÌI ®Ak ÓÇBÎm Ó¸Í É¸ÃBĆ ,ÓÃËjÎI ÔBÈ»BZI /Å¸Î»Ë [23] OnλBY ®Ak ifÃA ÓÇBÎm ÆeÌI Ë ,ÓÇBÎm ©JW kA ÆËjÎI fÃA BÇlΆ eAf¿ Ë ®Ak ÁÇÌI Å¸Î»Ë . ®Ak kA Æfq fÃAÌNà AfU ÆÌÄ·A É· fĆ jÇ ,ÓMAg Éà ,Ai ÓÇBÎm j¿ .ÔeÌI jNÍe ÔlΆ ifÃA É· ,ÔeÌJà ®Ak ifÃA ÉÄΨI ÓÇBÎm ÅÎÀÇ É· ÓNnÍBq
,fÃiAe Óyj§ Ôl·I ÓÍAfU jNÍe kA �Í ,fÃÌI ªÌà �Í jÍk É· BÈÍËlU ɼÀVI Ë jMj΂ Ë ,õÝR¿ eÌI jMf΃m Ë jMkAie fÍk É· eiAe ÆAfI ÓÍAfU ËjÀ§ kA fÍk ɸÃBĆ .fÃA Óyj§ ÔBÈ°uË ÉÀÇ ÅÍA Ë .jNÍe ÔjÈq kA Ë /eÌI jNÍe Ón· jn‚ Ë [24]
,fÄÃAÌa ªAÌÃA ªÌà Ai ÅÍA Ë eÌrà oÄU É· Ó§Ìà eÌI ÉÃÌN† É· fq Af΂ o‚ eÌI oÄU BÍ ÓMAg Ó÷¼· É· f¿E fÍf‚ o‚ .fÃA ÔË jÍk É· BȧÌà ÉÀÇ ªÌà ÓĨÍ
.½v¯ BÍ eÌI ªÌà BÍ
Ai ÅÍA Ë ,Ai Âej¿ Ó·BÃfÄa ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI Ai Ó÷¼· �Í j¿ BÈÄM BÍ ,Óyj§ Ó÷¼· B÷¿AË ÔlΆ ÁÇ Ë Ai Âej¿ ÁÇ ÆfÎJÄU ɸÃBĆ eÌI Ai Ó¸Í kA sÎI BÈÎ÷¼· BÍ ,fÄÃAÌa É÷uBa .fÄÃAÌa ÂB§ ~j§ Ai ÅÍAË /Ai jNÍe ÔlΆ ÁÇ Ë Ai ®Ak ÁÇ ÓÇBÎm ÆÌ†Ë ,Ai jNÍe [25]
;ÆAÌÎY kA Âej¿ Æ̆ ,eÌI ªÌà BÍ ;ÆAÌÎY Æ̆ ,eÌI oÄU BÍ Ó÷¼· Ó¤°» jÇ o‚
,eÌI ÂB§ ~j§ BÍ ;MYBy Æ̆ ,eÌI ÉuBa BÍ ;µOBà Æ̆ ,eÌI ½v¯ BÍ .ÊBÎm Ë f΃m Ë ÊfÄJÄU ɸÃBĆ
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
10
5. Explication of the Character of Definition and Description
In definition, the purpose is to discern the reality of a thing’s essence; [here] the
distinction [of the thing from other things] follows of itself. In description, [on the other
hand,] the purpose is to denote a thing, even though its essence is not really discerned; the
very denoting [of the thing] is to distinguish [it from other things].
Definition, [26] then, [involves] the essential characteristics of a thing. Defining a thing
consists in your taking the genus that is closest to it (e.g., animal in the case of man), and
then supplying its essential difference (e.g., rational). Thus, you say: “man is a rational
animal”; this, then, is the definition of man. Likewise, when you say: “four is a number
which upon being halved twice arrives at one.”
As for description, it is, for instance, such as when you say: “man is a laughing, crying,
wide-nailed animal”; or “four is a number which, when multiplied by itself, sixteen
results”; or “four is a number which results from the multiplication of two by itself.”
Now, it is necessary that in definition and description four kinds of error not be
committed. All four [of these errors] fall under a single notion, namely: every unknown
thing that you wish to make known, you must [make known] by means of a thing which
is more known than it; otherwise [27] there would be no utility [in your making it
known].
As regards those four errors that split off from this notion:
(a) One is that of making something known by itself; e.g., in the definition of
time it is said, “Time is the duration of motion.” But time and duration are the same
thing, and whoever [finds] the definition of time difficult, will also [find] the definition of
duration difficult: his asking “What is time?” is [tantamount to] his asking “what is
duration?”
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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Ámi Ë ÷fY ¾BY Æej· Af΂ (5) .fÍE ©JNI eÌa ÓÍAfU Ë ,OmA lΆ PAg O´Î´Y ÅNaBÄq ,÷fY ifÃA ~j« O´Î´ZI ÔË PAg É· fĆ jÇ ,l·I OmA ÆeAe ÆBrà ,Ámi ifÃA ~j« Ë
.eÌI Ai Æej· AfU ,ÆeAe ÆBrà eÌa Ë .fÍBÎà ÉNaBÄq
ÅÍjM �Íelà ɷ eÌI ÆE Æej· ÷fY Ë .eÌI lΆ ÓMAg ÔBÈ°uË kA ÷fY /o‚ [26] ,ÔiBÎI ÔË ÓMAg ½v¯ ÊBNÃE Ë ,Ai Âej¿ ÆAÌÎY ɸÃBĆ ,ÔjÎNI lΆ oÄU .eÌI Âej¿ ÷fY ÅÍA o‚ ;#OmA µWBà ÆAÌÎY Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ o‚ ,µOBà ɸÃBĆ .#fmi Ó¸ÎI Æej· ÉÀÎà iBIËfI É· OmA ÔiBÀq iBȆ$ ÓÍÌŒ É· ÆBćÀÇ Ë
,#ÅaBà ÅÈ‚ ,ÆBÍjŒ ,ÆAfÄa OnÎÃAÌÎY Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ É· eÌI ÆBĆ Ámi B÷¿AË BÍ ,#fÍE ÊelÃBq ÅNrÍÌa ifÃA ÔË Ljy kA É· OmA ÔiBÀq iBȆ$ BÍ
.#fÍE OnÇ ÅNrÍÌa ifÃA Ëe Ljy kA É· OmA ÔiBÀq$
ÓĨ¿ �Í ifÃA iBȆ jÇ É· ,fN¯ÌÎà Bña ÉÃÌŒ iBȆ Ámi Ë ÷fY ifÃA É· fÍBI Ë É· ÓÇAÌa Ë eÌI ÉNaBÄqBà ɷ ÔlΆ jÇ É· fÍBI :É· OnÃE ÓĨ¿ ÆE B÷¿A .fN¯A .eÌJà ÊfÍB¯ ˆÎÇ / ÷ÜAË ,eÌI jM ÉNaBÄq ÔË kA É· ÓÄ· Ôl·I ,ÓÄ· ÉNaBÄq [27]
:fįB¸q ÓĨ¿ ÅÍA kA É· Bña ÓĨ¿ iBȆ ÆE B÷¿AË
fÄÍÌŒ ÆB¿k ÷fY ifÃA ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÃBmBÄq eÌbI ÁÇ Ai lΆ É· OnÃE Ó¸Í É· Ai o¸ÃE Ë .eÌI lΆ �Í ÆB¿k Ë P÷f¿ Ë #OmA sJÄU P÷f¿ ÆB¿k$ É· É· ÔË ÆfÎmj‚ Ë ,eÌI ½¸r¿ P÷f¿ ÷fY Ai ËA ÁÇ ,eÌI ½¸r¿ ÆB¿k ÷fY
#?OnΆ P÷f¿$ É· eÌI ÔË ÆfÎmj‚ #?OnΆ ÆB¿k$
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
11
(b) Another, is that of making one thing known by means of something [else]
which is similar to it in obscurity and clarity; e.g., it is said, “blackness is that color
which is the opposite of whiteness”; but this is no better than [28] when it is said,
“whiteness is that color which is the opposite of blackness,” for blackness and whiteness
are of the same order in terms of obscurity and clarity.
(c) Third, is that of making one thing known by means of another thing that is
more obscure; e.g., in the definition of fire it is said: “[fire] is that body which resembles
the soul.” Yet soul is much more obscure than fire.
(d) Fourth, is that of making a thing known by means of that by which it becomes
recognized; e.g., in the definition of the sun it is said: “the sun is the star which emerges
in the day.” Thus, the sun is made known by means of day; yet it is not possible for
anyone [29] to recognize day except by means of the sun, for in reality day is the time in
which the sun has emerged. Hence if sun is difficult [to define], so too would day be, or
rather, more so.
These four conditions are extremely important in definitions and descriptions in order
that error does not occur.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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eÌI ÔË Æ̇ÀÇ lΆ ÆE É· ,fÄÃBmBÄq Ôl·I Ai ÔlΆ É· OnÃE jNÍe Ë Ôf΃m ÷fy É· OmA ÉÃÌŒ ÆE ÓÇBÎm$ É· fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓÖAf΂ Ë ÓŒfÎq̃I ÷fy É· OmA ÉÃÌŒ ÆE Ôf΃m$ É· fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃE /kA OnÎà jNλËA ÅÍA Ë .#OmA [28] .ÓÖAf΂ Ë ÓŒfÎqÌ‚ ifÃA fÃAÊBNÍBU �ÎI Ôf΃m Ë ÓÇBÎm É· ,#OmA ÓÇBÎm
ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÃBmBÄq jM ÊfÎqÌ‚ ÔË kA Ôl·I Ai ÔlΆ É· OnÃE ÂÌ÷Îm Ë iBÎnI o°Ã Ë ,#fÃB¿ o°ÄI É· OmA ÁnU ÆE ÔË$ :É· sME ÷fY ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ
.sME kA OmA jM ÊfÎqÌ‚
,eÌq ÉNaBÄq ÔÌI É· lΆ ÆFI fÄÃBmBÄrI Ai ÔlΆ É· OnÃE ÂiBȆ Ë .#fÍEjI kËjI É· OmA ÊiBNm ÆE LBN¯E$ :É· LBN¯E ÷fY ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,LBN¯FI ÷ÜA fmBÄrI Ai kËi /Ón· É· fÍBrÃ Ë ,fÄÃBmBÄq kËjI Ai LBN¯E o‚ [29] Æ̆ o‚ .eÌI Êf¿E jI ÔË ifÃA LBN¯E É· eÌI ÆB¿k ÆE kËi O´Î´ZI É· AjÍk
.eÌI jM ½¸r¿ ɸ¼I ,eÌI ½¸r¿ kËi ,eÌI ½¸r¿ LBN¯E
.fN¯ÌÎà ¡¼« BM Æej· Ámi Ë ÷fY ifÃA OmA Á÷È¿ Obm ¢jq iBȆ ÅÍA
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
12
6. Elucidation of the meaning of Noun, Verb and Particle
Every single expression is either a noun, verb, or particle (in Arabic noun is called ’ism,
while as for verb, the grammarians call it fi‘l and the logicians kalima). Noun (’ism) and
verb (kalima) both have complete meaning. For example, if someone asks, “who did you
see?,” and you reply, “Zaid,” the answer is complete; or if someone asks, “what did Zaid
do?,” and you reply, “he left,” the answer is complete. But particle does not have a
complete meaning: for example, if it is asked, “where is Zaid?,” [30] and you reply “to”
or “on” or “in,” it would be no answer as long as you do not say “to the house” or “in the
mosque” or “on the roof.”
However, the difference between noun (’ism) and verb (kalima) is that noun conveys
meaning, but does not convey the temporal aspect of that meaning; e.g., “man” or
“honesty.” The verb (kalima), on the other hand, conveys [both] meaning and the
temporal aspect of that meaning; e.g., “he hit,” which signifies [the act of] hitting and
that it was in past time. And likewise when you say “he may hit.” Also, [the verb]
always signifies the person with whom the meaning is [associated], like “the hitter” or
“the crawler.” However, that person or that thing is not specified so that you know which
it is.
[31] If someone asks, “Are ‘yesterday’ (d§ ), ‘last year’ (p~r), ‘of last year’ (p~r§n‘h)
nouns or verbs?,” the answer is that they are nouns. If he then says that each of these
three signifies time and must [therefore] be a verb, we would reply: not everything that
signifies time is a verb; for [a verb] must first signify a meaning, and then signify the
time of that meaning. For example, [when] you say “he hit,” you signify [first, the act of]
hitting, and then the time of that hitting. Now, our saying ‘yesterday’ (d§ ), has the core
of its meaning in time, [but] it is not such that it signifies a meaning and then the time of
that meaning.
This much that has been said about single expressions is sufficient. We must now speak
of composite expressions. [32]
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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²jY Ë sÄ· Ë ÂBà ÓĨ¿ Æej· fÍf‚ (6) Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÁmA Ai ÂBà ÔkBNI Ë ;²jY BÍ ,sÄ· BÍ ,eÌI ÂBà BÍ ,ej°¿ Ó¤°» jÇ Ai Ëe jÇ ÉÀ¼· Ë ÁmA Ë .fÄÃAÌa ÉÀ¼· ÆBδñÄ¿ Ë fÄÃAÌa ½¨¯ ÆBÍÌZà Ai sÄ·j¿ ,#Ai fÍk$ :ÓÍÌŒ #?ÔfÍe Aj·$ :É·fmj‚ Ón· jŒA ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ÂBÀM ÓĨ¿ LAÌU ,#O¯jI$ :ÓÍÌŒ #?ej· Ɇ fÍk$ :É· fmj‚ Ón· jŒA Ë eÌI ÂBÀM LAÌU /#?OmBV· fÍk$ :fÍÌŒ jŒA ɸÃBĆ ,eÌJà ÂBÀM ÓĨ¿ Ai ²jY B÷¿AË .eÌI ÂBÀM
ÓÍÌNà BM eÌJà LAÌU ˆÎÇ #ifÃA$ ÓÍÌŒ BÍ #jI$ ÓÍÌŒ BÍ #L$ :ÓÍÌŒ [30] .#ÂBI jI$ BÍ ,#fVn¿ ifÃA$ BÍ ,#ÉÃBbI$
jI eÌJà ½Î»e Ë ,ÓĨ¿ jI eÌI ½Î»e ÁmA :É· OnÃE ÉÀ¼· Ë ÁmA ÆBο ¶j¯ Ÿλ jI eÌI ½Î»e ÉÀ¼· B÷¿AË .#ÓNmie$ Ë #Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓĨ¿ ÆE Óη ɸÃE jI Ë Æek jI eÌI ½Î»e É· ,#elI$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓĨ¿ ÆE Óη Ë ÓĨ¿ jI eÌI ½Î»e ÉrÎÀÇ Ë .#fÃlI$ ÓÍÌŒ Æ̆ ÆBćÀÇ Ë .eÌI ÉNqhŒ ÆB¿k ifÃA lΆ ÆE BÍ o¸ÃE Å¸Î»Ë .ÊfÃla BÍ ÊfÄÃk :Æ̆ eÌI Ai ËA ÓĨ¿ ÆE É· Ón·
/ .On¿Af· É· ÓÃAe É· ,eÌJà Å÷Ψ¿
É· eÌI ÆE LAÌU #?ÉÀ¼· BÍ On¿Bà ÉÄÍiB‚ Ë iB‚ Ë Ôe$ :É· fmj‚ Ón· jŒA [31] ,eÌI ÉÀ¼· É· fÍBI Ë ÆB¿k jI OmA ½Î»e Ém jÇ ÅÍA É· fÍÌŒ jŒA o‚ .On¿Bà jI eÌI ½Î»e É· fÍBI Onbà ɷ ,eÌI ÉÀ¼· ÆB¿k jI eÌI ½Î»e Ɇ jÇ Éà ɷ ÁÎÍÌŒ jI ÓÄ· ½Î»e ,#elI$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓĨ¿ ÆE ÆB¿k jI eÌI ½Î»e ÊBNÃE Ë ÓĨ¿ Éà ,OnÃB¿k sÎĨ¿ o°Ã #Ôe$ B¿ iBN°Œ Ë ,Æek ÆE ÆB¿k jI ÊBNÃE Ë Æek
.sÃB¿k jI eÌI ½Î»e ÊBNÃE Ë ÓĨ¿ jI eÌI ½Î»e É· OnÃBĆ
ÔBȤ°» ifÃA ÆÌÄ·A .eÌI ÊfÄnI ej°¿ ÔBȤ°» ifÃA f¿E ÉN°Œ É· iAf´¿ ÅÍA / .ÅN°Œ fÍBI Åbm K÷·j¿
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
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7. Explication of what a Proposition is
From these single expressions, diverse compositions arise. Among the latter, there is one
kind that we must now [consider], namely, the kind that is [variously] called proposition
(qad§ya), [declaratory] statement or assertoric speech. This is that which, on hearing it,
you may say “it is true,” or “it is false.” For example: if someone says, “for man, there is
reward and punishment,” you can say that it is so; and if he says, “man is a flyer,” you
can say that it is not so. [33] If someone says, “whenever the sun rises, it is day,” you can
say that it is so; and if he says, “whenever the sun rises the stars are visible,” you can say
that it is not so. If he says, “number is either odd or even,” you can say that it is so; and if
he says, “number is either black or white,” you can say that it is not so. But if someone
says, “teach me something or some problem,” the answer to him in no way consists in
your saying “it is so,” or “it is not so.” [34] [Similarly,] if he says, “come with me to the
mosque,” the answer to him is not that “it is so,” and “you spoke the truth,” or “it is not
so,” and “you lied.”
8. Explication of the Types of Propositions
Propositions are of three types:
(a) One is called Predicative, e.g., “man is an animal,” or “man is not an animal.”
(b) One is called Connective Conditional, e.g., “since it is like this, it is like this;
and if it is like that, it is like that”; and “it is not [the case] that since it is like this or like
that, it is like this or like that.”
(c) One is called Disjunctive Conditional, e.g., “either it is like this [35] or it is
like that”; or “it is not [the case] that it is either like this or like that.”
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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eÌI Ɇ É· É÷Îz³ Æej· Af΂ (7) [32] ÉÃÌŒ Ó¸Í ÆÌÄ·A Ai B¿ ÆBrÍA kA Ë .fÍE KηjM ÆÌŒBÃÌŒ ,ej°¿ ÔBȤ°» ÅÍA kA ÂkBU Åbm Ë fÄÃAÌa jJa Ë fÄÃAÌa É÷Îz³ AjÃE É· OmA ÉÃÌŒ ÆE ÅÍA Ë ,fÍBI ÓÀÇ É· fÍBq Ë #OmA OmAi$ ÓÍÌŒ É· fÍBq ÔÌÄrI Æ̆ É· eÌI ÆE ÅÍA Ë .fÄÃAÌa ÓÃAÌM ,#OnIB´§ Ë LAÌQ Ai Âej¿$fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA :ÆE ¾BR¿ .#On«Ëie$ ÓÍÌŒ ÅÎĆ Éà ɷ ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ,#OmA ÊfÃj‚ Âej¿$ fÍÌŒ jŒA Ë ,OmA ÅÎĆ É· ÅN°Œ ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ,#eÌI kËi ,fÍEjI LBN¯E É· ÊBŒ jÇ$ É· fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA Ë /.OmA [33] ,#fÃÌI Af΂ ÆBŒiBNm ,fÍEjI LBN¯E É· ÊBŒ jÇ$ :fÍÌŒ jŒAË .OmA ÅÎĆ É· ,#O°U BÍ OmA ¶BW BÍ ,iBÀq$ :fÍÌŒ jŒAË .OmA ÅÎĆ Éà ɷ ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ,#Ôf΃m BÍ eÌI ÓÇBÎm BÍ ,iBÀq$ :fÍÌŒ jŒAË .OmA ÅÎĆ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ÔAɼ×n¿ BÍ ÔlΆ Aj¿$:fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA B÷¿AË .OmA ÅÎĆ Éà ɷ ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM ÅÎĆ ÉÃ$ BÍ #OmA ÅÎĆ$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃE eÌJà ÉÃÌŒ ˆÎÈI ÔË LAÌU ,#kÌ¿BÎI
#OmA ÅÎĆ$ É· eÌJà ÆE ÔË LAÌU ,#ÔE fVnÀI Å¿ BI$ :fÍÌŒ jŒAË /.#OmA [34] .#ÓN°Œ ®Ëie$ Ë #OmA ÅÎĆ ÉÃ$ BÍ ,#ÓN°Œ OmAi$Ë
É÷Îz³ OÀn³ Æej· Af΂ (8) :fÃA Án³ Ém BÇ É÷Îz³
.#iÌÃBU OnÎà Âej¿$ BÍ #OmiÌÃBU Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÃAÌa Ó¼ÀY Ai Ó¸Í Ë ;eÌI ÅÎĆ ,eÌI ÅÎĆ Æ̆$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÃAÌa ½v÷N¿ ÓOjq Ai Ó¸Í Ë
.#eÌI ÆBĆ BÍ ÅÎĆ ,eÌI ÆBĆ BÍ eÌI ÅÎĆ Æ̆ ÉÃ$ Ë ;#eÌI ÆBĆ ,eÌI ÆBĆ jŒA BÍ ;#eÌI ÆBĆ BÍ /eÌI ÅÎĆ BÍ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÃAÌa ½v°Ä¿ ÓOjq Ai Ó¸ÍË [35]
.#eÌI ÆBĆ BÍ eÌI ÅÎĆ BÍ É· OnÎÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
14
9. Explication of the Predicative Proposition:
Affirmation, Negation, Universality, Particularity
and whatever pertains to it
The characteristic of the predicative proposition is that through it we make a judgment
that something is something, or that something is not something: e.g., we say, “man is an
animal,” or “man is not an animal.” That [proposition in] which we say “is,” is called
affirmative, and that [proposition in] which we say “is not,” is called negative. That part
[of the proposition] about which the judgment is made (such as, in this example, “man”)
is called the subject; [36] and that part [of the proposition] by which the judgment is
[conveyed] – viz., that it is or is not – is called the predicate (such as, in this example,
“animal”).
Each of these two [sc. subject and predicate] is sometimes a simple expression: e.g.,
“man is an animal”; and sometimes a composite expression: e.g., “whoever does not
digest his food must have a sickness in his stomach”; for, [in the latter case,] the whole of
our saying “[whoever] does not digest his food” is the subject, and the whole of our
saying “must have a sickness in his stomach” is the predicate. However, it is possible
that you replace each of these two phrases with a simple expression: thus you may
designate the person who has not digested his food, A, [37] and the person whose
stomach has a sickness, B; therefore, [if] you then say “A is B,” it will have the same
meaning. Or it may be that of these two parts one is a single [expression], the other a
composite.
If someone asks, “Our saying: ‘Zaid is non-sighted’ or ‘is not-at-home’ – is it affirmative
or negative?,” we would reply that it is affirmative, for “non-sighted” is as a whole a
single predicate: if you affirm it, the proposition would be affirmative; and if you negate
it, the proposition would be negative. Hence, since we said “he is non-sighted,” we
affirmed it by the term “is.” Consequently, the proposition became affirmative; [38] this
is called the Deviant Affirmative. But if we want [the proposition] to be negative, we
would say, “Zaid is not sighted.”
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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Oμ· Ë K¼m Ë LBVÍA Ë Ó¼ÀY É÷Îz³ Æej· Af΂ (9) eÌI ÅÍA iÌaifÃA ɇÃE Ë OÍËlU Ë
,OmA ÔlΆ ÔlΆ É· ÁÎqBI Êej· Á¸Y ÔË ifÃA É· eÌI ÆE Ó¼ÀY É÷Îz³ OÎuBa ÆAÌÎY Âej¿$ ÁÎÍÌŒ BÍ #OnÃAÌÎY Âej¿$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,OnÎà ÔlΆ ÔlΆ BÍ ,ÁÎÍÌŒ #OnÎÃ$ É· AjÃE Ë ,fÄÃAÌa KUÌ¿ ,ÁÎÍÌŒ #OnÇ$ É· AjÃE .#OnÎÃ
,eÌI #Âej¿$ ¾BR¿ ÅÍifÃA ɸÃBĆ ,OmËjI Á¸Y É· ÔË kA ÊiB‚ ÆE Ë .fÄÃAÌa K»Bm ɸÃBĆ (OnÎà BÍ OnÇ É·)eÌI ËfI Á¸Y É· ÔË kA ÊiB‚ ÆE Ë /,fÄÃAÌa ªÌyÌ¿ [36]
.fÄÃAÌa ¾ÌÀZ¿ ,eÌI #ÆAÌÎY$ ¾BR¿ ÅÍifÃA
Ë ,#OnÃAÌÎY Âej¿$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,fqBI ej°¿ Ó¤°» ÓÇBŒ Ëe ÅÍkA Ó¸Í jÇ Ë ÓN¯E AjÍË ‘f¨¿ ,eiAÌNà ÂB¨W Aj· jÇ$ ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,fqBI K÷·j¿ Ó¤°» ÓÇBŒ Ë ,OmA ªÌyÌ¿ #eiAÌNà s¿B¨W$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ �¼ÀU BVÃE É· ,#fqBI ÊfÎmi É· fÍBq Å¸Î»Ë .OmA ¾ÌÀZ¿ #fqBI ÊfÎmi ÓN¯E AiË ‘f¨¿$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ �¼ÀU s¿B¨W É· Ai o¸ÃE É· fÍBq É· ,ÓÈà ɼÀU Ëe ÅÍkA Ó¸Í jÇ ¾fI ej°¿ Ó¤°» ÂBà (L) fqBI ÊfÎmi ÓN¯E Ai tAÊf¨¿ É· Ai o¸ÃE Ë /,ÓÄ· ÂBà (A) eiAÌNà [37]
Ëe ÅÍkA É· fqBI Ë .eiAe ÓĨ¿ ÅÎÀÇ #OmA (L) (A)$ ÓÍÌŒ ÊBNÃE o‚ .ÓÄ· .K÷·j¿ Ó¸Í Ë eÌI ej°¿ Ó¸Í ÊiB‚
BÍ OmA KUÌ¿ ,OmA ÉÃBbI Éà BÍ ,OmBÄÎIBà fÍk É· B¿ iBN°Œ$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA PBJQA jŒA ,OmA ¾ÌÀZ¿ Ó¸Í É¼ÀVI #BÄÎIBÃ$ É· ,OmA KUÌ¿ :ÁÎÍÌŒ #?K»Bm ÁÎN°Œ Æ̆ o‚ .eÌI K»Bm É÷Îz³ sÎÄ· Ó°Ã jŒA Ë ,eÌI KUÌ¿ É÷Îz³ sÎÄ· Ai ÅÍA Ë fq / KUÌ¿ É÷Îz³ o‚ .ÁÍej· PBJQA #OmA$ ¥°¼I ,#OmBÄÎIBÃ$ [38]
.#BÄÎI OnÎà fÍk$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ,eÌI K»Bm É· ÁÎÇAÌa jŒAË .fÄÃAÌa É»Ëf¨¿ VJUÌ¿
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
15
Now, the difference between these two [propositions] is that if Zaid did not exist in the
world, you could say “Zaid is not sighted,” because that Zaid which does not exist, is not
sighted. But you could not say “Zaid is non-sighted” except when Zaid in fact exists. If
it is asked, “Our saying: ‘Zaid is not non-sighted’ – is it affirmative or negative?,” we
would reply that it is negative, because “non-sighted” is the predicate, and the term “is
not” has negated it. This is called Deviant Negative.
This having become known, one must [next] know that the subject [of a proposition] is
either a universal expression or a particular expression. [39] An example of a particular
subject is your saying, “Zaid is a writer,” or “is not a writer.” This is called a Singular or
Individual [proposition]; the first [example] is affirmative, the second negative.
But as for when the subject is universal, there are two alternatives.
(a) Either it is not made clear to how many the judgment [applies]: whether [it
applies] to all or to some – e.g., when you say, “Man is a mover,” and do not say whether
all men or some men. This is called Indefinite Affirmative. And again, when you say,
“Man is not a mover,” and this is called Indefinite Negative.
(b) Or it is made clear [what] the quantity of the judgment is; this is called
Definite [proposition], [40] and the term indicating the quantity is called Sūr. Definite
[propositions] are of four kinds:
(i) One is when the judgment applies affirmatively to all: e.g.,
“Everything that is a man is an animal,” or, “every man is an animal.” This is called the
Universal Affirmative [proposition] and its quantity-indicator (sūr) are the terms
“everything” and “every.”
(ii) Another is when the judgment is applied to all negatively and by
denial: e.g., “None [among] men is immortal.” This is called the Universal Negative
[proposition] and its quantity-indicator (sūr) is the term “none.”
(iii) Third is when the judgment is applied to some positively and by
affirmation: e.g., “Some man is a writer.” This is called the Particular Affirmative
[proposition], [41] and its quantity-indicator (sūr) is the term “some.”
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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:ÓÍÌŒ É· fÍBq ,eÌJà ÆBÈU ifÃA fÍk jŒA ,É· OnÃE Ëe jÇ ÅÍA ÆBο ¶j¯ Ë :ÓÍÌŒ É· fÍBrÃ Ë .eÌJà BÄÎI ,OnÎà ɷ fÍk ÆE AjÍk ,#BÄÎI OnÎà fÍk$
É· B¿ iBN°Œ$ É· fÄmj‚ jŒA Ë .eÌI ÔBVI fÍk É· ÊBNÃE ÷ÜA #OmBÄÎIBà fÍk$ #BÄÎIBÃ$ É· AjÍk ,OmA K»Bm :ÁÎÍÌŒ #?K»Bm BÍ OmA KUÌ¿ ,BÄÎIBà OnÎà fÍk .fÄÃAÌa É»Ëf¨¿ VJ»Bm Ai ÅÍAË ,Omej· Ó°Ã Ai ËA #OnÎÃ$ ¥°»Ë OmA ¾ÌÀZ¿
¥°» BÍ eÌI Ó÷¼· ¥°» BÍ ªÌyÌ¿ É· fÍE ÉNnÃAe É· fÍBI ,f¿E ÉNnÃAe ÅÍA Æ̆ ÅÍAË ,#OnÎà jÎIe BÍ OmjÎIe fÍk$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃE ÔËlU ªÌyÌ¿ ¾BR¿ /.ÔËlU [39] .OmA K»Bm Â÷Ëe Ë OmA KUÌ¿ ÅÎNnbà ;fÄÃAÌa ÉÎvbq Ë fÄÃAÌa ÉuÌvb¿ Ai
.eÌJà ÆËjÎI Ëe kA eÌI Ó÷¼· ªÌyÌ¿ Æ̆ B÷¿AË
:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓajI jI BÍ ,OmA ÉÀÇ jI :OmfĆ jI Á¸Y É· eÌI Êej¸Ã Af΂ BÍ É¼ÀÈ¿ VJUÌ¿ Ai ÅÍA Ë ;Âej¿ ÓajI BÍ Âej¿ �ÀÇ ÓÍÌNÃ Ë ,#OmA ÊfÄJÄU Âej¿$
.fÄÃAÌa ɼÀÈ¿ VJ»Bm Ai ÅÍAË #ÊfÄJÄU OnÎà Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ Ë .fÄÃAÌa
ÔfĆ jŒAf΂ ¥°» Ë /,fÄÃAÌa ÊiÌvZ¿ Ai ÅÍA Ë ,Á¸Y ÔfĆ eÌI Êej· Af΂ BÍ [40] :OmA ÉÃÌŒ iBȆ ÊiÌvZ¿ Ë .fÄÃAÌa iÌm Ai
,eÌI Âej¿ Ɇ jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,PBJQBI eÌI Êej· ÉÀÇ jI Á¸Y É· OnÃE Ó¸Í Ë fÄÃAÌa KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· Ai ÅÍA Ë ,#OnÃAÌÎY Ó¿ej¿ jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ ,#eÌI ÆAÌÎY
.eÌI #jÇ$ Ë #Ɇ jÇ$ ¥°» ÔË iÌm Âej¿ ˆÎÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,Ó°Ã Ë K¼nI fÄqBI Êej· ÉÀÇ jI Á¸Y É· OnÃE jBÍe Ë
.eÌI #ˆÎÇ$ ¥°» ÔË iÌm Ë fÄÃAÌa K»Bm Ó÷¼· Ai ÅÍAË ,#OnÎà ÉÃAfÍËBU ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓNnÇ Ë PBJQBI fÄqBI Êej· ÓajI jI Á¸Y É· OnÃE ÂÌ÷ÎmË .eÌI #ÓajI$ ¥°» ÔË iÌm Ë /fÄÃAÌa KUÌ¿ ÔËlU Ai ÅÍAË ,#OmjÎIe Âej¿ [41]
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
16
(iv) Fourth is when the judgment is applied to some by denial and
negation: e.g., “Some men are not writers.” This is called the Particular Negative, and its
quantity-indicator (sãr) is the expression “some…are not”; it also has another quantity-
indicator, namely, “not all,” “not everything,” and “not every.” For when you say, “Not
all men are writers,” or “not everything that is a man is a writer,” or “not every man is a
writer,” you make a judgment of non-being, therefore it is negative; and you do not make
your judgment about all, because when you say “not all,” [42] it is possible that some
exist. Hence these statements that we [have just] noted are particular negative.
The judgment [borne by] an indefinite [proposition] is a particular judgment. For when
you say “Man is such-and-such,” your saying “man” may apply to all men, or it may
apply to [some] men, in that all men are men, and some men also are men. Hence, [the
statement applies] with certainty to some men, and with doubt to all men. Thus if
someone says, “some men are such-and-such,” it does not necessarily follow that some
others are contrary to that, because when all are, some are also. Consequently, the
judgment applying to some is not prevented from likewise applying to the others;
however, it applies with certainty to some, but with doubt to all.
[43] Thus, it has become evident that the judgment of an indefinite [proposition]
corresponds to the judgment of a particular [proposition]; and it has become evident that
predicative propositions are eight [in number]:
[FOUR INDEFINITE]:
1. Affirmative Singular;
2. Negative Singular;
3. Affirmative Indefinite;
4. Negative Indefinite;
FOUR DEFINITE:
5. Universal Affirmative;
6. Universal Negative;
7. Particular Affirmative;
8. Particular Negative.
Of these eight, the Singular [proposition] is not used in the sciences, while the indefinite
[conveys] a particular judgment. Thus the propositions that are of use in the sciences are
the remaining four definite propositions. As for the indefinite, wherever it is used in
place of the Universal it leads to error and confusion, as we shall make clear in another
place; consequently, it must be avoided.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓNnÎÃ Ë Ó°ÄI fÄqBI Êej· ÓajI jI Á¸Y É· OnÃE ÂiBȆ Ë OnÎÃ$ ¥°» ÔË iÌm Ë fÄÃAÌa K»Bm ÔËlU Ai ÅÍAË ,#jÎIe Âej¿ ÓajI OnÎÃ$ #Ɇ jÇ ÉÃ$ ¥°» Ë OmA #ÉÀÇ ÉÃ$ ¥°» ÔË Ë OmjNÍe ÔiÌm AiË Ë ,eÌI #ÓajI Ɇ jÇ ÉÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ ,#OmA jÎIe Âej¿ �ÀÇ ÉÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ Æ̆ É· AjÍk .#jÇ ÉÃ$ Ë Êej· ÓNnÎà Á¸Y ,#OmA jÎIe Ó¿ej¿ jÇ ÉÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ ,#OmA jÎIe OmA Âej¿ /,#ÉÀÇ ÉÃ$ ÓÍÌŒ Æ̆ É· AjÍk ,ÓqBI Êej¸Ã ÉÀÇ jI Á¸Y Ë eÌI K»Bm o‚ ,ÓqBI
.OmA K»Bm ÔËlU ÁÎN°Œ É· B¿ iBN°Œ ÅÍA o‚ .eÌI ÓajI É· fÍBq [42]
ÌM iBN°Œ ,#OmA ÅÎĆ Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ Æ̆ É· AjÍk ,OmA ÔËlU Á¸Y ½ÀÈ¿ Á¸Y Ë Âej¿ �ÀÇ É· ,fqBI Ai Ó¿ej¿ É· fÍBq Ë ,fqBI Ai Âej¿ �ÀÇ É· fÍBq #Âej¿$
.�rI Âej¿ �ÀÇ Ë OmA ÅδÎI Âej¿ ÓajI o‚ .OmA Âej¿ lÎà ӿej¿ Ë ,fÃA Âej¿ ÓajI É· OnÎà KUAË BVÃE kA #OmA ÅÎĆ Âej¿ ÓajI$:fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA ɸÃBĆ kBI ÓajI jI Á¸Y o‚ .eÌI lÎà ÓajI ,eÌI ÉÀÇ Æ̆ É· AjÍk ,eÌI ÆE ²ÝbI jNÍe / .�rI ÉÀÇ jI Ë ,eÌI ÅδÎI ÓajI jI Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI ÆBćÀÇ djI jNÍe jI É· eiAfÃ
ÔBÇ É÷Îz³ É· f¿E fÍf‚ Ë ,eÌI ÔËlU Á¸Y Æ̇ÀÇ ½ÀÈ¿ Á¸Y É· f¿E fÍf‚ o‚ [43] ,ÉJ»Bm �¼ÀÈ¿ ,ÉJUÌ¿ �¼ÀÈ¿ ,ÉJ»Bm �uÌvb¿ ,ÉJUÌ¿ �uÌvb¿ :fÃA OrÇ Ó¼ÀY
.K»Bm ÔËlU Ë KUÌ¿ ÔËlU Ë K»Bm Ó÷¼· Ë KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· :ÊiÌvZ¿ iBȆ Ë
o‚ ,OnÍËlU Á¸ZI ɼÀÈ¿ Ë fÍBÎà iB¸I BÈÀ¼§ifÃA ÉuÌvb¿ ,OrÇ ÅÍA kA Ë BV· jÇ ,ɼÀÈ¿ B÷¿AË .ÊiÌvZ¿ iBȆ BÈÀ¼§ ifÃA ÓÃf¿E iB¸I ÔBÇ É÷Îz³ fÃBÀI ;ÁÎÄ· Af΂ jNÍe ÔBVI ɸÃBĆ ,sÍÌrM Ë fĸ¯A ¡¼« ,Ó÷¼· ÔBVI fÍE ÊejI iB¸I
.Æej· fÍBI lÎÇj‚ ÔË kA o‚
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
17
One must know that the judgment of every proposition is either (a) inescapable and
binding: e.g., “man is a body” – and this is called Necessary; [44] or (b) [one that] may or
may not be [the case]: e.g., “man is a writer” – and this is called Possible; or (c) [one
that] cannot be [the case]: e.g., “man is an angel” – and this is called Impossible.
Now, the term possible applies to two notions: (i) it applies to [what simply] can be and
nothing more, or, in sum, to whatever is not impossible. (The necessary falls under this
[sense of the] possible, for the necessary does not exist as long as it is not possible for it
to exist.) (ii) It applies to [what] may or may not be: this is the true possible, and the
necessary does not fall under this. [For] everything that is possible to exist in this
[second] sense [of the possible], it is possible that it not exist. But [for] everything that is
possible to exist in the former sense, it is not possible [45] not to exist. This much is
enough regarding the clarification of the character of predicative propositions.
10. Explication of the character of
Connective and Disjunctive Conditional Propositions,
in the same manner as was done for Predicative Propositions
Just as predicative [propositions] consist of two parts (a subject and a predicate),
conditional [propositions] also have two parts.
As for the connective conditional, it consists of two parts and nothing more: an
antecedent and a consequent. The antecedent is that [part] with which the condition is
associated, while the consequent is that [part] which is the reply. An example of this is
when we say, “if the sun rises, it is day”: [46] our saying “if the sun rises” is the
antecedent, and “it is day” is the consequent.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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ɸÃBĆ ,KUAË Ë fqBI ÓNÄÍE jÇ BÍ É÷Îz³ jÇ Á¸Y É· fÍE ÉNnÃAe É· fÍBI Ë ,ÆeÌIBÃ Ë ÆeÌI fÍBq BÍ /;fÄÃAÌa ÔiËjy Ai ÅÍA Ë ,#OmA ÁnU Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ [44] ,ÆeÌI fÍBrà BÍ ;fÄÃAÌa ŸÀ¿ Ai ÅÍA Ë ,#OmA jÎIe Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ
.fÄÃAÌa ©ÄNÀ¿ Ai ÅÍA Ë ,#OmA ÉNqj¯ Âej¿$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ
ɇÃE jI ɼÀVI Ë ,oI Ë eÌI fÍBq jI Ó¸Í :fN¯A ÓĨ¿ Ëe jI #ŸÀ¿$ ¥°» Ë .eÌJà ,eÌI fÍBrà BM KUAË É· AjÍk ,fN¯A ŸÀ¿ ÅÍA jÍk ifÃA KUAË Ë .eÌJà ©ÄNÀ¿ fN¯ÌÎà ÔË jÍk ie KUAË Ë OmA ӴδY ŸÀ¿ ÅÍA Ë ,eÌIBÃ Ë eÌI fÍBq jI jNÍe Ë Å¸À¿ Ɇ jÇ ÉÃ Ë ;eÌJà ɷ eÌI ŸÀ¿ ,eÌJI É· ÓĨ¿ ÅÍfI eÌI ŸÀ¿ Ɇ jÇ Ë ifÃA OmA OÍB°· if³ ÅÍA Ë .eÌJà ɷ /eÌI ŸÀ¿ ,eÌJI É· ÅÎr΂ ÓĨÀI eÌI [45]
.Ó¼ÀY ÔBÇ É÷Îz³ ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃ
½v°Ä¿ Ë ½v÷N¿ ÓNjq ÔBÇ É÷Îz³ ¾BY Æej· Af΂ (10) f¿E Êej· Ó¼ÀY ie É· ÔËi ÆE jI ÁÇ
lÎà Ai ÓWjq ,¾ÌÀZ¿ Ó¸Í Ë ªÌyÌ¿ Ó¸Í ,eÌI ÊiB‚ Ëe Ai Ó¼ÀY ɸÃBćÀÇ .eÌI ÊiB‚ Ëe
¢jq É· eÌI ÆE Â÷f´¿ Ë .Ó»BM Ó¸Í Ë Â÷f´¿ Ó¸Í :oI Ë eÌI ÊiB‚ Ëe Ai ½v÷N¿ B÷¿A :ÁÎÍÌŒ Æ̆ É· OnÃE ÅÍA ¾BR¿ .eÌI LAÌU É· eÌI ÆE Ó»BM Ë ,eÌI ÆËj´¿ ÔÌI
iBN°Œ Ë OmA Â÷f´¿ #fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ B¿ iBN°Œ /,#eÌI kËi ,fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ [46] .OmA Ó»BM #eÌI kËi$ É· B¿
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
18
But as for the disjunctive conditional, it may be that a single antecedent has a [only] a
single consequent, or it may be that it has many consequents. An example of the first
[case] is when you say, “either this number is even, or it is odd”: the first [part] is the
antecedent, the second [part] the consequent – and here there is no more than a single
[consequent]. An example of the [second case] is when you say, “that number is either
equal to that [other] number, or it is less, or more”: here a single antecedent has two
consequents. Or it may be that there are more than two [consequents], or an unlimited
number: e.g., “every number is either two or three or four…”; and this has no limit.
[47] Thus the difference between the antecedent and the consequent [on the one hand],
and the subject and the predicate [on the other], is that a simple expression [can] stand in
place of the subject and the predicate, but it [cannot] stand in place of the antecedent and
the consequent, because each one of these [latter] is in itself a proposition. E.g., “If the
sun rises, it is day”: your saying “the sun rises” is a proposition, and your saying “it is
day” is [also] a proposition. However, the conditional [particle] bars the antecedent from
being a proposition, for when you say “if the sun rises,” with the introduction of the term
“if” this speech is excluded from being a proposition, so that it is neither true nor false.
[Likewise,] the [particle] of the reply bars the consequent from being a proposition, for
when you say “then it is day,” it too is neither true nor false.
[48] Similarly, with the disjunctive [conditional]: for when you say, “this number is
either odd…”: if the word “either” were not there, this antecedent would be a
proposition; [likewise with] “…or it is even”: if the word “or” were not there, this
consequent would be a proposition. This, then, is one difference between the antecedent
and the consequent [on the one hand], and the subject and the predicate [on the other].
Another difference is that [in the case of] subject and predicate, you say that the subject is
(or is not) the predicate, e.g., “Zaid is (or is not) alive.” But [in the case of] antecedent
and consequent, you do not say that the antecedent is (or is not) the consequent.
However, there are two differences between the antecedent and consequent of the
connective, and the antecedent and consequent of the disjunctive.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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iBÎnI BÈλBM É· fqBI Ë ,eÌI Ó»BM �Í Ai Â÷f´¿ �Í É· fqBI ½v°Ä¿ ifÃA B÷¿AË .#eÌI ¶BW iBÀq ÅÍA BÍ eÌI O°U iBÀq ÅÍA BÍ$:ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE ¾÷ËA ¾BR¿ .eÌI jNÍe ¾BR¿ Ë .eÌJÃ Ó¸Í lU BVÄÍA Ë ,OmA Ó»BM Â÷Ëe Ë ,OmA Â÷f´¿ ÅÎNnbÃ
BVÄÍA É· ,#sÎI BÍ Á· BÍ ,eÌI iBÀq ÆE fćÀÇ BÍ ,iBÀq ÆE$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE ,fqBI ÉÃAj· ÓI É· fqBI Ë ,eÌI Ëe kA sÎI É· fqBI Ë .OmA Ó»BM Ëe Ai Â÷f´¿ �Í / .OnÎà ÉÃAj· Ai ÅÍAË #iBȆ BÍ Ém BÍ eÌI Ëe BÍ ÔiBÀq jÇ$:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ
Ë ªÌyÌ¿ É· OnÃE ,¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ªÌyÌ¿ ÆBο Ë ,Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ ÆBο ¶j¯ o‚ [47] AjÍk ,fNnÍA Éà ӻBM Ë Â÷f´¿ ÔBVI Ë ,fNnÍBI ej°¿ Ó¤°» ÆBrÍA ÔBVI ¾ÌÀZ¿ LBN¯E jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ .fÃA ÓNÎz³ sÍÌa o°ÄI Ó¸Í jÇ Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ É· #eÌI kËi$ ÌM iBN°Œ Ë OmA É÷Îz³ #fÍEjI LBN¯E$ ÌM iBN°Œ ,#eÌI kËi ,fÍEjI :ÓÍÌŒ Æ̆ É· AjÍk ejJI ÓNÎz³ kA Ai Â÷f´¿ ,¢jq ¥°» Å¸Î»Ë .OmA É÷Îz³ Éà BM ,frI ÓNÎz³ kA Åbm ÅÍA #jŒA$ ¥°» Æf¿E ifÃA BI ,#fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ Æ̆ É· AjÍk ,ejJI ÓNÎz³kA Ai Ó»BM j¿ LAÌU ¥°» Ë .®Ëie ÉÃ Ë OmA OmAi
/ .®Ëie ÉÃ Ë eÌI OmAi Éà ÁÇ ,#eÌI kËi ÊBNÃE$ ÓÍÌŒ
¥°» jŒA ,#OmA ¶BW BÍ ,iBÀq ÅÍA$ :ÓÍÌŒ Æ̆ É· ,½v°Ä¿ ifÃA ÅÎćÀÇ Ë [48] ÔeÌJà #BÍ$ ¥°» jŒA ,#OmA O°U BÍ$ Ë ;ÔeÌI É÷Îz³ Â÷f´¿ ÅÍA ÔeÌJà #BÍ$ ªÌyÌ¿ ÆBο Ë ,Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ ÆBο On³j¯ Ó¸Í ÅÍA o‚ .ÔeÌI É÷Îz³ Ó»BM ÅÍA
.¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë
¾ÌÀZ¿ ªÌyÌ¿ É· ,eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ªÌyÌ¿ É· BVÃE ,ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE ¶j¯ jNÍe Ë É· BVÃE ÓÍÌNÃ Ë .#OnÎà BÍ ,OmA ÊfÃk fÍk$:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,OnÎà BÍ ,OmA ,½v÷N¿ Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ ÆBο Å¸Î»Ë .OnÎà BÍ OmA Ó»BM Â÷f´¿ É· ,eÌI Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿
/ .OmA ¶j¯ Ëe ½v°Ä¿ Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ Ë
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[49] (a) One [difference] is that the antecedent of the connective [conditional] cannot
become the consequent, nor can the consequent become the antecedent, without altering
the meaning [of the proposition]. For example, when you say, “if the sun rises, it is day,”
the judgment [here] cannot remain the same judgment if the antecedent becomes the
consequent, and the consequent becomes the antecedent. However, in the disjunctive
[conditional] you [can] make whichever [consequent] you wish into the antecedent and
the meaning remains the same. For example, if you wish, you [can] say, “number is
either even or odd,” or if you wish, you [can] say, “number is either odd or even.”
(b) The other difference is that the consequent of the connective [conditional] is
in accord with the antecedent and is its counterpart, e.g., being day [in relation to] the
rising of the sun. But the consequent of the disjunctive [conditional], on the other hand,
is opposed to, and incompatible with the antecedent, e.g., being even [in relation to]
being odd. It is for this reason that the [50] validation and affirmativeness of the
connective [conditional] consists in your maintaining the existence of this consonance
(e.g., “if the sun rises, it is day”). [On the other hand,] the denial and negativeness of the
connective [conditional] consists in your maintaining the non-existence of this
consonance (e.g., “it is not the case that when the sun rises, it is night”). But it may be
that the antecedent and the consequent are negative, yet the proposition is in itself
affirmative due to your having asserted this consonance: e.g., “if the sun does not rise, it
is not day”; this is affirmative on the ground that a judgment has been made regarding the
actuality and correlation of the non-existence of day with the non-rising of the sun.
[51] The indefiniteness and definiteness of the connective [conditional] consists in this.
Whenever you say, “if (or when) the sun rises, it is day,” and you do not add “always,”
“every time” or “sometimes,” this would be an indefinite conditional. But if you say
“every time,” it would be a universal affirmative [proposition]. Or if you say,
“sometimes, when the sun rises it is cloudy”: this is a particular affirmative [proposition].
Or if you say, “it is never the case that when the sun rises it is night”: this is a universal
negative [proposition]. Or if you say, “not every time the sun rises is it cloudy”: this is a
particular negative [proposition]. It may be that the connective proposition is universal,
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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ÓĨ¿ Ë ,eÌI Â÷f´¿ É· Ó»BM Ë ,eÌI Ó»BM É· fÍBrà ,½v÷N¿ Â÷f´¿ É· OnÃE Ó¸Í [49] ÅÎÀÇ Á¸Y É· fÍBrà ,#eÌI kËi fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ .eÌI ÔBVI É· ÂAf· jÇ ,½v°Ä¿ ifÃA B÷¿AË .Â÷f´¿ Ó»BM Ë ,eÌq Ó»BM Â÷f´¿ Ë ,eÌI Á¸Y
O°U BÍ iBÀq$ :ÓÍÌŒ ,ÓÇAÌa jŒA ɸÃBĆ .eÌI ÔBVI ÓĨ¿ Ë ÓÄ· Â÷f´¿ ÓÇAÌa .#O°U BÍ eÌI ¶BW BÍ iBÀq$ :ÓÍÌŒ ÓÇAÌa jŒA Ë ,#¶BW BÍ eÌI
ɸÃBĆ ,fqBI ÔË iAe ôÂòe Ë Â÷f´¿ BI eÌI µ¯AÌ¿ ,½v÷N¿ Ó»BM É· OnÃE jNÍe ¶j¯ Ë ,Â÷f´¿ BI iBŒkBmBÃ Ë eÌI ±»Bb¿ ,½v°Ä¿ Ó»BM B÷¿AË .Æf¿E jI LBN¯E BI ÆeÌI kËi ÆeÌI KUÌ¿ Ë PBJQA /É· OmAi ½J³ ÅÍkA Ë .ÆeÌI ¶BW BI ÆeÌI O°U ɸÃBĆ [50]
fÍEjI LBN¯E jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÔiBŒkBm ÅÍA ÓNnÈI ÓÄ· Á¸Y É· OnÃE ½v÷N¿ ,ÔiBŒkBm ÅÍA ÆeÌIBÄI ÓÄ· Á¸Y É· OnÃE ½v÷N¿ ÆeÌI K»Bm Ë Ó°Ã Ë .#eÌI kËi Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ É· fqBI Ë .#eÌI Kq ,fÍEjI LBN¯E Æ̆ É· eÌJÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ Êej· PBJQA Ai ÔiBŒkBm ÅÍA Æ̆ eÌI KUÌ¿ sÍÌa o°ÄI É÷Îz³ Ë ,fÃÌI K»Bm KUÌ¿ ½J³ ÆE kA ÅÍA Ë ,#eÌJà kËi ,fÍBÎÃjI LBN¯E jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓqBI
/.Ai Æf¿EBà jI LBN¯E j¿ Omf¿E Êej· ÆeÌIBà kËi ÔiAe ôÂòe Ë ÓNnÈI Á¸Y É· OmA
LBN¯E (Æ̆ BÍ) jŒA$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· OnÃE ½v÷N¿ ÔiÌvZ¿ Ë Ó¼ÀÈ¿ Ë [51] ÓWjq ÅÍA ,#ÓÇBŒ$ BÍ #ÔiBI jÇ$ Ë #ÉrÎÀÇ$ É· ÓÍÌŒ ÉÃ Ë ,#eÌI kËi fÍE jI Æ̆ É· ÊBŒ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ .eÌI Ó÷¼· KUÌ¿ ,#ÔiBI jÇ$ ÓÍÌŒ jŒA B¿A .eÌI ½ÀÈ¿ LBN¯E Æ̆ É· eÌJà lŒjÇ$:ÓÍÌŒ BÍ .eÌI KUÌ¿ ÔËlU ÅÍA ,#eÌI jIA fÍEjI LBN¯E jIA fÍEjI LBN¯E É· ÊBŒ jÇ ÉÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ BÍ .eÌI K»Bm Ó÷¼· ÅÍA ,#eÌI Kq ,fÍEjI ÔË ‘iB‚ Ëe jÇ Ë ,eÌI Ó÷¼· ½v÷N¿ �Îz³ É· fqBI Ë .eÌI K»Bm ÔËlU ÅÍA ,#eÌI jÎIe iÌÃBU ÓajI ,fÃÌI jÎIe Âej¿ ÓajI ÊBŒ jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ / ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ÔËlU [52]
.#ÊBŒ jÇ$ ÔA ÉN°Œ É· eÌI Ai ½J³ ÆE kA Ó÷¼· ÅÍA Ë ,#fÃÌI
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while both its parts are particular: e.g., [52] “whenever some men are writers, some
animals are writers.” This is universal on account of your saying “whenever.”
As regards affirmation in the disjunctive [conditional], it consists in your asserting the
dissonance [between the antecedent and the consequent]: e.g., “either it is like this, or it is
like that.” The negation [of the disjunctive conditional] consists in your denying this
dissonance: e.g., “it is not the case that number is either even or white; rather, it is either
even or odd.” The universal [disjunctive conditional] consists in this dissonance being
permanent: e.g., “always, it is either like this or like that.” The particular [disjunctive
conditional] consists in this dissonance being [present] some of the time: e.g.,
“sometimes it happens that men are either in a ship or drowned”; [53] this “sometimes”
[refers to] that time when [men are] at sea. The true disjunctive [conditional] is one
wherein this dissonance exists, but where the judgment does not reside outside its
components: e.g., “this number is either equal to that number, or it is less, or more.”
11. Explication of the character of Contradiction
The contradiction of a proposition is a proposition that is opposed to it by affirmation or
negation. If one is affirmative, the other is negative; and if one is negative, the other is
affirmative. [On the basis] of the form of their opposition, one of [the propositions] must
necessarily be true, and the other, false: they will then be contradictory to one another.
The conditions [governing] the form of this opposition are [the following].
(a) The meaning of the subject and predicate, as well as of the antecedent and the
consequent, must be the same; otherwise, the two [propositions] would not be
contradictory to each other. E.g., someone says, “the lamb has a father,” while another
says, “the lamb does not have a father.” [54] In one case, by “lamb” is meant sheep,
while in the other a celestial sign (of the Zodiac) is meant. Their statements [here] are
not contradictory to each other; this opposition is with respect to the subject. Or it is said,
“sugar is sh§r§n,” [sweet] and, “sugar is not sh§r§n” (i.e. not made of milk (sh§r)). Both of
these are true and are not contradictory to one another; this opposition is with respect to
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓÄ· PBJQA Ai ÔiBŒkBmBà ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE ½v°Ä¿ ifÃA LBVÍA B÷¿A ,ÓÄ· Ó°Ã Ai ÔiBŒkBmBà ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE K¼m Ë .#eÌI ÆBĆ BÍ ,eÌI ÅÎĆ BÍ$
Ó÷¼· Ë .#eÌI ¶BW BÍ O°U BÍ É¸¼I ,f΃m BÍ O°U BÍ iBÀq eÌJÃ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ÆBĆ BÍ eÌI ÅÎĆ BÍ ÂAf¿$:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ÁÖAe ÔiBŒkBmBà ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE eÌI ÓÇBŒ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ÓÇBŒ ÔiBŒkBmBà ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE ÔËlU Ë .#eÌI ifÃA É· OmA ÊBNÃE #ÊBŒ$ ÅÍA /Ë ,#eÌI ɳj« BÍ ,eÌI ÓNr· ifÃA BÍ Âej¿ É· [53]
ÆE kA ÆËjÎI Á¸Y Å¸Î»Ë eÌI ÔiBŒkBmBà ÅÍA É· eÌI ÆE O´Î´ZI ½v°Ä¿Ë .eÌI BÍie .#sÎI BÍ Á· BÍ eÌI jIAjI BÍ iBÀq ÆE BI iBÀq ÅÍA$:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌJà tBÈNÀn³
|δà ¾BY Æej· Af΂ (11) ,eÌI KUÌ¿ ÔË jŒA .ÓJ»Bm Ë ÓJUÌÀI ÔË ±»Bb¿ eÌI ÓN÷Îz³ ,É÷Îz³ |δà ÆBrÍA ²Ýa PiÌu kA Ë .eÌI KUÌ¿ ÅÍA ,eÌI K»Bm ÔË jŒA Ë ;eÌI K»Bm ÅÍA .fÃÌI |δà Ai jNÍej¿ �Í ÊBNÃE ,eÌI ®Ëie Ó¸Í Ë eÌI OmAi Ó¸Í É· fÍBI ÉÄÍEjÇ
:É· OnÃE ²Ýa ÅÍA PiÌu ÔBÈWjq Ë
jNÍf¸Íj¿ Ëe jÇ ÷ÜAË ,eÌI Ó¸Í Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ Ë ¾ÌÀZ¿Ë ªÌyÌ¿ ÓĨ¿ É· fÍBI Ai Ê÷jI$ fÍÌŒ ÔjNÍe Ë #eÌI if‚ Ai Ê÷jI$ É· fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ .fÃÌJà |δà Ai ÔBȻ̳ .fÄÇAÌa ÆBÀmE XjI Ó¸ÎI Ë fÄÇAÌa fÄ°mÌŒ #Ê÷jI$ Ó¸ÎI /.#eÌJà if‚ [54] É· fÄÍÌŒ BÍ Ë .OmA ªÌyÌ¿ KÃBU kA ²Ýa ÅÍA Ë fÃÌJà jNÍf¸Í |δà ÆBrÍA ÅÍA .OnÎà Êej· jÎq kA É· ÓÄ¨Í ,#OnÎà ÅÍjÎq j¸q$ Ë #OmA ÅÍjÎq j¸q$ Ë .OmA ¾ÌÀZ¿ KÃBU kA ²Ýa ÅÍA Ë ;fÃÌJà jNÍf¸Í |Î´Ã Ë fÃÌI OmAi Ëe jÇ ¡¼« Ë eÌI ÊfÎqÌ‚ BÈÀ¼§ ifÃA ÊBNÍBU iBÎnJI Ë ,BVÄÍA OmA ÊiB¸qE ¾BY ÅÍA
.fĸ¯A
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the predicate. Now, in this case the [situation] is obvious, but in many places in the
sciences it is concealed and leads to error.
(b) Another condition is that there must not be opposition between whole and
part: e.g., one says, “the eye of so-and-so is black,” and again, “the eye of so-and-so is
white, not black.” [In the first case,] by blackness is meant the blackness of the pupil,
[while in the second case,] by the denial of blackness is meant the white [55] area [of the
eye].
(c) Another condition is that both judgments be either in potentiality or in
actuality, not such as when someone says, “this fire is burning” (i.e. potentially), and
another says, “it is not burning” (i.e. actually, when it is not burning anything). Both of
these utterances are true and are not contradictory to one another.
(d) Another [condition] is that what supplements [the meaning of either
proposition] be the same for both: not such as when someone says, “ten is more” (i.e.
than nine), and another says, “ten is not more” (i.e. than eleven). These are both true and
are not contradictory.
(e) Another [condition] is that the time be the same and not two [different] times;
and [likewise] that the place be the same and not two [different] places.
In sum, the judgment of both [propositions] must be [made] in the same respect and must
have the same predicate [56] and the same subject. Hence if the subject is universal, one
of the propositions must be universal, the other particular; for it may be that both
universal [propositions] are false (e.g., “every man is a writer,” and “no man is a writer”);
and it may be that both particular [propositions] are true (e.g., “some men are writers,”
and “some men are not writers”). Hence the contradictory of “every” is “not every,” and
the contradictory of “none” is “some.” Once these conditions have been met, one [of the
propositions] would necessarily be true, and the other false. Know the character of
conditionals on the basis of [the same] reasoning.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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:fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌJà ²Ýa ÓŒiB‚ Ë ÓNÀÇ ifÃA É· fÍBI É· OnÃE ¢jq jNÍe Ë ,ÓÇBÎnI Ë ,#ÊBÎm Éà ,OmA f΃m Æݯ Ár†$ Ë ,#OnÇBÎm Æݯ Ár†$ .fÄÇAÌa Ai Ôf΃m / ÊBNÍBUj¿ ,ÓÇBÎm Ó°ÄI Ë fÄÇAÌa ÊfÍe ÓÇBÎm [55]
:fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ Éà ,½¨°I BÍ eÌI P÷Ì´I BÍ Á¸Y Ëe jÇ É· OnÃE ¢jq jNÍe Ë ÓÄ¨Í ,#ÊfÃkÌm OnÎÃ$:fÍÌŒ jNÍe Ë ,P÷Ì´I ÓÄ¨Í ,#OmA ÊfÃkÌm sME ÅÍA$ fÃÌJà |Î´Ã Ë ,eÌI OmAi Åbm Ëe jÇ ÅÍA Ë .ekÌnà Ai ÔlΆ É· ÊBNÃE ,½¨°I
.AijNÍf¸Íj¿
:fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ Éà ,eÌI Ó¸Í Ëe jÇ ÆBrÍA O¯ByA É· eÌI ÆE jNÍe Ë ÓÄ¨Í ,#OnÎà jNrÎI Êe$ :fÍÌŒ jNÍe Ë ,Éà kA ÓÄ¨Í ,#OmA jNrÎI Êe$
.fÃÌJà |Î´Ã Ë OnNmAi Ëe jÇ ÅÍA Ë .ÊekBÍ kA
.ÊBNÍBU Ëe Éà eÌI Ó¸Í ÊBNÍBU Ë ,O³Ë Ëe Éà eÌI Ó¸Í ,O³Ë ɸÃE jNÍe Ë
.ªÌyÌ¿ ÆBÀÇ Ë fÍBI / ¾ÌÀZ¿ ÆBÀÇ Ë ,fÍBI OÈV¸Í kA Ëe jÇ Á¸Y ɼÀVI Ë [56] É· ;ÔËlU Ó¸Í Ë ,eÌI Ó÷¼· É÷Îz³ Ó¸Í É· fÍBI ,fqBI Ó÷¼· ªÌyÌ¿ jŒA o‚
ˆÎÇ$ Ë #OmjÎIe Ó¿ej¿ jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ) fÃÌI ®Ëie Ó÷¼· Ëe jÇ É· fÍBq ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ) fÃÌI OmAi ÔËlU Ëe jÇ É· fÍBq Ë ;(#OnÎà jÎIe Âej¿ #ɆjÇ ÉÃ$ ,#ɆjÇ$ |δà o‚ .(#OnÎà jÎIe Âej¿ ÓajI$ Ë #OmjÎIe Âej¿ ÉÄÍEjÇ ,eÌI ÊeiËE ÔBVI BÈWjq ÅÍA Æ̆ Ë .eÌI #ÓajI$ ,#ˆÎÇ$ |Î´Ã Ë eÌI
.ÆAfI BÈÎWjq ¾BY pBγ ÅÍjI Ë .eÌI ®Ëie Ó¸Í Ë eÌI OmAi Ó¸Í
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22
12. Exposition of the character of Conversion
Conversion involves your turning the subject [of a proposition] into a predicate, and the
predicate into a subject – [57] or making the antecedent a consequent, and the consequent
an antecedent – while retaining the affirmative or negative [quality of the proposition],
and while retaining its truth.
As for the universal negative, it admits of conversion and results in the universal negative
again: for whenever it is true that “no A is B,” it is true that “no B is A”; otherwise its
contradictory would be true, viz. “some B is A.” That “some” is necessarily something,
say C. So C is that B which is A, and the same thing is both A and B. So there is an A
which is B; yet we had said that “no A is B” is true; and this is impossible. Thus, it has
become evident that when no A is B, no [58] B is A.
As for the universal affirmative, it is not necessary that its conversion be in every case a
universal affirmative; for one can say, “every man is animal,” but one cannot say, “every
animal is man.” However, it is necessary that its conversion be a particular affirmative,
because whenever all As are B, some Bs must be A, otherwise no B would be A – [in that
case] it becomes necessary, as has [just] been shown, that no A is B, yet we had said that
“every A is B.”
The conversion of the particular affirmative yields a particular affirmative; thus when
you say, “some As are B,” it is necessary that some Bs be A, [59] on the basis of the
same argument that we have stated.
As for the particular negative, it is not necessary that it have a conversion, for you can
say, “not every animal is man,” but you cannot say, “not every man is animal.”
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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o¸§ ¾BY ÆeÌÀà kBI (12) Â÷f´¿ BÍ ;ÓÄ· / ªÌyÌ¿ ,¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ÓÄ· ¾ÌÀZ¿ ,ªÌyÌ¿ É· eÌI ÆE o¸§ ¾BY [57] .eÌI ÔBVI ÓNmAi Ë ÔiAe ÔBVI ÓJ»Bm Ë ÓJUÌ¿ Ë ,ÓÄ· Â÷f´¿ Ó»BM Ë ÓÄ· Ó»BM
É· eÌI OmAi ÊBŒ jÇ É· ,fÍE kBI K»Bm Ó÷¼¸I ÁÇ Ë ejÍh‚ o¸§ ,K»Bm Ó÷¼· B÷¿A ÔË |δà ÷ÜAË ,OnÎà Æݯ iBNmBI ˆÎÇ É· eÌI OmAi ,OnÎà iBNmBI Æݯ ˆÎÇ .AeBI ÆBÀÈI ,eÌI ÔlΆ ÉÄÍEjÇ djI ÆE ,OmA Æݯ iBNmBI kA ÓajI É· eÌI OmAi ;iBNmBI ÁÇ Ë eÌI Æݯ ÁÇ ÉÄΨI ÔË Ë ,OmA Æݯ É· eÌI ÔiBNmBI ÆE ÆBÀÈI o‚ Æݯ ˆÎÇ É· OmA µY É· ÁÍeÌI ÉN°Œ Ë ,eÌI iBNmBI ÔË É· OnÇ ÓÃݯ o‚
,eÌJà iBNmBI Æݯ ˆÎÇ Æ̆ É· f¿E fÍf‚ o‚ .OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA Ë ,OnÎà iBNmBI .eÌJà Æݯ iBNmBI / ˆÎÇ [58]
ÅN°Œ ÆAÌM É· ,eÌI KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· ÔË o¸§ ÉÄÍEjÇ É· fÍBÎà KUAË ,KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· B÷¿AË Å¸Î»Ë .#OmA Âej¿ ÓÃAÌÎY jÇ$ É· ÅN°Œ ÆAÌNÃ Ë ,#OnÃAÌÎY Ó¿ej¿ jÇ$ É· ,fÃÌI iBNmBI ÆBÃݯ �ÀÇ É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· AjÍk ,KUÌ¿ ÔËlU o¸§ AiËA fÍE KUAË
ɸÃBĆ fÍE KUAË Ë ,eÌJà Æݯ iBNmBI ˆÎÇ ÷ÜAË ,fÃÌI Æݯ ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI É·fÍBI .OmA iBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ É· ÁÍA ÉN°Œ Ë ,eÌJà iBNmBI Æݯ ˆÎÇ É· fq Êej· Af΂
iBNmBI ÆBÃݯ ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI KUÌ¿ ÔËlU ÆE o¸§ ,KUÌ¿ ÔËlU Ë
.ÁÎN°Œ É· OVY ÆBÀÈI / ,fÃÌI Æݯ ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI É· fÍBI ,#fÃÌI [59]
ÉÃ$ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌM É· AjÍk ,eÌI o¸§ Ai ËA É· fÍBÎà KUAË ,K»Bm ÔËlU B÷¿AË .#OnÃAÌÎY Ó¿ej¿ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· ÅN°Œ ÓÃAÌNÃ Ë ,#On¿ej¿ ÓÃAÌÎY jÇ
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13. On Recognizing the Syllogism
To every unknown there is a path by which it becomes known. As regards conceiving or
conception, that path consists of definition and description, both of which we have
[already] mentioned. As regards affirming or assent, the path consists of reasoning.
Reasoning is of three kinds: syllogism, induction, and analogy. (But to argue from what
is present [manifest] to what is absent is also a part of analogy.) The most reliable of
these three is the syllogism, and of all syllogisms, the demonstrative syllogism. But as
long as we do not know what the syllogism as a whole is, we cannot know what the
demonstrative syllogism is.
[60] The syllogism, as a whole, is a discourse in which a number of statements are made,
such that if these statements are admitted, there follows of necessity another statement.
For example, if someone says, “every body is [endowed] with form,” and “everything
that is [endowed] with form is created,” this speech is a syllogism; because whenever
both of these propositions are admitted and conceded, there follows of necessity another
speech, viz., “every body is created.” [61] Likewise, if someone says, “if the world is
[endowed] with form, then the world is created; but the world is [endowed] with form”;
this, too, is a syllogism. For this is a speech composed of two propositions which,
whenever both are admitted, a third speech follows of necessity -- [a speech] other than
these two, although it is a part of one of them -- and that speech is: “the world is created.”
Now, syllogism is of two kinds: one is called connective, the other exceptive.
14. Explication of the Connective Syllogism
[62] Connective syllogism involves the bringing together of two propositions, each of
which has one part in common and is different in the other part. From these [two
propositions] there then results, of necessity, another proposition [made up] of those two
parts that were not shared in common. An example of this is what we said [before], viz.,
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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pBγ ÅNaBÄq ie (13) ,Ai Æej· i÷ÌvM Ë Ai ÆfÎmi ifÃA B÷¿A .eÌq ÉNnÃAe ÔÌI É· OnÎÇAi ÉNnÃAeBà jÈI ,Ai Æej· µÍfvM Ë Ai ÆfÍËjŒ B÷¿AË .ÁÍej· eBÍ Ai Ëe jÇ ÅÍA Ë ,Ámi Ë Om÷fY ÊAi ÆejI ½Î»e B÷¿A) .¾BR¿ Ë ÕAj´NmA Ë pBγ :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ém O÷VY Ë .OmA O÷VY ÊAi kA Ë ,OmA pBγ Ém jÇ ÅÍkA fÀN¨¿ Ë (.OmA ¾BR¿ �¼ÀU kA ÁÇ KÍB¬I fÇBq kA ÅNnÃAe ÁÎÃAÌNà ,eÌI Ɇ ɼÀVI pBγ É· ÁÎÃAfà BM Ë .ÓÃBÇjI pBγ BÈmBγ �¼ÀU
/ .eÌI Ɇ ÓÃBÇjI pBγ É·
fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ Æ̆ É· eÌq ÉN°Œ ÓÃBÄbm ÔË ifÃA É· eÌI ÓÄbm ɼÀVI pBγ Ë [60] ¾BR¿ .ÉÄÍEjÇ fÍE ÂkÜ jNÍe ÔiBN°Œ BVÃE kA ,eÌI Êf¿E ÉN°Œ ÔË ifÃA É· ÓÃBÄbm ÅÍA ,#OmA TfZ¿ Ôi÷Ìv¿ jÇ Ë ,OmA i÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$:fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA ÅÍA Êej· ÁμnM Ë ,fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ É÷Îz³ Ëe jÇ ÅÍA É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· AjÍk ,eÌI pBγ Åbm ÆBćÀÇ Ë / .#OmA TfZ¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ :É· fÍE ÂkÜ jNÍe ÓÄbm BVÄÍA kA ,eÌq [61] Á»B§ Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA TfZ¿ Á»B§ o‚ ,OmA i÷Ìv¿ Á»B§ jŒA$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA
É· É÷Îz³ Ëe kA ±»Û¿ OmA ÓÄbm ÅÍA É· AjÍk ,eÌI pBγ lÎà ÅÍA ;#OmA i÷Ìv¿ ‘iB‚ É· fĆ jÇ ,Ëe jÇ ÅÍA lUfÍE ÂkÜ Â÷Ìm ÓÄbm ,fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ Ëe jÇ É· ÊBŒ jÇ
.#OmA TfZ¿ Á»B§$ :É· OnÃE Åbm ÅÍA Ë OmA ÆBrÍA kA Ó¸Í
/ .ÓÖBÄRNmA Ai Ó¸Í Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÓÃAjN³A Ai Ó¸Í :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe pBγ Ë
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whenever it is conceded that “every body is [endowed] with form,” and “everything that
is [endowed] with form is created,” there follows of necessity [the proposition], “every
body is created.” There are, therefore, two propositions here:
(i): “every body is [endowed] with form”;
[63] (ii): “everything that is [endowed] with form is created.”
The first premise has “body” as one part, and “[endowed] with form” as the other part;
while the second premise has “[endowed] with form” as one part, and “created” as the
other part. Consequently, “[endowed] with form” is a part of both [premises]. However,
one [premise] has “body” alone, and the other has “created” [alone]. This [third]
proposition that has resulted of necessity, has “body” as one part, and “created” as
another part. Now, matters revolve around these three parts: “body,” “[endowed] with
form,” and “created,” which are called terms. Thus, “[endowed] with form” and
everything that is similar to it is called the middle term; “body,” which becomes the
subject in the resulting [proposition] is called the minor term; and “created,” which
becomes the [64] predicate in the resulting [proposition] is called the major term. Both
of those two propositions that are in the syllogism are called premises, and that
proposition which results of necessity is called the conclusion. That [proposition] in
which is [contained] the subject of the conclusion is called the minor premise, and that in
which is [contained] the predicate of the conclusion is called the major premise. The
coming together of these two premises is called connection, and the form of [this] coming
together is called figure.
Now, this form is of three kinds: (a) either the middle term is the predicate in one premise
and the subject in the other -- and this is called the first figure; [65] or (b) the [middle
term] is the predicate in both [premises] -- and this is called the second figure; or (c) the
[middle term] is the subject in both [premises]; -- and this is called the third figure. The
case of the antecedent and consequent [in] a connective [conditional proposition] is the
same as that of the subject and predicate of a predicative [proposition]. No syllogism
results from two negative [propositions], nor from two particular [propositions].
[Likewise,] whenever the minor is negative and its major is particular, no syllogism
results. Thus each figure has its own characteristics.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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ÓÃAjN³A pBγ Æej· Af΂ (14) [62] ÔkBJÃA ÊiB‚ �Í ifÃA Ai Ëe jÇ Ë ,fÃiËE ejŒ Ai É÷Îz³ Ëe É· eÌI ÆE ÓÃAjN³A pBγ Ëe ÆE kA É· ,jNÍe ÔAÉ÷Îz³ fÍE KUAË ÆBrÍA kA o‚ .ÓÍAfU ÊiB‚ jNÍfI Ë ,eÌI Êej· ÁμnM ÊBŒ jÇ É· ÁÎN°Œ ɸÃE ÅÍA ¾BR¿ .eÌJà ÔkBJÃA ÆBrÍA ifÃA É· eÌI ÊiB‚ É· fÍE ÂkÜ BVÄÍA kA ,#OmA TfZ¿ Ôi÷Ìv¿ jÇ Ë Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ :É· fÍE ÓÀnU jÇ$ ɸÃE Ó¸Í :OmA É÷Îz³ Ëe BVÄÍA o‚ .#OmA TfZ¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$
�Í Ai ÅÎr΂ �¿÷f´¿ Ë .#OmA TfZ¿ Ôi÷Ìv¿ jÇ$ ɸÃE jNÍe Ë /;#Omi÷Ìv¿ [63] #i÷Ìv¿$ ËlU �Í Ai Â÷Ëe �¿÷f´¿ Ë ;#i÷Ìv¿$ ËlU jNÍe Ë ,OmA #ÁnU$ ËlU Ai Ó¸Í Å¸Î»Ë .OmA Ëe jÇ ËlU #i÷Ìv¿$ o‚ .#TfZ¿$ ËlU jNÍe Ë ,OmA tËlU �Í ,f¿E ÂkÜ É· É÷Îz³ ÅÍAË .#TfZ¿$ Ai Ó¸Í Ë ,OmBÈÄM #ÁnU$
Ë ÁnU jI :OmA ÊiB‚ Ém ÅÍjI iB· tejŒ Ë .#TfZ¿$ ËlU �Í Ë OmA #ÁnU$ fÃB¿ ÔÌI ɆjÇ Ë Ai #i÷Ìv¿$ o‚ .fÄÃAÌa ÷fY Ai ÆBrÍA Ë ;TfZ¿ Ë i÷Ìv¿
ÅÎÈ· ÷fY fÍE ÂkÜ É‡ÃE ifÃA eÌq ªÌyÌ¿ É· Ai #ÁnU$ Ë ;fÄÃAÌa ÅÎBÃBο ÷fY .fÄÃAÌa ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY fÍE ÂkÜ É‡ÃE ifÃA eÌq ¾ÌÀZ¿ É· / Ai #TfZ¿$ Ë ;fÄÃAÌa [64] ÂkÜ É· Ai É÷Îz³ ÆE Ë ,fÄÃAÌa É¿÷f´¿ OmA pBγ ifÃA É· Ai É÷Îz³ Ëe jÇ ÆE Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÅÎÈ· V¿f´¿ eÌI ÔË ifÃA ÉVÎNà ªÌyÌ¿ É· AjÃE Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÉVÎNà fÍE Ëe ÅÍA Æf¿E ejŒ Ë .fÄÃAÌa ÅÎÈ¿ V¿÷f´¿ eÌI ÔË ifÃA ÉVÎNà ¾ÌÀZ¿ É· AjÃE Ë
.fÄÃAÌa ½¸q Ai Æf¿E ejŒ PiÌu Ë ,fÄÃAÌa ÆAjN³A Ai É¿÷f´¿
ªÌyÌ¿ Ë ,É¿÷f´¿ �Í ifÃA eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ ÅÎNÃBο ÷fY BÍ :eÌI ÉÃÌŒ Ém PiÌu ÅÍAË Ai ÅÍA Ë eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ Ëe jÇ ifÃA BÍ /.fÄÃAÌa ÅÎNnbà ½¸q Ai ÅÍAË ,jNÍe ifÃA Á¸Y Ë .fÄÃAÌa Â÷Ìm ½¸q Ai ÅÍA Ë eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ Ëe jÇ ifÃA BÍ .fÄÃAÌa Â÷Ëe ½¸q [65] kA Ë .OmA Ó¼ÀY ¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ªÌyÌ¿ Á¸Y É· OmA ÅÎćÀÇ ½v÷N¿ kA Ó»BM Ë Â÷f´¿ eÌI K»Bm Ôj¬u É· ÊBŒjÇ Ë .fÍBÎà pBγ ÔËlU Ëe kA Ë ,fÍBÎà pBγ K»Bm Ëe
.OmBÈNÎuÌva Ai Ó¼¸q jÇ o‚ .fÍBÎà pBγ eÌI ÔËlU sÍjJ· Ë
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15. Exposition of the Moods of the Syllogisms of the First Figure
The first figure has two merits: one is that its syllogisms do not require any proof in order
to establish that they are syllogisms (which is not the case for the other two figures); [66]
the other is that all four definite [propositions] (namely, the universal affirmative,
universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative) can be made into the
conclusion of this figure, whereas in the second figure no conclusion is affirmative, and
in the third figure no conclusion is universal, as will become evident [below].
In order for the conjuncts of the first figure to become a syllogism, two conditions [must
be fulfilled]: (i) their minor must be affirmative;
(ii) their major must be universal.
If this is not the case, it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false;
[67] but everything whose conclusion is not in every case true, when its premises are
true, is not a syllogism. Consequently, as these are the two [requisite] conditions, the
syllogisms of this figure are four [in number].
(a) First Syllogism: [consisting of] two universal affirmatives.
Example: If someone says, “every A is B,” and “every B is C”; from here the conclusion
follows that “every A is C.” Thus when you say, “every body is [endowed] with form,”
and “everything [endowed] with form [68] is created,” from here the conclusion follows
that “every body is created”; and this is a universal affirmative conclusion.
(b) Second Syllogism: [consisting of] two universals, but with the major negative.
For example, when someone says, “every A is B,” and “no B is C,” the conclusion
follows that “no A is C.” E.g.: “every body is [endowed] with form,” and “nothing [that
has been endowed] with form is pre-eternal”; whence it necessarily follows that “no body
is pre-eternal”; and this conclusion is a universal negative.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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¾÷ËA ½¸q ÔBÈmBγ ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃkBI (15) Omie É· fÍBJà ÓN÷VY AiËA ÔBÈmBγ ɸÃE Ó¸Í :OmA O¼Îz¯ Ëe Ai ¾÷ËA ½¸q jÇ É¸ÃE jNÍe Ë / ;(jNÍe ½¸q Ëe ¾BY OmA ÅÎĆ Éà Ë) fÃApBγ É· fÄ· [66] ÔËlU Ë KUÌ¿ ÔËlU Ë K»Bm Ó÷¼· Ë OmA KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· É·) Ai ÊiÌvZ¿ iBȆ Ë ,eÌJà KUÌ¿ ÉVÎNà ˆÎÇ Â÷Ëe ½¸q ifÃA Ë ,ej· fÍBq ÉVÎNà ÔË ifÃA (K»Bm
.eÌq Af΂ eÌa ɸÃBĆ ,eÌJà Ó÷¼· ÉVÎNà ˆÎÇ Â÷Ìm ½¸q ifÃA
:OmA ¢jq Ëe Ai ÅÎNnbà ½¸q ÔBÈÃAjN³A Æfq pBγj¿ Ë .eÌI KUÌ¿ É· fÍBI ÆBqAj¬u É· OnÃE Ó¸Í .eÌI Ó÷¼· É· fÍBI ÆBqAjJ· É· OnÃE jNÍe Ë
Ɇ jÇ Ë ,eÌI / ®Ëie ÉVÎNÃ Ë fÃÌI OmAi BÈ¿f´¿ É· fÍBq ,eÌJà ÅÎĆ jŒAË [67] .eÌJà pBγ ÆE ,fÃÌI OmAi sMB¿f´¿ Æ̆ ,¾BY ÷½· Ó¼§ eÌJà OmAi ÔË �VÎNÃ
.fÃÌI iBȆ ½¸q ÅÍA ÔBÈmBγ ,OmA ¢jq Ëe ÅÍA ,¢jq Æ̆ o‚
.KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :ÅÎNnbà pBγ kA ,#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë OmA iBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ$fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA :ÔË ¾BR¿ Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ .#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ$É· fÍE ÉVÎNà BVÄÍA ,#OmA TfZ¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà BVÄÍA kA ,#OmA TfZ¿ / Ôi÷Ìv¿ jÇ Ë [68]
.OmA KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· �VÎNÃ ÅÍA Ë
.K»Bm ÔjJ· Å¸Î»Ë Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :Â÷Ëe pBγ ,#eÌJà ÆBÀÈI iBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë ,OmA iBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ
Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ .#eÌJà ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ˆÎÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ÅÍA Ë #eÌJà ÁÍf³ ÁnU ˆÎÇ$ É· fÍE ÂkÜ BVÄÍA kA ,#eÌJà ÁÍf³ i÷Ìv¿ ˆÎÇ Ë
.OmA K»Bm Ó÷¼· ÉVÎNÃ
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(c) Third Syllogism: [consisting of] particular affirmative minor and universal
affirmative major. [69] E.g., someone says, “some substances are soul,” and “every soul
receives the form of knowledge”; hence, “some substances receive the form of
knowledge”; and this is a particular affirmative conclusion.
(d) Fourth Syllogism: [consisting of] particular affirmative minor and universal
negative major. E.g., someone says, “some substances are soul,” and “no soul is body”;
hence, “some substances are not body.”
The syllogisms of the connective [conditionals] are also in this way.
16. Syllogisms of the Second Figure
The [requirements] of the syllogism of the second figure are:
(i) that one premise be affirmative, the other negative;
(ii) that the major premise be in every case universal.
Consequently, the syllogisms [70] of [the second figure] are four.
(a) First [Syllogism]: [consisting of] two universals and a negative major.
E.g., “every A is B,” and “no C is B”; whence the conclusion: “no A is C.” The proof of
it is that since our saying, “no C is B,” is true, therefore its conversion (viz., “no B is C”)
is [also] true (as has been stated in the section on conversion). Hence when we say,
“every A is B,” and “no B is C,” this conclusion, viz., “no A is C,” is true.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
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/ .Ó÷¼· KUÌ¿ ÔjJ· Ë ÔËlU KUÌ¿ Ôj¬u kA :Â÷Ìm pBγ ,#ejÍh‚ Á¼§ PiÌu Ón°Ã jÇ Ë OmA o°Ã BÇjÇÌŒ ÓajI$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ [69]
.OmA KUÌ¿ ÔËlU ÉVÎNà ÅÍA Ë ;#ejÍh‚ Á¼§ PiÌu BÇjÇÌŒ ÓajI$ o‚
.Ó÷¼· K»Bm ÔjJ· Ë ÔËlU KUÌ¿ Ôj¬u kA :ÂiBȆ pBγ o‚ ,#OnÎà ÁnU o°Ã ˆÎÇ Ë OmA o°Ã BÇjÇÌŒ Óz¨I$:fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ
.#OnÎà ÁnU BÇjÇÌŒ ÓajI$
.eÌI ÆBm ÅÍjI ÁÇ PÝv÷N¿ ÔBÈmBγ Ë
Â÷Ëe ½¸q ÔBÈmBγ (16) ;K»Bm Ó¸ÍË ,eÌI KUÌ¿ É¿÷f´¿ Ó¸Í É· OnÃE Â÷Ëe ½¸q pBγ ÓNmie ¢jq
.eÌI iBȆ ÔË / ÔBÈmBγ o‚ .eÌI Ó÷¼· ¾BY jÈI ÔjJ· É¿÷f´¿ Ë [70]
.K»Bm ÔjJ· Ë Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :ÅÎNnbà BVÄÍA kA ,#OnÎà iBNmBI ÆBÀÈI ˆÎÇ Ë OmA iBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ$:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ
ÆBÀÈI ˆÎÇ$ B¿ iBN°Œ Æ̆ ɸÃE ÆBÇjI .#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ˆÎÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà µY (#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI iBNmBI ˆÎÇ$ É·) ÔË o¸§ o‚ ,OmA µY #OnÎà iBNmBI iBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ$ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ Æ̆ o‚ .o¸§ LBI ifÃA Omf¿E ÉN°Œ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ˆÎÇ$ :É· eÌI Omie ÉVÎNà ÅÍA ,#OnÎà ÆBÀÈIiBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë OmA
.#OnÎÃ
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(b) Second [Syllogism]: [consisting of] two universals and a negative minor.
E.g., “no A is B,” and “every C is B”; conclusion: “no A is C.” For [71] if you convert
the minor, and invert the two premises, it becomes thus: “every C is B,” and “no B is A”;
conclusion: “no C is A.” This conclusion admits of conversion and becomes the former
conclusion, viz., “no A is C.”
(c) Third [Syllogism]: [consisting of] a particular affirmative minor and a
universal negative major. E.g., “some As are B,” and “no C is B”; conclusion: “some As
are not C.” For the major admits of conversion and then becomes the fourth [syllogism]
[72] of the first figure and yields the same conclusion.
(d) Fourth [Syllogism]: [consisting of] a particular negative minor, and a
universal affirmative major. E.g., “some A is not B,” and “every C is B”; conclusion:
“some A is not C.” But this conclusion cannot be established by way of conversion
because the minor is a particular negative and does not admit of conversion, while the
major is a universal affirmative whose conversion is a particular: [73] when you bring the
convert [of the major] together with the minor, [there will be] two particulars, and from
two particulars no syllogism follows. Hence in order to show that [this syllogism] yields
a conclusion there are two strategies: (i) one is called demonstration by supposition, (ii)
the other [is called] demonstration by reductio ad absurdum.
(i) As for the way of supposition, it consists in this. When you have said, “some
A is not B,” that “some” is necessarily something – say, D. Then we say, “no D is B,”
and “every C is B.” The conclusion follows that “no D is C.” Once this has become
established, we say, “some A is D,” and “no D is C.” Hence from this statement it has
been established that “some A is not C.”
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27
.K»Bm Ôj¬u Ë Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :Â÷Ëe É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ Ë OnÎà iBNmBI Æݯ ˆÎÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ Ai ÅÎN¿f´¿ Ë ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u Æ̆ / É· AjÍk ;#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ˆÎÇ$ [71] ,#OnÎà Æݯ iBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë OmA iBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ$ É· eÌq ÅÎĆ ,ÓÄ· ½ÍfJM ÅÎr΂ �VÎNÃ Ë ejÍh‚ o¸§ ÉVÎNà ÅÍA Ë #OnÎà Æݯ ÆBÀÈI ˆÎÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ
.#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ˆÎÇ$ :É· eÌq
.ÔjJ· K»Bm Ó÷¼· Ë ,Ôj¬u KUÌ¿ ÔËlU kA :ÂÌ÷Îm fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OnÎà iBNmBI ÆBÀÈI ˆÎÇ Ë fÃiBNmBI ÆBÃݯ ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ÂiBȇI ÊBNÃE Ë ejÍh‚ o¸§ ÔjJ· É· AjÍk ,#fÃA ÆBÀÈI Éà ÆBÃݯ ÓajI$ É·
.eiE ÉVÎNà ÅÎÀÇ Ë eÌq ¾÷ËA ½¸q / [pBγ] [72]
.ÔjJ· KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· Ë ,Ôj¬u K»Bm ÔËlU kA :ÂiBȆ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OmiBNmBI ÆBÀÈI jÇ Ë OnÎà iBNmBI Æݯ ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,Æej· Omie fÍBrà o¸§ ÊAjI Ai Æf¿E ÉVÎNà ÅÍA Ë .#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ÓajI$ Ë OmA KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· ÔjJ· Ë ,ejÍhƒÃ o¸§ Ë OmA K»Bm ÔËlU Ôj¬u É· AjÍk
,fÃÌI ÔËlU Ëe ÔiËE ejŒ Ôj¬u BI Ai ÔË o¸§ Æ̆ Ë / ;eÌI ÔËlU ÔË o¸§ [73] :OmA jÎIfM Ëe Ai ÔË ÆeiËE ÉVÎNà Æej· fÍf‚ j¿ o‚ .fÍBÎà pBγ ÔËlU Ëe kA Ë
.ô±ô¼óa Ai Ó¸Í Ë fÄÍÌŒ ~AjN¯A Ai Ó¸Í ÆE ,#OnÎà iBNmBI Æݯ ÓajI$ ÓN°Œ Æ̆ :É· OnÃE ~AjN¯A ÊAi B÷¿A iBNmBI ÆE ˆÎÇ$ ÁÎÍÌŒ o‚ .AeBI #ÆE$ lΆ ÆE ,eÌI ÔlΆ É»BZ¿Ü #ÓajI$ Æ̆ .#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI ÆE ˆÎÇ$ :É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ Ë OnÎà ÅÍkA o‚ .#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI ÆE ˆÎÇ Ë OmA ÆE Æݯ ÓajI$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ,fq Omie ÅÍA
/ .#eÌI ÆBÀÈI Æݯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· fq Omie ¾Ì³
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[74] (ii) As for the way of reductio ad absurdum, it consists in this. If our
[conclusion] “some A is not C,” is false, then all A must be C. We have said that “every
C is B,” hence all A must be B. But we had said that “not every A is B” – this is
impossible, so the conclusion is true.
17. Syllogisms of the Third Figure
The [requisite] conditions for the syllogisms of this figure are:
(i) that the minor always be affirmative;
(ii) that one [75] premise (whichever it may be) be universal.
Consequently, the syllogisms of this figure are six [in number].
(a) First [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two universal affirmatives.
E.g., “every B is A,” and “every B is C”; conclusion: “some A is C.” For when you
convert the minor, [the syllogism] becomes: “some As are B,” and “every B is C,” and it
returns to the third syllogism of the first figure, yielding the conclusion [“some A is C”].
(b) Second [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two universals, [with] the major negative.
[76] E.g., “every B is A,” and “no B is C”; conclusion: “some A is not C.” For when
you convert the minor, it becomes the fourth [syllogism] of the first figure.
(c) Third [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two affirmatives, [with] the minor
particular. E.g., “some Bs are A,” and “every B is C”; conclusion: “some As are C.” For
when you convert the minor, it becomes the third [syllogism] of the first figure.
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#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ÓajI$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ jŒA :ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE ±¼a ÊAi B÷¿AË [74] ,#OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ$ É· ÁÎN°Œ Ë .eÌI ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ÉÀÇ fÍBI o‚ ,OmA ®Ëie .#OmA iBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· ÁÍeÌI ÉN°Œ Ë .eÌI iBNmBI Æݯ ÉÀÇ É· fÍBI o‚
.OmA Omie ÉVÎNÃ o‚ ,OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA
ÂÌ÷Îm ½¸q ÔBÈmBγ (17) É¿÷f´¿ /Ó¸Í Ë ,ÉÄÍEjÇ eÌI KUÌ¿ Ôj¬u É· OnÃE ½¸q ÅÍA ÔBÈmBγ ¢jq [75]
.fÃÌI sq ½¸q ÅÍA ÔBÈmBγ o‚ .eÌI Ó÷¼· (eÌI É· ÂAf· jÇ)
.KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :ÅÎNnbà fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë OmA Æݯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ eÌq ÅÎĆ ,ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u Æ̆ É· AjÍk .#eÌI ÆBÀÈI Æݯ kA ÓajI$ É· ½¸q kA ÂÌ÷Îm pBδI Ë ,#eÌI ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë fÃÌI iBNmBI ÆBÃݯ ÓajI$ É·
.fÍE ÉVÎNà ÅÍA Ë eejŒkBI ¾÷ËA
/ .K»Bm ÔjJ· Ë ,Ó÷¼· Ëe kA :Â÷Ëe fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë OnÃݯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ [76] [pBγ] ÂiBȇI ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u Æ̆ É· AjÍk .#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É·
.eÌq ÅÎNnbà ½¸q
.ÔËlU Ôj¬u Ë ,KUÌ¿ Ëe kA ÂÌ÷Îm fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë fÃA Æݯ ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ [pBγ] ÂÌm ,ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u Æ̆ É· AjÍk .#fÃA ÆBÀÈI ÆBÃݯ ÓajI$ É·
.eÌq ÅÎNnbà ½¸q
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(d) Fourth [Syllogism]: [consisting] of two affirmatives, [with] the major
particular. E.g., “every B is A,” [77] and “some Bs are C”; conclusion: “some As are C.”
For when you convert the major and say: “some Cs are B,” and “every B is A,” the
conclusion follows that “some Cs are A”; and then its conversion would be true, viz.,
“some As are C.”
(e) Fifth [Syllogism]: its minor is universal affirmative; its major particular
negative. E.g., “every B is A,” and “some B is not C”; [78] the conclusion follows that
“some A is not C.” This cannot be demonstrated by conversion, just as we stated in that
other case [sc. the fourth syllogism of the second figure]; however, it can be
demonstrated by [the method of] supposition and reductio ad absurdum.
As for [the method of] supposition, it is thus: let that B which is not C, be D, so
that no D is C. So we shall say, “every B is A,” and “some B is D”; the conclusion
follows that “some A is D.” We shall then say, “no D is C”; the conclusion follows that
“some A is not C.”
As for the method of reductio ad absurdum, it is this: if our [conclusion] “some A
is not C” is false, then every A is C. If we say, “every B is A,” and “every A is C,” the
conclusion follows that “every B is C.” [79] But we had said that “not every B is C.”
This is impossible, hence the conclusion that resulted is true.
(f) Sixth [Syllogism]: [consisting] of particular affirmative minor, and universal
negative major. E.g., “some Bs are A,” and “no B is C”; conclusion: “some A is not C.”
For when you convert the minor, it becomes the fourth [80] [syllogism] of the former [sc.
first] figure.
Likewise, for connective [conditionals] there are also two other figures where you replace
the subject and predicate with the antecedent and consequent.
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.ÔËlU ÔjJ· Ë ,KUÌ¿ Ëe kA :ÂiBȆ fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#fÄÃBÀÈI ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI Ë /,OnÃݯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ [77] ÓajI$ ÓÍÌŒ Ë ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai ÔjJ· Æ̆ É· AjÍk .#fÃA ÆBÀÈI ÆBÃݯ ÓajI$ É· ÆBÃBÀÈI ÓajI$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OmA Æݯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ Ë ,fÃAiBNmBI ÆBÃBÀÈI
.#fÄÃBÀÈI ÆBÃݯ ÓajI$ É· eÌI Omie ÔË o¸§ ÊBNÃE Ë ,#fÄÃݯ
.K»Bm ÔËlU sÍjJ· Ë ,eÌI KUÌ¿ Ó÷¼· sÍj¬u :ÁVÄ‚ / ,#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ ÉÃ Ë ,OmA Æݯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ Æej· Af΂ fÍBrà o¸¨I Ai ÅÍA Ë .#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà [78]
.±¼bI Ë Æej· fÍBq ~AjN¯BI Å¸Î»Ë ,ÁÎN°Œ Ai jNÍe ÆE É· ÆBćÀÇ ˆÎÇ BM ,AeBI ÆE ,OnÎà ÆBÀÈI É· iBNmBI ÆE :É· eÌI ÆBĆ ~AjN¯A B÷¿A ;#OnÃE iBNmBI ÓajI Ë OnÃݯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ :É· ÁÎÍÌŒ o‚ .eÌJà ÆBÀÈI ÆE ,#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI ÆE ˆÎÇ$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ÊBNÃE .#OmA ÆE Æݯ ÓajI$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNÃ
.#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI Æݯ ÓajI$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà #OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ ÉÃ$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ jŒA :É· OnÃE ±¼a µÍjO B÷¿AË jÇ Ë OnÃݯ ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ Æ̆ .OmA ÆBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ o‚ ,On«Ëie É· ÁÍeÌI ÉN°Œ Ë /.#OmA ÆBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃݯ [79] .OmA Omie f¿E É· ÉVÎNà ÆE o‚ ,OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA .#OnÃBÀÈI ÔiBNmBI jÇ ÉÃ$
.Ó÷¼· K»Bm ÔjJ· Ë ,ÔËlU KUÌ¿ Ôj¬u kA :Árq
ÉVÎNà ,#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI iBNmBI ˆÎÇ Ë ,OmA Æݯ ÆAiBNmBI ÓajI$:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ / ÂiBȇI ,ÓÄ· o¸§ Ai Ôj¬u Æ̆ É· AjÍk .#OnÎà ÆBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ$ É· fÍE
.eÌq ÅÎr΂ ½¸q [pBγ] [80] Â÷f´¿ ,¾ÌÀZ¿ Ë ªÌyÌ¿ ¾fI É· Ai PÝv÷N¿ j¿ eÌI jNÍe ½¸q Ëe lÎà ÅÎćÀÇ Ë
.ÓÄ· Ó»BM Ë
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18. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Connective [Conditionals]
Exceptive syllogisms [derived] from connective [conditionals] consist of a connective
[premise] and an exceptive [premise]. For example, you say, “if so-and-so has a fever,
his pulse is fast”; this is a connective [premise]. And you add, “but so-and-so has a
fever”; this is the exceptive. From here the conclusion results that “so-and-so has a fast
pulse.”
These syllogisms are of two kinds. [81]
(a) One is that the exceptive be identical to the antecedent and yield a conclusion
identical to the consequent, as we have [just] said.
(b) The other is that the exceptive be the contradictory of the consequent, e.g., in
[the above] example you say: “but his pulse is not fast.” [This] yields a conclusion
contradictory to the antecedent, viz., “therefore so-and-so does not have a fever.”
If you make the contradictory of the antecedent the exceptive, saying, “so-and-so does
not have a fever,” the conclusion does not result that “the pulse of so-and-so is fast (or is
not fast).” Similarly, if you make the exceptive identical to the consequent, as when you
say, “but his pulse is fast,” the conclusion does not result that “he has (or does not have) a
fever.”
19. Exceptive Syllogisms [derived] from Disjunctive [conditionals]
If the disjunctive consists of two parts, and you make the exceptive identical to either one
of them, [82] it yields [as] conclusion the contradictory of the other. For example, you
say, “this number is either even or odd,” “but it is even”; therefore you will say, “it is not
odd”. [Or else] “but it is odd”; therefore you will say, “it is not even.” But if you make
the contradictory of either part the exceptive, it would yield a conclusion identical to the
other [part]. For example, you say, “but it is not odd”; therefore “it is even;” [or] “it is
not even”; therefore “it is odd.” This is the case in true disjunctives, whereas in those
that are not true [disjunctives] it may be the case that it is not thus.
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PÝv÷N¿ kA ÓÖBÄRNmA ÔBÈmBγ (18) j¿ jŒA$:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÓÖBÄRNmAË fÍE Ó¼v÷N¿ kA PÝv÷N¿ kA ÓÖBÄRNmA ÔBÈmBγ KM ŸλË$ :ÓÍÌŒ kBI Ë .OmA ½v÷N¿ ÅÍA Ë ,#eÌI lÎM ÔË –i ,eiAe KM Ai Æݯ .#eÌI lÎM –i Ai Æݯ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà BVÄÍA kA ;OmBÄRNmA ÅÍA Ë ,#Ai Æݯ eiAe
/ :eÌI ÉÃÌŒ Ëe BÈmBγ ÅÍAË
;ÁÎN°Œ ɸÃBĆ ,Ai Ó»BM ÅΧ eiE ÉVÎNÃ Ë eÌI Â÷f´¿ ÅΧ BÄRNmA É· eÌI ÆE Ó¸Í [81] –i ŸλË$ :¾BR¿ ÅÍBI ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI Ó»BM |δà BÄRNmA É· eÌI ÆE jBÍe .#OnÎà KM Ai Æݯ o‚$ É· Ai Â÷f´¿ |δà eiE ÉVÎNà .#OnÎà lÎM ÔË
É· fÍBÎà ÉVÎNà ,#eiAfà KM Ai Æݯ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· Ai Â÷f´¿ |δà ÓÄ· BÄRNmA jŒAË :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ÓÄ· Ó»BM ÅΧ BÄRNmA jŒA ÆBćÀÇ Ë .#OnÎà BÍ OmlÎM Æݯ –i$
.#teiAfà BÍ teiAe KM$ É· fÍBÎà ÉVÎNà ,#OmA lÎM ÔË –i ŸλË$
PÝv°Ä¿ kA ÓÖBÄRNmA ÔBÈmBγ (19) eiËE ÉVÎNà / fqBI É· ÂAf· jÇ ÅΧ kA ÓÄ· BÄRNmA Ë eÌI ËlU Ëe kA ½v°Ä¿ jŒA [82] ,#OmA O°U Ÿλ ;¶BW BÍ eÌI O°U BÍ iBÀq ÅÍA$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,Ai Â÷Ëe |δà B÷¿AË ,#OnÎà O°U$ :ÓÍÌŒ o‚ ,#OmA ¶BW ŸλË$ ;#OnÎà ¶BW$ :ÓÍÌŒ o‚ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,jNÍe ÅΧ eiËE ÉVÎNà ,fqBI É· ÂAf· jÇ ,ÓÄ· |δà BÄRNmA jŒA ,#OmA ¶BW$ o‚ #OnÎà O°U Ÿλ$ ;#OmA O°U$ o‚ ,#OnÎà ¶BW Ÿλ$ .eÌI ÅÎĆ Éà ɷ fqBI Á¸Y ӴδYBà ifÃA Ë ,eÌI ӴδY PÝv°Ä¿ ifÃA Á¸Y ÅÍAË
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31
But if the disjunctive has more than two parts, whichever part you make the exceptive
from that whole [set] will negate the remainder. E.g., “this number is either greater [than
that number], or it is less, or it is equal”; “but this number is greater”; conclusion:
“therefore it is not equal or less.” And [if] you make the contradictory of any of the parts
the exceptive, the conclusion would be the remainder [of the proposition] in the way that
it is, [83] until one [part] remains. E.g., “but it is not greater”; conclusion: “either it is
equal or it is less.”
20. Composite Syllogisms
It is not the case that all conclusions come from a single syllogism or that two premises
are [always] sufficient; rather, it may be that a single problem is resolved by many
syllogisms. For example, a conclusion is drawn from two premises, and that conclusion
then becomes once more the premise for another syllogism and so on in this way until it
is the final [84] conclusion of the problem. Not all syllogisms are expressed in this well-
arranged order, but there are many instances when some premises are omitted, either for
[the sake of] brevity or for [some] expedient; and there are many instances when the
premises are inverted out of order. However, in reality, it comes back in the end to these
syllogisms of which we have spoken.
We will provide this discourse with an example [drawn] from the science of geometry,
and this example is the first figure from the book of Euclid.
We have a line AB, and we want to draw on this line, [85] by demonstration, a three-
sided figure (called a triangle) each side of which is equal to the other sides. We assert:
whenever we make point A the center of the compass, open [the compass] to point B and
[draw] a circle around A; then come back once again and make point B the center, and
draw a circle [with the radius extended] as far as point A around B – [the two circles thus
formed] will necessarily intersect one another. Let us mark the point of intersection C,
and let us draw a straight line from that point to A, and [another] straight line to B.
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ÆE kA ÓÄ· BÄRNmA É· ÂAf· jÇ ÅΧ ,eÌI Ëe kA sÎI BÇËlU Ai ½v°Ä¿ jŒA B÷¿A Ë ;jIAjI BÍ Á· BÍ OnÃËl¯A BÍ iBÀq ÅÍA$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ejÎŒjI Ai Ó³BI ,ɼÀU |Î´Ã Ë ;#OnÎà Á· Ë jIAjI o‚$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OnÃËl¯A iBÀq ÅÍA ŸλË
.fÃB¿ Ó¸Í É· ÊBNÃE BM /,eÌI É· ÆBćÀÇ eÌI Ó³BI ÉVÎNà ÓÄ· BÄRNmA É· ÂAf· jÇ [83] .#Á· BÍ OmjIAjI BÍ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OnÎà ÆËl¯A ŸλË$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ
K÷·j¿ ÔBÈmBγ (20) Ó¸Í É· eÌI ɸ¼I ;fqBI oI É¿÷f´¿ Ëe BÍ fÍBÎI pBγ Ó¸Í kA BÇ ÉVÎNà �ÀÇ Éà ÆE kBI ,fÃiE ÉVÎNà ɿ÷f´¿ Ëe kA ɸÃBĆ ,eÌq Omie iBÎnI ÔBÈmBδI ɼ×n¿
�VÎNà / ÅÍjaE BM eÌq ÓÀÇ ÆBćÀÇ Ë Ai jNÍe ÓmBγ eÌq É¿÷f´¿ ÉVÎNà [84] eÌI iBÎnI Å¸Î»Ë ,fÄÍÌŒ ÉNmAiE KÎMjM ÅÍjI Ai BÈmBγ ÉÀÇ ÉÃ Ë .eÌI ɼ×n¿ É· eÌI iBÎnI Ë .Ai O¼ÎYj¿ BÍ Ai iBvNaAj¿ ,fÄĸ°ÎI Ai BÇ É¿÷f´¿ Óz¨I É· B¿ É· fÍE BÈmBγ ÅÍfI jaE O´Î´ZI Å¸Î»Ë ,fÄÄ· jÎaDM Ë ÁÍf´M Ai BÇ É¿÷f´¿
.ÁÎN°Œ
kA AeBI ÅÎNnbà ½¸q ¾BR¿ ÅÍA Ë ÉmfÄÇ Á¼§ kA ÁÍiËE Ó»BR¿ Ai Åbm ÅÍA Ë .pfμ³A LBN·
Ó¼¸q ÆBÇjJI / ¡a ÅÍjI É· ÁÎÇAÌa ÓÀÇ Ë ,AeBI #LA$ ÔË ÆBrà OnÎ÷ña Ai B¿ [85] .eÌI jNÍf¸Í fćÀÇ ÔË kA Ô̼Ȃ jÇ É· (fÄÃAÌa S¼R¿ Ai ËA É·) Ìm Ém ÁÎÄ· #L$ �ñ´Ã BM Ë ÁÎÄ· iBŒj‚ l·j¿ Ai #A$ �ñ´Ã É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ Ë ÁÎÄ· Ô̧e ÔiËfI Ë ÁÎÄ· l·j¿ Ai #L$ �ñ´Ã Ë ÁÎÖBÎI kBI Ë ,#A$ ejŒ ÁÎÄ· ÊjÍAe Ë ÁÎÖBrNI �ñ´Ã ÊBNÃfÍjI jI .fÃjI É»BZ¿Ü Ai jNÍej¿ �Í ,#L$ ejŒ ÁÎÄ· ÊjÍAe #A$ �ñ´Ã
.#L$ ÉI OmAi Ó÷ñaË ÁÍiËE #A$ ÉI OmAi Ó÷ña O¿Ý§ ÆE kA Ë ÁÎÄ· O¿Ý§ #X$
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C
B A
We say, then, that this figure which is enclosed by the points ABC is [86] a triangle with
all three sides equal. The proof of this is that the two lines AB and AC are equal, for they
have been traced from the center to the circumference. Likewise, the two lines BA and
BC are equal, because each one of them is equal to line AB. Hence on line AB we have
constructed a triangle whose three sides are equal.
So in speech syllogism is employed in this way; in reality it is such as I am going to say.
There are four [87] syllogisms here, all from the first figure.
(a) The first [syllogism] is this: The two lines AB and AC are two straight lines
that extend from the center to the circumference; every straight line that extends from the
center to the circumference is equal; conclusion: the two lines AB and AC are equal.
(b) Another [syllogism]: The same is the case for the two lines BA and BC.
(c) Third [syllogism]: The two lines AC and BC are two lines that are equal to
the single line AB; any two lines that are equal to a single line are equal to one another.
[88] Conclusion: the two lines AB and AC are both equal.
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X
L A
OmA ÓR¼R¿ / OmA #X ,L ,A$ ÔBÇ Éñ´Ã ÆBο ifÃA É· ½¸q ÅÍA É· ÁÎÍÌŒ o‚ kA É· AjÍk ,fÃjIAjI #X A$ Ë #L A$ ¡a Ëe É· OnÃE ÅÍA ÆBÇjI .jIAjI ̼Ȃ Ém jÇ [86] ¡a Ëe Ë ,fÃjIAjI #X L$ Ë #A L$ ¡a Ëe ÅÎćÀÇ Ë .fÃA Êf¿E ¡ÎZÀI l·j¿ ¡a jI o‚ .fÃA #L A$ ¡a jIAjI Ó¸Í jÇ É· AjÍk ,fÃjIAjI #X L$ Ë #X A$
.fÃjIAjI ËA Ô̼Ȃ Ém jÇ É· ÁÍej· ÓR¼R¿ #L A$
:ÅN°Œ ÁÇAÌa Å¿ É· eÌI ÅÎĆ O´Î´ZI Ë .fÃjI iB¸I ÅÎĆ pBγ Åbm ifÃA o‚ .¾÷ËA ½¸q kA ÉÀÇ OmA pBγ / iBȆ BVÄÍA [87]
¡ÎZÀI l·j¿ kA É· fÃA OmAi ¡a Ëe #X A$ Ë #L A$ ¡a Ëe :OnÄÍA ÅÎNnbà Ëe É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ;fÃÌI jIAjI fÄÍE ¡ÎZÀI l·j¿ kA É· OmAi Óña Ëe jÇ Ë ,fÃf¿E
.fÃjIAjI #X A$ Ë #L A$ ¡a
.Ai #X L$ Ë #A L$ ¡a Ëe j¿ ÅÎćÀÇ :jBÍeË
jÇ Ë ,fÃA #L A$ ¡a �Í jIAjI É· fÃA ¡a Ëe #X L$ Ë #X A$ ¡a Ëe :ÂÌ÷ÎmË #L A$ ¡a Ëe É· fÍE ÉVÎNà / .fÃÌI jIAjI Ëe jÇ ,fÃÌI ¡a �Í jIAjI É· Ó÷ña Ëe [88]
.fÃjIAjI Ëe jÇ #X A$ Ë
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(d) Fourth [syllogism]: The figure ABC that has been constructed on line AB, is
bounded by three equal lines; everything that is bounded by three lines that are equal is a
triangle whose three sides are equal. Conclusion: the figure ABC, constructed on line
AB, is a triangle with all its three sides equal.
It is necessary that other problems be resolved according to this reasoning.
21. Syllogism by reductio ad absurdum
Among composite syllogisms there is one called syllogism by reductio ad absurdum.
[89] The difference between this syllogism and the preceding one (called direct or
straight syllogism) is that the syllogism by reductio ad absurdum establishes its
conclusion by [proving] the invalidity of its contrary; and it proves the invalidity of its
contrary by showing that it necessarily results in an impossibility. Everything from
which an impossibility results of necessity, is [itself] impossible; for, since the impossible
does not exist, that which cannot but be from the impossible never exists.
This syllogism by reductio ad absurdum is composed of two syllogisms: One is a
syllogism which I discovered among the unknown conjunctive syllogisms; and one is the
exceptive syllogism. Example of this: someone wants to establish [90] that every A is B;
he says, “if not every A is B, while we know that every C is B (this is, for example,
without doubt), it necessarily follows from this that not every A is C.” However, this is
impossible, for the opponent admits, for example, that this is impossible. Hence our
saying that “every A is B” is true.
In tackling this discourse by direct syllogisms, people have undertaken a lengthy labor,
and have themselves abandoned it. Now Aristotle has alluded to what I am going to say;
however, he went as far as saying that the reductio ad absurdum comes from the
conditional [syllogism]. Hence the demonstration of [the fact] that reductio ad absurdum
comes from the conditional is what I am going to speak of.
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,OmA jIAjI ¡a Ém ÔË ejNI OnÇ #L A$ ¡a jI É· #X L A$ ½¸q :ÂiBÈ†Ë ÉVÎNà .jIAjI t̼Ȃ Ém jÇ eÌI ÓR¼R¿ ÔË ,fÃÌI jIAjI ¡a Ém ÔË ejNI Ɇ jÇ Ë .jIAjI t̼Ȃ Ém jÇ OmA ÓR¼R¿ ,OnÇ #L A$ ¡a jI É· #X L A$ ½¸q É· fÍE
.fÍE Êej· pBγ ÅÍjI Bȼ×n¿ jNÍe É· fÍBI Ë
±¼a pBγ (21) ÆBο ¶j¯ Ë / .fÄÃAÌa ±¼a pBγ Ai ËA É· OmA ÓmBγ K÷·j¿ ÔBÈmBγ �¼ÀU kA [89] pBγ É· OnÃE (fÄÃAÌa ÁδNn¿ pBγ Ë OmAi pBγ Ai ËA É·) ÅÎr΂ Ë ±¼a ½WBI ÆAfI Ai ËA ²Ýa Ë ,fÄ· ½WBI Ai ËA ²Ýa É· ÆAfI fÄ· Omie Ai Ô̧e ±¼a ,É· AjÍk ,eÌI ¾BZ¿ fÍE ÂkÜ ¾BZ¿ ÔË kA ɆjÇ Ë ,eiËE ÂkÜ ¾BZ¿ ÔË kA É· fÄ·
.eÌJà OnÎà tiB† ¾BZ¿ kA ɸÃE lŒjÇ ,eÌJà ¾BZ¿ Æ̆
ÔBÈmBγ �¼ÀU kA OmA ÓmBγ Ó¸Í :pBγ Ëe kA OmA K÷·j¿ ±¼a pBγ ÅÍA Ë É¸ÃE ÅÍA ¾BR¿ .ÓÖBÄRNmA pBγ Ó¸Í Ë ;ÂA ÊeiËE ÆËjÎI Å¿ É· KÍj« ÓÃAjN³A ÓÃݯ jÇ Éà jŒA$ :fÍÌŒ ,OmA iBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ É· / Æej· fÇAÌa Omie Ón· [90] kA (OmA �q ÓI õÝR¿ ÅÍA É·) OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ É· ÁÍA ÉNnÃAeË ,OmiBNmBI j´¿ Áva É· OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA Å¸Î»Ë .#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ Éà ɷ fÍE KUAË BVÄÍA .eÌI ÷µY #OmA iBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ$ É· B¿ iBN°Œ o‚ .OmA ¾BZ¿ ÅÍA É— õÝR¿ eÌI
eÌa Ë fÃAÉN¯jŒ s΂ kAie ÔiB· Omie ÔBÈmBδI Åbm ÅÍA ÆejIkBI ifÃA ÆB¿ej¿ Ë ËA Å¸Î»Ë ,ÅN°Œ ÁÇAÌa Å¿ É· OmA Êej· ÅÍfI PiBqA oλBWBñmiA Ë .fÃA ÊeBÈà ÓWjq kA ±¼a ɸÃE Æej· fÍf‚ o‚ .OmA ÓWjq kA ±¼a :É· OnN°Œ iAf´¿ ÅÍA
.ÅN°Œ ÁÇAÌa Å¿ É· OmA ÅÍA ,OmA
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The first syllogism [by reductio ad absurdum] consists of a conjunctive connective and a
predicative. For example, [91] if our saying that “every A is B” is false, then “not every
A is B” is true; now, [let us say] “every C is B” (by agreement); the conclusion that
follows is the condition that “if every A is B is false, then not every A is C.” However,
[let us say] “every A is C” (by agreement), and this is the exceptive. The conclusion
follows that “every A is B” is not false; therefore it is true.
If someone takes the contradictory of a conclusion in whose truth there is agreement, and
[if] he combines it with a premise which is true by agreement, the conclusion follows
directly without [recourse to] reductio ad absurdum. E.g., he says, “every A is C; and
every C is B; therefore every A is B.” [92] However, in speech there are many situations
where [syllogism by] reductio ad absurdum is more appropriate and the speech becomes
briefer.
22. Disclosure of the Character of Induction
Induction involves making a universal judgment about a subject, based on the particulars
found in that subject. For example, it is said, “every animal moves its lower jaw when it
chews.” If every single particular relating to this judgment could be found, so that none
[93] is excluded, the judgment regarding the universal would [in that case] be certain.
However, people who [use] induction, on finding many or the majority [of the
particulars] in a given way, make a judgment regarding all [of them]. But this is not
necessary, for it is possible that what has not been seen is contrary to what has been seen,
and that a hundred thousand [cases] are in agreement and [only] a single one opposed;
e.g., the crocodile, which moves its upper jaw and not the lower. Dialecticians and the
mutakallimãn for one trust to this [sc. manner of reasoning].
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:É· B¿ iBN°Œ jŒA / É· ÅÎĆ .Ó¼ÀY Ë OmA ½v÷N¿ ÓÃAjN³A kA pBγ ÅÎNnbà [91] ,OmA OmAi #OmiBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ ÉÃ$ o‚ ,On«Ëie ,#OmiBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ$
OmiBNmBI Æݯ VÀÇ jŒA$ É· ÓWjq fÍE ÉVÎNà ;#OmiBNmBI ¶B°MBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ$ Ë :fÍÌŒ Ë fÄ· É¿÷f´¿ Ai ÉVÎNà ÅÍA kBI Ë ,#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ Éà o‚ ,On«Ëie jÇ$ Ÿλ ,#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ Éà o‚ ,On«Ëie OmiBNmBI Æݯ VÀÇ jŒA$
#OmiBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ;OmBÄRNmA ÅÍAË ,¶B°MBI ,#OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃݯ .OmA ÷µY o‚ ,OnÎà ®Ëie
�¿÷f´¿ ÆFI Ai ËAË ,On³B°MA ÔË ÓNmifI É· ejÎNI Ai ÉVÎNà |δà eÌa Ón· jŒAË É· fÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,OmAi fÍE ÉVÎNà ±¼a ÓI eÌa ,fÄ· KηjM ,OmA ¶B°MA É· µY / #.OmiBNmBI ÓÃݯ jÇ o‚ ,OmiBNmBI ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ Ë ,OnÃBÀÈI ÓÃݯ jÇ$ jM ÊBMÌ· Åbm Ë eÌI jMiÌaifÃA ±¼a É· eÌI ÊBNÍBU iBÎnI Åbm ÆBο ifÃAÅ¸Î»Ë [92]
.eÌq
ÕAj´NmA ¾BY ÆeÌÀà (22) PB÷ÍËlU ifÃA Á¸Y ÆE É· ½J³ ÆEkA Ó÷¼· Ó§ÌyÌ¿ jI fÄÄ· ÓÀ¸Y É· eÌI ÆE ÕAj´NmA .#fÃBJÄU ÅÍjÍk j¯k ÆfÎÖBa O³ÌI ÓÃAÌÎY jÇ$ :fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,fÄIBÍ ªÌyÌ¿ ÆE Ó÷¼· jI Á¸Y ,fÈVà / ˆÎÇ BM Á¸Y ÅÍjI ÅN¯BÍ PB÷ÍËlU kA Ai Ó¸Í jÇ fÄÃAÌNI jŒA [93] ÅÎĆ Ai jNrÎI BÍ Ai ÔiBÎnI Æ̆ ,fÄÄ· ÕAj´NmA É· ÓÃB¿ej¿ Å¸Î»Ë .eÌI ÓÄÎ´Í ²Ýa ÊfÍeBà ɷ ÆeÌI fÍBq É· AjÍk ,eÌI ÔiËjy Éà ÅÍAË ;ÉÀÇ jI fÄÄ· Á¸Y ,fÄIBÍ ÅÍjIk j¯k É· `BnÀM ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ±»Bb¿ Ó¸Í Ë fÃÌI µ°÷N¿iAlÇ fu Ë ,eÌI ÊfÍe .OmA ÅÍjI eBÀN§A Ó¸Í Ai ÆBÀ÷¼¸N¿ Ë ÆB÷λfU Ë .fÃBJÄVà ÅÍjÍk Ë ,fÃBJÄVI Ai
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23. Disclosure of the Character of Analogy
Analogy is weaker than induction. [94] It involves making a judgment about something
on the basis of what has been observed in [another thing that] resembles it. It is said, for
example, “the soul of man is a power that must not endure after the [death of the] body,
just as vision [does not endure after the destruction of] his eye.”
Analogy is mostly employed in matters of governance and in fiqh (jurisprudence). It is
not a necessary [reasoning], for it may be that the judgment [based on] one similar thing
is contrary to the judgment [based on] another similar thing. For there are many things
that are similar in one sense, but contrary in a thousand other senses: on the basis of one
of them the judgment would (or could) be true, while on the basis of another it would not
and could not be true. So analogy is suitable for consolation and the spreading of [95]
belief, but it is not suitable for certainty. However, if the claim is particular, viz., “some
A is B,” analogy is itself a direct argument of the third figure. E.g., “that is the example
of A, and that is the example of B”; conclusion: “some A is B.”
24. The Way of the Dialecticians in Proving the Absent from the Present
At first, the dialecticians possessed this [reasoning by] analogy that we have mentioned;
[96] later on, however, they came to realize that this is not a necessary judgment, but they
did not know of any other way. [So] they thought up a ploy and declared, “we seek the
cause.” An example of this is that they came and found some character for a thing, such
as, for example, [in the case of] a house, its having been made. They called the “house”
the principle, and its having been “made” the judgment. They then went away and
beheld the sky and found it similar to the house. Since they viewed the sky too [as] a
body with shape and form, they declared the sky to have been made; but they did not say
that the sky is made because it is similar to a house – for they realized that not everything
that is similar to something [else] [97] is of [the same] character – but they said, “Let us
establish the cause that a house [is a thing that] has been made is that it is a body with
shape and form; therefore everything that has this characteristic of being with shape and
form is [a thing that has been] made.” And they sought to establish this in two ways.
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¾BR¿ ¾BY ÆeÌÀà (23) ɇÃAfI ÔlΆ jI fÄÄ· Á¸Y É· eÌI ÆE ¾BR¿ Ë /.OmA ÕAj´NmA kA jM Onm ¾BR¿ [94] ÅM oƒm fÍBI É· OmA ÓM÷̳ Âej¿ o°Ã$ :É· õÝR¿ fÄÍÌŒ .fÄÄÎI ËA ‘fÄÃB¿ ifÃA
.#ÔË Ár† ÓÖBÄÎI ɸÃBĆ ,fÃBÀÃ
AjÍk OnÍiËjy Éà ÅÍA Ë .fÃjI iB¸I É´¯ ifÃA Ë ÔjÎIfM ÔBÇiB· ifÃA jNrÎI ÅÍA Ë É· fÃA BÇlΆ iBÎnI É· ,eÌI jNÍe ‘fÄÃB¿ Á¸Y ²Ýa ÔfÄÃB¿ Á¸Y É· fÍBq É·
,eÌI Omie Á¸Y ÆBrÍA kA Ó¸Í jI Ë :±»Bb¿ ÓĨ¿ iAlÈI Ë fÃÌI ÊfÄÃB¿ ÓĨ¿ �ÎI Ë fÍBq Ai ÓqÌa ¾e ¾BR¿ o‚ .fÍBrÃ Ë eÌJà Omie jNÍe jI Ë ,eÌI É· fÍBq BÍ Óz¨I$ É· ,eÌI ÔËlU Ô̧e jŒA B÷¿A Ë .fÍBrà Ai ÅÎ´Í Ë ,Ai ÆBÀŒ / Æfĸ¯A [95]
ÆE$ :ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ .ÂÌ÷Îm ½¸q kA eÌI Omie O÷VY eÌa ¾BR¿ ,#OmiBNmBI Æݯ .#OmiBNmBI Æݯ ÓajI$ É· fÍE ÉVÎNà ,#OmiBNmBI ¾BR¿ ÆE Ë OnÃݯ ¾BR¿
fÇBq kA KÍB¬I ÆejI ½Î»e ifÃA ÆBλfU ÊAi (24) fÄNnÃAfI oƒm /ÆE kA Ë OmeÌI ÁÍej· eBÍ É· ¾BR¿ ÅÍA ÆBλfU Ome ifÃA Onbà [96] É· fÄN°Œ Ë fÃfÎrÍfÃA ÓN¼ÎY .fÄNnÃAfà ÓÇAi jNÍe Ë ,OnÎà KUAË Á¸Y ÅÍA É· ÓÀ¸Y Ai ÔlΆ Ë fÃf¿BÎI ÆBrÍA É· OnÃE ÅÍA ¾BR¿ Ë .#ÁÎÄ· O÷¼§ K¼W B¿$
Ë .Á¸Y Ai ÓQfZ¿ Ë fÃfÃAÌa ½uA Ai ÉÃBa :ÓQfZ¿ Ai ÉÃBa õÝR¿ ɸÃBĆ ,fÄN¯BÍ Ai ÆBÀmE ɸÃAfI .fÄN¯BÍ ÉÃBa fÄÃB¿ Ai ËA Ë fÃfÍjNà ÆBÀmE ifÃA Ë fÃfrI ÊBNÃE É· fÄN°NÃ Ë fÃfÃAÌa TfZ¿ Ai ÆBÀmE ,PiÌu Ë ½¸q BI fÃfÍe ÓÀnU lÎÃ
Ɇ jÇ Éà ɷ fÄNnÃAe É· AjÍk ,OmA ÉÃBa ‘fÄÃB¿ ÔË É· AjÍk OmA TfZ¿ ÆBÀmE ÉÃBa ɸÃE O÷¼§ É· ÁÎÄ· Omie$ :fÄN°Œ Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI ÔË Á¸ZI /eÌI ÔlΆ ‘fÄÃB¿ [97] O°u ÅÍA AiË É† jÇ o‚ ,PiÌu Ë ½¸q BI OmA ÁnU ÔË É· OnÃE OmA TfZ¿ :fÄNnU ÉÃÌŒËfI ÓNmie ÅÍAË .#eÌI TfZ¿ lÎà ÔË ,eÌI PiÌuË ½¸q BI É· eÌI
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(a) One, by the earlier method, which is called conversion and rejection. For
example, “everything that we have seen [possessing] shape and form, we have seen [as]
having been made; and everything that we have seen [that is] without shape and form has
not been made.” But this method is weak, for there may exist a thing that is [98] contrary
to this and [which] they have not seen; or it may be that all [things] are that way except
the sky – for there are many things that have the same character, and among which there
is one contrary to all. Hence, from finding everything – with a single exception – with
the same character, it does not necessarily follow that that single exception also is of the
same character.
(b) Then some who were a bit more astute came to realize that this argument is
not very solid. Putting forward an alternative way, they deemed it to be thoroughly
correct and now adopt this stance: [99] They come up with this thing which they call
principle and enumerate all its properties insofar as they can. They say, for example, “the
house has existence; stands by itself; possesses this or that character; is a body [endowed]
with form; and has been made. Its having been made is not due to existence (otherwise
every existent thing would have been made), nor is it due to its subsisting by itself
(otherwise everything that subsists by itself would have been made), nor is it due to this
or that [character]. Therefore its having been made is due to its being a body [endowed]
with form. Therefore [100] every body that is [endowed] with form has been made;
therefore the sky has been made.”
Now this is a more seemly method, good in dialectic; however, it is not true or certain.
To elucidate the uncertainty of this [method] there exist ways that are more difficult, but
we shall show by means of a few simpler ways that this is uncertain.
(a) First, it may be that the judgment relating to that thing which they call
principle is not due to any cause, but rather due to, for example, houseness – and in [the
character] of houseness there is nothing in common with the house.
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ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÃAÌa ejW Ë o¸§ Ai ÆE É· ,eÌI ÅÍjNr΂ µÍjñI Ó¸Í Ë ½¸q ÓI Ɇ jÇ Ë ,ÁÍfÍe TfZ¿ ÁÍfÍe PiÌu Ë ½¸q BI Ɇ jÇ$ :É· õÝR¿ É· ÆeÌI fÍBq É· AjÍk ,OmA Onm µÍjW ÅÍA Ë .#eÌJà TfZ¿ ÁÍfÍe PiÌu
lVI eÌI ÆBĆ ÉÀÇ É· eÌI fÍBq Ë ,fÃA ÊfÍfà ÆBrÍA Ë ÅÍA ²ÝbI / OnÇ ÔlΆ [98] ²Ýb¿ eÌI Ó¸Í ÆBrÍA ÆBο ifÃA Ë ,Á¸Y Ó¸ÎI fÃÌI BÇlΆ iBÎnI É· ,ÆBÀmE É· ÉÄÍEjÇ fÍBÎà KUAË ,Á¸Y �Í jI OmA Ó¸Í ÆE lU Ɇ jÇ ÅN¯BÍ kA o‚ .ÉÀÇ
.eÌI Á¸Y ÆE jI lÎÃ Ó¸Í ÆE
ÓÇAi .OnÎà Ô̳ Åbm ÅÍA É· fÄNnÃAe fÃeÌI jN·jÍk ÓNb» É· ÓÃBn· o‚ / .fÃAÊeBNnÍA ÊAi ÅÍjI ÆÌÄ·A Ë OmA Omie Obm É· fÄNqAfÄ‚ Ë fÃeiËE jNÍe fÃjÀrI ÔË ÔBÈ°uË ÉÀÇ Ë fÃiËE s΂ fÄÃAÌa ½uA É· Ai lΆ ÅÍA Ë fÄÍBÎI [99] Ë Æݯ Ë OmA o°ÄI ÁÍB³ Ë ,OmA OnÇ ÉÃBa$ :õÝR¿ É· fÄÍÌŒ .fÄÃAÌM ɸÃBĆ ÓNnÇ ½J³ kA Éà sÎQfZ¿ Ë .OmA TfZ¿ Ë Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU Ë ,OmA iBNmBI ÁÍB³ jÇ ÷ÜAË) OmA Ón°ÄI ÁÍB³ ½J³ kA ÉÃ Ë ,(ÔeÌI TfZ¿ ÓNnÇ jÇ ÷ÜAË) OmA sÎQfZ¿ o‚ .OmA ÔiBNmBI kA ÉÃ Ë OmA ÓÃݯ kA ÉÃ Ë ,(ÔeÌI TfZ¿ Ón°ÄI o‚ .eÌI TfZ¿ i÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU jÇ / o‚ .Omi÷Ìv¿ ÓÀnU É· OnÃE ½J³ kA [100]
.#OmA TfZ¿ ÆBÀmE
.OnÎà ÓÄÎ´Í Ë Ó´Î´Y Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA tÌa ¾fU ifÃA Ë OmA jM ÊfÄÃB¿ µÍjW ÅÍA Ë jNÃBmE ÊAi fćI Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA jMiAÌqe É· OmBÈÇAi ,ÅÍA ÓÄδÍBà Æej· fÍf‚ ifÃAË
.OmA ÓÄδÍBà ÅÍA É· ÁÎÄ· Af΂
½J³ kA Éà ,fÄÍÌŒ ÓÀÇ ½uA É· Ai lΆ ÆE j¿ Á¸Y É· fqBI :É· OnÃE ÅÎNnbà .eÌJà kBJÃA ˆÎÇ Ai ÉÃBa j¿ ÓNÃBa ifÃA Ë ,eÌI ÓNÃBa ½J³ kA õÝR¿ ɸ¼I eÌI ÓJJm
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(b) Another is that it is no easy task to enumerate all of the properties [of a thing]:
[101] an argument is needed [to show] that all of the properties have been enumerated
and none left out. But [the dialecticians] never concern themselves with this; rather, they
say, “If a property has been left out, [then] it is up to you who are the opponent to say
[what it is]”; yet my ignorance [of what property may have been left out] – I who am, for
example, the opponent – is no reason that it does not exist. Or they say, “If [this property
which you claim has been omitted] existed, it would not have been hidden from you and
I; just as if an elephant were standing here, you and I would see it.” This, too, does not
amount to anything, for there exist in things many characters that I seek, and that he also
seeks, which are not seen at once. But it never happens that when an elephant stands
right before someone, it goes unseen or that one is cast into doubt [about it]. These two
defects exist in this way.
[102] (c) Third is this: Let it be such that he has found all the characteristics – for
example, the house has three characteristics, A, B, C. [However,] the division of the
causes is not merely into three, but many more. For example, the house has been made
either on account of A, or on account of B, or on account of C; or on account of
houseness and A, or houseness and B, or houseness and C; or on account of A and B, or
B and C, or A and C; or on account of houseness and A and B, or a similar combination
of one with the other. For it may be that on account of a single character there is no
judgment, but when they become two or three the judgment ensues. [103] For instance,
blackness comes from alum and gallnut; ten comes from four and six, and any one of
these alone does not [yield] that judgment. Hence all these divisions must be ruled out so
that [only] one remains.
(d) The fourth defect is this. Let us also grant [the following]: let us be
accommodating and suppose that the division [of the characteristics] are A, B, and C –
one by one, and no other. And let us concede that it is neither from A nor from B: [104]
[in that case] it does not of necessity follow that [the judgment] comes from C, in the
sense that wherever there is a C, [there too] the judgment is. For it may be that C has two
parts: one part that is the cause of that judgment, and another part that is not; and just
because A and B do not yield this judgment it does not of necessity follow that it comes
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BÈ°uË ÉÀÇ É· fÍBI ÓN÷VY /:OmA ÆBmE ÔiB· Éà BÈ°uË �ÀÇ ÆejÀq ɸÃE jBÍe Ë [101] ɸ¼I ,fÄqBJà ¾Ì¬r¿ ÅÍfI lŒjÇ ÆBrÍA Ë .OmfÃBÀà ±uË ˆÎÇ Ë OmejÀq
õÝR¿ Å¿ ÅNnÃAeBÃ Ë ,#ÓÀva É· ÌM ÓÍÌNI É· fÍBI OmfÃB¿ Ó°uË jŒA$ :fÄÍÌŒ ÊfÎqÌ‚ ÌM jI Ë Å¿ jI ,ÔeÌI jŒA$ :fÄÍÌŒ BÍ .OnÎà ɷ OnÎà ÆE ½Î»e ÁÀva É· ÔlΆ lÎà ÅÍAË .#ÓÀÍfÍfI ÌM Ë Å¿ ,ÔeÌI ÊeBNnÍA Ӽ΂ BVÄÍA jŒA ɸÃBĆ ,ÔeÌJà ifÃA Ë ,fÄ· K¼W lÎà ËA Ë ÁÄ· K¼W Å¿ É· BÇlΆ ifÃA eÌI ÓĨ¿ iBÎnI É· ,OnÎà Ai ËA Ë tfÄÎJà ɷ eÌI ÊeBNnÍA Ón· Ár† s΂ É· eÌJà lŒjÇ ½Î‚ Ë .fÄÎJà O³Ë
/ .ÊAi ÅÍifÃA OnÇ KΧ Ëe ÅÍA .fN¯A �q
ÓÃݯ :eÌI ±uË Ém Ai ÉÃBa õÝR¿ - O¯BÍ ±uË �ÀÇ É· AeBI ÅÎĆ :ɸÃE Â÷Ìm Ë [102] õÝR¿ ;eÌI jNrÎI ÔiBÎnI É· ,oI Ë eÌI Ém Éà BÈN÷¼§ OÀn³ .ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÔiBNmBI Ë ½J³ kA BÍ ;ÓÃBÀÈI ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÔiBNmBI ½J³ kA BÍ ,eÌI ÓÃݯ ½J³ kA BÍ TfZ¿ ÉÃBa kA BÍ ;ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÓNÃBa ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓNÃBa ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÓÃݯ Ë ÓNÃBa BÍ ;ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÓÃݯ ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÔiBNmBI ½J³ kA BÍ ,ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓÃݯ ½J³ ½J³ kA fÍBq É· ;jNÍe BI Ó¸Í KηjM ÅÎćÀÇË ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓÃݯ Ë ÓNÃBa ½J³ kA ɸÃBĆ / .fÃÌq Ém Æ̆ BÍ ,fÍE Á¸Y fÃÌq Ëe Æ̆ ,eÌJà Á¸Y ˆÎÇ Ai ÓĨ¿ �Í [103] .eÌJà Á¸Y ÆE BÈÄM Ai Ó¸Í jÇ Ë sq Ë iBȆ kA fÍE Êe Ë ËkB¿ Ë �Ak kA fÍE ÓÇBÎm
.fÃB¿ Ó¸Í BM fÄ· ½WBI Ai ÂBn³A ÉÀÇ ÅÍA É· fÍBI o‚
ÂBn³A É· ÁÍiAfÄ‚ Ë ÁÍjÎŒ ÆBmE Ë ÁÎÄ· Á÷¼n¿ lÎà ÅÍA :É· OnÃE KΧ ÂiBÈ†Ë ÁμnM Ë .OnÎà jNÍe Ë ,ÆB¸Í ÆB¸Í ,OmA ÓÃBÀÈI Ë ÔiBNmBI Ë OmA ÓÃݯ ÓÃBÀÈI kA É· fÍBÎà KUAË / :OmAi ÔiBNmBI kA ÉÃ Ë OmA ÓÃݯ kA Éà ɷ ÁÎÄ· [104] ÓÃBÀÈI É· fÍBq É· AjÍk .eÌI Á¸Y ÆE eÌI ÓÃBÀÈI BV· jÇ É· ÓĨ¿ ÆFI ,eÌI Á¸Y ÅÍA ɸÃAfI Ë .eÌJà Án³ �Í Ë eÌI Á¸Y ÆE O÷¼§ Án³ Ó¸Í :eÌI Án³ Ëe AjÍk .eÌI ÓÃBÀÈI Án³ Ëe jÇ kA É· fÍBÎà KUAË ,OnÎà Ai ÔiBNmBI Ë Ai ÓÃݯ
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from both parts of C . For once it has become evident that the cause is outside of A and
B, it does not of necessity follow that everything that is outside of A and B is a cause.
Indeed, the cause does reside in that characteristic which is outside of A and B, and it
does not depart from there. However, it may be that the one remaining characteristic is of
two kinds, [105] and one of its kinds is not a cause, while the other is a cause. For
instance, if at first these four divisions were made: A, B, C1, and C2, and it was again
established that the cause was not A or B, it would not of necessity follow that each of
the remaining Cs is a cause; it would, however, be one of these two Cs. Similarly, now
that three parts are made and C is taken as a whole, it does not of necessity follow that
because it was not divided every C is a cause. Indeed, the cause does reside within the
totality of things that are C, but not every C [is a cause].
It thus becomes manifest for this reason that this way is not certain, but that [106] it is
good in dialectic, for the superficial and the mass of people do not know the defect of this
and accept it.
25. Explication of the Form and Matter of the Syllogism
The form of the syllogism is this conjunction and composition that occurs among the
premises, as has been said. As for the matter of the syllogism, [these] are the premises:
the more solid they are, the more solid the syllogism is. [107] Syllogisms are, in form,
all of one kind; however, not all consist of true premises, for there are many syllogisms
whose premises are [based] on opinion and not on truth.
In sum, the premises of any syllogism are one of two [kinds].
(a) Either they are premises that have first been established by a syllogism or an
argument (in truth or in opinion), and when they have been established, they are then
made the premise of the syllogism, for they have not been accepted in themselves and it
is possible for someone to doubt them.
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Ɇ jÇ É·fÍBÎà KUAË ,OmA ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓÃݯ kA ÆËjÎI É· f¿E fÍf‚ O÷¼§ Æ̆ É· ÓÃݯ ÆËjÎI É· eÌI ±uË ÆAifÃA O÷¼§ ,ÔiE .eÌI O÷¼§ eÌI ÔiBNmBI Ë ÓÃݯ ÆËjÎI Ëe eÌI ÊfÃB¿ É· ±uË Ó¸Í ÆE É· fÍBq Ÿλ .fÈVà BVÃE kA Ë ,eÌI ÔiBNmBI Ë ¾÷ËA kA jŒA ɸÃBĆ .eÌI O÷¼§ ÉÃÌŒ �Í Ë eÌJà O÷¼§ ÔË kA ÉÃÌŒ �Í Ë ,eÌI / ÉÃÌŒ [105] Ó¸Í Ë ÅÎĆ ÓÃBÀÈI Ó¸Í Ë ÔiBNmBI Ó¸ÍË ÓÃݯ Ó¸Í :ÔfÃej· iBȆ OÀn³ ÅÍA É· Ôf¿BÎà KUAË ,OnÎà iBNmBI Ë Æݯ O÷¼§ É· Ôfq Omie kBI Ë ,ÆBĆ ÓÃBÀÈI .ÔeÌI ÆBÀÈI Ëe ÅÍkA Ó¸Í Å¸Î»Ë ;ÔeÌI O÷¼§ ÔeÌI ÊfÃB¿ É· ÆBÀÈI ÂAf· jÇ É¸ÃAfI fÍBÎà KUAË ,O¯jŒ ɼÀVI Ai ÆBÀÈI Ë ,ej· OÀn³ Ém ÆÌÄ·A É· ÅÎćÀÇ É· OmBÇlΆ �¼ÀU ÅÍA ifÃA O÷¼§ ,ÔiE .eÌI O÷¼§ ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ É· ej¸Ã OÀn³
.ÓÃBÀÈI jÇ ÉÃ Å¸Î»Ë ,fÃA ÆBÀÈI
,Om̸Îà ¾fU ifÃA /Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA ÅÎ´Í Éà ÊAi ÅÍA É· eÌq Â̼¨¿ KJm ÅÍfI o‚ [106] .fÃjÍhƒI Ë fÄÃAfà ÅÍA KΧ Âej¿ Ó¿B§ Ë ÔjÇB£ É·
pBγ P÷eB¿ Ë pBγ PiÌu Æej· Af΂ (25) ÉN°Œ ɸÃBĆ ,fN¯A PB¿÷f´¿ ÆBο ifÃA É· eÌI ±Î»DM Ë ÆAjN³A ÅÍA pBγ PiÌu
.eÌI jM Omie pBγ eÌI jM Omie fĆjÇ Ë ,fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ pBγ P÷eB¿ B÷¿AË .f¿E ,fÃÌI OmAi ÓMB¿÷f´¿ kA ÉÀÇ ÉÃ Å¸Î»Ë ,fÃÌI ÉÃÌŒ �Í ÉÀÇ PiÌvI BÈmBγ Ë / [107]
.fÃÌI O´Î´ZI ÉÃ Ë fÃÌI ÆBÀNI ÆBrÍA PB¿÷f´¿ É· fÃÌI BÈmBγ iBÎnI É·
:eÌJà ÆËjÎI Ëe kA ÓmBγ jÇ PB¿÷f´¿ ɼÀVI Ë O´Î´ZI) fÃÌI Êej· Omie ÓN÷VY Ë ÓmBδI Onbà AjÃBrÍA É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ BÍ ,fÄÄ· pBγ �¿÷f´¿ Ai ÆBrÍA ÊBNÃE fÃÌI Êej· Omie Ai ÆBrÍA Æ̆ Ë ,(ÆBÀNI BÍ .Ón· fÄ· ÷�q ÆBrÍA ifÃA É· fÍBqË ,fÃA Éà ÉN¯jÍh‚ sÍÌa o°ÄI AjÃBrÍA É· AjÍk
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[108] (b) Or they are premises that have been accepted as such, on the ground that they
are in themselves true.
Whenever the premises of the syllogism are such as the former type we stated [i.e. (a)],
they will have necessarily been established by means of other premises. But there is a
limit to this [procedure] and it reaches premises that are not established by other
premises; these are in truth principles. If they are good, true and right, the syllogisms
built on them will be right and true. But if they are false, that which has been built on
them would be false. Therefore, once we know the types of these primitive premises, we
would know the types of the principles of syllogisms and the matters of the syllogisms so
that [we would know] which are demonstrative, which dialectical, which sophistical,
[109] which rhetorical, and which poetic.
26. Exposition of the types of Primitive Premises in Syllogisms
The premises that are adopted and employed in syllogisms, without being established by
any argument, are of thirteen kinds: (i) the primary; (ii) the perceptible; [110] (iii) the
experiential; (iv) the transmitted; (v) those premises whose syllogism is always present to
the mind; (vi) [premises apprehended by] the estimative [faculty]; (vii) the widely-known
(in truth); (viii) [premises] accepted [on trust]; (ix) the indisputable; (x) the specious; (xi)
the widely-known (in appearance); (xii) the [premises based on] suspicion; (xiii) the
imaginary.
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eÌa ÆBrÍA É· Á¸Y ÆE jI ,fÄqBI ÉN¯jŒ AjÃBrÍA ÅÎćÀÇ É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ BÍ Ë [108] .fÃA Omie
AjÃBrÍA ÉÄÍEjÇ ,ÁÎN°Œ ÅÎr΂ Án³ ifÃA É· fÄqBI ÆBĆ pBγ PB¿÷f´¿ É· ÊBŒjÇ Ë ÆBrÍA É· fmi ÓMB¿÷f´ÀI Ë ,eÌI jaE Ai ÅÍA Ë .fÄqBI Êej· Omie jNÍe ÓMB¿÷f´ÀI Ë ÷µY Ë fÃÌI �Îà jŒA .fÃÌI ½uA O´Î´ZI ÆBrÍAË fÄĸà Omie PB¿÷f´¿ jNÍfI Ai ,fÃÌI ½WBI jŒAË .fÃÌI ÷µY Ë Omie fÄqBI Êej· BÄI ÆBrÍA jI É· BÈmBγ ,Omie ÅÎr΂ PB¿÷f´¿ ÅÍA ÂBn³A Æ̆ o‚ .fqBI ½WBI fÄqBI Êej· BÄI ÆBrÍA jI ɇÃE Ë On¿Af· ÓÃBÇjI BM ,ÁÎÃAfI BÈmBγ ÔBÈM÷eB¿ Ë BÈmBγ ÔBȼuA ÂBn³A ,ÁÎÃAfI .On¿Af· Ôj¨q Ë On¿Af— ÓIBña Ë On¿Af— / Óñ»B¬¿ Ë On¿Af— Ó»fU [109]
BÈmBγ ifÃA ÅÎr΂ PB¿÷f´¿ ÔBÈNÀn³ ÆeÌÀà kBI (26) Omie ÓN÷VZI AjÃE ɸÃE ÓI ,fÃjI iB¸I Ë fÃjÎNI BÈmBγ ifÃA É· BÇ É¿÷f´¿ kA
:fÃA ÉÃÌŒ ÊelÎm ,fÄÄ· Ó¸Í Ë <4> ,PB÷ÎIjVM Ó¸Í Ë <3> / ,PBmÌnZ¿ Ó¸Í Ë <2> ,PBλ÷ËA Ó¸Í <1> [110]
,ÉrÎÀÇ eÌI jyBY ½´§ ifÃA ÆBrÍAjI pBγ É· PB¿÷f´¿ ÆE Ó¸ÍË <5> ,PAjMAÌN¿ ,PÜÌJ´¿ Ó¸Í Ë <8> ,O´Î´ZI PAiÌÈr¿ Ó¸Í Ë <7> ,PB÷ÎÀÇË Ó¸Í Ë <6>
,jÇB¤I PAiÌÈr¿ Ó¸Í Ë <11> ,PBÈJr¿ Ó¸Í Ë <10> ,PBÀ÷¼n¿ Ó¸Í Ë <9>
.PÝÎbN¿ Ó¸Í Ë <13> ,PBÃÌĤ¿ Ó¸Í Ë <12>
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(i) The Primary
As for the primary premises, they are those which reason first renders necessary in man;
[111] he cannot doubt them and does not know of ever having doubted them. If he
imagines that he came into this world all at once, with his reason the same as it is, neither
hearing nor learning anything other than someone’s teaching him the meaning of both
parts of that premise until he conceives it; and [if] he then wanted not to assent and to
doubt – he could not doubt. Thus, for example, if he knew at that time, by conception,
what whole is and what part is; and [if he knew] what bigger is, and what smaller is, he
would not be able [112] to withhold assent to the fact that the whole is greater than the
part; similarly, he could not doubt that things that are equal to the same thing, are
themselves also equal to one another – [and this] not on account of the estimative
declaring it thus, as we shall remark later.
(ii) The Perceptible
As for perceptible premises, they are those premises whose truth we know through
sensation. [113] For example, we say, “the sun rises and sets”; “the moon waxes and
wanes.”
(iii) The Experiential
The experiential are those premises which can be known neither by reason alone, nor by
sensation alone, but which can be known by means of both [together]. For instance, each
time when sensation perceives an action from a thing (or one of its states), and perceives
it in that way on every occasion, reason knows that it is not because of chance, or else it
would not always be the case, and would not be [for the most part]. An example of it is
the burning [action] of fire, [114] or the secretion of bile [induced by] scammony, and
whatever is similar to this.
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PBλËA <1> fÃAÌNÃ Ë / ;fÄ· KUAË AiËA Âej¿ ifÃA ¾÷ËA eja É· eÌI ÆE PBλËA PB¿÷f´¿ B÷¿A [111] ÷�q ÆE ifÃA ÔË É· eÌI ÓN³Ë lŒjÇ É· fÃAfÃ Ë ,fÄ· ÷�q ÔË ifÃA É· Æej·
ÔlΆ Ë ,ejbI ÆBćÀÇ ,f¿E Á»B§ ÅÍA ifÃA O¨¯e �ÎI É· eiAfÄ‚ jŒA Ë .OqAe fÍkÌ¿BÎI É¿÷f´¿ ÆE ËlU Ëe jÇ ÓĨ¿ Ai ËA Ón· É· ÷ÜA ,OaÌ¿BÎà ÔlΆ Ë fÎÄrà .Æej· fÃAÌNà ÷�q - fÄ— ÷�q Ë fĸà µÍfvM É· OmAÌa kBI Ë ,ej· i÷ÌvM BM Ɇ ËlU Ë ,eÌI Ɇ ÷½· É· O³Ë ÆE ifÃA i÷ÌvM Á¸ZI ÓNnÃAfI jŒA ,õÝR¿ ɸÃBĆ fĸà µÍfvM É· / Æej· ÓNnÃAÌNà ,eÌI Ɇ jMeja Ë ,eÌI Ɇ jNŒilI Ë ,eÌI [112] BÇlΆ jÇ É· Æej· ÷�q ÓNnÃAÌNà ÅÎćÀÇ Ë ,OmËlU kA jNÈ¿ ÷½— ɸÃAfI ÁÇË É· AjÃE ½J³ kA Éà - fÃÌI jNÍf¸Í jIAjI lÎà ÆBrÍA ,fÃÌI lΆ �Í jIAjI É·
.ÁÎÄ· eBÍ jNnƒm ɸÃBĆ ,fÍB¿j¯
PBmÌnZ¿ <2>
.ÁÎqBI ÉNnÃAe ÷oZI ÆBrÍA ÓNmAi É· fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PBmÌnZ¿ PB¿÷f´¿ B÷¿AË .#fÇB¸I Ë fÍAl°ÎI ÊB¿$ Ë ,#eÌq Ëj¯ Ë fÍEjI LBN¯E$ :ÁÎÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ / [113]
PBIjV¿ <3>
;÷oY BÈÄNI ÉÃ Ë ÅNnÃAe fÍBrI eja ÓÖBÈÄNI Éà ɷ fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PBIjV¿ ,fÄÎI Ó¼¨¯ ÔiBI jÇ ÔlΆ kA ÷oY Æ̆ ɸÃBĆ .ÅNnÃAe fÍBq Ëe jÈI Å¸Î»Ë On³B°÷MA KJm kA Éà ɷ eja fÃAe ,fÄÎI ÆBĆ BÇiBI �ÀÇ Ë fÄÎI Ó»BY Ai ËA BÍ / sME ÅNaÌm ɸÃBĆ ÔË ¾BR¿ .ÔeÌJà ¾BY ÅÍjNrÎI Ë ÔeÌJà ÉrÎÀÇ ÷ÜAË
.fÃB¿ ÅÍfI ɆjÇ Ë ,Ai Aj°u BÎÃÌÀ´m Æej· ¾BÈmA Ë [114]
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(iv) The Transmitted
As for the transmitted, they are those premises that have been established for reason on
[the basis of] the testimony of many people. For instance, we know that in the world
there is Cairo and Baghdad, although we have not seen them. The condition for the
transmission [of a tradition] is that no doubt enter into it; everything concerning which
doubt can occur to someone, is not yet a transmitted [tradition] for that person. [115]
Hence it is not becoming for someone to say, “You must assent to such-and-such a thing,
for the judgment of this is the same as the judgment of another thing which you have
affirmed”; for if it were the case that the judgment of [this thing] were the same as the
judgment of that [other thing], we would not be able to doubt, just as we were not able to
in [the one case]. Transmitted [tradition] produces certainty in its own truth, so that the
hearer does not need to ponder about the speakers. [116]
(v) Premises that have syllogisms with themselves in nature
Some premises that have need of a syllogism are such that their syllogism can be
obtained through seeking [for it]. The seeking for a syllogism is the seeking for the
middle term, because the minor and the major terms are themselves [already] present in
the problem.
Some [syllogisms] are such that whenever the premise is recalled, the middle term is
recalled; for instance, you know at once that odd is one less than even. Not [117]
everyone in whose nature a syllogism is found knows what it is, or is able to express it in
words; however, by his own reason he knows correctly what its conclusion is.
(vi) [Premises apprehended by] the estimative [faculty]
Estimative [premises] are those false but extremely powerful premises in the soul,
regarding which the soul cannot at first fall into doubt. Their cause is the estimative
faculty, not the intellect; and they are of such an order that two states result.
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PAjMAÌN¿ <4>
,Ai ejaj¿ eÌI Êfq Omie o· iBÎnI ÓÇAÌNI É· eÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PAjMAÌN¿ B÷¿A ¢jq Ë .ÁÍA ÊfÍfà ɷ fĆ jÇ ,eAf¬I Ë Omjv¿ ÆBÈU ifÃA É· ÁÍA ÉNnÃAe ɸÃBĆ o· ÆeBN¯A fÃAÌM ÷�q ÔË BI É· ÔlΆ jÇ Ë ,fN¯ÌÎà �q ÔË ifÃA É· OnÃE jMAÌM ÅÍfI É· fÍBI$ :É· fÍÌŒ É· fmjà Ai Ón· o‚ /.eÌJà jMAÌM kÌÄÇ Ai o¸ÃE ,Ai [115] É· ,#ÓÍÊfÍËjŒ ÔÌI ɸÃE kA ,OmA lΆ jNÍe Á¸Y Æ̆ ÔË Á¸Y É· ,ÔËjNI lΆ ɸÃBĆ ,Æej· ÷�q ÓÀÎNnÃAÌNà ,ÔeÌI ÆE Á¸Y Æ̆ ÔË Á¸Y É· ÔeÌI ÆBĆ jŒA OUBY Ai ÊfÃÌÄq ɸÃBĆ ,fĸ¯A ÅÎ´Í eÌa O´Î´ZI jMAÌM Ë .ÁÎNnÃAÌNà ÆE ifÃA
/.fÄ· ½¿DM ÆBŒfÄÍÌŒ ifÃA É· fÍBÎÃ
©JO ifÃA fÃiAe ÅNrÍÌa BI pBγ É· ÓMB¿f´¿ <5> [116]
Ai ÆBrÍA pBγ É· fÃA ÆBĆ OmA OUBY pBδI Ai ÆBrÍA É· PB¿÷f´¿ kA Óz¨I ÷fY É· AjÍk ,OmA ÅÎNÃBο ÷fY K¼W ,pBγ K¼W Ë .ÆeiËE fÍBq OmfI K¼ñI
.fÃÌI jyBY ɼ×n¿ ifÃA eÌa ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY Ë ÅÎÈ·
ie ɸÃBĆ ,fÍE eBÍ ¡mËA ÷fY ,fÍE eBÍ É¿÷f´¿ É· ÊBŒ jÇ É· eÌI ÆE Óz¨I Ë ÔË ©JW ifÃA É· o· jÇ / ÉÃ Ë ,eÌI Á· Ó¸ÎI O°U kA ¶BW É· ÓÃAfI O§Bm [117] sÍÌa ejbI Å¸Î»Ë ,ÅN°Œ fÃAÌNI ÆBIlI BÍ ,eÌI Ɇ É· fÃAe eÌq Af΂ ÓmBγ
.eÌI Ɇ ÉVÎNà ɷ AjÃE fÃAfI OmifI
PBÎÀÇË <6> ifÃA o°Ã ɸÃBĆ ,o°Ã ifÃA Ô̳ Obm Å¸Î»Ë ,½WBI fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PBÎÀÇË É· eÌI ÊBNÍBU ÆAfI Ë ,½´§ Éà eÌI ÁÇË ÆE KJm Ë .Æej· fÃAÌNà ÷�q iB· ¾÷ËBI ÔË
.eÌI ÊeBN¯A ¾BYËe AiËA
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(a) One is that reason does not have any judgment regarding them so that it [can]
then know by means of an argument; thus reason is silent about them.
[118] (b) The other is that the estimative [faculty] wishes to know that thing on the
basis of sensible [things], whereas that thing is not sensible, for it is prior to the sensible
and is not perceived by the estimative because only the sensible enters the estimative.
And what wonder is it that something does not enter the estimative, for the estimative
itself does not enter the estimative.
The estimative does not bring a contrary against anything that is primary in the intellect;
thus, it does not introduce any doubt about [the fact] that the whole is greater than the
part. Hence when the existence of things that are contrary to the sensible is established
by way of the primary [things], the estimative grants the premises but does not grant the
conclusion, because it is contrary to its capacity. [119] For example, the estimative says,
“Anything to which one cannot point, viz., where it is, and which cannot be [either]
outside of the world or inside it, that thing does not exist.” And it says, “there is no
alternative but that outside the world there be either void or plenum.” And, “it is not
possible that a thing become greater than it is other than by an increase coming to it from
the outside or by there arising within it spaces.” But the argument of reason itself
establishes that these are all false.
[120] (vii) The widely-known
As for the widely-known (which have [nothing] other than being widely-known), they are
premises which the mass of men and those like them consider to be primary in the nature
of reason, while it is not thus. However, from his childhood on man hears them, and all
[121] or most cities are in agreement regarding them.
[These premises are] either (a) something which the intellect does not [declare]
necessary by its first nature, but [which] man’s habitude [does declare necessary]; such as
the concepts of shame and mercy and everything similar.
Or (b) the cause of [these premises] is induction.
Or (c) their cause is that there exists an intricate condition whereby the condition
of the state and the judgment alter. However, that condition being intricate, the mass of
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ÔË ifÃA eja o‚ ,fÃAfI O÷VZI É· ÊBNÃE BM eÌJà Á¸Y ËA ifÃA Ai eja É· Ó¸Í /.eÌI tÌ¿Ba
lΆ ÆE Ë ,fÃAe PBmÌnZ¿ Á¸Y jI Ai lΆ ÆE É· fÇAÌa ÁÇË É· eÌI ÆE jNÍeË [118] lU É· AjÍk ,fÍBÎà ifÃA ÁÇË ifÃA Ë eÌI pÌnZ¿ kA s΂ É· ,eÌJà pÌnZ¿ ÁÇË É· ,fÍBÎà ÁÇË ifÃA ÔlΆ É· eÌI KV§ Æ̆ Ë .fÍBÎà ÁÇË ifÃA pÌnZ¿
.fÍBÎÃ ÁÇË ifÃA eÌa
ifÃA eiËBÎà ÷�q ɸÃBĆ ,eiBÎà ²Ýa Ai ËA ÁÇË ,Onλ÷ËA ½´§ ifÃA É· lΆ jÇ Ë É· BÇlΆ ÓNnÇ eÌq Omie PB÷λËA ÊAi kA Æ̆ o‚ .ËlU kA eÌI jNÈ¿ ÷½· ɸÃE ,fĸà ÁμnM Ai ÉVÎNÃ Ë fÄ· ÁμnM Ai PB¿÷f´¿ ÁÇË ,fÄmÌnZ¿ ²ÝbI ÆBrÍA PiBqA ÔÌI Ɇ jÇ$ :É· fÍÌŒ ÁÇË É¸ÃBĆ / .OmA ÔË sÃAÌM ²Ýa É· AjÍk [119] lΆ ÆE ,eÌI Á»B§ ÆËifÃA BÍ eÌI Á»B§ ÆËjÎI É· fÍBrÃ Ë ,OmBV· É· ej· ÆAÌNà fÍBrÃ$ Ë ,#eÌI Ý¿ BÍ eÌI Ýa Á»B§ ÆËjÎI É· OnÎà ÊiB†$:É· fÍÌŒ Ë .#eÌJà ifÃA BÍ fmi ÔÌI ÆËjÎI kA ÓMeBÍk ɸÃFI ÷ÜA ,eÌq jNÈ¿ OnÇ É¸ÃE kA ÔlΆ É· /.OmA ½WBI ÉÀÇ ÅÍA É· fÄ· Omie eÌa eja O÷VY Ë .#fN¯A BÈUjó¯ ÔË ÆBο
PAiÌÈr¿ <7> [120]
É÷¿B§ ‘fÄÃB¿ Ë É÷¿B§ É· fÃA ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ,fÃiAfà ÔiÌÈr¿ lU É· PAiÌÈr¿ B÷¿A Ó·eÌ· kA Å¸Î»Ë ;eÌI ÆBĆ ÉÃ Ë ,OmiB· ¾÷ËBI eja ©JW ifÃA É· ,fÃiAfÄ‚ ÅÎĆ .fÄqBI Êej· ¶B°÷MA ÆE jI ,BÇjÈq jNrÎI BÍ / ,BÇjÈq �ÀÇ Ë eÌÄq ÆE Âej¿ [121]
Âjq ÓĨ¿ kA ,Âej¿ ÔÌa Å¸Î»Ë ,©JW ¾÷ËBI fĸà KUAË ½´§ É· eÌI ÔlΆ BÍ .fÃB¿ ÅÍfI ɆjÇ Ë OÀYi Ë .eÌI ÕAj´NmA ÔË KJm BÍ
eejŒjI Á¸Y Ë ¾BY ¢jq ÆAfI É· eÌI �ÍiBI ÓWjq BVÃE É· eÌI ÆE ÔË KJm BÍ ¾BR¿Ë .ejÎNI ¢jq ÓI ÆBćÀÇ o‚ ,fÃAfà Âej¿ �÷¿B§ Ë eÌI �ÍiBI ¢jq ÆE ŸλË
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men do not know it, hence they accept it thus unconditionally. An example of the
widely-known [premises] is when it is said, “justice is necessary,” or “it is not fitting to
tell lies”; or for instance when it is said, “one ought not to expose one’s nakedness in
front of [other] people,” [122] or “an innocent person ought not to be harmed.” Or when
it is said, “God is capable of everything and knows everything.” Among these [widely-
known opinions], some are true, such as the former examples; but their truth becomes
established by argument. If man imagines that he has come into this world all at once,
endowed with reason, and strives to doubt [the truth of these premises], he could doubt
[them]. And some are false, except conditionally. For example, it cannot be said, [123]
“God has power over the impossible; He is a knower and cognizant of [the fact] that he
has a companion.”
There are many widely-known [things] that are pure falsehood, while [some] widely-
known [things] are superior to others. Some widely-known [things] are the same for all
people, as when it is said, “lying is disgraceful”; and some are widely-known among a
[particular] group, just as among doctors they are one thing, among astronomers another,
among craftsmen another, and others for other trades. The contradictory of the true is the
false, while the contradictory of the widely-known is the base. In sum, the widely-known
is that which the mass of men accept; however, those which [124] are widely-known and
no more are these premises and what resembles these premises. Hence if you take the
true widely-known absolutely, the primary [things], some of the sensible [things], the
experiential [things] and the transmitted [things] would be widely-known [things].
However, there is [another class of] widely-known besides these, as has been said.
(viii) Premises accepted [on trust]
The premises accepted [on trust] are those that are received from a virtuous and wise
person, possess firmness, and are neither primary nor perceptible.
(ix) The Indisputable
The indisputable are those premises which, once the opponent concedes them, you then
use them against him, [125] whether they be true or widely-known or accepted or not.
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ɸÃBĆ Ë #ÅN°Œ fÍBrà ®Ëie$ Ë ,#OnJUAË eAe$:fÄÍÌŒ É· eÌI ÆBĆ PAiÌÈr¿ Ë ,#ÆeikE fÍBJà ÊBÄŒ ÓI Ai o·$ Ë ,#eBrŒ fÍBJÃ/Pi̧ ,ÆB¿ej¿ s΂$:fÄÍÌŒ [122] Óz¨I ɼÀU ÅÍkA .#fÃAe Ai ÔlΆ jÇË OmieB³ ÔlΆ jÇ jI ÔAfa$:fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ jŒA Ë .eÌq Omie O÷VZI sÎNmAi Å¸Î»Ë ,ÅÎr΂ ÔBÈ»BR¿ ɸÃBĆ ,OmA OmAi fÈU Ë ,eÌI eja BI Ë ,fq ½uBY O¨¯e �ÎI ÆBÈU ÅÍifÃA É· eiBNÃA ÆBĆ Âej¿
fÍBrà ɸÃBĆ ,ÓWjrI ÷ÜA OmA ®Ëie Óz¨I Ë .Æej· ÷�q fÃAÌM ,fÄ· ÷�q É· fÄ· .#OmiBÍ AiË É¸ÃFI BÃAe Ë OmA Á»B§ Ë ,¾BZ¿ jI OmA ieB³ ÔAfa$ :É· /ÅN°Œ [123]
Ë .eÌI jM Ô̳ ÔiÌÈr¿ kA ÔiÌÈr¿ Ë ,eÌI ²ju ®Ëie É· eÌI iÌÈr¿ iBÎnI Ë .OmA Oqk ®Ëie fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ÆBn¸Í Ai Âej¿ �ÀÇ j¿ PAiÌÈr¿ kA Óz¨I Ë eÌI jNÍe ÆB¸ql‚ ÆBο ie ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ÓÇËjŒ ÆBο ie PAiÌÈr¿ kA Óz¨I Ë ½WBI ÷µY |δÃË .jNÍe Ai jNÍe �r΂ Ë jNÍe ÆAjŒeËie Ë jNÍe ÆBÀVÄ¿ ÆBοifÃA Å¸Î»Ë fÃjÍhƒI Âej¿ �÷¿B§ É·eÌI ÆE iÌÈr¿ ɼÀVIË .©ÎÄq iÌÈr¿ |δÃË eÌI Æ̆ o‚ .PB¿÷f´¿ ÅÍA fÄÃB¿ Ë fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ ÅÍA ,oI Ë eÌI sÍiÌÈr¿ /ɸÃE [124] PAjMAÌN¿ Ë PBIjV¿Ë PBmÌnZ¿ ‘iB‚ Ë PBλ÷ËA ,ÔjÎŒ ¶ÝWBI Ai ӴδY iÌÈr¿ .f¿E ÉN°Œ É· ÅÎĆ ÅÍA ,eÌI ÆBrÍA kA ÆËjÎI É· eÌI ÔiÌÈr¿ Å¸Î»Ë fÃÌI iÌÈr¿
PÜÌJ´¿ <8>
iAÌNmA Ë ,ÁθY Ë ½yB¯ Ón· kA fÃÌq ÉN¯jÍh‚ É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ PÜÌJ´¿ B÷¿AË .pÌnZ¿ ÉÃ Ë fÃÌI Ó»÷ËA ÉÃ Ë ,fÄqBI ÉNqAe
PBÀ÷¼n¿ <9>
/ ,ÔiAe iB¸I ÔË jI o‚ ,fÄ· ÁμnM Áva Æ̆ É· fÃÌI BÇ É¿÷f´¿ ÆE PBÀ÷¼n¿ ÅM �Í iÌÈr¿ PBÀ÷¼n¿ Ë .tBJ¿ ÓÇAÌa Ë tBI ¾ÌJ´¿ BÍ iÌÈr¿ BÍ ÷µY ÓÇAÌa [125]
.Âej¿ O§BÀU Á÷¼n¿ PAiÌÈr¿ Ë ,OmA Áva É· fÃA
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The indisputable [premises] are the widely-known of one person, who is the opponent,
while the widely-known are [those premises] granted by the totality of men.
(x) The Specious
The specious are premises which by deceit present themselves as true, or widely-known,
or accepted, or indisputable, or resembling these, without in reality being them.
(xi) The Widely-known in appearance
The widely-known in appearance are those premises that upon first hearing them [126] it
is imagined that they are widely-known; but when you look at the truth, they are not
widely-known. For example, it is said, “you must aid your friend in truth and in
falsehood.” On a first hearing, it [is acceptable], but when it has been well thought
through with oneself, it is realized that it is not widely-known, for the widely-known is
contrary to it, viz., that one must not aid anyone, whether friend or enemy, in falsehood.
(xii) The Premises based on Suspicion
The premises based on suspicion are premises that become accepted through the
domination of doubt, [127] while reason knows that it may be that they are not true. For
example, someone says, “so-and-so is lurking around the neighborhood at night, so he
has some mischief in mind”; or “so-and-so has sent a message to our enemy, so he is
engaged in enmity with us.”
(xiii) The Imaginary
The imaginary are those premises that move the soul so that it covets something or is
repelled from something. It may be that the soul knows that they are false, as when
someone says to someone else, “this thing that you are eating is bile that has been
thrown-up,” while [in fact] the thing [in question] is honey. Although one knows that it
is false, [128] [one’s] nature is repelled and does not want [the honey]. Hence the true
and the widely-known are also imagined; however, the purely imagined are such as these.
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PBÈJr¿ <10>
iÌÈr¿ BÍ fÃA ÷µY ÆBrÍA É· fÄÍBÀà ÅÎĆ ɼÎZI É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ PBÈJr¿ B÷¿AË .fÃÌI ÆBrÍA Éà O´Î´ZI Ë fÃB¿ ÆBrÍBI ɸÃE BÍ Á÷¼n¿ BÍ ¾ÌJ´¿ BÍ fÃA
jÇB¤I PAiÌÈr¿ <11>
É· fN¯A ÁÇË ÅÎĆ / ÆfÎÄq ¾÷ËBI É· fÃÌI PB¿÷f´¿ ÆE ,jÇB¤I PAiÌÈr¿ B÷¿AË [126] fÍBI$ :fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ .fÃÌI iÌÈr¿ Éà ÔjNÄI O´Î´ZI Æ̆ Ë ,fÃiÌÈr¿ ÆBrÍA Æ̆ o‚ ,fN¯A iB¸I ÆfÎÄq ¾÷ËBI ,#ÓÄ· ÔiBÍ ½WBI Ë µZI Ai sÍÌa OmËe É· ÔË ²Ýa iÌÈr¿ Ɇ ,OnÎà iÌÈr¿ É· fÍE ÉNnÃAe ,eÌa BI fÍE ÊfÎrÍfÃA �Îà .Æej· ÔiBÍ ½WBI jI eÌI ÅÀqe BÍ eÌI OmËe É· Ai o¸‡ÎÇ fÍBJà ɷ ,OmA
PBÃÌĤ¿ <12>
É· fÍBq É· fÃAe eja Ë /,fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ ÆBÀŒ �J¼¬I É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ PBÃÌĤ¿ B÷¿AË [127] ÓñμbM o‚ ,eejNο O÷¼Z¿ ejŒ KrI Æݯ$ :fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ ,eÌJà Omie
B¿ Ó·BÄÀqfI ÔË o‚ ,OmeBNmj¯ ÂB΂ B¿ ÅÀqfI Æݯ$Ë ,eiAe jm ifÃA .#On»Ì¬r¿
PÝÎb¿ <13>
ÔlΆ kA BÍ eiE xjY ÔlΆ jI BM fÃBJÄVI Ai o°Ã É· fÃA ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ÆE PÝÎb¿ B÷¿AË :É· Ai Ón· fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ ,fÃA ®Ëie É· fÃAe o°Ã É· fqBI Ë .ejÎŒ Pj°Ã É· fĆ jÇ ,eÌI ÅÎJNÃA lΆ ÆE Ë #OmeiËEjI ÔAj°u ÔiÌa ÓÀÇ ÌM É· lΆ ÅÍA$ ,eÌI ½Îb¿ lÎà iÌÈr¿ Ë ÷µY o‚ .fÇAÌbÃ Ë ejÎŒ Pj°Ã ©JW / On«Ëie É· fÃAe [128]
.eÌI ÅÎćÄÍA ²ju ½Îb¿ ŸλË
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27. Explication of the Status of these Premises
Primary [premises], perceptible [premises], experiential [premises], transmitted
[premises] and those [premises] whose syllogism is in [one’s] nature are [all] premises of
the demonstrative syllogism. The use of demonstration is [the attainment of] certainty
and the discovery of truth. Widely-known and indisputable [premises] are premises of
the dialectical syllogism. There is no doubt that primary [premises] and everything that
was enumerated along with them, if [employed] in dialectic, it would be better. [129]
However, they do not occur in dialectic insofar as they are true but insofar as they are
widely-known and indisputable.
Now, dialectic has several uses.
(a) One is that [in the case of] those meddlesome prattlers who lay claim to
science, who have incorrect doctrines, and who proceed on an arduous path, you [can], by
knowing the truth via demonstration, demolish them by dialectic.
(b) Another is that if there are people whom you wish to persuade of some truth
or some expediency, and whom you cannot [persuade] by means of demonstration, you
[would be able to] induce belief in them by means of dialectic and the widely-known.
[130] (c) Third is that the students of the particular sciences (such as geometry,
medicine, physics and everything similar) have principles to conform to [which] are
established by other sciences (and ultimately the principles of all sciences are established
by metaphysics). Consequently, the student is then not satisfied; [but] when you prove
those principles to him by means of dialectical syllogisms, he becomes satisfied.
(d) Fourth is that with the power of dialectical syllogisms one can prove both
what is the case [131] and what is not the case. Hence, when in a problem dialectical
syllogisms are brought in [to prove] what is the case, and other syllogisms are brought in
[to prove] what is not the case, and those syllogisms are considered well, it may finally
turn out that the truth comes to be disclosed among them.
But as for how the principles of dialectic can be known and its art acquired, it is of no
concern to us in this book where our aim is the truth.
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PB¿÷f´¿ ÅÍA ÔBÇB_ÍBU Æej· Af΂ (27) pBγ �¿÷f´¿ ,eÌI ©JW ifÃA ÔË pBγ ɇÃE Ë jMAÌN¿ Ë ÓIjVM Ë pÌnZ¿ Ë Ó»÷ËA PBÀ÷¼n¿ Ë PAiÌÈr¿ .÷µY Æej· Af΂ Ë OmA ÅÎ´Í ÆBÇjI ‘fÍB¯ Ë .eÌI ÓÃBÇjI
ifÃA jŒA ,f¿E ÊejÀq ÔË BI ɆjÇ Ë Ó»÷ËA É· OnÎà ÷�q Ë ,fÃA Ó»fU pBγ �¿÷f´¿ Å¸Î»Ë ,fÃA ÷µY É· ¾fU ifÃA fN¯ËA AjÃE OÈU kA ÉÃ Å¸Î»Ë ;eÌI /jNÈI ,fÃÌI ¾fU [129]
.fÃA Á÷¼n¿ Ë fÃiÌÈr¿ É· AjÃE OÈU kA
:OmBÇ ÊfÍB¯ Ai ¾fUj¿ Ë ÊAi Ë fÃiAe OmAiBà ÔBÈJÇh¿ Ë ,fÄÄ· sÃAe Ô̧e É· ÓÃBλÌz¯ É· OnÃE Ó¸Í
.ÓĸrI Ai ÆBrÍA ,¾fVI o‚ ,ÆBÇjI ÊAi kA ÷µY ÅNnÃAfI ,fÃjI iAÌqe
BÍ ,fÄÄ· teB´N§A ÆBrÍA É· ÓÇAÌa Ó÷´Y É· fÃÌI ÓÃBn· jŒA ɸÃE jNÍe Ë /.Óĸ¯A eB´N§A Ai ÆBrÍA PAiÌÈr¿ Ë ¾fU ÊAjI ,ÓÃAÌNà ÆBÇjI ÊAjI Ë ,ÓNZ¼v¿
ɆjÇ Ë PB÷ΨÎJW Ë ÷KW Ë ÉmfÄÇ Æ̆) ÔËlU ÔBÈÀ¼§ ÆBŒfÃkÌ¿E É· OnÃE Â÷ÌmË [130] ÔBȼuA Ë)eÌq Omie jNÍe ÔBÈÀ¼¨I Ë fμ´NI eÌI BȼuA Ai ÆBrÍA ,(fÃB¿ ÅÍfI tÌa ÊBNÃE ¾e Ai ÊfÃkÌ¿E o‚ .(eÌq Omie ɨÎJñ»A f¨I B¿ Á¼¨I jaE BÈÀ¼§ �ÀÇ
.eÌq tÌa ÔË ¾e ,ÓÄ· PBJQA ÔËjI Ai BȼuA ÆE Ó»fU pBδI Æ̆ ,eÌJÃ
OnÎà ÁÇ Ë ,Æej· / PBJQA ÆAÌM Ai OnÇ ÁÇ Ó»fU pBγ P÷Ì´I É· OnÃE ÂiBȆ Ë [131] ,OnÎà jI BÈmBγ Ë ,OnÇ jI fÍE ÊeiËE Ó»fU ÔBÈmBγ ɼ×n¿ ifÃA Æ̆ o‚ .Ai
.fÍE Af΂ ÆBο ÆE ifÃA ÷µY É· fqBI jaE ,fÍE Êej· ½÷¿DM ̸Îà BÈmBγ ÆE Ë
Ai B¿ ,Æej· Kn· ÔË O§BÄu Ë ÅNnÃAe Ó»fU ¾ÌuA ÆAÌM ÉÃÌN† ɸÃE B÷¿A Ë .OnÎà iB¸I OmA ÷µY ÔË ifÃA B¿ eAj¿ É· LBN· ÅÍifÃA
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As for the premises of the estimative [faculty] and the specious, they are the premises of
sophistical and fallacious syllogisms. In sophistical and fallacious syllogisms there is no
use [132] other than injury. Or if there is a use, it is that you [can] test someone who is
making a claim as to whether he knows or does not know; in that case it is called
probative syllogism. Or else [its use] is to rebuke the artless pretender, so that people do
not learn from him and recognize his rank; in that case it is called polemical syllogism.
As for the [premises that are] widely-known in appearance, the [premises] accepted [on
trust], and the premises based on suspicion, these are premises [belonging to] the
rhetorical syllogism. The use of rhetoric lies in the political governance of men, in the
branches of the religious law, [133] in giving counsel, enmity, censure, in praise and
blame, in magnifying or abbreviating speech, and everything resembling this. There is a
separate science and book [devoted] to rhetoric which is of no concern to us here. We
have recognized that if within the aims of rhetoric primary and widely-known [premises]
are used, it is well and good; however, it is not a condition that it must in every case be
such.
As for the imaginary, they are the premises of poetical syllogisms, and there is a
particular book [devoted] to it which is of no concern to us at present. If true premises
occur in poetry, [134] or widely-known [premises], it is not on account of truth that they
are employed, but on account of [their] imaginative [character].
Of all these syllogisms we are concerned with two sorts: the demonstrative – in order that
we may use [them]; and the fallacious – in order that we may avoid [them].
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fÃÌI Óñ»B¬¿ Ë ÓÖBñn¯Ìm pBγ PB¿÷f´¿ ,PBÈJr¿ Ë PBÎÀÇË PB¿÷f´¿ B÷¿A Ë ,eÌI ÊfÍB¯ jŒA Ë .ÆBÍk ÷ÜA / OnÎà ÊfÍB¯ ˆÎÇ Óñ»B¬¿ Ë ÓÖBñn¯Ìm pBγ ie Ë [132] pBγ Ai ËA ÊBNÃE Ë ,fÃAfà BÍ fÃAe BM fÄ· Ô̧e É· Ai Ón· ÓÖB¿kBÎI É· eÌI ÆE Ë fÃkÌ¿BÎà ÔË kA ÆB¿ej¿ BM ,Ai jÄÇ ÓI Å· Ô̧e Ó»B¿kBI BÍ .fÄÃAÌa ÓÃBZN¿A
.fÄÃAÌa ÔeBħ pBγ AiË ÊBNÃE Ë ,fÄÃAfI ÔË OJMj¿
Ë .fÃÌI ÓIBña pBγ PB¿÷f´¿ ,PBÃÌĤ¿ Ë PÜÌJ´¿ Ë jÇB¤I PAiÌÈr¿ B÷¿A Ë Ë PiÌr¿ ifÃA Ë / O¨Íjq ÔBÈaBq ifÃA Ë ,eÌI Âej¿ OmBÎm ifÃA ÉIBña ‘fÍB¯ [133] Æej· eja Ë Åbm Æej· –ilI ifÃA Ë sÇÌ¸Ã Ë sÍBNm ifÃA Ë LBN§ Ë O¿Ìva iB¸I BVÄÍA Ai B¿ É· ,ÓIBN· Ë OmA ÓÀ¼§ ÉÃBŒAfU Ai ÉIBña Ë .fÃB¿ ÅÍfI ɆjÇ Ë ,fÍE ÊejI iB¸I ÔiÌÈr¿ Ë Ó»÷ËA ,ÉIBña ÔBÈyj« ifÃA jŒA É· ÁÍA ÉNnÃAe Ë .fÍBÎÃ
.fÍBI ÆBĆ ÉÄÍEjÇ É· OnÎà ¢jq Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI �ÎÃ
ÆÌÄ·A Ai B¿ Ë OnÎIBN· É÷uBa AjÃE Ë ,fÃA Ôj¨q pBγ PB¿÷f´¿ PÝÎb¿ B÷¿AË jÈI kA Éà ,iÌÈr¿ BÍ /,fN¯A j¨q ifÃA OmAi PB¿÷f´¿ jŒA Ë .OnÎà iB¸I [134]
.Ai Ó¼ÎbN¿ jÈI kA É· ,fÄqBI Êf¿E iB¸I Ai ÓNmAi
Ë ;ÁÍiAe iB¸I BM - ÓÃBÇjI :fÍE iB¸I LBI Ëe BÈmBγ ÅÍA ɼÀU kA Ai B¿ Ë .ÁÎÄ· lÎÇj‚ ÔË kA BM - Óñ»B¬¿
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28. Further Comment on the Account of Demonstration
Every demonstrative science is comprised of three things: one is called subject, one the
essential traits, and one the principles.
[135] The subject is the thing whose character is to be examined in that science; e.g. the
human body [is examined] in medicine, length in geometry, number in arithmetic, and
sound in the science of music. It is not necessary for the master of any one of such
sciences to establish that its subject exists. If the existence of the subject of the science is
evident, tant mieux; but if it is not, he establishes it in another science. However, there is
no alternative for him but to know the subject of his own science by definition.
Essential traits are those characteristics that fall [entirely] within the subject of that
science [and] which do not fall outside it; e.g., the ‘triangular’ or the ‘square’ with regard
to some quantities; [136] and ‘straightness’ or ‘crookedness’ with regard to some others –
these traits are essential with regard to the subject of geometry. Or for example,
‘evenness’ and ‘oddness’ (and everything similar) with regard to number; or ‘harmony’
and ‘discordance’ with regard to sound; or ‘health’ and ‘illness’ with regard to the human
body. In every science it is necessary that first the definition of these things be known; as
for their existence, this is known at the end by reasoning, for these characters are the ones
which that science establishes.
As for the principles, these are the premises that are fundamental to that science; for the
student [137] must first affirm these principles in order that he may then know that
science.
Put otherwise, we say that every science has a subject, problems, and principles; [and] we
have [already] said what the principles and the subject are.
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Ai ÆBÇjI SÍfY j¿ `jq jNrÎI (28) Ë ÓMAg iBQE Ai Ó¸Í Ë fÄÃAÌa ªÌyÌ¿ Ai Ó¸Í :eÌI lΆ Ém Ai ÓÃBÇjI ÓÀ¼§ jÇ j¿
/ .ÔeBJ¿ Ai Ó¸Í
Ó¸ql‚ Âej¿ ÅM ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÄ· ÔË ¾BY ifÃA j¤Ã Á¼§ ÆE ifÃA É· eÌI l·ÃE ªÌyÌ¿ [135] ɸÃBĆ Ë ,Ai LBnY Á¼§ j¿ iBÀq ɸÃBĆ Ë ,Ai ÉmfÄÇ j¿ ÊkAfÃA ɸÃBĆ Ë ,Ai É· eÌJà ÂkÜ BÈÀ¼§ ÅÎĆ ÅÍkA ÓÀ¼§ jÇ fÃËAfa jI Ë .Ai Ó´ÎmÌ¿ Á¼§ j¿ kAËE
Ë , òÁô ø̈à òË B}ÈøJò¯ eÌI Af΂ ÔË ªÌyÌ¿ ÓNnÇ jŒA .OnÇ ÔË ªÌyÌ¿ É· fÄ· Omie ªÌyÌ¿ ɸÃE kA teÌJà ÊiB† Å¸Î»Ë ;fÄ· Omie eÌa jNÍe ÓÀ¼§ ifÃA ,eÌJà jŒA
.fmBÄrI ÷fZI sÍÌa Á¼§
,fN¯ÌÎà ÔË ÆËjÎI É· fN¯A Á¼§ ÆE ªÌyÌ¿ ifÃA É· eÌI BÈNÎuBa ÆE ÓMAg iBQE B÷¿AË Óz¨I j¿ Ô‹· Ë ÓNmAi ɸÃBĆ Ë ,Ai / BÇ ÊkAfÃA Óz¨I j¿ ©Ij¿ Ë S¼R¿ ɸÃBĆ [136] ɆjÇ Ë Ó³BW Ë ÓN°U ɸÃBĆ Ë ,Ai ÉmfÄÇ ªÌyÌ¿ j¿ eÌI ÓMAg BÇjQA ÅÍA Ë .Ai ɸÃBĆ Ë ,Ai kAËE j¿ ÔiAËkBmBÃ Ë ÔiAËkBm ɸÃBĆ Ë ,Ai iBÀq j¿ fÃB¿ ÅÍfI BÇlΆ ÅÍA ÷fY ¾÷ËBI É· fÍBI ÓÀ¼§ jÇ ifÃA Ë .Ai Âej¿ ÅM j¿ ÔiBÀÎI Ë ÓNmie É· fÃÌI BÈ»BY ÆE BÈ»BY ÅÍA É· ,fÄÃAfI O÷VZI jaE ,ÆBrÍA ÓNnÇ B÷¿AË ,fÄÃAfI
.fÄ· Omie Ai ÆBrÍA Á¼§ ÆE
ÔeBJ¿ ÆFI Ai / ÊfÃkÌ¿E É· fÄqBI Á¼§ ÆE ½uA É· fÃÌI ÓMB¿÷f´¿ ÔeBJ¿ B÷¿AË [137] .fÃAfI Ai Á¼§ ÆE ÊBNÃE BM ÆfÍËjŒ fÍBJI OnbÃ
ÔeBJ¿ Ë OmA ½ÖBn¿ Ë OmA ªÌyÌ¿ Ai ÓÀ¼§ jÇ É· ÁÎÍÌŒ jNÍe ÔËjI Ë
.eÌI Ɇ É· ÁÎN°Œ ªÌyÌ¿ Ë ÔeBJ¿ ;OmA
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29. The Types of Problems in the Demonstrative Sciences
The subjects of the problems of the demonstrative sciences are either (a) part of the
subject of that science, or (b) they are part of the essential traits that we spoke of.
(a) If they are part of the subject of the science:
(i) Either they are the subject itself: e.g., in geometry it is said, “every quantity is
[either] congruent with another [138] quantity of the same genus, or is incongruous,” and
this is what is sought to be established; or e.g., it is said in arithmetic, “every number is
the half of its two [neighbors], for both of them are of the same distance from it; just as 4
is the half of 5 and 3, 6 and 2, 7 and 1; and just as 5 is the half of 6 and 4, 3 and 7, 2 and
8, and 1 and 9.”
(ii) Or they are the subject of the science [together] with a trait. For example, it
is said, “every quantity that is incongruous with another quantity, is incongruous [139]
with all its congruents.” For in this problem “quantity” has been taken [together] with
“incongruent.” Or e.g., it is said in the science of arithmetic, “every number that you
divide in two, the [square] of its half is one quarter of the [square] of the whole of it”; for
[here] “number” has been taken [together] with “dividing in two” in the subject.
(iii) Or they are a species of the subject of the science; e.g., it is said, “Six is a
perfect number,” for six is a species of number.
(iv) Or they are a species [together] with a trait; [140] e.g., it is said in geometry,
“every straight line perpendicular to another straight line forms two right angles.”
(b) Or they are an [essential] trait; e.g., it is said in geometry, “[for] every triangle, its
three angles are equal to two right angles.”
As for the predicate in the problems of the demonstrative sciences, it is an essential trait
specific to the essence of the subject of that science.
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ÓÃBÇjI ÔBÈÀ¼§ ½ÖBn¿ ÂBn³A (29) kA BÍ ,eÌI Á¼§ ÆE ªÌyÌ¿ ɼÀU kA ÆBrÍA PB§ÌyÌ¿ BÍ ÓÃBÇjI ÔBÈÀ¼§ ½ÖBn¿
.ÁÎN°Œ É· ÓMAg iBQE ɼÀU :eÌI Á¼§ ªÌyÌ¿ ɼÀU kA jŒA
/jNÍe �iBr¿ ÔiAf´¿ jÇ$:É· fÄÍÌŒ ÉmfÄÇ ifÃA ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ o°Ã BÍ É¸ÃBĆ Ë ,fÄÄ· Omie É· fÄÇAÌa ÅÍA Ë ,#ÅÍBJ¿ BÍ ,eÌI eÌa oÃBV¿ iAf´¿ [138] ÔiËe Ai Ëe jÇ É· ,eÌI sÍÌa �ÃAj· Ëe �ÀÎà ÔiBÀq jÇ$:É· LBnY ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ ,eÌI ÓœÍ Ë O°Ç Ë ,Ëe Ë sq Ë ,Ém Ë WÄ‚ �ÀÎà iBȆ ɸÃBĆ ;eÌI Ó¸Í ÔË kA OrÇ Ë Ëe �ÀÎÃ Ë OmA O°Ç Ë Ém �ÀÎÃ Ë OmA iBȆ Ë sq �ÀÎà WÄ‚ ɸÃBĆ Ë
.#OmA ÉÃ Ë Ó¸Í �ÀÎÃ Ë OmA ,eÌI ÔiAf´¿ ÅÍBJ¿ É· ÔiAf´¿ jÇ$:fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ÔjQA BI eÌI Á¼§ ªÌyÌ¿ BÍ #ÅÍBJ¿$ BI Ai #iAf´¿$ ɼ×n¿ ÅÍA ie É· ,#eÌI ÔË ÆB·iBr¿ �ÀÇ / ÅÍBJ¿ [139] �ÀÎÄI Ljy ,ÓÄ· ËfI É· ÔiBÀq jÇ$:LBnY Á¼§ ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBÄ†Ë .fÄN¯jŒ ifÃA fÄN¯jŒ #Æej· Ëe$ BI Ai #iBÀq$ É· ,#eÌI ÔË �ÀÇ Ljy �Í iBȆ ÔË
.ªÌyÌ¿ sq É·,#OmA ÷ÂBM ÔiBÀq sq$ :fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI Á¼§ ªÌyÌ¿ kA Ó§Ìà BÍ
.iBÀq kA OmA Ó§Ìà jI É· ÁδNn¿ Ó÷ña jÇ$ :É· ÉmfÄÇ ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ /,ÔjQA BI eÌI Ó§Ìà BÍ [140]
.#ÉÀÍB³ Ëe Æ̆ fÄ· ÉÍËAk Ëe fNnÍA ÁδNn¿ Ó÷ña
ÉÀÍB³ Ëe fĆ ÔË �ÍËAk Ém ÓR¼R¿ jÇ$ :ÉmfÄÇ ifÃA fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,eÌI ÔjQA BÍ .#fÃÌI
ªÌyÌ¿ PAgj¿ ÷xBa ÓMAg eÌI ÔjQA ,ÓÃBÇjI Â̼§ ½ÖBn¿ ifÃA ¾ÌÀZ¿ B÷¿AË
.Ai Á¼§ ÆE
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30. Explanation of the term “Essential”
as used in the Premises of Demonstrative [Sciences]
By essential here is not simply meant what we said earlier only; rather, that [141] is
meant and [more] besides. In sum, by essential is meant here something that belongs to
the essence. Either it is something that permeates the definition of its subject, and you
know that this [thing] belongs to the essence by itself. Or it is something in whose
definition the subject enters, in that the essence has the subject of the art in itself and not
on account of something that is more general (e.g., motion [belongs] to man not on
account of humanity but on account of corporeity, and corporeity is more general than
humanity), nor on account of a subject that is more particular than it (e.g., writing with
respect to body, which is on account of humanity, for as long as human does not exist,
body does not become writer). [142] However, it is like flat-nosedness [in relation] to the
nose, or straightness [in relation] to the line: for the nose is incorporated in the definition
of flat-nosed, as is the line in the definition of straightness.
In the problems of the demonstrative sciences the predicate is essential, and certainly no
extrinsic state is discussed or is made predicate: a geometer never looks to see whether
the straight line or the curved line is better, and he never looks to see whether the straight
is opposed or not to the curved, because goodness and opposition are not among the
essential [characters] of the line, and the subject of the science of geometry [143] is not
grasped in their definition; nor are they grasped in the definition of the subjects of the
problems of the science of geometry. Rather, in this case either the master of dialectics
speaks, or the scientific master, for essential goodness and opposition are his subject.
Consequently, the predicates of the problems of the demonstrative sciences are essential,
but not any essential; rather, this second essential, for the former essential is itself evident
in that it itself makes the subject evident. So why should the evident be sought for by
argument and demonstration?
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fÄÍÌŒ ÓÃBÇjI PB¿÷f´¿ ifÃA É· ÓMAg ¥°» Æej· jÎn°M (30) Ë fÄÇAÌa / ÆE É· ,oI Ë ÁÎN°Œ jNr΂ B¿ É· fÄÇAÌa ÆE BÈÄM Éà ÓMAhI BVÄÍA [141] BÍ .eÌI eÌa kA Ai PAg É· fÄÇAÌa ÔlΆ ÓMAhI BVÄÍA ɼÀVI Ë .fÄÇAÌa ÆE lU ÔeÌbI Ai PAgj¿ ÅÍA É· ÔA ÉNnÃAe Ë fÍE eÌa ªÌyÌ¿ ÷fY ifÃA É· eÌI ÔlΆ O§BÄu ªÌyÌ¿ PAg É· fÍE ÔË ÷fY ifÃA ªÌyÌ¿ É· eÌI ÔlΆ BÍ .eÌI eÌa
Ai Âej¿ sJÄU ɸÃBĆ) OmA jN÷¿B§ ÔË kA É· eÌI ÔlΆ jÈI kA ÉÃ Ë eÌI eÌa kA Ai ,(Ó¿ej¿ kA OmA jN÷¿B§ ÓÀnU Ë ,OmA ÓÀnU jÈI kA É· ,OmA Ó¿ej¿ jÈI kA Éà jÈI kA É· ,Ai ÁnU ÔjÎIe ɸÃBĆ) OmA jN÷uBa ÔË kA É· OnΧÌyÌ¿ jÈI kA ÉÃ Ë Ónñ¯A Æ̆ eÌI ÆBĆ Å¸Î»Ë / .(eÌrà jÎIe ÁnU ,eÌJà ÆBnÃA BM É· OnÎÃBnÃA [142] .fÍE ÓNmAi ÷fY ifÃA ¡aË fÍE Ónñ¯A ÷fY ifÃA ÓÄÎI É· ,Ai ¡a ÓNmAi Ë ,Ai ÓÄÎI
Ë fÄĸà SZI KÍj« Ó»BY kA ÉNJ»A Ë ,eÌI ÓMAg ¾ÌÀZ¿ ÓÃBÇjI Â̼§ ½ÖBn¿ ifÃA Ë lŒjÇË ,ejŒ ¡a BÍ jM̸Îà OmAi ¡a É· ejNÄà pfÄÈ¿ lŒjÇË .fÄĸà ¾ÌÀZ¿ AiËA ÔBÈÎMAg kA Éà Ô÷fy Ë ÓÍ̸Îà ɷ AjÍk ,eÌJà BÍ eÌI ÷fy Ai ejŒ j¿ OmAi É· ejNÄà ifÃA ÆBrÍA ÉÃ Ë ,eÌrà ÉN¯jŒ ÆBrÍA ÷fY ifÃA / ÉmfÄÇ Á¼§ ªÌyÌ¿ Ë ,OmA ¡a [143] ¾fU fÃËAfa BÍ ¾BY ÅÍifÃA ɸ¼I ;fÃÌq ÉN¯jŒ ÉmfÄÇ Á¼§ ½ÖBn¿ PB§ÌyÌ¿ ÷fY
.eÌI ÔË ªÌyÌ¿ ÓMAg Ô÷fy Ë ÓÍ̸Îà ɷ ,ÓÀ¼§ fÃËAfaBÍ fÍÌŒ Åbm
ÓMAg ÅÍA É· ,ÓMAg jÇ ÉÃ Ë fÃÌI ÓMAg ÓÃBÇjI ÔBÈÀ¼§ ½ÖBn¿ PÜÌÀZ¿ o‚ .fÄ· Â̼¨¿ Ai ªÌyÌ¿ eÌa ÔË É· eÌI Â̼¨¿ eÌa ÅÎr΂ ÓMAg É· AjÍk ,Â÷Ëe
?ÆBÇjI Ë O÷VZI Æej· K¼W Ai Â̼¨¿ fÍBq Æ̆ o‚
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50
31. The [various] Types of Principles of Demonstration
and that which is Predicate in them
There are four principles and primary foundations in demonstrative science:
[144] (a) The definitions which at the outset are established as principles; e.g. the
definition of ‘point,’ ‘line,’ and ‘figure’ in Euclid’s book.
(b) Primary premises and those [premises] other than primary, namely, those in
which there is no doubt; these are called axioms; e.g., in [Euclid’s] book it has been set
down as a principle that all things that are equal, their halves are equal; and if you
subtract from equals an equal [amount], those which remain would be equal.
(c) The posited principle which is the principle of the science and in which there
is doubt; [145] however, its truth [depends] on another science, and in this science it must
be taken by conformity; then it would be the posited principle which the student accepts
and [regarding which] there would not be for him a contrary belief.
(d) The postulate, and this is like the posited principle; however, the student has a
belief contrary to that principle, yet for the time being he forbears. The example of both
of these [sc. the postulate and the posited principle] are the principles one reads of in
Euclid’s book under the name of that which there is no choice but to agree upon; for
example, he says that you must accept that “around every point [taken as] center [146] it
is possible to draw a circle.” Here many people say that the circle does not exist in
reality, of course, nor is it possible that the circle exist in the way the geometers say, viz.,
that there is a center from which all straight lines [leading] to the periphery are equal.
These, then, are the [various] types of the principles of demonstrative science. It is
necessary that the predicates of the premises of the earlier principles be first. The first
[predicate] is [of a sort] that there is not a more general intermediary between it and the
subject. For example, animality and laughter in relation to man: he has each of them
without [147] a more general intermediary; and not like voluntary motion which man
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eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ ÆBrÍA ifÃA ɇÃE Ë ÆBÇjI ÔeBJ¿ ÂBn³A (31) / .fÃA iBȆ ÓÃBÇjI Á¼§ ifÃA Åλ÷ËA ¾ÌuA Ë ÔeBJ¿
¡a Ë Éñ´Ã ÷fY pfμ³A LBN· ifÃA ɸÃBĆ ,fÄÄ· ½uA AfNIBI É· BÇ÷fY Ó¸Í [144] .½¸q Ë
Ai ÅÍA Ë ;OnÎà ÷�q ÆBrÍA ifÃA É· ɼÀVÃE kA ,Ó»÷ËA lU Ë Ó»÷ËA PB¿÷f´¿ jBÍeË ÊeBÈà ½uA LBN· ÆE ifÃA ɸÃBĆ .fÄÃAÌa ©¿BU Á¼§ Ë fÄÃAÌa ²iB¨N¿ Á¼§ jIAjI kA Æ̆ Ë ,fÃÌI jIAjI ÆBrÍA ÔBÇ ÉÀÎà fÃÌI jIAjI É· BÇlΆ jÇ :É· Omf¿E
.fÃÌI jIAjI fÃBÀI É· Ó³BI ,jIAjI ÓÄ· ÆBv´Ã
ÔË ÓNmie Å¸Î»Ë /,eÌI ÷�q ÔË ifÃA Ë eÌI Á¼§ ½uA É· ªÌyÌ¿ ½uA Â÷Ìm Ë [145] É· eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ ½uA ÊBNÃE Ë ÅN¯jŒ fÍBI fμ´NI Á¼§ ÅÍifÃAË ,eÌI jNÍe ÓÀ¼¨I
.eÌJà ÆE ±»Bb¿ ÔeB´N§A ÔË �ÍelÃ Ë ejÍhƒI AjÃE ÊfÃkÌ¿E
ÊfÃkÌ¿E É· eÌI ÆE Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ ½uA Æ̇ÀÇ ÔË Ë ,OmA ÊieBv¿ ÂiBÈ†Ë ÅÍA ¾BR¿ Ë .O³Ë ifÃA fÄ· ÓÀÇ OZ¿Bn¿ Å¸Î»Ë ½uA ÆE ²Ýa eiAe ÔeB´N§A OnÎà ÊiB† ɸÃE ÂBÄI fÄÃAÌa ÓÀÇ AiË pfμ³A LBN· ifÃA É· OmBȼuA ÆE Ëe jÇ l·j¿ �ñ´Ã jÇ jI$ :É· ÔjÍhƒI fÍBI É· fÍÌŒ ÓÀÇ É¸ÃBĆ ,ÔËjI Æej· ¶B°÷MA kA
Ë ,ÉNJ»A OnÎà O´Î´ZI ÊjÍAe É· fÄÍÌŒ Âej¿ iBÎnI BVÄÍA Ë .#Æej· fÍBq / ÊjÍAe [146] É· fqBI sÍl·j¿ É· ,fÄÍÌŒ ÆBmfÄÈ¿ ɸÃBĆ eÌI eÌUÌ¿ ÊjÍAe É· ÆeÌI fÍBrÃ
.fÃÌI jIAjI ÊiBĸI ÔË kA OmAi ÔBÈña �ÀÇ
ÅÎr΂ ÔBȼuA PB¿÷f´¿ PÜÌÀZ¿ Ë .fÃA ÓÃBÇjI Á¼§ ÔBȼuA ÂBn³A ÅÍA o‚ ,jN÷¿B§ eÌJà ÉñmAË ªÌyÌ¿ ÆBο Ë ÔË ÆBο É· eÌI ÆE Ó»÷ËA Ë .fÄÍBI ÅλËA ,jN÷¿B§ fÃA ÉñmAË /ÓI AiË Ó¸Í jÇ É· ,Ai Âej¿ Ó·BÃfÄa Ë ÔiÌÃBU ɸÃBĆ [147]
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possesses on account of animality, while animality is more general than humanity.
As for predicates of the premises that are not primary principles (those that have once
been the conclusion [of a syllogism] but have now become premises), it is possible that
they not be primary [predicates], but they must be essential and necessary if the problem
is to be necessary. For whenever the premises are not necessary, it is possible that their
judgment change; and if their judgment changes, then it is not incumbent upon reason to
assent to their conclusion; [148] hence their conclusion is not necessary.
The essential in the premises of demonstration are of both kinds, whereas in the problems
it is one kind, for it is possible that the middle term be the essential in the former [sense]
for the minor term. However, it is then not possible that the major term be essential in
the same [sense] for the middle term; otherwise, it would be essential also in this [sense]
for the minor, for the essential of the essential in this [sense] is essential. Hence it would
be essential in the conclusion and in the problem; and you [already] know that it is not
possible.
It is possible that the middle term be essential [in the] second [sense] for the minor, and
the major the essential [in the] former [sense] for the middle. And it is possible that both
be essential [149] in the second sense.
32. Exposition of the character of Demonstrative Syllogisms
What had to be said regarding the foundations, principles and problems has been said.
Now syllogisms must be spoken about. The demonstrative syllogism is of two kinds.
One is the true demonstrative, and it is called “demonstration [of the reason] why” (in
Arabic called demonstration of lima). The other is also a demonstration, but it is not a
demonstration [of the reason] why; rather, it is “demonstration [150] of existence” (in
Arabic called demonstration of anna).
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Ó¿ej¿ kA ÔiÌÃBU Ë ;OmA ÔiÌÃBU ½J³ kA Ai Âej¿ É· ,OmAÌbI sJÄU Æ̆ Éà .OmA jN÷¿B§
Ë fÄqBI ÊeÌI ÉVÎNà iBJ¸Í É·) eÌJà ÅÎNnbà ½uA É· ÓMB¿÷f´¿ PÜÌÀZ¿ B÷¿A Ë ÔiËjy Ë fÃÌI ÓMAg É· fÍBI Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI Ó»÷ËA Éà ɷ fÍBq ,(fÃÌq É¿÷f´¿ ÆÌÄ·A É· fÍBq fÃÌJà ÔiËjy PB¿÷f´¿ É· ÊBŒjÇ É· ,ÆeÌI fÇAÌa ÔiËjy ɼ×n¿ jŒA
�VÎNà ÉI É· eja jI eÌJà KUAË ÊBNÃE eejNI ÆBrÍA Á¸Y Æ̆ Ë ,eejNI ÆBrÍA Á¸Y .eÌJà ÔiËjy ÆBrÍA �VÎNà o‚ / ,eËjNI ÆBrÍA [148]
÷fY É· fÍBq É· ,ÉÃÌŒ �Í ½ÖBn¿ ifÃAË ,eÌI ÉÃÌŒ ËejÇ ÆBÇjI PB¿÷f´¿ ifÃA ÓMAgË ÅÎÀÈI ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY É· fÍBrà ÊBNÃE Å¸Î»Ë .Ai ÅÎÈ· ÷fYj¿ eÌI ÅÎr΂ ÓMAg ¡mËA ÓMAg ÓMAg É· ,Ai ÅÎÈ· j¿ ÔËi ÅÍjI ÁÇ eÌI ÓMAg ÷ÜAË ,Ai ¡mËA j¿ eÌI ÓMAg ÔËi .fÍBrà ɷ ÔAÉNnÃAe Ë eÌI ÓMAg ɼ×n¿ Ë ÉVÎNà ifÃA o‚ .eÌI ÓMAg ,ÔËi ÅÍjI
¡mËA j¿ ÅÎr΂ ÓMAg ÅÎÈ¿ Ë ,Ai ÅÎÈ· j¿ eÌI ÅÎnƒm ÓMAg ¡mËA ÷fY É· fÍBqË
.ÅÎnƒm ÓĨÀI fÃÌI / ÓMAg Ëe jÇ É· fÍBq Ë ,Ai [149]
ÓÃBÇjI ÔBÈmBγ ¾BY ÆeÌÀÃkBI (32) BÈmBγ ifÃA ÆÌÄ·A .f¿E ÉN°Œ ,½ÖBn¿ Ë ÔeBJ¿ Ë ¾ÌuA ifÃA ÅN°Œ OnÍBI ɇÃE
.OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe ÓÃBÇjI pBγ .fÍE ÅN°Œ Åbm É· fÍBI
.fÄÃAÌa òÁø» ÆBÇjI ÔkBNI Ë fÄÃAÌa ÓÍAj† ÆBÇjI AiËA Ë ,OmA ӴδY ÓÃBÇjI Ó¸Í Ë OmA ÓNnÇ/ÆBÇjI É· ,OnÎà ÓÍAj† ÆBÇjI Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA ÆBÇjI ÁÇ jNÍe Ë [150]
.fÄÃAÌa úÆC ÆBÇjI ÔkBNI
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In sum, all demonstrations are demonstrations [of the reason] why, if by “why” is meant
the “why” of a belief or the “why” of a claim, for the middle term in every syllogism is
the cause of the belief in the conclusion. However, here we do not mean this [sense of]
why, rather, we mean the why of the state of the thing in its existence – viz., why is it in
itself in this way? – not “why did you say such-and-such?” For there are many times
when, by establishing [the answer to] “why did you say [that]?”, we know that what you
said exists; however, we do not know what the cause is that it is in that way.
For example, if someone says, “at such-and-such a place there is a fire,” and you ask him,
[151] “Why did you say that?”, and he answers you, saying, “because there is smoke
there” – he has answered [the question] “why did you say that?” and has established that
there is a fire there. However, he has not established and not shown why fire has been
produced there and what the cause was. Thus the existence of smoke is the middle term;
however, it is the cause of existence in that you know that [the fire] exists, but it is not
the cause of the why of existence, so that you know why this fire that is there exists. Thus
if someone claims: “such-and-such a thing will burn there,” and you say, [152] “Why did you say
that?”, he says, “Because there is a fire there and wherever there is fire things burn” – here he has
supplied both the why of speech and the why of existence. Hence this is called the demonstration
[of the reason] why (lima), and the former the demonstration of existence (anna).
The condition of the demonstration [of the reason] why (lima) is not that which is known
among the logicians, for they suppose that the middle term must in all circumstances be
the cause of the major term, just as fire (in the example we mentioned) is the cause of
burning. Rather, the middle term must be the cause of the existence of the major term in
the minor term, although it is not the cause of the major term, but is, for example, its
effect. However, it is because of [the middle term] that this major has been produced in
the minor, so that it is the cause of the why. [153] For example, you say, “man is
animal”; “every animal is body,” although body is the cause of animality, and animality is
not the cause of body. But animality is the cause that man is body, for corporeity belongs
first to animality and because of animality does it belong to man. For if animality existed
without corporeity, humanity would have been that way too.
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ÓÍAj† Ë fÄÇAÌa eB´N§A ÓÍAj† Aj‡I jŒA ,fÃÌI ÓÍAj† ÆBÇjI BÈÃBÇjI �ÀÇ É¼ÀVI Ë ÔAj† ÅÍA Éà BVÄÍA Å¸Î»Ë ,eÌI ÉVÎNà eB´N§A O÷¼§ ÓmBγjÈI ¡mËA ÷fY É· ,Ô̧e OmA ÅÎĆ Aj† É· - ÁÎÇAÌa ÓÀÇ sÎNnÇ ifÃA lΆ ¾BY ÔAj† É· ,ÁÎÇAÌa ÓÀÇ É· fÍEÊej· Omie É· eÌI iBI iBÎnI É· ,#?ÓN°Œ ÅÎĆ Aj†$ Éà - sÍÌa ÔeÌbI É· OmA KJm Ɇ É· ÁÎÃAfÃ Å¸Î»Ë ,OnÇ ÓN°Œ ɇÃE É· ÁÎÃAfI BM #?ÓN°Œ Aj†$
.OmA ÆBĆ
:É· / ÓÍÌŒ Ai ËA ,#OmA sME ÊBNÍBU ÆÝ°I$ :É· fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA õÝR¿ [151] LAÌU ,#OmeËe BVÃE É· AjÍk$ :fÍÌŒ Ë fÇe LAÌU AjM ÔË ;#?ÓN°Œ Aj†$ Af΂ Ë ej¸Ã Omie Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA sME BVÃE É· ej· Omie Ë eAe #?ÓN°Œ Aj†$
¡mËA ÷fY eËe ÆeÌI o‚ .OmeÌI KJm Ɇ Ë Omfq ½uBY BVÃE sME Aj† É· ej¸Ã ,OnÎà ÓNnÇ ÔAj† O÷¼§ Ë ,OnÇ É· ÓNnÃAe É· OmA ÓNnÇ O÷¼§ Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA lΆ Æݯ É· fÄ· Ô̧e Ón· jŒA o‚ .OmAj† OmBVÃE É· sME ÅÍA É· ÓÃAfI É· sME BVÃE É· AjÍk$ :fÍÌŒ ÔË ,#?ÓN°Œ Aj†$/:ÓÍÌŒ ÌM Ë ,ÅNaÌm fÇAÌbI BVÃE [152] ÁÇ Ë OmA ÉN°Œ iBN°Œ ÓÍAj† ÁÇ BVÄÍA ,#ekÌnI Ai lΆ eÌI sME BV· jÇ Ë OmA
. úÆC ÆBÇjI Ai ÅÎr΂ Ë ,fÄÃAÌa òÁø» ÆBÇjI Ai ÅÍA o‚ .ÓNnÇ ÓÍAj†
fÍBI ÅÎNÃBο ÷fY É· fÃiAfÄ‚ É· ,fÄÃAe ÆBδñÄ¿ ÆBο É· OnÃE Éà òÁø» ÆBÇjI ¢jqË ÅNaÌm O÷¼§ ÁÍej· eBÍ É· ¾BR¿ ÅÍifÃA sME ɸÃBĆ ,ÉÄÍEjÇ eÌI ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY O÷¼§ É· É· fĆ jÇ ,ÅÎÈ· ÷fY ifÃA eÌI ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY ÆeÌI O÷¼§ É· fÍBI ¡mËA ÷fY ɸ¼I .OmA ÅÍAeÌI Êfq ½uBY ÔË KJnI Å¸Î»Ë eÌI ÔË ¾Ì¼¨¿ õÝR¿ ɸ¼I eÌJà ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY O÷¼§ ÓÃAÌÎYjÇË OnÃAÌÎY Âej¿$:ÓÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ /.eÌI ÓÖAj† KJm BM ,ÅÎÈ· ifÃA ÅÎÈ¿ [153] Å¸Î»Ë .OnÎà ÁnU O÷¼§ ÓÃAÌÎYË OmA ÓÃAÌÎY O÷¼§ ÁnU É·fĆjÇ ,#OmA ÁnU KJnIË OmAi ÓÃAÌÎYj¿ ÓÀnU Onbà ɷ ,OmA ÁnU Âej¿ É· OnÃE O÷¼§ ÓÃAÌÎY .ÔeÌI ÆBĆ ÁÇ Ó¿ej¿ ,O÷ÎÀnU ÓI ÔeÌI eÌUÌ¿ ÓÃAÌÎY jŒA É· ,OmAi Âej¿ j¿ ÓÃAÌÎY
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33. Explication of the types of Scientific Questions
Scientific questions are in all of four kinds: [154] (a) hal (“is it?”), asking about existence
and non-existence; (b) mā (“what?”), asking about whatness; (c) ayyu (“which?”), asking
about whichness; (d) lima (“why?”), asking about the cause. As for “how many?”,
“how?”, “when?”, and “where?”, these do not fall within [the scope] of scientific
questions.
(a) The question hal (“is it?”) is of two kinds: One is when you ask, “does such-
and-such a thing exist?”; the other is when you ask, “is such-and-such a thing this way?”
(b) The question mā is of two kinds: [155] One is when you say, “ what is the
meaning of the word you [used]?”. For example, if someone says “triangle,” you will
say, “what is the meaning of triangle? What do you mean by triangle?”. The other is
when you say, “what is the triangle in itself?”
The first question of mā (“what?”) is prior to hal (“is it?”), for first it is necessary that
you know what he is saying so that you can then concern yourself with whether it exists
or not. The other question of mā (“what?”) is after hal (“is it?”), for as long as you do not
know if it exists, you do not say “what is it?”. The answer to the question mā (“what?”)
is the explanation of the name or definition of the essence.
[156] (c) As for the question ayyu (“which?”), it asks either about [specific] difference
or property.
(d) As for the question lima (“why?”), it is of two kinds: One is, “Why did you
say that?”; the other is, “Why is that?”.
The question hal (“is it?”) and lima (“why?”) involve affirmation; the question mā
(“what?”) and ayyu (“which?”) involve conception.
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ÓÀ¼§ K»Bñ¿ ÔBÈNÀn³ Æej· Af΂ (33) .fmj‚ ÓNnÎÃ Ë ÓNnÇ kA ÆEË ,#½Ç$ Ó¸Í/.OmA ÉÃÌŒ iBȆ ÉÀÇ ÓÀ¼§ ÔBÈJ¼ñ¿ [154] Ë .fmj‚ Ó¿Af· kA ÆEË ,#÷ÔA$ K¼ñ¿ Â÷ÌmË .fmj‚ ÔlΆ Ɇ kA ÆE Ë ,#B¿$ jNÍeË #BV·$Ë #Ó·$Ë #ÉÃÌN†$Ë #fĆ$ B÷¿AË .fmj‚ KJm kA ÆE Ë ,#Á»$ K¼ñ¿ ÂiBȆ
.fN¯ÌÎà BÈÀ¼§ ÔBÈJ¼ñ¿ ifÃA
ɸÃE jNÍe Ë ;OnÇ lΆ Æݯ É· ÓmjƒI É· Ó¸Í :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe #½Ç$ K¼ñ¿ Ë .OnÇ ÅÎĆ lΆ Æݯ É· ÓmjƒI
,#?ÌM ¥°» ÓĨ¿ eÌI Ɇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE Ó¸Í /:OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe #B¿$ K¼ñ¿ Ë [155] ÓÇAÌbο Ɇ Ë ?S¼R¿ ÓĨ¿ eÌI Ɇ$:ÓÍÌŒ ÌM ,#S¼R¿$fÍÌŒ Ón· É· õÝR¿
#?sÍÌa o°ÄI eÌa S¼R¿ eÌI Ɇ$ :ÓÍÌŒ É· OnÃE jNÍeË .#?S¼RÀI
Ɇ É· ÓÃAfI É· fÍBI Onbà ɷ ,OmA #½Ç$ kA jNr΂ #B¿$ kA ÅÎr΂ K¼ñ¿ Ë kA jNÍe #B¿$ K¼ñ¿Ë .OnÎà BÍ OnÇ É¸ÃAfI ÔÌq ¾Ì¬r¿ ÊBNÃE BM fÍÌNο Ë .OmA lΆ Ɇ É· ÓÍÌNà OnÇ É· ÓqBI ÉNnÃAfà BM É· ,OmA #½Ç$ oƒm
.PAg ÷fY BÍ ,eÌI ÂBà jÎn°M #B¿$ K¼ñ¿ LAÌU
.É÷uBa kA BÍ ,fmj‚ ½v¯ kA BÍ ,#÷ÔA$ K¼ñ¿ B÷¿A [156]
Aj†$ É· jNÍe Ë ,#?ÓN°Œ Aj†$ :É· Ó¸Í :OmA ÉÃÌŒ Ëe #Á»$ K¼ñ¿ B÷¿AË #?OnÇ
kA #÷ÔA$ Ë #B¿$ K¼ñ¿ Ë ,fÃA µÍfvM ½J³ kA #Á»$ K¼ñ¿ Ë #½Ç$ K¼ñ¿ Ë
.fÃi÷ÌvM ½J³
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34. Directives giving Protection against Fallacies
Just as when we were teaching how definition and description must be done we gave
directives on how you [can] avoid [making] error [in] definition, so likewise since [157]
we have explicated how syllogism and demonstration are, we give directives by a few
principles so that there is protection from error in syllogism. There is no need to lengthen
out the speech and to mention all the causes of fallacy.
(a) The first thing is that you must become habituated to analyzing truly
complicated syllogisms so that you know quickly whether [a given] speech is a syllogism
and which syllogism it is, or whether it is not a syllogism.
(b) Another is that you divide the syllogism, analyze it to the limit, and consider
it so that the middle term is in the same respect and the same state in both premises; for if
[158] there is a little excess or defect the syllogism would not be a syllogism and there
would be error. For example, in conversion, if someone says, “No house is in man,” and
then again, “No man is in the house,” this speech would be false, [whereas] the
conversion of the universal negative must be true. The cause of this is that in the former
premise “house” was subject, and “in man” was predicate. And conversion consists in
your making the predicate, exactly as it is, the subject, and the subject, predicate. In the
original [proposition] “man” alone was not predicate, while “house” alone was the
subject. But in the conversion “man” alone became the subject, while “house” together
with “in” [became] the predicate. Consequently, a correct [conversion] did not result, for
one had to say, “nothing that is in man is a house.”
[159] (c) Third is that, when you have divided the syllogism, you consider it so that
there is no opposition between the major term and the minor, and between the two parts
of the conclusion. You must keep in mind the conditions of contradiction in such a
situation so that you know whether there is agreement or not.
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fÄÇe ÓÄÀÍA PBñ»B¬¿ kA É· BÈNÎuË (34) ÔBña kA É· ÁÍej· O÷ÎuË ,Æej· fÍBI ÉÃÌN† Ámi Ë ÷fY É· ÁÍfÍkÌ¿BÎI ɸÃBćÀÇ ,eÌI ÉÃÌN† ÆBÇjIË pBγ É· ÁÍej· Af΂ /Æ̆ lÎà ÅÎćÀÇ ,ÓÄ· lÎÇj‚ ÉÃÌN† ÷fY [157] fÍBÎà OUBY Ë .fN¯A ÓÄÀÍA pBγ ifÃA ¡¼« kA BM fĆ Ó¼uBI ÁÎÄ· ÓÀÇ O÷ÎuË
.Éñ»B¬¿ LBJmA �ÀÇ Æej· eBÎI Ë Åbm ÆfÎr· kAifI
BM ÓNmAjI ÉN°qE ÔBÈmBγ ÆejI kBJI Æej· fÍBI PeB§ AjM É· OnÃE ÔlΆ ¾÷ËA Ë .OmA pBγ Éà BÍ ,OmA pBγ ÂAf· Ë OmA pBγ Åbm ÅÍA É· ÓÃAfI eËk
�Í jI ¡mËA ÷fY BM ,ÔjNÄI Ë ÔjIkBI ÷fY jnI Ë ÓÄ· ½Îv°M Ai pBγ ɸÃE jNÍe Ë ,eÌI ÓÃBv´Ã Ë PeBÍk ÉÍB¿iAÌa/jŒA É· ,eÌI É¿÷f´¿ Ëe jÇ ifÃA ¾BY �Í jI Ë ÔËi [158] :É· fÍÌŒ Ón· jŒA É· ,o¸§ ifÃA ɸÃBĆ .fN¯A ¡¼« Ë eÌI pBγ Éà pBγ
ÅÍA ,#OnÎà ÉÃBa ifÃA Âej¿ ˆÎÇ$ :É· fÍÌŒ kBI Ë ,#OnÎà Âej¿ ifÃA ÉÃBa ˆÎÇ$ ifÃA É· OnÃE ÅÍA KJm Ë .eÌI OmAi É· fÍBI Ó÷¼· K»Bm o¸§ Ë ,eÌI ®Ëie Åbm É· eÌI ÆE o¸§ Ë .eÌI ¾ÌÀZ¿ #Âej¿ ifÃA$Ë ,eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ #ÉÃBa$ ÅÎr΂ �¿÷f´¿ #Âej¿$ BÈÄM ½uA ifÃA Ë .¾ÌÀZ¿ Ai ªÌyÌ¿ Ë ,ÓÄ· ªÌyÌ¿ ÉÄΨI Ai ¾ÌÀZ¿ ªÌyÌ¿ #Âej¿$ BÈÄM o¸§ ifÃAË ,eÌI ªÌyÌ¿ #ÉÃBa$ BÈÄM Ë ,eÌJà ¾ÌÀZ¿
É· ÓN°Œ É· ÓNnÍBI É· f¿E LAÌu Éà ÂjUÜ ,¾ÌÀZ¿ #ifÃA$ BI #ÉÃBa$ Ë ,fq /.#OnÎà ÉÃBa eÌI Âej¿ ifÃA É· lΆ ˆÎÇ$
ÅÎÈ· Ë ÅÎÈ¿ ÷fY ÆBο BM ÔjNÄI ,ÓqBI Êej· ½Îv°M Ai pBγ Æ̆ ɸÃE Â÷Ìm Ë [159] ÊBNÍBU ÅÎĆ ifÃA |δà ÔBÈWjq É· fÍBI Ë .eÌJà ²Ýa ÉVÎNà ‘iB‚ Ëe ÆBο Ë
.OnÎÃ BÍ OnÇ ¶B°MA É· ÓÃAfI BM ,ÔiAe eBÍ
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
55
(d) Fourth is that [the meaning] of the terms be questioned. For there are many
times when there is a single term [160] with a double meaning, but it is supposed that it
has a single meaning – and this is a great calamity. Therefore the meaning must be
adhered to, not the [given] term. This also is part of the conditions of contradiction, but
we have stated the use separately.
(e) Fifth is that it is necessary that no confusion occur at the place where a
pronoun is. For example, it is said, “He did,” where it may be that “he” refers to one
case, but it is thought to refer to another case. Likewise, it is said, “He saw it,” for “it” is
a pronoun referring to different cases. [161] For example, it is said, “whoever has known
a thing, vey [“he/she/it”] is like what he knew.” This term vey refers to the known and
the knower, and each of the two has a different meaning.
(f) Sixth is that you avoid the indefinite and not take it in place of the universal,
for there are many things which, if said as indefinite, reason becomes deceived and
accepts, while if said as universal, reason becomes awake and does not accept. For
example, it is said, “someone who is a friend of your enemy is not your friend;” it may be
that this [162] speech is accepted; but if this is made definite and it is said, “everyone
who is a friend of the enemy, is an enemy,” or “no friend of the enemy is a friend,”
reason does not accept [this] and says that it is not necessary that all be such.
(g) Seventh is that you consider the premises of the syllogism so that the cause of
your adherence to them is not that you, having thought to find their contradictory,
concede them because of your failure to discover [their contradictory] – for it may be that
there is a contradictory for them but you have not found it. You then adhere [to the
premises] when you know that it is not possible that [163] they have a contradictory,
[and] not when you have not found it.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
55
Ë ,Ëe ÓĨ¿ Ë eÌI /Ó¸Í ÂBà ɷ eÌI ÔiBÎnI É· ,fÍEÊfÎmj‚ ÂBà kA ɸÃE ÂiBȆ Ë [160] ÓĨÀI É· fÍBI o‚ .OmA –ilI ÓN¯E ÅÍA Ë OmA Ó¸Í ÓĨ¿ É· fÍE ÉNqAfÄ‚
Ai ÊfÍB¯ Å¸Î»Ë ,OmA |δà ÔBÈWjq ɼÀU ifÃA ÁÇ ÅÍAË .ÂBÄI Éà ,fÍE ÊfÍËjNI .ÁÎN°NI AfU
,#ej· ÔË$fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ .fN¯ÌÎà ±¼Nb¿ eÌI jÎÀy É· ÓÍBU É· fÍBI ɸÃE ÁVÄ‚Ë :fÄÍÌŒ É· ÅÎćÀÇ Ë ;fÃiAfÄ‚ jNÍe ÔBU Ë eejŒkBI jNÍe ÔBU #ÔË$ É· fqBI É· ɸÃBĆ / .eejŒkBI ±¼Nb¿ ÔBÈÍBVI Ë eÌI jÎÀy #ÅÎq$ ÅÍA É· ,#tfÍfI$ [161] #ÔË$ ¥°» ÅÍA ,#OnÃAe É· eÌI ÆBĆ ÔË ,OnÃAe Ai ÔlΆ É· jÇ$ :fÄÍÌŒ
.eÌI ±¼Nb¿ ÓĨ¿ Ai Ëe jÇ Ë ,eejŒkBI ÊfÄÃAfI Ë ÉNnÃAfI
É· eÌI lΆ iBÎnI É· ,ÔjÎNà Ó÷¼· ÔBVI AiË Ë ÓÄ· lÎÇj‚ ½ÀÈ¿ kA ɸÃE Árq Ë Ë eÌq iAfÎI eja fÄÍÌŒ Ó÷¼· Æ̆ Ë ,ejÍhƒI Ë eÌq Ê÷j« eja fÍE ÉN°Œ ½ÀÈ¿ Æ̆ fqBI ,#eÌJà ÌM OmËe ,eÌI OmËe ÌM ÅÀqe BI É· Ón·$ :fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ ,ejÍhƒÃ É· Ón· jÇ$ :É· fÄÍÌŒ Ë fÄÄ· iÌvZ¿ Ai ÅÍA jŒA Ë ,fÍE ÉN¯jÍh‚ Åbm /ÅÍA É· [162] ejÍhƒÃ eja ,#eÌJà OmËe ,ÅÀqe OmËe ˆÎÇ$ BÍ #eÌI ÅÀqe ,eÌI ÅÀqe OmËe
.fÃÌI ÅÎĆ ÉÀÇ É· OnÎà KUAË fÍÌŒ Ë
É· eÌJà ÆE ÆBrÍBI ÆfÍËjŒ KJm BM ÔjNà ifÃA pBγ ÔBÇ É¿÷f´¿ ifÃA ɸÃE ÁN°Ç Ë Êej· ÁμnM ÓqBI ÉN¯BÎà Æ̆ ,ÓIBÍ |δà Ai ÆBrÍA É· ÓqBI ÊfÎrÍfÃA ÅNrÍÌa É· ÓÃAfI É· ÔËjŒ ÊBNÃE .ÓqBI ÉN¯BÎà ÌM Ë eÌI |δà AjÃBrÍA É· eÌI É· - ÓqBI
.ÓN¯BÎà ÌM É· Éà ,eÌI |δà Ai ÆBrÍA /É· ÆeÌI fÍBrà [163]
D~~~~nishn~~~~meh part I: Logic
56
(h) Eighth is that you see to it that you have not made of the problem (or of
something whose meaning is the meaning of the problem) its own premise by having
changed the term. For example, it is said, “the reason that every moving [thing] must
have a mover is that nothing moves itself.” This premise and problem have the same
meaning.
(i) Ninth is that you see to it that you do not establish one thing by another thing
which [164] itself is established by [the first thing]. For example, someone says, “the
reason that the soul does not die is that it acts eternally.” If again it is asked, “Why does
it act eternally?”, it is answered, “because it does not die.”
(j) Tenth is that you guard against taking the widely-known or the [apprehensions
of the estimative faculty] in place of the truth; and that you keep the indications that have
been said, so that if the premise is primary or true it becomes evident, and if it is other it
becomes evident. Hence you will be busy with true [premises], whether a true [premise]
whose truth does not need an argument [165] or whether a true [premise] that has been
established by argument and syllogism. You will make that the premise of the syllogism,
for whenever you know the syllogism, know and employ demonstration, and keep these
directives, you cannot make an error or know that you do not know.
Peace be upon the one who follows the right path
This is the end of the book of logic that was spoken of.
Next we shall speak regarding the higher science, i.e., the divine science.
µñÄ¿ Á¼§ :ÅÎNnbà sbI - ÓÖݧ �¿BÄrÃAe
56
ÊfÎÃAejŒ ¥°» ɸÃAfI ÓqBI Êej¸Ã ÅNrÍÌa �¿÷f´¿ Ai ɼ×n¿ BM ÔjNÄI ɸÃE ÁNrÇË É¸ÃE jI ½Î»e$ :É· fÄÍÌŒ ɸÃBĆ .OmA ɼ×n¿ Á¸Y ÔË Á¸Y É· ÔlΆ BÍ ÓqBI ɼ×n¿ Ë É¿÷f´¿ ÅÍAË ,#fJÄVà eÌa lΆ ˆÎÇ É· OnÃE ,fÍBI ÊfÄÃBJÄU Ai ÊfÄJÄU jÇ
.fÃA Á¸Y �ÎI
fÇAÌa Omie ÔÌI / lΆ ÆE É· Óĸà Omie Ôl·I Ai ÔlΆ BM ÔjNÄI ɸÃE ÁÈÃ Ë [164] ÊfÄÄ· iB· ÁÍAe É· OnÃE ejÎÀà o°Ã ɸÃE jI ½Î»e$ :É·fÍÌŒ Ón· ɸÃBĆ .Æfq É· AjÍk$ :fÍÌŒ ,#?OmA ÊfÄÄ· iB· ÁÍAe Aj†$ :É· fÄmjƒI Æ̆ kBI Ë .#OmA
.#ejÎÀÃ
ÆE Ë ;ÓqBI ÉN¯jNà ÷µY ÔBVI Ai ÓÀÇË BÍ Ai ÔiÌÈr¿ É· ÔiAfÇBNà ɸÃE ÁÇe Ë fÍf‚ eÌI ÷µY BÍ eÌI Ó»÷ËA É¿÷f´¿ jŒA BM ,ÔiAe ÊBNà OmA Êf¿E ÉN°Œ É· BÈN¿Ý§ sδY É· Ó´Y ÓÇAÌa ,ÔÌq ¾Ì¬r¿ ÷µZI o‚ .fÍE fÍf‚ eÌI jNÍe jŒAË ,fÍE
�¿÷f´¿ Ai ÆE Ë .Omfq Omie pBγ Ë O÷VZI É· Ó´Y ÓÇAÌa /Ë fÍBJà O÷VY Ai [165] Ë ,ÔiAeiB¸I Ë ÉNnÃAfI ÆBÇjI Ë ,ÓqBI ÉNnÃAe pBγ É· ÊBŒjÇ É· ,ÓÄ· pBγ
.ÓÃAfà ɷ ÓÃAfI BÍ ÓÄ· Bña É· Æej· ÓÃAÌNà ,ÔiAe ÊBNà BÈN÷ÎuË ÅÍA
ÔfÈ»A ©JMA Å¿ Ó¼§ ÂÝn»AË
.f¿E ÉN°Œ É· µñÄ¿ LBN· jaE OnÄÍA .ÓÈ»A Á¼§ ÓÄ¨Í ,ÅÍjI Á¼§ ifÃA ÁÎÍÌŒ Åbm oƒm ÅÍkË